Stoppel in ICJ

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Bond Law Review

Volume 21 | Issue 1 Article 5

6-1-2009

Estoppel in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ A principlepromoting stability threatens to undermine it

Alexander Ovchar

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Estoppel in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ A principle promoting stabilitythreatens to undermine it

Abstract

Estoppel is one of the most powerful and exible instruments to be found in any system of courtjurisprudence; and it has featured in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (the Court)and its predecessor, in a number of cases. Estoppel, in the jurisprudence of the Court, obliges a State to beconsistent in its aitude to a given factual or legal situation. Such a demand has the potential to encouragestability and predictability in international relations. Te Court has not been consistent in the application ofestoppel; commentators assert that estoppel lacks coherence in international law. However, few commentatorshave taken on the task of isolating in what ways the Court has been inconsistent when applying estoppel, andnone have made suggestions as to how the Court should eliminate the inconsistencies. Trough a detailedexamination of the judicial application of estoppel, this paper argues precisely in what ways the Court hasbeen inconsistent, and then makes suggestions as to how the Court should eliminate the inconsistencies.Tese proposals give estoppel a measure of predictability in the jurisprudence of the Court, and thus ensure

that the principle promoting stability does not undermine it. Sir Frederick Pollock, Te Expansion of theCommon Law (1904) 108.

Keywords

estoppel at the ICJ

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ESTOPPELINTHEJURISPRUDENCEOFTHEICJAprinciplepromotingstabilitythreatenstoundermineit

ALEXANDEROVCHAR

IntroductionEstoppel isoneof the mostpowerfuland flexible instruments tobe found inany

system of court jurisprudence.1 In one form or another, it is recognised by all

systemsofprivate law.2Thisrecognitionhasextendedtothe internationalsphere

there is no doubt that estoppel is a general principle of international law. 3Consequently,estoppelhasfeatured in thejurisprudenceof theInternationalCourt

ofJustice (the Court) and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International

Justice,inanumberofcases.4

Estoppel, in thejurisprudence of theCourt,5obliges aState tobe consistent in its

attitude to a given factual or legal situation.6Such ademandhas thepotential to

encourage finality,stabilityandpredictability7in internationalrelations, inanage

whenthiscooperationinmanyfieldsisbecomingincreasinglyessential.8

LLB(FirstClassHonours)(Adelaide),BCom(Adelaide).1 SirFrederickPollock,TheExpansionoftheCommonLaw(1904)108.2 SirHerschLauterpacht,PrivateLawSourcesandAnalogiesofInternationalLaw(1927)204.3 IanBrownlie,PrinciplesofPublicInternationalLaw(6thed,2003)616.4 Althoughestoppelhasfeaturedinthejurisprudenceofotherinternationaljudicialbodies,

theexclusivefocusofthispaperisonthedecisionsoftheCourtanditspredecessor.The

reasonforthisistwofold.First,theCourt,astheprincipaljudicialorganoftheUnited

Nations(CharteroftheUnitedNationsart92),isconsideredtobethemostauthoritative

internationaljudicialbody.See,eg,CliveParry,TheSourcesandEvidencesofInternationalLaw(1965)91.Secondly,theCourtitselfveryrarelymakesuseofthedecisionsofother

internationaljudicialbodiesonestoppel.Therefore,inthisareaofinternationallaw,

decisionsofotherinternationaljudicialbodiesdonotseemtobeperceivedbytheCourtas

persuasiveintheirreasoning.5 AreferencetotheCourt,inthispaper,isareferencetotheInternationalCourtofJustice

andthePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice.6 IainMacGibbon,EstoppelinInternationalLaw(1958)7InternationalandComparativeLaw

Quarterly458,468.7 TerritorialDispute(LibyanArabJamahiriyavChad)(Merits)[1994]ICJRep6,78

(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola)(TerritorialDispute).8 NuclearTests(AustraliavFrance)(Judgment)[1974]ICJRep253.

1

Ovchar: Estoppel in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ

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The Court has not been consistent in the application of estoppel; there is wide

confusion over the scope of the principle in extracurial literature.9Commentators

arguethattheverydiversityoftheformsinwhichtheprincipleofestoppelhasbeen

applied tend tomake the concept sodiffuseas to impair itsvalueasa termof

art.10However,althoughmanyarecontenttoassertthatestoppelhasnoparticular

coherence in international law,11very fewcommentatorshave takenon the taskof

isolatinginwhatwaystheCourthasbeeninconsistentwhenapplyingestoppel,12and

none have made suggestions as to how the Court should eliminate the

inconsistencies.

Through a detailed examination of thejudicial application of estoppel, this paper

argues precisely in what ways the Court hasbeen inconsistent, and then makes

suggestions as to how the Court should eliminate the inconsistencies. TheseproposalsgiveestoppelameasureofpredictabilityinthejurisprudenceoftheCourt,

andthusensurethattheprinciplepromotingstabilitydoesnotundermineit.

The structure of this paper is as follows. Part II of the paper identifies the three

fundamental elements of estoppel that havebeen distilledby theCourt from the

principleasitoperatesinmunicipallegalsystems.

Upon this foundation,Part IIIanalyses thejurisprudenceof theCourtonestoppel

andsystematicallyexaminestheapplicationofeachelementbytheCourt.Itargues

thattheCourtisclearononeelementbutinconsistentontheothers.Inparticular,theCourthasbeen inconsistentonwhensilencegivesrise toanestoppelandwhether

detrimentalrelianceisrequiredforanestoppeltoarise.

9 See,eg,DerekBowett,EstoppelBeforeInternationalTribunalsAndItsRelationTo

Acquiescence(1957)33BritishYearBookofInternationalLaw176,201;AntoineMartin,

LEstoppelEnDroitInternationalPublic:PrcddunApercudelaThoriedelEstoppelenDroit

Anglais(1979)274.10 MacGibbon,EstoppelinInternationalLaw,aboven6,478.SeealsoChristopherBrown,A

ComparativeandCriticalAssessmentofEstoppelinInternationalLaw(1995)50UniversityofMiamiLawReview369,41012.

11 Brownlie,n3,616.SeeespeciallyBrown,aboven10.12 StudiesbyBowett,aboven9andMacGibbon,EstoppelinInternationalLaw,aboven6,

althoughindepth,arenowoutdated,becausethemajorityofcasesonestoppelwereheard

bytheCourtafterthesearticleswerewritten,anditispreciselyinthesecasesthatthe

inconsistenciesintreatmentoftheprincipleappear.ThestudiesbyYousefYouakim,

EstoppelinInternationalLaw(PhDDissertation,CornellUniversityLawSchool,1969)and

Martin,aboven9,althoughmorerecent,areencyclopaedicincontentanddonotattempt

toisolatetheinconsistencies.Otherrecentstudiesexaminingthetopichavegenerallybeen

incorporatedintolargerstudiesofinternationallaw,thustreatingestoppelinasomewhat

truncatedmanner.

2

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PartIVconsidersthewayforwardfortheCourt.Itcontendsthattheinconsistencies

discoveredinPartIIIshouldnotremain,astheyaffecttheperceptionofStatesasto

theprobityoftheCourtandcreate legaluncertainty,whichinturnunderminesthe

valueof international lawasaguide to futureState conduct.Suggestionsare then

made as to how the Court should eliminate these inconsistencies; in particular,

silenceshouldbeonlygivenevidentiaryweightanddetrimentalrelianceshouldbe

establishedforanestoppeltoarise.

InternationalEstoppelThe principle underlying estoppel is often expressed in the Latin maxim allegans

contrarianonaudiendusest,translatedasoneshouldnotbenefitfromhisorherown

inconsistency.13

This

principle

is

found

in

all

major

legal

systems.14

It

underlies

the

various typesofestoppel incommon lawjurisprudence15and thecivil lawconcepts

ofpreclusion,debarmentandforeclusion.16

Estoppellikeconcepts inmunicipal lawarebothspecificand technical.17InEnglish

jurisprudence, for example, a number ofbranches or categories of estoppel,with

differentoriginsandinconsistentrules,havebeendevelopedovertheyears.18Oneof

these distinctions is that a statement of fact can give rise only to common law

estoppel;astatementof laworapromise,on theotherhand,cangiveriseonly to

13 TempleofPreahVihear(CambodiavThailand)(Merits)[1962]ICJRep6,39(SeparateOpinion

ofJudgeAlfaro)(TempleofPreahVihear);NorthSeaContinentalShelf(DenmarkvFederal

RepublicofGermany;NetherlandsvFederalRepublicofGermany)[1969]ICJRep4,120

(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAmmoun)(NorthSeaContinentalShelf).Thisisafigurative

translation,whichhasbeenpreferredbymostscholarsonthistopic.Aliteraltranslationis

onemakingcontradictorystatementsisnottobeheard.SeeLordMcNair,LawofTreaties

(1961)485.14 JorgPaulMllerandThomasCottier,EstoppelinRudolfBernhardt(ed),Encyclopaediaof

PublicInternationalLaw(2003)118.SeealsoBoizard(Liselotte)vCommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities[1982]1CMLR157,171(AdvocateGeneralWarner).AngloAmerican

terminologyhasgainedprevalenceinliteratureonthissubjectandthustheprinciple

underlyingestoppelisreferredtoasestoppel.15 See,eg,GeorgeKeetonandLASheridan,Equity(3rded,1987)856.16 See,eg,MuirWatt,PourlaccueildelestoppelenDroitPrivFranaisinBourelBguin

(ed)MlangesenlhonneurdeYvonLoussouarn(1994)303.17 Generally,see,eg,TerritorialDispute,77(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola);Georg

Schwarzenberger,InternationalLaw(3rded,1957)566.Inrelationtocommonlaw

jurisprudence,see,eg,PatrickParkinson,ThePrinciplesofEquity(2003)21416.Inrelationto

civillawjurisprudence,see,eg,Martin,aboven9,240.18 ElizabethCooke,TheModernLawofEstoppel(2000)16.

