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STOPPING THE SPRAWLHow Winnipeg Could Benefit from Metropolitan

Growth Management Strategies for a Slow-Growth Region

byRichard LennonChristopher Leo

ISBN: 0-88627-254-8 January 2001

About the AuthorsAbout the AuthorsAbout the AuthorsAbout the AuthorsAbout the Authors

Richard Lennon Richard Lennon Richard Lennon Richard Lennon Richard Lennon recently returned from studies in Toronto at York University, from whichhe will soon receive his M.A. in Political Science. His research interests have focused onurban and regional planning, economics from a public policy perspective, and federal andprovincial politics. He is currently employed as a data analyst/research associate for a Win-nipeg market research firm.

Christopher Leo Christopher Leo Christopher Leo Christopher Leo Christopher Leo is a professor of Political Science at the University of Winnipeg and aCanadian Centre for Policy Alternatives-Manitoba Research Associate.

AcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Jim Silver, Todd Scarth, the University of Winnipeg,theCanadian Centre for Policy Alternatives-Manitoba, and the Social Science and HumanitiesCouncil of Canada for support and encouragement, but accept full responsibility for errors,omissions and lapses in logic, judgement or good taste.

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................... 1

STOPPING THE SPRAWL ........................................................................................................................... 3

TYPICAL URBAN DECLINE ........................................................................................................................ 4

URBAN DECLINE IN WINNIPEG.............................................................................................................. 8

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................................................... 12 Perceived need and leadership ......................................................................................................... 12 Legitimacy and citizen participation ............................................................................................... 14 Fears of loss of growth ......................................................................................................................... 14

GROWTH MANAGEMENT POLICY ........................................................................................................ 16 Statement of goals ................................................................................................................................ 16 Regional governance and agencies ................................................................................................. 17 Local planning and land use control .............................................................................................. 17 Land development and the urban growth boundary ................................................................ 19 Transportation policies ........................................................................................................................24 Social policies .........................................................................................................................................26 Environmental protection ...................................................................................................................26

CRITICISMS ...................................................................................................................................................27

CONCLUSION...............................................................................................................................................28

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................29

Stopping the Sprawl 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

extensive citizen participation.

• A growth boundary designed to setoff areas of future urban develop-ment from agricultural areas wouldbe an important feature of MGM, butWinnipeg’s slow growth requires theboundary to take an unconventionalphysical form — the form of an “ar-chipelago” rather than an “island.”

• A series of disincentives to sprawldevelopment, combined with incen-tives for more compact growthwould constitute a critical supportfor MGM.

Other important supports would be:

• Combined transportation and landuse measures designed to bolster thetransit system;

• Inner city revitalization and housingmeasures; and

• Social initiatives aimed especially atthe inner city.

The paper concludes that, although met-ropolitan growth management wouldnot be easy to achieve in Winnipeg, it isboth urgently needed and possible.

The adoption of measures de-signed to counter urban sprawl,i.e. to achieve more compact

growth across urban regions, is becom-ing an increasingly common phenom-enon in North American cities, and isreferred to as “smart growth” or “met-ropolitan growth management” (MGM).For the most part, however, such meas-ures have been adopted in areas affectedby rapid population growth and thereis a widespread conception that they aremost appropriate to rapid growth. Thispaper argues that sprawl developmentis potentially far more damaging toslowly growing cities than rapidly grow-ing ones, and that metropolitan growthmanagement is therefore highly appro-priate to a slow-growth situation.

Examining the case of Winnipeg, thepaper considers the problems and pos-sibilities that are likely to be encounteredin any attempt to manage this slowlygrowing urban region’s growth, andproduces a set of recommendations de-signed to take advantage of the oppor-tunities and overcome the difficulties.

Among the highlights of the recommen-dations are the following:

• The scope and impact of a meaning-ful set of MGM measures necessitate

2 Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives


problems in the Winnipeg area. Next weexamine common elements of MGM asit has been applied elsewhere in NorthAmerica, noting the difficulties inherentin applying such a policy to a slow-growth metropolitan area.

Finally, we consider ways of makingsuch a policy more practical for the Win-nipeg area. Our point of departure is arecognition that, at present, both publicand political support for MGM are weakin Manitoba, though there is a wide-spread awareness of growth problems.We are not implying that MGM is immi-nent in Winnipeg, only exploring av-enues for getting there. It is our belief,however, that the case for MGM in aslowly growing city is substantiallystronger than it is generally consideredto be. Indeed, as we argue in the sectionentitled “Urban Decline in Winnipeg,”the need for MGM is, if anything, moreurgent in a slowly growing city than inone that is growing rapidly. A case studyof Winnipeg can be a useful starting-point in considering the wider questionof whether MGM is desirable andachievable in slowly growing cities. Ourobjective is a set of recommendations forthe formulation and implementation ofMGM in Winnipeg, drawing on experi-ence with MGM in other jurisdictions.

STOPPING THE SPRAWL

How Winnipeg Could Benefit from MetropolitanGrowth Management Strategies for a Slow-Growth Region

Winnipeg faces a growth di-lemma. A city of more than600,000, with the highest

residential property taxes in westernCanada, and the third highest in thecountry, it is surrounded by semi-ruralmunicipalities with substantially lowertax rates and faster growth rates. A grow-ing number of home buyers are optingfor lower taxes within easy commutingdistance of the city. High taxes, in turn,restrict the resources available for cop-ing with the other horn of the growthdilemma: neighbourhood decline, hous-ing abandonment, and deteriorating in-frastructure, especially in the inner city.

In many American metropolitan areas,attempts are being made to work towardlong term solutions to such growth prob-lems through metropolitan growth man-agement (MGM): managing urbangrowth in such a way as to increase ur-ban densities, promote more mixed landuses, and limit sprawl. A perceived ob-stacle to MGM in the Winnipeg area isthat Winnipeg is a region of relativelyslow growth. This raises the question ofhow growth can be directed toward de-sirable ends, when there is little growthto manage. In this paper, we begin bymaking a case for a broad, regionalpolicy such as MGM to deal with urban


TYPICAL URBANDECLINE

Over the past twenty years,much of the literature on ur-ban decline (Bradbury,

Downs, & Small, 1982; Downs, 1994;Orfield, 1997) has argued thatunmanaged urban sprawl results in anumber of problems throughout themetropolitan region. The process of ur-ban sprawl is associated with the exo-dus of the middle class from much of theinner city and older suburbs which may,as a result, contain a high concentrationof poverty (Downs 47-49). Poor neigh-bourhoods, in turn, tend to experienceserious social problems, including sig-nificant losses in population, social iso-lation, unemployment, ineffectiveschools, crime, and erosion of housingstock and infrastructure (Downs, 79-83;Orfield, 2-4; Yeates 1995, 222-3). Thesesocial problems create a great demandfor increased services, which the city ishard pressed to meet due to the finan-cial strains already put on city coffers bysuburban infrastructure costs (Downs77-8; Orfield, 5-8). The net result is hightaxes for the suburbs and inadequateservices to meet the social needs of theinner city. Although there are often othercauses of high taxes, service cutbacks,and social problems, we argue that un-controlled urban sprawl worsens theseproblems significantly.

While the roots of suburbanization inCanada date back largely to the earlypostwar years, following changes in thesystem of home finance (Harris 1991, 56-7; Sewell 1994, 12-14), today it is fuelledvery often by a desire for segregationfrom people of lower income, of a lowerclass, or of a different ethnicity(Bradbury, Downs, and Small 1982, 74-6). As a result, over time,suburbanization has the effect of geo-graphically separating groups by in-come, race, or class (Downs 1994, 9-10).

