Stinchcombe, Arthur - On the Virtues of the Old Institutionalism, 1997

7/30/2019 Stinchcombe, Arthur - On the Virtues of the Old Institutionalism, 1997

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/stinchcombe-arthur-on-the-virtues-of-the-old-institutionalism-1997 1/20

On the Virtues of the Old Institutionalism

Author(s): Arthur L. StinchcombeSource: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 23 (1997), pp. 1+2-18Published by: Annual Reviews

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952541 .

Accessed: 26/08/2013 10:17

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Annual Reviews is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annual Review of

Sociology.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.54.67.91 on Mon, 26 Aug 2013 10:17:04 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=annrevs

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952541?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952541?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=annrevs







2 STINCHCOMBE

sociologistn order o make living s an nstitutionalconomist,ince twasclear hat wouldmake poor iving t that mong conomists.

Myfirstntellectualdentity,hen,was shapedby theold institutionalists.They eft ehind legacy fproblems, ore roblems erhaps han olutions.Thegenerativespect f he ld nstitutionalism,ts penness othemacrosoci-ologicalbackgroundtructureehind irms,ousehold onsumption,ndmar-kets, aveme things o work n.

ThismadeBerkeley heplaceto go for raduatechool,because TVA ndtheGrassRoots Selznick1949) was about neway to institutionalizelec-tricityndfertilizerroduction,s well as publicversus rivateandtenure;Union emocracyLipset t l 1956)was about form f ppropriationf killmonopolies;Work ndAuthorityn ndustryBendix1956) about newaytodevelop nstitutionsfsmall-firmanufacturingftextiles. elznick, ipset,and Bendixwere,whateverlsetheylsowere, nstitutionalconomists.

Institutions,learned hen, haped hecreation ndfunctionsfunits nmarket nd therelations etween hem. ut unlike he nstitutionsf mod-ern nstitutionalism,eopleranthese nstitutionsy organizingctivities ntheir ehalf.nstitutionsere,nthe irstnstance,reatedypurposiveeoplein legislaturesnd nternationalnions, nd npamphletsf businessdeol-ogists nNorthernngland.Modernnstitutionalism,ocreate caricature,is Durkheimiann the ense hat ollectiveepresentationsanufacturehem-selvesby opaque processes, reimplementedydiffusion,re exteriorndconstrainingithoutxterioreopledoing he reationrthe onstraining.

Thepurpose fthis ssay hens to take ome elected roblems fmoderneconomicociology,nd ome heoreticalenerativerinciplesf he ld nsti-tutionalism,ndtoshow hereslife nthe ldbonesyet. nthe ackgroundfthe ssay sa contrastetweenhe ld nstitutionalismnwhich eoplebuilt ndran nstitutions,ndthenewDurkheimiannstitutionalismnwhich ollectiverepresentationsperate ntheirwn.My primaryurposesgenerativeatherthanritical,othe icturedraw f henewnstitutionalisms contentious.utI hopethat aricatures a stylized ersion fthe entralhrustfthenewnessofthenew nstitutionalism,ndparticularlyfthenewness f tsfaults.

This sthen review ycontrastfnew nstitutionalistconomicociology.Itsmain urposes toreviveome entralmechanismsrom he ld nstitution-alism, ndto usethat evivificationothrowight n thebroad ontoursf ourpresent ifficulties.

In thefirstart f he nalysis,treat articularlyohn enryWigmore, hostudiedhe elationetween henstitutionsf videnceawand he unctioningofAmerican ndBritish ourts s organizations.t is a peculiarityf suchcourts hat hey roduce egitimateecisions,nd so legitimacys absolutelycentralotheirurvival,ndthatn order oproduceegitimateecisions hey








OLD INSTITUTIONALISM 3

haveto use legitimate eans, specially egitimatevidence.Producinguchlegitimatevidence s the roduct f dversaryourt rganizationshat nvolvejudges, ontendingounsel,uries, nd flow f vidence romhe utside romwitnesses nddocuments,ctionswith egalconsequences uch s delivery fsigned ocuments,rrests nprobable ause, ndthe ike, llofwhich ave obeorganizednd egitimatedor delegitimated)ythe ourt.

Because legitimacys the ntended roductfthese nstitutions,peratingthroughourt rganizations,hewhole nterprisescentral o nstitutionalhe-ory.Muchofthe egitimacyf ourts,s analyzed yWigmore,as todowitheffective eans o achieveusticeby intelligentrocessingf the ubstanceof evidence.ComparedoWigmore's,modernnstitutionalismas an impov-erished otion f egitimacyndofhowthe egitimacyf rituals epends nsubstantiveoodsense pplied oquestionsfvalue.1

The second nd hird arts f his hapterreat hemoral ommitmentspectof ontractsor ransactionss centralothe ossibilityf he xistence forga-nizationsnthemarket.hecentral ld nstitutionalistsreatedreRHCoase,especially is "TheNature ftheFirm"1937),John Commons, speciallyhisLegal FoundationsfCapitalism1974 [1924]),Joseph Schumpeter,s-peciallyhis BusinessCycles Schumpeter 964 [1939], pp.46-83, 105-50;alsosee a more opular ersion fthe rgumentn1942), ndPhilip elznick,especiallynhisLeadershipnAdministration1957). Thebasic ntuitionereis Durkheim's bservationhat heres a noncontractualasisofcontract.

In particular,he etof ontractshat onstitutefirm asa particularind fnoncontractualasis,outlined ith reat epth ndperceptionyCommons.Thefunctionfthatpecialbasisfor ontractshat reate irmssbest utlinedbyCoase's classicpaper nthenature ffirmoundariess activityetswithin

'Wigmorewas a lawyers' awhistorian. e triedo reformulatehehistoryf the ases andstatutesf he aw of vidence othattwouldmake ense o udges nd awyers eciding videncequestions. hat s, his nstitutionalurpose as to nfluenceourtsincludingontendingounsel)to decideevidence uestions o as to achieve ustice, n average.Wigmorehereforeended omakemore enseof historyhanprobably as originallyhere nd to ignore ases that id notmake ensefrom ispoint fview.He also was not nethnographerryingoreflectccuratelyheinformalspects f theuse ofevidenceaw n practice; is purposewasto be authoritativeatherthan thnographic. igmore elievedn nstitutionsnd n scholarships a way o mprovehem.My ownview s that e succeeded, uthis purposes differentrommypurpose ere f showingthat e wasrightbout ow he ourts orkeds institutionservingjustice.ecause donot nowthe ases andhistorys wellas he did, am not na position o criticize is analysis rom ithin(Twining 990hassomerelevantmaterial). ociologistshinkfthe aw of evidencemainlynconnection ith onstitutionalases on criminalaw, specially or apital rimesgainst ersons.Wigmore as well ware hatmostaw practices law on economic laims erivingromontractand propertynd thatthas more o do with he ontractlause n theConstitutionhanwith heBill of Rights,nd most rimes against roperty.o formypurposes ere, e is analyzingneconomicallyelevantnstitution,ourt roceduren evidence uestions.








