Stress Test Results

8/14/2019 Stress Test Results

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TheSupervisoryCapitalAssessmentProgram:

OverviewofResults

May7,2009

BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem


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1

TheSupervisoryCapitalAssessmentProgram:

OverviewofResults

May7,2009

I.IntroductionandSummaryAbankingorganizationholdscapitaltoguardagainstuncertainty. Capitalreassuresan

institutionsdepositors,creditorsandcounterpartiesandtheinstitutionitselfthataneventsuchasan

unexpectedsurgeinlossesoranunanticipateddeteriorationinearningswillnotimpairitsabilityto

engageinlendingtocreditworthyborrowersandprotectthesavingsofitsdepositors. Duringthis

periodofheightenedeconomicuncertainty,U.S.federalbankingsupervisorsbelievethatthelargest

U.S.bankholdingcompanies(BHCs)shouldhaveacapitalbuffersufficienttowithstandlossesandallow

themtomeetthecreditneedsoftheircustomersinamoresevererecessionthanisanticipated. For

thisreason,theFederalReserveandotherbanksupervisorsembarkedonacomprehensive

simultaneousassessment

of

the

capital

held

by

the

19

largest

U.S.

BHCs

in

February

of

this

year.

ThisunprecedentedexerciseknownastheSupervisoryCapitalAssessmentProgram(SCAP)

allowedsupervisorstomeasurehowmuchofanadditionalcapitalbuffer,ifany,eachinstitutionwould

needtoestablishtodaytoensurethatitwouldhavesufficientcapitaliftheeconomyweakensmore

thanexpected. ThoseBHCsneedingtoaugmenttheircapitalcomingoutofthisassessmentwillhavea

monthtodesignadetailedplan,subjecttosupervisoryapproval,forthestepstheywilltaketoputthe

SCAPbufferinplace,andthenimplementthatplanbyearlyNovemberofthisyear.

TheunprecedentednatureoftheSCAP,togetherwiththeextraordinaryeconomicandfinancial

conditionsthatprecipitatedit,hasledsupervisorstotaketheunusualstepofpublicallyreportingthe

findingsofthissupervisoryexercise. Thedecisiontodepartfromthestandardpracticeofkeeping

examinationinformationconfidentialstemmedfromthebeliefthatgreaterclarityaroundtheSCAPprocessandfindingswillmaketheexercisemoreeffectiveatreducinguncertaintyandrestoring

confidenceinourfinancialinstitutions.Tothisend,adetailedwhitepaperontheSCAPdataand

methodologywasreleasedonApril24th.1 Thiscompanionpaperreportsforeachofthe19institutions

individuallyandintheaggregatetheSCAPestimatesoflossesandlossratesacrossselectcategoriesof

loansandsecurities;theresourcesavailabletoabsorbthoselosses;andtheresultingnecessarycapital

buffers.

ThereareanumberofpointstokeepinmindwheninterpretingtheSCAPfindings:

Theestimatesreportedherearethoseoftheteamsofsupervisors,economists,andanalyststhatconductedthisexercise,andtheymayormaynotlineupwithwhatthefirmsthemselvesor

externalanalysts

and

researchers

might

have

produced,

even

using

asimilar

set

of

basic

assumptions. Theseestimatesbenefitfromtheinputofextremelydetailedinformation

collectedfromeachofthe19BHCs,theextensivereviewandanalysisofthatinformationbythe

1BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem(2009)TheSupervisoryCapitalAssessmentProgram: Design

andImplementationwhitepaper(WashingtonDC:BoardofGovernors,April24).

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20090424a.htm.


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2

SCAPteams,andthejudgmentofsupervisorsandotherexperts. Thebreadthanddepthofthe

resourcesbroughttobearinformulatingtheseestimatesareunparalleled.

Theestimatesarenotforecastsorexpectedoutcomes;theyaretheproductsofatwoyearaheadwhatifexerciseconductedundertwoalternativemacroscenarios. Roughlyspeaking,

thefirstscenarioreferredtoasthebaselinewasanassumedpathfortheeconomythat

followedthethencurrentconsensusforecast,andthesecondthemoreadversescenario

wasadeeperandmoreprotracteddownturnthantheconsensus. Notonlyisitvirtuallycertain

thattheeconomywillnotevolveinlockstepwitheitherofthesescenarios,buttherewerealso

otherfactorsthathadtobeassumedconstantforthepurposeofconductingthisexercise,and

anyofthosefactorscouldchangemateriallyfromwhatwasimplicitlyorexplicitlyassumedin

thisprocess.

TheSCAPwasadeliberatelystringenttest. ItwasdesignedtoaccountforthehighlyuncertainfinancialandeconomicconditionsbyidentifyingtheextenttowhichaBHCisvulnerabletoday

toaweakerthanexpectedeconomyinthefuture. ByensuringthattheselargeBHCshavea

capitalbuffernowthatisrobusttoarangeofeconomicoutcomes,thisexercisecountersthe

riskthat

uncertainty

itself

exerts

contractionary

pressures

on

the

banking

system

and

the

economy. Intheeventtheeconomyweakensmorethanexpected,thefirmswillhaveadequate

capital;intheeventtheeconomyfollowstheexpectedpath,oranevenstrongerpath,thefirms

willstillbeviewedasstrongertodayforhavinghigherlevelsofcapitalinanuncertainworld.

TheSCAPfocusednotonlyontheamountofcapitalbutalsoonthecompositionofcapitalheldbyeachofthe19BHCs. Thatis,SCAPassessedtheleveloftheTier1riskbasedcapitalratioand

theproportionofTier1capitalthatiscommonequity.2 TheSCAPsemphasisonwhatistermed

Tier1Commoncapitalreflectsthefactthatcommonequityisthefirstelementofthecapital

structuretoabsorblosses,offeringprotectiontomoreseniorpartsofthecapitalstructureand

loweringtheriskofinsolvency. Allelseequal,moreTier1CommoncapitalgivesaBHCgreater

permanentloss

absorption

capacity

and

agreater

ability

to

conserve

resources

under

stress

by

changingtheamountandtimingofdividendsandotherdistributions.Todeterminethesizeof

theSCAPbufferforeachfirm,supervisorsusedtheirestimatesofeachfirmslossesand

resourcesforthemoreadversescenariotoanswerthefollowingtwoquestions:

o Iftheeconomyfollowsthemoreadversescenario,howmuchadditionalTier1capitalwouldaninstitutionneedtodaytobeabletohaveaTier1riskbasedratioinexcessof6

percentatyearend2010?

o Iftheeconomyfollowsthemoreadversescenario,howmuchadditionalTier1CommoncapitalwouldaninstitutionneedtodaytohaveaTier1Commoncapitalrisk

basedratioinexcessof4percentatyearend2010?