Goldberg and Mercer (1986, 45-7) haveargued that Canadian cities are differentin this respect from American cities,which have a long history of racial con-flict and discrimination. While this maybe true, Canadian cities may be chang-ing. Winnipeg, for example, has seen arecent and large influx of aboriginal mi-grants, many of whom have settled inthe inner city, who make up the major-ity of the population in some inner-cityareas, and who are disproportionatelydependent on social services (Driedger1995; Goldberg and Mercer, 47; Ley 1991,326; Nairne 1998; Stewart 1993, 154).These areas may yet come to resembleU.S. ghetto neighborhoods. In sum, seg-regation involves the concentration ofthe poor within the older, inner city.

The literature points to urban problemswhich occur following the segregationof poverty. (Massey and Denton, 1993;Jencks and Peterson, 1991; Mincy and


Wiener, 1993; Marcuse, 1997; 1997a; VanKempen, Eva T, 1997) Orfield (2-5) hasargued that this, due to the physicalseparation from jobs and the lack of mid-dle class role models, reinforces welfaredependency and leads to higher crimerates. For example, a high concentrationof adolescents from troubled or impov-erished families may lead to the forma-tion of street gangs. Students who haveintelligence and potential, but who livewithin these troubled neighbourhoods,may be co-opted into gangs if they havefew other role models. Hence, the greaterthe concentration of poverty and socialproblems, the more intense those prob-lems will become. As this occurs, theexodus of middle class residents, whofear the crime and social problems in theinner city, becomes greater, thereby per-petuating the cycle.

Suburbanization in itself is not an “evil,”providing it can be sustained. Perhapsthe most severe consequence of mosturban sprawl is that it has been at verylow densities. Low densities, stemmingfrom inefficient land use, result in a highamount of infrastructure and servicesper taxpayer and, hence, higher city ex-penses per tax dollar (Orfield, 86). Theseadded infrastructure and service ex-penses, combined with the added socialservice costs in the inner city, inevitablyresult in higher property taxes and serv-ice cutbacks. (Harris and Scarth, 1999)And since suburban residents typicallypay higher taxes and have greater re-

sources with which to pressure the citygovernment, it is usually services mostbeneficial to the inner city that are cutfirst and to thegreatest degree.This decline inservices to theinner city, par-ticularly whenits residents re-quire them themost, only fur-ther aggravatesalready existingsocial problemsand, as a result,suburbanization.These problemstend to be much worse in American cit-ies, where fractured tax bases result ingreater fiscal disparities, further encour-age sprawl, and can result in a loss oftax base for the metropolitan region as awhole (Orfield, 86-7), but the symptomsare evident in Winnipeg and other Ca-nadian cities as well.

The expansion of low density suburbshas, in part, been fuelled by the increasein automobile ownership, which allowsindividuals to live farther from theirworkplaces and from shopping areas.Widespread automobile ownership alsomade spatial separation of commercial,residential, and industrial areas feasible(Yeates 1998, 201). Residence or employ-ment in use-separated suburban areas,in turn, mandates automobile owner-

Suburbanization

in itself is not an

“evil,” providing it

can be sustained.


tive job searches. Secondly, increasedpublic transit usage will have to be a partof any successful campaign to reduceautomobile usage and, hence, signifi-cantly lower pollution levels and lowerroad and bridge construction and main-tenance costs. A third reason is that in-creased transit use would lead to re-duced traffic congestion.

While conventional suburban develop-ment has severe consequences for cities,the consequences of exurban growth areworse. Exurban growth refers to thegrowth of residential communities out-side of the central city’s boundaries,driven possibly by the high taxes alreadyreferred to, a desire for living in a coun-try setting, or a desire to escape per-ceived problems of the city. Exurbangrowth involves an erosion of the taxbase of the central city, further worsen-ing its financial difficulties. Exurban resi-

ship. Thus the automobile, which beganas a convenience that enabled separationof uses, in the end became a necessityfor anyone living or working in subur-ban areas. The separation of uses at lowdensities and the increase of automobileusage has increased traffic congestion,air pollution, and road usage, which re-sults in increased road maintenance andbuilding costs for the city.

The viability of public transit is weak-ened due both to the increased automo-bile usage and to the low populationdensity in suburban areas (Downs, 7-9;Yeates, 214-5; Pucher 1998, 26). A viablepublic transit system serves a number ofimportant purposes. In the first place,residents who do not own a vehicle de-pend on transit to travel to work, school,or other destinations. It is essential, also,for those who are not employed and whodo not drive to be able to conduct effec-

Table 1: Hectares consumed per thousand population change 1966-86

CCCCMMMMAAAA RRRRaaaatttteeee ooooffff llllaaaannnndddd ccccoooonnnnssssuuuummmmppppttttiiiioooonnnnTTTToooorrrroooonnnnttttoooo 27

VVVVaaaannnnccccoooouuuuvvvveeeerrrr 34MMMMoooonnnnttttrrrreeeeaaaallll 35CCCCaaaallllggggaaaarrrryyyy 43

OOOOttttttttaaaawwwwaaaa----HHHHuuuullllllll 47QQQQuuuueeeebbbbeeeecccc 51

EEEEddddmmmmoooonnnnttttoooonnnn 59WWWWiiiinnnnnnnniiiippppeeeegggg 95

SSSSoooouuuurrrrcccceeee:::: PPPPaaaatttttttteeeerrrrssssoooonnnn,,,, 1111999999998888,,,, 777766661111....


dents no longer pay residential propertytaxes to the city, but, in Canada at least,they typically remain oriented to the city,often work there, and enjoy many of itsamenities, without having to help payfor city infrastructure, policing, socialservices and other services. Manyexurban municipalities are largely com-posed of middle class to wealthy resi-dents, a situation which is maintained

by local zoning requirements that ex-clude smaller, multifamily, and subsi-dized housing. Hence, exurban munici-palities frequently have lower socialservice costs and little need for highertaxes.

Table 2: Population density changes in urbanized portions of selected CMAsMMMMeeeeaaaannnn ppppooooppppuuuullllaaaattttiiiioooonnnn ddddeeeennnnssssiiiittttyyyy,,,, uuuurrrrbbbbaaaannnniiiizzzzeeeedddd ttttrrrraaaaccccttttssssCCCCMMMMAAAA

1111999999996666 CCCChhhhaaaannnnggggeeee 1111999977771111----99996666PPPPeeeerrrr cccceeeennnntttt ooooffff ppppooooppppuuuullllaaaattttiiiioooonnnn

iiiinnnn uuuurrrrbbbbaaaannnniiiizzzzeeeedddd ttttrrrraaaaccccttttssssTTTToooorrrroooonnnnttttoooo 3,329 -4.43% 80.2

MMMMoooonnnnttttrrrreeeeaaaallll 3,255 -23.21% 77.6OOOOttttttttaaaawwwwaaaa----HHHHuuuullllllll 2,478 8.84% 72.5VVVVaaaannnnccccoooouuuuvvvveeeerrrr 2,377 20.27% 78.1WWWWiiiinnnnnnnniiiippppeeeegggg 2,375 -16.96% 83.0HHHHaaaammmmiiiillllttttoooonnnn 2,288 -7.86% 82.2EEEEddddmmmmoooonnnnttttoooonnnn 2,165 -13.45% 73.4

QQQQuuuueeeebbbbeeeecccc 1,962 -14.54% 69.6CCCCaaaallllggggaaaarrrryyyy 1,916 -4.26% 78.8

SSSSoooouuuurrrrcccceeee:::: BBBBuuuunnnnttttiiiinnnngggg,,,, FFFFiiiilllliiiioooonnnn aaaannnndddd PPPPrrrriiiissssttttoooonnnn,,,, 2222000000000000....

