Strenksi 1980. Levi-Strauss and the Buddhists

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Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History

Levi-Strauss and the BuddhistsAuthor(s): Ivan StrenskiReviewed work(s):Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan., 1980), pp. 3-22Published by: Cambridge University Press

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Levi-Strauss and the BuddhistsIVAN STRENSKIConnecticutCollege

This is by no means the first attempt to link Levi-Strauss with Buddhistthought. It is my purposeto make it, however, the most thorough and leasteccentric comparison to date. I want to set the record straight about thenature and significance of Buddhist parallels in the thought of ClaudeLevi-Strauss.To my mind there are both theoretical and historical values in revealingthe extent to which it might be said that a common 'mind' may be seen atwork in these two apparently differenthistorical realities.On the level of theory, this comparison constitutes, in some small andpreliminary way, an informal 'structuralismof structuralism.'I seekto lendfurther credenceto the structuralistview that different schemes of thoughtand action may be seen as variants on a single theme, or aspects of acommon code. The perception of such underlyingunities in human affairssuggests one reason why certain cultural phenomena in recent times havehad the kinds of disquieting effects of Buddhism and structuralism.Theyperhaps touch the same tender nervesof contemporary consciousness, and

I Throughout this essay I shall use Theravada Buddhism as my standard representativeofthe Buddhist tradition. This branch of Buddhism is found today in most parts of South andSoutheastern Asia. It contrasts with the Mahayana tradition of East Asia in doctrine, socialorganization, ritual, among other things. The chief reasons I have chosen this form ofBuddhism for comparison with structuralist thought are three: (1) the ideas of TheravadaBuddhism seem more closely related to Levi-Strauss's ideas than those of other forms ofBuddhism; (2) only one documented account of Levi-Strauss's encounter with a Buddhistsociety exists, a meeting that took place in the early 1950s in Theravadin Burma; and (3)because Theravada Buddhism is in many ways logically and historically the most 'primitive'form of Buddhism we know, it serves ably the purpose of comparison. On the one hand,simplicity makes the conceptual task of comparing systems of thought, complex even undernormal circumstances,all the easier. On the other hand, since in some way the classic ideas ofall Buddhist traditions can be seen to develop from seminal ideas and oppositions inTheravada Buddhismas revealed in the Pali Canon,a comparison that beginswith TheravadaBuddhism has at least a good chance of representing he broad traditionsof Buddhism. This isnot however necessarily to echo the beliefs of modern Theravada orthodoxy: some forms ofMahayana Buddhism arejust as, or even more, 'primitive' than forms of Theravadin beliefand practice. I want only to agree with those who have made the case for the extraordinaryantiquity and primitiveness of much of the Pali Canon and current Theravadin belief andpractice.0010-4175/80/1109-0100 ? 1980 Society for Comparative Study of Society and History

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4 IVAN STRENSKIdo so in analogous ways. They transform similarproposals about humannature which both attract interest and yet repel it at the same time. If thisanalysis has not absolutely mined the depths of these things I will at least beglad to have stripped back some layers of the surface, and to have beguntracing some of the deep running veins enriching both Buddhism andstructuralism. Without being too greatly distracted by their different'codes,' the human sciencesought to tryto understand the great ideologicaloptions entertainedby human beings. Buddhismand structuralismpresentaspects of one of these great options.On the level of historical inquiry, I also seek to encourage students of theaffairsof this century to take rathermore seriously the depth and natureofwhat one knows as 'orientalism.' Levi-Straussrepresentsonly one exampleof a leading intellectual whose thought may meaningfully be said to movein Buddhistdirections. In particular,it would be interestingto consider theaffinity of Levi-Strauss for Buddhism as an aspect of his location amongassimilatedJewishintellectualson the left-wingof the political spectrumofthe Third Republic. Why did Levi-Straussexpress his pacific tendencies inBuddhist terms?Was he alone in doing so? What of the 'orientalism'andleft-wing politics of someone like Marcel Mauss? What do we know aboutSylvain-Levy, the great buddhologist, in this connection? It does not seemto me that the story of the left wing in the Third Republic has been toldfrom this standpoint.With these horizons in view, let me begin this comparison with a briefsurvey of some of the most prominent attempts to deal roundly andseriously with Levi-Strauss'saffinity for Buddhism. Given the complexityand subtlety of both Buddhism and structuralism, t will be no surprisethatbalance and accuracy do not characterize these studies. In the end, eachattempt to find the center of this comparison tends to slide off center, andveer out into space.I. SOME ECCENTRICSEven though Levi-Strauss devotes the concluding chaptersof his autobio-graphy (to 1955), Tristes Tropiques,to an appreciation of Buddhism, therelation of these discussions to Buddhism have not been rigorouslyexplored. This is all the more remarkable in light of recent criticism ofstructuralism by present-day French Marxists as ahistorical and con-templative. Still the theme lies virtually untouched. When it has beentreated in print, it has been regarded only curiously or eccentrically.Robert F. Murphy's 'On Zen Marxism'2 s fairly typical. Having baitedhis hook as if to lure the great denizens of the deep, Murphy disappointsreaders credulous enough to believe that titles of articles have anything to

2 R. F. Murphy, 'On Zen Marxism,' Man, 63, 1963.



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LEVI-STRAUSS AND THE BUDDHISTS 5do with their contents. Murphy says virtually nothing about Zen, norabout Buddhism,and thereforenothing about the relation of Buddhism tostructuralism.

More responsible to his readers is the intellectual historian H. StuartHughes. In his otherwise severelyflawed treatment of Levi-Strauss in TheObstructedPath,3Hughes notes that Levi-Straussbelieves Buddhism'com-pletes' the material liberation begun by Marxism. This is a theme ofconsiderable importance for understanding both Levi-Strauss and theBuddhist-Marxist syncretists of then contemporary (early 1950s) SouthAsia. And in this sense, Hughes has at least got his hands on a comparisonwith concrete historic import for both the biography of Levi-Straussandthe political life-story of modern Buddhism. The same cannot be said,unhappily, for Hughes's pseudo-theosophical misreading of Buddhism asperenniallyembodying 'a tone of acceptanceof cosmic resignation'4-- evenif this graspsthe mood of Weltschmerz nd declineoften encounteredin themeditative musings of Levi-Strauss or the image projected by the 'salonBuddhism' of the 1920s and later.5As we will see shortly, Levi-Strauss'sunderstanding and appropriation of Buddhismfall far short of thorough-ness. So he moves toward two opposing poles in the Buddhist tradition atthe same time, perhaps without realizing this. Even if Hughes has not gotthese two poles in perfectfocus, he has at least represented wo orientationsin the thought of Levi-Strauss which also are really Buddhist in certainsenses: Levi-Strauss is at once thrilled by the prospect of the union ofrevolutionary ideology with contemplative praxis, on the one side, yet healso broods that Promethean and humanist visions are folly: 'The worldbegan without the human race and it will probably end without it.'6Although elements of pessimism are to be found in the Buddhist tradi-tion and structuralism,others like Susan Sontag and Robert Zimmerman,7respectively, trace Levi-Strauss'spessimism, equanimity, and detachmentto the influence of Lucretius. This at least has the dubious benefit ofcontinuity with the intellectual tradition of the West. Levi-Strauss doesindeed credit the philosopher of nature with a footnote in TheRaw and theCooked and a one-line epigram from De Rerum Natura in the opening