2Tier1capital,asdefinedintheBoardsRiskBasedCapitalAdequacyGuidelines,iscomposedofcommonand

noncommonequityelements,someofwhicharesubjecttolimitsontheirinclusioninTier1capital. See12CFR

part225,AppendixA,II.A.1.Theseelementsincludecommonstockholdersequity,qualifyingperpetual

preferredstock,certainminorityinterests,andtrustpreferredsecurities. Certainintangibleassets,including

goodwillanddeferredtaxassets,aredeductedfromTier1capitalorareincludedsubjecttolimits.See12CFRpart

225,AppendixA,II.B.


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3

TheSCAPbufferdoesnotrepresentanewcapitalstandardandisnotexpectedtobemaintainedonanongoingbasis. Instead,thatcapitalisavailabletohelpBHCsabsorblargerthanexpected

futurelosses,shouldtheyoccur,andtosupporttheBHCsabilitytoservetheircustomers,

includinglendingtocreditworthyborrowersduringtheeconomicdownturn.

TheresultsoftheSCAPsuggestthatiftheeconomyweretotrackthemoreadversescenario,

lossesat

the

19

firms

during

2009

and

2010

could

be

$600

billion.

The

bulk

of

the

estimated

losses

approximately$455billioncomefromlossesontheBHCsaccrualloanportfolios,particularlyfrom

residentialmortgagesandotherconsumerrelatedloans. Theestimatedtwoyearcumulativelosseson

totalloansunderthemoreadversescenariois9.1percentatthe19participatingBHCs;forcomparison,

thistwoyearrateishigherthanduringthehistoricalpeaklossyearsofthe1930s. Estimatedpossible

lossesfromtradingrelatedexposuresandsecuritiesheldininvestmentportfoliostotaled$135billion.

Incombinationwiththelossesalreadyrecognizedbythesefirmssincemid2007,largelyfromcharge

offsandwritedownsonthevaluesofsecurities,theSCAPresultssuggestfinancialcrisisrelatedlosses

atthesefirms,iftheeconomyweretofollowthemoreadversescenario,couldtotalnearly$950billion

bytheendof2010.

Thepotential

losses

facing

these

19

firms

have

to

be

weighed

against

the

potential

resources

availabletothemtoabsorbthoselosses. Atyearend2008,capitalratiosatall19BHCsexceeded

minimumregulatorycapitalstandards,inmanycasesbysubstantialmargins,andmostmetsupervisory

expectationsonthecompositionofcapital. Tier1capitalatthesefirmstotaledabout$835billioninQ4

2008. ThepracticalimplicationofthiscapitalisthatmanyoftheBHCsalreadyhadsubstantialcapital

buffersinplacetoabsorbtheirshareoftheestimated$600billionoflosses. Inaddition,bankswill

realizerevenuesfromongoingbusinessestoabsorblosses,thoughatalowerlevelintheweak

economicconditionsofthestressscenariothaninthebaseline. However,someofthoserevenueswill

needtogointobuildingloanlossreservesagainstcreditproblemsin2011.

Aftertakingaccountoflosses,revenuesandreservebuildrequirements,intheaggregate,these

firmsneedtoadd$185billiontocapitalbufferstoreachthetargetSCAPcapitalbufferattheendof

2010underthemoreadversescenario. Therearetwoimportantthingstonoteaboutthisestimate.

First,the$185billionaccruesto10ofthe19firms,meaning9ofthe19firmsalreadyhavecapital

bufferssufficienttogetthroughtheadversescenarioinexcessof6percentTier1capitaland4percent

Tier1Commoncapital. Second,thevastmajorityofthis$185billioncomesfromashortfallinTier1

Commoncapitalinthemoreadversescenario,withvirtuallynoshortfallinoverallTier1capital. This

resultmeansthatwhilenearlyallthefirmshavesufficientTier1capitaltoabsorbtheunusuallyhigh

lossesofthemoreadversescenarioandstillend2010withaTier1riskbasedratioinexcessof6

percent,10ofthesefirmshadcapitalstructuresthataretoostronglytiltedtowardcapitalotherthan

commonequity. Thus,eachofthe10firmsneedingtoaugmenttheircapitalasaresultofthisexercise

mustdosobyincreasingtheirTier1Commoncapital.

The$185

billion

estimated

additional

capital

buffers

correspond

to

the

estimate

that

would

haveappliedattheendof2008. Butanumberofthesefirmshaveeithercompletedorcontractedfor

assetsalesorrestructuredexistingcapitalinstrumentssincetheendof2008inwaysthatincreasedtheir

Tier1Commoncapital. TheseactionssubstantiallyreducedthefinalSCAPbuffer. Inaddition,thepre

provisionnetrevenuesofmanyofthefirmsexceededwhatwasassumedinthemoreadversescenario

byalmost$20B,allowingthemtobuildtheircapitalbases. Theeffectsofthesetransactionsand

revenuesrenderedtheadditionalcapitalneededtoestablishtheSCAPbufferequalto$75billion.


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4

Asmentionedabove,anyBHCneedingtoaugmentitscapitalbufferwillberequiredtodevelop

adetailedcapitalplantobeapprovedbyitsprimarysupervisor,afterconsultationwiththeFDICandthe

Treasury,overthenext30days,andtoimplementthatplaninthenextsixmonths. BHCsare

encouragedtodesigncapitalplansthat,whereverpossible,activelyseektoraisenewcapitalfrom

privatesources. Theseplanscanalsoincludeactionssuchasrestructuringcurrentcapitalinstruments,

salesofassets,andrestrictionsondividendsandstockrepurchases,andwillhavebenchmarksforfirms

toachieveinspecifiedtimeframes.

