STRATEGY & PARTNER WORKSHOP AND IKI WORKSHOP (24-26 … · 2018. 5. 11. · STRATEGY & PARTNER WORKSHOP AND IKI WORKSHOP (24-26 April 2018) Report Version: 04.05.2018 The Strategy

STRATEGY & PARTNER WORKSHOP

AND IKI WORKSHOP (24-26 April 2018)

Report

Version: 04.05.2018

The Strategy & Partner Workshop (24-26 April) convened all Climate Transparency partners and affiliated

experts to discuss Climate Transparency’s 2018 strategy, the concept and indicator set of the Brown to Green

report and communication activities.

The IKI Workshop (26 April) convened all partners involved in Climate Transparency’s IKI project. It discussed IKI

guidelines. The policy paper working groups under IKI had a kick-off session to coordinate their work.

Secretariat of Climate Transparency: [1] HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform gGmbH | Germwanwatch e.V. Web: www.climate-transparency.org

Content

A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... 2

B. WORKSHOP SESSIONS ............................................................................................... 7

1. Overall strategy of Climate Transparency ....................................................................... 7

2. Indicators: Introduction, data availability, climate policy & NDCs ............................... 15

3. Indicators: Adaptation ................................................................................................... 20

4. Indicators: Emissions and decarbonization ................................................................... 23

5. Indicators: Just transition .............................................................................................. 30

6. Impacting the debate – national and international communication ............................ 34

7. Governance of Climate Transparency ........................................................................... 40

8. Indicators: Financing the transition .............................................................................. 47

9. IKI policy papers with peer comparisons ...................................................................... 57

C. ANNEX – PARTICIPANT LIST ..................................................................................... 59

http://www.climate-transparency.org/


A. Executive Summary All Climate Transparency partners1 and further experts convened on 24-26 April 2018 in Berlin to

discuss Climate Transparency’s strategy for 2018, communication, governance, indicator set of the

Brown to Green Report and the policy papers developed under the IKI project. A detailed presentation

of the discussions per sessions is contained in the document.

The conclusions and agreements by partners of the Strategy & Partner Workshop 2018 per session

as perceived by the Secretariat are:

Overall strategy of Climate Transparency

• There was a broad agreement to the objectives for 2018 – 2020 and objectives for 2018.

However, Climate Transparency will not try to influence the G20 or UNFCCC process, but use

the G20 and the UNFCCC as a hook to stimulate more ambitious national climate action and

international negotiation ambitions.

• The report this year will be published a month before the G20 summit and COP, so it can be

tailored to either event in the national communication. For next year, the Secretariat will make

a proposal for the launch of the report as an updated report is feasible to be produced before

the G20 Summit in Japan in June 2019.

• Climate Transparency partners in different countries have to make additional efforts to tailor

the report to the national context and add policy recommendations etc. when engaging in a

briefing meeting with high level officials to bridge the gap between data and national policy

debates. If considered helpful by the next Steering Committee meeting, a regular exchange

between partners on strategy development for briefing meetings with stakeholders (e.g. G20

sherpas) could be institutionalized.

• Explore how this year’s report could include qualitative case studies illustrating lessons learnt

of some countries to increase peer learning and capacity building for implementation.

• Climate Transparency partners will think about how to make the report more attractive for

countries and stakeholder for whom climate is not a priority.

• Climate Transparency will explore how to include a narrative/describing text in the country

profiles this year (more qualitative explanations and summarizing paragraph at the

beginning).

Indicators: Introduction, data availability, climate policy & NDCs

• Internationally comparable databases, namely Enerdata, CAT, PRIMAP, IEA will be used in the

first place in order to allow for comparability. In case more recent data or more coherent data

from national sources is available, this data will be preferred (= option 1). All partners will

compare their national data with the Enerdata data set as a first step.

1 Jiang Kejun, Energy Research Institute, China, participated via video conference. A list of participants can be found in the Annex.



• The decision where to use national data and where international databases has to be done

indicator by indicator.

• Partners will have more time than last year to double check data.

• The Secretariat of Climate Transparency will explore the development of a background paper

tackling the issue of data difference in national and international sources and the difficulty to

draw comparisons. This paper could be used to feed into the international debate around the

global stock take.

The policy performance section of the Brown to Green report will include the following

NDCs

• Use the CAT for rating NDC ambition.

• Use the CAT to determine whether the recent policy mix is in line with the country's NDC.

• Add a paragraph to make a qualitative judgment on the NDC, NDC updates and

implementation. In countries where Climate Transparency has no partner this paragraph will

entail the qualitative information on NDCs presented by Climate Watch.

Policies

• Adapt the policy evaluation table to the national circumstances (e.g. only show policies

relevant for the national context) and rate them regarding Paris compatibility. Explore

whether adding a fourth category (categories so far: No policy, policy not Paris compatible,

policy Paris compatible) to differentiate policies that are not Paris compatible.

• Include CCPI policy evaluation to show the overall policy performance.

Expand the time for data review for the partners.

Indicators: Adaptation

• The adaptation working group led by Swati Agarwal will look for more specific indicators on

vulnerability, policies and finance (domestic and international).

• The working group will provide a first draft of indicators for the 2017 report in the Steering

Group Call on June 7 and a final data set mid-July.

• If there are international data sets with comparable data on adaptation, these will be included

for all G20 countries. Qualitative data will be provided for the countries where Climate

Transparency has partners. Each partner will gather own country data.

• The working group will continue to operate throughout the year for next year’s report.

Indicators: Emissions and decarbonization

• Germanwatch and NewClimate Institute will consider all arguments raised and come up with

a new list of indicators to be discussed.

• Emissions and decarbonization sections will be shown together (not separated as in last year’s

report).



Zero-carbon and new renewable energy sources

• Display of fossil fuels, new renewables and zero carbon technologies side by side.

o CCPI evaluation for new RE, simplified rating for fossils and zero-carbon (same as coal

rating last year)

• Attempt to distinguish between sustainable and non-sustainable biomass.

• Review if possible to differentiate between large and small hydro.

Sectoral indicators

• Include new indicators on the forest and agriculture sectors.

• Differentiate between freight and passenger transport.

• Rate countries against G20 average and/or against Paris compatibility.

Share of coal/renewables and energy use per capita

• Energy use and intensity indicators will only be displayed with current level, trend arrow and

rating.

• Explore how to balance the trend rating esp. in developing countries.

In general, partners could add policy assessments to give more background information to the country

scorecards.

Indicators: Just transition

• The just transition working group led by Andrew Marquard will provide a first draft of

indicators for the 2017 report in the Steering Group Call on June 7 and a final data set mid-

July.

• If there are international data sets with comparable data on just transition, these will be

included for all G20 countries. Qualitative data will be provided for the countries where

Climate Transparency has partners. Each partner will gather own country data.


Impacting the debate – national and international communication

• Report will be finalized mid-October and launched 1st/2nd week of November, ideally in all

countries at the same time/day.

• Create a summary of the country data as new frontpage of the country profiles.

• An option could be to create a positive messaging with good policy examples of different

countries to counterbalance the 1.5 IPPC report media messages.

• The Secretariat will put all country partners in touch with the GSCC expert in their country at

beginning of June so that partners can start to develop national communication strategies.

• The Secretariat will form a communication working group together with GSCC and partners.



• Explore common COP event with UNEP Gap Report hosted by Indonesia. Fabby will need a

concept note by June.

• Explore early presentation at World Bank Annual meetings.

Governance of Climate Transparency

• No changes to the governance structure were agreed except:

o Keep separation between Partners and Observers and delete requirement to receive

funding through the Secretariat to bring own funding

o Government cannot be Observers, unless they are funders

o Secretariat Germanwatch & HVGP endorsed

o “Criteria” and “Considerations” for new Partners will be merged (proposal will be

made by Secretariat and presented to the Steering Group in one of the next Calls)

• The governance structure will be reviewed in 2019.

• Overview of budget 2018 will be made available to the Steering Group as soon as it is available.

• The Co-Chairs Alvaro Umaña and Peter Eigen unanimously were re-elected for a 2-year term

(next election in 2020).

Indicators: Financing the transition

• Checklist. Investigate what is possible, including data availability from ECF, the UNEP enquiry

and Green Action Tracker, followed by two paragraph narrative in each country sheet written

by partners.

• Investment attractiveness of RE. Make a decision to include RECAI as Allianz not available but

give space in country sheets to highlight any discrepancies.

• Fossil fuel subsidies. Figure should show absolute values (broken down by production and

consumption). Country partners to provide feedback on the data, as well as guidance on

relevant timeframes for showing trends.

• Carbon revenues. Review I4CE data and methodology, and as with other indicators include the

G20 average benchmark. Present in absolute values on the same scale as FFS.

• Effective carbon rates. Review the OECD methodological approach, as well as treatment of

implicit carbon pricing and sectoral (emissions). Check with the OECD on data updates and

Stern and Stiglitz outputs for benchmarks.

• Green and brown public finance for energy. Obtain OCI data for G20 countries and present

green and brown data (domestic and international), with the G20 average benchmark.

Circulate list of public finance institutions covered by the database, caveat in country sheets.

• International provision of finance. Request access to the UNFCCC international public

provision dataset, seek better understanding of the MDB data we can extract from the OECD

DAC CRS. Propose the alternative sheet in the developing country sheets that can help the

country narrative around international public finance.



• Circulate the method for the removed indicator on emissions of new investments in the power

sector, noting that we have no updated data this year and NewClimate found method

challenges.

IKI policy papers with peer comparisons

• The following policy paper working groups have been established: 1) Energy transition

(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), 2) Coal phase out (China, India (?), Indonesia, South Africa) and 3)

Subsidies/finance (India & South Africa (?) – tbd)

• The group coordinator will coordinate regular phone calls of the groups.

• The groups report on their work in every Steering Group Call.

• The groups will present a time line of their work in the Steering Group Call on June 7.

Finally, it was agreed to have a working meeting at COP24, 5 December, 3 pm until dinner.