3H. S. Hughes, The ObstructedPath (New york: Harper and Row, 1968), reprintedin E.Hayes and T. Hayes, eds. ClaudeLevi-Strauss:TheAnthropologistas Hero (Cambridge:TheMIT Press 1970), pp. 22-46.4 Ibid., p. 45.5I have coined the term 'salon Buddhism' to describe a certain culturalvogue for Buddhistnotions and practices among Western intellectual elites in the early decades of the 20thcentury. As far as I know, little work has been done on this phenomenon, although suchstudiesmight easily be as rewardingand informative as studieswe now possess on the ragefororiental ideas and practices in the last two decades.6 C. Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques New York: Atheneum, 1961),p. 397.7Susan Sontag, 'The Anthropologist as Hero,' in Hayes and Hayes, pp. 184-96. R. L.Zimmerman, 'Levi-Strauss and the Primitive' in Hayes and Hayes, pp. 216-34.



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6 IVAN STRENSKIpages of Tristes Tropiques.8But this is not exactly what one would call thebest evidence of substantial intellectualinfluence.Bycontrast, the citationsof Buddhist notions as well as the grasp of Buddhist concepts rate seriousattention, as we will see. Moreover, virtually any part of Levi-Strauss's'Lucretian' pessimism, detachment, and introversion can be found in theBuddhist tradition as well. Despite the advantage Lucretius receives byvirtue of his membership in the Western cultural tribe, the far-flung Bud-dhists actually seem to exert more influence on Levi-Strauss than theirlike-minded European counterparts-at least if we go by the evidenceavailable in the written record Levi-Strauss provides us. To be sure, theinfluence of Buddhism on the thought of Levi-Straussin no way matchesthat of Durkheim, Boas, Marx, Freud and others within the recenthistoryof the human sciences in the West. The same cannot be said for the ratherpale effect of the thought of Lucretius.Bycontrast, the imprintof Buddhistideas, while not standing out in bold red, at least shows its modest saffronhue.

Doubtless the most interesting and fruitful discussion of this subjectcomes from the polymathic pen of the Mexican man of letters,Octavio Paz.In a dashing tour through this territoryof cross-cultural intellectualscenes,Paz provides sure, clear and steady direction: The 'similarity betweenBuddhismand Levi-Strauss'sthought is not accidental,'9saysPaz pointingover the horizon. Along with Stuart Hughes, Sontag and Zimmerman,Paznotes the moods of sobriety, detachment,'0and revulsionfor power sharedby the Buddhists and Levi-Strauss.1 Paz then moves on to note how bothstructuralismand (at least) early Buddhism sharerelational ontologies'2-even if Levi-Strauss's focus tends toward logical matters, while the earlyBuddhists conceive these fundamental relations casually and materially.Buddhism and structuralism also rejectcertain fundamental metaphysicalpositions. Both dismiss the idea of a transcendental human ego,"3sinceboth reject substantialist ontologies. Both dismiss the idea of an ultimatemeaning in history, since both rejectthe existence of some cosmic person orforce which could give history such meaning.'4 Both finally suspect thepretentions of human ideologies, since mental constructs are no morepermanent and substantial than any other, whether personal, material orotherwise.15Even though Paz may representthe best of those who have taken up thisproblem of the relation of Buddhism to structuralism,a better treatmentispossible. Paz treats the relationshipratherhaphazardlyandcasually.There

8 Sontag, ibid.,pp. 187ff.,Zimmerman, ibid.,pp. 232ff.90. Paz, ClaudeLevi-Strauss.an Introduction New York: Delta, 1970), p. 150.10Ibid., p. 137. 13 bid., p. 130.1Ibid., p. 139. 14 id., p. 136.12 bi. p. 120. 5Ibid.,p. 138.



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LEVI-STRAUSS AND THE BUDDHISTS 7is, I shall show, rather more system to Levi-Strauss's appropriation ofBuddhist notions than Paz seems to admit. What is more, there are ratherserious differences between Levi-Strauss'sview of the world and the Bud-dhist dhamma.Paz skates rather lightly over these and thus presents tooagreeable a picture of the actual relationships between structuralistandBuddhist thought. Before presenting my own view of the positive correla-tions, let me state some significant distinguishing differences.II. SOME DIFFERENCESThese distinguishing features divide into those of form and content, re-spectively. In form, Buddhismalways appearsas a 'religion;'structuralismdoes not. This is so despite what Susan Sontag says in describing thestructural anthropologist as a saint-like figure 'engaged in saving hissoul' 16.

The principal danger here lies in the seductivepower of the extravagantuse of metaphor: Structuralism indeed invites us to accept a worldview, aWeltanschauung,a total anthropology, and thus to take on the globalvisionary ambitions of 'religions.' But if that is all that most 'religions'are,then they would have been long since reducedto what Thomas Luckmanncalls 'invisible religions.'17Religions in the plenary sense have been muchmore than what Luckmann describes-matters of private attitude, 'in thehead,' so to speak. They have been considerably richer human phenomenathan the ratherthin 'religion' that structuralismis supposed to be. On topof this, even if structuralismwere suchan 'invisiblereligion,' it would be, inthe opinion of historians of religionlike Robert Ellwood, a 'folk religion'-and one on the brink of extinction'8-lacking the vital social and institu-tional embodiment necessaryfor persistence through time.In content, Buddhism and structuralism also seem to speak in differentvoices: Where Buddhists hold sharp views about matters of morality,Levi-Strauss seems-at least half the time-to waffle on specificmatters ofright and wrong. One calls to mind, for example, Levi-Strauss's culturalrelativity with respect to the morality of cannibalism, as an instance of hisprincipledunwillingnessto engage the moral issues.19Now even if it is alsotrue (as I will argue later) that Levi-Straussspeaks as a Buddhist moraliston other issues, this does little more than present a certain paradox. Ingeneral the differences between ethical absolutism and ethical relativismremain.

