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Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan District Governance and Accountability Programme Richard Hogg Governance Adviser South Asia Governance and Public Sector Afghanistan

Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

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District Governance and Accountability Programme. Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan. Richard Hogg Governance Adviser South Asia Governance and Public Sector Afghanistan. Project Components. Component 1 - MoF - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in

Afghanistan

District Governance and Accountability Programme

Richard HoggGovernance AdviserSouth Asia Governance and Public SectorAfghanistan

Page 2: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

• Component 1 - MoFFunds flow/service outputs mapping & public perception survey– Links funding, output and perception of services for the first time– PETS approach for Education case study

• Component 2 - IDLGDistrict accountability & sustainability assessment– Accountability in the absence of District Council elections (DDA?)

• Component 3 – ALA (etc.)District level process mapping & optimisation– Adapting BPS models to improve performance in delivery (land

registration focus)

Project Components

Page 3: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

• Better informed dialogue on GIRoA district level service delivery and its role in improving perceptions of government

• Better understanding of the impact of off- and on-budget funding on service delivery• Highlighting the importance of O&M in development funding (building on the August Tadbeer report)• Advancing the use of PETS to analyse Afghan PFM• Development of methodological tools to enable further GIRoA efforts in district level data collection

• Improved understanding of accountability drivers in district level governance• Recommendations to improve GIRoA accountability to public despite lack of progress with District

Council elections• Engagement with IDLG over recommendations of current Presidential Commission (IDLG/MRRD)

examining DCs & DDAs• Fresh perspectives on efforts to promote community engagement fora (DDA/CDC) and civil-military

district level development

• Improved understanding of potential to use process simplification at the district level• Adaptation of standard BPS practices for district level impact (e.g. supporting IARCSC sub-national PAR

and anti-corruption efforts)• Informing World Bank ARTF Justice Sector Reform next phase planning• Informing efforts to improve land-related GIRoA service delivery (USAID LARA following LTERA)

Intended outcomes

Page 4: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

Pilot Districts

Page 5: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

• Collection– Central ‘research fatigue’– Lack of district disaggregation in the Provinces– Lack of clarity in Districts (KII, FGD)– External actors: variety, lack of data, unwilling to share– Operational challenges

• Analysis– Data across levels and actors is inconsistent– Internal inconsistency from single sources (e.g. MoF: AFMIS,

Provincial Budgeting, DAD; uneven systems/application of codes)– Predominance of external budget (where data is weakest)

• Observations– The picture is unclear: impossible to deliver full fund flow

mapping– Pilot effort highlights challenges in understanding district

governance challenges– Concentration on relatively strong data sets and comparison

across districts nevertheless permits an interesting perspective on relevant issues

– View from the Districts is imperfect, but valuable as a unique methodical view from GIRoA’s primary service delivery units

The data challenge

Provincial Govt

District Govt

DGm m m m m

DDA DSh

IP

HealthEducation Agric Rural DevJusticePolice

Beneficiaries

mDistrict Departments:

Staff / EquiptSkills / Vision

Outreach

District Dev AssAsop Distr Shura

Assessmentlevels

IP IP IP IP IPImplementingPartners

SectorAssets

Services

End-UsersPerception

Core budget External Budget

District Accountability Study: Overview of actors & mechanisms assessed

Budget & Fund flows

Sub-national Gvt structure

Page 6: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

Fund Flows: Core Budget at Provincial Level

Overall 1389 operating budget expenditure report shows higher budget allocation to Balkh province (caused by 30% additional line ministries offices than in Laghman & large defense budget), but a lower per capita allocation than Bamyan

6

Balkh Bamyan Laghman21 (salaries) 87 363 409 9 725 559 12 102 58722 (O&M) 9 577 079 8 786 055 679 86925 (assets) 81 781 159 47 776 116 1 856 348

total 178 721 648 66 287 730 14 638 804Pop 1 194 000 411 700 410 300

ratio OB/pc 150 161 36MOF treasury - extrapolated to 12 months - CSO 2008-09 population data

1389 core budget: ratio expenditure/per capita in USD

1389 core development budget: ratio budget/per capita in USD

Balkh Bamyan Laghman130 480 000 85 960 000 11 700 000

Pop 1 194 000 411 700 410 300ratio DB/pc 109 209 29MOF Provincial Budgeting Unit - CSO 2008-09 population data

The core development budget is skewed by the weight of large infrastructure work (roads) in both Bamyan (USD 50m) and Balkh (USD 96m) Bamyan remains better positioned in per capita budget allocation Laghman is significantly underfunded

Page 7: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

Fund Flows: Core Budget Expenditure report at district level

1389 6 month report on O&M shows a very low level of expenditure indicative of 3 things: low budget allocation to O&M poor planning and poor execution of O&M reporting of expenditure still centralised at provincial level (expenditure in cash or in kind made at the provincial level, for the district)

