F-117A

STEALTHFIGHTER

Jane'sHOW TO FLY AND FIGHT IN THE

F-117A

STEALTHFIGHTER

JON LAKE

HarperCollinsPublishers

F- I I 7A

HarperCollinsPublishers77-85 Fulham Palace RoadHammersmithLondon W6 8JB

First Published in Great Britain byHarperCollinsPublishers 1997

1 3 5 7 9 1 0 8 6 4 2

Copyright © Jon Lake 1997

ISBN 0 00 470109 8

Cover painting: lain WyllieColour illustrations: John Ridyard and Chris Davey (3-view)Editor: Ian DairyDesign: Rod TeasdaleProduction Manager: David Lennox

Colour reproduction by ColourscanPrinted in Italy by Rotolito

All rights reserved. No part of this publicationmay be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted in any form or by anymeans, electronic, mechanical, photocopyingor otherwise, without the prior writtenpermission of the publishers.

F- I I 7A

CONTENTS6

INTRODUCTION

8WHY STEALTH?

14

SECRET STRIKE FORCE

32FRONTLINE SERVICE

46FLYING TODAY'S MISSION

88A FUTURE FOR STEALTH?

F- I I 7A

INTRODUCTION:THE ELITE SURPRISEOf all the pilots in the US armed forces,those who fly the Lockheed F-l 17 areperhaps the most justified in thinking ofthemselves as an elite. Although it wasconceived, designed and delivered at theheight of the Cold War, when the USAFprocured its aircraft in hundreds, only 59production examples of the F-1 17 wereever built. The aircraft was conceived as a'Silver Bullet', a highly specialized precisionattack weapon capable of flying missionstoo difficult and too dangerous for anyother airplane in the inventory.

Below: The F-117A istoday openly flown bythe 49th Fighter Wingfrom Holloman AFB,New Mexico, close tothe White Sands NationalMonument, a far cryfrom its secretbeginnings.

The aircraft was primarily intended to act as asurprise attacker, a secret strategic asset readyfor use in some covert mission ordereddirectly by the President, perhaps one wheredeniability would be useful. Typical projectedmissions included attacks against individualterrorist leaders, or attacks on C3 (Command,Control & Communication) sites during a

hostage rescue mission. Alternatively, in areal war with the Warsaw Pact, the F-l 1 7 Acould have flown as a pathfinder, attackingkey air-defense sites to allow conventionalbombers and fighter bombers to follow upwith their own attacks. This would make theF-11 7A an effective force multiplier, makingconventional fighter bombers moreproductive and less vulnerable. Either way,only a handful of these versatile aircraft wereneeded.Pilots for this unique machine are themselvesalso something of a rare breed. Only a smallnumber of pilots have ever qualified to fly theF-11 7, and each has been assigned aconsecutive 'Bandit number' to mark hisachievement. To preserve security, Banditnumbers were secret, and began at 150 forservice pilots, with numbers from 100 for testpilots. In the earliest days of the program, F-11 7 pilots were assigned to an aircraft whosevery existence was a closely guarded secret,and they could not reveal which aircraft theyflew, even to their own families: they lived astrange nocturnal existence, isolated from therest of the world. Today the existence and

INTRODUCTION

mission of the F-117 is known, but theaircraft is still surrounded by great secrecy.You need special authorization even to goclose enough to the airplane to touch itsstrange black skin, and many of itstechnologies and capabilities remain veryhighly classified.The F-117A has been seen in the staticdisplays of a number of airshows in the USAand even in the UK and in Europe. Buteverywhere it has appeared, its groundcrewhave erected barriers at least 18 feet from itswingtips nose and tail, and armed guards arethere to ensure that no-one goes any closer

than that. The pilot might stand by thebarrier, basking in the limelight, signingposters and programs for small boys andanswering simple questions with easy charm.But start getting technical and he'll move on,or parrot a rehearsed answer which actuallymeans nothing at all. He certainly wouldn'tbe willing to confirm publicly most of whatis written in the pages that follow, though95% of this information has been providedby program insiders. The US Air Force willnot let the public anywhere near the F-117.This book puts you in its cockpit and lets youride along as it flies a typical mission.

Above: Hal Farley wasthe pilot of the first F-117 (then known simplyby its Senior Trendcodename) for its maidenflight on 18 June 1981.He has since been thedriving force behind theaircraft's flight testprogramme. His unique'Bandit Number' reflectshis unparallelledimportance to theprogramme. He is'Bandit 117'.

F- I I 7A

SECRET ORIGINS:WHY STEALTH?