Besides there are other substantial points of disagreement,which can be16Sontag, 'The Anthropologist as Hero,' p. 191.17T. Luckmann, InvisibleReligion (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1967).18R. Ellwood, 'U.S. Religion's Ominous Down-Home Turn,'Los Angeles Times,Part VI,Sunday, 21 May, 1978:1.19Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques,pp. 385-86.



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8 IVAN STRENSKIlisted for the sake of convenience: (1) Centralto the structuralistenterpriseis the view that structuralismis a branch of the general theory of signs-semiotics.20With this I do not see the remotest relation to Buddhism. (2)Although I will arguethat between structuralistand Buddhistpsychologiesmuch is sharedin common, at least one major differencein mode ought tobe noted: like those of Freud, Buddhist psychological perspectives aredynamic. Causality remains the key operative principle.21By contrast,structuralismadopts static and gestaltic perspectives.22 3) Epistemologi-cally, early Buddhismat least is empiricistand even positivist:23 tructural-ism deliberately sets out to displace both empiricist and positivist episte-mologies in the human sciences.24Although it is true that other forms ofBuddhism are as anti-empiricist as structuralism, it is not primarily inepistemology that Buddhism and structuralism compare. It is rather interms of general worldview that Buddhism and Levi-Strauss share similarpresuppositions. It is this 'general' sense of Buddhism which cuts acrosssectarianlines, and makes for fruitful comparison with structuralism.III. A MEETING OF MINDSAlthough it may not be essential to the argument I seek to establish, itwould be circumstantiallyuseful to make historically plausible the connec-tion of Levi-Strauss's structuralism to Buddhist ideas. What do we knowabout what Levi-Strauss knew or might plausibly have known aboutBuddhism?We know for a start that Levi-Strauss did some fieldwork in Burmaamong Buddhists of the Chittagong area during the 1950s.25 t is notablethat in the context of this episode of his life Levi-Strauss admits a piousconcern for Buddhism. A key passage in his discussion of Buddhismin theconcluding chapters of his autobiography, TristesTropiques, ells us muchabout the man we have seen only from the perspective of anthropologicaltheory, Freudianism, Marxism, and other Western ideologies. While he isaccompanying a pious Burmese friend to a rural Buddhist temple, apotentially awkward incident occurs:'Youneednot do as I do,' saidmycompanion s heprostrated imself ourtimesbefore healtar:andI, respecting isopinion,remainedmotionless.. Andyet,foronce,Ishouldhave eltno embarrassmentadIfollowedhisexample.Betweenhatformof worship ndmyself herewasnomisunderstandingo getintheway.It was

20 C. Levi-Strauss, TheScope of Anthropology(London: J. Cape, 1967),p. 17.21P. De Silva, Buddhistand FreudianPsychology (Colombo, Sri Lanka: LakeHouse, 1974),p. 31.22I. Rossi, The Unconscious n Culture(New York: Dutton, 1974), pp. 71-75.23K. N. Jayatilleke, Early BuddhistTheoryof Knowledge(London: Allen & Unwin, 1963),passim.24 Rossi, The Unconscious n Culture,pp. 60-68.25Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques,Chap. 36.



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LEVI-STRAUSS AND THE BUDDHISTS 9not a questionof bowingdown to idols,or of adoringa supposedly upernaturalorderof things,butsimplyof payinghomage o decisive eflectionswhichhadbeenformed twenty-five centuries earlier.... To those reflectionsmy civilization couldonlycontributebyconfirminghem....For what, after all, have I learnt from the mastersI have listenedto, thephilosophers haveread, he societies have nvestigated,ndthatveryScience nwhich he West akessuchpride?Simplya fragmentaryessonor twowhich, f laidend to end,could reconstitutehe meditations f theSageat thefoot of histree.26Whatever else one might say about this passage, it certainly establishesthe point that Levi-Strausswas no strangerto Buddhism. But the origin ofLevi-Strauss's knowledge of Buddhism seems out of the reach of mostscholars, at least for the moment. Levi-Strauss has denied explicitly anyknowledge of Buddhism.27And we know virtually nothing about the extentand character of the popular intellectual awareness of Buddhism in Levi-Strauss's time-especially the period of the 1920s when he would havecome into contact with these and other diverse intellectual influencesas astudent of philosophy in Paris. I preferto call this type of Buddhism'salonBuddhism.' Evidence of a common understanding of a vague sort ofBuddhism is evident in German intellectual and popular circles of the timein question. And if this be true of Germany, why not of France?Here onethinks of Hermann Hesse, Thomas Mann, Karl Jaspers,Oswald Spengleramong others. Surelythere are French parallels, those thinkers who mighthave popularized Buddhist notions among the French intelligentsiaduringthe formative period of Levi-Strauss's intellectual life in the 1920s. At anyrate, scholars might want to look here for evidence of such sources ofBuddhist ideas in Levi-Strauss.

Historians of thought might also follow the internal line of influencewhich may be traced from Levi-Strauss to Freud, and thence to Schopen-hauer,28perhaps the first European to popularize and develop Buddhistideas in a thoroughgoing and systematic way. Here one could trace thewell-worn path from Levi-Strauss's notion of the unconscious to that ofFreud's. In turn one would then have to travel the lesser known route fromFreud back to Schopenhauer. Historians of philosophy have generallyconcurred that in Schopenhauer's general notion of unconscious mentalactivity the roots of Freud's equally general views about the unconsciousare to be found. This connection also explains the somewhat brooding andpessimistic assessment of human rationality and consciousness that thesethree thinkers share and expound in their differentways.But regardingboth of these historical accounts of Levi-Strauss's nterestand knowledge of BuddhismI remainunenthusiastic. The line from Freudto Schopenhauer, however historically respectable, seems rather too weak26Ibid., p. 394.27Personal correspondence.28De Silva, Buddhistand FreudianPsychology, Appendix, pp. 171-87.