4 STINCHCOMBE

which ther lements f thefirm ave a competitivedvantage veroutsidefirmsrovidinghe ameservices r goods n themarket, ecauseof esser"transactionosts." chumpeters the lassic ource nthe elationothe argercompetitivetructuref apitalismf hatmonopolydvantagehatomes roma firm'saving uperiorroductivity.ll three ritersre nterestedn he ormof nstitutionshatmakes he ompetitivetructuref apitalismossible, ivenwhat hat tructures, namelyhe ompetitionffirmshat ando somethingbetterhan nyone lse.

The impoverishediew ofmodernnstitutionalheoristsespeciallyn the''organizationalcology ranch")educes he onceptionf ompetitionothatofthe elationsmong rganizations2hat ave he legitimate"rganizationalform or hat population." hisconceptioneavesoutmany spects f whatthe raditionalnstitutionalheoristsctually houghtbout ompetition. hetransactionosts iteraturee.g. Williamson975) preserves ore fthis on-tent, xcept hatt doesnot tudyegitimacyfthemarkettself,ndso ithasa vacuousdescriptionf whatfirmsas hierarchies)re contrastedo. Theconceptionsf Commons ndSchumpeterf howcompetitive arketsameto be legitimatere notvacuous.

Thesecondpart fthis hapteroncentratesnhowcontractsnthemarketcome obe egitimatey heway heyre onstituted,y hemutualelief f hecontractingartieshat ach scommittedothe ineof ction romisednthecontracts.Weemphasizespeciallyhe ommitmentf firmobecompetentin thefutureocarryut he ctivitiespecifiedn the ontracts. ontractsrewhatmarketsentrallyonsist f, o theiregitimacyscentralotheegitimacyofmarkets-a factwell knowno nstitutionalconomistsnthepast.Coasethen nalyzeswhat t s about hefirm hat s thenoncontractualasis of con-tracts, amelytsspecialcompetencies. ommonsnalyzes hese s they reembeddednworkingules,while chumpeterreatshem s innovationshathavespecific inds f effectsn the apitalmarketndthereforen businesscycles. Selznick reats heprocesses ywhich ommitmentocompetenciesare built nto rganizations.

Thethird ection reatsheproblemf the egitimacyn the aw of marketcompetitions a system,nd tsrelation o the egitimacyfbeing bletodothings etterhan ompetitorss a moral nd egal laim n theprofitsf uchcompetence.

Thefourthection sananalysis f classicformulationfthe ailuref n-stitutionsyEdward anfield,speciallynhisTheMoralBasisof BackwardSociety1967 [1958]). Banfield's asicarguments thatnstitutions,ndcom-mitmentoinstitutions,re essential o the reationfpublicgoods. In turn,

2Thefirmsreassumed obeidentical,achfirmountings one, nmost pplications.









economic rogressnvolved he roductionfpublic oods, ncludingbviousones uch s roads r ivil rder,ndnot o obvious nes uch s thewillingnesstodiscusswhatweshould o nextn spirit fhonestynd ompromise. henthe nstitutionaleans o create ublic oods re not vailable,welfare eemstopeopletodepend n looking ut for hemselvesnd their mmediate in,ratherhan ntryingocreate reater elfare or ll. Banfieldpplied his nal-ysis o Southerntaly. iego Gambetta1993) has a compatiblenalysis boutwhy heMafia s a business upplyinguaranteesor ontractsn a distrustfulenvironmentoes not onstitutegoodbasis for conomic evelopment.

I applythis ine ofargumento explainwhy apitalismn Russia is notas successful s it hasbeen ntheWest-perhapsnoteven as successful ssocialismwas-because the ocialist nstitutionshat nablepeopleto createpublic oodshavebeendestroyedut ot eplaced y nstitutionsppropriateocapitalism.nparticular,argue hat, nder ocialism, ontractsetween irmsandthe orporatistndustrialuthoritiesncentrallanninggencieswere sedtocreatemany f the equisite ublicgoods. Thedestructionfthe apacityofthose uthoritieso reward irms orpublic-orientedehavior as left heenforcementf ontractsoMafia-likerganizations,s inSoutherntalywhenBanfieldwas there.

Older nstitutionalistsidnot ssume hatnstitutionsere lways herendalwaysworked.Consequentlyhecauses of variationnthe ffectivenessfinstitutionserepart f Banfield's esearchrogram. hecreationfpublicgoods sparticularlyroblematicna warof eachagainst ll. Institutionsan(butneednot)reduce he mpedimentsfthefree ider roblem,hat eoplecan benefitromublic oodswithoutontributingo theirreation. he evelof uccess ncreatingoads, r aw andorder,rbargainingngoodfaith re llsensitivendicatorsf nstitutionalffectiveness.he "amoral amilism"hatBanfield oundmong outherntalian illagers as ts nalog n the amoralfirmism"fpostsocialistussia, nd nthemafias, gooddeal ike he outhernItalianMafia, hat nforce ontracts.

