“A Studied and Calculated Course of Criminal Misconduct”:

American POWS during and after the Korean War

STEVEN ROPER

HIST 300KK

Professor Ferrell

4-17-15

Abstract

The American POWs of the Korean War experienced a brutality that had never been

experienced in previous wars. The Korean War featured two sets of worldviews at war: the

white-centered racialized hierarchy vs. the Asian-centered racialized hierarchy as well as

capitalism vs. communism. The battling ideologies created a storm of brutality that drove some

POWs to collaborate with the communist Chinese and North Koreans in the form of confessions

and acceptance of communist ideas. The collaboration was viewed in an extremely negative light

by the American government and public which led to difficulties for returning POWs in terms of

repatriation and readjustment to everyday life.

1

The Korean War will likely forever be titled “the forgotten war” in the United States.

However, the war left deep striations on the lives of those who served in the frozen hell of the

Korean peninsula. While American soldiers were harassed by suicidal charges from the North

Koreans and the Chinese at the treacherous Chosin Reservoir, the real torture occurred behind

the barbed wire of North Korean prisoner-of-war (POW) camps.

The overall treatment of American prisoners of war by their captors was extremely brutal.

This stemmed from two main differences between the two sides. First, the North Koreans as well

as Chinese had an Asian-centralized hierarchy that had existed for thousands of years while the

Americans had a white-centralized racial hierarchy that had been in place since the first African

arrived in America in 1619 (though one could argue even before then tracing back to English

worldviews). Second, the North Koreans and Chinese were staunchly communist while the

United States was the torch-bearer for capitalism in the world. These clashing worldviews

created a unique brutality that had never been faced by American POWs. The brutal treatment

that American soldiers faced naturally caused some of them to collaborate with the enemy in

order to end their torture. Collaboration came in many forms such as forced “confessions” to war

crimes against the Korean people, but it was received in the United States by both the

government and public as nothing more than treason. The negative reactions by the government

and the public caused great difficulties for returning POWs including problems related to their

repatriation and inclusion back into everyday life.

The key to understanding the brutality of the treatment received by Korean War POWs is

to draw comparison to treatment of American POWs in other wars. The first war in which

Americans found themselves in captivity was the Revolutionary War. The interactions with the

British during the American Revolution were generally positive in nature for soldiers. There was

2

an established understanding between each side that once the muskets fell silent, the surrendering

soldiers were to be treated with dignity and respect. Commander-in-Chief of American forces

George Washington, writing to Commander-in-Chief of British forces Sir William Howe in

November 1776, stated: “. . . it is not my wish that Severity should be exercised toward any

whom the fortune of War has thrown, or, shall throw into our hands. On the contrary, it is my

desire that the utmost Humanity should be shewn them. I am convinced the latter has been the

prevailing line of Conduct to Prisoners.”1 While the British followed this line for land

combatants, the story for sailors was quite different. The British operated prison ships in which

American sailors, packed tightly together in the cargo hold, were subject to a variety of diseases.

Both George Washington and Benjamin Franklin appealed to the British to change their policies

towards American sailor POWs, but to no avail. During the War of 1812, British treatment of

American POWs remained similar to that of the Revolutionary War with a stark disparity

between the experiences of soldiers and sailors. 2

Between the Revolutionary War and the War of

1812 the British captured a total of 38,152 Americans on both land and sea.3

Following the Revolutionary War, the Americans next experienced the capture of sailors

in the wars with the Barbary states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli. As early as 1784

Salle pirates captured the American ship Betsey. However the capture was merely to secure a

treaty with the United States.4 The true story of American POWs in the Barbary Wars begins in

1 Robert C. Doyle, Voices from Captivity: Interpreting the American POW Narrative (Lawrence: University

Press of Kansas, 1994), 90.

2 Ibid., 91-92.

3 “POWs/MIAs from all US Wars,” http://www.gmasw.com/pow_list.htm (accessed April 12, 2015).

4 Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World (New York: Hill and

Wang, 2005), 52-53.