SomefirmsmaychoosetoapplytotheU.S.TreasuryforMandatoryConvertiblePreferred

(MCP)underitsCapitalAssistanceProgram(CAP)asabridgetoprivatecapitalinthefuture. MCPcan

serveasasourceofcontingentcommoncapitalforthefirm,convertibleintocommonequitywhenand

ifneededtomeetsupervisoryexpectationsregardingtheamountandcompositionofcapital. In

addition,theTreasurywillconsiderrequeststoexchangeoutstandingpreferredsharessoldunderthe

CapitalPurchaseProgram(CPP)orTargetedInvestmentProgram(TIP)fornewMCP. The19firmshave

U.S.Treasurypreferredequitysecuritiesof$216billion.

Strongbankswithamplecapitalareessentialforarobusteconomy. Bymakingacareful

evaluationof

the

potential

vulnerabilities

of

the

largest

19

U.S.

BHCswhich

together

hold

two

thirds

of

assetsandmorethanonehalfoftheloansintheU.S.bankingsystemtheSCAPwillhelptoensurethe

strengthoftheU.S.bankingsector. TheSCAPisalsoanimportantcomplementtotheU.S.Treasurys

supportoftheU.S.bankingsystem,andhelpstoprotectthetaxpayersinvestmentsinU.S.financial

institutions. Bothoftheseprograms,byincreasingthequantityandqualityofcapitalheldbylargeU.S.

BHCs,willhelpreduceuncertaintyabouttheimpactofpotentiallosses,andallowtheU.S.banking

systemtoplayitsroleinsupportingastronger,faster,andmoresustainableeconomicrecovery.

II.SCAPLossandResourceProjectionsTheparticipatingBHCswereaskedtoestimatetheirpotentiallossesonloans,securities,and

tradingpositions,aswellaspreprovisionnetrevenue(PPNR)andtheresourcesavailablefromthe

allowanceforloanandleaselosses(ALLL)undertwoalternativemacroeconomicscenarios. Theseestimateswerereviewedandanalyzedbysupervisorsandthenevaluatedagainstindependent

benchmarksdevelopedbysupervisorstoarriveatthesupervisorslossestimates. Carewastakento

ensurethatthelossandresourceestimatesreflectedtheriskandbusinesslinesofeachBHC,andthat

theywereconsistentwiththemacroeconomicenvironmentspecifiedinthetwoeconomicscenarios,

especiallyforthemoreadversescenariothatformsthebasisofthecapitalbuffercalculations. This

sectionreportstheresultsofthisprocess,firstinaggregateforthe19participatingBHCsandthenfor

individualfirms.

II.A.LossandResourceEstimatesbyBHCs

Eachparticipating

BHC

was

instructed

to

estimate

potential

losses

on

its

loan,

investment

securities,andtradingportfolios,includingoffbalancesheetcommitmentsandcontingentliabilitiesand

exposures,overthetwoyearhorizonbeginningwithyearend2008financialstatementdata. Forloans,

theBHCswereinstructedtoestimateforwardlooking,undiscountedcreditlossesthatis,lossesdueto

failuretopayobligations(cashflowlosses)ratherthandiscountsrelatedtomarktomarketvalues.

Toguideestimation,thefirmswereprovidedwithacommonsetofindicativelossraterangesfor

specificloancategoriesunderconditionsofthebaselineandthemoreadverseeconomicscenarios(see


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5

table1). Firmswereallowedtodivergefromtheindicativelossrateswheretheycouldprovide

evidencethattheirestimatedlossrateswereappropriate.

Theindicativelossraterangeswerederivedusingavarietyofmethodsforpredictingloan

losses,including

analysis

of

historical

loss

experience

at

large

BHCs

and

quantitative

models

relating

the

performanceofloansorgroupsofloanstomacroeconomicvariables. Supervisorsviewedthese

indicativerangesasusefulindicatorsofindustrylossratesandinthatwaytheycanserveasageneral

guide,butrecognizedthattheymightnotadequatelycapturedifferencesacrossindividualfirmsthat

couldaffecttheperformanceandlossesinsignificantways. Thus,supervisorsaskedfirmstoprovide

granulardataabouttheparticularcharacteristicsoftheirportfoliosinordertomakemoretailored

quantitativeassessmentsofloss. LossestimatesfortheSCAPthusreliedultimatelyonfirmspecific

informationaboutfactorssuchaspastperformance,originationyear,borrowercharacteristics,and

geographicdistribution.

II.B.AggregateLossEstimates

Thetwoyearlossestimatestotalcloseto$600billioninthemoreadversescenarioforthe19

BHCs(table2). EstimatedSCAPlossesonresidentialmortgagesaresubstantialoverthetwoyear

scenario,consistentwiththesharpdropinresidentialhousepricesinthepasttwoyearsandtheir

projectedcontinuedsteepfallinthemoreadversescenario. Expectedlossratesonfirstliensand

second/juniorliensarewelloutsidethehistoricalexperienceofcommercialbanks. Theeffectsof

reducedhomepricesonhouseholdwealthandtheindirecteffectsthroughreducedeconomicactivity,

alsopushupestimatedlossesonconsumercredit,includinglossesoncreditcardsandonother

consumerloans. Together,residentialmortgagesandconsumerloans(includingcreditcardandother

Baseline MoreAdverse

FirstLienMortgages 56 78.5

Prime 1.52.5 34

AltA 7.59.5 9.513

Subprime 1520 2128

Second/JuniorLienMortgages 912 1216

ClosedendJuniorLiens 1820 2225

HELOCs 68 811

C&ILoans 34 58

CRE 5

7.5 9

12

Construction 812 1518

Multifamily 3.56.5 1011

Nonfarm,Nonresidential 45 79

CreditCards 1217 1820

OtherConsumer 46 812

OtherLoans 24 410

Table1:IndicativeLossRatesProvidedtoBHCsforSCAP(cumulativetwoyear,inpercent)


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6

consumerloans,notshown)accountfor$322billion,or70percentoftheloanlossesprojectedunder

themoreadversescenario.3 Estimatedlossratesoncommercialrealestateloans,especiallythose

relatedtolanddevelopment,alsoareelevatedinthemoreadversescenario,reflectingrealizedand

projectedsubstantialdeclinesinrealestatevalues. Forcommercialandindustrialloans,estimatedloss

ratesarewithintherangeofthoseexperiencedinbusinessdownturnsinpastrecentrecessions.

