Strategic Nuclear Materials Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Proliferation

8/13/2019 Strategic Nuclear Materials Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Proliferation

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Name: Raymond Lane

Course: ME 389C

Instructor: Dr. Sheldon Landsberger

Date: 12/5/13

Strategic Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, and Proliferation

In order to understand the policy of the United States with regards to nuclear fuel recycling,

reprocessing, and proliferation one must understand the goal of recycling/reprocessing and the

state of mind of the country when the decisions were made not to pursue them. The ultimate goal

was to recycle plutonium for use in Fast Breeder Reactors [1]. It was the consensus at the time to

plan this transition in stages. At first, spent fuel from Light Water Reactors would be recycled

and reprocessed for re-use in Light Water Reactors in order to develop the technology and

processes necessary to transition to reprocessing for Fast Breeder Reactors.

The fuel developed that incorporated uranium oxide and plutonium oxide was referred to as

Mixed Oxide fuel. The Mixed Oxide fuel could not simply be inserted into traditional Light

Water Reactors. There were several areas of concern with regards to the incorporation of Mixed

Oxide fuel into the traditional Light Water Reactor designs. Although uranium oxide and

plutonium oxide both have similar chemical behavior, some significant differences exist that

must be accounted for in designing and licensing a design to incorporate Mixed Oxide fuel.

Uranium oxide and plutonium oxide have different neutronic characteristics. This can adversely

impact required control rod design, poison loading and geometry, and result in new power

peaking profile in the core. Mixed Oxide fuel also contains more than one isotope of plutonium

and at various concentrations based on the history of the fuel. The ratio of fissile plutonium to


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non-fissile plutonium decreases with irradiation cycles. Plutonium has larger and more

pronounced resonance peaks as well as a larger Doppler effect resulting in changes to the

temperature coefficient of reactivity. Plutonium also produces fewer average neutrons per

fission, requiring a larger plutonium mass versus uranium for the same reactivity level. However,

this effect is somewhat offset by a slower reduction in plutonium reactivity as a result of fuel

burn up. Finally, plutonium has a lower delayed neutron fraction and life time leaving a lower

safety margin in decay versus prompt criticality [2].

As a result, a significant amount of experimentation and testing was necessary before mixed

oxide fuel could be adopted. The United States abandoned testing when Mixed Oxide fuel was a

nascent technology and had only applied it in Fast Breeder Reactors and some Light Water

Reactors. The international community continued to develop the technology. Western Europe

has over thirty years of experience recycling and reprocessing their fuel. France, more than any

other country is using Mixed Oxide fuel in its Light Water Reactors. Germany, Belgium, the

United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Japan are in some stage of incorporating Mixed Oxide fuel

into their Pressurized Water Reactor and Boiling Water Reactor designs. Belgium and France are

the only countries in Western Europe with reprocessing and Mixed Oxide fuel production

capabilities to date [2].

There have been many methods developed to reprocess fuel for reuse. The major steps of

most reprocessing methods can be summed up as follows:

1. The fuel is mechanically chopped into smaller pieces.2. The chopped fuel is dissolved in nitric acid.3. Solvent extraction is used to separate the products of interest and the wastes into separate

streams.


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4. The resulting High Level Waste is handled.Processes based on the above four steps are referred to as chop and leachsystems. The first

reprocessing programs were set up by United States weapons program to extract plutonium.

Many methods of reprocessing were considered, but solvent extraction was selected as the most

suitable. In 1951, a plant in Washington State employed a well-known industrial solvent called

hexone for the reduction and oxidation of plutonium. This process would be called REDOX. The

British developed a process employing di-butoxy-diethyl-ether, called BUTEX. Unfortunately,

both of these processes experienced chemical engineering issues and the United States developed

a new process that became known as Plutonium Uranium Recovery EXtraction, or PUREX for

short [2].