B. Workshop sessions

1. Overall strategy of Climate Transparency Gerd Leipold, Secretariat Climate Transparency, presented the overall strategy of Climate

Transparency for 2018. Fabby Tumiwa, Institute for Essential Service Reform (IESR), Indonesia, Jorge

Villarreal, Iniciativa Climática de México (ICM) and Andrew Marquard, Energy Research Center, South

Africa, responded to the presentation and provided their country perspectives. Based on these inputs,

the workshop participants split up in four break-out groups to further discuss the strategic direction of

Climate Transparency. The main discussion points and agreements are summarized below.

i. Input – Gerd Leipold

Environmental analysis

Political environment

• Talanoa Dialogue likely to appeal for higher ambition without concrete steps. Change in

ambition will only come from national debate.

• Climate and green finance moves mainstream. Those central for climate for whom climate is

not central become more important.

• Argentina G20 Presidency to concentrate (with respect to climate) on

o Infrastructure investment

o Development of climate resilient infrastructure and job creation

o Long-term low emission strategies

o Aligning international finance flows with the NDCs

and long-term strategies

o Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies

o Renewable energy and energy efficiency

• Japan and Saudi Arabia G20 Presidencies 2019 and 2020

o Priorities yet unclear, but likely that climate has lower priority

o Strong role of US (chairs G7 in 2020)

Transparency initiatives for climate

• Initiative for Climate Action (ICAT)

o Provision of tools and support to measure and assess the impacts of national climate

actions

o Implementing partners: UNEP DTU Partnership, Verra and WRI

• Climate Watch (flagship project of NDC partnership)



o Provision of online tool to create customized mitigation and adaptation country data

for policy makers and other stakeholders

o Managed by WRI in cooperation with various partners

• Partnership on Transparency in the Paris Agreement

o Practical exchanges between countries on the transparency rules of the Paris

Agreement

o Launched by South Africa, South Korea and Germany, supported by several partners

• Initiatives focus on capacity building and provide no country rankings and ratings

Overview of climate action assessments



Theory of change

Objectives 2018 – 2020

The long-term objectives of Climate Transparency are

• To stimulate the national debate in G20 countries in order to raise ambition in line with the

1.5/2 degree target through providing the most comprehensive, concise and comparable

information about the climate action of G20 countries.

• To add to the ‘ratchet mechanism’ (Facilitative Dialogue 2018, NDC submission 2020, Global

Stocktake 2023) through country comparisons and contrast it with what countries ought to do

for the 1.5/2 degree target.

• Influence the G20 countries to put greater emphasis on climate, take steps to reduce fossil fuel

subsidies and promote low-carbon, climate-resilient finance within the G20 process.

Objectives 2018

Make the Brown to Green Report more attractive and impactful through:

• More recent data

• A move towards NDC assessment

• Better coverage of adaptation and just transition

• More consistency in the report

• List of existing climate assessment (indices and ratings) in the Annex

Explore whether a net carbon price could be defined for inclusion in 2019

Improve communication through:

• Decentralised outreach in partners’ countries

• Using more communication channels and using them more actively



USP of Climate Transparency

Climate Transparency differs from similar initiatives by

• Providing the most comprehensive yet concise overview of climate actions of countries

• Enabling comparisons between countries (including with ratings and ranking) which stimulate

the national debate

• Ensuring a balanced global perspective through its network of partners

• Having the ability to influence the national debate through a national partner network and

through targeted (direct) communication

• Describing brown alongside green and not restricting itself to the green developments

• Not doing its own research, but bringing together the work of others

ii. Input – Fabby Tumiwa

What do policy makers expect from the report?

• How do we stimulate consistent national debate with the report? We had a nice launch with

good high-level participation in Indonesia, but having a debate based on the report is not easy.

It is crucial to put emphasis on continuous national debate beyond launch of report, not only

getting media attention.

• Policy makers in Indonesia always want to see good news, they are the ones that have to

provide answers and input to the questions of our president. They also want to know where

Indonesia stands out in the G20 comparison. Last year’s report showed that Indonesia

commitment on fossil fuel subsidy reforms is unique. Government representatives were proud

of this as the report confirmed that what they were doing was helpful. This provides them with

a confirmation to continue. But we also need to show how they can improve in other areas,

e.g. green bonds, Indonesia has green bond issued this year.

• We have to think about individual ways to link the report to the actual policy discussion in each

country. Last year, the new Indonesian energy minister back slided on renewable energy, so

we could use report to provide counter arguments.

• Government stakeholders in Indonesia had a lot of questions on data. We should try to show

more transparently where the data is coming from.

Communication

• The media attention on the Brown to Green Report was good, but bringing it up in a more

constructive debate is not easy. You have to communicate with the right person at the right

level.

• I had an interview on CNN and the report went to the president’s office. The president included

information of the report in its G20 statement.

• Audience always had questions on the interpretation of data and main messages. We should

make it simpler and include more visualisations.



• We have to think about an information package that can be used by other NGOs and media.

iii. Input – Jorge Villarreal

• Dual nature of Climate Transparency: Climate Transparency is on the one hand a coalition of

different experts gathering data and making a smart report, but on the other hand with its

national partners, it is also a political group (we make politics!). This strategy document reflects

both, but political component should be reflected in a clearer and transparent way.

• The narrative of the report is closely linked to the G20, but why and how does the G20 matter

nowadays? What is the impact of the G20, why do we want to be linked to G20 and not to

other agendas? E.g. in Mexico, the OECD agenda is more powerful than G20 agenda. Or why

not make a presentation at Davos at World Economic Forum?

• We are focusing on impacting ambition of countries. But country comparisons can be really

helpful to increase the capacity of a country to implement policies by sharing lessons learned.

• How to position climate change in countries with democracy and poverty challenges, where

climate is not a priority on the public agenda?

iv. Input – Andrew Marquard

• G20: So far we used the G20 as a very useful hook and now we engage with the G20 process

itself. But what are our goals here? Do we want to achieve domestic goals through pressures

by the G20 or influence the final G20 statement? How do we spend resources in IKI allocated

on G20 work, e.g. G20 sherpa staff briefing meetings?

• Domestic impact: If we want to raise ambition at the national level, 1) the focus on the release

of report is short sighted and superficial, we need a theory where this change comes from,

what is the effect of showing infographic to stakeholders? A lot of our budget goes to briefing

meetings with high level stakeholders. I am not sure if this is best approach, this needs a

country-driven and more programmatic approach, aiming to connect the very detailed set of

information to actual national processes.

• Theory of change: The impact depicted is too ambitious and simplistic. It also raises questions

about national sovereignty.

• Qualitative information: The report provides an enormous amount of quantitative standalone

information. We should pull out case studies on each country that provide more in-depth

qualitative information.

DISSCUSSION POINTS

Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis

• The Argentinian government is interested in the report and cares about the results. It has reservations on the actuality of the data.



• Japan and Saudi Arabia having the G20 Presidency in 2019/20 are rather likely to talk about adaptation than mitigation. This is why the Argentinian put adaptation high on the agenda to ensure the continuity of climate discussions within the G20.

Anne Olhoff

• I am coordinating the UNEP Gap Report which has a similar mission as the Brown to Green Report. In the last edition we included a chapter on the G20 countries performance and a chapter on NDCs and how to close the gap.

• There would be great opportunities to explore a cooperation and have common outreach activities, e.g. a common event at COP24.

The four break-out groups discussed the following two questions:

• What are the lessons learned from 2017 and how can Climate Transparency improve its work?

• Do you agree with the three objectives of Climate Transparency referring to the national level, G20 and UNFCCC?

Spring group (Rapporteur: Jan Burck, Germanwatch)

• We have to ensure to use the report’s findings more than once a year. This could be done with policy papers under IKI etc.

• Comparability of countries and G20 average is not always so useful. In national contexts sometimes comparisons are not so important. We need to decide indicator by indicator whether we can use national data that is not comparable.

• The G20 as a body does not play a major role in a lot of countries, not good angle for the publication. We have to think about how will this be dealt with in decentralized strategies.

• We will have more impact if we include more recent data.

Summer group (Rapporteur: Jasmin Cantzler, Climate Analytics)

• Partners should be earlier included in the report production than last year, particular in drafting the country profile, not only reviewing it.

• In Mexico, ICM used the report’s findings to advance certain policy proposals in meetings with government officials, the report was often a hook starting the conversation. The inclusion of most recent data and trends are most important to support policy proposals.

• Climate Transparency could provide the raw data of the graphs on the website so that stakeholders can create their own graphs, e.g. with just two countries.

• Climate Transparency should not engage in the Talanoa Dialogue but rather create external pressure by presenting a G20 stocktake in the media.

• It is unclear how Climate Transparency engages in the G20 process and what the objectives are. We will not influence the content of the final communique which would need more technical efforts.



Autumn group (Rapporteur: Eduardo Ferreira, World Bank)

• When developing the report, we should always keep in mind our stakeholder engagement on the national level.

o Re-emphasize the report will be available again this year

o Start with their priorities and how the report can help

• The narrative of the report could be improved by linking the different sections better. This year the narrative could focus on the NDC ambition cycle. We should not include policy recommendations, which can be added by partners in national contexts.

• Climate Transparency should focus on countries and not the G20 and UNFCCC processes although these processes can serve as a hook to speak with those not central for climate as well (e.g. G20 sherpa staff)

• An advice would be to include more benchmarking practices to be included in report.

Winter group (Rapporteur: Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis, FARN)

• Communication: report too comprehensive to translate it for country/media, there needs to be an effort to tailor the national messaging more to the national context.

• Provide infographics as they are easier to understand.

• Include a narrative/describing text in the country profiles, as only providing the data does sometimes not mean much to stakeholders.

• Include best performances and worst performance of a country at the beginning of the title page of each country profile (good way to start communication).

• This year we should use more time for preparing a communication strategy (international and national) and establish media relations.

Agreements

• There was a broad agreement to the objectives for 2018 – 2020 and objectives for 2018. However, Climate Transparency will not try to influence the G20 or UNFCCC process, but use the G20 and the UNFCCC as a hook to stimulate more ambitious national climate action and international negotiation ambitions.