Intotal,theestimatedloanlossratesunderthemoreadversescenarioareveryhighby

historicalstandards. Thetwoyearcumulativelossrateontotalloansequals9.1percentinthemore

3Someoftheselosseshavealreadybeentaken,however,intheformofdiscountsonimpairedloansacquired

duringmergers. Thesediscountsreducefutureestimatedcreditlossesonresidentialmortgageandconsumer

loansbyapproximately$57billion,whichwasincorporatedwhencalculatingtheadditionalcapitalfortheSCAP

buffer.

AtDecember31,2008 $Billions

Tier1Capital 836.7

Tier1CommonCapital 412.5

RiskWeightedAssets 7,814.8

Estimatedfor2009and2010fortheMoreAdverseScenario $Billions As%ofLoans

TotalEstimatedLosses(Beforepurchaseaccountingadjustments) 599.2

FirstLienMortgages 102.3 8.8%

Second/JuniorLienMortgages 83.2 13.8%

CommercialandIndustrialLoans 60.1 6.1%

CommercialRealEstateLoans 53.0 8.5%

CreditCardLoans 82.4 22.5%

Securities(AFSandHTM) 35.2 na

Trading&Counterparty 99.3 na

Other(1) 83.7 na

Memo:PurchaseAccountingAdjustments 64.3

ResourcesOther

Than

Capital

to

Absorb

Losses

in

the

More

Adverse

Scenario

(2)

362.9

SCAPBufferAddedforMoreAdverseScenario

(SCAPbufferisdefinedasadditionalTier1Common/contingentCommon)

IndicatedSCAPBufferasofDecember31,2008 185.0

Less:CapitalActionsandEffectsofQ12009Results(3)(4) 110.4

SCAPBuffer(5) 74.6

(1)Includesotherconsumerandnonconsumerloansandmiscellaneouscommitmentsandobligations

Note:Numbersmaynotsumduetorounding

(2)Resourcestoabsorblossesincludepreprovisionnetrevenuelessthechangeintheallowanceforloanandleaselosses

(5)TheremaybeaneedtoestablishanadditionalTier1capitalbuffer,butthiswouldbesatisfiedbytheadditionalTier1Commoncapitalbuffer

unlessotherwisespecifiedforaparticularBHC

(3)CapitalactionsincludecompletedorcontractedtransactionssinceQ42008

Table2:SupervisoryCapitalAssessmentProgram

AggregateResultsfor19ParticipatingBankHoldingCompaniesfortheMoreAdverseScenario

Theestimatesbelowrepresentahypothetical'whatif'scenariothatinvolvesaneconomicoutcomethatismoreadversethan

expected. Theseestimatesarenotforecastsofexpectedlossesorrevenues.

MoreAdverseScenario

(4)TotalincludesonlycapitalactionsandeffectsofQ12009resultsforfirmsthatneedtoestablishaSCAPbuffer


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7

adversescenario. AsshowninFigure1,thislossrateishigherthantwoyearlossratesobservedfor

U.S.commercialbanksfrom1920to2007/2008. Inadditiontothesharpesttwoyeardropinresidential

housepricessincethen,andaprojectedfurthersteepdeclineinthewhatifadversescenario,therisein

theunemploymentrateinthescenariowouldbemoreseverethananyU.S.recessionsincethe1930s.4

Table2alsoreportsaggregateprojectionsforlossesonsecuritiesheldintheavailableforsale

(AFS)andheldtomaturity(HTM)investmentportfoliosand,forBHCswithtradingaccountassets

exceeding$100billion,lossesontradingandcounterpartycreditrisklosses. Theselossesrepresenta

significantshareofthetotal.

ToevaluatelossesforsecuritiesintheAFSandHTMportfolios,supervisorsfocusedonsecurities

subjectto

credit

risk.

At

the

end

of

2008,

the

19

BHCs

held

$1.5

trillion

of

securities,

more

than

one

half

ofwhichwereTreasury,agencies,orsovereignsecurities,orhighgrademunicipaldebt,andsoare

subjecttonoorlimitedcreditrisk. Onlyabout$200billionwasinnonagencymortgagebacked

securities(MBS)andonlyaportionofthesewererecentvintageorwerebackedbyriskiernonprime

mortgages. Remainingmaterialexposuresincludedcorporatebonds,mutualfunds,andotherasset

backedsecurities. Forsecuritizedassets,supervisorsassessedifthesecuritywouldbecomeimpaired

duringitslifetime. Ifthecurrentlevelofcreditsupportwasconsideredinsufficienttocoverexpected

losses,thesecuritywaswrittendowntofairvaluewithacorrespondingotherthantemporary

impairment(OTTI)charge,equaltothedifferencebetweenbookandmarketvalue. TheseOTTI

chargesequaled$35billioninthemoreadversescenario,withalmostonehalfoftheestimatedlosses

comingfromthenonagencyMBS.5

4AnotherreferencefortheestimatedlossratesintheSCAPiswheretheystandrelativetoestimatesmade

recentlybyotheranalysts. Unfortunately,manyofthelossestimatesarenotdirectlycomparablebecausethey

arefordifferenttimehorizons(forexample,lifetimelosses)orarebasedondifferenteconomicscenarios.

However,basedonassessmentsthatwecanmakewiththeavailableinformation,theSCAPestimatesappearto

beaboutinthemiddleoftherangeoftheseotherestimates.5Torecognizelossesinthemoreadversescenario,supervisorschoseaconservativeapproach.Financial

AccountingStandardsBoard(FASB)StaffPositionFAS1152andFAS1242,RecognitionandPresentationofOther

ThanTemporaryImpairments, April9,2009,regardsdebtsecuritiesheldintheAFSandHTMaccountsand

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1921

1926

1931

1936

1941

1946

1951

1956

1961

1966

1971

1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

2001

2006

Percent

Figure 1: Commercial Bank Two-Year Loan Loss Rates1921 - 2008

SCAP Total Loan Loss Rates = 9.1%

Sources: International Monetary Fund (1920 - 1933), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1934 - 2007), and commercial bank reports on condition and income (2008)


9/38

8

Inaddition,firmswithtradingassetsof$100billionormorewereaskedtoestimatepotential

tradingrelatedmarketandcounterpartycreditlossesunderamarketstressscenarioprovidedbythe

supervisors,basedontheseveremarketshocksthatoccurredinthesecondhalfof2008. Theestimated

lossesfromtradingrelatedexposuresweresubstantial,closeto$100billionacrossthefivefirmsto

whichitwasapplied. Theprimarydriversofpotentialstresslosseswereprivateequityholdings,other

creditsensitivetradingpositions,andpossiblelossesstemmingfromcounterpartycreditexposurestooverthecounter(OTC)derivativestradingcounterparties. Thepossiblelossesfromcounterpartycredit

exposuresweremeasuredusingcreditvaluationadjustmentmethodsbasedonstressedexposurelevels

andexpecteddeteriorationofthecreditworthinessofcounterpartiesunderthemoreadversescenario.