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equitableestoppel.19Similarly,inAustralianjurisprudence,thereisasmorgasbord

of concepts to choose from under the heading of estoppel. 20 Comparable

complexitiessurroundestoppellikeconceptsincivillawjurisprudence.21

The Court, however, has not adopted the technicalities of specific forms of

estoppel.22Instead,ithasheldthatestoppelconsistsofthreefundamentalelements:

first, a Statemustmake a representation to another; secondly, the representation

must be unconditional and made with proper authority; and finally, the State

invoking estoppel must rely on the representation. 23 If all three elements are

established,anestoppelarises.24

19 See,eg,JordenvMoney(1854)5HLC185;TerritorialandAuxiliaryForcesoftheCountyofLondonvNicols[1949]1KB35;TomlinvReid[1963]EGD338.See,generally,JohnMcGhee,

SnellsEquity(31sted,2000)5689.Thedivisionbetweencommonlawandequitable

estoppel,however,hasbeencriticisedinCrabbvArunDistrictCouncil[1975]3AllER865,

880(LordScarman);AmalgamatedInvestment&PropertyCoLtd(InLiquidation)vTexas

CommerceInternationalBank[1982]1QB84(LordDenning).ForcriticisminBritishextra

curialliterature,seeespeciallyRogerHalson,TheOffensiveLimitsofPromissory

Estoppel[1999]LloydsMaritimeandCommercialLawQuarterly257;MarkLunney,Towards

aUnifiedEstoppel[1992]TheConveyancer239.20 JohnCarterandDavidHarland,ContractLawinAustralia(4thed,2002)140,butnotethat

theauthorsthemselvesdoubtthevalidityofthedistinctionsbetweenthedifferentformsofestoppel.ThisdistinctionwascriticisedinWaltonsStores(Interstate)LtdvMaher(1988)164

CLR387,420(BrennanJ);CommonwealthvVerwayen(1990)170CLR394,413(MasonCJ).

ForcriticisminAustralianextracurialliterature,see,eg,JusticeRoderickMeagher,Justice

DysonHeydonandJusticeJohnLehane,Equity,DoctrinesandRemedies(4thed,2002)4058.21 SeeMartin,aboven9,274;TempleofPreahVihear,39(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro);

CharlesVallee,QuelquesObservationsSurLEstoppelenDroitdesGens(1973)77Revue

GeneraledeDroitInternationalPublic949.22 MllerandCottier,aboven14,118.SeealsoTempleofPreahVihear,40(SeparateOpinionof

JudgeAlfaro),625(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).Forsupportinextracurial

literature,seeespeciallyLauterpacht,PrivateLawSourcesandAnalogiesofInternationalLaw,aboven2,3956.

23 See,eg,NorthSeaContinentalShelf,26.Forsupportinextracurialliteraturesee,eg,Bowett,

aboven9;MeganWagner,JurisdictionbyEstoppelintheInternationalCourtofJustice

(1986)74CaliforniaLawReview1777.24 TheCourthasnotbeenconsistentintheuseofterminologywhendiscussingestoppel,

usingtermssuchasestoppel,preclusion,acquiescenceanddebarmentinterchangeably.

This,however,isnotsignificantbecauseiftheabovementionedelementsareestablished,

theprincipleisappliedineffect.Itisthenirrelevant,insubstance,whatithasbeenlabelled

asbythecourt.See,eg,TempleofPreahVihear,40(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro),625

(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice);TerritorialDispute,77(SeparateOpinionofJudge

Ajibola).ForsupportinextracurialliteratureseeSchwarzenberger,InternationalLaw,above

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Consequently,estoppel inthejurisprudenceof theCourt isfreefrom the manifold

refinements grafted onto itby domestic legal systems.25In its transition from the

municipaltotheinternationalsphere,theconceptofestoppelhasbeenbroadenedso

substantially that the analogy with the estoppel of municipal systems may be

positivelymisleading.26Consequently,asobservedbyJudgeAlfaro in theTempleof

Preah Vihear case, although there are similarities between estoppel in the

jurisprudenceofinternationalandmunicipalcourts,

[t]here isaverysubstantialdifferencebetween thesimpleandclearcut rule

adopted and applied in the international field and the complicated

classifications,modalities,species,subspeciesandprocedural featuresof the

municipalsystem.27

TheCourt, therefore,hasadopted asimpleandwhollyuntechnicalconception28of

estoppelandapplieditasaruleofsubstanceandnotmerelyasoneofevidenceor

procedure.29

Notwithstanding this simplification, theCourthasnotbeen consistent inapplying

estoppel.30Thenextpartofthepaperexaminesthescopeofeachelementandisolates

theinconsistenciesintheapplicationofestoppelbytheCourt.

InconsistenciesinapplicationRepresentationArepresentationisthefirstelementrequiredtoestablishestoppel.Arepresentation,

andthuspossiblyestoppel,canarisefromadeclarationorfromsilence.31TheCourt

n17,566;Wagner,aboven23,1780;RobertJenningsandArthurWatts(eds),Oppenheims

InternationalLaw(9thed,1992)527.25 AnthonyDAmato,Consent,Estoppel,andReasonableness:ThreeChallengestoUniversal

InternationalLaw(1969)10VirginiaJournalofInternationalLaw1,8.26 MacGibbon,EstoppelinInternationalLaw,aboven6,477.27 TempleofPreahVihear,39(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro).28 Ibid62(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).29 TerritorialDispute,77(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola).Thequestionofwhetherthe

juridicalbasisoftheprincipleofestoppelinthejurisprudenceoftheCourtisfoundinits

inceptionasaruleofcustomarylaworasageneralprincipleoflawrecognisedbycivilised

nationsisnotclear;anditisnotthepurposeofthispapertoanswerthisquestion.See,eg,

VladimirDegan,SourcesofInternationalLaw(1997)55.30 Seeeg,Bowett,aboven9,201;Martin,aboven9,274.31 Seeeg,TempleofPreahVihear,62(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice);ElettronicaSicula

SpA(UnitedStatesofAmericavItaly)[1989]ICJRep15,44.SeealsoGeorgSchwarzenberger,

TheFundamentalPrinciplesofInternationalLaw(1955)87Recueildescoursdel Acadmie

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has consistently held that a declaration gives rise to an estoppel only if the

declaration is clear and consistent.32At the same time,however, theCourthasnot

beenconsistentinholdingunderwhatcircumstancessilencegivesrisetoanestoppel.

ArisingfromaDeclarationTogiverise toanestoppel,adeclarationmustbeunequivocal,andconsistentwith

theotherdeclarationsof theState.Not alljudicialdecisionsexpressly refer to this

criterion;all,however,applyitineffect.

In theSerbianLoanscase, theCourtobserved thatadeclarationmustbe clearand

unequivocal33togiverise toanestoppel. In theNorthSeaContinentalShelfcase, the

Courtobserved that theFederalRepublicofGermanywouldbeestoppedonly if it

clearlyandconsistentlyevincedacceptance34ofaConvention itdidnotratify.Themerefactof takingpart in thedraftingof theConventionandacting inaccordance

withitwasnotenoughtosatisfythiscriteriononlyaverydefinite,veryconsistent

courseofconduct35onthepartoftheFederalRepublicofGermanycouldhavegiven

risetoanestoppelinthecircumstances.

A similar testwas applied in the Land, Island andMaritimeFrontierDispute case.36

There, El Salvadorian andHonduran expressions of views as to the existence or

natureofNicaraguan interests37didnotgiverise toanestoppelbecause theywere

not clear and consistent declarations they were only ambiguous statements of

deDroitInternationaldelaHaye195,256;RobertJennings,AcquisitionofTerritoryin

InternationalLaw(1963)3841;DominiqueCarreau,Droitinternational(7thed,2001)230.32 TheCourtreferstodeclarationsandconductinterchangeably.SeeMilitaryand

ParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(NicaraguavUnitedStatesofAmerica)

(Jurisdiction)[1984]ICJRep392,415;LandandMaritimeBoundarybetweenCameroonand

Nigeria(CameroonvNigeria)(Jurisdiction)[1998]ICJRep275,303.33 PaymentofVariousSerbianLoansIssuedinFrance(FrancevSerbCroatSlovene)[1929]PCIJ(ser

A)No20,38(SerbianLoans).EstoppelreceivedpassingattentioninFactoryatChorzow

(GermanyvPoland)(Jurisdiction)[1925]PCIJ(serB)No3andEuropeanDanubeCommission(AdvisoryOpinion)[1927]PCIJ(serB)No14.However,thebrevityofthejudicial

examinationofestoppeldoesnotallowonetodrawanyusefulconclusionsaboutthe

principleinthejurisprudenceoftheCourt.SeeJCWitenberg,lEstoppel,UnAspect

JuridiqueduProblemedesCreancesAmericaines(1933)60JournalduDroitInternational

531,537.34 Ibid25.TheConventioninquestionwastheGenevaConventionontheContinentalShelf,

openedforsignatureOpenedforsignature29April1958,499UNTS311(enteredintoforce

10June1964).35 Ibid26.36 (ElSalvadorvHonduras)(ApplicationForPermissionToIntervene)[1990]ICJRep92.37 Ibid118.

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opinion.38In theMilitaryandParamilitaryActivities inandagainstNicaraguacase, the

Courtobservedthatanestoppelmaybeinferredfromtheconduct,declarationsand

thelikemadebyaStatewhichclearlyandconsistentlyevincedacceptance39ofa

particular state of affairs. Similarly, the Court observed in the Land andMaritime

BoundarybetweenCameroonandNigeriacasethat:

an estoppel would only arise ifby its acts or declarations Cameroon had

consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed to settle the boundary

disputesubmittedtotheCourtbybilateralavenuesalone.40

Theseconditionswereconsiderednottohavebeensatisfiedinthiscaseandthusno

estoppelwasestablished.41

Inthe

Legal

Status

of

Eastern

Greenland

case,

42

theCourt

held

that

astatement

made

by

theNorwegianMinisterofForeignAffairs in1919effectively recognisedthewhole

ofGreenlandasDanish43;andbecause thestatementwasclearandconsistentwith

previous Norwegian declarations,44 the declaration made in 1919 gave rise to an

estoppel.45

In theArbitralAwardMadebytheKingofSpainon23December1906case,46Honduras

argued thatby accepting the appointment of the arbitrator, Nicaragua was now

estopped fromquestioninghis competency.TheCourt agreedwith theHonduran

contention,observingthat:

Nicaragua,byexpressdeclarationandbyconduct,recognized theAwardas

validand it isno longeropentoNicaraguatogobackuponthatrecognition

andtochallengethevalidityoftheAward.47

38 Ibid.39 (NicaraguavUnitedStatesofAmerica)(Jurisdiction)[1984]ICJRep392,415.40 (CameroonvNigeria)(Jurisdiction)[1998]ICJRep275,303.41 Ibid304.Ontwooccasions,theCourthasheldthatanestoppeldidnotarisewithout

elaboratingonwhenadeclarationgivesrisetoanestoppel.SeeBarcelonaTractionLightand

PowerCo(BelgiumvSpain)(Judgment)[1964]ICJRep4,245(BarcelonaTractionLightand

PowerCo);SovereigntyOverPedraBranca/PulauBatuPuteh,MiddleRocksAndSouthLedge

(MalaysiavSingapore)(Merits)[2008]ICJRep[228]at19April2009

(SovereigntyOverPedraBranca).42 (DenmarkvNorway)(Merits)[1933]PCIJ(serA/B)No53(LegalStatusofEasternGreenland).43 LegalStatusofEasternGreenland,68.44 LegalStatusofEasternGreenland,646.45 Ibid73.46 (HondurasvNicaragua)[1960]ICJRep192(ArbitralAwardMadebytheKingofSpain).47 Ibid213.