CCCCMMMMAAAA IIIInnnnnnnneeeerrrr----cccciiiittttyyyy ddddeeeennnnssssiiiittttyyyy cccchhhhaaaannnnggggeeee1111999977771111----99996666 ((((%%%%))))

IIIInnnnnnnneeeerrrr----cccciiiittttyyyy ppppooooppppuuuullllaaaattttiiiioooonnnn cccchhhhaaaannnnggggeeee1111999977771111----99996666 ((((%%%%))))

VVVVaaaannnnccccoooouuuuvvvveeeerrrr 15.20 18.5CCCCaaaallllggggaaaarrrryyyy -1.92 -1.92TTTToooorrrroooonnnnttttoooo -10.31 -10.67

EEEEddddmmmmoooonnnnttttoooonnnn -15.96 -15.96OOOOttttttttaaaawwwwaaaa----HHHHuuuullllllll -22.23 -22.51

HHHHaaaammmmiiiillllttttoooonnnn -26.84 -20.23WWWWiiiinnnnnnnniiiippppeeeegggg -27.59 -23.25MMMMoooonnnnttttrrrreeeeaaaallll -31.10 -35.34QQQQuuuueeeebbbbeeeecccc -35.74 -35.45

SSSSoooouuuurrrrcccceeee:::: BBBBuuuunnnnttttiiiinnnngggg,,,, FFFFiiiilllliiiioooonnnn aaaannnndddd PPPPrrrriiiissssttttoooonnnn,,,, 2222000000000000....

Table 3: Inner city population and density changes


URBAN DECLINE INWINNIPEG

While sprawl in the Winnipegregion is not comparable to that in manyAmerican cities (Goldberg and Mercer1986), it has clearly taken a toll. Threeseparate measures of sprawl — hectaresconsumed per thousand populationchange, density changes in urbanizedportions of the CMA* and densitychanges in the inner city — are sugges-tive of what is happening (see Tables 1-3). Of these three measures, it is prob-ably hectares consumed per thousandpopulation change (Table 1) that is themost significant. The drawback of thefigure for density changes in urbanizedportions of the Winnipeg CMA (Table 2)is the hedge “urbanized portions,”which exclude the earliest stages offringe development.

Indeed, as Table 2 shows, the figure forWinnipeg excludes 17 per cent of thepopulation of the CMA. Undoubtedlysome commercial farmers, who aregenuinely part of a rural economy, areamong those excluded, but so, in all like-lihood, are the “sprawl pioneers”: hobbyfarmers, homes strung out along majorroads and relatively isolated residents offuture suburbs. Table 1, by contrast, cov-ers the entire CMA, and takes in thoseareas actually converted to urban use, asmeasured by remote sensing. (Patterson

1993) Even this measure will fail to cap-ture some of the more scattered urbanresidences in otherwise rural areas. Inaddition, the figures in Table 1 are some-what dated, but, if anything, that wouldsuggest that the table understates theproblem. Other evidence, cited below,makes it clear that the situation hasworsened since 1986.

As for the inner city population changes(Table 3), these figures, taken by them-selves, could signify the density reduc-tions that often accompanygentrification — a state of affairs thatexists in substantial parts of Toronto’sinner city and in more scattered portionsof inner cities elsewhere in Canada —or they could indicate serious social andeconomic decline. Other evidence, citedbelow, clearly shows that, in Winnipeg,the latter cause is the predominant one.On any interpretation, the three tables,taken together, show that sprawl in theWinnipeg region is at least substantialand at most the worst in Canada. In lossof inner city population, Winnipeg alsoranks near the bottom of Canadian cit-ies.

However, the information in these ta-bles, gleaned from a comparative analy-sis of several cities, is less revealing thana demographic comparison of the cen-tral city with fringe municipalities, aswell as evidence of social and physicalchanges visible at street level and invis-ible underground. The central city, with

* The equivalent of an American MSA.


a 1996 population of 611,630, is sur-rounded by a ring of urbanizing ruralareas and rapidly growing small towns.The outer ring, with a population of71,445, remains thinly populated, but inrecent years it has been taking a dramati-cally disproportionate share of the newpopulation growth, even though the citystill has large areas of developable land.

Population growth within the city was3.7 per cent from 1986 to 1991 and 0.3per cent over the next five years, whileexurban growth took off, with munici-palities bordering the city growing atrates in excess of ten per cent over fiveyears, and in some instances more than20 per cent. (Lezubski, 1999) The innercity, meanwhile, has been caught up inlong-term population decline, losingone-quarter of its population between1966 and 1996. (Silver, Lezubski andBlack, 1999, 4)

Even more unmistakeable is the evi-dence of physical decay and social dis-tress. The deterioration of the inner city’solder infrastructure becomes most dra-matically visible when an automobile ortruck plunges through a hole that sud-denly opens up in the street. This hasoccurred several times in recent years,thanks to deteriorating sewer lines(Redekop 1996; Wild 1994). The streetsand houses of the inner city are deterio-rating less spectacularly, but possiblyeven faster. Despite heroic efforts on thepart of all three levels of government andthe local business community, once-bus-

tling Portage Avenue is a problem area,and Selkirk Street, the former commer-cial heart of the North End, is moribund.Unoccupied retail premises are a com-mon sight on Portage and are virtuallyubiquitous on Selkirk.

In inner-city residential neighbour-hoods, housing has deteriorated dra-matically, and boarded-up residences arebecoming an increasingly common sightin some of the worst neighbourhoods.Some neighbourhoods are beset bygangs and arson has become a favouritestreet sport. Much of the inner city hasbeen red-lined by insurance companies,with the result that home owners apply-ing for insurance may be refused, or maybe required to pay more than the stand-ard premium.

Such decline is a lamentably commonphenomenon in North America, but itsspecific impact on any given city variesaccording to local circumstances. Win-nipeg’s decline has been shaped by thefact that is that it is slow-growth city.Anthony Downs (1994, 67) definesslowly growing cities as those that hadpopulation gains of under ten percentover ten years. From 1986 to 1996, thepopulation gain of the CMA of Winni-peg from 625, 304 to 667, 209 reflects a6.7 percent increase (Leo 1998; Manitobaand Winnipeg 1996).

An important difference between theurban decline found in a slow-growthcity and that found in a rapidly grow-


ing city is depopulation of the inner city(Bradbury, Downs, and Small 1982, 174).As upwardly mobile residents continueto move out of the inner city, there is noincoming population to replace thoseleaving. This leads to a situation of hous-ing abandonment and an ever-increas-ing concentration of residents unable toupgrade their housing. Recent City ofWinnipeg area studies elaborate thefindings set out on Table 3 by showingdeclining population levels in many in-ner city neighbourhoods as well as pro-portions of housing in need of major re-pair in the ten to twenty percent range(City of Winnipeg Planning Department1991, 1993).

A second characteristic of urban declinein a slow-growth city is the decline of itscommercial core. In cities undergoingeconomic decline or limited growth,there is relatively little new investmentin the downtown area to offset the de-cline and suburbanization of its commer-cial aspects. In rapidly growing cities, onthe other hand, there may be sufficientinvestment in the downtown to spurexpansion that swallows up adjacentdecayed residential areas. Winnipeg hasclearly suffered a dramatic decline in itsdowntown, as evidenced by high ratesof vacancy, building and infrastructuredeterioration, and store closures (Mani-toba Business 1993).

All of these empty spaces are still servedby infrastructure, but they lack taxpay-ers to help pay for it. Empty spaces

served by infrastructure that are not cov-ered off by revenue are also in evidencein the fringe areas of a slowly growingcity. If a metropolitan area is growingrapidly, empty spaces created by “leap-frog” development at the edge of themetropolitan area are likely to be filledin relatively quickly with taxpayers tohelp support the infrastructure. In aslowly growing city, taxpayer supportfor overextended infrastructure is likelyto grow more slowly.