Thetotallossestimateof$600billionforthe19BHCsisinadditiontothesubstantiallossesthat

havealreadybeentakenbythesefirmsinthepastcoupleofyears.6 Thatis,theforwardlookinglosses

intheSCAPdonotincludethelossesthathavealreadyoccurredsincetheassetswereoriginatedand

arealreadyreflectedinthefirmsbalancesheets. Lossestakeninthesixquartersthroughtheendof

2008bythesefirmsandfirmstheyacquiredaresubstantial,estimatedatapproximately$400billion.

Theyincludechargeoffs,writedownsonsecuritiesheldinthetradingandintheinvestmentaccounts,

anddiscounts

on

assets

acquired

in

acquisitions

of

distressed

or

failed

financial

institutions.

As

an

offset,about$65billioninthesemergerrelateddiscountsarecapturedintheSCAPlossprojections(the

socalledpurchaseaccountingadjustments)whichreflectthatasubstantialpartofestimatedlosseson

theassetspurchasedwerealreadyrecorded. Thus,amorecomprehensivemeasureoflossestotalsat

least$935billionforthe19participatingBHCsinthemoreadversescenario.7

II.C.FirmlevelLossEstimates

Asdiscussedearlier,theSCAPlossestimatesweremadeusingconsiderablefirmspecificdata

abouttheriskandlikelyfutureperformanceoftheportfolios. Becausetheexercisemadeextensiveuse

ofthisinformation,theresultinglossratesvarysignificantlyacrossBHCs. Table3summarizesthe

results

for

each

of

the

19

BHCs

that

participated

in

the

SCAP.

The

table

reports

loss

amounts

and

loss

rates,alongwithprojectionsofresourcestoabsorblosses,andtotalcapitalneedateachinstitution.

Theappendixcontainsseparatetablesforeachofthe19BHCs.

focusesonwhetherfirmsintendtosellanimpairedsecurityorwhether itismorelikelythannotthatfirmswillbe

requiredtosellthesecuritybeforerecoveryofitscostbasis. Ifeitheroftheseconditionsismet,thefirmmust

recognizeOTTI.TheFASBsguidanceholdsthatafirmsdeterminationofitsabilitytoholdasecuritytorecovery

shouldconsidersourcesofuncertainty. Supervisorsbelieveditprudenttoincorporatethepossibilitythatfirms

maynotbeabletoholdasecuritytorecoveryunderconditionsmorestressfulthanexpected. Thusforthose

securitiesestimatedorrecommendedbysupervisorstobeotherthantemporarilyimpaired,thelosswasequalto

thedifference

between

the

investments

amortized

cost

basis

and

its

fair

value.

6Pastlosses,however,arerecognizedinthestartingregulatorycapitallevelsusedtocalculatetheSCAPcapital

buffer,asdiscussedinthenextsectionofthepaper.7TheselossesarenotfulllifetimelossesbecausetheSCAPlossprojectionsareforatwoyearforwardhorizonand

thusdonotcapturelossesoccurringbeyondtheendof2010. However,giventheprofileofthemoreadverse

scenario,whichincludesareturntopositiverealGDPgrowthwithinthetwoyears,thishorizonseemslikelyto

capturealargeportionoflossesfrompositionsheldasoftheendof2008. Theimpactofsomelossesafter2010is

alsocapturedintheoverallSCAPexercisethroughthecalculationofyearend2010reserves,whicharecalibrated

tobesufficienttocoverprojected2011losses.


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10

Figure2showstheratiooftotalestimatedtwoyearlossestoyearend2008riskweighted

assets(RWA)inthemoreadversescenarioforthe19participatingBHCs. Clearly,thereissubstantial

variationacrossfirmsinthesizeofestimatedlossesrates,reflectingdifferencesinbusinesslinesand

assetquality. ThemedianlosstoRWAratioequals7.5percent,andtheratiorangesfrom3.0percent

to11.8percentacrossthefirms. Theseestimatesarenotforecastsofexpectedlosses,butare

estimatesoflossesthatwouldoccurundereconomicconditionsmorestressedthananticipated. HigherlossestimatesdonotnecessarilyimplyaneedformorecapitaltomeettheSCAPbuffer,assomefirms

willalsohavehigherestimatedresourcesandcapital.

Thenextfivechartsillustrateselectedlossratesbyloantypeacrossthe19BHCs. Lossratesare

calculatedascumulative,twoyearlossesdividedbybeginningofperiodloanbalances.Thelossrates

donotreflectadjustmentstorecognizewritedownsofloanportfoliosacquiredduringmergers. The

chartsalsoshowthemedianlossrateacrossthefirms.

Aswithoveralllosses,therearesignificantdifferencesinlossratesbyloantypeacrossBHCs.

Forexample,whilethemediantwoyearlossrateonfirstlienmortgageswas8percentacrossthe15

BHCswithamaterialamountofmortgages,theratesvariedfromalowof3.4percenttoahighofnearly

12percent. Forsecondandjuniorlienmortgages,therangeamong14BHCswas6percentto21

percent,and

amedian

rate

of

about

13

percent.