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Therefore,bymaking a clear declaration that it accepted theAwardmadeby the

King of Spain as valid prior to the arbitration, Nicaragua was estopped from

questioningthevalidityoftheAward.

In theNuclearTestscase,Australia asked theCourt todeclare French atmospheric

nuclear testing in theSouthPacificOcean illegal.Before theCourtheard thiscase,

Francemadeaseriesofdeclarationstotheeffectthatallatmospherictestswhichare

soontobecarriedoutwill,inthenormalcourseofevents,bethelastofthistype.48

The Court held that these declarations gave rise to an estoppel because of

intention. 49 This intention, the Court explained, is to be ascertained by

interpretation of the act 50 of making the declaration itself. Therefore, the Court

observedthatforadeclarationtogiverisetoanestoppel,thesolerelevantquestion

is whether the language employed in any given declaration does reveal a clear

intention.51

This test, ineffect, isnodifferent from the clearand consistent criteriondiscussed

previously.IntheNuclearTestscase,noemphasiswasplacedontheactualintention

of the State the focus was on the declaration itself. 52 Therefore, whether the

declarationgaverisetoanestoppelinthiscasewasamatternotofsubjectiveintent

butofexternalobjectivejustice.53

Further support for this interpretation canbe foundon the factsof the case it is

clear that theFrenchgovernmentdidnotevincean intention tobebound.Noneof

the statements made by French officials contained an express assumption of

obligation.Commentatorshavestressed theextremeunlikeness thatFrancewould

have really intended to assume an obligation.54DrDegan, for example, observed

that:

the probable intentions of French officials were quite the opposite: avoid

assuming a firm legal obligation, but by these political and informal

48 Ibid266.49 Ibid267.50 Ibid.51 Ibid268.52 PhillippeCahier,LecomportementdesEtatscommesourcededroitsetdobligationsin

RecueildEtudesdeDroitInternationalEnHommageaPaulGuggenheim(1968).53 MarttiKoskenniemi,FromApologytoUtopia:TheStructureofInternationalLegalArgument

(2006)348.SeealsoThomasFranck,WordMadeLaw:DecisionoftheICJintheNuclear

TestsCases(1975)69AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw612,617.54 Koskenniemi,aboven53,351.MllerandCottier,aboven14,118.

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statementstocalmtheanxietyofapplicantsandtopreserveitsfreedomof

actionforthefuture.55

Itis

thus

clear

that

the

test

adopted

in

the

Nuclear

Tests

case

is

objective

the

Court

construed the French intent from the declaration itself, and not from the actual,

subjectiveintentionsoftheState.56

Given thisobjectivefocus,therewouldbenodifferencebetweenthis,and theclear

andconsistenttest,whichfeaturedinpreviouscases.57Togiverisetoanestoppel,a

declaration,undereithertest,mustbeunambiguous,atleastinthesensethatitmust

reasonablysupport themeaningattributed to itby thepartyraising theestoppel.58

Therefore, in effect, the Court in the Nuclear Tests case applied the clear and

consistentcriterionofpriorcases.

The foregoing analysis has shown that the Court has consistently held that a

declarationcangiverisetoanestoppelbutonlyifitisclearandconsistent.Insome

cases theCourthasexplicitlyapplied this criterion,while inothers itapplied it in

effect.ThenextsectionarguesthattheCourthasnotbeenconsistentindetermining

whensilencegivesrisetoanestoppel.

ArisingfromSilence:IsSilenceEvidentiaryorConclusive?In addition to a declaration, an estoppel can also arise from silence.59The Court,

however,has

not

been

consistent

in

determining

when

this

occurs.

60

Onclose

analysis

55 Degan,aboven3,55.SeealsoLuigiBravo,MethodesdeRecherchdela

CoutumeInternationaledanslaPratiquedesetats(1985)192RecueildesCours233,260.56 SeeEricSuyandKarelWellens,InternationalLaw(1998)217.57 AlfredRubin,TheInternationalLegalEffectsofUnilateralDeclarations(1977)71American

JournalofInternationalLaw1,2630;JeanDidierSicault,Ducaractreobligatoiredes

engagementsunilatrauxendroitinternationalpublic(1979)83RevueGeneraledeDroit

InternationalPublic

633,68788.

58 IanSinclair,EstoppelandAcquiescenceinVaughanLoweandMalgosia

Fitzmaurice(eds),FiftyYearsoftheInternationalCourtofJustice:EssaysinHonourof

SirRobertJennings(1996)107.59 Onecommentatorsuggeststhat,inthejurisprudenceoftheCourt,estoppelisaseparate

principletoacquiescence,andthussilencecangiverisetoacquiescencebutnotestoppel

andviceversa.SeeIainMacGibbon,TheScopeofAcquiescenceinInternationalLaw

(1954)31BritishYearBookofInternationalLaw143,1478.Theusefulnessofthisdistinctionis

doubtfulinlightofthefactthatthemajorityofcases,aswellasextracurialliterature,treat

estoppelastheconsequenceoftheacquiescenceofaState.Thus,itisunnecessarytoconsider

thedistinction,ifany,betweenthetwoconcepts.Forcurialsupport,see,eg,TempleofPreah

Vihear,63(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).Forextracurialsupport,see,

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ofthecircumstanceswhensilencegivesrisetoestoppel,twodiametricallyopposed

approachesbecomeevident.

Oneapproachcontendsthatthemerefactofsilencegivesrisetoanestoppel.Onthisapproach, silence and lack of protest are so fundamental that they decide by

themselves alone thematter in thedispute61and thus, arguesJudgeAlfaro in the

TempleofPreahVihearcase,constituteapresumptionjurisetdejureinvirtueofwhich

aStateisheldtohaveabandoneditsright62toopposeanadverseclaimbyanother

State.Ajurisetdejureassumption isone thatdenotes conclusivepresumptionsof

lawwhichcannotberebuttedbyevidence.63Therefore,accordingtothisview,there

isnoneedtoconsiderotherevidencewhichmightgiverisetoadifferentinference;

silenceisconclusiveinestablishingestoppel.

Anoppositeapproachassertsthattogiverisetoanestoppel,silencemustbeviewed

in context of the circumstances in which it was maintained; the presumption of

consent derived from silence may be rebutted by a clear indication of contrary

intention.Silenceisthusofevidentiaryvalueonly.64

Therefore, thedistinctionbetween the twoviews is thejudicialimportancegiven to

silenceby theCourt; sometimes it is conclusivewhile at other times it is of only

evidentiaryweightinestablishingestoppel.

Thisisafundamentaldistinction.WhentheCourtadoptstheconclusiveview,aclear

response opposing a claim of another Statemustbemade in order toprevent an

estoppelarising.Ontheevidentiaryview,however,thereisonlyaneedtoprotestan

adverse claim if the position of the State is not clear from its current conduct.A

detailedexaminationofcases thathavedealtwith this issue reveals that theCourt

hasnotbeenconsistentintheapproachitprefersnoviewhasgainedprevalence.

An estoppel arising from silencewas considered for the first time in the Fisheries

Case.65There,theUnitedKingdomobjectedtotheNorwegiansystemofdelimitation

ofitscoastlinealongtheNorthSea.TheUnitedKingdomarguedthatthissystemof

delimitation effectively extended theNorwegian territorial sea into the high seas,whichareopentousebyallnations.

Schwarzenberger,InternationalLaw,aboven17,566;McNair,aboven13,488;Bowett,

aboven9,201;Youakim,aboven12,158;Wagner,aboven23,17834.60 TheCourtreferstosilence,acquiescenceandlackofprotestinterchangeably.61 TempleofPreahVihear,43(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro).62 Ibid44(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro).63 MarkShain,PresumptionsundertheCommonandtheCivilLaw(1944)18Southern

CaliforniaLawReview91,97.64 TempleofPreahVihear,131(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).65 (UnitedKingdomvNorway)[1951]ICJRep116(FisheriesCase).

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Themajority of the Court held, however, that theUnited Kingdom should have

illustrated itsdiscontentwith this system ofdelimitation earlier. Inparticular, the

majorityobserved thatas thedelimitation significantly affected thepositionof the

United Kingdom in the North Sea, the United Kingdom should have protested

against it,andbynotdoingsoforover60years,wasnowestopped fromclaiming

otherwise.66Thus, the British silence, in the form of a prolonged abstention from

protesttothissystemofdelimitation,gaverisetoanestoppel.67

Incomingtothisconclusion,themajorityadoptedaconclusiveviewofsilence;itdid

notexaminethecircumstancesinwhichthesilencewasmaintained.Haditdoneso,

this examination would have revealed that the United Kingdom was never

completely awareof theNorwegian systemofdelimitationduring the 60years in

whichNorwayclaimedtheBritishshouldhaveprotested.68Theinformationthatwasavailable to the United Kingdom revealed contradictions in the system of

delimitation used by Norway, and thus the British government felt it was

unnecessarytoprotest.

It is precisely the examination of the circumstances in which the silence was

maintained which seems to be the underlying reason for the dissent of Judges

McNairandReid. Immediatelyafterexamining thesecircumstances,JudgeMcNair

concludedthat:

Inthesecircumstances,IdonotconsiderthattheUnitedKingdomwasaware,oroughtbutfordefaultonherparttohavebecomeaware,oftheexistenceofa

Norwegiansystemoflongstraightbaselinesconnectingoutermostpoints.69

Thus, theJudge held that the British silence should not give rise to an estoppel.