3

1785 with the Algerian corsairs’ capture the Maria and enslavement of its crew.5 The taking of

the Maria event set off a chain of captures and enslavements of American crews in the Barbary

states. American POWs in the captivity of the Barbary states were often either placed in

dungeons where the plague existed or were placed in the service of a wealthy North African. The

freedom process for the POWs was arduous as they awaited word that the United States either

paid for their freedom or was on the attack.6

After the conclusion of the Barbary Wars in 1815 and the end of the War of 1812 in the

United States would not experience another significant POW situation until the Mexican-

American War (1846-1848) in which 46 Americans were taken captive.7 Although it is reported

that a total of 339 Americans were taken in the entirety of the Indian Wars, it is difficult to

decipher how many were captured in the years leading up to the Mexican-American War.8 While

Americans captured by the Mexicans were often marched up to 300 miles, there was a degree of

respect between officers of each army. After a meeting between surrendering American Captain

William Heady and a Mexican colonel, American officers were allowed to keep their horses and

swords whereas enlisted men had to relinquish all arms.9

The next chapter in American POW history is a bit murky. Civil War POWs faced the

harshest conditions yet of any generation of American POWs despite the fact it was largely

unintentional. The American Civil War pitted brother against brother and brings both sides into

5 Doyle, 93.

6 Ibid., 95.

7 “POWs/MIAs from all US Wars.”

8 Ibid.

9 Doyle., 96.

4

the equation of treatment by the enemy. Confederate and Union soldiers alike experienced

horrific conditions in POW camps such as Camp Douglas outside of Chicago, Illinios and

Andersonville in Georgia. Prison officials of both camps often did not outfit prisoners with

sufficient clothing in order to battle exposure. Soldiers had little access to rations and lived off

low caloric intake for weeks at a time.10

The two camps also shared a similar feature: “the dead-

line.” The dead-line established the farthest a prisoner could wander before a guard could shoot.

Often the dead-line was not announced to all prisoners which resulted in accidental deaths from

wandering.11

The similarity in the treatment of both Confederate and Union prisoners points to

the economic costliness of the war for the two sides. The goal of each side was not to be overly

brutal to the captives, but rather were stretched so thin that adequate resources could not be

diverted to the POW camps. The Confederate Army was having difficulty feeding itself much

less a group of POWs while the Union Army threw everything at its disposal to repeated

attempts to drive towards Richmond.

Compared to the desperate conditions of POWs in the Civil War, the captives of World

War I were generally well taken care of. The majority of POWs survived their stay in German

camps largely due to the German recognition of the Treaty of Amity, the Hague Convention of

1899, and the Geneva Convention of 1906, as well as the American adherence to the same

protocols.12

While American POWs had to sleep on floors, they often found a roof over their

heads and were worked in a variety of labor parties throughout their captivity.13

The Germans

10 Ibid., 150, 154.

11

Ibid., 150-51, 154-55. 12

Ibid., 125.

13 Ibid, 158.

5

also constantly attempted to question American POWs on the structure and plans of the United

States military. As Harold Willis recalls in a meeting with a rival German squadron: “[I] knew

that the Germans were more than curious to know the plans and the organization of our Air

Force: how many squadrons were already at the front and the numbers soon to come. They were

greatly interested in my Nieuport Type 28, and I did not hesitate to say that it was a superb

pursuit ship, far better than their Pfalzes and Albatrosses.”14

Following the relatively relaxed experience in World War I, Americans once again were

plunged into a difficult situation in World War II. The Second World War saw the introduction

of one of the first elements that made the Korean War POW experience exceptionally brutal:

competing racialized hierarchies. Germans were white, and many Americans could trace their

roots back to Germany. However, the “Yellow Peril” Japanese were near the bottom rung of

society in the views of the Americans. The Japanese had the exact opposite opinion: the white

man was below the Asian.

The camps in Germany were often to those of World War I. An investigation by the

House of Representatives found that the Germans treated American POWs well largely due to

the kind American treatment of German POWs.15

There were exceptions to the fair treatment by

German captors such as the massacre of American soldiers at the Battle of the Bulge on

December 17, 1944 known as the Malmedy Massacre.16

Despite this dark chapter, only 1 percent

14 Ibid., 126.

15

Jacob Neufeld and George Watson Jr., “A Brief Survey of POWs in Twentieth-Century Wars,” Air Power History 60 (Summer 2013): 39.