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10 IVAN STRENSKIand thin to supportso much weightyand detailed speculationas revealedinthe citation above. And lacking the basic research on the 'salon Buddhism'of the 1920s we are not in a very good position to locate the sources ofLevi-Strauss's knowledge of Buddhism there either. At any rate, Levi-Strauss knows a bit too much (despite the denials) about Buddhism andknows this a bit too well to attribute his feeling for Buddhism to anorientalisme of intellectual fashion.To support this, consider only the things Levi-Strausshas to say aboutBuddhism and Marxism, again in the specific context of his field study inBurma:Buddhism asachieved omethinghat,elsewhere,nlyMarxism asbrought ff: thas reconciledmetaphysicswith the problemof humanbehavior .. BetweenMarxist riticism,whichsetsmanfree romhis firstchains,and Buddhist riticism,whichcompletes hatliberation,here s neitheroppositionnorcontradiction . .Marxism nd Buddhism redoingthesame hings,butat differentevels.29As it happens, Levi-Strauss seems to echo the words of a vocal group ofSouth Asian Buddhist intellectuals-perhaps even without realizing it.Numbering among them many prominent Burmese,this group advocatedin the early 1950s a form of political alliance, at least at the ideological level,between Buddhism and Marxism.30I suggest that this did not escapeLevi-Strauss's attention during or in preparation for his field study ofBurmese Buddhism in the early 1950s. (This, I want to suggest, had adouble impact on Levi-Strauss, as we will see shortly). Here, for instance,are the words of such a Buddhist-Marxist syncretistfrom Burma:'In thebeginning wasa Buddhist nlyby tradition.The moreI studyMarxism,however, hemoreI feelconvincedn Buddhism .. foranyman who hasdeeplystudiedBuddhism, ndcorrectlyperceivedts tenets hereshouldbe no obtacle obecominga Marxist .. Marxist heorydealswith mundaneaffairsand seeks tosatisfymaterialneedsin life ... Buddhistphilosophy,however,deals with thesolutionof spiritual atisfaction n lifeandliberation romthis mundaneworld.'31To most readers, these two texts would seem to be saying quite similarthings. In fact Levi-Straussmay well have been paraphrasingthe words ofthe Buddho-Marxist syncretist quoted above, so closely do they resembleone another.One need not however go this far. It matters little whether Levi-Straussknew about Buddhist-Marxistsyncretismbeforehe went to Burma,afterhereturnedfrom Burma, or indeed whether or not he ever realized what theBurmese thought about the relations of Marxism and Buddhism. What

29 Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques,p. 395.30E. Sarkisanz, BuddhistBackgrounds of the Burmese Revolution (The Hague: Mouton,1965).31U Ba Swe, The BurmeseRevolution, quoted in G.O. Totten, 'Buddhism and SocialisminJapan and Burma,' ComparativeStudies in Society and History, 2, 1960:301.



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LEVI-STRAUSS AND THE BUDDHISTS IImatters is Levi-Strauss's view about this relation. I want at least to beconsistent about my judgement that historical data is so poor in this casethat it is relatively useless to stake one's claims about the relation ofBuddhism and structuralismto any historical foundation at all. We simplydo not know enough about the actual historical connections betweenLevi-Straussand the Buddhists to say very much. Thus if there areconnec-tions between structuralism and Buddhism, they are not likely to behistorical, but structural themselves! If history does not seem able here tosuggest why Levi-Strauss sometimes thinks like a Buddhist, then perhapsstructuralism can? What we seem to have in the case of Levi-Strauss'sappreciation of Buddhismand his own creation of structuralism,I want toargue, is something of the same 'mind'being worked out. Without reifyingthe notion of 'mind,' I believe it can be shown that Levi-Strauss and theBuddhists think about certain things in the same way because structuralanthropology, broadly understood, and Buddhist 'anthropology' share acommon 'mind' on certain key issues in human nature.The significance of Levi-Strauss's Burmese experience then should beclear: Imagine his astonishment: not only does he find his own modifiedMarxism alive and well in Buddhist Burma;he also discovers that manymilitant Burmesereconcile this with Buddhist piety and principles. CouldLevi-Strauss have failed to make the furtherinference?To wit, if Buddhistsperceive deep relations between their own thought and Marxism,how canstructuralism, which has always acknowledged its Marxist inheritance(however little deserved)resistthe connection with Buddhism?In Buddhistthought and practice Levi-Strauss seems to recognizedeep similaritieswiththe movement of his own thought. I want now to spell out these similaritiesand show how structuralism and Buddhism are led to many of the sameproblems and solutions to questions about human nature. Thus, Levi-Strauss's attraction to Buddhism does more than exemplify the grandbricoleur at play; it signals a deeper affinity on the one hand betweenBuddhistthought, seen in a new light through its syncretismwith Marxism,and on the other hand, with structuralism,which has always paid homageto Marx.IV. LEVI-STRAUSS AND THE BUDDHISTS ON THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

Sociological Individualism.The meeting of structuralismand Buddhismin a common 'mind'bears close inspection simplybecausethey agreeon thefundamental issues of human nature: the nature of society and humanpsychology. Let us take the nature of human society first.Early Buddhist social theory has been credited with the belief in a'contract theory of society.'32Buddhists have always held such a posi-

32R. S. Sharma, Aspects of Political Ideas andInstitutions inAncientIndia. Delhi: pp. 65ff.



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12 IVAN STRENSKItion-at least in India-in order to distinguish themselves from the Hindutradition, which teaches the divine origins of traditional caste society.Individual men agree to make society, not the gods. Yet, Buddhists havealso exhibiteda keen awarenessof the deeperlimitsand incorrigibledefectsof social life, however it may be arranged. Society is a worldly institution,unalterably marked and conditioned by dukkha (ill-fare), anicca (imper-manence) and anattd(non-substantiality).This tendency of the Buddhists to mistrust the ability of men to tran-scend the radical limits of their social arrangementsseems to give Buddhistsocial theory a dogmatic conservative appearance. This in part is so.Historically speaking,the Buddhists wereopposed to the new society whichwas then in the making in the fifth century Ganges Valley. But, there iseveryreason to deplore the political and social distressthis new society wastrying to impose upon the masses of people. A. K. Warder33and othershave argued that Buddhist conservatism functioned as a protest againstexploitative changes under way in the time of Buddha. The 'otherworldly'characterof Buddhist social teaching then needs to be understood relativeto the kind of 'world'that was in the making at the time of the Buddha.TheBuddhists were, in effect, saying that despite the social contracts workedout by this new exploitative society, certain incorrigible limits would bereached against which no maneuvers would be effective. Even the tyrantwas limitedby the deep conditions whichgovernedall social arrangements.In the Buddhistcase, the teachings of ill-fare, impermanence,and non-sub-stantiality warned the tyrant not to expect things to go as he may havewished. The deep nature of human social life was change, and changeafflictstyranny as much as it afflictsany other social scheme.One would not be mistaken if one read behind the lines of the dualBuddhist attitude to society a particular attitude to the individual.Although society in some sense can be treated in the Buddhist view as a.'thing,' the Buddhists see society primarilyas an aggregate of individuals.Dukkha, etc., afflict the social contract, because these limiting conditionsfundamentally afflict the individual. Conversely, if one would reformsociety, one must begin by fundamentally reformingthe individual.This sociological individualism in no small part accounts for the tradi-tional Buddhist reliance upon the 'Great Man' to bring about necessarysocial change and/or stability. The central place played by the Buddhistmonarch, like Asoka in ancient times, and the modern political leaders ofnewly independent nations of Buddhist South Asia, like Thailand, is thusno historical accident. Buddhist social theory requiresthe 'Great Man' asmuch as it requires 'social contract.' Both are particular to sociologicalindividualism. And even though the individual may, in the end, be afflicted

33A. K. Warder, 'EarlyBuddhism and other ContemporarySystems,'Bulletinof the Schoolof Oriental and African Studies 18, 1956:43-63.