Similarreasons impelledJudgeReid tohold likewise.JudgeReidobserved that the

various decrees of the Norwegian government, which set out the system of

delimitation,werenot brought to theattentionofothergovernmentsandcertainly

not to theattentionof theBritishGovernment.70Thus,as theUnitedKingdomwas

notcompletelyawareofthespecificsystemofdelimitationusedbyNorway,nordid

the United Kingdom receive constructive notice of the system, 71 Judge Reidconcludedthatitshouldnotbeestoppedfromdisputingthesystem.

66 Ibid140.JudgesAlvarezandHsuMo,intheirseparateopinions,didnotaddressthe

specificpointraisedaboveandthustheirjudgmentsarenotincludedinreferencestothe

majorityinthiscase.67 Ibid139.68 Ibid138.69 Ibid180(DissentingOpinionofJudgeMcNair).70 Ibid200(DissentingOpinionofJudgeReid).71 Ibid172(DissentingOpinionofJudgeMcNair).

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Thedifference inopinionbetween themajority,anddissentingJudgesMcNairand

Reid, was the judicial weight given to the British silence. The majority seemed

contenttoimputeconstructiveknowledgeofthedelimitationtotheUnitedKingdom

without specific regard to the particular circumstances in which the silence was

maintained. Thus, themajority adopted a conclusive view of silence. In contrast,

dissenting Judges McNair and Reid meticulously considered the circumstances

surroundingthesilenceandconcludedthatitdidnotgiverisetoanestoppel.Thus,

JudgesMcNairandReidsawsilenceasbeingonlyofevidentiaryweight.

The facts concerning theTempleofPreahVihearcase centredona territorialdispute

betweenCambodia(thenknownasFrenchIndoChina)andThailand(thenknownas

Siam) over the Preah Vihear Temple. A joint committee of topographers was

establishedin1904todeterminetheprecisecontoursofthefrontierlinebetweenthetwo countries. This committee produced amap in 1907 thatwas sent to the Thai

authorities, according towhich the Temple was situated in Cambodian territory.

TherewasnoreactiononthepartoftheThaiauthoritiestothismap,eitherthenor

formanyyearssubsequently.72

It is not entirely clear who had effective possession over the Temple over the

followingfourdecades.TheonlyJudgeswhomadeaconclusivefindingonthisissue

were Judges Koo and Spender who, in dissent, held that Thailand exercised

administrativecontrolovertheregionsurroundingtheTempleandhadcontrolover

theTemple itself.73In1954,Thaimilitary forcesoccupied theTemple following the

French withdrawal from Cambodia. A dispute arose over the ownership of the

Temple.

CambodiacontendedthatThailandhadacceptedthemappreparedin1907which

placedtheTempleontheCambodiansidebecauseitfailedtoprotest itscontents.

Therefore,Cambodiaargued,Thailandwasestoppedfromclaimingsovereigntyover

theTemple.

Thailand argued that abundant evidence has been given that Thailand has

exercisedfullsovereigntyintheareaoftheTempletotheexclusionofCambodia.74

Therefore, Thailand contended, no estoppel couldbe established as Thailand, in

effect,didprotesttothecontentsofthemap.ThemajorityoftheCourtobservedthat

themapcreatedcircumstancesthat:

72 Ibid23.73 Ibid93(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo),138(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).74 Ibid12.

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calledforsomereaction,withinareasonableperiod,onthepartoftheSiamese

authorities, if they wished to disagree with the map or had any serious

questiontoraiseinregardtoit.75

AsThailanddidnotdoso,themajorityheldthatThailandshouldbeestoppedfrom

claiming sovereignty over the Temple. 76 However, Judges Koo, Spender and

Quintana,intheirdissentingreasonsforjudgment,arguedthatinlightofthebroader

circumstances of the case, particularly the Thai exercise of sovereignty over the

Temple,theThailackofprotestshouldnotgiverisetoanestoppel.77

Thisdifferenceinconclusionswascausedbyavaryingdegreeofjudicialimportance

accordedtotheThaisilence.ThemajorityobservedthattheThaisilencegaveriseto

an estoppel regardless of evidence to the contrary, such as the Thai exercise of

sovereignty over the Temple. Absence of protest, even in light of seeminglycontradictory conduct, gave rise to an estoppel. Thus, according to the majority,

silencewasconclusiveinestablishinganestoppel;silencewasjurisetdejure.

JudgeSpenderarguedindissentthatiftheThaisilencewastheonlyevidenceinthis

caseitcouldwellbeconclusive.78However,whentheThaisilenceisweighedagainst

theThaioccupationoftheTemplearguedJudgeSpenderitwillbeseenthatsuch

admissionsasmaybespeltoutoftheconductofSiambytheCourthavelittleifany

evidentiaryvalueinthedeterminationofthiscase.79

Similarly,JudgeKoospokeofsilenceasbeingarelevantfactoronlyinthelightofits unequivocal conduct and of the attendant circumstances.80The alleged lack of

protest,JudgeKooargued,was plainlycontradictedbyevidenceofsustainedState

[Thai]activityinexerciseofsovereigntyintheTemplearea.81Therefore,asThailand

hadconsistentlyindicatedabeliefthattheareainquestioncontinuestobelongto

herownsovereignty,hersilenceshouldnothavegivenrisetoanestoppel.82

JudgeQuintana, inhisdissent,similarlyobserved that,apartfrom theThaisilence,

[o]therconsiderationsadducedbythePartiesmustbeevaluatedbyaninternational

75 Ibid23.76 Ibid24.JudgesAlfaroandFitzmaurice,intheirseparateopinions,concurredwiththe

majorityonthispoint,andarethusincludedinreferencestothemajorityinthiscase.See

ibid39(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro),55(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).77 Ibid52(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo),70(DissentingOpinionofJudgeQuintana),130

1(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).78 Ibid131(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).79 Ibid.80 Ibid96(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo).81 Ibid52(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo)82 Ibid51(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo).

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tribunalat theircorrectsignificance.83Consequently,silenceand lackofprotest, as

evidence,haveonlyacomplementaryvaluewhich is in itselfwithout legaleffect.84

Consequently,JudgesKoo,SpenderandQuintanasawThaisilenceasbeingofonly

evidentiaryvalue.

IntheElettronicaSiculaSpAcase,85theUnitedStatesallegedthatItalyviolatedatreaty

between the twocountries inpreventingRaytheon,acompany incorporated in the

UnitedStates,fromliquidatingtheassetsofitswhollyownedItaliansubsidiary.

In 1974, theUnited Stateswasof the opinion thatRaytheonhad exhausted every

legal remedyavailable to it in Italy. Italywasawareof thisconviction,but at that

timewasoftheopinionthatthelocalremedieshadnotbeenexhausted.86WhenItaly

raised the local remedies defence in 1978 that Raytheon should have sued the

ItalianGovernmentintheItaliancourtstheUnitedStatesarguedthatthisabsence

ofripostefromItalyamountstoanestoppel.87ItwasarguedthatItalyshouldhave

apprisedtheUnitedStatesofitsopinion,andbyfailingtodoso,shouldbeestopped

fromclaimingthatalllocalremedieshavebeenexhausted.88

TheCourtrejectedthisargumentonthebasisthattheItaliansilencedidnotgiverise

toanestoppel.TheCourtobservedthatalthough

an estoppel could in certain circumstances arise from a silence when

something ought to have been said, there are obvious difficulties in

constructing an estoppel from a mere failure to mention a matter at aparticularpointinsomewhatdesultorydiplomaticexchanges.89

The Court examined the extensive communication between the two States and

effectively discounted the value of the Italian silence in light of the wider

circumstances in which it was maintained. In particular, by viewing the Italian

silence in the context of the relatively informal and disorganised communication

betweenthetwoStates,itheldthatitdidnotgiverisetoanestoppel.Thus,theCourt

adoptedtheevidentiaryviewofsilence.

TheJanMayencase90concernedadisputeover thedelimitation in theareabetweenGreenland (Denmark) and theJanMayen Island (Norway).Denmark argued that

83 Ibid70(DissentingOpinionofJudgeQuintana).84 Ibid71(DissentingOpinionofJudgeQuintana)(emphasisadded).85 (UnitedStatesofAmericavItaly)[1989]ICJRep15.86 Ibid44.87 Ibid.88 Ibid.89 Ibid.90 MaritimeDelimitationintheAreabetweenGreenlandandJanMayen(DenmarkvNorway)

(Merits)[1993]ICJRep38.

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Greenlandwasentitledtoafisheryzoneatadistanceof200nauticalmilesfrom its

baseline,whilstNorwayclaimedthattheouterlimitoftheDanishfisheryzonewas

themedianlinebetweentherelevantcoasts.

In support of its claim,Norway contended thatDenmark had knowledge of the

longstanding position of the Norwegian Government in the matter of maritime

delimitation,91andbynotillustratingitsdiscontentwiththisposition,shouldnowbe

estoppedfromchallengingtheexistenceandvalidityofthemedianlineboundary.92

TheCourtexaminedthecircumstances inwhichtheDanishsilencewasmaintained

andconcludedthatnoestoppelwasestablished.TheCourtobservedthattheDanish

silence was explained by the concern not to aggravate the situation pending a

definitive settlement of theboundary.93 Therefore, the underlying reason for the

Danish restraint in the enforcement of its fishing regulations was to avoid

difficultieswithNorway.94

The Court was not exclusively concerned with the question of whether Denmark

should have protested the Norwegian delimitation. Its examination of the facts

extendedalso to the reasons forwhyDenmarkkept silent.Thus, it seems that the

Court considered the two competing factors theneed toprotest and theDanish

hesitationindoingsoandobservedthatitwasreasonable,inthecircumstances,for

Denmarktoremainsilent.

Silencewasthusonlyofevidentiaryweight.HadtheCourtadoptedajurisetdejure

viewofsilence,itwouldnothaveconsideredthereasonsfortheDanishhesitationto

protest,andthuslikelyheldthatanestoppelwasestablished.

In the TerritorialDispute case, themajority of theCourt found that theboundary

between Chad and Libya was defined by the 1955 Treaty of Friendship andGood

Neighbourliness(the1995Treaty).95In itspleadings,Chadoffereda supplementary

reasonforwhytheboundarybetweenthetwoStatesshouldbedefinedbythe1955

Treaty.Chadcontendedthatevenifthe1955Treatywasinvalid,thefactthatLibya

didnotprotestagainstthisboundaryinsubsequentdealingsbetweenthetwoStatesestoppeditfromclaiminganotherboundary.