The United States employed this process at the Savannah River and Hanford sites starting in

the mid 1950s. Based on what is known of the worlds reprocessing techniques, they all employ

variations of the PUREX process. The solvent employed in the PUREX process is tri-n-butyl

phosphate (TBP). In PUREX, the fuel is chopped, then it is dissolved in nitric acid. The heavier

elements go into the acid solution, leaving behind the cladding. The acid solution, containing

plutonium, uranium, transuranics, and fission products is processed by solvent extraction that

separates the uranium and plutonium from the undesirable compounds. A separate chemical

reaction is then used to separate the plutonium from the uranium [2].

Proposed proliferation-resistantmethods of reprocessing all revolve around a common

element of the nonseparation of the reprocessing streams into pure plutonium or weapons grade

uranium. The uranium, plutonium, transuranics, and fission products would be left in the end

product. Leaving any would be proliferators to have to perform additional work before the

material would be in a form suitable for weapons production. There have been several names


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assigned to these processes: CIVEX, coprocessing, proliferation resistant, and APEX. Some of

the methods actually spike the fissile material with nuclides of high specific activity. The

purpose is to create materials that are so radioactive or so high in temperature that they are

impossible to handle [2].

CIVEX is a good example of spiking. It spikes plutonium with fission products that emit

gammas. Plutonium-238 is another spiking agent that has been considered. Adding only 5%

plutonium-238 to fissile materials with a concentration high enough to create a nuclear weapon

will create a surface temperature of almost 900 C. Conventional explosives used to trigger

nuclear weapons melt at around 200 C, making it impossible to bring the fissile material

together with a trigger to construct a weapon [2].

The policy not to pursue reprocessing was put in place by the Carter Administration in 1977.

In order to understand why they made the decision that they made, we must examine the world

stage at that time. The United States detonated a nuclear weapon that used plutonium from a

United Kingdom reactor in 1962 that was unofficially about 85% plutonium [3]. This has been

identified as "fuel grade" plutonium by the community thereafter. Therefore, it was a certainty

that it was possible to repurpose spent fuel into nuclear arms. This was further complicated when

India joined the original nuclear powers in 1974 by testing its own nuclear weapon. Additionally,

India refused to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [4]. This gave some concern to United

States policymakers that spent fuel reprocessing could lead to rampant nuclear proliferation.

The concern built to a crescendo when, five days before the United States Presidential

election in 1974, the Ford Administration put an indefinite hold on all reprocessing initiatives in

the US with the following statement:


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"[T]he reprocessing and recycling of plutonium should not proceed unless there is sound

reason to conclude that the world community can effectively overcome the associated

risks of proliferation...that the United States should no longer regard reprocessing of used

nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel

cycle, and that we should pursue reprocessing and recycling in the future only if they are

found to be consistent with our international objectives." [5]

President Carter, after consulting with his staff and the results of a Ford Foundation and Mitre

Group study on nuclear fuel reprocessing, announced:

"We will defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium produced in

the United States nuclear power programs...The plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, [a proposed

reprocessing plant] will receive neither federal encouragement nor funding for its completion as

a reprocessing facility. [5]

President Carter's administration and the Ford Foundation/Mitre group Study evaluated six

main areas of concern to be examined in detail:

1. Diversion of Plutonium From Reprocessing Plants2. Use of "Reactor Grade" Nuclear Weapons3. Terrorist Threats4. Setting An International Example5. Economics6. Proliferation Risk Assessment: Direct Disposal versus Reprocessing [6]Policymakers, wary of any nuclear proliferation, pointed out how simple it would be for a

country that desires to be a nuclear power to covertly divert Plutonium from the reprocessing

stream for weapons use. Lending weight to this argument, it was disclosed in 2003 that a


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reprocessing facility in Japan cannot identify the location of between 59 and 206 kg of bomb

useable plutonium [7]. Japan claims that none of the material is actually lost, but can be

accounted for by mechanical and mathematical uncertainties in the process. This has proven

itself to be a very legitimate fear of policy makers. It was apparent to the United States in 1975

that Israel had attained nuclear capability by this very means [8]. Israel has coordinated with the

French to build a nuclear reactor plant and reprocessing facility in the late 1950s [9]. The

weaponization of this design was verified when explicit designs and photographs demonstrating

the ability to enrich uranium as well as laboratory models of nuclear devices were provided to

the London Sunday Times by a former Israeli nuclear technician in 1986 [10].