• The report this year will be published a month before the G20 summit and COP, so it can be tailored to either event in the national communication. For next year, the Secretariat will make a proposal for the launch of the report as an updated report is feasible to be produced before the G20 Summit in Japan in June 2019.

• Climate Transparency partners in different countries have to make additional efforts to tailor the report to the national context and add policy recommendations etc. when engaging in a briefing meeting with high level officials to bridge the gap between data and national policy debates. If considered helpful by the next Steering Committee meeting, a regular exchange between partners on strategy development for briefing meetings with stakeholders (e.g. G20 sherpas) could be institutionalized.

• Explore how this year’s report could include qualitative case studies illustrating lessons learnt of some countries to increase peer learning and capacity building for implementation.



• Climate Transparency partners will think about how to make the report more attractive for countries and stakeholder for whom climate is not a priority.

• Climate Transparency will include a narrative/describing text in the country profiles this year (more qualitative explanations and summarizing paragraph at the beginning).



2. Indicators: Introduction, data availability, climate policy & NDCs In this session, Jan Burck, Germanwatch and Niklas Höhne, NewClimate Institute, Germany 1)

introduced the suggested major changes for this year’s Brown to Green Report, 2) laid out the options

to integrate more recent data and 3) proposed a structure for the climate policy section of this year’s

report including an NDC assessment.

Cyril Cassisa, Enerdata, introduced the work of Enerdata.

i. Introduction

The Brown to Green Report is the most comprehensive yet concise of its kind.

To keep it concise, the 2018 report should make a careful selection of indicators based on the

following criteria:

• The leading question of the report could be: “How well is the country doing in its transition

towards a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy in line with the Paris Agreement?)”

• Showing recent changes and answering whether there is a shift from brown to green

• Reflecting a global perspective

Major changes for this year’s report suggested are:

• Including more recent data in all sections, particularly in the emissions and decarbonisation

section, if there is consistency with the national data of partners (to be checked)

• Country profiles, where the first page gives a coherent and concise overview of a country`s

performance

• Adding new indicators covering just transition and adaptation (depending on the results of the

working groups)

• Revising the narrative and indicator selection of the finance section to include indicators on 1)

financial policies, 2) fiscal policies and 3) public finance based on the discussions Climate

Transparency conducted with finance stakeholders in London in 2017

• Including a more detailed assessment of countries` NDCs in the policy performance section

• Greater consistency and alignment between the country profiles and the summary report

ii. Data availability and Enerdata

In the past, the Brown to Green Report has used PRIMAP, CAT and IEA data for most of its indicators.

Those sources have different publication dates and would be able to provide e.g. GHG data for 2015

as well as renewable and energy use data for 2016. Without a different source, the report will show

2015 data for some of its most important indicators.



To increase the actuality of the report, contact with Enerdata, a French for-profit data company, has

been established. Enerdata signaled that it could provide Energy Use and CO2, sectoral and RE data

covering 2017. The consistency and comparability of the Enerdata data with national data is yet to be

checked by Centro Clima, ERC, ERI, FARN, ICM, IESR and TERI for their countries.

Partners also wished that more country databases should be used in the report to increase the usability

of the report in the national debates. This would mean that sometimes it would not be possible to

calculate G20 averages or to make direct country comparisons. The decision where to use national

data and where international databases – or both next to each other - has to be done indicator by

indicator.

DISCUSSION POINTS

Gabriel Blanco

• Has the EDGAR database been considered? Jan Burck: Yes, the EDGAR database is

included in PRIMAP.

William Wills

• For Brazil, the Enerdata information is consistently 23-27% higher than the national data

from 1990 to 2016.

Andrew Marquard

• Almost all the data from big international data comes normally from national datasets. We

could produce a quick guide that navigates through different data sources on a country by

country basis to show what are the best sources and why.

Jorge Villarreal

• The report is used to support the policy proposals of national partners. National and

international data should therefore be coherent and up-to-date. One could visualize how

the different data sources come together.

Bert Metz

• Is recent data more important than comparable data? We could use the latest national

data and harmonize it. William Will: I support this idea.

Eduardo Ferreira

• It is more important to have comparable data than recent data. The first step would be to

agree on the principle (data has to be comparable).

Gabriel Blanco

• Being transparent suggests to have everything on the table: National and international

datasets likewise. Then, the government can decide which data to take.

Gerd Leipold



• Harmonizing data sounds good but the harmonization of all the data will be undoable for

Climate Transparency. Comparisons are central for the mission of Climate Transparency.

• Putting various sources of information next to each other is counterproductive because it

then can be argued that we don’t have a coherent message.

Andrew Marquard

• Most G20 countries have communicated quite recent data but there is still a gap of

around four years. The most pragmatic approach might be to develop a policy brief about

transparency (how did we deal with data, how did we generate the data etc.) would be

appropriate to check where the discrepancies between international and national data

come from.

Niklas Höhne

• He sums up that there are four options:

1) Start with a common dataset and check whether there is country agreement (only

show either national or international data)

2) Use national data by default and add exceptions for international data when

needed.

3) Starting with national greenhouse gas inventories and harmonize (not doable

under Climate Transparency)

4) Put everything on the table (This could be too confusing)

AGREEMENTS

• Internationally comparable databases, namely Enerdata, CAT, PRIMAP, IEA will be used in

the first place in order to allow for comparability. In case more recent data or more coherent

data from national sources is available, this data will be preferred (= option 1). All partners

will compare their national data with the Enerdata data set as a first step.

• The decision where to use national data and where international databases has to be done

indicator by indicator.

• Partners will have more time than last year to double check data.

• The Secretariat of Climate Transparency will explore the development of a background

paper tackling the issue of data difference in national and international sources and the

difficulty to draw comparisons. This paper could be used to feed into the international

debate around the global stock take.

iii. Climate policies & NDCs

Previous indicators:

• Policy rating table: rating whether existing policies are in line with Paris Agreement

• Climate Change Performance Index expert’s policy evaluation



• Compatibility of climate targets with a 1.5°C/2°C scenario (Climate Action Tracker)

• Being on track to meet the NDC (Climate Action Tracker)

Suggested improvements:

• Policy rating table: Using the same methodology as last year? Or integrating a fourth category

on implementation?

• It is suggested that this section includes a NDC assessment, which will require a special

narrative. The assessment will focus on comparing the ambition of NDCs (shown by the Climate

Action Tracker and the Climate Change Performance Index) with current policy visualized by

the policy rating table. The most important element of the assessment is to show whether

current policy is in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Data sources: CCPI, RISE, CAT

DISCUSSION POINTS


• Adaptation should be included in the NDC assessment as well.

• CAT alone does not necessarily reflect changes made to NDCs that do not affect the

emissions target. The Brown to Green Report should also reflect on the policy changes

made within revised NDCs.

Gabriel Blanco

• We should evaluate NDC goals vis a vis their respective implementation for each country

and make clear that the policy table shows the Paris compatibility and not the NDC

implementation.

• The policy for a certain NDC needs to be evaluated. The NDC goals highly depend on their contexts.

Andrew Marquard

• Climate Transparency is doing two things at once: the compatibility with the Paris Agreement (CAT) and general climate policy assessment (CCPI). Additionally, the new element would be to assess the NDC implementation. The question is what is effectively an economy-wide mitigation target? There are many different targets. It is important to make clear how to get to the one that is used by CAT in order to asses this one.

Cyril Cassisa

• For policy implementation, this specification is very useful. Concerning the categories, it is

important that in case there are more categories, the colours need to stay the same ones

so that the progress of different countries can be shown over the years.

Jorge Villarreal

• There could be three pillars:

o The CAT report (NDC assessment)

o The CCPI report (general assessment of the climate change policy but not the

implementation)



o Own evaluation (assessment of NDC implementation)

-> Do these proposals allow us to make an assessment of the implementation or not? We need to be careful not to mingle these three narratives and clearly distinguish between them.

Swati Agarwal

• Mitigation, adaptation and capacities (all three elements) need to be included in the NDC

assessment.

• Most targets are highly dependent on technology and finance. It is useful to integrate this

as well.

Fabby Tumiwa

• How will Climate Transparency deal with a case as Indonesia that does not have an official

2050 emissions reduction/coal phase-out target set by the government? There is a trend

visible but no official target (which might create problems for the policy table).

• To whom belong the emissions from foreign countries? What is the boundary?

Eduardo Ferreira

• What is the objective of this section and whom are you targeting? I understood the focus

here is NDC, so I would not drop NDC assessment and its NDC implementation.

AGREEMENTS

The policy performance section of the Brown to Green report will include the following

NDCs

• Use the CAT for rating NDC ambition.

• Use the CAT to determine whether the recent policy mix is in line with the country's NDC.

• Add a paragraph to make a qualitative judgment on the NDC, NDC updates and implementation. In countries where Climate Transparency has no partner this paragraph will entail the qualitative information on NDCs presented by Climate Watch.

Policies

• Adapt the policy evaluation table to the national circumstances (e.g. only show policies relevant for the national context) and rate them regarding Paris compatibility. Explore whether adding a fourth category (categories so far: No policy, policy not Paris compatible, policy Paris compatible) to differentiate policies that are not Paris compatible.

• Include CCPI policy evaluation to show the overall policy performance.

Expand the time for data review for the partners.



3. Indicators: Adaptation Swati Agarwal, The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), India, gave a presentation and led the

discussions on including adaptation indicators in the 2018 Brown to Green Report.

Why an adaptation focus in the Brown to Green Report?