91 Ibid53.92 Ibid.93 Ibid54.94 Ibid55.95 TreatyofFriendshipandGoodNeighbourliness(withAnnexes,SpecialConvention,Conventionon

GoodNeighbourliness,ConventiononEconomicCooperationandCulturalConvention),10

August1955,FranceLibyanArabJamahiriya,1596UNTS264(enteredintoforce20

February1957).

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JudgeAjibolawastheonlyJudgetoconsiderthisargument.Inhisseparateopinion,

heobservedthat:

basedontheprincipleofestoppelthesilenceoracquiescenceofLibyafromthedateof signing the1955Treaty to thepresent time,withoutanyprotest

whatsoever,clearlymilitatesagainstitsclaim.96

JudgeAjibolathenconcludedthatinlightofthebroadercircumstancesinwhichthe

silence was maintained, Libya was estopped from denying the 1955 Treaty

boundary.97

The use of theword militate in the reasoning ofJudgeAjibola is significant. It

impliesthattheJudgesawsilenceashavinginfluential,butnotconclusiveweightin

establishingestoppel.

Following

an

examination

of

the

broader

circumstances

in

which the silence was maintained, theJudge concluded that there was no other

evidencewhichcould leadone toadifferingconclusion;Libyadidnotoccupy the

territory inquestionnordid itengage inanyotherconductwhichwas inconsistent

withitssilence.98Therefore,hadLibyaexercisedsomesovereigntyovertheterritory

inquestion,itseemsthatnoestoppelwouldhavearisen.Silence,therefore,wasonly

ofevidentiaryweight.

The preceding examination reveals that the Court has not been consistent in

determiningwhensilencegivesrisetoanestoppel.Thisiscausedbytheconflicting

judicialimportancegiventosilence:sometimesitisconclusive,yetatothertimes,itisonlyofevidentiaryweightinestablishingestoppel.TheCourthasbeenunclearon

theapproachitprefersandthisisthereforethefirstareaofsubstantiveinconsistency

intheapplicationofestoppelbytheCourt.

Inconclusion,thiselementofestoppelisunclear:althoughcoherentinitstreatment

of an estoppel arising from a declaration, the Court has not been consistent in

determiningwhensilencegivesrisetoanestoppel.

Authorisedand

Unconditional

Thesecondelementofestoppelisthatarepresentationmustbebothauthorisedand

unconditional.Ifthiselementisnotsatisfied,arepresentation,evenifitisclearand

consistent,doesnotgiverisetoanestoppel.

The Court has been consistent in the judicial treatment of this element. It has

continuallyheld thata representation isauthorisedonly if it ismadebyanorgan

96 TerritorialDispute,81(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola)(emphasisadded).97 Ibid83(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola).98 Ibid845(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola).

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competenttobindtheStateandarepresentationisdeemedunconditional,unlessitis

madeinthecourseofnegotiationsorissubjecttoexpressconditions.

The question of proper authoritywas first discussed in the LegalStatus

of

Eastern

Greenlandcase.There,theCourtheldthat:

areplyofthisnature,givenbytheMinisterforForeignAffairsonbehalfofhis

Government in response to a requestby the diplomatic representative of a

foreignPower in regard toaquestion fallingwithinhisprovince, isbinding

uponthecountrytowhichtheMinisterbelongs.99

This reasoning illustrates that the Courtwas not concernedwith the question of

whether theMinister had actualauthority tomake the representation.Rather, the

focusoftheCourtwasonwhethertheMinisterwascompetenttobindtheState;was

theMinistergiven thepower to engage the State internationally?When theCourt

concludedthatitwas,itobservedthattherepresentationwasauthorised.100

This particular view of authorisation was endorsed in the Nottebohm Case. 101

AlthoughtheCourtheldthattherewasaclearandconsistentrepresentation,itthen

proceeded to conclude that the representation was not authorised because a

consulate is not an organ which is competent to bind a State; it is not given

responsibility to bind the State internationally on such affairs. Thus, the Court

concluded that as the representation of theConsulGeneral ofGuatemalawasnot

authorised,itdidnotgiverisetoanestoppel.102

Similarly, in the Gulf ofMaine case,103 the Court held that although a clear and

consistent representation was present, a midlevel government official 104 the

Assistant Director for Lands and Minerals of the United States Bureau of Land

Managementhadnoauthoritytodefineinternationalboundariesortakeaposition

on behalf of his Government on foreign claims in this field. 105 The Court thus

concluded that the Assistant Director was not competent to bind the State and

thereforehis representation, although clear and consistent,didnotgive rise to an

estoppel.

99 LegalStatusofEasternGreenland,71.100 SeealsoBowett,aboven9,192.Cf.Martin,aboven9,160.101 (LiechtensteinvGuatemala)(SecondPhase)[1955]ICJRep4.102 Ibid1718.103 DelimitationoftheMaritimeBoundaryintheGulfofMaineArea(CanadavUnitedStatesof

America)[1984]ICJRep246(GulfofMaine).104 Ibid306.105 Ibid307.

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Inadditiontobeingauthorised,arepresentationmustalsobeunconditional.Inthe

Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, Norway argued that her representation to

DenmarkwasconditionalonDanishcooperationonaseparateissueofsovereignty

over the Spitsbergen Island. 106 The Court held, however, that the Norwegian

representation was unconditional because it was not made in the course of

negotiations.107However, the Court suggested that had the above argumentbeen

successful,noestoppelwouldhavearisen.108

Inconclusion,thiselementofestoppeliscleartheCourthasconsistentlyheldthata

representationmustbeauthorisedandunconditionaltogiverisetoanestoppel.

TheCourthasalso consistentlyapplied the respective test foreach requirement:a

representation isauthorised if theorganmaking therepresentation iscompetent to

bind the State, while a representation is unconditional if it is made outside of

negotiationsandisnotsubjecttoexpressconditions.Attentionmustnowturntothe

thirdandfinalelementofestoppelreliance.

RelianceThefinalelementoftheprincipleisthatthepartyclaimingestoppelmusthaverelied

ontherepresentation.109TheCourthasnotbeenconsistentinholdingwhetheraState

must have suffered detriment as a result of its reliance; it is unclear whether

detrimentalrelianceisrequiredforanestoppeltoarise.

ThePrerequisiteofDetrimentMostdecisions support theproposition that for an estoppel to arise, apartymust

showthatithastakendistinctactsinrelianceontheotherpartysstatementeitherto

itsdetrimentortotheothersadvantage.110Thesedecisionsalltakeabroadviewof

detrimentalreliance;aStatethatsufferednodirectharmcanstillinvokeestoppelby

virtueofthebenefitgainedbytheotherState.111

IntheSerbianLoanscase,theCourtheldthatnosufficientbasishasbeenshownfor

applyingthisprinciple[ofestoppel]astherehasbeennochangeinpositiononthe

106 LegalStatusofEasternGreenland,88.107 Ibid8890.108 Ibid88.109 See,eg,NorthSeaContinentalShelf,25.110 TempleofPreahVihear,63(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice);NorthSeaContinental

Shelf,26.ThispassagehasbeencitedwithapprovalinLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontier

Dispute(ElSalvadorvHonduras)(ApplicationbyNicaraguatoIntervene)[1990]ICJRep3,118;

SovereigntyOverPedraBranca,[228].111 See,eg,TempleofPreahVihear,63(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).

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partofthedebtorState.112IntheNorthSeaContinentalShelfcase,theCourtstatedthat

theconductoftheFederalRepublicofGermanymusthavecausedDenmarkorthe

Netherlands,inrelianceonsuchconduct,detrimentallytochangepositionorsuffer

someprejudice.113

In the Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and againstNicaragua case, the Court

observed thata representation, in the formof conduct,musthave causedanother

StateorStates,inrelianceonsuchconduct,detrimentallytochangepositionorsuffer

somedetriment114togiverise toanestoppel.Further, in theBarcelonaTractionLight

and Power Co case, the Court refused to uphold the Spanish estoppel argument

becausenodetrimentalreliancewasestablished;theCourtwasnotabletoholdthat

anytrueprejudicewassufferedbytheRespondent.115

Thisviewwasendorsed intheLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDisputecase,where

theCourtobservedthatforanestoppeltoarise,apartymustrelyonanotherpartys

representationtohisdetrimentortotheadvantageofthepartymakingit.116Inthe

LandandMaritimeBoundarybetweenCameroonandNigeriacase,theCourtheldthatan

estoppelwouldonlyarisewhereaState, inrelianceonarepresentationofanother,

hadchangedpositiontoitsowndetrimentorhadsufferedsomeprejudice.117

In the Temple ofPreahVihear case, themajority held that detrimental reliancewas

required to invoke estoppel. In particular, themajority held thatCambodia could

invoke estoppelby virtue of thebenefit gainedby Thailand,whichwas a stablefrontierwithCambodia.118JudgeFitzmaurice,inhisseparateopinion,arguedthatthe

essentialconditionoftheoperationofestoppelwasthat:

[t]he party invoking the rule must have relied upon the statements or

conduct of the other party, either to its own detriment or to the others

advantage.119

DissentingJudges Koo and Fitzmaurice also supported this view, although they

questioned its application on the facts.Judge Koo argued that the legalbasis of

estoppelwas

that

one

party

has

relied

on

the

statement

or

conduct

of

the

other

either

to itsowndetrimentor to theothersadvantage.120JudgeSpenderheld thataState

112 SerbianLoans,39113 [1969]ICJRep4,26.114. (NicaraguavUnitedStatesofAmerica)(Jurisdiction)[1984]ICJRep392,414.115 BarcelonaTractionLightandPowerCo,25.116 (ElSalvadorvHonduras)(ApplicationbyNicaraguatoIntervene)[1990]ICJRep3,118.117 (CameroonvNigeria)(Merits)[1998]ICJ275,304.118 TempleofPreahVihear,32.119 Ibid63(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).120 Ibid97(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo).

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claimingestoppelmusthavebeenprejudicedortheStatemakingtherepresentation

musthavesecuredsomebenefitoradvantageforitself.121

These cases, therefore, unequivocally show that detrimental reliance must beestablishedforanestoppeltoarise.

EstoppelwithoutDetrimentalRelianceWhilerequiringdetrimentalrelianceinsomecases,theCourthasheldinothersthat

detrimentalrelianceisnotrequiredforanestoppeltoarise.