Thesearefour ather ifferentrguments.he firsttudies clearcase inwhich egitimacyf ritualsncourtroomsarieswith owwellthey ubstan-tivelychieveusticenthe se of videncen he aw and o produceegitimatedecisions.My arguments that nless he ules fevidencereguided ycon-siderationsf ustice, hey o notproduce egitimacy.he second tudieswhyfirmsrewillingoenternto ontractshat equirehe ounterpartyomaintaininto he uturehe ompetenceodo the ervices ontractedor. heargumentis that nly ffirmsrecommittedn severalways, ncluding orally, illthatpromise o maintainompetencee believed.The third utlineswhy t everbecomes egitimateor ompetitorsododamage o eachother,ndhowcivillaw has had to be arrangedo that hat ompetitiveonflictivesrisenotto








6 STINCHCOMBE

claims n court, ut nstead o "legitimate"ompetition.chumpeter akesstrongrgumentshat conomic evelopmentepends n nnovators,irmshatdo not mitatetherirmsut reneverthelessegitimatelybletodo damage oentrenchedusinessnterests. ndhe andCommons oth rgue hat his egit-imacy fcompetitionas always eenprecarious,ndthat nly fewkinds finstitutionsan uccessfullynstitutet.Finallywestudynstitutionshat ome-times o notwork,ndHobbes'soutcome fthewar f achagainst ll reigns.Banfield rgues hatwhen nstitutionso notwork o create ublicgoods, heincentivesomoralitynd ooperationhat therwiselow romuccessfulre-ation fpublicgoods e.g.higherncome rom conomic evelopment)ail ooperate.Thenonlymafias, ith hekind fconsenthey licit, reate venprimitiveocialorder, noncontractualame heoreticalasis ofcontracthatdoesnotwork swellas business thics ndeffectiveivil aw.

The overall rgumentfthesefour ubargumentss that heblankplacesinwritingsf modernnstitutionalismomeespecially romack of detailedtheorynd research bouthowparticularnstitutionsork.Muchofthenar-rowness n modern nstitutionalismnorganizationalheorys explained ylack ofdetail n the onceptionsf nstitutions. narrow onceptions eas-ier to mathematize.hisin turn s due to ignoringhework f people whoput hedetail nto nstitutionsnd whoconstraineople ndorganizationsoconformo nstitution'sxteriority.ut f he uts f he ausalprocess f nsti-tutionalnfluencere eft utofthemodel, henwe successfully athematizeabstractmpiricism,nempiricism ithouthe omplexityf real ife.Wig-more, ommons,chumpeter,ndBanfield new lot boutvariancenhow,andhowwell, nstitutionsork;tbehooves sto mitatehem.

RitualMeansofSurvival s. nstitutionalizedaluesIt s theduty fUnited tates ppellateourtsobehave xactlys specifiedninstitutionalheory,amelyotake s their rinciplefdecision ndofwritingopinionshe nstitutionalizedtandardspecified y he upreme ourt.Theseandothernstitutionalizedtandardsreembeddednthe egitimateecisionsat commonaw and statuteaw,defined s those hat ther ourts,ncludingtheSupreme ourt,wouldrecognize s valid. Thusaccordingo the newinstitutionalistrinciplesnnouncednMeyer Rowan1977),the ourt rga-nizations ith heirontendingounsel,udges, uries, ndflows fwitnessesareengagingn theformalitiesf evidence aw as a ritual o egitimate hatthey redoing. If therewerenodeeper rinciplesehind his ctivity,herewouldbe no sense n theirwritingpinionsboutwhy hey ecided hewaythey id,no reasonfor ither f thecontendingarties oappeal, ndso noreason opayfor ppellate ourtstall; itwouldbe sufficientor hemosaythat heSupreme ourtwouldprobablyavorheplaintifforthedefense).









Thus t s onlybecausewe imagine hatusticewill be served hatwe setup thewhole pparatusf appeals-of judgesguessingwhat achotherwillsay-to demand hat hey bey he egitimizingormal rocedureshatMeyer& Rowan pecify ndWigmorenEvidence 1983 [1940]) describes.nshort,the cceptance f the dea that he ppellate ourtwas a ritualwoulddestroyits egitimacy. nd t s clear hat hewrittenpinions f appellate ourtsrecentral othe llegationhat tis not ust a ritual,which ouldas wellhavebeen dispensedwith y allowing he ourt foriginalurisdictiono specifywhatwas legitimatender heConstitutionndto make tsownguessaboutthe upreme ourt; ndthe upreme ourt ould n ts urnmerelyendbacka yesorno,without ajorityndminorityndconcurringpinions.

Similarlyn scientificapers,he ormalitualsfcitation f cientiststherthan he uthorhowthat he uthors orientedocontributingo a bodyofknowledgeecognizedyothers;heres no obvious itual eason or he esultssectionhatctuallymakes hat ontribution.ecould normouslyimplifyheformalrganizationfjournalsfwedidnot ave ohave efereeommentntheresultsection. here s the ame roublenexplaininghe ctual lgebrananalgebra extbookdopted y heCaliforniarTexas tate extbookertificationorganizations,he ctualfertilizerhat ackedupthe oopted armersntheTennessee alleyAuthorityoardsSelznick1949), he ctual cleaving nlyunto" hat s theputativerganizationalonsequencefthewedding ows, heactualdollars hat ackupthe nnual eportfa corporation.

Whatwe havetoexplain, hen,swhyt s so essential oorganizationshattheir ormalituals ot eem obea shuck,ndwhy heyose egitimacys soonas itappears hey reonly nterestednthe etterf the aw, hewordsnthevows, heplaces ontheTVA boards,heright umber fpages n the lgebrabooks. WhydidI, for xample, et ndignanthenmy on n thepreschoollearnedhe orrectnswerhatt shottern ummerecause hen heNorthernHemispheres closer o the un, nd hefavorablympressedhe ducationalauthorityutnothis fathery "gettingt right"'? was dissatisfied ith hepreschoolookbecause ts nswerwas substantivelyrong, ot ecause twasnot fficiallyuthorized.

We do find ormal itual riteria f whethernappellate pinions seriousorganizationalubstance;or xample,what ourtnopinionomesfrommat-ters or tsritual tatus.Butwhy s itthat ntermediateppellate ourts akeproducingpinionswith hose itualmarks o seriously,s opposed osayingthey uess he upreme ourtmight ecideyes or no) and eavingtat that?Whywouldwebedismayedf nappellateourt pinion adall the itationsofcases butmissed he oint-more ismayedhan f tmissed iting crucialcase and o hadto nventhe rinciplefustice ver gain?Whywouldwe beless dismayedf school aughtnalytic eometryefore uclidean eometry,








8 STINCHCOMBE

outside he anonical rder, hanf tudentseverearned otreat eometricalproblems ith lgebra'?

In short, hysformalityever nough or egitimacy,ithoutome onvic-tion hathe ormalitys usta more bstractormfthe ubstance?Why s it,for xample,hat principlef egitimacyfa contracts "(d) Thecourthalldeterminehetherhewriting as ntendedythe arties s a final xpressionof heirgreementith especto uch ermss are ncludedherein"CaliforniaCode ofCivilProcedureas amendedn 1978), s quoted nWigmore1983[1940]) p. 75n]? The institutionalulehere elieson a substantiveetermi-nation bout hewillsoftheparties, atherhan usta formaleading fthecontentfthewriting.