American experience in the Vietnam war andIsraeli experience in the Yom Kippur warconclusively demonstrated the danger posedby increasingly sophisticated Soviet SAMsand air-defense radar. Intelligence sourcesindicated that the USSR would soon bedeploying advanced interceptors withimproved lookdown/shootdown capability.The SAM-5 was capable of reaching 125,000ft and could be nuclear-tipped, taking careof any minor aiming errors. In the 1973 YomKippur war, Israel lost some 109 aircraft in18 days, these falling to second-best exportSoviet SAMs manned by ill-trained Egyptianand Syrian crews. One answer to theincreasing vulnerability of tactical aircraftwas to dedicate forces to electronic warfare,jamming enemy radar, or locating anddirectly attacking air-defense systems. Butexperience in Vietnam and the Middle Eastseemed to indicate that the allocation ofresources to EW (Electronic Warfare) andSEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences)was unable to halt a growing loss rate andthat there had to be another, better answer.

The far-sighted suggested that one suchanswer could lie in the reduction of the radarcross section (RCS) of tactical aircraft. Thiswould decrease the effective range of enemyradars, potentially to a point at whichinterception would be impossible before thebomber reached its target. Lockheed madeplans to resurrect its D-21 reconnaissancedrone as the basis of a manned or unmannedattack aircraft, this vehicle having enjoyed thelowest RCS recorded to that date.

In 1975 the USAF held a Radar Camouflage.Symposium at Wright-Patterson AFB, andsoon afterwards, DARPA (Defense AdvancedResearch Projects Agency) invited Northrop,McDonnell Douglas and three otheraerospace companies to design proof-of-concept stealth aircraft in a competitionfunded in 1976. The winner would receive acontract to build two demonstrator aircraft.

Above left: A model ofthe original 'Have Blue'hangs in Lockheed'sanechoic chamber, duringearly tests of radar crosssection (RCS).

Below: Extensive use wasmade of sub-scalemodels for accuratemeasurement of RCS.Much of the work had tobe carried out by night.

SECRET ORIGINS

Remarkably, Lockheed were not invited tosubmit a design, not least because its existingStealth experience (the SR-71 reconnaissanceaircraft, the D-21 drone and the U-2, all withfeatures to reduce RCS) was so secret that no-one actually knew their capabilities.Lockheed were able to get CIA permission toreveal SR-71 and D-21 data to DARPA, andthis was impressive enough for the companyto be allowed to participate in thecompetition. It is said that the SR-71, the sizeof the B-58 Hustler bomber, had a radarcross-section similar to that of the Piper Cub,about 100 times smaller than that of thecontemporary F-14 fighter!

Lockheed won the competition in April1976 with a faceted design, which proved tentimes less visible to radar than that of itsnearest rival, Northrop. Scale models of bothwere extensively tested on the radar ranges atWhite Sands, where it was discovered thatboth had lower radar cross-sections than thepoles on which they were mounted! TheLockheed design's RCS was calculated asbeing equivalent to that of a small ballbearing, and senior Lockheed personnellobbied air-force officers and politicians byrolling equivalent ball bearings across theirdesks, saying 'That's how big our new fighterbomber looks on radar!'.

Above: The Have Blueprototypes were notdeclassified until longafter the production F-117A. Only a handful ofphotos of the tinyprototypes have everbeen released.

Technicians makeadjustments to a pole-mounted RCS model.Designing a pole with alower RCS than the -F-117 was hugely difficult!

RCS tests could bedisrupted by the tiniestblemish on a model'sskin, from insects to bird-excrement.

F- I I 7A

THE XST PROGRAM

Above: The XSTs and the early YF-117As were shipped from Burbank to the secrettest facility at Groom Lake at dead of night, aboard USAF C-5s.

When the Lockheed design's RCS was validated the wholeprogram was reclassified Top Secret - Special Access Required, andAir Force Systems Command took over the program from DARPA, toensure secrecy. Lockheed built two sub-scale prototypes (known asXSTs, or Experimental Survivable Test-beds) under the program name'Have Blue'. The aircraft had no USAF serials, and no DoDdesignations, and remained a completely secret project. These

prototypes were quite deliberately built lightlyand cheaply, using off-the-shelf componentswherever possible, including J85 engines. Thefirst prototype's role was to prove that afaceted aircraft could have acceptablehandling qualities, while the second woulddemonstrate RCS.