In theLegalStatusofEasternGreenlandcase, theCourtheld thatNorwaywasbound

by theverbalassurancegivenby theNorwegianMinisterofForeignAffairs tohis

Danishcounterpart.Initsjudgment,theCourtimpliedthatdetrimentalreliancewas

notrequiredforanestoppeltoarise.122

Onecommentatorisoftheview,however,thatdetrimentalreliancewasrequiredin

thecasebecausethere

canbe no doubt that the Court was impressedby the fact that Denmark,

relying on Norways unilateral promise of noninterference, thereafter

proceededtoexecuteplansandprojectsforitsremotecolony.123

This, however, is confusing reliance with detrimental reliance. Reliance does not

alwayslead

to

adetriment

aState

must

be

worse

off

in

amaterial

way

from

its

reliance.ThisobservationwasmadeintheBarcelonaTractionLightandPowerCocase,

wheretheCourtheldthatSpaindidrelyontheBelgianrepresentation,butindoing

so,itsufferednomaterialprejudice.124

The same canbe said for the Danish claim.Although Denmark did rely on the

Norwegian representation, it suffered no prejudice. This interpretation of the

judgment is supported by Professor Higgins, who observes that in this case,

detrimental reliance is distinct from the assumption of legal obligation 125 and

concludesthatdetrimentalreliancewasnotrequiredbytheCourt.LordMcNairalso

121 Ibid1434(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).122 LegalStatusofEasternGreenland,701.AlthoughtheCourtupheldtheDanishclaimwithout

requiringdetrimentalreliance,Denmarkarguedinitspleadingsthatdetrimentalreliance

wasrequiredforanestoppeltoarise,andthatthisrequirementwassatisfiedonthefacts.

SeeLegalStatusofEasternGreenland(DenmarkvNorway)(Merits)[1933]PCIJ(serC)No63,

843.123 Franck,aboven53,617.124 (BelgiumvSpain)(Judgment)[1964]ICJRep4,267.125 DameRosalynHiggins,ProblemsandProcess(1994)36.

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supportsthisviewheconcludesthatthecaseshowsthatdetrimentalrelianceisnot

requiredforestoppeltooperate.126

IntheArbitralAward

Made

by

the

King

of

Spain,themajorityobservedthatanestoppel

was established Nicaraguawasboundby its declarationwhich recognised the

AwardoftheKingofSpainasvalid.127However,onthefacts,Hondurassufferedno

detrimentfrom itsrelianceon theNicaraguanrepresentation.128Therefore, itcanbe

concluded that actual harm was not demanded by the Court. Judge Holguin,

appointedadhocbyNicaragua,criticisedthis,arguinginhisdissentthatnoestoppel

wasestablishedbecauseHondurasdidnotsufferanydetrimentfromitsreliance.129

IntheNuclearTestscase,theCourtheldthatdetrimentalreliancewasnotrequiredto

establishestoppel.TheCourtobserved thatneithera subsequentacceptanceof the

declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the

declaration130tocreateanestoppel.Consequently,Francewasestoppedfromgoing

back on its representations, even thoughAustralia suffered nodetriment from its

reliance. 131 Therefore, in effect, the Court accepted an estoppel claim without

requiringthattheStateinvokingitsufferanydetrimentorharm.132Inthethreecases

discussed above, detrimental reliance was not required to establish estoppel. 133

Therefore, the foregoing analysis illustrates thatjudicial decisions are divided on

whether detrimental reliance really is required for estoppels to operate;134 some

casessupporttheneedfordetrimentalreliance,whilstothercasessuggestotherwise.

126 McNair,aboven13,487.SeealsoChristianDominice,Aproposduprincipedelestoppel

endroitdesgens,inRecuieldEtudesdeDroitInternationalEnHommageaPaulGuggenheim

(1968)327.127 ArbitralAwardMadebytheKingofSpain,209.128 Ibid.SeealsoBrown,aboven10,391.129 Ibid222(DissentingOpinionofJudgeHolguin).130 (AustraliavFrance)(Merits)[1974]ICJRep253,267.131 Cf.KrzysztofSkubiszewski,UnilateralActsofStatesinMohammedBedjaoui(ed),

InternationalLaw:AchievementsandProspects(1991)236,whoisoftheviewthatrelianceper

sewasnotrequiredinNuclearTests.132 SeeBrown,aboven10,409.133 TheNottebohmCase(LiechtensteinvGuatemala)(SecondPhase)[1955]ICJRep4doesnotyield

itselftoeasyclassification.TheCourtdismissedtheestoppelargumentofLiechtenstein

withoutelaboratingonwhetherdetrimentalreliancewasrequired.However,onthe

pleadings,Liechtenstein,theStateclaimingestoppel,arguedthatMrNottebohmdidsuffer

detriment,andthisassertionwasnotcontestedbyGuatemalainherpleadings.See

NottebohmCase(LiechtensteinvGuatemala)(SecondPhase)[1955]ICJPleadings393.134 Higgins,aboven125,36.

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Some commentators, however, suggest that there is no inconsistency in the cases

discussedinthissection.135Attentionnowturnstotheirarguments.

AJustificationforthisInconsistency?Some commentators deny that there is an inconsistency in the treatment of

detrimentalrelianceinthecasesoutlinedearlierinthissection.136Theyjustifythisby

observingthatthereareactuallytwoseparateprinciplesatworkinthesecases;that

ofestoppelandthatofabindingunilateralundertaking.137Detrimentalrelianceisa

prerequisitefortheformer,butisnotrequiredinthelatter.138

Thisproposedapproachisattractive.Itseparatesthecasesdiscussedpreviouslyinto

twocategoriesthoserequiringdetrimentalrelianceandthosethatdonot.Casesnot

requiringdetrimentalreliancecouldbeexcludedfromfurtheranalysisastheyarenotbased on estoppel beingbased on a separate principle of abinding unilateral

undertakingandarethereforebeyondthescopeofthisstudy.Onewouldthenbe

leftwithestoppelcasesthatunanimouslysupporttheviewthatdetrimentalreliance

isrequiredandtherewouldbenoinconsistencyinthiselement.

Althoughattractive,thisapproachisbasedonfictionithasnojudicialsupportand

itstheoreticaljustificationsareflawed.139Abindingunilateralundertakingisbinding

because of estoppel.140Therefore, it is nothing less than estoppel shorn of its

relianceanddetrimentelements.141

The Court has not confirmed that abinding unilateral undertaking is a separate

principle to estoppel. There are nojudicial discussions concerning the distinction

between estoppel and a binding unilateral undertaking.142 There is, however, an

135 Seebelown136.136 SeeSergioCarbone,PromiseinInternationalLaw:AConfirmationofitsBindingForce

(1975)1ItalianYearBookofInternationalLaw166;WilfriedFiedler,ZurVerbindlichkeit

eisetigerVersprechenimVolkerrecht(1976)19GermanYearBookofInternationalLaw35;

Cahier,aboven52,237;AdolfoMiajadelaMuela,Losactosunilateralesenlasrelacionesinternacionales(1968)3RevistaEspanoladederechointernacional429.

137 Termsbindingunilateralundertaking,bindingunilateralpromiseandbinding

unilateraldeclarationareusedinterchangeablyinextracurialliteratureonthissubject.138 See,eg,Carbone,aboven136,170.139 SeeJennings,aboven31,4254;MllerandCottier,aboven14,120.140 Wagner,aboven23,1788.141 Brown,aboven10,410.142 Cf.SovereigntyOverPedraBranca,[228],[229],wheretheCourt,forthefirsttime,considered

aclaimofestoppelandaclaimofabindingunilateralundertakingseparatelyinthesame

judgment.Theanalysiswassobrief,however,thatnotangibleconclusionscanbedrawn

abouttherelationshipbetweenthetwoconcepts.

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observationmadebytheCourtintheNuclearTestscasethattheprincipleofbinding

unilateralundertakingiswellrecognized.143Itisdifficulttoseehowthisisso,when

theCourtprovidednoauthoritytosupportthisclaimanditspriordecisionsreveal

no consensus supporting a rule asserting an international obligation tobe

createdbyaunilateraldeclarationutteredpubliclyandwithan intent tobe

bound,intheabsenceofanaffirmativereactionfromotherStates.144

Giventhislackofjudicialsupport,howdoproponentsjustifytheviewthatabinding

unilateralundertakingisaseparateprinciplefromestoppel?

ProfessorJacqueargues that the twoprinciplesestoppelandabindingunilateral

undertaking differ in theory. 145 He explains that estoppel develops from the

meaninggiven

to

acts

or

promises

by

the

party

invoking

the

estoppel

whereas

a

binding unilateral undertaking depends on the intention of the promisor. 146 He

proceeds to argue that both principles apply subjective tests of intention of the

parties, although estoppel does thisby focusing on the party invoking estoppel,

whereasbindingunilateralundertakingsfocusonthepromisor.147

ThisdistinctionisinconsistentwiththeCourtsdecisionintheNuclearTestscase.The

Court made it clear that the sole relevant question is whether the language

employed inanygivendeclarationdoesrevealaclear intention.148Thisfocus isnot

ontheintentionoftheStatemakingthedeclarationbutonanobjectiveinterpretation

ofthewordsofthedeclarationitself.149

Furthermore, in the context of the explanationproposedbyProfessorJacque, it is

difficulttoimaginearepresentationthatwouldgiverisetoanestoppelbutnottoa

bindingunilateralundertaking. Inapossibleattempt toexplain this,oneauthority

suggests thatwhen properlyanalysed,detrimentalrelianceseemsmorerelevantto

estoppelthantothebindingnatureoftheunilateralact.Aunilateralactiseitherbinding

or not.150 It is unclear, however, how a declaration that gives rise to a binding

unilateralundertaking,wouldnotalsogiverisetoanestoppel.Giventhatthefocus

inboth ison theobjective interpretationof thedeclaration itself, the resultwould

143 NuclearTests267.144 Rubin,aboven57,8.145 JeanPaulJacque,AProposdelaPromesseUnilateraleinPaulReuter(ed),LeDroit

International:UniteetDiversite(1981)32739.SeealsoFiedler,aboven136,702.146 Jacque,aboven145,327.(Authorstranslationoforiginaltext).147 Ibid328.148 NuclearTests,268.Seeaboven56andaccompanyingtext.149 Ibid267.150 Higgins,aboven125,36(emphasisinoriginal).