Influence on Non-G20 countries

Balanced reflection on Mitigation and Adaptation

Growing significance given future COPs

Address issue of equity

Enhance Assessments of global impacts

Provide information on national actions

Ideas and suggestions

Development of Adaptation Metrics

Indicators to Measure Status and Progress

These could be used to analyze and compare adaptation across G20 countries

There are some possible entry points

And also challenges and opportunities

Possible entry points

• Exposure & vulnerability

o Indicators to measure risks (eg. http://www.emdat.be/ )

o E.g. Frequency of extreme events, number of deaths due to heat wave, crop loss

(monetary) due to weather extremes, fresh water shortages (no. of days where

supply was less than required), loss (human life, infrastructure and economy) due to

floods like Chennai 2015, Mumbai 2005, climate risk disclosure by companies

• Sectorial assessment & needs

o Indicators to measure adaptation finance (eg. https://www.adaptation-

fund.org/apply-funding/implementing-entities/national-implementing-entity/ ,

https://www.greenclimate.fund/home)

o Eg. National institutional set up for operationalizing adaptation activities, number of

adaptation projects (per sector) financed and commissioned through global

adaptation fund

• Policies – INDC – National Action Plans

o Indicators to measure adaptation policies (Eg. http://climate-

adapt.eea.europa.eu/countries-regions/countries/germany)


http://www.emdat.be/

https://www.adaptation-fund.org/apply-funding/implementing-entities/national-implementing-entity/



https://www.greenclimate.fund/home

https://www.greenclimate.fund/home

http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/countries-regions/countries/germany




o Eg. Domestic adaptation fund, funds for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), presence of

Adaptation Plans in INDC, crop insurance coverage, climate smart agriculture

policies, coverage of climate services

Challenges and opportunities

• Adaptation remains a local affair – household, community, city

• Thus, adaptation needs and deficit are also local

• Therefore, the challenge remains

o to measure the adaptation needs accurately on the ground – because they are

dynamic, and contextual

o to have comparable indicators across countries.

• Though adaptation needs are local they can be aggregated at the national level to get a holistic

view

• Therefore, in a top-down scenario, the responsibility to fill adaptation deficit overlaps with

national development priorities

• Thus, adaptation also requires a policy and top down focus

• This is the approach we adopt in Brown-to-Green report

DISCUSSION POINTS

Jan Burck

• The ND gain index could be used under the section exposure & vulnerability?

Andrew Marquard

• The Em-Dat database shows potential threats, while the ND gain index is backward looking

Anne Olhoff

• I coordinate also the UNEP adaptation gap report – progress and gap measurement

(comes out before COP this year)

• What do you want with the adaptation component in comparison to mitigation? How far

is a country away from 100% emergency coverage?

• Be aware that covering adaptation requires at least as much knowledge and resources as

dealing with mitigation.

• Link the narrative to the global stock take and global adaptation goal. This will offer

opportunities to escape from local boundaries.

• You could also include vulnerability risks and financing and costs of adaptation.


• There are a lot of interlinkages with the policy section. Do we have an adaptation section

or include it overall in the report?



Bert Metz

• Look also whether development policies/banks do invest in climate-resilient infrastructure

or not (consider the “brown” element of adaptation).

Hannah Schindler

• A framework for climate-resilient infrastructure development and investment will be

provided in the upcoming OECD/ILO study that the Argentinian G20 Presidency

commissioned.

Andrew Marquard

• I suggest looking at the following three categories: 1) Vulnerability, 2) Plans, policy and

programs, 3) Finance

Sarah D’haen

• One could also track the science base of NAPs, NAPs are often established without a

scientific base for expected impacts, it is now often developed afterwards

• We could also include the co-benefits of mitigation/adaptation.

Jiang Kejun

• What is meant by adaptation policy? In China, we only have measures to respond to

disasters and no national adaptation policy.

Swati Agarwal

• Yes, it is the same in India. I suggest that we will not distinguish between the two in our

report.

Agreements

• The adaptation working group led by Swati Agarwal will look for more specific indicators on vulnerability, policies and finance (domestic and international).

• The working group will provide a first draft of indicators for the 2017 report in the Steering Group Call on June 7 and a final data set mid-July.

• If there are international data sets with comparable data on adaptation, these will be included for all G20 countries. Qualitative data will be provided for the countries where Climate Transparency has partners. Each partner will gather own country data.




4. Indicators: Emissions and decarbonization Jan Burck, Germanwatch, and Niklas Höhne, NewClimate Institute, Germany, made a proposal on the

indicator set for the emissions and decarbonization session in this year’s Brown to Green Report.

Alexander Jung, Agora Vehrkehrswende, presented the study „Towards Decarbonising Transport – A

G20 Stocktake on Sectoral Ambition” published together with GIZ in 2017 and to be update in 2018.

i. Emissions

Previous indicators:

• GHG emissions development graph

• CCPI GHG rating


• This category will stay largely untouched, yet the presentation of the graph might vary if

Enerdata information is used as they only provide data for CO2 emissions from fuel

combustion and no LULUCF or GHG data

Data sources: PRIMAP, CCPI, Enerdata (?)

ii. Decarbonization

A detailed listing of the decarbonization indicators including year and source can be found in the

attached excel document on the indicators for the Brown to Green Report 2018.


• This section will stay largely untouched. It is possible that depending on data availability some

tweaks are made to the indicator selection. The presentation or arrangement of the selected

indicators may also be changed in minor ways.

• Use a zero-carbon benchmark

• Include decarbonisation indicators related to agriculture and land use

Data sources: CAT, CCPI, IEA, PRIMAP, Worldbank, Enerdata (?)

iii. G20 Publication Agora Verkehrswende

The report “Towards Decarbonizing Transport – A G20 Stocktake on Sectoral Ambition” can be

downloaded here.


https://www.agora-verkehrswende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2017/Verkehr_und_Klima_in_den_G20_Laendern/Agora_Verkehrswende_GIZ_TDCT_Summary_ENG_WEB.pdf




DISCUSSION POINTS

Zero-carbon and new renewables energy sources

William Wills

• I agree with the three pillars solution (fossils, sustainable RE, zero-carbon). However, we

should find a more diplomatic name for “sustainable RE”. -> “new renewables”.

Gabriel Blanco

• Can biofuel/biomass be classified as sustainable energy or not? How do we define large

hydro?

Jan Burck

• Traditional biomass is excluded from the zero-carbon figure.

• There is no database for large hydro alone.

• We have to decide whether to include hydro and new biomass in new renewables.

William Wills

• How does ENERDATA deal with the biomass issue? Jan Burck: They do differentiate

between traditional and non-traditional biomass, but this does not display the amount of

sustainable biomass.

Gabriel Blanco

• In Argentina, there is data available for single dams. So, the differentiation between large

and small hydro is possible. We could also use the definition of large hydro of the CDM

Executive Board.

Fabby Tumiwa



• There are varying definitions according to the countries. E.g. in Indonesia, data does not

differentiate between the different types of hydro and is defined rather broadly.

• How does ENERDATA handles the separation of hydro and the rest of RE? Jan Burck: They

display it in the same way as IEA, so no separation.

Jorge Villarreal

• After the energy reform in Mexico, “hydro” is not separated into large, middle, micro

anymore.

Sectoral decarbonization indicators

Alexander Jung

• It would be valuable to distinguish between freight and passenger transport. Jan Burck:

IEA distinguishes between the two transport types so, ENERDATA probably does that too.

Charlene Watson

• The sectors that are used in decarbonisation section are different sectors than the ones

that are shown in the emissions section. This is a change of narrative.

• Presenting coal and renewables next to each other might be a presentational problem as

they use different scales.

• Regarding the forest sector, the cover compared to 1990 is not very meaningful by itself. It

would be beneficial to include carbon density by hectare of forest cover.

Jan Burck

• The emissions graph is taken from CAT. We will make some suggestions concerning the

section split (emissions and decarbonisation). Moreover, by putting the two sections

(emissions and decarbonisation) together, some elements can be dropped because they

are doubled, and information becomes redundant.

• Regarding the forest sector, for some countries, the country profiles need to be specialized

more on forests even though forest data is often very inaccurate. Brazil and some other

countries have got data though.

William Wills

• I am not sure whether 1990 is fitting for a baseline for the forest coverage. The size of the

forest in comparison to the size of the country should be considered.

• The agriculture emissions intensity (livestock, grain etc.) could be shown in a pie chart – or

domestic consumption and export) could be tackled.

Swati Agawal

• We could consider the national plans for forestry.

Bert Metz

• The comparison of the indicators with the Paris benchmark instead of the G20 average

could be helpful. For emissions, this comparison is done normally.



Gerd Leipold

• From the 2016 to the 2017 report, we shifted from CO2 emissions to GHG emissions. Thus,

we lost the Paris compatible benchmark. Would it be possible to reintroduce this

benchmark by using ENERDATA information?

Niklas Höhne

• It will be checked what data is available and then, Jan will make a design proposal for the

emissions graph (thereby discussing the sectoral split of emissions).

A few partners met during the break and suggest the inclusion of the following indicators on

forestry and agriculture:


William Wills

• Regarding the share of coal, there is a certain inconsistency: In the graph, it is compared to

the G20 average whereas in the rating, it is compared to Paris compatibility.

Jan Burck

• There must have been a misunderstanding: the ratings are based on country comparisons,

not on Paris compatibility.

William Wills

• Countries with very high share of weather-depended RE might need to build some fossil

fuels, which results in a bad rating in the trend.

Andrew Marquard

• So, Climate Transparency chooses what countries should do in order to reach

decarbonisation. There are also other country-specific ways that are not mirrored by the

graph. So, there is a tension between the overarching global view of what countries are

doing and how they should perform and the national perspective. The Paris agreement

Sector New indicator Database Comments

Forest • Hectars/year deforested

• (hectars/year deforested)/hectar of forest

FAO “State of the World’s Forests”

• Country specific drivers (differentiation between agriculture and deforestation)

• Take trends into consideration

Agriculture • emissions/ capita from consumption

• emissions/ capita from production

CAT • To be researched

• Take trends into consideration



allows countries to decide their own pathways. There is no easy solution, but it is an issue

to look at.

Swati Agarwal

• Most of the developing countries would be rated “brown” if the starting point is not

defined well. This could have a de-motivational effect.

Jorge Villarreal

• What is still missing in the country profiles is a policy assessment/context (How to provide

a comprehensive view of what is really happening in the countries). He raises the question

whether Climate Transparency can add policy assessments/context as an additional

document part of the Brown to Green Report Package that countries can distribute with

the country profile.

Niklas Clement

• Which elements should we show in the coal and fossil fuel graph without overloading it?