Those who take a contrarian view pointed out that the process of reprocessing fuel is getting

better at exact accountability with each new iteration, and that people and processes can

intercede to ensure that no actual material is used for proliferation. Additionally, it would be

apparent that any country unwilling to submit to international inspections is likely pursuing

reprocessing for less than peaceful means and would be subject to international pressure to relent

[1]. It appears that international action is the only item standing between Iran and a nuclear

arsenal, but it has failed miserably with respect to India, Pakistan, and India. It would appear that

at least three out of four countries with the resources and desire to develop nuclear weapons have

done so despite international efforts. Perhaps the fact that Iran is in the spotlight and subject to

several international sanctions and has not produced a weapon yet demonstrates that international

mechanisms are in place now to allow for international pressure to serve as a successful

deterrent.

Those who argue against reprocessing say that it is a known fact that plutonium from

reprocessed fuel is capable of producing a nuclear detonation. As previously mentioned, this was


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proven in 1962 by the United States government. Those supporting reprocessing claim that

material is inferior to plutonium from other sources and not the ideal material for weapon

manufacture. Plutonium used in nuclear weapons is approximately 90% enriched. Typical

plutonium concentrations from nuclear fuel are approximately 70%. The weapon detonated by

the US government is estimated to have been 85% enriched. An additional feature of spent

nuclear fuel that makes it less than ideal is the neutron capture of plutonium-239 to plutonium-

240. Plutonium-240 undergoes spontaneous fission and can result in premature detonation of the

weapon. Currently, plutonium-239 and plutonium-240 are difficult to separate. Plutonium

created for weapons use is produced in a special reactor that exposes the uranium-238 over a

short duration to limit the production of plutonium-240 to avoid premature detonation issues.

This makes plutonium from spent nuclear fuel undesirable for weapons production [1].

All sides agree that the threat of a terrorist attack or capture of reprocessed plutonium is

something to be considered seriously. Those against reprocessing have pointed out that terrorists

do not even need to construct a nuclear weapon with the stolen plutonium to be successful. The

detonation of a conventional bomb surrounded by stolen plutonium would contaminate a wide

area and, if ingested, would result in a significant lingering casualty rate. Incidentally, the mere

of attack by terrorist on a storehouse or reprocessing facility, regardless of success, may be

enough to accomplish their goal. The dirty bomb scenario would only be worse if the

plutonium were not separated and the actinides from the fuel were included as well [1].

Those in favor of reprocessing point out that strategic nuclear material exists in current

stockpiles and it has been safely trafficked around the country in unmarked vehicles for decades

with no reported incidents. Additionally, many countries already reprocess their fuel with no

noted terrorist attacks, implying that the treat is overstated [1]. To this end, the United States has


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created an organization within the Department of Energy named the National Nuclear Security

Administration that is responsible for the management and security of the nations nuclear

weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs [11].

Those of the opinion that reprocessing ultimately results in proliferation believe that the

United States must set an example for other countries. Contrarians point out that the decision to

not pursue reprocessing has not stopped other countries from pursuing reprocessing technology.

Instead, they point out, that the United States has lost its preeminent role in the field of nuclear

technology. It could also be argued that the lack of commitment from United States

policymakers has stifled private investment in domestic reprocessing [1]. This is all further

compounded by the lack of a clear nuclear fuel cycle policy in the United States. The Nuclear

Regulatory Commission has even halted new licenses until the issues with the Yucca Mountain

Spent Nuclear Fuel Repository have been resolved and the uncertainty of what to do with spent

nuclear fuel no longer clouds the minds of regulators and investigators alike [12].