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havetobethesameundereithertest.151Therefore,itseemsthatabindingunilateral

undertakingisnotaseparateprinciple;it isnothingmorethananestoppelwithout

its detrimental reliance requirement. Dr Brown agrees with this conclusion,

observingthattheeffortsofsomewriters

todistinguish estoppel fromunilateralpromise serveonly to show thevast

misunderstandings in this area of the law the court [in theNuclearTests

case], ineffect,acceptedapromissoryestoppel claimwithout requiring that

thepartyinvokingitsufferanydetrimentorharm.152

It is thus clear that the Court has not been consistent in determining whether

detrimental reliance must be established for an estoppel to arise. Conflicting

decisions cannot be explained by reference to a principle of binding unilateral

undertaking;thisinconsistencyiscausedbyanarbitraryapproachoftheCourttothequestionofwhetherdetrimentalrelianceisrequiredforanestoppeltoarise.

TheforegoinganalysishasarguedthattheapplicationofestoppelbytheCourthas

beensubjecttotwouncertainties.First,itisunclearunderwhatcircumstancessilence

gives rise toanestoppel; sometimes silence is conclusivewhileatother times it is

onlyofevidentiaryweight inestablishingestoppel.Secondly, it isunclearwhether

detrimentalreliance isrequiredforanestoppeltoarise;somecasessupportthisyet

othersdenytheneedfordetrimentalreliance.Judicialdecisionsontheseissueshave

beenarbitrary

and

ad

hoc

they

cannot

be

reconciled.

The

next

part

of

the

paper

examinestheimpactoftheseinconsistencies,andconsidershowtheyshouldbedealt

withbytheCourt.

AnendtoinconsistencyThispartof thepaper considers theway forward for theCourt. It argues that the

inconsistencies established in the preceding part should not remain, as they

undermine theperceptionofStates as to theprobityof theCourt and create legal

uncertainty.

Article 59 of the Statuteof the InternationalCourtofJustice (the Statute) states that

decisions of the Court have nobinding force exceptbetween the parties and in

respectofthatparticularcase.153Nevertheless,despiteanabsenceofstaredecisis,the

151 SeeKoskenniemi,aboven53,348.152 Brown,aboven10,408.153 StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeart59.Article59oftheStatuteisidenticaltoArticle

59oftheStatuteofthePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice.Foranexaminationofdebates

betweenjuristsontheAdvisoryCommitteepreparingtheStatuteofthePermanentCourtof

InternationalJustice,seeespeciallyPermanentCourtofInternationalJusticeAdvisory

CommitteeofJurists,ProcsVerbauxoftheProceedingsoftheCommittee(1920)332,336.

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Courtdoesexamineitspreviousdecisionsandtakesthemintoaccountwhenseeking

the solution to adispute.154Even though aparticulardetermination of law is only

formallybindingonthepartiesbeforeit,theCourtwill invariably,inthecourseof

makingsuchadetermination, invokepreviousjurisprudenceanddictapertinent to

thepresentfacts.155

Given that theCourt almost always takesprevious decisions into account,156it is

thus imperative for the Court tomaintainjudicial consistency.157This isbecause

intellectualcoherenceandconsistencyisthecornerstoneofcontinuingrespect158for

thejurisprudenceoftheCourt.Furthermore,thesuccessoftheCourtisdependentto

a large degree upon its reputation for impartial adjudication, 159 and judicial

consistencyisthemostobviousmeansofavoidingaccusationsofbias.160SirRobert

Jenningsemphasisesthis,byobservingthatjudicialinconsistencyisacircumstancewhich must be a discouragement if not even a deterrent to governments

contemplating international litigation.161Therefore, inconsistent decisions, such as

thoseregardingestoppel,affecttheperceptionsofstatesmenastotheprobityofthe

Court,aswellasthewillingnessofStatestoreferrealcasestoit.162

Furthermore,judicialconsistencyprovides somedegreeofcertaintyas towhat

the law is on a particular issue. 163 Thus, inconsistent decisions create legal

uncertainty.This in turnundermines the value of international law as a guide to

futureStateconduct.164

154 SeeRebeccaWallace,InternationalLaw(2005)26.155 Higgins,aboven125,202.156 MichaelAkehurst,AModernIntroductiontoInternationalLaw(6thed,1993)150.157 Brownlie,n3,21.SeealsoJHWVerzijl,InternationalLawinHistoricalPerspective(1976)526.158 Higgins,aboven125,202.159 SeeThomasHensley,NationalBiasandtheInternationalCourtofJustice(1968)12

MidwestJournalofPoliticalScience568,568.160 PeterMalanczuk,AkehurstsModernIntroductiontoInternationalLaw(6thed,1997)53.

AccusationsofbiasarenotinfrequentagainsttheCourt.See,eg,EricPosnerandMiguelde

Figueiredo,IstheInternationalCourtofJusticeBiased?34JournalofLegalStudies189.161 RobertJennings,WhatIsInternationalLawAndHowDoWeTellItWhenWeSeeIt?

(1981)37AnnuaireSuissedeDroitInternational59,60.162 Rubin,aboven57,1.163 Wallace,aboven154,26.SeealsoOscarSchachter,InternationalLawinTheoryandPractice

(1991)40.JohnHenryMerrymanandRogelioPerezPerdomo,TheCivilLawTradition:An

IntroductiontotheLegalSystemsofEuropeandLatinAmerica(3rded,2007)arguethatthis

propositionistrueforalllegalsystems:at48.164 LungchuChen,AnIntroductiontoContemporaryInternationalLaw:APolicyOriented

Perspective(1989)85.

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Article38(1)(d)oftheStatutereferstojudicialdecisionsassubsidiarymeansforthe

determination of rules of law. 165 However, far from being treated as such, the

judgments of the Court are treated as authoritative pronouncements upon the

currentstateof international law.166ProfessorParryobserves that thejudgmentsof

theCourtareconsideredhighlypersuasiveastopropositionsofinternationallaw.167

Professor Sohn agrees with this view, arguing that decisions of the Court are

consideredasrecognizedmanifestationsofinternationallaw.168

Given thatthejudgmentsof theCourtare indeedauthoritativepronouncementson

thestateofinternationallaw,169itisreasonabletoexpectthatStateswillrefertothem

forguidancewhenevertheyconsiderthepossibilityofissuingadeclarationoffuture

policy170orembarkingonagivencourseofaction.171

165 StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeart38(1)(d).AlthoughArticle38(1)oftheStatuteis

expressedintermsofthefunctionoftheCourt,itisgenerallyregardedasacomplete

statementofthesourcesofinternationallaw.SeeBrownlie,n3,19;JenningsandWatts

(eds),aboven24,514.Article38(1)oftheStatuteisbasedonArticle38oftheStatuteofthe

PermanentCourtofInternationalJustice.166 Higgins,aboven125,202.SeealsoGeraldFitzmaurice,SomeProblemsRegardingthe

FormalSourcesofInternationalLawinBaronFredrikMarivanAsbeck(ed),Symbolae

Verzijil(1958)153.167 CliveParry,TheSourcesandEvidencesofInternationalLaw(1965)91.SeealsoFitzmaurice,

SomeProblemsRegardingtheFormalSourcesofInternationalLaw,aboven166,172;

Sinclair,aboven58,116;Schachter,aboven163,39.168 LouisSohn,TheDevelopmentoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations:PresentStatein

MaartenBos(ed),ThePresentStateofInternationalLawandOtherEssaysWritteninHonourof

theCentenaryCelebrationoftheInternationalLawAssociation18731973(1973)59.The

PermanentCourtofInternationalJusticehadsimilarinfluenceduringthetimeofits

operation(192042),notwithstandingthattheCovenantoftheLeagueofNationsart2didnot

enumerateitamongtheorgansoftheLeagueofNations.See,eg,ManleyHudson,The

PermanentCourtofInternationalJustice19201942(1943)11112.169 Higgins,aboven125,202.SeealsoMalcolmShaw,InternationalLaw(2003);Godefridus

Hoof,RethinkingtheSourcesofInternationalLaw(1983)171;SamMuller,DavidRai and

HannahThurnszky(eds),TheInternationalCourtofJustice:ItsFutureRoleafterFiftyYears

(1996)17;MuhammadNawaz,OtherSourcesofInternationalLaw:AreJudicialDecisions

oftheInternationalCourtOfJusticeaSourceofInternationalLaw?(1979)19IndianJournal

ofInternationalLaw526.Cf.LouisHenkin,InternationalLaw:CasesandMaterials(2nded,

1987)whoisoftheviewthatdecisionsoftheCourtareonlyapersuasiveauthorityof

existinginternationallaw:at107(emphasisadded).170 Rubin,aboven57.SeegenerallyConstanzeSchulte,CompliancewithDecisionsofthe

InternationalCourtofJustice(2005)ch4.171 ThequestionofwhetherStatesdorefertodecisionsoftheCourtforguidanceontheir

futureconductisbeyondthescopeofthispaper.SeeLouisHenkin,HowNationsBehave(2nd

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Inconsistentdecisions thusmake itdifficult, ifnot impossible,forStates toconduct

theiraffairsinconformitywithprevailinglaw.Thiseffectivelyunderminesthevalue

of international law as a guide to future State conduct.172Stateswould thus have

fewer reservations about failing to abideby their representations. Consequently,

cooperationbetweenStateswouldbeplaguedbygreatercautionandmistrust.This

willaddfurtherinstabilityandinsecuritytointernationalrelations.

It is therefore imperative for the Court to confront these inconsistencies. As

[e]stoppelisaconceptinevolution173inthejurisprudenceoftheCourt,suggestions

arenowmadeastohowthisevolutionshouldprogress.Inparticular,thefollowing

sections argue that silence should only be given evidentiary weight and that

detrimentalrelianceshouldberequiredforanestoppeltoarise.

ThedrawbacksofaconclusiveviewofsilenceTheCourtshouldnotgivesilenceconclusiveweight.Otherwise,itwillbegivingthe

State claiming estoppel an unfair advantage and creating other undesirable

consequences.

AStatemaybesilentinlightofanadverseclaimagainstitforanumberofreasons.

First, fordiplomatic reasons, itmayprefer to letadispute liedormant fora time.

Secondly,itmaynotbeawareofanadverseclaimagainstit.Finally,itmightassume

thatthereisnoneedtoprotest.AconclusiveviewofsilencegivestheStateclaimingestoppelanunfairadvantageineachcase.