16 The Malmedy Massacre was perpetrated by the 1

st SS Panzer Division. The 1

st SS Panzer Division

captured 80 men of the US Army's Battery B, 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion. The men were lined up and executed by their German captors.

6

of Americans held by the Germans died in captivity. In contrast 40 percent of POWs held by the

Japanese died in captivity due to harsh conditions, torture, and executions.17

The Japanese

Bushido Code as well as their conceptions of the inferiority of the white man led many Japanese

guards to view surrendering Americans as sub-humans.18

The Japanese utilized “hell ships”

which were essentially merchant ships packed with POWs. As “hell ship” survivor John Jacobs

recalls: “The prisoners had been so crowded in these other holds that they couldn't even get air to

breathe. They went crazy, cut and bit each other through the arms and legs and sucked their

blood. In order to keep from being murdered, many had to climb the ladders and were promptly

shot by guards. Between twenty and thirty prisoners had died of suffocation or were murdered

during the night.”19

While the physical torment of the POWs aboard the “hell ships” was

extreme, it was still missing the mental torture that would later be practiced by the communists.

The Cold War that followed World War II introduced the second element that created a

unique level of brutality for Korean War POWs: the battle between communism and capitalism.

Communist principle dictated that the two systems could not coexist. In order for communism to

succeed, the capitalist system had to collapse under its own weight. In the eyes of the communist

North Koreans, the South Koreans must first be saved from their capitalist overlords (the United

States) through reunification. North Koreans believed that a way to rid the capitalist poison from

South Korea and succeed in reunification was to eliminate or mentally destroy any Americans

taken captive during the conflict. Prisoners were purposely neglected, tortured, and even

17 Ibid.

18

Ibid. 19

Lee A. Galdwin, “American POWs on Japanese Ships Take a Voyage into Hell,” http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2003/winter/hell-ships-1.html (accessed April 12, 2015).

7

subjected to a new reeducation program labeled as “brainwashing” by the American press.20

The

reeducation (brainwashing) programs were put into place mainly by the Chinese. The Chinese

were instrumental to the North Korean efforts as they provided both financial and material

support for the war. The Chinese were also beginning to distance themselves from the Soviet

system of communism in favor of a new, peasant –focused Sino system of communism. They

realized that turning American soldiers against their own system yielded greater gains in

propoganda for communism than simply murdering or torturing them. First Lieutenant Wadie

Rountree’s account details the program pushed on the soldiers by the communists. Rountree

points out that the Chinese had a course that blamed the United States for the start of the Korean

War as well as for the use of chemical warfare against the communists. Rountree claims: “A

propaganda poster depicted American planes parachuting rats into North Korea to spread

disease. To make sure the Americans were identified with capitalism, the eyes of the rats were

replaced with dollar signs.”21

American soldiers often sat through lectures titled “Capitalists of

WWII” which blamed the war on the forces of capitalism and gave the Soviets credit for all

major victories against the Nazis and Japanese.22

Segregation of officers from their enlisted men

kept them from keeping the morale of their soldiers up and encouraging resistance to the

teachings in the classrooms. The leader of United Nations forces in Korea, Matthew Ridgway

(1951-1952), saw the brutal treatment of American POWs as purely political on the part of the

communists: “[It was] a studied and calculated course of criminal misconduct . . . carried out

with such callous disregard to human life and suffering as to indicate a design on the part of the

20

Doyle, 29.

21 Richard Peters and Xiaobing Li, Voices from the Korean War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,

2004), 229.

22 Ibid., 230.

8

Communist leadership. The Communists' policy was connected to political ends. As the peace

talks progressed [1951-1953] the treatment of [American] war prisoners would improve or revert

dependent upon the Communist gains in these negotiations."23

In addition to the strenuous reeducation techniques employed by the communists,

physical torture and executions played a major role in breaking down American POWs.