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LEVI-STRAUSS AND THE BUDDHISTS 13by dukkha, anicca, and anattd, there is no society without him or prior tohim. Even though the Buddhists refused to reify the individual or honorhim with the title 'substance,' it would have been far worse in Buddhisteyesto have reified or imbued with substance the social order-as traditionalHindus and newly emergent fifth century statists were wont to do.With the rise of modern states in the Buddhist world the traditionalsocial teachings come under some stress. Both Marxist and non-Marxiststates seeking to promote rapid economic development seem inevitably toput emphasis on the need to fullfil national goals, rather than purelyindividual ones. Moreover, even in the traditional perspective, social wel-fare and reform have had strong mandates ever since the days of Asoka atleast. The common cry is that the good society inevitably encouragesgoodness, and thus saintliness, in the individual. The Sangha (the Buddhistorder of monks), too, is the normal context of holiness, not' somethingadded on to the individual quest for salvation. Thus, on balance, onecannot write off Buddhism as a simple-minded sort of individualisticreligion. Much of the tradition is and continues to be social. This does not,however, contradict what I have saidabout the key ontological place of theindividual in social theory. That remains.Social Life with a HiddenFace. In all this the Buddhists tried to co-optand transcend the positivist spirit that prevailed in their day. Jayatilleke,for instance,34notes how the Buddhists both assent to the positivist viewthat all knowledge must rest on sense experience, while extending thefoundations of knowledge to include extra-sensory perception. ESP in theBuddhistview merely representsan extension of sensory knowledge, ratherthan its denial. Therefore, no great problem arose for them in this novelepistemological view. In fact, the Buddhists went on to use ESP in aperfectly positivist way to verify the central tenets of Buddhism (dukkha,anicca,...). In particular social and historical situations, this enabledBuddhists to 'see through' the events of the present moment, so to speak:Despite the apparent permanence of the new autocratic states thriving inthe day of the Buddha, one could see within them the seeds of theirdestruction-all these states, like all individuals, were marked by theconditions of existence, dukkha,anicca,.... The nature of social life wasnot written on its face; that deeptruth is found by transcendingthe limitsofordinary sense experience, by developing the proper sort of ability to 'see'beyond the flat world of everyday life.

Such an attitude may also be expressed in another way: the Buddhistsbelieved that perception, knowledge, truth, etc., could be looked on asoccurring on different levels.35Roughly, for the Buddhists these were theconventional (sammuti)and absolute (paramattha)levels. They, in turn,34K. N. Jayatilleke, Early BuddhistTheoryof Knowledge,pp. 358ff.35Ibid., pp. 351-68.



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14 IVAN STRENSKImirroredthe dual levels of social life that we saw earlier,not to mention abroad range of key divisions within other areas of life. In fact, one mightnote in concluding this discussion how dualities afflictedand in fact charac-terized Buddhist attitudes to life as a whole: At once champions of thewelfarestate, yet all the while nagged by the ineradicable defects inherentinthe human situation; at once determinedto remake society along the linesof Buddhist ethical principles, yet all the while just as convinced of thepreferabilityof leaving the worldbehind;at once acceptingthe good societyas conducive to salvation, yet refusing to identify the good society withsalvation. Some commentators, like BardwellSmith,evengo on to add thatthese apparent conflicts ought to remain part of Buddhist life, and thatForBuddhistso losethisdistinction s to transformheir raditionntosomethingdiscontinuouswith its originaland historic ssence .... The central askof Budd-hismin the immediate uture s to display he reconcilabilityf what oftenseemdivergent aths.36

In his own way, Levi-Strauss offers many of the same views about thenature of society.,As an avowed critic of positivism37 n the social sciencesLevi-Straussholds that although in the empirical point of view society mayappear a product of convention, it is really a natural phenomenon. Socialcontracts are themselves governed by the unconscious and inherent struc-tureof the human brain.38Like the Buddhists, then, Levi-Straussis conser-vative about society's ability to transform itself by further contracts andconventions. Society can change significantlyonly if nature itself changes.Even for a sophisticated materialist like Levi-Strauss, basic social changewould then requirebasic change in the structureof matter. This would mostevidently be reflectedin the make up of the brain, then in the 'psyche,'andfinally in society. Notice finally how these moves leave Levi-Strauss, likethe Buddhists, in the end a sociological individualist. We get to 'rockbottom' in society when we get down to the brain.There will, of course, be differences of nuance between the positions wehave canvassed. The Buddha would probably be somewhat more ambiva-lent about whether or not changes in the structure of matter would ser-iously affect the way men think. The question of whether psychologicaltraits reduceto or are determinedby material characteristicsof the humanbrain is hard to determinein the case of Buddhistpsychology. In any eventhuman transformation (the Buddhist Nirvana) is something Buddhistshave always linked with human effort. It does not seem the kind of thingwhich could be attained by manipulating the brain. It is not 'written' into

36 B. Smith, 'Sinhalese Buddhism and the Dilemmas of Reinterpretation,' in B. Smith, ed.,The Two Wheels of the Dhamma. Chambersburg; American Academy of Religion, 1972,p. 106.37Rossi, The Unconscious n Culture,pp. 60-68.38C. Levi-Strauss, 'Structuralism and Ecology,' BarnardAlumnae,Spring, 1972:7.