Such

variation

reflects

substantial

differences

in

the

portfoliosacrosstheBHCs,byborrowercharacteristicssuchasFICOscores,andloancharacteristicssuch

asloantovalueratio,yearoforigination,andgeography. Thesedifferencesresultinsignificant

variationinlossestimatesatthefirmlevelascomparedwithapplyingasinglelossrateperasset

categorytoallBHCs.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

AmEx

BofA

BB&T

BNYM

CapitalOne

Citi

FifthThird

GMAC

Goldman

JPMC

KeyCorp

Metlife

MorganStanley

PNC

Regions

StateStreet

SunTrust

USB

Wells

Percent

Figure2:SupervisorEstimatesofTotalLossestoRiskWeightedAssets

forMoreAdverseScenario

Median= 7.5%


12/38

11

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

AmEx

BofA

BB&T

BNYM

CapitalOne

Citi

FifthThird

GMAC

Goldman

JPMC

Ke

yCorp

M

etlife

MorganStanley

PNC

Re

gions

StateStreet

Sun

Trust

USB

Wells

Percent

Figure3:SupervisorEstimatesofFirstLienMortgageLoanLossRates*


Median= 8.0%

*IncludesPrime,AltA,andSubPrimemortgages

0

5

10

15

20

25

AmEx

BofA

BB&T

BNYM

CapitalOne

Citi

FifthThird

GMAC

Goldman

JPMC

KeyCorp

Metlife

MorganStanley

PNC

Regions

StateStreet

SunTrust

USB

Wells

Percent

Figure4: SupervisorEstimatesofSecondLienMortgageLoanLossRates*


Median= 13.3%

*Includes

closed

end

junior

liens

and

HELOCs


13/38

12

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

AmEx

BofA

BB&T

B

NYM

Capita

lOne

Citi

Fifth

Third

G

MAC

Goldman

JPMC

KeyCorp

M

etlife

MorganStanley

PNC

Re

gions

StateS

treet

Sun

Trust

USB

Wells

Percent

Figure5: SupervisorEstimatesofCommercialRealEstateLoanLossRates*


Median= 10.6%

*Includesconstruction,multifamily, andnonfarm/nonresidential

0

5

10

15

20

25

AmEx

BofA

BB&T

BNYM

CapitalOne

Citi

FifthThird

GMAC

Goldman

JPMC

KeyCorp

Metlife

M

organStanley

PNC

Regions

StateStreet

SunTrust

USB

Wells

Percent

Figure6:SupervisorEstimatesofCommercial&IndustrialLoanLossRates


Median= 5.8%


14/38


15/38

14

III.TheSCAPCapitalBufferMinimumcapitalstandardsforaBHCareintendedtoserveonlyasaguideforsupervisorsin

determiningtheadequacyoftheBHCscapitalrelativetoitsriskprofile. Inpractice,supervisorsexpect

allBHCstohavealevelandcompositionofTier1capitalwellinexcessofthe4percentregulatory

minimum,andalsotohavevotingcommonstockholdersequityasthedominantelementofTier1

capital. Inthisregard,theuseofTier1CommoncapitalintheSCAPisconsistentwiththeBoardslong

held

belief

that

common

equity

should

be

the

dominant

form

of

Tier

1

Capital.

8

Under

the

SCAP,

supervisorsevaluatedtheextenttowhicheachofthe19BHCswouldneedtoaltereithertheamountor

thecomposition(orboth)ofitsTier1capitaltodaytobeabletoexceedminimumregulatory

requirementsinQ42010,evenunderanunexpectedlyadverseeconomicoutcome.

Specifically,theSCAPcapitalbufferforeachBHCissizedtoachieveaTier1riskbasedratioofat

least6percentandaTier1Commoncapitalratioofatleast4percentattheendof2010underthe

moreadversemacroeconomicscenario. ByfocusingonTier1CommoncapitalaswellasTier1capital,

theSCAPemphasizedboththeamountofaBHCscapitalandthecompositionofitscapitalstructure.

OncetheSCAPupfrontbufferisestablished,thenormalsupervisoryprocesswillcontinuetobeusedto

determinewhetherafirmscurrentcapitalratiosareconsistentwithregulatoryguidance.

Byits

design,

the

SCAP

is

more

stringent

than

asolvency

test.

Each

BHCs

capital

was

rigorously

evaluatedagainstatwoyearaheadadversescenariothatisnotapredictionoranexpectedoutcome

fortheeconomy,butisinsteadawhatifscenario. Thus,anyneedforadditionalcapitaland/ora

changeincompositionofcapitaltomeettheSCAPbufferbuildsinextracapitalagainsttheunlikely

8Tier1CommoncapitaliscalculatedasTier1capitallessnoncommonelements,includingqualifyingperpetual

preferredstock,qualifyingminorityinterestinsubsidiaries,andqualifyingtrustpreferredsecurities.

2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

A

mEx

BofA

B

B&T

BNYM

CapitalOne

Citi

FifthThird

GMAC

Gold

man

J

PMC

KeyCorp

Me

tlife

MorganSta

nley

PNC

Reg

ions

StateStreet

SunTrust

USB

W

ells

Percent

Figure8:SupervisorEstimatesofResourcestoAbsorbLossestoRisk

WeightedAssetsforMoreAdverseScenario

Median= 4.9%

*Resourcestoabsorblossesincludepreprovisionnetrevenuelesschanges inALLL


16/38

15

eventtheadversescenariomaterializesand,inthatwayitmayhelptopreventthatadverseeventfrom

occurring.

TheillustrationbelowshowshowthebufferworksforahypotheticalBHCneedingtoaugment

itscapitalattheendoftheSCAP. ThelefthandsideoftheexhibitshowstheBHCsinitialcapitallevel

uponthecompletionoftheSCAPonMay7anditscapitallevelafteritbuildstheSCAPbufferoverthe

sixmonthsfromMay7toNovember9.MuchlikethestressassessmentexerciseundertakenintheSCAP,therighthandsideoftheexhibitshowswhatwouldhappentotheBHCscapitalundertwo

alternativescenariosforthemacroeconomy. Intheexpected,orbaseline,scenario,theBHCwouldend

theperiodwithevenhighercapitallevelsthatarewellaboveregulatoryminimums,whileintheworse

thanexpected,ormoreadversescenario,theBHCwouldendtheperiodwithcapitalnearorslightly

aboveappropriatelevels.

Thepresenceofthisonetimebufferwillgivemarketparticipants,aswellasthefirms

themselves,confidenceinthecapacityofthemajorBHCstoperformtheirvitalroleinlendingevenif

theeconomyprovesweakerthanexpected.