According to the January 11, 1954 US Senate Report No. 848 on Atrocities, the North Koreans

and Chinese committed seven separate massacres of American troops including attacks on

medics and chaplains administering aid to wounded soldiers.24

The communists also forced

American soldiers on marches over harsh terrain with inadequate gear to deal with the elements,

killing those that fell behind on the march as did the Japanese during the Bataan Death March in

April 1942. After marches and executions came the intense physical torture of the POWs.

Torture methods included stabbing soldiers with heated and sharpened bamboo sticks, burning

POWs with lighters, and, as First Lieutenant Henry J. McNichols recalled, “A can opener which

was on a dog tag hanging around my neck. They inserted that into the wound in my left shoulder

and give them a half twist, and one of them said, ‘ptomaine poison.’ After he inserted this into

my wound then, I took it out. He slapped me and hit me on my shoulder, on the wound, with the

butt of his rifle, and put it back in there. Well, I decided it would be best if I left it in there.”25

The combination of an Asian-centered racialized hierarchy that was largely the same as

the one encountered in World War II (albeit with the Koreans and Chinese replacing the

23

Neufeld, 41.

24

“US Senate Report No. 848 on Atrocities,” http://b-29s-over-korea.com/POWs-In-Korean- War/POWs-In-Korean-War_1.html (accessed February 20, 2015).

25 Ibid.

9

Japanese at the top) and the Cold War era battle of communism vs. capitalism created a unique

blend of executions, torture, and attempts at brainwashing that American POWs had never

encountered in previous conflicts. Though the brutality of the Japanese was extreme in World

War II, the research of psychologists Patricia Sutker and Albert Allain Jr. found that amongst

their subjects 88 percent of Korean War POWs had a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD) while WWII Pacific Theater POWs had a diagnosis rate of 76 percent, WWII European

Theater POWs had a rate of 54 percent, and regular combat veterans had a rate of only 14

percent, clearly displaying that Korean War POWs endured the most trauma due to uniquely

brutal conditions.26

American POWs in previous wars had done a fair job of resisting any type of

collaboration. Due to this intense level of trauma, the likelihood of collaboration with the North

Korean and Chinese communists increased dramatically. Already under constant barrage with

physical torment such as the refusal of medical care for those sick and dying, the communist

assault on the mind became too much for some American POWs to withstand. Classes held by

the communists typically lasted one to three hours per day. The classes were the only opportunity

the POWs had to interact with one another as their captors had completely banned any form of

organization outside of the classroom. Since the POWs were never allowed to gather into groups,

the communists were able to essentially divide and conquer the minds of their captives.

Collaboration came in many forms such as the acceptance of communism as the correct

worldview and the false admission to American war crimes including the use of germ warfare to

26

Patricia Sutker and Albert Allain Jr.,“Assessment of PTSD and Other Mental Disorders in World War II and Korean Conflict POW Survivors,” Psychological Assessment 8 (March 1996): 22.

10

kill “superior” Chinese and North Korean forces.27

The most recognized case of a false

confession comes from Marine Colonel Frank H. Schwable. Colonel Schwable played into the

communist plans perfectly. Not only was he the second highest ranking officer in captivity

during the war, he was also a pilot.28

The communists plan to establish American use of

chemical/biological warfare had two requirements: 1) get a high-ranking American rather than an

enlisted man to admit that the allegations were correct, and 2) the American confirming the

allegations had to be a pilot who allegedly participated in the dropping of germ-filled canisters or

rats onto the Chinese and North Korean armies. Initially refusing to admit to such wild

accusations, Schwable was identified by the Chinese as a “reactionary” prisoner. This label

brought the hell of intense torture and starvation upon him in an attempt to re-label him as

“progressive.”29

After five months of living in what Schwable himself described as “degradation,

humiliation, intimidation, mental poisoning, and physical, moral, and spiritual oppression,” the

tough Marine finally was broken.30

Studies have found that 15 percent of POWs actively

collaborated with the communists by providing information on other POWs, making false

confessions to war crimes (much like Schwable), or writing propaganda articles for the enemy.31

In addition to Schwable’s narrative there is also the story of the twenty-one American

POWs who chose to stay with the captors following the war. The twenty-one is the most extreme

27

Peters, 230.

28 David G. Williams, “Menticide in the Court of Public Opinion,” http://www.h-

net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=34232 (accessed March 10, 2015).