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LEVI-STRAUSS AND THE BUDDHISTS 15matter, as it were, and thus unlike the fundamental transformation aneurologically interested structuralistmight envisage, Nirvanacould not intheory be neurologically induced. The Buddhists seem to play ratherfasterand looser with the idea of neurological constraints upon knowledge thando the structuralists.The Buddhists believe that although one might not beable to change the structures of the social world in fundamental ways,through his own moral effort, the Buddhist saint can change the cognitiveand psychological structures of his own 'mind' (not necessarily identifiedwith 'brain'). For Levi-Strauss this sort of 'direct action' on behalf ofchanging our own mental-neurological structure hardly seems possible.Yet, of course, both the Buddhistsand Levi-Strauss stillagreethat the deepnature of human society remains impervious to human manipulation:There are no utopias possible for the Buddhists or Levi-Strauss.Residual Sociological Holism? Now it is true that this shared suspicionabout the ability of human will and deed to transformour social arrange-ments rests primarilyon a view of the individual which Levi-Straussandthe Buddhistshold. (We will see more about this in the next section.) Yet itis also true that Levi-Strauss and the Buddhists sometimes talk as if thesocial realmhad its own laws and traits, and as if one could perhaps speakabout problemsparticularto the social realmas such. How they areable todo so without contradicting the methodological and sociological indivi-dualism of their views of social being I am not preparedto say. It is notimportant, at any rate, to settle this matter here. What is important is tonote that both the Buddhists and Levi-Strauss talk this way and to appre-ciate the things they have to say.For Levi-Strauss, societies seem to rest on contradictions, on kinds oftypically tragic inconsistencies in their principles of organization. Wediscover these inconsistencies in myths. The structures revealed in mythsfrom the far reaches of the globe show that societies nurturedeep irrecon-cilable desires within their own constitutions. These contradictions are sofundamental to the existence of the societies, however, that to eliminatethem would be impossible without at the same time destroyingthem. AgainLevi-Strauss heaves a deep sigh and like a fatherly psychoanalyst broodson: 'No society is perfect. Each has within itself, by nature, an impurityincompatible with the norms to which it lays claim.... 39No society chooses this situation. Moreover, one can do little more thantry to palliate the conflict by the use of myths, rituals,and religion. Shortofdestroying the society thus afflicted, one cannot extract or replace thesecontradictions. As Levi-Strauss tries to argue, notably in his analyses ofOedipus or Asdiwal, for instance, it is in the nature of social realitythat theparticipants in society are constrained to want things they cannot possibly

39Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques,p. 385.



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i6 IVAN STRENSKIhave and to do things they cannot possibly achieve.40Poignant evidence ofthis from mythsfrom across the globe testify that those who do not observethis natural law meet the pathetic ends that Oedipus, Asdiwal, or othermythical heroes have met: knowledge that leads to blindness, or mobilitythat ends in stasis.Little imagination is requiredto cast Levi-Strauss'svision in a Buddhistlight. The correspondence is remarkable, even to the way both the Bud-dhists and Levi-Strauss focus on the key problem of desires, wants, andambitions.

Yet, the differencesare noteworthy: For Levi-Strauss the brain and itsmaterial structureexplain finally why the mythical heroes are constrainedto do this or that. The Buddha, on the other hand, accounts for thepervasivenessof the conflict and the futility of desire on the psychologicallevel alone. Buddhistsdo not feel requiredto explain the logic of conflicteddesire in terms of neurological levels of human life. Reductionism does notseduce the Buddhists (at least not until now) the way it has attractedLevi-Strauss. The Buddha was addressing problems he took to be funda-mentally psychological and moral.In response to the world, the Buddha at least tactically counseled with-drawaland finally anchoritic isolation. The Buddha did not of course hatepeople; nor did he hide from or cower before his enemies. Neither did henaively believe that mere geographical distance from society, whetherthatsociety werehospitable or not, would insure salvation. Yet, some degreeofremove from the hub-bub of social life seemed necessary for effectivepsychological detachment.How striking in this regard are the words of Levi-Strauss declaring aseeminglyBuddhist-likeappetite for solitude and longing for privacy:'Iamby temperamentsomewhatof a misanthrope. . . because thereis nothing Idread more than a too-close relation with my fellow man.'4' Earlierin hislife Levi-Strauss would describe something of the same orientation in hisdescription of recruits to different faculties in the university. There are'extroverts' and 'introverts,' he notes. The first group consists in thoseattractedto law and medicine, the second to the humanitiesand sciences.Inthis dichotomy anthropology finds itself on the side of the introverts:'Those who readlettersof the sciencesarecharacterizedby resistanceto thedemands of the group. Likemembers of some monastic orderthey tend toturn more and more in upon themselves....'42 One could hardly want amore explicit statement of the kinship between the kind of work Levi-40C. Levi-Strauss,StructuralAnthropology New York: Doubleday, 1967),p. 212, and 'TheStory of Asdiwal,' N. Mann, tr., in E. R. Leach, ed., The Structural Study of Myth andTotemism(London: Tavistock, 1967) pp. 16-17.41 A. Akoun, J. Mousseau and F. Morlin, 'A Convention with Claude Levi-Strauss,'Psychology Today5,12,1972:82.42Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques,p. 58.



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LEVI-STRAUSS AND THE BUDDHISTS 17Strauss made his vocation and the kind of vocation Buddhist monkspractice. I want now to consider further support for my attempts toestablish a pattern of similarities between the thought of Levi-Strauss andthe Buddhists by turning to the matter of human psychology.LEVI-STRAUSS AND THE BUDDHISTS ON PSYCHOLOGY

No Self. Perhaps the key correspondence in the psychological views ofLevi-Strauss and the Buddhists is their rejectionof the transcendentalego.On the whole, both adopt a certain anti-anthropocentricattitude. Humanindividuality does not stand up to deeper scientific scrutiny. To Levi-Strauss, this means that the 'human sciences' will paradoxically seek to'dissolve man.'43The trends of scientificexplanation toward monism leavespecial explanations of human behaviour far in the humanistic past. Mancan be quite adequately understood without residue by the very same lawsused to explain the world of nature. Indeed, for Levi-Strauss man is a partof nature and structural anthropology a budding natural science.44Although commonsense and ordinaryexperience may indicate that man isunique, the truth of things is to be told in terms of the structure of thehuman brain and the causal flux of natural change.There is even passion in Levi-Strauss's views about the individual: hecalls the 'first-person singular . . . detestable,'45and looks forward withbodhisattva-like vision to the subordination of the ego's 'claims to theobjective will-to-emancipation of that multitude of human beings who arestill denied the means of choosing their own destiny.'46Here it seems thatLevi-Straussadopts a Mahayanist perspective in contrast to the positionshe took earlier,which lie more within the Theravadintraditions prevailingin Burma and other parts of South Asia. Both traditions concur, however,and aim to overcome individualism, and really only differ here in thestrategies employed to attain this end. The Burmese Buddhists, beingTheravadin, seek to undermine individualism as directly as Levi-Straussdoes in firstrejectingthe existence of a transcendentalego. The MahayanaBuddhists seek to upset the same sense of uniqueness of the individual bysubordinating individual plans to the welfare of the group. ForMahayanists no one is free unless all are free. In Levi-Strauss'sreflectionson Buddhism in the depths of the Burmesejungle one hears an unmistak-able Mahayanist echo: 'the salvation of any one individualdepends on thesalvation of humanity as a whole.'47

43 C. Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 247.44Levi-Strauss, The Scope of Anthropology,pp. 24-25, 31.45 Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques,p. 398. Also note Levi-Strauss's disavowal of the first-person pronoun in his L'Homme Nu, a matter he explains on pp. 559-63 as a rejection ofegoism.46Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques,p. 398.47Ibid., p. 395.