7

1389 salary report shows discrepancies in reporting systems between Balkh and the other 2 districts, as most of Balkh expenditure still get reported directly at provincial level district level data not yet fully reliable but 1390 should give a full picture and better opportunity for per capita comparions Education remains the predominant expenditure line in terms of salaries

1389 core operating/salary expenditure report in USD

Ministry BALKH QARGHAYEE YAKAWLANG Grand Total

Attorney Genera l - 3 748 693 4 441

IDLG/dis trict governor 21 430 30 453 28 226 80 109

Haj & Rel igious - 11 737 8 016 19 753

Agricul ture & Irrigation - 19 137 16 693 35 830

Communication - 3 219 5 654 8 873

Educati on 1 207 799 1 075 266 1 080 647 3 363 712

Energy and Water - 2 583 - 2 583

Finance - 6 788 3 588 10 376

Interior (Pol i ce) - 337 647 - 337 647

Justi ce (Hoqooq) - 4 315 6 481 10 796

Supreme Court - 14 776 13 852 28 628

Grand Total 1 229 230 1 509 670 1 163 848 3 902 748

MOF Treasury AFMIS report 15/1/11 extrapolated to 12 mo - 1 USD = 50 Afs

1389 O&M code 22 - AFMIS report (6 months only)

Balkh Yakawlang QargayeAttorney Genera lIDLG 116 462Haj & Rel igiousPol ice/MOIMin of Education 224 737Provincia l Education 54 800CommunicationAgricul ture and IrrigationEnergy and WaterJusticeSupreme Court

Tota l in Afs 54 800 224 737 116 462Total in USD 1 166 4 782 2 478

MOF Treasury AFMIS report

Page 8: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

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Fund Flows: External BudgetDifficult compilation of data at provincial level

Reports from the aid coordination unit on donors commitments highlight the challenge of reporting on multi-year commitments when funds are managed outside government systems

Cumulative commitments on external budget confirm a stronger focus on Balkh in absolute, but a higher per capita commitment in Bamyan.

The execution rate however is much lower in Bamyan, an indication of the difficult access and limited local capacities. Laghman remains at the bottom of all 3 provinces

1389 government projections of the external budget provides an incomplete picture of external funds allocated to provinces

External funds make government accountability difficult because: Donors don’t report regularly, more often once a year, all financial data compiled at programme level or national level Donors don’t budget nor report with provincial breakdown

1389 external budget: ratio budget/per capita in USD

Balkh Bamyan Laghman6 170 000 10 200 000 190 000

Pop 1 194 000 411 700 410 300ratio XB/pc 5 25 0,46MOF Provincial Budgeting Unit - CSO 2008-09 population data

1387-1389 CERP expenditure report - ratio budget/per capita in USD

Balkh Bamyan Laghman520 000 6 580 000 22 990 000

Pop 1 194 000 411 700 410 300ratio XB/pc 0,44 16 56MOF Aid Coordination Unit - CSO 2008-09 population data

1380-1389 external budget cumulative report in USD

Balkh Bamyan Laghmancommitment 629 098 347 264 851 085 141 339 620disbursement 262 409 263 53 596 139 28 751 819

Pop 1 194 000 411 700 410 300Comm/cap 527 643 344Disb/cap 220 130 70Execution rate 42% 20% 20%MOF DAD Aid Coordination Unit

CERP funds focus predominantly in the South and East, as a tool to support stabilization activities. Laghman is finally receiving some attention (!). A total of USD 58m is committed to the Laghman, incl. USD 10m for Qargaye

CERP has allocated funds to the northern regions only recently.

Page 9: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

The emerging picture (1): outputs [Balkh]Education

• 28 elementary schools (2B, 6G, 20M)• 4 middle schools (boys)• 6 high school (5B, 1G)• 1 madrassa• 30,850 students (59%B, 41%G – G% lower

prov average)• 574 teachers (460M, 114F)• About 25% of the schools do not have

buildings

Infrastructure / Energy• Balkh-Sheberghan road: asphalted Ring Road connecting Kabul to

Herat via the north• Balkh-Dehdadi rd• Bandar Emam rd linking Balkh DC to Mazar + 6 villages• Chamtal rd: Balkh to Chamtal and 10 villages• Aqcha rd: Balkh to 9 villages to Jawzjan• Kelift rd: Balkh to Dawlatabad d + 30 villagesAll roads year round accessible• Electricity supply from Uzbekistan via Mazar• Low end consumption = limited incentive to extend the grid beyond

Balkh DC / NSP instead

Agriculture & Irrigation• Most arable land is irrigated (54,000 ha)• 8 irrigation canals from Balkh river, 100 villages out of

117 have deep wells, very deep water table in some areas = water resource management need continuous improvement

• Diversified agriculture: cotton, sesame, tobacco, rice, wheat- large producer of vegetable/fruits

• 21 cooperatives , most of them not very active

Health/Sanitation

1 District Hospital (50 health staff)1 CHC (2 doctors) /4 BHC (6 doctors)/1 SC (1 doctor)= ratio doctors/population one of the highest in the provinceInsufficient access to clean water considered as a significant issue

Page 10: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

Local Governance: appreciation of the governor in all 3 districts seems relatively high. Mixed review of the justice system (perception survey not the right tool to assess justice issues?)