These added impacts of sprawl devel-opment upon slowly growing cities havenot been given the attention they deservein the MGM literature, which, in distin-guishing between the effects of slow andrapid growth, has generally limited it-self to the observation that anti-sprawlmeasures will take effect more slowlywhere “growth pressures are weak”(Downs 1994, 152), leaving the impres-sion that MGM is unlikely to be worth-while in a situation of slow growth. Suchformulations are echoed in local politi-cal arenas, where fears of loss of growthoften become the overriding policy con-sideration and preclude any serious dis-cussion of MGM. Many have concludedthat it does not pay to undertake meas-ures promoting denser development insuch cities as Winnipeg. However, if weaddress costs instead of benefits — andtake into consideration the fact thatempty spaces created by decay or leap-frog development are being filled slowlyor not at all — we would be likely to con-


clude that densification is much moreurgent in slowly growing cities than itis in rapidly growing ones. (Leo andBrown, 2000)

In Winnipeg, the problems of depopu-lation, decline of housing stock, deterio-ration of downtown, and growing socialproblems were major impetuses for theestablishment in 1981 of the Core AreaInitiative, a massive urban revitalizationprogram funded by all three levels ofgovernment (Stewart 1993). Though theprogram directed over $200 million inpublic funds, in addition to privatemoney, to Winnipeg’s core from 1981 to1992 to combat these problems, its suc-cess was limited due to the persistence,stubbornness, and geographical extentof those problems (Decter and Kowall1990, iii; Stewart 159-160). Furthermore,it was not accompanied by measuresdesigned to address long term urbandecline; core area problems were allevi-ated without adequate reference to sub-urban and exurban expansion, a majorfactor in the severity of Winnipeg’s in-ner city decline. The CAI was akin topouring water into a leaky bucket with-out first patching the leaks.

The crucial question for Winnipeg thenis how might it go about patching its“leaks”? If suburban and exurban expan-sion were to be limited or redirected,then it would be much easier and muchmore effective to revitalize the inner cityand to ameliorate the conditions of many

of its residents. The most successful andviable measure would likely be one thatdoes not restrict growth, but rather man-ages growth and,if possible, redi-rects it towarddeclining neigh-bourhoods. Thiswould requiresubstantial gov-ernment involve-ment and leader-ship, extensiveco-operation be-tween differentlevels of govern-ment, business,and city resi-dents, and aw i d e - r a n g i n gm e t r o p o l i t a narea focus.

Programs alongthese lines,which appear tobe gainingground, both inpolicy and in the academic literature(Blais, 1995; DeGrove with Miness, 1992;Downs, 1994; Knaap and Nelson, 1992;Leo 1998; Leo et al 1998; Leonard, 1983),are variously referred to as “smartgrowth” or regional or metropolitangrowth management (MGM). In general,MGM involves the establishment of acomprehensive and regional frameworkor plan to manage urban growth in a

The Core Area

Initiative was akin to

pouring water into a

leaky bucket without

first patching the

leaks. The crucial

question for Winnipeg

is how might it go

about patching its

“leaks”?


POLITICALCONSIDERATIONS

Perceived need and leadership

For MGM to exist, there must first be aperceived need to manage urbangrowth. In Oregon’s case, there was astrong environmental consciousnessbased particularly on the desire to saveagricultural, forest, and coastal landfrom the rapidly expanding city (Howe,1993, 61-2; Leo et al 1998). With a strongperceived need, it became possible toform a political coalition based on thisissue, to raise public awareness and sup-port, and to pass the legislation designedto meet land preservation goals. As wasapparent in Oregon, not only was per-ceived need required to put the appro-priate plan into action, but leadershipwas also essential, as evidenced by thatprovided by Governor Tom McCall (Leo1998).

Florida’s growth management programalso benefited from appropriate leader-ship (Starnes 1993, 78). The perceivedneed for growth management arose fol-lowing several major developmentprojects throughout urban Florida, in-cluding military investment, the build-ing of Walt Disney World, CapeCanaveral space port development, andthe construction of a major airport. Thesedevelopments were widely considered

rational manner, taking into account resi-dential densities, the costs of infrastruc-ture, transportation, environmental con-cerns, preservation of agricultural land,and affordable housing (DeGrove withMiness 1992, 2-3; Leo 1998). The mostnoted and, perhaps, most successful ex-ample of MGM in North America hasbeen in Oregon, though a number ofother states have also adopted someform or certain elements of MGM.

In order to examine the appropriatenessof metropolitan growth management forthe Winnipeg area, it is first importantto describe its elements as found else-where, then describe if or how these ele-ments might be reproduced in the con-text of Winnipeg. It should be noted thatany plan meant to address the problemsof Winnipeg, even if based on one ap-plied elsewhere first, would have to besuited to Winnipeg’s own unique situa-tion and needs. The described elementsof MGM are, for the most part, takenfrom Portland, since that appears to bethe most successful case in NorthAmerica. Furthermore, regional urbanplanning has thirty years of history inOregon upon which it can be judged.However, lessons based on other exam-ples of state plans, which have had vary-ing degrees of effectiveness and success,do exist and some references are madeto those.


important to the whole region, but fol-lowing numerous land use disputes,transportation problems and a drought,concern about the impact of unplannedgrowth prompted Governor Askew in1971 to direct a citizen assembly and atask force to begin a process wherebyurban growth in Florida would be bet-ter managed.

A sharp and obvious difference betweenurban growth in Florida and Oregon, onone hand, and urban growth in the Win-nipeg area, on the other, is the speed andmagnitude of growth. Clearly, the mas-sive size and speed of growth in bothOregon and Florida raised a strongerstate of alarm about the consequences oframpant, uncontrolled urban growththan would likely arise in Manitoba. Sec-ondly, among all of the American statesthat have adopted some form of MGMbetween 1970 and 1992, all were eitheron the east or the west coast (DeGrove1992, 7). Perhaps the perceived beautyand fragility of coastal ecosystems hasbeen an important factor in creating aperceived need for growth management;after all, environmental concerns havebeen prominent in the development ofmost state growth management plans(DeGrove 1992).

The Winnipeg metropolitan area is nei-ther rapidly growing, nor is there anapparent large-scale fear of the environ-mental consequences of urban growth.Therefore, there appears to be little per-ceived need for a metropolitan growth

management plan. This is because thepublic has, in general, not associatedmany of our urban problems with un-controlled growth. People are , however,concerned about the decline of the in-ner city, and about crime, high taxes, anddeterioration of infrastructure. Politicalleadership that links these issues withmetropolitan growth problems mightsucceed in generating public support forMGM. Since the city of Winnipeg can-not control regional growth on its own,action would have to be taken, at leastin part, by the provincial government.

The assertion of provincial political au-thority over municipal governmentwould not be a new departure in Cana-dian politics. In contrast to the Ameri-can “home rule” tradition, it has alwaysbeen accepted in Canadian politics —though not always gladly — that pro-vincial government has full authority tointervene in municipal affairs in any waythat it sees fit and can justify to its sup-porters. Oregon’s MGM system, inwhich a state board has the authority todisallow municipal plans, is, in theAmerican context, a remarkable exerciseof state power over local government.In Canada, such intrusions are routinelycarried out by provincial municipalboards, and they are far from the mostsevere provincial interventions in localaffairs. Recently, for example, the gov-ernment of Ontario, ignoring strong lo-cal resistance, abolished the governmentof Metropolitan Toronto and merged sixmunicipal governments in the region


into the new unitary local governmentof Toronto.