IV.CalculationofAdditionalCapitaltoBuildSCAPBufferTocalculatetheamountofadditionalcapitaltobuildtheSCAPbuffer,supervisorsbeganwith

estimatesofcreditandtradinglossesfromPPNRandALLLtoestimatethepretaxchangetoretained

earnings.9 Pretaxchangestoretainedearningswereallocatedtoanaftertaxportionandataxrelated

portionusinga35percentaveragetaxrate. Thetaxrelatedportionofanylosseswasappliedtothe

9IfanalysisindicatedthattheALLLcouldbeloweratQ42010thanitwasatQ42008,thenthecommensurate

reservereleasewasaddedtopreprovisionnetrevenueasanadditionallossabsorbingresource.

7May2009 9Nov2009 BaselineScenario MoreAdverseScenario

SCAPBufferHelpsEnsureAppropriateBankCapital

intheMoreAdverseScenario

InitialCapital and SCAPBuffer PossibleFutureOutcomes

SCAP

Buffer

Appropriate

CapitalLevels


17/38

16

stockoftotaldeferredtaxassetstoestimatetheproformavalue,inaccordancewithexistingcapital

rules. Finally,aftertaxchangestoretainedearningswerecombinedwithprojectedpreferreddividend

paymentstoestimatethechangeinequitycapitalandproformaequitycapitalforyearend2010.10 Pro

formariskweightedassetsweredefinedasRWAfrom4Q2008plusanyassetsbroughtontothe

balancesheetinaccordancewithFAS140.11

ABHC

was

considered

to

require

an

additional

SCAP

buffer

if

its

pro

forma

Tier

1ratio

was

below6percentorifitsproformaTier1Commonratiowasbelow4percentattheendof2010. For

manyfirms,ifabufferwasrequiredtomeettheTier1Commoncapitalratioof4percent,theadditional

commonorcontingentcommonequitythatwouldberaisedwouldbesufficienttobringitsTier1ratio

toorabove6percent.

Theinitialsupplementalcapitalbufferestimatesarebasedonyearend2008capitalandrisk

weightedassets,adjustedforFAS140. Theseestimatesthusdonotreflectdevelopmentsaffectingthe

firmscapitalpositionsandcorporatestructuresincetheendoftheyear. Tocapturetheseeffects,the

estimatesfortheinitialcapitalbufferswereadjustedtoreflectcertaincapitalactions,representinga

directincreaseordecreaseinthedeterminationofcapitalneeds.Theseadjustmentswerebasedon

informationsupplied

by

participating

BHCs,

subject

to

consultation

and

review

by

supervisors.

Capital

actionadjustmentsreflectfactorssuchascontractedmaterialsalesordispositionsofbusinesses,

holdingsordiscontinuedoperations,contractedexchangesofsecuritieswithaBHCscapitalstructure,

andtheamount(ifany)ofmandatoryconvertiblepreferredtoconverttocommonbyyearend2010.

TheresultswerealsoadjustedtoreflectQ12009operatingperformance.Thefinalsupplementalcapital

bufferistheinitialestimateplusorminustheimpactoftheseadjustments.

V. IndicatedAdditionalCapitalBuffersunderSCAPV.A.AggregateSCAPBuffer

Theinitial

results

using

data

through

Q4

2008

suggest

that

the

aggregate

capital

needed

for

the

19BHCstoreachtheSCAPcapitalbuffertargetsinthemoreadversescenariois$185billion,thevast

majorityofwhichneedstobeintheformofTier1Commoncapital(table2). Capitalneedsaremainly

intheformofTier1Commoncapital,whichreflectsthefactthatwhilemanyinstitutionshavea

sufficientamountofcapital,theyneedtotakestepstoimprovethequalityofthatcapital.

ThefinalcapitalbufferincorporatescapitalactionsandtheimpactofQ12009operating

performance. Theseadjustmentsaresubstantial,reflectingstrongpreprovisionnetrevenuesatsome

firmsinthefirstquarterand,toamuchlargerdegree,effortsalreadytakenbysomefirmspriortothe

conclusionoftheSCAPtoraisecommonequitybysellingsubsidiaries,convertingpreferredstock,or

issuingcommonshares. Aftertakingintoaccountthecompletedorcontractedcapitalactionsandthe

10Common

dividends

were

assumed

to

be

zero

in

the

more

adverse

scenario.

11Thesupervisorsconductingthecreditanalysisworkedcloselywithaccountingspecialistsintheagenciesto

ensurethatthefirmsprojectionswereconsistentwithexistingaccountingstandards. Additionally,supervisors

evaluatedthepotentialimpactofproposedchangestoFAS140andFIN46(R)whichareexpectedtobefinalizedin

May2009andimplementedinJanuary2010. Theagenciesaccountingspecialistsdiscussedtheamendmentswith

FASBmembersandstaffandotherexpertstoassessthereasonablenessoffirmestimatesofassetslikelytobe

broughtontothebalancesheetstartingin2010asaresultoftheamendments. Theonboardingofassetswere

alsofactoredintoourassessmentofriskweightedassetsandtheassociatedALLLneeds.


18/38


19/38

18

Appendix: InstitutionSpecificResults


20/38

19

AtDecember31,2008 $Billions As%ofRWA

Tier1Capital 10.1 9.7%

Tier1CommonCapital 10.1 9.7%

RiskWeightedAssets 104.4



FirstLienMortgages na na

Second/JuniorLienMortgages na na

Commercialand

Industrial

Loans

na

na

CommercialRealEstateLoans na na


Securities(AFSandHTM) na na

Trading&Counterparty na na

Other(1) 2.7 na

Memo:PurchaseAccountingAdjustments na

ResourcesOtherThanCapitaltoAbsorbLosses(2) 11.9


(SCAPBufferisdefinedasadditionalTier1Common/contingentCommon)

IndicatedSCAPBufferasofDecember31,2008 NoNeed

Less:CapitalActionsandEffectsofQ12009Results(3) 0.2

SCAPBuffer NoNeed


(2)Resourcestoabsorblossesincludepreprovisionnetrevenuelessthechangeintheallowance

forloanandleaselosses



MoreAdverseScenario

AmericanExpressCompany

SupervisoryCapitalAssessmentProgram

EstimatesforAmericanExpressCompanyfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario

Theestimatesbelowrepresentahypothetical'whatif'scenariothatinvolvesaneconomicoutcomethatismoreadverse

thanexpected. Theseestimatesarenotforecastsofexpectedlossesorrevenues.