Jan Burck

• Probably, only the G20 average for fossil fuel will be displayed. The ratings need to be

revisited.

Andrew Marquard

• We could include fossil fuel production as an indicator as it could be useful to add the

supply side.

• The RE graph could be shown as a bar graph which shows sustainable RE and large hydro

separately.

• We should check which indicators in the decarbonization section are relevant for which

country.

William Wills

• The energy use CCPI rating has the same problem, it is unfair for developing countries

where energy use is increasing for developmental reasons.

Andrew Marquard

• For developing countries, a certain amount of energy use is necessary in order to reach a

good HDI rating. TPES is a misleading indicator because it does not show anything about

decarbonisation efforts. There are differences in winter heating need depending on the

weather conditions of the respective country or the energy intensity of the economy (e.g.

Australia that specializes in energy intensive industries). So, looking at the primary energy

use is not benefitting at all.

Bert Metz

• It might be helpful to include emissions on a “consumption base” not only on a “supply

base”.

Franziska Marten



• Energy use per capita is included to portray the energy efficiency on a macro basis. Energy

use is therefore completed by energy intensity indicators. This is part of a more holistic

picture of the CCPI.

Andrew Marquard

• Primary energy is not a good measure for energy efficiency as countries can e.g. simply

switch to renewables and improve their performance without increasing their efficiency.

AGREEMENTS

• Germanwatch and NewClimate Institute will consider all arguments raised and come up with a new list of indicators to be discussed.

• Emissions and decarbonization sections will be shown together (not separated as in last year’s report).

Zero-carbon and new renewable energy sources

• Display of fossil fuels, new renewables and zero carbon technologies side by side.

o CCPI evaluation for new RE, simplified rating for fossils and zero-carbon (same as coal rating last year)

• Attempt to distinguish between sustainable and non-sustainable biomass.

• Review if possible to differentiate between large and small hydro.

Sectoral indicators

• Include new indicators on the forest and agriculture sectors.

• Differentiate between freight and passenger transport.

• Rate countries against G20 average and/or against Paris compatibility.


• Energy use and intensity indicators will only be displayed with current level, trend arrow and rating.

• Explore how to balance the trend rating esp. in developing countries.

In general, partners could add policy assessments to give more background information to the country scorecards.



5. Indicators: Just transition Andrew Marquard, Energy Research Center (ERC), South Africa, gave a presentation and lead the

discussions on the possibility to develop just transition indicators for the 2018 Brown to Green Report.

Why indicators on just transition?

• The fossil fuels industry (plus other emissions-generating industries) are still the basis for the

global energy industry (and others).

• Millions of livelihoods are tied to it almost everywhere – a rapid transition would lead to

massive job losses in these sectors (even if there is no net job losses / the green economy

creates more jobs).

• This is a major concern for unions / governments, so a just transition is a priority because:

o Equity / fairness – rapid shifts out of fossil fuels will lead to sever economic impacts of

some often-marginal communities.

o strategic – accommodating the concerns of unions and governments etc. re the just

transition will facilitate more rapid retirement of fossil fuel infrastructure.

Approaches

• Lots of experience based on where transitions out of coal have taken place previously (not

necessarily for climate reasons)

• Just transition is a topic in the UNFCCC process:

o Response measures are discussed for more or less a decade

o It is built into the preamble of the Paris Agreement

• Aspects:

o Procedural / process – existence of policies, programmes, national/regional/local

processes, budget allocation

o Substantive – programmes on a firm/local/regional/national level

• Broad vs narrow focus – either on specific instances / firms or a broader development-based

strategy.

Key issues/questions/complexities

• What makes a transition ‘just’? What is the scope of assessment?

• How to differentiate already existing policies (social welfare, industrial policy, existing mine

closures) from ‘just transition’ policies?



• How to measure/identify policies given the large differences in political cultures? (for example,

social safety nets for retrenched workers in social democratic contexts vs other contexts with

more/less state involvement?).

• Content vs process (procedural vs substantive).

• Who is counted? Workers, communities, asset holders, state-owned enterprises as needing

transition support?

• Only a transition from fossil fuels or more broadly (for instance, deforestation-related

industries/sectors)?

Inclusion in the Brown to Green Report – ideas

1. Option: A single indicator in the “climate policy performance” section, under the “policy

evaluation” subsection, which rates countries on the extent to which they have “just

transition” policies in place.

2. Option: A new, stand-alone section of the report (i.e. half a page or more) devoted to the

just transition, which contained a more detailed set of semi-structured information on just

transition policies, programmes and issues in each G20 country, which could include the

following, which would also require some of the issues above to be clarified:

a. Does the just transition form part of the national climate policy framework?

b. Are there dedicated just transition programmes, with allocated budgets?

c. Are there national / regional / local just transition processes in place or planned?

d. Are there any useful case studies? (national/regional/local) worth reporting on?

3. Option: A new-stand-alone section of the report which would address not only just

transition issues but also developmental / social issues surrounding the transition to a low-

carbon economy

Could also include figures on employment etc. – jobs vulnerability to decarbonization



DISCUSSION POINTS

Andrzej Ancygier

• The lost jobs have to be compensated by other jobs. This is worse for some regions where there is nothing else. We have to unpack just transition.

Gerd Leipold

• We have to be careful that we do not identify job losses with climate change. In most cases, job losses are due to changes in technology and economy.

Jorge Villarreal

• I agree. We should not only speak about jobs, but also about social inclusion and poverty

eradication. In Mexico, policies on renewables have to enable social

inclusion/participation.

• We could look for example at energy poverty indicators (1/3 of households in Mexico live

in energy poverty).

Fabby Tumiwa

• We could start with a simple indicator: Number of people working in the coal sector/fossil

fuel sector, look at contribution of the sector to GDP. Indonesia is worried that revenues

are getting lost from coal sector.

Jesse Burton

• We could do this, but the problem is that that the share of jobs in the fossil fuel sector is

not so high in many countries. However, governments are afraid to destroy whole

communities.




• We have to put things into perspective, also number of green jobs created by IRENA

sounds not much.

• In Argentina there are no specific policies on just transition, we should look at policies in

general including just transition elements.

Hannah Schindler

• We could also consider fiscal policies. Often an argument against carbon pricing is that it

has adverse social effects, but one could look at how revenues for carbon pricing are

redistributed for developmental concerns (e.g. health, education) by the government.

Similarly, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies can include just transition elements – e.g. in

Indonesia there is a compensation for poor households.

Leah Worrall

• ODI has a report based on OECD data that shows revenue distribution.

William Wills

• I agree with Jorge that maybe including social and development concerns would be best

way.

• We should also look at job mobility among sectors and among regions of the world.

Bert Metz

• Getting to a single indicator at this point of time seems difficult. We could start with

qualitative discussion, maybe there is not a good story to tell for all G20 countries, for

partners it might be doable, if agreement is reached what to cover.

• In the UNEP Gap report 2017 there is a chapter on coal phase out for main coal countries,

this material could be used.

• Third option is most difficult one, to do it well would be very demanding, I would suggest

doing a more limited version, e.g. second option.

Gerd Leipold

• The suggested typology (graph) might reinforce argument that job losses are due to

climate change

AGREEMENTS

• The just transition working group led by Andrew Marquard will provide a first draft of indicators for the 2017 report in the Steering Group Call on June 7 and a final data set mid-July.

• If there are international data sets with comparable data on just transition, these will be included for all G20 countries. Qualitative data will be provided for the countries where Climate Transparency has partners. Each partner will gather own country data.




6. Impacting the debate – national and international communication Hannah Schindler, Secretariat of Climate Transparency, provided input on Climate Transparency’s

communication strategy including target groups, channels and lessons learnt from last year. Ragnhild

Pieper, Global Strategic Communication Council (GSCC), introduced their work and shared advice on

media work when launching an international report.

i. Input Climate Transparency communication

Target audiences

1. Stakeholders involved in the national climate policy process (NDC revision, development of

long-term strategies etc.)

a. Environment ministries, energy ministries, finance ministries and other involved

ministries

b. Think tanks and experts

c. NGOs

d. Finance and business sector

e. Media

2. Climate Negotiators

3. G20 policy-makers, stakeholders and finance experts

f. G20 sherpas and their team

g. Ministries involved in the preparation of the G20 process (eg. Finance and

economy ministries of G20 countries)

h. T20 (group of think tanks), B20 (group of business leaders)

and C20 (group of civil society)

i. Actors from civil society, the academic world and media that report on the G20

process (finance media and big daily newspapers)

Channels of communication

1. Media work

• International and national (county specific) press releases

• Journalist briefings

• Aim 2018: 600 media articles worldwide

Improvements in 2018

• Approach media a month before G20 Summit and COP24

• Closer collaboration with communication partners, e.g. World Bank, internationally

• Strengthening communication efforts nationally



• Reach out to finance/economic media and big daily newspapers

• Explore specific press release on finance

2. Online communication

• Launch webinar: Webcasting it in social media like Twitter, Youtube.

• Social media: Twitter and facebook posts by all partners on launch of report and other

national IKI activities

• Website: All knowledge products will be published on Climate Transparency website and

partner websites


• Conduct online launch both for experts and journalists

• Increased social media awareness not only at time of report launch

• Strategy to align partner communication (e.g. retweeting by partners)

• New elements such as videos and infographics

3. Direct communication

• Workshops on policy papers with peer comparisons

• Personal briefing meetings with key stakeholders

• Personal letters/mails to key stakeholders


• Workshops focus on specific sub topic of Brown to Green report relevant to the national

debate

• Workshop and briefing meetings address key stakeholders outside the climate community

(e.g. G20 Sherpa staff, finance ministries)

• Developing of target group specific briefing documents that select relevant data and

messages of the report

Communicators

• All Climate Transparency partners (national releases)

• International Secretariat of Climate Transparency (international release)

• Global Strategic Communication Council (support in some G20 countries)



• World Bank

• ClimateWorks

Launch of the report

Suggested launch day 5 November (report finalized mid-October)

• Suggestion to have one international webinar for experts and one for journalists on 5 Nov.