Legitimacy and citizenparticipation

Most successful growth managementplans allow for substantial citizen par-ticipation. The massive scope and impactof MGM simply make this a necessity.Portland’s program included a largedegree of public consultation, broadlybased public education, and popularsupport as evidenced by four separatevoter initiatives (Leo 1998). In Florida,an assembly of citizens was struck tomake recommendations and offer sug-gestions to legislators (Starnes 1993, 78).Hence, government leadership on deal-ing with urban growth cannot come inthe form of the government simply dic-tating a new policy to the public, butmust seek legitimacy through publicconsultation. This is relatively simpleand risk-free for the government andwill help coalesce support for MGM; thegovernment can then proceed with rec-ommendations from the public, seekinga middle ground among conflicting rec-ommendations.

A program of consultation with the pub-lic should occur in Manitoba; it will, atleast, open up a public debate on urbansprawl and growth in Manitoba and, atbest, result in a legitimate MGM plan.While the government could proceedwith such a plan without major publicconsultation, the more legitimacy and

popular approval behind MGM, themore likely it is to succeed. This wouldhave to include the government puttinga substantial effort and resources towardcourting the ideas and suggestions of thepublic and not just giving the appear-ance of public consultation as govern-ments sometimes do.

Important political support for such aplan could come from very diverse in-terests. These might include downtownbusinesses worried about a decliningdowntown; inner city and inner subur-ban residents concerned about droppingproperty values, poverty, and increasedcrime; taxpayers seeking greater effi-ciency in the management of the city; en-vironmentalists looking to limit the city’simpact on the environment, and farm-ers and small townspeople residing nearthe city seeking to curb its expansion.Input and co-operation from such across-section of interests would be bothbeneficial and necessary during this pre-liminary period of public consultation.

Fears of loss of growth

An important difference between a rap-idly growing urban region and a slow-growth one which often has conse-quences for the development of MGMis the desperation which exists in a slow-growth climate for continued growthand a fear that gains made by growthwill evaporate if that growth is in anyway interfered with. This is one impor-tant reason why Winnipeg has been will-


ing to accept proposals for growth withfew conditions placed on those propos-als. Overcoming the fears that MGM willhalt growth rather than manage it willnot be easy. A public debate on the is-sue, perhaps opened by the government,might lead to some realization that un-controlled growth does not bring justbenefits, but also costs. Hence, growthmanagement is necessary and, if imple-mented properly, might not drive awaygrowth but rather improve its net ben-efit to society.

It is noteworthy that MGM in Oregonwas conceived as a means, not of slow-ing growth, but of promoting it, by help-ing Oregon to become a more attractivelocation. (Leo 1998) It is also worth bear-ing in mind that MGM became estab-lished in Oregon, and maintained itspopular support, during a recessionaryperiod. At that point at least, MGM wasnot driven by fear of excessive growth.The Oregon experience, in its earlystages at least, suggests that rapidgrowth is not a necessary condition ofpopular support for MGM.


GROWTHMANAGEMENTPOLICY

We have established that theconsiderations involved inthe formulation and imple-

mentation of MGM are not the same inslowly growing cities as those affectingrapidly growing centres, but they are notall different either. In this section, we un-dertake a catalogue of some of the mostimportant factors in an MGM policy,considering Winnipeg’s situation .

Statement of goals

MGM is a long-term plan rather than a“quick fix” for a variety of urban ills.Hence, most American states that haveadopted MGM in some form have estab-lished a set of broad goals their programsare designed to achieve. (Innes 1993, 22).While the statement may include a vari-ety of wide-ranging objectives, havingsuch a statement emphasizes and re-minds citizens and legislators what theyare trying to accomplish and what theend result should be. This is also impor-tant for tailoring the plan to identifywhat needs and concerns are most cru-cial for the local region to address. Fur-thermore, the development of goals of-fers an ideal forum for public participa-tion in the development of MGM, theimportance of which was emphasized

above. The importance of having clearlyarticulated goals is as great in a slow-growth region as it is in a rapidly grow-ing centre.

Since the primary problem that MGMaddresses is excessive low-density de-velopment, a major objective must be theachievement of higher densities. That isobvious, but another objective is almostequally important. An overall MGMplan should include policies encourag-ing a greater mixing of land uses. Mixeduses would, first of all, work well withpolicies reducing automobile use. Thisis because they would allow residents tolive near their places of work and shop-ping and, hence, reduce the necessity ofhaving an automobile. Second, mixeduses support higher densities and oftenmore efficient uses of land by permittingsuch combinations as apartments abovestores. Third, areas of mixed uses aremore likely to be busy with pedestriantraffic throughout the day, thereby pro-viding a greater sense of personal secu-rity (Jacobs 1961). No MGM plan couldsweepingly redesign the character ofWinnipeg overnight, however elementsof MGM and encouraging a greater mix-ing of uses would be mutually support-ive policies.

Credible MGM schemes usually includea wide range of elements, taking in suchdisparate matters as parks, a variety ofenvironmental concerns, and muchmore — far more than can be convinc-


ingly covered in a single article. In thesepages we concentrate a number of ele-ments that are central to the success ofMGM: growth boundaries, taxationmeasures, incentives for MGM-compat-ible development, housing and transpor-tation. Our intention is to develop a rea-sonably convincing core for a pro-gramme that would require much fur-ther elaboration.

Regional governance and agencies

An important prerequisite for MGM isthat it be overseen by an agency or gov-ernment that has jurisdiction over theentire metropolitan region. Otherwise,each part of the metropolitan area willagree only to proposals which directlybenefit their neighbourhoods and willreject any others. NIMBY – “not in mybackyard” — is the reason why such aplan must be led by a provincial or statebody rather than by a city government,which rarely has jurisdiction over theentire metropolitan area. Fortunately,Canadian cities are, in general, less frac-tured than their American counterparts,thus reducing disputes, and Canadianprovinces, as mentioned previously, canmore easily and legitimately become in-volved in urban affairs (Goldberg andMercer 1986, 196-8). Hence, establishingMGM in Winnipeg or another Canadiancity is easier than it is in the US. Thisleaves open the question of why thereare no major MGM examples in Canada,despite the widespread sprawled natureof Canadian cities. Perhaps Canadian in-

ner cities have not yet declined enoughfor sufficient alarm to prompt the devel-opment of MGM plans.

In addition to having provincial or stateenactment of MGM, there must also bean instrument of enforcement, disputeresolution and planning co-ordination.In Portland, this takes the form of thosestate bodies, the Land Conservation andDevelopment Commission (LCDC),which sets standards and developspolicy, the Land Use Board of Appeals(LUBA), which rules on land use mat-ters, and the Department of Land Con-servation and Development (DLCD), thestate agency that administers the pro-gram (Howe 1993, 62-3). In Canada, suchfunctions would normally be performedby the provincial Municipal Board, theMinister of Urban Affairs, or a personor body responsible to the minister. Theidea of an exercise of control over cityplanning, based upon principles laiddown in provincial legislation is a famil-iar feature of Canadian local politics ingeneral and Manitoba politics in particu-lar. The specifics of MGM rules wouldbe relatively novel, but the method ofcontrol would not.

Local planning and land usecontrol

It is important to note that MGM doesnot take away all planning power andability from local jurisdictions. The ex-perience with MGM, in Oregon and else-


where, has been that the state govern-ment requires local planning and zon-ing to be consistent with the overallgoals, and uses sanctions or incentivesto maintain the co-operation of all mu-

nic ipal i t iessubject to theplan (Innes1993, 22).While MGMshould noterase the deci-sion-makingpower of localgovernments,it must not, atthe oppositeextreme, bei n e f f e c t i v eand simplycreate a con-

fusing, multi-layered bureaucracy. Ha-waii’s state plan has suffered this criti-cism since it is not legally binding norwas it developed in coordination withthe existing land use classification sys-tem (Bosselman 1986, 8), and thevoluntaristic arrangements in the LowerMainland of British Columbia (the Van-couver region) are vulnerable to similarobjections (Patterson, 1998). An effectivegrowth management plan, which wouldrequire local jurisdictions to plan in co-ordination with plan objectives, couldlead to a serious review and updatingof city regulations and zoning bylaws,hence reducing rather than expandingthe red tape associated with develop-ment proposals.