I believewehave ecentlynderestimatedhe egree o which eople cceptinstitutionsecausethey hink he nstitutionsavethe ightnswer, ecauseinstitutionsmbody value hat he eople lso accept.When elznick 1949)showed hat major onsequencef "grass oots" dministrationn theTVAwas the ooptationf eading otentialarmerpponentsfTVA nto hede-fense fgovernmentower enerationntheValley,we all thoughthismadeTVA'sclaim obedemocratic ore uspect. ormal emocracy as notgoodenough or s. Whywouldweexpect hattwouldbegoodenough or therstudentsfpublic dministrationrfor itizens?We, oo, idnotwant he VAtogothroughhedemocratic otions,ecauseweholddemocracys a value,not s a legitimator.ts egitimatingapacity ollows romtsbeing value.

We couldinvestigatehisbylooking t which ocial movementsucceedagainst ormallynstitutionalizedractices.orexample, eremyentham n-dertooko argue hat heformalityf therulesof evidence n his timeun-derminedheuseofreason ndgoodsense n egal nferenceTwining 990,pp.38-41). The old nstitutionalistheoryfSelznick ndotherss that easonandgoodsense arevalues, ndformalitymeans o reason ndgoodsense.Selznick's heory ould redictentham'success.Theview hatusticemat-ters othe egitimacyftheformalityouldpredicthat he awof evidenceafter entharnould ome oput gooddealmore aithnthe iscretionf hejudge, gooddeal essfaithnformalersionsf he recedentn videnceaw.

Andthat s what hemodernextbooksnthe odifiedtatutoryawofevi-dence ay Rothstein981,pp.10--12).npart henew nstitutionalismouldpredicthat eutham hould ave ost ut, articularlymongawyers ho redependentnpredictinghat he therawyershat un he ourtswilldecide.Theprofessionf awdepends n somorphism,hathe rgumentsheymakewillbe the ameas the rgumentshe ourtswillaccept. tseemsratherhatlawyerswantednstead orudgestousereason ndgoodsense, ndnotbebound y nstitutionalizedules xcept hose hatpecified hen nd onwhatgroundsheudgecould nterveneouse his/herood udgment.hat s, nthe









longpull, awyers avored ules hat sedthe eason ndgood senseof udges,ratherhan ormal ituals fcorrectness.

For xample, neobservesnthe awof vidence hat he riteriaf videnceare ppliedmuchmore trictlyhen hearing ealswith ubstantiveightshanwith heformalitiesfthe ourse f an ssuethroughhe ourt ystem,o thathearings n a change f venuehavevery nformalules fevidence.Further,the aw is morepainstakinghen herights tstake re more erious, s incriminal ases compared o civil ases e.g. exclusions f evidence ecause twas illegally btained re muchmore ommonn criminalases), n criminaltrials s opposed o grandury ndictmentearingse.g. thegrandury atherthan hedefendantecideswhat vidence hedefendantan offer),n habeuscorpushearingshan ailbondhearings,n cases of child ustody atherhanchild upportevels, nsearch nd seizure f evidence atherhan iscoveryhearings WigmorenEvidence 1983 [1940]) vol. lA, pp. 25-332 givesasummaryf variationsn the awofevidence ccordingo urisdictions].3hemoreusticematters,nshort,he reaterhe ormalityf he pplicationf helaw ofevidence.

Thispointscrucialoour ifferencesith henew nstitutionalism.e wanttopredict hen he nstitutionilldemandmore ormality,otwhen he rga-nizationwillmore nthusiasticallydopt he nstitution'standards,s Meyer& Rowan 1977) do. It spreciselyecause he ehavior f nstitutionaluthor-ities nenforcingtandardsaries hat t s importanto notice hatnstitutionsarestaffed,atherhan eingmerely ollective epresentations.

Similarly,otes n academic epartmentsrecountedmuchmore arefully,and thevotes re more ikely obeby secret allot nd kept onfidentialthedoctrineeing hat negetshonest pinions nlywithmmunityf thevoter),when he ssue s a crucialmatteruchas a tenure ase. Anothercademicexample: Graduate tudentsre sent ituallyutof theroomwhen heir is-sertation efense s beingdebated nd voted n, butnot n a seminarwheretheirontributionodiscussionstobedebated. he criteriandprocedureorexaminationsndtheir radingre often iscussednthe yllabusnd n fac-ulty andbooks, hereaswhen heprofessor ill ctually ppear orhisofficehours,s opposed owhat sannounced,smore nformallyiscussed y ngrystudentsutsidehis or herdoor. In short, hemore judgmentf academic

3When ubstantiveights re dealtwith n administrativeearingse.g. hearings n welfarerights) r by agreed rbitration, ore nformalaws ofevidence pply. Herewe wouldpredictthat hemore mportanthe ubstantiveight,hemore ormalherules f evidence ompared oother dministrativeearings r arbitrationroceedings.imilarly eromekolnick rgues1975[1966],pp. 155-161)that hebigger he ase,themore areful olice retofollow hedictatesfthe aw ofevidence s wellas other eterminantsfthe uality f vidence e.g. policemenmakebetter itnesseshan rug ealers), ecause hey now videncewillbe evaluatedmore trictly.








10 STINCHCOMBE

meritmatters,hemore ormalizednd nstitutionalizede find tto be. It shard o maginehat his sall a matterf mpression anagement,hat o onereally areswhethertudentsnd unior acultyre valuatedywhat hey aveaccomplished,ather han y formallyorrectrocedures. ut n particular,institutionaluthoritiesemandmore onformityith nstitutionalalues hemore mportanthedecisions.

My argumenthen s that ariationsnthe indingnessf nstitutionalitualsaretobeexplained ybeliefs boutwhat henstitutionsfor. he more mpor-tant he ssues t take, hemore mportantillbe those itualshat re arefullyjustifieds servinghevalue. As a criminal ase passesfrom uestioningnthe treet,o arrest,o ndictment,o conviction,hedegree f bindingnessfthe ules hatmake videnceegitimatencreases.As the areer onsequencesofan academicudgmentncrease n mportance,hegreaterheformalityfthe pecificationfwhatstobe udged, hemore ikely ommitteeatherhanindividualudgment,he argerhenumber f stages, ndthemore herightsofappeal.As a negotiationf a contractroceeds, o increases hedegree fformalityf udgmentboutwhathas beenagreed o,whetherhe greementis final,ndwhetherhe erms avebeenmade lear ither uringheprocessofnegotiationrbyreferenceothepracticen a trade.