Health & Education: people generally believe that significant progresses have been made over the past 9 years in health and education, but mostly in terms of infrastructure. Perceptions are less positive when assessing the quality of the services (skills and competences of teachers and health staff, lack of text books), particularly in the field of health since the change of IP since 2010 in the BPHS programme

Economic Activities: Employment remains the #1 concern of Afghans / a certain dependency on what and how much the GIRoA should “provide”: in agriculture for example, farmers across the wealth line mention seeds, improved seeds, livestock, storage, marketing , etc…

Land issues difficult to assess because people are not comfortable disclosing the status of their land (fear of taxation). Others think that if they use the land they are the owner. Process for land registration is possibly influenced by political considerations (positioning of Amlak in DG office)

A limited understanding of the role of NSP: described as a project implementing mechanism more than community consultation/empowerment process. Limited capacity amongst the population to relate to technical pertinence and strategic pertinence of NSP projects. Limited awareness (if any) of DDA

The emerging picture (2): perceptions

70

96

62

68

62

100

30

5

38

32

38

00

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Male Female Male Female Male Female

Balkh Qarghai Yakawlang

Satisfied

Not satisfied

Are you satisfied with the education services provided in your area?

Corruption: although the survey is not looking directly at corruption, the term comes up frequently, as a quasi “proxy” for dissatisfaction. If a service does not exist, or is poorly delivered or implemented, people refer to “corruption” (rather than to technical skills available locally, or financial capacity of the region/country)

Security: most people consider that security is acceptable, even in Qarghaye, for themselves, but not for GIRoA or NGO employees

Page 11: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

YAKAWLANG

BAMYAN BALKH

BALKH QARGHAYE

LAGHMANPopulation: 411,700Number students: 108,870Number schools: 305 (54% 1sh/46% 2sh)Number teachers: 3064 (80% male)

Population: 411,700Number students: 108,870Number schools: 305 (54% 1sh/46% 2sh)Number teachers: 3064 (80% male)

Population: 1,194,000Number students: 383,463Number schools: 441 (37% 1sh/53%2sh/11%3sh)Number teachers: 9523 (51% male)

Population: 1,194,000Number students: 383,463Number schools: 441 (37% 1sh/53%2sh/11%3sh)Number teachers: 9523 (51% male)

Population: 410,300Number students: 173,996Number schools: 230 (86% 1 shift)Number teachers: 3348 (90% male)

Population: 410,300Number students: 173,996Number schools: 230 (86% 1 shift)Number teachers: 3348 (90% male)

Population: 82,300Number students: 23,695Number schools: 58 Number teachers: 501 (47/teacher)DED employees: 11

Population: 112,400Number students: 34,176Number schools: 40 Number teachers: 657 (52/teacher)DED employees: 15

Population: 92,200Number students: 26,513Number schools: 48Number teachers: 571 (46/teacher)DED employees: 10

Focus on Ministry of Education (MoE):• Represents over 15% of the national operating budget and 4% of the development budget;• Employs 67% of the country’s civil servants; • Pilot ministry for setting-up of the budget reform initiatives;

Challenges: Inaccessibility of schools;• Long winter season during which schools closed;• Lack of city power in province (use of generators and fuel).

Challenges: • Security concerns;• Number of schools that run 2 or 3 shifts;• Insufficient staff at district level.

Challenges: • Large number of schools with no/insufficient building;• Insurgency/ security concerns;• Large gender disparities in teachers.

Population data from CSO Statistical Yearbook 2009-10 (projections used), local estimates of district population is much higher;EMIS 1388 data used for number teachers, schools and students;EQUIP data provided by Kabul EQUIP-Office

Sectoral example: Education PETS

Page 12: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

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Salaries and wages: ✔ Major improvements in terms of timeliness of payment of salaries to teachers (over 80% receive on time in past 3 months); ✔ Processes are understood at all levels; forms are filed and accessible;

✖ Late disbursement of funds identified as major reason for delay in recent months;✖ AFMIS system technical problems slows processing at Mustoufiat;

Operations and Maintenance:All level officials are aware of the paucity of budget allocation for this componentSchool level: ✔ Knowledge about needs, Use of community resources to seek solutions to O&M problems;

✖ Lack of skills for planning and prioritizing needs; Lack of confidence in official processes.District level: ✖ Lack of sufficient and qualified staff to process requests from schools and those of the office;

✖ Past experience of not accessing funds diminish trust in the process.Province level: ✖ Weak planning skills for pre-empting needs of offices; Lack of feedback regarding inputs that are provided to the MoE.