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18 IVAN STRENSKIThe Buddhist doctrine of the individual may not be particularly well-known. In Buddhistparlanceit goes by the name of the doctrine of anattd,

literally the doctrine of no-self. In many ways this ancient teaching con-forms to the anti-substantial and processual view of human personalityLevi-Strauss shares with contemporary physiological psychology.48Forthe early Buddhists human personality enjoys a mere functional unity,which proper insight reveals as a stream of fundamental constituents(khandhaDmpersonally caused by conditions. The Buddhists cast theontological net a bit wider than does Levi-Strauss,because they also holdthat consciousness (vinndna) may be counted as one of these causallyconditioned constituents of the human person.49Moreover, unlike Levi-Strauss, consciousness dominates the more crudelymaterialkhandhdsandcontrols their development and combination. Unlike the perhaps moreconsistently materialistLevi-Strauss,the Buddhists seem to have a greatersense of the ways mind exerts influenceover matter, even as mind dependsupon matter.50No Secrets. Since both Levi-Strauss and the Buddhists share similarcriticalattitudes toward individualism, both also share relatedconvictionswhich rise from this fundamental belief. Both, for example, feel rather littlesensitivity about the privacy of mental processes or about the putativerights of 'privilegedaccess' regardingthe 'contents' of mind. Structuralistslook forward, for example, to the inevitable reductionof 'mind' to 'brain,'and therefore to empirical scrutiny of the mind. As if to rub in theshortcomingsof introspection and privilegedaccess, Levi-Strauss notes thenotorious fallibilityof introspectionand finallyits inabilityto penetratethedeep unconscious levels of mind, from whence, he believes, consciousthought arises. These deep unconscious structural constraints upon ourconscious human thought arebeyond introspective powerssimply becausethey are (for Levi-Strauss, at any rate) beyond mental power: as 'meaty'neurological entities and only susceptible to empirical analysis of thebrain.51The Buddhawas, of course, no neurologist. Yet for him and othersof potent mental development, the minds of others are open to a kind of'empirical'inspection-even to the degree that ordinarilyunconscious andunrecognized mental factors are concerned.52Likewise the minds of theBuddhaand the saints (arahant)areopen to theirown inspection, whichoncertain occasions is claimed to be infallible.53 This indeed makes theBuddha more the epistemological optimist, since for him introspection too

48R. Johanson, The Psychology of Nirvana (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), Ch. XIV.49Ibid., p. 66.50Ibid., and Y. Karunadasa, The BuddhistAnalysis of Matter (Colombo: Department ofCulturalAffairs, 1967), p. 65fn.51I. Strenski, 'Falsifying Deep Structures,'Man(ns), 9,1974: 574-7.52De Silva, Buddhistand FreudianPsychology, pp. 68-71.53Jayatilleke, Early BuddhistTheoryand Knowledge,pp. 423, 437-39, 466.



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LEVI-STRAUSS AND THE BUDDHISTS 19has a lofty status. But it must be admitted that the cognitive powersclaimedby the Buddhists were rather special, and not therefore really comparableto those Levi-Straussmay have had in dismissingthe cognitive pretentionsof introspection. Yet, to the extent these broad epistemological views arecomparable, the Buddha and Levi-Strauss share common views about thesevere limits to claims of 'privilegedaccess,' something one might expectfrom psychological views which place man in a fundamental continuitywith the natural world. Man may be different;but persons are neither sospecial nor so privileged that they can evade the searching scrutiny ofscientist or seer.No Violence. This abhorence of individualism in both the cases ofLevi-Strauss and the Buddhists has one rather paradoxical, yet rational,outcome. In fact, the very oddity of the situation that both Levi-Straussand the Buddhistsshould make the overthrowof ontological individualismthe basis of an ethic of compassion speaksin another way for the legitimacyof our comparison: It is odd, and therefore noteworthy, that both Levi-Strauss and the Buddhists should think oddly in the same way!

Everyreader of Levi-Strausshas no doubt beenimpressedby the prevail-ing mood of sympathy, gentleness, and compassion found in his works.But, until this time, no one has arguedthat such attitudeshave roots deep inthe soil of structuralism's naturalist and anti-individual conception ofhuman nature, yet, I believe, this is so. For Levi-Strauss,even our senseofindividuality restson a more primitivesense of the unity of our own specieswith nature, and this has certain consequences:It isbecausemanoriginallyelthimselfdentical o allthose ikehim(amongwhich,Rousseauexplicitly ays, we must includeanimals) hat he cameto acquire hecapacity o distinguish imselfas he distinguisheshem, .e. to usethediversity fspeciesasconceptual upport orsocialdistinctions.54In turn this perception of our identity with nature calls mankind to theproper sort of intellectual and ethical attitude. For Levi-Strauss this isnothing less than 'compassion.'55 t is compassion whichunifies nature andculture, affectivity and intellectuality. Compassion is that all-embracingattitude which calls all things into an ecological community, into a societyof all living things.Such sensitivity has been well documented in the Buddhist tradition.Early Buddhism, in particular, exemplifies how perhaps once uniquelyconceived social virtues like kindness and compassion might be extendedbeyond the frontiers of humankind to embrace all living beings in a singlecommunity. To abolish the sharp distinction between man and natureentails that one treat what seemed alien as kin.

54C. Levi-Strauss, Totemism(Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 101.55Ibid.