Formalitynd ritualization,hen,ncreasewith he ubstantivemportanceof the ssue,because ngeneral hereason orhaving hingsnstitutionalizedand ritualizeds that heymatter. r toput t theotherway round,when hevalue ystemnformingn institutionanksomethings ofhigh riority,t smore ikely hat hekeepers fthe nstitutionillformalizeonformityiththe nstitutionn a ritual esigned o monitor,nforce,nd enact hevalueofthat omething. hehigherhepriority,hehigherheformalityndritual.The moreritualized things in an institution,he ess it s merely ritual,because hemore ubstantivelymportantt s. Orto returno our xample fevidenceaw,themoreusticedepends na bitofevidence,hemore ormalevidence awtheres about he ntroductionfthat vidence.

TransactionostsvsMoralCommitmentThe contractshat onstitutemarketreordinarilygreementsboutfutureperformances.t is that act hatmakes henoncontractualart f contractscentral,ince he arties' redictionsf achother's utureehaviorepend npredictionsbout ach other's uture orality.ut nparticular,neroutinelycontracts or notherirm's erviceswhen hat irmando somethingetterthan necando itoneself. onsequently,t s inparticularhe ort fmoralitythatwillguaranteehe other irm's utureompetencehat s central o thecreationfmostmarkets.f n the uturehe ther irms notgoing o be morecompetentt their usinesshan ou re,whymake contract itht?









To relate heold institutionalismo the nstitutionalismf transactionostanalysis,t sbest o startwith ldtransactionostanalysis,nCoase (1937).Coase defined hemaximizingoundaryfa firms thedivision etweenhesetofthingstcoulddo betterrcheaperhantcouldhire rbuy.Anairplanedevelopernd manufactureranmakeplanesbetter han n airline an. Butit can onlyborrow hemoney o develop passenger lane fairlines igncontractsnadvance obuy Newhouse 982). Airlineswillbuy hem or hefuturenlyf hey elievemanufacturersill eriouslynd ompetentlysethemoney odevelop ndmake betterirplane. irlines illmake ommitmentsonly ftheairlines ntheir urn elieve hey hemselves illstillbe able tocompetenselling ravelingndexpresshippingervices.

In particular,irlineswill have to sell airline ervices etter hanBoeing,Lockheed, rMcDonnell-Douglas,orf hemanufacturerserebettert run-ning irlines s well as at buildingirplanes,heairlineswould merely efinancingheirompetition.ankersnly elieve he uturesontractsetweenairlines nd irframe anufacturersf heyhinkhemanufactureranandwillbuilda betterirplane,nd the irlineswillstillbe there o buy twhen hecontractomesdue. It s an immediateerivationfCoase's theoryhat art,at least,ofthenoncontractuallement fcontract as to be mutual elief neachother's utureuperiorompetence.Much ofone'stransactionosthastodo with ryingoguarantee ycontractual eans hefutureompetencefthe ounterparties,ithoutiving ver o themhe ent fone's own uperiorfutureompetencenone's ownbusiness. he naturefthis ystemfmutualbelief n each other'sompetenceecomes articularlylearwhen great ealofmoney, owand nthefuture,astopassbetween hree ifferentinds ffirms,achrelyingn the uccess fthe elation etween he ther wo.

Theexpectedeturnf ll the ransactionosts fthese evelopment,anu-facturing,nd oancontractsltimatelyepends n the aithf ll three artiesthat hemanufacturerill howdevotionobuilding etter,heaper,nd saferairplanes.Unless there s competencendwill behind hat ransaction-costboundary,nlessBoeingor Lockheed rMcDonnell-Douglasanreallydosomethings etterhan heyor anyone lse)canbuy nthemarket,hewholeweb ofcontractsomescrashing own. Likewiseunless he irlines ehindtheir irm'squilibriumoundaryan do theirob, therewill be nomoney opayfor hebetterlane, o inturn omoney or hemanufactureropaythebanker. hesame, hanginghe hangeable arts, olds or hebanker ricingrisks esponsiblyor he apitalmarket,ndusing ankingquityobackothercontractshatplit pthe isks or ppropriatearts fthe apitalmarket.

Transactionosts reworthaying, hen,nlywhen here retwo or nthiscase at east hree) irmselievablyryingobeanddowhat ttakes obe bestat their wnbusiness.Only f firmanbe believedwill ny ther irmrefer








12 STINCHCOMBE

it to internalctivities,hus reatingheboundaryetweenhe wofirmsndthenecessityf a contract.

Similarly,universityontractsut ts anitoringndwaste emoval asks,butkeeps tsresearch ndteachingn-house,ecause thasa believable om-mitmentoscholarship,nd no noticeableommitmentoclean buildings.tis theuniversity'sommitmento researchndteaching hat ltimately akesthewastemanagementirm elieve t willbe paid for tscontract,or heuni-versity's verheadostswillbe paid only fstudentsndgrant-giverselievetheuniversityan andwilldo its ob. Similarlyhehospital uys CATSCANmachine atherhan uildone itself,with he ncome rcredit erived romitscredibilityo a clientwho thinks e mayhavehad a stroke. f theclientchoosesthewrong ospital,hat oes notknow nough obuy CATSCANmachine, emight otget second hoice.AndtheCATSCANmanufacturerthat ellstoa hospital hat annot ttracttrokeatients illnot e paidfor hemachine.

The "hierarchy"Williamson 975) thaties outside hemarket, rotectedbytransactionostsbarriers,astobe a thinghat roduces eliably n intothefuture,o that tspredictedutureompetenceustifiesaying ransactioncosts now. The transactionost a cost ofrisk)ofgoing nto he mergencyroom f hospital hen ne sperhaps aving stroke illonly epaid fonethinkshemedicalworkersare noughobecompetentnd o tay ompetent,to work venthroughheir aughter'seventhirthdayartyfnecessary,otriagemainly n thedegree furgency,obuy CATSCANmachine eforeone has evenhad the troke,nd o on.