✖ Decisions involve various actors (Mustoufi, Governor) and thus depend upon relations between officials; EQUIP school construction: Completion is impeded by various types of bottlenecks that combine differently in provinces;✖ Procedural bottlenecks (inadequacy of disbursement of installments, lack of physical funds); ✖ Exogenous bottlenecks (duration of construction season, accessibility for transport of material, security constraints);Areas of focus for future;✔ Differentiated assessment of the cost of construction in each province;✔ Define role of the shuras and school management committees.Textbook distribution:

✔ Coherent process for planning and distribution of adequate number of textbooks; ✔ Improvement in quality of the textbooks in 1389;

✖ At provincial and district level lack of adequate staff for counting and storage of books; Insufficient transport budgets.✖ At school level lack of staff to estimate number of books required; No budget for transport from district to schools.

Education PETS (2)

Page 13: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

Accountability features [Balkh]District Level Organizations Accountability Features of District Level Organizations

Delegation Finance Performance Information Enforcement

District Government Offices

Services related to education, health, etc.

Funding support from national government, mostly for salaries

Except for health service, performance of services is not monitored

No formal reporting on performance of services. Occasional citizen complaints but no formal process for resolution

Except for health services, very few quantity and quality measures of outputs are in place therefore very weak enforcement

District Development Assemblies

Predominantly social development projects

Organizing, training and project funding support from national government

Proper documentation of privately contracted projects

Members provide feedback on quality and quantity of works accomplished

Members decide on impact and next sets of project plans

Unity ShuraSecurity and stability but could also cover other areas of concern

None documented but possibly privately supported by district governor and selected leaders

No formally agreed upon base for performance, but linked to level of insurgency in the area

Exchanges of ideas on occasional meetings

Very little evidence of enforcement of decisions agreed upon

Page 14: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

• Traditional organizations in sub district levels have accountability relationships that appears to be robust but not properly documented

• Non traditional organizations in sub district levels have accountability relationships that are still emerging but whose documentation is in place, most especially the CDCs

• DDAs and CDCs have same project ID and implementation tasks, with CDC mechanisms appearing to have better documentation and process checks and balances

• Very weak accountability relationships of all district level organizations• Recommendations of IDLG/MRRD Commission to consider lack of DC

elections could change the status of DDAs radically• Context of other district level initiatives, such as ASOP, DDP, RAMP-UP,

ASGP

Accountability functions: initial observations

Page 15: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

Processes: focus on potential delivery improvements

StakeholderValue add/ Non

Value Added Time (hrs)

Actual Work / Wait Time (hrs)

Total Processing Time

Potential Streamlining Opportunity

Provincial Government

(2 VA /4 NVA)*

16.0/3.0 8.33/10.67 19.0 Province ratio of work to wait is better than District but Province has disproportionate share of NVA*

District Government

(15 VA/3 NVA)

68.75/40 13/95.75 108.75 District has the majority of value-adding steps but a disproportionate share of wait time

Public

(7 VA/2 NVA)

7.5/0.75 5.5/2.75 8.25 The public is required to have a minimum 17 interactions with 6 different government stakeholders. Need to minimize the interactions and variety of officials.

TOTAL 92.25/43.75=136 hrs 26.83/109.17 = 136 hrs 136 hrs

• Land disputes key driver of conflict: goal of improved delivery in land registration• Sub-national efficiency gains possible, in addition to central policy support and informing donors in the field• Methodology for improving any district level administrative service delivery process

Page 16: Strengthening District Level Accountability and Service Delivery in Afghanistan

• Capacity of District Level Administration– Short working hours; staffing issues– Operational concerns (O&M funding issues)– Limited assets– Poor information flows– Incoherent and variable delivery processes

• Cost effectiveness– Lack of consistency in administrative/accountability functions– Wages and O&M costs relative to actual services delivered– Correlation of funds to outputs to perception– Competition and overlap in functions of District bodies– Strength of external budget undermines District administration

• Sustainability– Cost of maintaining structure of 400+ districts– Transition context– Policy environment: delivering methodical data– Models for GIRoA systematic data gathering and analysis in future

• Potential improvements– Undermining corruption arising due to process ‘coping’ – Better integration of District level administration into wider GIRoA systems– Rational approach to improving GIRoA administrative (not political) harmonisation and responsiveness to local needs at its lowest unit level– More intelligent basis for GIRoA sub-national public administration reform efforts– Justification for better donor information sharing and coordination; building in awareness of challenges at District level

Emerging headline issues