The XSTs were built and test-flown inconditions of enormous secrecy. No workerwas allowed to be left alone with a blueprint,and only a handful had any idea what theywere working on. When the aircraft werecompleted, they were shipped by C-5 Galaxyto the top-secret flight test facility at GroomLake. Here the first aircraft made its maidenflight on 1 December 1977. During this andall subsequent flights, all workers involvedwith other projects, and many of thoseworking on XST itself, were locked into themess hall. No-one who was not specificallycleared to do so was allowed to even see theaircraft. This rule was so strictly enforced thatthe flight test team's coffee mugs (whichshowed just the nose of a cartoon version ofthe XST, peeking from a cloud) fell foul of

GENESIS OF THE F-117These diagrams trace the evolution of the Stealth Fighter from its origins as the sub-scaleHave Blue, which represented the optimum 'Hopeless Diamond' shape to prove the LO concept.

SECRET ORIGINS

Right: The prototype YF-117A takes shape at theSkunk works. The facetednosecone has yet to beadded, and the engineintakes and exhausts arecompletely missing. Thetype's conventional alloyconstruction is apparent.

Far Right: The woodenmock-up of the YF-117takes shape at Lockheed'sfamous 'Skunk Works'.This allowed systems tobe accurately positioned.

security and had to be used only in the presence of cleared personnel,and then locked securely away in a safe (not just a locked cupboard,but a steel-doored, combination-locked safe).

The XST remains an extremely secret aircraft. Both prototypes werelost in accidents, and photos of them were not released until longafter the production F-11 7 A itself emerged from the secret world. Thismay be because the XST's external configuration represented a closerapproximation of the ideal 'Hopeless Diamond' stealth shape workedout by Lockheed, with no compromises for production or weaponssystem performance. It is likely that a full-scale XST would bestealthier than the F-11 7 as actually built.

Lockheed received an order to build a production version of theXST under the program name Senior Trend. The contract was signedon 1 November 1978, and stipulated that the aircraft would have the

same RCS as the original XST wooden polemodel, and that the first must fly by July1980. The production aircraft would be afighter-sized airplane carrying two laser-guided bombs. Five would be built initially,with twenty more to follow. Lockheed missedthe contractual first flight deadline and lost$6 m on the first five aircraft. Fortunatelyorders totalled 29 aircraft, then 59, and thecompany made $80 m on the program addingin $30 m of free improvements to avoidcharges of excess profit! The pre-productionSenior Trend first flew on 18 June 1981.

SENIOR TREND

F-1 1 7A FIRST PROTOTYPE

PRODUCTION F-117A

F- I I 7A

NAMING THE BLACK JETThe production Senior Trend aircraft is today officially named as theLockheed F-117A Stealth Fighter. This is a misleading epithet whichtakes little account of the fact that this is perhaps the aircraft in theUS inventory least capable of any useful air-to-air (fighter) role. Likethe F-111 before it, the F-117 is a bomber in all but name, and thefighter tag is a political convenience and an indication of theaircraft's size as much as anything else.

The aircraft went unnamed for much of itsearly history, and there have been aconfusion of designations and nicknamesapplied to the aircraft over the years. Thename Project Harvey (after the invisible rabbitin the Jimmy Stewart film of the same name)was probably unofficial, while Hollywoodalso provided a nickname used by the earlyflight test team - 'Elliott', or 'Pete's Dragon'. Itis still uncertain as to whether the COSIRSacronym (COvert Survivable In weatherReconniassance/Strike) was applied to the F-11 7 A, or whether this was another stealthaircraft program which has remained 'black'ever since. When Lockheed gained a contractto build five FSD (Full Scale Developmentphase) examples of a production derivative ofHave Blue (otherwise the XST, orexperimental survivable test-bed) the aircraftwere known by the Senior Trend programname. Senior Trend was itself a completelyrandom codename, since although the Senior

Below: Behindcamouflage netting,Lockheed techniciansand engineers preparethe first Senior Trend forits maiden flight. Withpanels removed, theengines can be seen,together with their jetpipes, which flattenedinto broad, flat slots,hidden by the upturnedtrailing edge.

prefix is a standard reconnaissance codeword, the second word in the name wasselected randomly by computer.