29 Ibid.

30

Ibid. 31

William Lindsay White, The Captives of Korea: An Unofficial White Paper on the Treatment of War Prisoners (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1957), 262-63 .

11

case of American POW collaboration during the war.32

While POWs who collaborated but still

desired to return to the United States, were met with harsh criticism, but still able to re-enter

civilian life (to varying degrees of success), the twenty-one had completely bought in to the

captors’ desires and refused a return to a “capitalist and imperialist” lifestyle that they had

previously lived in. The reasons for refusal of repatriation by the twenty-one generally falls into

one of four categories: fear of reprisal upon returning to the United States for aiding their

captors, racial issues within America, meeting women in China, and genuinely accepting the

communist system.33

Those of the 21 who aided their captors often did so with two

consequences: favorable treatment for themselves and harsher treatments for those they

condemned, evidenced by nonrepatriation Claude Batchelor’s claim: “Otho [Bell’s] chief reason

for staying behind was not so much from political reasons as from fear.”34

Black nonrepatriation

Clarence Adams cited race as his primary reason for staying with his captors. He claimed that the

communist system was free of the racial discrimination found in the United States. Other

nonrepatriations met women in China whom they eventually married and were often the most

likely of the twenty-one to request repatriation later. Finally, there were those who genuinely

accepted the communist system such as James Veneris who became a follower of communism in

Peking and never repatriated to the United States.35

In 1955 three of the nonrepatriations

32 For comparison 20,000 North Korean and Chinese POWs refused repatriation following the peace

negotioations.

33 Adam J. Zweiback, “The 21 Turncoat GIs: Nonrepatriations and the Political Culture of the

Korean War," http://www.koreacoldwar.org/reports/21gis.html (accessed March 15, 2015). 34

Virginia Pasley, 21 Stayed: The Story of the American GIs Who Chose Communist China, Who They Were and Why They Stayed (New York: Ferrar Publishing, 1955), 87.

35 Zweiback.

12

published a book titled Thinking Soldiers to explain their reasoning for choosing to stay with

their captors.36

Reports of the actions of collaborator POWs gradually filtered back to the United States

through either propaganda releases by the communists or through reports filed by released

POWs. Both the United States government and public were infuriated that American soldiers

would “so easily” give up on the great principles of American democracy and follow the devilish

communists. The fact that many of the American POWs were able to resist the physical and

mental assault of the North Koreans and Chinese also greatly contributed to the frustration of the

government and public. One theory that emerged was that the men that gave in were simply not

masculine enough and were lacking the “emotional and physical toughness” required to fight off

desires to make the torture stop.37

Writers in the United States took this view and utilized it in the

immediate years following the conclusion of the war as the Cold War intensified with the

expansion of nuclear weaponry. Eugene Kinkead, editor and writer for The New Yorker, with the

support of the United States military conducted research on the causes of POW collaboration.

Kinkead published two articles titled “The Study of Something New in History” (1957) and

“Have We Let Our Sons Down?” (1959) in The New Yorker. Kinkead concluded that, due to the

feminization and degradation of American society, US soldiers could not withstand the same

harsh conditions that their communist counterparts could. 38

Kinkead also argued in his book In

Every War but One (1959) that the Korean War POWs were the first in the history of the United

States not to maintain a high level of honor during captivity, especially compared to the brave

36 Richard Joseph Faillace Jr., “Prisoners of Cold War: Soviet and United States Exploitation of American

Korean War Prisoners, 1950-1956” (PhD dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 2000), 11.

37 Ibid., 6.

38

Ibid., 9.

13

soldiers that survived four years in Japanese captivity. Kinkead claimed that the treatment of the

POWs was not unbearably harsh therefore there was no reason for capitulation to the demands of

the communists.39

Much like the public, the United States government was angered by the reports of

collaboration. As soon as POWs were returned to the control of the UN forces they were

questioned about a variety of topics relating to their imprisonment by UN appointed officials.40

The first topic generally covered was the status of still missing POWs in order to determine if the

communists were lying about the deaths of certain prisoners in order to keep them in captivity.