Ofcourse, hedegree o which rganizationsreate heir istinctiveompe-tencies ymoral ommitmentss a variable.Andthe xactdefinitionf whatwe wouldmeanbythat ariable sdifficult-presumablyanagerialommit-ment s moremportanthan he ommitmentfhewers fwoodanddrawersofwater, or xample.But imagine hatwe willdefinehat ariablemoreexactly yextractingndicatorsf t from elznick's eadership inAdminis-tration1957)than y bstractinghem rom liverWilliamson1975),becauseSelznickwasprimarilyevelopingtheoryfthe distinctiveompetence"fanorganization,ts bilityorealize aluesn waynootherrganizationould.

Birth ndDeathvs nstitutionsfCreative estructionSchumpeterhoughthatmany conomic nstitutionshat acilitatedapital-ism s we knowtdependedn values ther han apitalism.mperialismndmercantilismeredriven ythevalue ofpower s much s by profit. a-bordisciplineouldprobably e achievedmore asilybysocialism han ya capitalism owshorn f tsfeudal overninglasses. Valuesofdemocracyempiricallyssociatedwith apitalism ependedn their urn n competing









political liteswhowanted o govern irst,rofitrom overnmentfterwards.Schumpetererhaps its ncomfortablyith elznick s a comemberf n oldinstitutionalchool.Butone ofthe ositions e holds n commonwith he ld

institutionalistss that heform fcompetitionmong rganizationss histor-icallyvariable, epending good deal on thevaluesof thegoverninglassesandtheirhallengers.

InSchumpeter'srgumenthe ulingnstitutionsffectedrganizationalcol-ogy, nd nparticularhat ecalled creativeestruction"Schumpeter1964[1939]), 1942). Inthe ongrun, hebigcompetitorsf n earlier opulationforganizationsrenew; ater, opulationsforganizationsf differentort hatreshape heniches n which arlier rganizationalopulationsepend. f t s

true hat he xygen tmospherefearthwas created ythefirsthlorophyll-using naerobic opulations,ausing he ong-runhift o oxygen-breathinganimals nd "creatively estroying" ost naerobic trains,henbiologicalevolution as powerfulnalogies o Schumpeter'seasoning.Thusto ana-lyze thewithin-speciesr within-"organizationalopulation" ompetitionstomiss hebig story fevolutionnd ofeconomic evelopment:nterspeciescompetition.

Thus chumpeterasprimarilynterestednthe nstitutionshat llowed he

peaceful4 estructionf wholepopulationsf organizations.o put tanotherway, ewanted oknow owmodernocietyreateduch recariousegitimacyfor given ype forganizationhat heobs, profits,rcommunity-sustainingcontributionsf whole ndustriesouldbe destroyed.fsomeone lsebuiltbettermousetrap,ll the ccumulatedegitimacyhat ccounted or hefirstpart fthe limb ftheold populationfcat breeders p theGompertzurvewas notapparentlynough. chumpeteregardedhisprecariousnessf thelegitimacyfoldpopulationsforganizationss remarkable,ndhe therefore

regardedhe nstitutionshat llowed uchdestructionfpeople's ivelihoodsprecarious. e arguedhattwas such reative estructionhat auseddepres-sions Schumpeter964 1939]), ndhe waspoliticalcientistnoughoknowthat overnmentsndtheeconomywere onfrontedith hallengesotheirlegitimacy hen hey llowed uchdestructionnd ts ccompanyingepres-sions.He thoughthe emarkablenstitutionsacilitatingompetitionetweenspecies forganizationsere xtraordinarilyrecarious.

But think hedefinitivenalysis f what hese nstitutionsere sJohn

Commons's1974 [1924]), specially iscareful efinitionf he egalprotec-tion fcompetition1974, pp. 83-134). Commonstarts isanalysis f whatlegitimateompetitioneans or apitalismydistinguishingheegaldefense

4At eastSchumpeterreferredeaceful estruction-henew hat rganizationsnd nstitu-tionswereoften reated nd destroyedy conquest, uthe thoughthatwas badfor conomicdevelopment.s doesGambetta1993).








14 STINCHCOMBE

of workingules" ffirmsncompetition5hat redistinctiveoa given orpo-ration. hese redefendedegally nthe ense hat nly heBoardofDirectors

ofa corporationanallocate hepropertyf the orporationr permitccesson the hopfloor,ndeven tockholdersannot ake way lathe rfour aysof firmlectriciano atisfyheir ropertynterest.nterferenceithworkingrules nvades he egally efendedutonomyf a competitiveorporation,heautonomyohavedistinctiveules hat llowthem odo somethingnnovativethat anroutinelyive monopolisticdvantagena nichena market.Whenthis s combinedwith n opportunityn themarketCommons 974 [1924],pp. 153-157), tproduces "going oncern alue," ndthe nstitutionalro-

tectionfeconomic

pportunitiesistinctiveo

capitalisms the

protectionf

that oing oncern alue Commons 974:172-213).WhatCommonsespeciallywhen ombined ith chumpeter) anaged o

do, then,was to umpover he nstitutionalismf organizationalcology fonepopulationdeveloped specially yAdamSmith or irms,ndtheorizeddifferentlyyHannan Freeman977,1989recently)irectlyo he stablish-mentf nevolutionarycology fmultipleompetingpecies defined y heirworkingules ndbythe pportunities-oriches-those xploit).Commons

wasan

nstitutionalistnd

houghthesewere efendednthe egal nstitutions

ofcapitalism.Whenhooked ogetherhey xplain lso whyTobin'sq-ratioof themarket alueofcorporationso the eplacementalueoftheir ssets sordinarilyreaterhan1 ineconomic ooms Tobin& Brainard 977), whythererebusiness epressionsnwhich hat atio oesdownnpopulationse-ingeliminated,ndwhy oth oom nd,more urprisingly,ust redefendedby nstitutions.here snoplacefornstitutionso abolish rganizationsn alarge cale nmodern rganizationalcology-they nly egitimatehem.

Darwinian volution oesnotneed nstitutionsefendingompetitionitherwithin rbetweenpecies.Humans efend hemselvesocially romompeti-tionbytariffarriers,acialprejudice,onspiraciesn restraintftrade, uildregulations,atent ffices,rofessionalocieties nd icenses opractice,radeunions, oning egulations,rotectionackets,mmigrationndnaturalizationservices, onquest fcompetitors,ndthegenocide f ndigenouseoples.