• International launch is at same time as Argentinian launch/press briefing (e.g. 11 am in Buenos

Aires, 4 pm Berlin)

• Press briefings and launch events in China, Brazil, Germany, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South

Africa are ideally at the same day or a day after depending on time differences

• A video with main international messages for national launchs will be provided

ii. Input GSCC media work – lessons learned

Spread across eighteen countries and six continents, the GSCC is a network of expert political

communicators with the common objective of leveraging the action required to steer the world to a

low-carbon pathway.

GSCC communicators in G20 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,

India, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, The Republic of Korea, Russia, UK, USA

How GSCC works

• The GSCC functions like an unbranded strategic communications consultancy

• Amplifies ideas and research of supported partners

• ‘Plays the spaces’ – to add to the work of others and not duplicate it

• Making sure that journalists in each geography and internationally are aware of the latest

stories and reports that confirm the need for a low-carbon transition or provide solutions on

how to accelerate this transition

• Direct pitches to journalists, organising and disseminating op-eds, setting up media briefings

and editorial board meetings, identifying, mobilizing and amplifying new voices that are

missing from the debate



Best practice: Launch of the Lancet Countdown

• Broad range of communications materials

• Sending whole media package under embargo 5 days before the launch with nationally

tailored pitches

• Mobilisation of national spokespeople and external voices from diverse sectors supporting and

validating the report findings (op-eds, tweets etc.), e.g. Patricia Espinosa, Christina Figurers

Brown to Green Report 2017 – Lessons learned on media work

1. Messaging

• Start early to condense diverse and complex findings into compelling messages

• Punchy, less balanced PR and quotes

• League tables / country rankings

• Embed narrative in ongoing policy context

• Highlight relevance of the report for the international climate process

2. Materials

• New (or latest) country specific data

• Translations of key findings/executive summary

• Streamline PR (key findings)



• Q&A, talking points and media training for spokespeople

• Work with key influencers & opinion formers, get strong voices to validate report

3. Organisation & Timing

• Share complete and final materials early

• Facilitate early contact between Climate Transparency partners and GSCC desks, set

up joint conference call(s) and a platform to share documents

• Earlier publication due to high competition for media coverage in the week of the

G20 summit (and COP24!) Keep drumbeat until G20 and COP24.

• Online media launch (in 2 time zones with different speakers) with recording to share

DISCUSSION POINTS

The participants split up in three groups to discuss the date and format of the launch of the report this year:

Group 1:

• 1st or 2nd week of November would be good – Tuesday Wednesday, Thursday better than Monday or Friday for media and events

• A decentralized strategy is needed to allow for different entry points.

• Think about tying the launch to any other meetings/events

Group 2:

• Partners agree with a launch at the beginning of November (e.g. in Mexico this will be a good timing to address the new administration)

• The World Bank Annual Meetings convening the finance ministers will take place on 12 October in Indonesia. If the Indonesian government is pushing for a short slot to present part (e.g. finance section) of the Brown to Green report, this would be a great opportunity.

Group 3:

• The teaser campaign could already start in September (e.g. a lot of good opportunities in India) and a two pager on the report would be valuable for that.

• The launch date of 5 November is not suitable for India (holiday) and thus the second week of November would be preferred.

• We should aim for a decentralized launch offering opportunities for several different launch dates following central global media launch in countries (allowing country partners to define perfect hooks).

Messaging of report

Charlene Watson



• The media might interpret the findings of the 1.5 IPCC report as very negative. It may be

good to send out a positive story afterwards. We could respond to this report, that

probably will speak about the urgency of action.

Ragnhild Pieper

• I agree. It is good to send positive message afterwards.

Bert Metz

• Aligned with the message of the IPCC report, we could show that countries are not doing what they have promised to do.

Gerd Leipold

• With 2017 data, we can show positive change over last years, that will not be included in the IPCC report.

Jan Burck

• Recent trends in emissions are unfortunately not positive at the moment.

Andrew Marquard

• There are a lot of things happening in terms of policy development and green finance, report shows this and we have to build on this. We could draw up positive examples of each countries, not in terms of actual emission outcomes, but policies.

AGREEMENTS

• Report will be finalized mid-October and launched 1st/2nd week of November, ideally in all countries at the same time/day.

• Create a summary of the country data as new frontpage of the country profiles.

• An option could be to create a positive messaging with good policy examples of different countries to counterbalance the 1.5 IPPC report media messages.

• The Secretariat will put all country partners in touch with the GSCC expert in their country at beginning of June so that partners can start to develop national communication strategies.

• The Secretariat will form a communication working group together with GSCC and partners.

• Explore common COP event with UNEP Gap Report hosted by Indonesia. Fabby will need a concept note by June.

• Explore early presentation at World Bank Annual meetings.



7. Governance of Climate Transparency The main purpose of the session was to review the governance of Climate Transparency as adopted

during the Partners and Strategy Meeting in 2017.

Sebastian Wegner, Secretariat Climate Transparency, presented the existing governance structure.

i. Climate Transparency as an Open Partnership

• Is open to new partners

• Does not advocate specific policies beyond a commitment to speed up the transition to a low-

carbon economy (however, it does not limit partners in advocating policies)

• Is committed to a scientific approach (incl. being transparent about results and how they were

arrived at)

• Seeks to provide an international service for coordination, collection and provision of relevant

data of climate action and strives for ownership of content and communication of partners in

G20 countries.

• Invites for a partnership on an equal footing for content as well as communication

contributions; the last one also based on preferences, capacities and available resources

• Enlists the cooperation of partner institutions; the responsibility for the reports of Climate

Transparency lies with the contributing expert authors

Objectives of the governance structure are:

• Equal representation of all partners

• Fair and geographically diverse representation

• Fast and effective decision making

• Trust between the partners

ii. Partners and observers

Partners

• make substantive contributions to the analysis and communication of information based on

receiving funding through Climate Transparency (typically through Secretariat).

• take part in the decision making

Climate Transparency strives for a geographical balance of partners

Observers

• contribute to the discussions, the content and the communication of Climate Transparency,

but do not receive funding through the Secretariat of Climate Transparency.



• are not part of the decision making but invited to express views and opinions on specific issues.

Climate Transparency strives for a wide network of Observers. Funders are invited to join the group of

Observers.

iii. Considerations and criteria for new partners

Considerations for new partners (as agreed in Steering Group Call #2 2017):

• Active contribution: Partners are actively development of the Brown to Green Report and/or

its outreach activities.

• Expertise: Partners have a relevant expertise for the development of the Brown to Green

Report (e.g. mitigation, adaptation, finance) and/or outreach activities (e.g. communication,

policy analysis)

• Geographical distribution: Climate Transparency strives for a diverse geographical distribution

of partners.

• Multi-functional perspective: Climate Transparency strives for the integration of perspectives

from all relevant stakeholders within the partnership. Governments and intergovernmental

organisations are invited to contribute as observers.

• Ability to influence debate: Partners have a high standing and well-established networks to

crucial target groups of Climate Transparency to be able to influence the debate in their

country contributing to the or their sphere (e.g. finance world).

Criteria for new partners (as agreed in Steering Group Call #2 2017):

1. Needed expertise: The new Partner adds specific expertise needed in the further development

of the report and its outreach activities (e.g. adaptation, finance).

2. Additional G20 countries: The new partner is preferably located in a G20 country that is not

represented yet in the current partnership.

3. Adding to the multi-functional perspective: The new partner widens the stakeholder

perspective of the partnership, while at the same time is open to the development of a credible

comparable assessment.

4. Own funding: The new partner has preferably own or additional funds or is willing to raise the

latter to become part of Climate Transparency.



iv. The four bodies

The co-chairs

The Steering Group



The Secretariat

The Working Groups

The current working groups are:

1. Adaptation: Lead – Swati Agarwal

2. Just Transition: Lead – Andrew Marquard

3. Report: Lead – Jan Burck

4. Communication: Lead – Gerd Leipold



DISCUSSION POINTS

• It was discussed which role governments should take. Most of the participants were in favor of not having governments as Observers unless they were funders. Nevertheless, participants were strongly in favor of engaging with governments to discuss the Brown to Green Report.

It was explained that NewClimate Institute wished to step down from its role as one of the organisations serving as international Secretariat of Climate Transparency. It was underlined, that this is mainly concerning the production of the Brown to Green Report. This role will be taken by Germanwatch again (they were responsible for the production of the first report in 2015). This change will not have an impact on NewClimate Institute’s engagement as Partner of Climate Transparency.

AGREEMENTS

• No changes to the governance structure were agreed except:

o Keep separation between Partners and Observers and delete requirement to receive funding through the Secretariat to bring own funding

o Government cannot be Observers, unless they are funders

o Secretariat Germanwatch & HVGP endorsed

o “Criteria” and “Considerations” for new Partners will be merged (proposal will be made by Secretariat and presented to the Steering Group in one of the next Calls)

• The governance structure will be reviewed in 2019.

v. Summary of activities and financials 2017

Main activities:

• Brown to Green Report 2017 with improved indicator set by 13 organizations

• International launch webinar and national launch events in 5 G20 countries

• Brown to Green Forum in Berlin

• Finance Workshop in London and Finance paper

• International media work and national media work in 8 G20 countries

• Personal briefings and letters to high level government representatives

→ Ca. 500 media articles

→ Direct communication with ca. 400 key stakeholders

→ 17,542 website visits in launch month



DISCUSSION POINTS

none

AGREEMENTS

• Overview of budget 2018 will be made available to the Steering Group as soon as it is available.

Election of Co-Chairs

The following election procedure was used:

• Nominations:

Nominations should be send till 20.00 CEST, Friday, 20 April 2018 to info@climate-

transparency.org

• Presentation of candidates:

Candidates can present themselves at the beginning of the Governance session of the

Strategy and Partners Meeting – candidates not present can be presented by their

nominator. Nominees need to have agreed to serve as Chair before election.

• Eligible to vote

The Partners of Climate Transparency are eligible to vote for the Co-Chairs.



• At present the following organisations are Partners:

Centro Clima, Climate Analytics, ERC, ERI, FARN, Germanwatch, HVGP, IDDRI, IESR, Initiativa

Climatica de Mexico, NewClimate Institute, ODI, TERI

• Election:

Election by simple majority. If requested a secret ballot will be hold.