The first five FSD aircraft used Scorpion callsigns, and were often known as Scorpions,after a Baja Scorpion successfully penetratedall the security precautions to show up on theprogram manager's desk! Aviation engineersand pilots are not always the world's bestzoologists or entomologists and soon gotmixed up as to what species the aircraft was.The name 'Cockroach' was soon usedinstead, especially by the less reverentialservice pilots. The new name stuck, since theaircraft actually looked like one! In the earlydays, a number of names and designationswere used unofficially, including Nighthawk(which was nearly adopted as the type'sofficial name), Ghost and Spectre, as well asthe simple and straightforward Black Jet usedby pilots. Outside the Stealth community,there have also been nicknames. Someapplied the designation F-19, seeing a gapbetween the US Navy's F/A-18 and thestillborn F-20. In fact, Northrop requested theF-20 designation as a marketing ploy for theirF-5G, and the gap was left deliberately. Thisproved extremely handy for the USAF, whocould honestly deny the existence of any F-1 9Stealth aircraft. For a while, after the aircraft

SECRET ORIGINS

came out of the black world, some elementsof the press called it the Wobblin Goblin,based on a misunderstood fragment ofdescription applied to the aircraft's handlingcharacteristics before the stabilityaugmentation kicked in during one specificearly test maneuver.

The number 11 7 was used before theaircraft became the F-11 7, the number beingentered in lieu of an aircraft type on officialforms and maintenance records. There havebeen suggestions that the designation wasused to fit in with the codenames and call-sign type designations used by Groom Lakeand Tonopah-based Soviet aircraft. The MiG-1 7 (Have Drill) was reportedly the F-11 3, theMiG-21 (Have Doughnut) was the F-114,while other types, including the MiG-23 andSu-7, took other designations. One story hasit that the F-11 7A designation was reportedlyadopted officially after Lockheed printed the

aircraft's Dash One flight manual with F-117Aon its cover. There was supposedly anunwillingness to re-print the document, eventhough the officially favored designation wassaid to have been F-19!

One thing no-one called the aircraft wasthe 'Stealth Fighter', since the very wordStealth had been specifically and deliberatelyclassified as top secret, and even behindclosed doors at Tonopah or within the designoffices which produced the aircraft, use of theS-word was taboo. Things change, however,and once the aircraft's existence wasacknowledged, the word stealth becameacceptable. So officially, today, the one-timeSenior Trend is the Lockheed F-117A StealthFighter. Although the F-117 bears the'Lockheed' label, the aircraft was actually theproduct of a small and discrete division of theCalifornian aerospace giant, the so-called'Skunk Works'.

Above: With extendedleading edges, and withits port wingtip paintedred, this is the first YF-117A, identifiable by itscentreline testinstrumentation boomand symmetrical pilots.The leading edgedogtooth was added latein the aircraft's career inan effort to improve takeoff and landingperformance, andparticularly to reducelanding speeds.

F- I I 7A

SECRET STRIKE FORCE:

INTO SERVICEToday, any publication listing the order ofbattle of the US Air Force will openly andhappily tell you that the F-l I7A is flown bythe 49th TFW (Tactical Fighter Wing) atHolloman AFB, New Mexico, as part of AirCombat Command. With no two-seat F-1 17version, its pilots tend to come fromoperational tours on other frontlinetactical fighter types, not direct fromtraining. There is still a requirement for apotential F-117A pilot to have 700 flyinghours before conversion. This level ofopenness relating to the Stealth Fighter is avery new phenomenon, and is far from thesituation which pertained for the first sixyears of the aircraft's service career, whenits very existence was secret.

In the early days, the F-117A was seen as anairborne equivalent to the US Army's SpecialForces, or to the Navy's SEALs, with a covert'smokeless gun' role, which might includestrikes against terrorists or rogue nations onthe direct orders of the President. There wereplans for using the aircraft in larger, full-scalewars, but these were even more secret. Undera plan reportedly known as 'Downshift 02',for instance, it was envisaged that F-11 7As

Below: Wearing ED (forEdwards) tailcodes, theF-117A combined testforce are seen high overCalifornia. The second,third and fourthprototypes are seen withNo.831, a much lateraircraft used for test andtrials duties.

might 'take out' the Dacha of the SovietPresident. Complete secrecy was felt to beessential, not only to ensure surprise, but alsobecause some operations might be deniable.The very existence of the aircraft was notadmitted, and its operating unit and locationhad complex cover stories. While the USAFrequirement stood at a single squadron of'silver bullet' F-117As, the aircraft could haveremained based at the super-secret test facilityat Groom Lake, and might even havefollowed the U-2 and A-11 in being operatedby the CIA. But when it became clear that awhole wing of Stealth Fighters would beacquired (largely due to Congressionalpressure for a wing-strength unit), it wasincreasingly obvious that they would requirea separate base. Existing airforce facilitieswere too well known, and too open for thenew aircraft, and the decision was taken todevelop an entirely new facility. For a while,there were apparently plans to base asquadron permanently in the UK (foroperations in Western and Eastern Europe, theMiddle East and even the USSR), with asecond squadron to be based in Korea foroperations in the Pacific. The third squadronwould have remained in the USA for trainingand contingency operations in other areas.There were some plans to deploy the aircraftoverseas aboard C-5 Galaxies, with theirwings removed, but this was soon realized to