Next, the former POWs were asked about the atrocities the actions of the enemy in order to bring

about proper international action against the communists. Finally, the freed POWs were

questioned about the actions of their fellow soldiers during captivity.41

The findings were

gathered by UN officials in a report on Operation Little Switch focused specifically on the

actions of collaborators and the actions of the communists against POWs.42

The Prisoner of War

Working Group (PWG) and United States Army were initially highly critical of collaborators

and intended to pursue courts-martial of those accused of aiding the enemy. Findings reports

created during Operation Little Switch showed that almost all American POWs had provided

information to the enemy, but generally the information was false or unimportant to the enemy’s

goals.43

By the conclusion of the conflict of the 7,140 men captured by the Chinese and North

39 Ibid., 10-11.

40

Doyle, 29.

41 James Angus MacDonald Jr., The Problems of US Marine Corps Prisoners of War In Korea (Washington,

DC: History and Museums Headquarters, 1988), 227.

42 Ibid., 228.

14

Koreans, only 192 had committed serious offenses against fellow soldiers.44

Originally there

were forty-seven total courts-martial proposed against former POWs however, only fourteen

were brought to actual trial. Those convicted faced prison sentences, usually around ten years.45

Despite the harsh criticism directed at the former POWs of the Korean War as a whole it

was not the first time that POWs were viewed negatively by the United States. Union POWs in

the Civil War were required by reunion event organizers to provide their name as well as the

conditions of the capture and release. If the swore allegiance to the Confederacy, former POWs

could not join reunion groups and generally were looked upon with scorn by their fellow

veterans.46

The former Civil War POWs also met hostility from civilians. Meetings of those who

had not sworn allegiance to the Confederacy were often subject to criticism from civilians with

one individual asking, “Are they to advertise your wounds and sufferings?” showing callousness

from those who had not experienced the same torment.47

The opinions of the public and the American government soon changed as the nation

sped towards the 1960s. Multiple Korean War POWs began to publish memoirs about their

experiences during captivity, painting a more accurate picture of the harshness of communist

captivity. This in turn immediately discredited claims of humane treatment by early authors such

as Kinkead. Academics also began to attack the messages of Kinkead’s In Every War but One as

the United States received reports of brutality by Vietnamese captors during the Vietnam War.

43

Ibid., 230.

44 Ibid., 231.

45

Ibid., 229.

46 Brian Matthew Jordan, Marching Home: Union Veterans and Their Unending Civil War (New York:

Liveright Publishing, 2014), 142. 47

Ibid., 145.

15

Due to the Vietnam War the public and academia were forced to reconsider the treatment of the

Korean War POWs. They decided that POWs had indeed suffered to an unimaginable degree,

alleviating the accusations of treason that came with the reports of collaboration. Earlier, the

1964 release of The Manchurian Candidate affirmed that some actions of captive Americans had

been outside of their control. The film highlights (and at points overly dramatizes) the power of

Chinese and North Korean brainwashing techniques. American Raymond Shaw, despite being an

honest, good soldier was brainwashed into assassinating the president of the United States by the

communists.48

Similar to the public, the United States government soon softened its stance on the

collaboration of Korean War POWs. A report delivered to the Secretary of Defense in 1955 by

the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War stated: “The prisoner of war situation

resulting from the Korean War has received a great deal of adverse publicity. As it is stated in

our account, much of that adverse publicity was due to lack of information and consequent

misconceptions in regard to the problem.”49

The United States government also took steps to

insulate itself from another possible POW collaboration crisis. President Dwight D. Eisenhower

issued Executive Order #10631, commonly known as the Code of Conduct for Members of the

Armed Forces of the United States (1955) in order to provide soldiers with specific instructions

on how to behave in captivity.50

The Code of Conduct set forth by Eisenhower is still found in

the armed forces today.

48 The Manchurian Candidate (MGM Pictures, directed by John Frankenheimer, 1962; Beverly Hills, CA:

MGM Pictures, 2004.)