• Each partner has two votes: Centro Clima, Climate Analytics, ERC, ERI, FARN, Germanwatch,

HVGP, IDDRI, IESR, Initiativa Climatica de Mexico, NewClimate Institute, ODI, TERI

• The two candidates with most votes will serve as co-chairs 2018-2020

• Simple majority needs to be satisfied

DISCUSSION POINTS

The only nominations received by the Secretariat were Alvaro Umaña and Peter Eigen.

AGREEMENTS

• The Co-Chairs Alvaro Umaña and Peter Eigen unanimously were re-elected for a 2-year term (next election in 2020).



8. Indicators: Financing the transition Charlene Watson and Leah Worrall, Overseas Development Institute, UK, and Hannah Schindler,

Secretariat of Climate Transparency presented a proposal for a new narrative and related indicator set

for the section “financing the transition” in the 2018 Brown to Green Report. Clément Métivier,

Institute for Climate Economics (I4CE), France, introduced their newly published figures on carbon

pricing revenues in 2017.

Narrative

The finance narrative will be shaped around two core premises:

To shift from brown to green finance, G20 governments, central banks and financial authorities

have at their disposal tools from three categories: 1) financial policies and regulations, 2) fiscal

policy levers and 3) public finance. A transition requires the application of a combination of

tools in each category. Together, these sets of tools support increased private green finance

(see Figure 1). The finance chapter of the Brown to Green Report will be structured according

to these three categories, with indicators measuring country performance in each category.

While there has been progress worldwide in mobilising green finance, current brown (or high

carbon, climate-risk inducing) finance substantially outweighs the green. The focus of

transitioning to a low carbon, climate-resilient economy must be on shifting away from brown

finance and not only on mobilising further green finance. The indicators are, as far as possible,

intending to capture both brown and green finance.

Figure 1: How governments can shape the transition from brown to green finance



Overview of suggested indicators 2018

2 Dependent on additional funds 3 Not contacted yet, dependent on additional funds

Indicator Source New indicator

Research needed2

Potential data provider for (new) indicators3

Financial policy and regulation

1. Narrative of policies for greening the financial system and (re)directing finance (country sheets only)

Desk research and studies by UNEP Inquiry, ECF etc.

x x UNEP Inquiry, ECF, I4CE

2. Investment attractiveness for renewable energy RECAI 2018

Fiscal policy levers

3. Effective carbon rates OECD 2017; 2018

4. Carbon revenues World Bank x x World Bank, I4CE

5. Fossil fuel subsides OECD 2017 and IEA 2017

Public finance

6. Brown and green public energy finance OCI, 2017 x OCI

7. International public finance provision (Multilateral climate funds and bilateral finance)

OECD, 2017; CFU, 2017; UNFCCC, 2017

x x UNFCCC, ODI, OECD



Proposed indicators to remove in 2018

• Green bonds outstanding per country as a percentage of the overall debt securities market

for that country

• Emissions of new investments in the power sector

• Pledge to the Green Climate Fund

• Future international climate finance commitments

i. Financial policy and regulation

Checklist

1. Overall national finance strategy

2. Disclosure policies of climate-related information

✓ Corporations

✓ Asset owners and asset managers

3. Policies (re)directing finance

✓ Support of development of green bond markets

✓ Climate-related credit policies and lending requirements for banks

✓ Climate-related investment requirements of public funds and development finance

institutions

Investment attractiveness for RE

Indicator Description Data Challenges

Investment

attractiveness

for renewable

energy

Depiction of the two indices to show which

countries rank high/low according to both.

Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness

Index (RECAI)

Macro indicators (e.g. economic stability),

energy needs (e.g. security and supply),

enabling environment, project delivery (e.g.

infrastructure), and technology potential

RECAI, Ernst & Young,

2018

(Allianz 2018 not

available in the

report period)

RECAI ranks 40

countries not G20

focussed

Various criteria

looked at here rather

belong to the

“Climate policy

performance” chapter

of the Brown to

Green report



ii. Fiscal policies

Fossil fuel subsidies


Fossil fuel

subsidies

Fossil fuel subsidies

that currently act as

a ‘negative carbon

price’ by continuing

to support specific

sectors and uses of

fossil fuels.

Fossil fuel subsidies (including

tax breaks and budgetary

support) from the latest OECD

subsidy inventory (OECD 2016

data updated in 2017).

Figures could be expressed as

an absolute amount and relative

to the G20 average

To have a complete data set

for G20 countries OECD and

IEA data need to be

combined, making

comparison more difficult as

OECD and IEA use different

methodologies for the

transport sector.

Fossil fuel subsidies (USD millions) 2016 data: OECD inventory (on production and consumption subsidies) does

not contain data for Argentina and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, numbers for these are based on the from the IEA

database, which uses a different methodology for calculating subsidies, called the ‘price-gap’ approach

(accounting only for consumption subsidies) (e.g. comparing the price of energy to a ‘reference’ price that takes

into account the full costs)

Carbon revenues


Carbon revenues

The revenues generated by

carbon prices presented in

absolute value and compared

to the G20 average.

I4CE It is not comprehensive, e.g. it doesn’t

capture or compare against fossil fuel

revenues.

There is no layer that explores the

earmarking, or not, of these revenues.



Global Carbon Account 2018: https://www.i4ce.org/download/global-carbon-account-2018/

Effective carbon rates


Effective carbon

rates

The total carbon price

applying to CO2

emissions from energy

use (carbon price,

other taxes and price of

tradeable emission

permits).

OECD data on

effective carbon

rates (OECD,

2017/8)

It does not provide an understanding of the

actual effectiveness of carbon pricing on the

ground.

Not all sector emissions are covered and the

effective carbon rate does not take into

account support measures for fossil fuel use

that may affect energy prices, and which also

act as a negative carbon price.


https://www.i4ce.org/download/global-carbon-account-2018/


iii. Public finance

Green and brown public finance for energy


Green versus

brown public

energy finance

Government support for

energy projects via public

finance institutions (national

development banks and other

development finance

institutions, overseas aid

agencies, export credit

agencies and key multilateral

development banks)

‘Brown’ refers to fossil fuel

energy projects, including coal,

oil, gas and fossil fuel-based

power generation/

transmission.

‘Green’ refers to clean energy

projects, such as solar, wind,

tidal and geothermal.

The data is from

Oil Change

International

(OCI, 2017).

Data is available

for the years

2013-2016.

The indicator is focussed on energy

infrastructure and omits other

infrastructure, transport, agriculture

(and resilience).

Nuclear and large hydro (>10MW)

projects are classified as a third ‘grey’

category in the OCI database (given

their overall environmental impact is

not as straightforward as projects

classified as green).

There is double counting with

international provision of mitigation

finance as both measure MDB

spending (particularly green).


http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2017/07/talk_is_cheap_G20_report_July2017.pdf


International provision of finance


International

public finance

provision

Captures the absolute amount

and theme (adaptation,

mitigation and cross-cutting)

of:

- Contributions

through the major

multilateral climate

funds

- Bilateral climate

finance contributions

Presented as an absolute

amount and compared to a

G20 developed country

average and a G20 developing

country average

OECD

Development

Assistance

Committee

Creditor

Reporting

System (OECD

DAC CRS, 2017),

Climate Funds

Update, UNFCCC

It does not consider the ’brown’

spending in bilateral aid or MDB

spending and may have overlaps with

the net public finance for energy

projects indicator.

Attributing MDB spending to

countries is politically sensitive.

DISCUSSION POINTS

Financial policy and regulation.

Checklist. Discussion points raised include:

• Whether to include development-related strategy with climate implications, as well as more direct climate strategy.

• The need for country nuance, e.g. in the presence of banking regulations to promote sustainable finance in Indonesia, but it not being mandatory until 2020, and the need to isolate the quality, enforcement and timelines of country regulations.

• Need to reduce any overlap with existing policy section.

• Need to balance the need to avoid ‘new research’ in line with the Climate Transparency strategy.

• Possible approach: approach ECF to see if there is an indicator on disclosure we can use followed by two paragraph narrative in each country sheet written by partners where possible and others where not.

Investment attractiveness for RE. Discussion points raised include:

• Allianz data is not going to be updated in time to meet our report deadline.

• RECAI is also not necessarily comprehensive, as countries are included depending on rating (e.g. Indonesia’s latest data is for early 2016).

• RECAI indicators are developed by Ernst & Young are not transparent and should be avoided (i.e. a E&Y study in Mexico was funded by the steel industry and argued that RE are not competitive).


https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1

https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1


Fiscal policies

Fossil fuel subsidies. Discussion points raised include:

• Different methodologies are adopted by IEA and OECD. This can result in e.g. IEA-methodology overestimations in developing countries reliant on consumption subsidies. However, most recent evidence suggests consumption subsidies can be just as high in developed country.

• Argentina is not included in the OECD database, but FARN is releasing data in the coming weeks and we can use this to supplement the (production) data in the country profile.

• In Argentina, fossil fuel consumption subsidies are a socially sensitive issue and country nuances, such as this, can be represented in the country profiles.

• Where using GDP pro rata, use PPP, which will be fairer and may produce different results. Another alternative is to present it in per capita terms and to also use a G20 average.

• Another option is to present the data per tonne of emissions, alongside carbon revenues but not clear if this can be achieved given complexity of emissions.

• At the country level, there is a need to demonstrate timeline trends in fossil fuel subsidies.

• There is a need to recognise the different tax approaches in different regions (e.g. lower energy taxation in the US than the EU), which will affect calculations of tax breaks. Include this with the figure or in a footnote.

• Use the qualitative information in country studies to address political sensitivities.

Carbon revenues. Discussion points raised include:

• Useful to show what is included in carbon taxation, e.g. Mexico and Argentina exclude gas taxation (where gas will be the major power source in the coming years).

• The I4CE data includes information on which fuel types and which sectors are included. It includes only explicit carbon pricing schemes (i.e. carbon taxes and emission trading schemes), but excludes implicit carbon pricing mechanisms (e.g. taxation on fuels).