Easing and discarding unnecessary re-strictions, following a review of Winni-peg’s regulations would also be benefi-cial for anyone attempting to invest inthe city. Many of the restrictions now inforce require such things as minimumfrontages and road allowances and leadto the patterns of low density residen-tial development that are typical of sub-urbs. As we argue in more detail below,in the section entitled “Land develop-ment and the urban growth boundary”changes in regulations would ease thepath to development approvals for neo-traditional developments and other de-signs that depart from the standard sub-urban pattern, opening the way for agreater variety of development, includ-ing higher densities and more mixeduses. Also beneficial would be a clear,consistent framework and policywhereby developers’ proposals are re-sponded to within a reasonable amountof time. For this reason, the regionalgrowth management plan might gainsome support among developers andothers who are often forced to deal withexcessive city regulations. In Portland,straightforward and quick processes fordevelopment approval have made iteasier for investors to do business (Leo1998). Robert M. Rhodes (1986, 48), theattorney for one developer, made a simi-lar comment on Florida’s Growth Man-agement Act: “State comprehensive planpolicies encourage efficient develop-ment in areas that have capacity to serve

An effective growthmanagement plan couldlead to a serious reviewand updating of cityregulations and zoningbylaws, hence reducingrather than expandingthe red tape associatedwith developmentproposals.


new population in a timely and orderlymanner.” Implementing MGM opensthe potential for an updating or discard-ing of unnecessary regulations, andgreater coordination of new regulations,thus countering criticism that MGM nec-essarily adds another layer of bureauc-racy to government and business.

New regulations or policies could bedesigned to encourage higher residen-tial densities. These would not be radi-cal changes designed to dramaticallyincrease densities, but rather moderatepolicies to mandate moderate increasesin density. As Downs has noted (1994,150), the mathematics of density are suchthat the benefits that come with higherdensity increase at a decreasing rate asone increases density. Hence, increasingdensities from low to medium has agreater effect than increasing densitiesfrom medium to high. As a result, im-plementing regulations which raise av-erage residential densities by a moder-ate amount will go a long way to reduc-ing excessively expensive infrastructurecosts by the city and increasing the vi-ability of public transit. At the same time,it still allows for some dwellings of lowerand medium density, thereby maintain-ing choice for the consumer.

The kinds of land use changes neededto implement MGM are essentially thesame in slowly and rapidly growing cit-ies, but the impacts would differ. On onehand, slow growth means that it will

take longer for changes in the land useregime to have a noticeable impact onthe overall pattern of metropolitangrowth. (Downs, 1994) By the same to-ken, the changes that can be achievedmay well be more urgently required ina slowly growing centre. As we haveobserved, sprawl development in aslowly growing city tends to produceinfrastructure wealth and revenue pov-erty: roads and underground municipalservices stretching across empty spacesthat only slowly fill with revenue-pro-ducing development. (Leo and Brown,2000) In Winnipeg, any measures thatpromote filling in and more efficientdevelopment patterns in place of addi-tional low-density, single-use develop-ment at the fringe would come as a wel-come measure of relief for a seriouslyoverstretched infrastructure.

Land development and the urbangrowth boundary

In order to limit unsustainable urbansprawl, MGM plans usually incorporatesome sort of urban growth boundary(UGB). Downs (1994, 153-4) explains thatthese reduce sprawl and infrastructurecosts, increase residential densities, andhelp speed up and make developmentmore predictable. The theory is that alimit on urban sprawl at the fringe of thecity will direct urban growth into thecentral city, potentially reviving declin-ing areas and increasing residential den-sity. Portland established a UGB which


allowed for twenty years’ development.(Leo 1998) To be effective, a UGB mustbe drawn around all urban developmentin the metropolitan area; anything shortof this will lead to exurban or leapfrogdevelopment.

Several problems can occur when at-tempting to establish a UGB (Downs1994, 127-8). First, it is difficult to estab-lish a boundary to include all develop-ing or developed areas, while excludingundeveloped areas, especially when de-velopment is scattered loosely. Secondly,a UGB drawn too tightly makes no roomfor future development, while onedrawn too loosely will have little impact.Thirdly, a UGB may create a land devel-opment monopoly within developableareas, thereby driving up land prices. ForWinnipeg’s case, these difficulties wouldall have to be taken into consideration.

Setting a strict UGB will be crucial forWinnipeg if MGM is to work. Thisboundary must be drawn to include allurban areas over the entire metropoli-tan area of Winnipeg, but should not in-clude too much open space. A bound-ary line drawn which leaves out urbancommunities will likely lead to develop-ment of those communities at the ex-pense of Winnipeg, while one that isdrawn too widely would be ineffective.An urban limit line drawn by Plan Win-nipeg was found to face both problems(Institute of Urban Studies 1990).Though it attempted to direct urban

growth to older neighbourhoods and tonewer suburban areas which could beserviced at reasonable costs to the city, itappeared to simply allow furthersuburbanization within the city and, insome cases, to drive urban growth toexurban areas.

Winnipeg’s slow growth, and the extentto which bedroom communities havespread into the countryside and nearbysmall towns, call for a different approachhere than the one that was used in Port-land, where a single growth boundaryhas been drawn in such a way that theurbanized and urbanizing portions ofMetro Portland form a single land mass.If we think of this urbanized mass as anisland, a more appropriate form for theurbanized areas of metropolitan Winni-peg would be an archipelago. Numer-ous small towns around Winnipeg havebecome, in part, bedroom communities,and numerous newer subdivisionswithin easy commuting distance are sur-rounded by farmland or woodland. Ifthis entire area were surrounded by asingle growth boundary, it would takegenerations at present growth rates forthe whole area to become urbanized andthere would still be communities andother developable areas outside theboundaries that would be within fairlyreasonable commuting distance of Win-nipeg.

If boundaries are to be effective, theymust be drawn around each existing


community, in such a way as to allowfor 20 years’ growth around each com-munity. The establishment of theseboundaries could be combined with aban on the formation of new communi-ties outside Winnipeg. In order to pre-vent those communities in which devel-opment was permitted from continuingto deprive Winnipeg of growth, theirgrowth could be limited to historical lev-els — for example an annual growth rateequal to their average annual growthover the past 30 years. Such measurescould cause inflation of land prices inoutlying communities, but if so, onepractical effect would be some erosionin the cost advantages outlying commu-nities now enjoy, thanks to low landprices and taxes that do not have to coverthe full range of urban services.