49 MacDonald, 230.

16

The issue of Korean War POWs continues to this day. The United States government is

determined to ensure the release of any men held in prison camps. In 2011, the United States

House of Representatives of the 112th

Congress agreed on Resolution 376: “Calling for the

Repatriation of POW/MIAs and Abductees from the Korean War.” The resolution recognizes

there are South Korean prisoners of war and civilian abductees from the Korean War who are

still alive in North Korea and who want to be repatriated, takes note of the U.S.-North Korean

agreement of October 20, 2011, on resuming operations to search for and recover remains of

American POW/MIAs, calls upon the U.S. government to continue to explore the possibility that

there could be American POW/MIAs still alive inside North Korea, and recommends that the

United States and South Korea jointly investigate reports of sightings of American POW/MIAs,

encourages North Korea to repatriate American and South Korean POWs, and calls upon North

Korea to: (1) admit to the abduction of more than 100,000 South Korean civilians and reveal the

status of the abductee; and (2) agree to family reunions and repatriation of the abductees.51

House Resolution 376 shows there is continuing concern for Americans that may be in captivity

60 years later.

The unique conditions of the Korean War created a brutality for American POWs that

had never been encountered in the nation’s history. The clashing of contrasting worldviews

including an Asian-centered racialized hierarchy vs. a white-center racialized hierarchy and

50

Commonly recognized as “name, rank, and serial number,” the Code of Conduct actually contains nine points including a soldier’s duty to: defend of the United States and its way of life, avoid surrender and to evade capture at any cost short of death, try to escape if captured, reject favors from the enemy, help fellow prisoners stay alive, avoid collaborating with the enemy, avoid statements or writing that discredit the United States or its allies, maintain personal responsibility for all actions, trust the U.S. government to care for loved ones and work toward release.

“Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States,” Executive Order 10631 (1955).

51 “Calling for the Repatriation of POW/MIAs and Abductees from the Korean War,” H.R. 376, 112th Cong,

(2011).

17

communism vs. capitalism caused the North Korean and Chinese communists to treat American

POWs inhumanely. Due to the brutal treatment, some POWs collaborated with the enemy by

providing information, providing false confessions regarding American war crimes, and

accepting communist ideas. As stories regarding the collaboration reached the United States,

both the government and public reacted with disgust and anger before understanding the

complete situation the POWs had endured. Approaching and during the Vietnam War, the

American public and government became more sympathetic to the plight of the POWs. In 1955

President Eisenhower issued Executive Order #10631, instituting the United States Soldier’s

Code of Conduct in order to prevent future issues regarding POW collaboration. Matthew

Ridgeway described the treatment of American POWs in the Korean War as “a studied and

calculated course of criminal misconduct.” Though he was referencing the actions of the

communists, the same sentence could be applied to the experiences of the POWs upon returning

home.

18

Works Consulted

Books:

Bassett, Richard M., and Lewis H. Carlson. And the Wind Blew Cold: The Story of American

POWs in North Korea. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2011.

Biderman, Albert. March to Calumny: The Story of American POWs in the Korean War. New

York: Macmillan, 1963.

Carlson, Lewis H. Remembered Prisoners of a Forgotten War: An Oral History of the Korean

War POWs. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002.

Carruthers, Susan. Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing. Los Angeles:

University of California Press, 2009.

Cumings, Bruce. Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953. Seattle:

University of Washington Press, 1983.

Deane, Philip. I Was a Captive in Korea. WW Norton: New York, 1953.

Doyle, Robert C. Voices from Captivity: Interpreting the American POW Narrative. Lawrence:

University Press of Kansas, 1994.

Kinkead, Eugene. In Every War but One. WW Norton: New York, 1959.

Lambert, Frank. The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World. New York:

Hill and Wang, 2005.

Lech, Raymond B. Broken Soldiers. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000.

Jordan, Brian Matthew. Marching Home: Union Veterans and Their Unending Civil War. New

York: Liveright Publishing, 2014.

Pasley Virginia. 21 Stayed: The Story of the American GIs Who Chose Communist China, Who

They Were and Why They Stayed. New York: Ferrar Publishing, 1955.

Peters, Richard, and Xiaobing Li. Voices from the Korean War. Lexington: University Press

of Kentucky, 2004.

Springer, Paul J. America’s Captives: Treatment of POWs from the Revolutionary War to the

War on Terror. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010.