• Implicit carbon pricing approaches are equally important, e.g. India prices electricity efficiency to promote renewable energy and is working to convert that into an effective carbon rate.

• Possible overlap with effective carbon rates that includes implicit and explicit carbon pricing.

Effective carbon rates. Discussion points raised include:

• There is a need to compare the I4CE methodology on carbon revenues with the OECD methodology on effective carbon rates, as there is potential overlap here.

• See the recent Stern and Stiglitz paper on required carbon pricing as a benchmark taking into account country differences.

• The data was last updated in 2012 and the country landscapes have changed significantly since then. But the data should still be included. Note: the OECD will be releasing some new data this year (in 2018) and we are seeking clarification on when.

• As noted in the fossil fuel subsidies discussion: one option is to present the fossil fuel subsidies data per tonne of emissions, alongside carbon revenues, to determine ‘net’ positive and negative carbon rates.



Public finance

Green and brown public finance for energy. Discussion points raised include:

• The Oil Change International (OCI – Talk is Cheap) dataset was updated in July 2017. It includes small hydropower (<10 MW) and large hydropower (>10 MW).

• The Argentina estimate is too low, which may be due to tenders and projects in development that are only partially publicly funded.

• The Mexico estimate is also too low, given significant spending on fossil fuel generation.

• The Indonesia estimate is also seemingly too low.

• Argentina and Mexico partners can support with data gathering for Argentina and Mexico, where transparency on public finance may be particularly low. This might also apply to Russia and Turkey. (Note: share the Argentina and Mexico OCI data with partners for feedback.)

• The OCI database excludes transport financing and international private finance for power, as well as pension funds.

• There is a need to explore whether MDB data is included, e.g. where they provide loans that governments will need to pay back.

• Cross-check the OCI data with ClimateScope data on renewable energy investments.

• There is a need to circulate information on which public finance institutions are covered by the OCI dataset.

International provision of finance. Discussion points raised include:

• There is a need to benchmark climate finance contributions and not present by GDP.

• Exclude the ‘blank page’ in the country studies and instead use for the development of the country narrative, e.g. the climate finance needs in developing countries, and e.g. GCF funding to Mexico would help to scale up RE deployment. (Note: this will need to be checked with the designer).

• There is a need to adopt strict definitions on bilateral climate finance, e.g. Japan classifies certain super-critical coal-fired power plants as climate financing.

• Note that multilateral climate financing captures only financing into multilateral funds.

• There is a need for a strong disclaimer on what is included in the UNFCCC Secretariat data.

• The UNFCCC update with 2015-2016 data will exist at the end of May but not clear when it will be published, seeking clarity.

• Development bank financing will be missing from this picture and so we seek to understand if we can get at this through the OECD.

General discussion. Discussion points raised include:

• The need to link more closely to the NDCs, as well as ‘financing needs for NDCs’ (though the latter may only be available for few countries e.g. India and South Africa)

• Should the scope be increased to look more closely at private financing. Data is available for other private finance indicators, but this has been excluded due to strategic focus on G20 country governments. Estimates are available to capture private financing (e.g. OECD, IMF) but they diverge significantly.

• Problematic inclusion of green bonds data, e.g. doesn’t distinguish between sovereign and non-sovereign bonds, and types of bonds, as well as differing data availability across countries. (Note: the UNFCCC biannual assessment and Climate Policy Initiative’s climate finance landscape do not include green bonds).



• Carbon disclosure is important, e.g. countries reporting on issuance of green bonds.

• Emissions of new investments in the power sector could be included in the decarbonization section. But, IDDRI is not updating the (2016) data used in the 2017 B2G report. Note: to circulate the methodology to the consortium for feedback.

• Treatment of China and other countries that provide international public finance.

• There is a need to talk about timelines for the finance section (e.g. final indicators by mid-June, possibility of organising a workshop/webinar on financing in next few months).

• Focus on the international datasets, then supplement this data with additional country-level data.

AGREEMENTS

• Checklist. Investigate what is possible, including data availability from ECF, the UNEP enquiry and Green Action Tracker, followed by two paragraph narrative in each country sheet written by partners.

• Investment attractiveness of RE. Make a decision to include RECAI as Allianz not available but give space in country sheets to highlight any discrepancies.

• Fossil fuel subsidies. Figure should show absolute values (broken down by production and consumption). Country partners to provide feedback on the data, as well as guidance on relevant timeframes for showing trends.

• Carbon revenues. Review I4CE data and methodology, and as with other indicators include the G20 average benchmark. Present in absolute values on the same scale as FFS.

• Effective carbon rates. Review the OECD methodological approach, as well as treatment of implicit carbon pricing and sectoral (emissions). Check with the OECD on data updates and Stern and Stiglitz outputs for benchmarks.

• Green and brown public finance for energy. Obtain OCI data for G20 countries and present green and brown data (domestic and international), with the G20 average benchmark. Circulate list of public finance institutions covered by the database, caveat in country sheets.

• International provision of finance. Request access to the UNFCCC international public provision dataset, seek better understanding of the MDB data we can extract from the OECD DAC CRS. Propose the alternative sheet in the developing country sheets that can help the country narrative around international public finance.

• Circulate the method for the removed indicator on emissions of new investments in the power sector, noting that we have no updated data this year and NewClimate found method challenges.

Additional note: it will be problematic to present fossil fuel subsidies and carbon revenues per tonne of emissions. This is a result of various methodological obstacles: the fossil fuel subsidy data is for 2016, whilst the carbon revenues data is for 2017; emissions data, by sector, is not readily available for years 2016 and 2017 (e.g. WRI’s CAIT database where the latest data is for 2014); determining the relative weighting of sectors on a country-by-country basis is problematic; fossil fuel subsidies can be highly targeted (e.g. support can be limited to public buses/taxis/etc.) and this financing cannot be generalised to entire sectors (e.g. the transport sector as a whole); etc.



9. IKI policy papers with peer comparisons Hannah Schindler, Secretariat of Climate Transparency, introduced the concept of the policy papers

with peer comparisons. Partners established two working groups and conducted a first working session

within the groups to coordinate their work this year.

IKI policy papers with peer comparisons

• Centro Clima, ERC, ERI, FARN, ICM, IESR and TERI develop each one policy paper with peer

comparisons in 2018 (new paper in 2019)

• Establishing groups of e.g. 2-4 partners/countries with regional and/or thematic comparison

(spotlight on one topic of B2G report)

• Criteria for policy paper:

o Paper should move forward national debate

o Inclusion of data/graph(s) from B2G report plus qualitative analysis of context and

policies

o Focus on country comparisons and peer learning through good-practice examples

o One work product per group which will be published in each partner’s country of the

group tailored to the national context and with country-specific messages on first page

(ca. 10 pages, depending on question and number of group members)

• Review and data support by NewClimate, Germanwatch, ODI and HVGP

DISCUSSION POINTS

Group 1: Energy transition (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico)

• Jorge will coordinate the work of the group.

• The paper will address: 1) Technical economic component: State of the art of RE,

economic barriers (stranded assets and fossil fuel subsidies) and 2) Social and politics

component: corruption, weak democracy etc. that influence how electricity/energy

systems are working.

• Brazil might focus on economic aspects, while Argentina and Mexico might focus on social

aspects.

• Group plans to work on the paper during the next four months.

Group 2: Coal phase out (China, Indonesia, India (?), South Africa)

• A group coordinator is yet to be determined.

• The paper will compare the different contexts of the countries, policy options to phase out

coal and their implications (just transition).

• A specific angle is yet to be discussed.

• The group will have its first call on 22 May at 10 am CET.



• Andrew and Swati will meet in Bonn to discuss possibility of an additional, third, policy

paper working group comparing financial aspects (e.g. fossil fuel subsidies) in South Africa

and India. Swati has the feeling that work on coal in India would not have an additional

value as there are already a lot of coal phase out studies.

AGREEMENTS

• The following policy paper working groups have been established: 1) Energy transition (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), 2) Coal phase out (China, India (?), Indonesia, South Africa) and 3) Subsidies/finance (India & South Africa (?) – tbd)

• The group coordinator will coordinate regular phone calls of the groups.

• The groups report on their work in every Steering Group Call.

• The groups will present a time line of their work in the Steering Group Call on June 7.



C. Annex – Participant list

Name Organisation

Swati Agarwal The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI)

Andrzej Ancygier Climate Analytics

Gabriel Blanco Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN)

Jan Burck Germanwatch

Jesse Burton Energy Research Centre (ERC)

Jasmin Cantzler Climate Analytics

Cyril Cassisa Enerdata

Niklas Clement Germanwatch

Holger Dalkmann Agora Verkehrswende

Sarah D'haen Climate Analytics

Peter Eigen HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform

Eduardo Ferreira World Bank

Carolin Grasi Germanwatch

Niklas Höhne NewClimate Institute

Alexander Jung Agora Verkehrswende

Jiang Kejun Energy Research Institute (ERI)

Gerd Leipold HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform

Andrew Marquard Energy Research Centre (ERC)

Franziska Marten Germanwatch


Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN)

Surabi Menon ClimateWorks Foundation



Clément Métivier I4CE Institute for Climate Economics

Bert Metz European Climate Foundation

Yesi Mariyam Nasrul Institute for Essential Service Reform (IESR)

Anne Olhoff Technical University of Denmark

Ragnhild Pieper Global Strategic Communication Council

Hannah Schindler HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform

Fabby Tumiwa Institute for Essential Service Reform (IESR)

Jorge Villarreal Padilla Iniciativa Climatica de Mexico (ICM)

Charlene Watson Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

Sebastian Wegner HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform

William Wills CentroClima

Leah Worrall Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

Luis Zamarioli Climate Analytics

Aleksandra Zebrowska HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform


Documents

STRATEGY & PARTNER WORKSHOP AND IKI WORKSHOP (24-26 … · 2018. 5. 11. · STRATEGY & PARTNER WORKSHOP AND IKI WORKSHOP (24-26 April 2018) Report Version: 04.05.2018 The Strategy