If infill development in Winnipeg is tobe made more attractive, disincentivesagainst low-density fringe developmentwithin the city would be desirable aswell. Currently, development charges onnew subdivisions are designed to covercosts to the city in only three areas: roadsand bridges, underground municipalservices, and parks. When those costs arecovered by the developer, the subdivi-sion is deemed to be paying its way andmore. As the city spreads outward atever lower densities, and in patterns thatmandate growing auto-dependence, noaccount is taken of such further costs asmaintenance of police and fire responsetimes at lower and lower densities, new

community centres and librarybranches, costs of providing transit serv-ice to subdivisions where even minimalbus service must be heavily subsidized,costs of building new suburban schoolswhile serviceable downtown schools areclosed, and so forth. In addition to re-strictions on exurban development,there should be increases in develop-ment charges for fringe development, soas more nearly to reflect the real costs ofservicing these subdivisions.There would, of course, be political op-position to such measures. Among thepotential opponents would be develop-ers, real estate people and others in orassociated with the land developmentbusiness; anyone who hopes to profitfrom land speculation in the urbanfringe, including many farmers; anyonewho hopes to become an exurban resi-dent in future. Many others would fearland price inflation, or nurture fears ofperceived excessive regulation and gov-ernment interference. Hence, imple-menting MGM would involve not onlycoalescing numerous inner city anddowntown interests, but it would alsoinvolve attempting to bring much of theopposition “on side” with trade-offs,compromise, or, in Stone’s (1987, 1989,1993) terminology, side payments. It iscrucial to the success of MGM, therefore,that it include incentives as well as dis-incentives.

Where might incentives be found? Forstarters, it is worth noting that some


exurbanites have already begun to resistfurther development on the grounds thatthey are in danger of losing the naturalsurroundings which were a prime moti-vation for moving to an exurban loca-

tion. Some resi-dents of outly-ing towns, aswell as somefarmers whofear interferencewith their agri-cultural opera-tions, therefore,might welcomedisincentives toexurban devel-opment — poli-cies that result in

a slower rate of growth and appreciat-ing residential land values. As far as ag-ricultural land values are concerned, oneof the prime potential benefits of an ur-ban growth boundary is protection of ag-riculture from land price inflation. In-deed, in Oregon, and therefore in NorthAmerica, the earliest proponents of anurban growth boundary were farmers inthe Willamette Valley, who feared urbanencroachment and escalating landprices. (Leo 1998) Growth management,therefore, might generate support fromanyone committed to a future in com-mercial agriculture. In the Winnipegarea, the provincial government hasbeen encouraging both exurban residen-tial development and the developmentnear the city of massive hog farming

operations. That curious juxtaposition ofdevelopment policies is likely, in anyevent, to produce support for some formof restriction on the urbanization of ru-ral land.

If MGM is to gain and maintain politi-cal support, it is crucial that it not takefrom the consumer the ability to chooseamong a wide variety of housing at dif-ferent price levels. Exurban develop-ment curbs and increased charges onlow-density development at the fringewill place upward pressure on the pricesof the housing affected by the restrictionsand charges. To be sure, thanks in partto its slow growth, Winnipeg is one ofthe most affordable housing markets inthe country, but the credibility of MGMdemands that it not be or be seen as thecause of general land price inflation. Itis important therefore to combine restric-tions and extra charges on fringe devel-opment with incentives for developmentwithin the city. Three possibilitiespresent themselves.

First, if there are to be increased chargeson fringe development within the city,based on the need to cover costs of serv-icing low densities, it is logical that thesebe combined with rebates or incentivesto developers of infill. These could becalculated on the reverse of the princi-ples applied to the extra charges: A cal-culation of the savings over a period oftime from fuller and therefore more effi-cient use of existing capacity in transit,

If MGM is to gain andmaintain politicalsupport, it is crucialthat it not take fromthe consumer theability to chooseamong a wide varietyof housing at differentprice levels.


roads, water and sewer lines,reoccupation of schools that might oth-erwise be suffering declining enrolment,and so forth, could produce a sum, apercentage of which would then be of-fered to prospective developers as anincentive. This principle has been ap-plied in a different form in the UnitedStates under the name of tax incrementfinancing. Our suggestion is somewhatmore conservative. Instead of calculat-ing future tax revenues — which wouldbe produced by any development, andmight or might not balance expensesincurred by the development — we ad-vocate calculating the savings specific toinfill development and basing incentiveson those. Tax increment financing avail-able only for infill development wouldbe a workable alternative to our sugges-tion.

Secondly, like many slowly growing cit-ies, Winnipeg has a large stock of dete-riorating housing in the inner city, avail-able at very affordable prices, but in needof renovation. A number of communitygroups are engaged in renovationprojects, but a problem that some areencountering is that building code reno-vation standards go beyond what isneeded to ensure safety and serviceabil-ity of housing that, though deteriorated,has proven its worth over decades. Theexistence of this problem has been ac-knowledged and building code revisionfor heritage buildings is being devel-oped, but nothing concrete has been

done about affordable housing. Thoughdelving into this issue would requiremore time than can be provided by thispaper, it is worth noting that some ac-tion in this area would not only ease theburdens of community volunteers butprovide improved market incentives forhousing renovation.

A third form of incentives for infill de-velopment could be provided by revi-sions in building codes and zoning regu-lations affecting new housing. Althoughconventional, low-density, single-usesuburban land development is clearly aresponse to market demands, the fre-quent success in recent years of neo-tra-ditional developments has shown forsome time now that there is also a po-tential market demand for neighbour-hood designs more in keeping with thegoals of MGM. Since the 1970s, with thesize of family units shrinking and thecost of housing escalating, developershave repeatedly identified market op-portunities for more compact forms ofhousing — or for neighbourhoods wherethe proximity of stores and public facili-ties encourages more walking and lessdriving — only to be thwarted by plan-ning regulations affecting such things aslot sizes, widths of rights-of-way or sepa-ration of uses. Since the late 1980s, thecause of compact housing and mixed-use neighbourhoods has been taken upby proponents of the so-called “newurbanism.” A perusal of the postings onthe e-mail list of the Congress for the


New Urbanism produces numerous ex-amples of the frustrations posed by con-ventional planning regulations, and inWinnipeg, these frustrations have hadthe net effect of continued production ofa very limited and traditional range ofnew neighbourhood designs. One incen-tive, therefore, that would supportMGM, and could produce political sup-port for it, is a form of deregulation af-fecting the zoning and building codes fornew neighbourhoods, or at least the re-writing of regulations so that develop-ers can more easily choose between dif-ferent styles of neighbourhood design.*

In short, significant incentives for MGMcan be created, even with very conserva-tive calculations. Moreover, if they suc-ceed in lessening or eliminating urbansprawl, they can save money in the longrun. Incentives are particularly impor-tant because of Winnipeg’s slow growth.In a rapidly growing city, a governmentagency could restrict growth with anurban growth boundary and the growthwould almost immediately begin to in-crease the average residential densitywithin the city and, before long, possi-bly have an effect on the inner city. How-ever, in a slow-growth city, this processwould take longer, possibly longer thana government could maintain publicsupport for a policy without any of thatpolicy’s expected benefits materializing.Hence, a package of incentives and plan-ning measures is critical to the political

feasibility of managing growth in a slow-growth metropolitan region.

Transportation policies

As MGM has, as one of its goals, to pro-duce housing of greater density, to en-courage more mixed uses, and to man-age overall urban growth, it must alsotake transportation into account. Thegrowing problem of traffic congestion,the sheer expense of building new roadsand highways, and the pollution causedby automobile use has produced grow-ing pressures for a shift in transporta-tion policy (Giuliano and Wachs 1993,162-3). Portland’s initiatives included thebuilding of a transit mall, a pair of down-town streets for buses and pedestriansonly, the tearing up of a waterfront ex-pressway to build a park, the unificationof transit into a single, metropolitan-wide system, and the establishment of alight rapid transit line (Leo 1998). Alongthe new transit line, compact mixedcommercial and residential develop-ments were then erected to further in-crease the viability of the public trans-portation system. Such neighbourhoodsare known as transit-oriented develop-ment (TOD). Another possible supportfor transit was modelled in Phoenix,which does not have a MGM plan, buthas seen significant success in its BusCard Plus program, in which employ-ers encourage their employees to usepublic transit by issuing bus credit cards

* A thorough discussion of how this could be done can be found in Ministries of Housing and Munici-pal Affairs, Government of Ontario, 1995.