AStatemayabstainfromprotesttoretaintepidrelationswithanotherState.174Oneof

the reasons why Thailand did not officially protest the Cambodian claim of

sovereigntyovertheTemple intheTempleofPreahVihearcasewasthatThailand, in

thewords ofPrincessPhunPhitsamaiDiskul, only gave the French an excuse to

ed,1979)47;EdithBrownandHaroldJacobson(ed)EngagingCountries:CompliancewithInternationalEnvironmentalAgreements(1998);BethSimmons,Compliancewith

InternationalAgreements(1998)1AnnualReviewofPoliticalScience75;RogerFisher,

BringingLawtoBearonGovernments(1961)74HarvardLawReview1130;JackGoldsmith

andEricPosner,DoInternationalNormsInfluenceStateBehavior?TheLimitsofInternational

Law(2005).172 Generallysee,eg,JohnBraithwaite,RulesandPrinciples:ATheoryofLegalCertainty

(2002)27AustralianJournalofLegalPhilosophy47.173 MllerandCottier,aboven14,116.174 SeeTempleofPreahVihear,85(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo);MaritimeDelimitationin

theAreabetweenGreenlandandJanMayen(DenmarkvNorway)(Merits)[1993]ICJRep38,53

4.

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seizemore territoryby protesting.175When observed in light of historic relations

betweenThailandandFranceatthetime,176thePrincesssexplanationseemsnatural

andreasonable.177

It is reasonable for a State towithhold from protest so that it does not provoke

another.Bynottakingthisintoaccount indecidingwhethersilencegivesrisetoan

estoppel, a relatively weak State, with no desire to antagonize a powerful

neighbour,isataconsiderabledisadvantageifitfindsitselfinapositiontoasserta

rightlater.178

ThiscanextendtocasesnotasextremeasthatofThailandandFranceintheTempleof

Preah Vihear case a current disputebetween China and India will serve as an

example.IndiacurrentlyclaimssovereigntyovertheAksaiChinregionwhichChina

has been administering since the SinoIndian War. 179 India, however, has been

activelycooperatingwithChinaonvariouseconomic issueswhileabstaining from

protestover thisdispute.180It isclearlynot Indias intention toconcede thedispute

overtheAksaiChinregionitstemporarylackofprotestismostlikelyafunctionof

its aim to furtherdiplomaticprogress onother fronts.However, theCourtwould

cometoanoppositeconclusionifitappliestheconclusiveviewofsilence.

Secondly,aStatemaynotprotestbecauseitisnotawareofanadverseclaimagainst

it.Statesare agglomerationsofmanyorganseachofwhich ismadeupofmany

individuals.181This leads to theobviousdifficulty thataStatedoesnotnecessarily

175 TempleofPreahVihear(CambodiavThailand)(WrittenPleadingsofThailand)[1962]ICJRep

401.176 CambodiawasaprotectorateoftheFrenchcolonialempirefrom1887to1954.See,

generally,JohnTully,FranceontheMekong:AHistoryoftheProtectorateinCambodia(2002).177 GMKelly,TheTempleCaseinHistoricalPerspective(1963)39BritishYearBookof

InternationalLaw462,465.SeealsoTempleofPreahVihear,91(DissentingOpinionofJudge

Koo).178 AtheneMunkman,AdjudicationandAdjustmentInternationalJudicialDecisionsand

theSettlementofTerritorialandBoundaryDisputes(1972)46BritishYearBookofInternationalLaw1,97.

179 TheSinoIndianWarwasfoughtin1962.See,generally,ChihLu,TheSinoIndianBorder

Dispute:ALegalStudy(1986)180 Forexample,inJanuary2006bothStatessignedtheMemorandumforEnhancing

CooperationintheFieldofOilandNaturalGaswhichallowsforjointSinoIndianbidsfor

energyassetsinotherStates.SeeChina,IndiaSignEnergyAgreement,ChinaDaily

(Beijing),13January2006,3.ForSinoIndiancooperationonotherissues,see,eg,Nancy

Jetly,SinoIndianRelations:OldLegaciesandNewVistas(1994)30ChinaReport215;John

Lancaster,India,ChinaHopingtoReshapetheWorldTogether,WashingtonPost

(Washington),12April2005,16.181 Munkman,aboven178,97.

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speakwiththeonevoiceatthesametime.IntheFisheriesCase,forexample,Judge

Reid observed that the information available to the United Kingdom revealed

contradictions in the system of delimitation usedbyNorway.182In such cases, no

simple, tidy estoppels can really be made out.183 Inferences drawn from silence

become excessively subjective; they can no longer be assumed to be accurate

representations of the attitude of the State. Such situations, therefore, require a

weighingof the activities andpositions takenby the claimants;184they requirean

evidentiaryviewofsilence.Otherwise,theCourtwouldreachconclusionswhich,as

was argued in the Temple of Preah Vihear case by Judge Spender, would be

inconsistentwiththefactsincontrovertiblyestablishedbytheevidence.185

Finally, a Statemight not see the need to protest the claim of another State if it

assumes that itsconductsufficiently illustrates itsattitudeonagivendispute.Thisassertion can be exploredby examining an ongoing disputebetweenJapan and

RussiaoversovereigntyovertheKurilIslands.TheIslandshavebeenunderRussian

administrationand control forover sixdecades.186Japan,however, contends that it

shouldhavesovereigntyovertheIslandsastheywere improperlyseizedbyRussia

aftertheendofWorldWarTwo.187In2005,theMinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan

releasedapamphlet thatstated that theIslands are inherent territoriesofJapan.188

Todate,Russiahasnotofficiallyrespondedtothispamphlet.Undertheconclusive

view of silence, Russia would be estopped from claiming sovereignty over the

Islandsbecause it failed toprotest theJapanese assertions in thepamphlet,whichcreated circumstances that called for an official reaction fromRussian authorities.

This, however, wouldbe an unjust result by occupying and administering the

Islands, the Russian authorities, in effect, are protesting the Japanese claims of

sovereigntyovertheIslands.

182 FisheriesCase,200(DissentingOpinionofJudgeReid).183 Munkman,aboven178,99.184 Rubin,aboven57,10.185 TempleofPreahVihear,109(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).186 See,generally,SeokwooLeeetal,TowardsaFrameworkfortheResolutionofthe

TerritorialDisputeovertheKurileIslands(2001)3InternationalBoundariesResearchUnit

Boundary&TerritoryBriefings1;YakovZinberg,TheKurilIslandsDispute:TowardsDual

Sovereignty(1998)5BoundaryandSecurityBulletin89.187 MinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan,ThePositionoftheJapaneseGovernmentontheNorthern

TerritorialIssue(1965)45.SeealsoYutakaOkuyama,ThedisputeovertheKurileIslands

betweenRussiaandJapaninthe1990s(2003)76PacificAffairs37.188 MinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan,JapansNorthernTerritories:ForaRelationshipof

GenuineTrust(PressRelease,8March2005)2.

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FurthertogivingtheStateclaimingestoppelanunfairadvantage,aconclusiveview

ofsilenceputsanemphasison inactionandprotestaspartofStateconduct,rather

than objective and clear conducts 189 , which leads to undesirable practical

consequences.Givingsilenceconclusiveweightistoputahighpremiumonconstant

andvigorousprotest.ItcreatesasituationinwhichStatesarecompelledtobecome

exceptionallytouchyininternationalrelations,perusingeachothersstatutebooks

andputtingoutreservationsoftheirpositiononeveryconceivableoccasion190infear

of an estoppel arising against them. This is likely to lead to a barrage of State

declarations,moreakintomediareleases,thesolepurposeofwhichistoprotectthe

Statefromanadverseestoppelarising.Thisisunlikelytoencouragecooperationon

issuesindispute;itonlyfuelstheneedtoprotestandrewardsvigorousvindication.

JudgeAlfaro,whoadoptedtheconclusiveviewofsilenceintheTempleof

Preah

Vihear

case,observedthatestoppelis

rootedinthenecessityofavoidingcontroversiesasamatterofpublicpolicy

Bycondemninginconsistencyagreatdealoflitigation isliabletobeavoided

and the element of friendship and cooperation is strengthened in the

internationalcommunity.191

ItisdifficulttoseehowthiscanbeachievedbyencouragingStatestoprotest.Infact,

it seems the effectwouldbe quite the opposite therewillbe less emphasis on

cooperationin

the

resolution

of

disputes

and

greater

emphasis

on

alitigious

outcome.Thisshiftinfocuswouldbeinimicaltoplacidinternationalrelations.

Therefore,anestoppelarisingfromsilencealoneshouldnotbeeasilypresumed.The

Court should examine the surrounding circumstances in which the silence was

maintained,devoidofanyjurisetdejurepresumptions,when consideringwhether

silenceshouldgiverisetoanestoppel.

TheneedfordetrimentalrelianceTheCourt should only allow an estoppel to arise ifdetrimental reliancehasbeen

established.An estoppelwithoutdetriment isnotwell grounded in theory and is

undesirableasamatterofpolicy.

189 NunoSergioMarquesAntunes,RachaelBradleyandCliveSchofield,Estoppel,

AcquiescenceandRecognitioninTerritorialandBoundaryDisputeSettlement(2000)2

InternationalBoundariesResearchUnitBoundary&TerritoryBriefings1,35.190 DavidJohnson,InternationalCourtofJustice.JudgmentsofMay26,1961,andJune15,

1962.TheCaseconcerningtheTempleofPreahVihear(1962)11Internationaland

ComparativeLawQuarterly1183,12034.191 TempleofPreahVihear,42(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro).

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The principle of estoppel that one should not benefit from his or her own

inconsistency192stemsfromfundamentalnotionsofjusticeandfairness,193whichare

almostuniversallycitedforestoppelininternationallaw.194Whatinjusticeiscaused

byaStategoingbackonarepresentationthatcausesnodetrimenttoanyone?Howis

itfairtoallowaStatetoclaimthatanother isestoppedwhenitisnotprejudicedin

anywayfromitsrelianceontherepresentation?

Detrimental reliance isan integralpartofestoppel. Prejudiceordetrimentarenot

simply addenda; they trigger the very justification 195 for estoppel in the

jurisprudenceoftheCourt.Therefore,asDrBrownargues,ifaStatecouldbebound

bythemereutteranceofapromiseorassurance,onecanonlyconcludethat,in

internationallaw,thetheoryofunilateralpromisewouldbeamodificationof

estoppelandthatthelattertheorywouldberenderedlargelyobsolete.196

Some have argued that this modification is justified under the overarching,

fundamental principle of good faith. 197 However, how can good faith justify an

esto

Documents

Stoppel in ICJ