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20 IVAN STRENSKIThis however cuts both ways, it must be admitted, and explains in partthe unavoidable ambivalence both Levi-Straussand the Buddhistsbringtohuman and natural affairs. To wit: to treat men and animals alike, let us

say, may mean to treat men like pigs, or to treat pigs like men! It seemsinvariably true that the practical attempts to realize this sort of monistattitude produce a little of both results: Men are treated somewhat worsethan they may have been;while animals come out somewhat better.This isespecially true, of course, whereman has been accustomed to a position ofsome privilege. But it depends upon the particular nature of the unityconstructed. The situation might be otherwise, for example in the Christiannotion of the overcoming of the division between man and God. Here, manseems to do ratherbetter than he does in his union with the animals, sincehe becomes God-like, to put it rathertoo simply. God, on the other hand,does rather less well, having first to be crucified in the person of Jesus,before his final resurrection and enthronement in glory. In any case, mypoint remains that ambivalence is unavoidable when one attempts toconstruct unity where there was once duality. The effort may be stillworthwhile, although there are likely to be considerable problems oflearning to operate under the new conditions of conceptual merger.In the Buddhist tradition the perilsof this sort of conceptual associationare numerous.They are also instructive.Despite what I said about the focalimportance of compassion, readers of the early Buddhist texts will recallmany instances wherethe Buddha seems compassionate in a most peculiarway. Typically he is unsentimental and even cold in his delivery of kindadvice and information. (One could cite the Story of Kisagotami as nar-rated by the Buddhist commentator, Buddhaghosa, for example).56Yet, ifwe see this behavior in the light of its relation to the sort of conceptualmerger mentioned above, we can understand why the Buddha must becompassionate in the somewhat aloof and remote way that he is. (This isnot moreover merelya function of his lofty status as an enlightened being.The behavior of the Buddha is not only unsentimental in manner, but inthe nature of the advice he gives). The Buddha's prevailing unsentimentalcomportment to men indicates that for the Buddha persons were notprivilegedin the way extremeindividualistswould believe. Buddhist indivi-dualism shows the signs of its having been moderated by counter-indivi-dualist thinking-in particular, both the rejection of a transcendentalegoism and the association of human and non-human life. The other sideofthe coin shows how this association in the Buddhist traditionalso producesparticularly 'humane' treatment of animals. One could cite here Buddhistethical proscriptions against harming animals, as well as the easy wayBuddhist literatureslips into anthropomorphismand the 'patheticfallacy.'

56L. Stryk, Worldof the Buddha(New York: Doubleday, 1969), pp. 173-74.



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LEVI-STRAUSS AND THE BUDDHISTS 21Readers may be surprisedto know that the literature we know as Aesop'sFables originated in the Indian subcontinent, and most probably in theearly forms of the Buddhist literature now known as the Jdtakas. ForBuddhists, there is no 'fallacy' in attributing human qualities to non-human beings. People are special to some degree, it is true. But theBuddhistswould tend to stressthe sense of degreesof differenceratherthanthe notion of an unbridgeable gap between men and animals.In the light of these Buddhist beliefs, Levi-Strauss'sremarksin a lecture,'Structuralism and Ecology,' have clear and powerful bearing:In thelongrun,structuralismeachesusto loveandrespectheecology,becauset ismadeupof living hings,of plantsand animals romwhichsince tbeganmankinddid not only derive ts sustenancebut also, for a long time,its deepestestheticfeelingsas wellas itshighestmoraland intellectualpeculations.57No strayremark.This vision of things fits Levi-Strauss'searlierremarksontotemic distinctions, as well as the antidualist thrust of his overall thinkingabout human nature. In structural thinking, Buddhism would find thesimilar desire to undermine the differences which place man in a sovereignposition of independence and domination over all fellow beings in theworld.

No Salvation? Let me pause here to draw together these psychologicalthemes and connect them with the earlier discussion about the nature ofsociety. There we saw that Levi-Strauss and the Buddhists share the viewthat society is ultimately governed by the same preconventional lawsgoverning nature. Society, just as nature, cannot change beyond the limitsinherentin things:no-self, impermanence,ill-fare,etc. Moreover, society isfounded upon deep disquieting contradictions. Thus it is both wise andprudent for people to prefer a detached attitude to life. For the Buddhiststhis culminates, as we all know, in monastic life-at first cenobitic, butideally anchoritic. The vocation of the hermit also becomes inescapable,because, as we saw, the Buddhists are sociological individualists. In effectthis means that the quality of social life depends directly on the quality ofindividual virtue. People must firststrikeat their own shortcomings. It is inthese personal malignancies that social problems are based. After sensitivepersons have removed themselves from society, the job of uprooting thecauses of ill must begin in earnest. Levi-Strauss's way of putting thisancient Buddhist viewpoint has a sharperturn to it, no doubt the partialresult of his debate with Sartre: Turning Sartre's phrase 'Hell is otherpeople' on its head, Levi-Straussobjects, sayingrather,'Hell is ourselves.'58And further,'In acenturywhereman s bentonthe destruction f innumerableormsof life' t is

57Levi-Strauss, 'Structuralism and Ecology,' 14.58E. R. Leach, Levi-Strauss(London: Fontana, 1970),p. 37.



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22 IVAN STRENSKInecessaryo insist,as do themyths, thata properly ppointedhumanismannotbeginof itsownaccord,butmustplacethe worldbefore ife,lifebeforeman,andtherespect f othersbeforeself-interest.'59

While in substantial agreement with Levi-Strauss,a Buddhistwould goone step further. Indeed, we may make and be our own 'hells.' Deepconstraints structureour thought and behavior in many ways. Yet, someform of serious transformationis possible. Call it what one will, salvation iswithin the reach of people who care to exert themselves to seek it. ForBuddhists this occurs not sentimentally through gracious divine agency,but by rigorous self-effort. Buddhist Nirvdnaconsists partly in an escapefrom the limits imposed by individualism, an escape which is describedlargely in terms of the achievement of knowledge. Levi-Straussseems oftenenough the pure rationalist, an heir to the tradition of enlightenmentwisdom. But at this writing he has not spelled out the benefits of thisknowledge in metaphors of salvation.VI. POSTSCRIPTIn sum, a close comparison of Buddhist and structuralviews of society andself reveal striking parallels, a series of systematically arranged notions.Both bifurcate social nature and dwell on the underlying trans-social,trans-individualdeep constraints that fundamentally structurehuman life.There is no changing these constraints; at best we escape from them.Neither the Buddhists nor Levi-Strauss really accept the possibility ofutopian transformations of reality, whether politically or ontologicallyrealized. From the ethical side, both Buddhists and Levi-Strauss show,perhaps to compensate for the incorrigibility of these constraints, thehuman face of compassion-but based oddly enough on a rejection ofontological individualism. This, in turn, generates in Levi-Straussa senseof relation with the natural world; in the Buddhists, the rejection ofindividualism generates an appetite for Nirvdna.

59Ibid.

Documents

Strenksi 1980. Levi-Strauss and the Buddhists