(Rimsza 1997). Users are billed monthlyfor each ride taken to a maximum of themonthly bus pass fee.

While traffic congestion and pollutionhave not been as serious in Winnipeg asin many other North American cities, thecosts of road and bridge constructionand maintenance have seriously drainedCity resources. (Leo and Brown, 2000) Anumber of recent American studies havefound that overall government motorvehicle-related expenditures signifi-cantly exceed revenues, thereby result-ing in a hidden government subsidy ofthe auto (ICLEI 1997). For this reason too,transportation policies need to take anew direction and should be includedin an overall MGM framework so thatthe construction of new roads and high-ways is compatible with overall trans-portation policy objectives.

In Winnipeg, a redirection of money forprojects such as new bridges and roadstoward public transit projects is criticallyimportant, and will become feasible oncethe city and the province abandon theirself-imposed obligation to extend infra-structure to virtually every location thatsuits the convenience of land specula-tors. A good starting-point would be theconstruction of the Southwest TransitCorridor, a rapid transit line consistingof cost-effective diesel buses running ona concrete strip dedicated exclusively totransit, which has been a fixture of suc-cessive city plans. This line is considered

viable because it connects two popula-tion concentrations — downtown andthe University of Manitoba — along therelatively heavily populated PembinaHighway corridor. It would amelioratetraffic congestion along Pembina High-way and encourage cost-effective, com-pact development along the route, incontrast to road and bridge projects’ en-couragement of sprawl. The estimatedtotal cost for the entire facility would be$70 million (City of Winnipeg 1997) —about $45 million less than the NorwoodBridge. Postponement of this project hasbeen a routine feature of City Council’sannual budget deliberations for at leasttwo decades. It has been studied atlength. Implementation could begin atany time.

A related initiative would be measuresto encourage businesses to locate alongthe Graham Avenue transit mall, whichwould be served by a spur line from thedowntown end of the the SouthwestTransit Corridor. Business could also beencouraged to become involved in suchprograms as Phoenix’s Bus Card Plusprogram, referred to above. The viabil-ity of these initiatives would be sup-ported by residential density increasesproduced by MGM, which would re-duce auto dependence and increase theconvenience of transit.


lution of Oregon’s MGM system (Leo1998). Events in Oregon and other stateswhere MGM is being attempted, as wellas a large environmentalist literature,make it clear that there is a substantialdegree of correspondence between theaims of MGM proponents and those ofenvironmentalists. (Leo et al, 1998) Po-tentially, therefore, environmental con-cerns can produce political support forMGM. In Manitoba environmentalistscarry little political weight, and Winni-peg’s slow growth may be part of thereason. In such American jurisdictionsas Oregon and Florida, where environ-mental concerns have played an impor-tant role in MGM, it was fears associatedwith rapid growth that provided muchof the impetus for environmentalists’concerns.

It is possible, however, that, in time, en-vironmental concerns will come more tothe forefront, and play a role in a futurepolitics of MGM. The proliferation oflarge-scale hog farms, together with agrowing volume of residential develop-ments relying on septic tanks seem cer-tain to raise environmental issues, and,once cultivated, sensitivity to environ-mental issues may produce receptivityto MGM-related proposals. In the mean-time, a small but often vocal environ-mentalist community is a source of sup-port for MGM proposals.

Social policies

It is important to stress that, while MGMcan can act as an antidote to social isola-tion, which is likely to worsen many ofthe problems of poverty, (Harrell andPeterson, 1992; Jencks and Peterson,1991; Marcuse, 1997; Van Kempen, 1997;Wilson, 1987) it is not a magic wand thatwill abolish inner-city problems, noreven a social program. In order to ad-dress these problems, other initiativesmust be combined with MGM . It is notour intention, in this article, to contrib-ute to the literature on remedies for in-ner-city social problems, but among theinitiatives that need to be undertaken inWinnipeg, in addition to the housingprogrammes referred to above, are edu-cation, job training, affirmative action,improved accessibility to child care, ahigher minimum wage, and especiallycommunity development in many forms(Silver, 2000). Particular attention needsto be paid to the growing concentrationof aboriginal people in some inner-cityneighbourhoods, and policies to addresstheir problems should be undertaken inconsultation with representatives of theaboriginal community itself.

Environmental protection

Environmentalism has been a strong in-fluence on many of the MGM frame-works in North America. For example,environmentalist groups, such as the1000 Friends of Oregon, have played alarge role in the development and evo-


CRITICISMS

A proposal for MGM would becriticized for the short-term ex-penses that it would probably

incur to the City and to the provincialgovernment. It may be that as govern-ments enter a post-deficit era, the fundsfor such a plan might become moreavailable. As well, it is important to keepin mind that MGM would result in moreefficient use of funds in the long run andcould potentially result in lower prop-erty taxes and improved services. There-fore, any expenses incurred in adminis-tering and applying MGM should beseen as an investment rather than a netcost.

MGM will also be criticized as an un-warranted interference in the market-place and with individual choices onwhere to live. While it is true that MGMintervenes in markets, it should bepointed out that tax rebates, housingpolicies, jurisdictional boundaries, andzoning and building codes have allserved to “tamper” in the opposite di-rection. As well, many of the personalchoices to move to the City’s fringe arebased upon fears of crime, property de-valuation, and poor schools, all thingsthat are, in part, related to urban sprawl.Besides, as it is now, market mechanismsare clearly not about to end excess ur-ban sprawl, significantly increase resi-dential densities, or revive the inner city.

The case for intervention in the market-place, therefore, is substantial.

One criticism might be that tamperingwith growth in the Winnipeg region willsimply drive it away to another metro-politan area such as Calgary. If the sug-gestion implicit in this argument is thathousing and associated retail develop-ment will be driven out, it is withoutsubstance, because such markets are in-herently local ones. Corporate mobilityis not a factor here. As for such majorcommercial developments as a bank’sregional headquarters or the headquar-ters of an insurance company — whichmay well be in a position to locate inanother city — the proposals in this ar-ticle would be unlikely to affect themsignificantly. In any event, the experi-ence of Portland and Vancouver, (Leo1998, 1994) among other jurisdictions,suggests that developers are less de-terred by regulations — which exist inany case — than by regulations arbitrar-ily and sluggishly enforced. Finally, ifMGM were to truly work in Winnipegand result in a better overall quality oflife for its residents, including betterservices or lower taxes, growth in Win-nipeg might be encouraged.

A final criticism that might be levied atMGM is that there is little growth to re-direct toward the inner city. As a result,MGM might make only a small differ-ence at best. While this criticism has sub-stance, there is growth, and while there


is, it may as well take a form that is eco-nomically viable for the city and urbanregion. And, as we have argued, sprawlis likely to be more costly to a slowlygrowing city than a rapidly growing one.MGM is crucial to changing the overalldownhill direction of our cities by shift-

ing the traditional patterns of urbangrowth, regardless of how rapid thatgrowth is.

CONCLUSION

Metropolitan Growth Manage-ment for the Winnipeg areais both desirable and possi-

ble, even in a slow-growth context. Slowgrowth has had the effect of makingWinnipeg’s political leaders reluctant tochallenge or regulate growth in the nameof efficiency or even common sense, butwe have uncovered no persuasive evi-dence that it cannot be done, providedthe political will can be found. As wehave argued, an effective MGM scheme

for Winnipeg would include citizen par-ticipation, an urban growth boundary, aseries of incentives and disincentives fordevelopment, regional sharing of taxrevenue, a focus on transportation anddowntown renewal, and serious socialinitiatives, especially in the inner city.Such measures are capable of playing arole in the reduction of urban decay, thepromotion of more efficient use of tax-payers’ money, and the revival of theinner city.


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