In humanhistory,ompetitionas notordinarilyeenlegitimate.t is awonder hatmodernrganizationalcologists avenotnoticed his.Most nsti-

tutional onditionsestrictompetition.nstitutionshat llowpeople's iveli-

hoodsandcapital obe destroyed y competitionre rare. chumpeterndCommons new hat ndconsideredheegitimacyf exposure"oother eo-ple's "liberties" he mainthing o be explained. apitalism, articularlytslegitimateompetitionnd creative estructionart,s not tallnatural ut s

5See alsoessentiallyhe ameconceptn "routines"n Nelson& Winter982.









instead n nstitutionalreation. o use egitimacyo explain nly he pswingof organizationalrowth ates, nd to forgethat he egitimacyf ntensifiedcompetitiony firms ith nnovationshat estroysarge egitimateopula-tions,wouldhaveseemed peculiar lindnessn thedays ofCommons ndSchumpeter,hen moot-Hawleyariffsnd mmigrationuotaswere n theland. Theprecariousegitimacyf maquiladorasver hebordern Mexicomight each s again hat ompetitiontselfs stillnotvery egitimate.

That ocialistnstitutionso NotWork oes NotMeanCapitalist nesDoIn many astEuropean ountrieshepopulationsavedecided hat hey avetried apitalismnd t does notwork, o they re voting heir ld communistleadersback n. In theold institutionalism,hefailure f capitalismo workinsoutherntalywas also argued yEdwardBanfield,n TheMoral Basis ofa Backwardociety1967 [1958]). The basic deaofthat ookwasthat omesorts f nstitutionsndermineapitalistrganizations,ndthat hey o so byfailingoprovidentegritynthe chievementfpublic oods lawandorder-especiallyivil aw, ity rganization,oads, reconomic evelopmentfficesfacilitatingactoryndfirmoundation).

Banfield's asicnotionwas thatfthenuclear amily as so setup thattssolidaritynd nterestsnvariablyverrodehose fothernstitutions,hen hoseothernstitutionsouldnotdotheirob. Institutionshat epend n generosityofspiritndattentiono collectivewelfare reespecially ulnerable. art finstitutions'obwas egitimatinghe ulfillmentfoccupationalnd eadershipobligationsn firmsndineconomicallyignificantovernmentperations.Large-scale orruptionhen narenas equiringntegritynthe ursuitfpublicgoods is an outcome f a particular ay of nstitutionalizingamilies.TheMafia nd Cosa Nostra re na certainensenot nstitutionsecause hey rein thebusiness fcorruptinghatevernstitutionset nthewayof short-runmaximizationfnuclear amilynterestsonthe icilianMafia, eeespeciallyGambetta993).

The basicpoint anbe illustratedfwe considerheroleofaccreditationassociationsneducation,he ieldwhereMeyer Rowan1977,pp.354-356,citingheir 975paper) irstbservedhe owerfulole f nstitutions.ccred-itation ocieties o nothavemany ormalowers, or esources odistribute;they aveonlymoral owers.Oneofthe onsequencess that hey ery en-erally skfor olunteersrom everal ducationalrganizationsogo inspectanother ne. Now imagine South talian rSicilian ocialorganizationsdescribedyBanfieldendingutunpaid olunteersndmakinghem old oeducationaltandardsfthe ortMeyerwants oexplain, utwithout akingan offerhey an't refuse.Paying ff he ccreditors ould urelymake he








16 STINCHCOMBE

formal eportnto venmore ant nd ritual hanMeyer bserves.A phrasefrom eamsters'eaderJimmy offa n a trade nion ebate ver olitical c-tionoccurs o me: "There re two kinds f political ction. You can makespeeches, ryoucan givemoney.We givemoney."f schools avemoney oraccreditation,ould he ituals fformal rganizatione convincing?

TheextensionfBanfield'snstitutionalrgumento apitalismanmost as-ilybe seenby alling n a really ldfashionednstitutionalist,mileDurkheim(1933 [1893]). Durkheim eld hat hedivision f abor ested n thenoncon-tractuallementsf ontract,he ommitmentovalues f ommercialonesty,nonstrategicseofbankruptcy,dvertisingith ome nformationalue, om-petencenone's occupation,ndthe ike. Banfield's rgumenthenmight eread as assertinghat oth he ontractsetween irms,nd between overn-ments ndfirms,renot nstitutionalizednder amoral amilism."

Now back to theattemptointroduceapitalismnEastern urope. Thelanguage escribingicily s often sed odescribe he conomic rrangementsincapitalist ussia; the mafia"nRussiadoes nothaveto be importedromSoutherntaly.The egitimationf nstitutionalelations nder ocialismwasbywayofthepurposes fgovernment,s manifestedngovernmenteasuresofoutcome, overnmentubsidies fproductionhatwas considered publicgood, nd he ike.Thecontractetween firmnd he overnmentas hardlydeeply heologicallyrounded,ut thadnoncontractuallementsnthe ensethat ther arts f hegovernmentould ackup the orporatistndustrylavkandhelp nforce onformitynthe actory anager.

Thiscentral lanningegitimationystemor upply, uality ontrol,mea-surementfproductivity,aborrelationsegulation,ricingndpaymentordeliveryffinishedrsemifinishedoods, nd so on,no longer egitimates.Calvinism iving upernaturalanctions or ommercialntegrityeems obethin nthe round. hecapacityf he opulationocreate ublic oods, uchas industrytandards-setting,redit xtensionnd ts redit-ratingystem,on-estbrokeragenstock ndbondmarkets,scrippledecause hat apacity sedto be all embeddednthecentral lanningystem.The lackof ntermediatecorporateodieswithegitimacyf heir wnbasedonthe xpectationhey illliveupto their wnmoral ystemhen roduces conditionike hat anfieldcalledamoral amilism. ndthat s notgoodfor apitalismn RussiaorotherEastEuropean ountries,nymore hantwasgoodfor apitalismnSouthernItaly.