White, William Lindsay. The Captives of Korea: An Unofficial White Paper on the Treatment of

War Prisoners. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1957.

Websites:

19

Galdwin, Lee A. “American POWs on Japanese Ships Take a Voyage into Hell.”

http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2003/winter/hell-ships-1.html (accessed

April 12, 2015).

Segal, Henry A. “Observations on Prisoners of War Immediately Following t\Their Release.”

http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/korea/recad2/ch9-3.html (accessed February 22,

2015).

“Stigma and Astigmatism.”

http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/The%20Problems%20of%20U.S.%20Ma

rine%20Corps%20Prisoners%20of%20War%20in%20Korea%20%20PCN%2019000411

200_3.pdf (accessed February 20, 2015).

“US Senate Report No. 848 on Atrocities.” http://b-29s-over-korea.com/POWs-In-Korean-

War/POWs-In-Korean-War_1.html (accessed February 20, 2015).

Williams, David G. “Menticide in the Court of Public Opinion.” http://www.h-

net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=34232 (accessed March 10, 2015).

Zweiback, Adam J. “The 21 Turncoat GIs: Nonrepatriations and the Political Culture of the

Korean War." http://www.koreacoldwar.org/reports/21gis.html (accessed March 15,

2015).

Articles:

Neufeld, Jacob, and George Watson Jr. “A Brief Survey of POWs in Twentieth Century Wars.”

Air Power History 60 (Summer 2013): 34-45.

Sutker Patricia, and Albert Allain Jr. “Assessment of PTSD and Other Mental Disorders in

World War II and Korean Conflict POW Survivors.” Psychological Assessment 8

(March 1996): 18-26.

Sutker, Patricia, Daniel K. Winstead, Harry Z. Galina, and Albert N. Allain . “Assessment of

Long-Term Psychosocial Sequelae Among POW Survivors of the Korean Conflict.”

Journal of Personality Assessment 54 (Spring 1990): 170-80.

Tovy, Tal. “Manifest Destiny in POW Camps: The US Army Reeducation Program during the

Korean War.” The Historian 73 (Fall 2011): 503-25.

Dissertations/Theses:

Allapat, George K. “The Legal Implications of the Repatriation of War Prisoners in Relation to

the Korean Armistice and in View of the Division of Korea.” PhD dissertation, St. Louis

University, 1958.

Cooper, Bernarr. “Radio Broadcasting to Chinese and Korean POWs: A Historical Analysis.”

PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1956.

20

Faillace, Richard Joseph, Jr. “Prisoners of Cold War: Soviet and United States Exploitation of

American Korean War Prisoners, 1950-1956.” PhD dissertation, Oklahoma State

University, 2000.

Friedrich, Alexandra M. “POWs: Victims of the Cold War? A Comparative Analysis of the

Prisoner of War Issue in the Korean and Vietnam War Armistice and Peace

Negotiations.” Master’s Thesis, University of New Orleans, 1993.

Moakley, G.S. “US Army Code of Conduct Training: Let the POWs Tell Their Stories.”

Master’s Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1976.

Scott, Craig. “UNC and the United Nations: Nonforcible Repatriation, 1951-1953.” Master’s

Thesis, San Diego State University, 1986.

Sherrell, Chandler C. “A Historical Analysis of United States Prisoner of War/Missing in Action

Repatriation and Remains Recovery.” Master’s Thesis, US Army Command and General

Staff College, 1998.

Witherspoon, John A. “International Law and Practice Concerning Prisoners of War during the

Korean Conflict, 1950-1954.” PhD dissertation, Duke University, 1968.

Young, Charles S. “Name, Rank, and Serial Number: Korean War POWs and the Politics of

Limited War.” PhD dissertation, Rutgers University, 2003.

Government Documents:

“Calling for the Repatriation of POW/MIAs and Abductees from the Korean War.” H.R. 376,

112th

Cong. (2011).

“Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States.” Executive Order

10631. (1955).

Film:

The Manchurian Candidate. MGM Pictures. Directed by John Frankenheimer. 1962; Beverly

Hills, CA: MGM Pictures, 2004.

I pledge my honor:______________________________________________