A review of the economics of the issue at the time the policy was formulated showed that the

decision to delay reprocessing would not result in any substantial effect on the nuclear industry

for the next ten to twenty years. Computer simulations performed at the time showed a very

small economic advantage to reprocessing. This directly affected fuel cost, which contributed to

a quarter of the cost of generation, which in turn only about one-half of the customer's bill [1]. At

the time, there was very little economic reason to rapidly develop the technology and processes.

The perception was that there was time to develop a proliferation proof or proliferation resistant

nuclear fuel cycle.

When comparing the risk of proliferation in a direct disposal versus reprocessing scenario,

opponents of reprocessing point out that direct disposal is the only method that is proliferation


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proof. Proponents of reprocessing point out that systems and processes can and have been

introduced to ensure that the reprocessing being carried out in the eleven countries that currently

reprocess has not resulted in any significant proliferation [1]. One method of disposal proposed

for Department of Defense plutonium is can in canister vitrification.

The conclusion of the Ford Foundation/Mitre Group Study group was that reprocessing added

a very limited economic benefit at that time versus the very real threat of proliferation. Newly

available studies showed that more Uranium was present in the Earth's crust previously believed,

undercutting the argument for urgent completion of FBRs to make the most use of the fuel. Their

ultimate conclusion was that the nuclear industry would not be adversely affected in the long-

term by adopting a once-through fuel cycle until an alternative fuel cycle was developed [1].

It was never the Carter Administration's intent that the policy become a permanent one. Carter

directed the formation of a panel consisting of over thirty countries to develop an alternative,

proliferation resistant fuel cycle for the world's consumers of nuclear power to adopt [1]. After

three years, the panel was dissolved with no apparent solution. Several US Presidents have

reiterated the de facto policy against reprocessing: Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill

Clinton, and George W. Bush [5].


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Works Cited

[1] A. D. Rossin, "Frontline - Policy on Reprocessing," Public Broadcasting Servicce,

[Online]. Available:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/readings/rossin.html. [Accessed

29 November 2013].

[2] R. G. Cochran and N. Tsoulfanidis, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Analysis and Management,

La Grange Park: American Nuclear Society, 1999.

[3] World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Fuel Recycling - Fuel Recycling - Plutonium,"

World Nuclear Association, March 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.world-

nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Fuel-Recycling/Plutonium/#.UX6HFrXvsi0.

[Accessed 29 November 2013].

[4] Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Country Profiles - India - Nuclear," Nuclear Threat Initiative,

February 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/india/nuclear/.

[Accessed 29 November 2013].

[5] Congressional Research Service, "Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: U.S. Policy Development,"

Congressional Research Service, 2008.

[6] J. P. Holdren, "A strategy to buy time,"Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,pp. 58-63, June 1977.

[7] B. Rahman, "Japan 'Loses' 206 kg of Uranium,"Financial Times, 28 January 2003.


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[8] Federation of American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapons - Israel," Federation of American

Scientists, 8 January 2007. [Online]. Available:

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html. [Accessed 1 December 2013].

[9] Global Security, "Nuclear Weapons - Israel," Global Security, [Online]. Available:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/nuke.htm. [Accessed 1 December 2013].

[10] British Broadcasting Corporation, "Vanunu: Israel's nuclear telltale," British Broadcasting

Corporation, 20 April 2004. [Online]. Available:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3640613.stm. [Accessed 1 December 2013].

[11] National Nuclear Security Administration, "Our History," National Nuclear Security

Administration, [Online]. Available: http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourhistory. [Accessed

1 December 2013].

[12] Reuters, "NRC halts plant license approvals to resolve waste issue," Reuters, 7 August

2012. [Online]. Available: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/08/07/utiltiies-nuclear-

idUKL2E8J7KDI20120807. [Accessed 1 December 2013].

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Strategic Nuclear Materials Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Proliferation