21/38

20









Commercialand

Industrial

Loans 15.7 7.0%





Other(1) 16.4 na






Less:CapitalActionsandEffectsofQ12009Results(3) 10.9

OtherCapitalActions(4) 1.8

SCAPBuffer 33.9

(1)Includesotherconsumerandnonconsumerloansandmiscellaneouscommitmentsandobligations(2)Resourcestoabsorblossesincludepreprovisionnetrevenuelessthechangeintheallowance

forloanandleaselosses


(4)Capitalbenefitfromriskweightedassetimpactofeligibleassetguarantee


MoreAdverseScenario


EstimatesforBankofAmericaCorporationfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario



BankofAmericaCorporation


22/38

21














Other(1) 1.3 na






Less:

CapitalActions

and

Effects

of

Q1

2009

Results

(3) 0.1

SCAPBuffer NoNeed





EstimatesforBB&TCorporationfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




BB&TCorporation

MoreAdverseScenario


23/38

22








Second/JuniorLien

Mortgages

na

na



CreditCardLoans na na



Other(1) 0.4 na




(SCAPbuffer

is

defined

as

additional

Tier

1Common/contingent

Common)


Less: CapitalActionsandEffectsofQ12009Results(3) 0.2

SCAPBuffer NoNeed





EstimatesforTheBankofNewYorkMellonCorporationfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




TheBankofNewYorkMellon

Corporation

MoreAdverseScenario


24/38

23








Second/JuniorLien

Mortgages 0.7 19.9%






Other(1) 4.3 na




(SCAPbuffer

is

defined

as

additional

Tier

1Common/contingent

Common)



SCAPBuffer NoNeed





EstimatesforCapitalOneFinancialCorporationfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




CapitalOneFinancial

Corporation

MoreAdverseScenario


25/38

24














Other(1) 20.4 na






Less:Capital

Actions

and

Effects

of

Q1

2009

Results

(3) 29.0

OtherCapitalActions(4) 58.1

SCAPBuffer 5.5



(4)IncludesimpactofpreferredexchangeoffersannouncedonFebruary27,2009



EstimatesforCitigroup,Inc.fortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




Citigroup,Inc.

MoreAdverseScenario


26/38

25









Commercialand

Industrial

Loans 2.8 11.0%





Other(1) 0.9 na





IndicatedSCAP

Buffer

as

of

December

31,

2008 2.6


SCAPBuffer 1.1






EstimatesforFifthThirdBancorpfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario



FifthThirdBancorp

MoreAdverseScenario


27/38

26






TotalEstimatedLosses 9.2








Other(1) 4.0 na






Less:

CapitalActions

and

Effects

of

Q1

2009

Results

(3)

4.8

SCAPBuffer(4) 11.5



(4)Firmneedstoaugmentthecapitalbufferwith$11.5billionofTier1Common/contingentCommon

ofwhich$9.1billionmustbenewTier1capital



MoreAdverseScenario

GMACLLC


EstimatesforGMACLLCfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




28/38

27










CommercialRealEstateLoans na na

CreditCard

Loans

na

na



Other(1) 0.3 na







SCAPBuffer No

Need





EstimatesforTheGoldmanSachsGroup,Inc.fortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




TheGoldman

Sachs

Group,

Inc.

MoreAdverseScenario


29/38

28














Other(1) 5.3 na






Less:

CapitalActions

and

Effects

of

Q1

2009

Results

(3) 2.5

SCAPBuffer NoNeed





EstimatesforJPMorganChase&Co.fortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




JPMorganChase

&

Co.

MoreAdverseScenario


30/38

29











CreditCard

Loans 0.002 37.9%



Other(1) 1.8 na







SCAPBuffer 1.8





EstimatesforKeyCorpfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




KeyCorp

MoreAdverseScenario


31/38

30











CreditCard

Loans

na

na



Other(1) 0.5 na







SCAPBuffer No

Need





EstimatesforMetLife,Inc.fortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




MetLife,Inc.

MoreAdverseScenario


32/38

31









Commercialand

Industrial

Loans 0.1 2.4%



Securities(AFSandHTM) na na


Other(1) 0.2 na





IndicatedSCAP

Buffer

as

of

December

31,

2008 8.3


SCAPBuffer 1.8





EstimatesforMorganStanleyfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




MorganStanley

MoreAdverseScenario


33/38

32










CommercialReal

Estate

Loans 4.5 11.2%




Other(1) 2.3 na





Indicated

SCAP

Buffer

as

of

December

31,

2008 2.3Less: CapitalActionsandEffectsofQ12009Results(3) 1.7

SCAPBuffer 0.6





EstimatesforPNCFinancialServicesGroup,Inc.fortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




PNCFinancial

Services

Group,

Inc.

MoreAdverseScenario


34/38

33






TotalEstimatedLosses 9.2








Other(1) 0.8 na







SCAPBuffer(4) 2.5




(4)Firmneedstoaugmentthecapitalbufferwith$2.5billionofTier1Common/contingentCommonofwhich$400millionmustbenewTier1

capital

MoreAdverseScenario


Regions

Financial

Corporation


EstimatesforRegionsFinancialCorporationfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




35/38

34











CreditCard

Loans

na

na



Other(1) 6.0 na







SCAPBuffer No

Need





EstimatesforStateStreetCorporationfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




StateStreet

Corporation

MoreAdverseScenario


36/38

35











CreditCard

Loans 0.1 17.4%



Other(1) 2.1 na







SCAPBuffer 2.2





EstimatesforSunTrustBanks,Inc.fortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




SunTrustBanks,

Inc.

MoreAdverseScenario


37/38

36











CreditCard

Loans 2.8 20.3%



Other(1) 2.8 na







SCAPBuffer No

Need





EstimatesforU.S.BancorpfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




U.S.Bancorp

MoreAdverseScenario


38/38














Other(1) 11.3 na






Less:

CapitalActions

and

Effects

of

Q1

2009

Results

(3) 3.6

SCAPBuffer 13.7





EstimatesforWellsFargo&CompanyBankHoldingCompanyfortheMoreAdverseEconomicScenario




WellsFargo

&

Company

MoreAdverseScenario

Documents

Stress Test Results