RingOuttheNew,Ring n the OldThe basicpostulate ere s that rganizationshatworkwell do so by payingpeopletoservevalues, otry o be competent,o conductheir usinesswithintegrity.t seasy o xaggeratehe ncentiveffectf he ayment,nd otreat









it as if t wereonly game-theoreticaloken.But payments an institutionaltool as well,forwe pay for hingswe believe n. I would rgue hat ayingfor hings e believe n s the oreofwhat n institutions. We accept okensof credit ather hanmoney ncentivesn algebra lasses, nd pay people toteach hem, ecausewebelievenalgebra; he eacher oes notget o cash ntheA's he or she does notgive out as in game theory,nd the tudent oesnotget o cash themnat the tore.Their nlyvalue s that veryone elievesthat herewas somerealmathematicsehind hem. ven new nstitutionalistsat Stanfordelieve nalgebra ndare willing o pay for t, and they o notwant ogivethatmoney o a school hat oesnotbelieve nalgebra.Nor dopeoplewant o givemoney o nsuranceompanies hatwon'tpay when heydie,nordo theywant obuyportable arddiskdrives rom company hatdoesn't nswer tstechnical elp ine,6 or o trustmost fthe apitalmarketsinEastern urope.The combinationfresourcesndbelievable ommitmentcanonlybe created,o theold institutionalistsrgued,fpeoplebelieve hatthe nstitutionalnforcershemselveselieve hevalues.

Onlywith hat ssumption,or xample,an weexplainwhy apitalismanfirstegitimatehehorse-and-buggyndustrynd henegitimatehe utomobileindustryhat estroyst,withouthanginghebasic nstitutionsfcapitalism.And t akes he ailuref he ssumptionhat nforcersf ommercialontractsbelieve nhonest ealing o see why heRussians nd Ukrainians now owell that apitalism oesnotwork:the nstitutionalnforcerso notbelievethat ommercial onestys possible, o they o notbotherocreate t. Theassumptionf transactionostanalysiss that ne cango outon themarket,payall the ransactionosts, nd sometimes) etbettererformancehan necouldproduce neself. It is onlythe contrast f thatmarketontract ithwhat he firm an do bettertself hatmakes heboundaryround hefirmorhierarchyn equilibriumnCoase's sense. But one cannot xplainwhytheresany herehere nless ne swillingobelieve hat ransactionartnerswill deliver hegoods,willmaintainhe ompetencendresponsivenesshatmakes he upplier's ork uperioro what he irm an do itself,t eastuntilthecontracts fulfilled. nepaysthe ransactionostsby contractingithsupplierwith ompetenceuperioro one'sown. Otherwisehe quilibriumfirmize s thewhole conomy, erhapss in the ld USSR.

In short,hetroublewith henew nstitutionalisms thatt does nothavetheguts f nstitutionsnit. Theguts f nstitutionss that omebodyome-where eally ares o hold norganizationothe tandardsnd s often aidtodo that. ometimes hat omebodys inside heorganization, aintainingts

6My advice s to call the echnicalupport umberefore uying-Iomegahas a wonderfulcomputerizedhone ystemor iving client n troublehe unaround.








18 STINCHCOMBE

competence. ometimest s inan accreditingody, ending ut volunteersto see iftheresreally ny lgebranthe lgebra ourse.And sometimeshat

somebody,rhisorher ommitment,s acking,nwhich ase the enterannothold, ndmere narchys loosedupon heworld.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

BrianGran ndStephen arleymadedetailed ommentsn a previous raft,CarolHeimer isciplined y endencyoprecious riting,ndRichardempertmadedetailed ommentsn thenext-to-the-lastraft.

Visit heAnnualReviews ome age athttp://www.annurev.org.

Literature ited

Banfield C. 1967. (1958). The Moral Basisof a Backward ociety.New York: FreePress

BendixR. 1956. Worknd Authorityn ndus-try:deologies f'Managementn theCourse

of'Industrialization.ewYork:Wiley/Ber-keley:Univ.Calif.PressCoase RH. 1937.The nature f thefirm. co-

nomica 4:386-405CommonsJR. 1974. (1924). Legal Founda-

tions fCapitalism. eprintedyUniv.Wisc.Press ndArno ress; riginallyublished yMacmillan

Durkheim . 1933. 1893). On theDivision fLabor n ociety. ransl./ed.Simpson. ewYork:Macmillan

Gambetta . 1993. The SicilianMafia: The

Business f'Privaterotection. ambridge,MA: Harvard niv. ressHannanMT,FreemanM. 1989.Organizational

Ecology. Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniv.Press

HannanMT, FreemanM. 1977.Thepopula-tion cology forganizations.m.J.Sociol.82:929-64

Lipset SM, TrowMA, ColemanJS. 1956.Union emocracy.Glencoe,L: FreePress

MeyerJW, RowanB. 1977. nstitutionalizedorganizations:ormal tructures mythnd

ceremony.m.J.Sociol. 83(2):340-63Meyer W,RowanB. 1975.Notes nthe truc-ture feducational rganizations.resentedatMeet.Am. Sociol.Assoc., an Francisco

NelsonRR, Winter G. 1982. An Evolution-aryTheoryf conomic hange. ambridge,MA: Belknap-Harvardniv. ress

NewhouseJ. 1982. The SportyGame. NewYork:Knopf

RothsteinR 1981. Evidence n a Nutshell:State ndFederalRules. t.Paul:West. nded.

SchumpeterA. 964. 1939).Business ycles:A Theoretical, istorical, nd StatisticalAnalysis f heCapitalistrocess. AbridgedbyRindigs els].NewYork:McGraw-Hill

SchumpeterA.1942. Capitalism,ocialism,and Democracy.New York: HarperTorchBooks

SelznickP. 1949. TVA nd theGrassRoots.Berkeley: niv.Calif.Press

SelznickP. 1984. (1957). Leadershipn Ad-ministration: Sociological nterpretation.Berkeley: niv.Calif.Press

Skolnick . 1975. 1966).Justice ithoutrial:Law Enforcementn Democratic ociety.New York:JohnWiley. nd d.

TobinJ, BrainardWC. 1977. Assetmarketsand he ost f apital.nEconomic rogress:PrivateValues ndPublicPolicy:Essays nHonor fW Fellner,d.R Nelson, Balassa,pp.235-62. Amsterdam:orth olland

TwiningW. 1990. Rethinkingvidence: Ex-ploratory ssays.Evanston:NorthwesternUniv. ress

VeblenT. 1934. (1899). The Theory f the

LeisureClass. NewYork:ModemLibraryWigmore H. 1983. (1940). Wigmoren Ev-idence: [Peter]Tiller'sRevision.10 vols.Boston:Little rown

Williamson. 1975.MarketsndHierarchies.NewYork:FreePress/London:ollierMac-millan

Documents

Stinchcombe, Arthur - On the Virtues of the Old Institutionalism, 1997