SECRET STRIKE FORCE

be impractical, because re-assembly and re-application of RAM was too time-consuming.There was always a degree of discomfortabout basing a secret aircraft at a USAF baseoverseas, particularly in the UK, where everyairfield is closely watched by dozens ofaircraft spotters, and where no airfield isreally 'off the beaten track' even to the extentthat major airfields in the USA often are.Macrahanish was reportedly examined as apossible base for the F-11 7, but in the end, itwas decided that overseas operating locationswould have to be just that, to preservesecrecy, and the search for a CON US(Continental United States) base for theStealth Fighter force continued.

Above: The first prototypewore the Christian namesof test pilots Farley,Anderson and Fergusonon its canopy rail.

Left and below: The firstprototype was re-paintedwith a disruptivecamouflage after its firstflight in an effort todisguise its facets. Thesmall vertical fins werereplaced after Flight No.7.

F- I I 7A

HIDDEN

Deep in the Nevada desert, in a remote partof the Nellis AFB ranges, lay the runway forthe Tonopah Test Range, one of manydisused runways and airfields within theranges. The 6,000-ft asphalt runway wasoriginally built by Sandia NationalLaboratories during the 1950s to supportnuclear weapons tests: the location hadpotential for improvement and expansion,while the only public land overlooking thebase was many miles away. The airfield wassubjected to a three-phase improvement andconstruction program.

Below: Armed guardssurround an F-117A as itmakes ready to taxyfrom its 'Canyon'somewhere onTonopah's darkenedramp. Until theprogramme was madepublic, F-ir7Asoperated only by night.

Under Phase I, from October 1979, the basewas reconstructed and expanded. Therunway was extended, and taxiways, aconcrete apron, a large maintenance hangarand a propane storage tank were addedstraight away. The USAF purchased 16 largefully air-conditioned mobile homes for abargain $1.5 m from Chevron Oil, and thesewere used as dormitories while permanentaccommodation was built.

Under Phase II the USAF added an extrataxiway, a new control tower, a 42,000-fthangar, a parts warehouse, a dining hall, awater storage tank, and extensive fuel storage

Below right: Tonopah'sgroundcrew used low-intensity 'wands' toguide the Stealth

!(>; fighters from theiranonymous corrugatedshelters, or 'canyons'.

Right: Access tosensitive areas of thesecret base atTonopah wascontrolled by palm-print scanners, withdifferent categories ofpersonnel allowed intodifferent areas of thebase, and wearingcolour-coded badges.

tanks. Phase III saw the runway furtherextended to 1 2,000 ft (a 2,000-ft increase),and further extensions were made to the ramfand taxiways. The runway gained arrestergear, and new navigation aids were installed.More fuel storage was provided, together witfLOX (Liquid Oxygen) storage, a fire stationand the first individual aircraft hangars toaccommodate the first 20 production aircraft.Permanent dormitories at last replaced themobile homes, which were relegated tostorage units until 1985, when all but onewere removed. The remaining Chevron traileiwas the TOCACL (Tonopah Officers' Club an<Chinese Laundry) which was equipped with ;bar, a big screen TV, pool and shuffleboardtables. By 1985 the pounding laundrymachines had been moved elsewhere, andthe trailer was given a much needed facelift

Above: Tonopah wasexpanded dramatically toaccomodate the F-117Aforce as it built up tobecome a Wing-strengthunit. The runway is alignedroughly South-East/North-West (300° and 120").

and improvement program of its own, butremained the after-duty hangout for the BlackJet pilots.

The airfield improvement program wascompleted in July 1982. The revitalization ofthe Tonopah Test Range was kept completelysecret, and the money spent was carefullyhidden in the defense budget.

Below: A Tonopah-based F-117A brieflyenters a pool of light as it passes throughdouble gates in the floodlit and heavilyguarded security fences, separating thecentral area of the base from therunway.

F- I I 7A

MYSTERY CORSAIR SQUADRON

It was inevitable that an entirely new unit would be formed tooperate the new aircraft, since to take the identity of an existingFighter Wing would have generated unwelcome questions. "Whathappened to the 4th TFW?" "What is this wing-sized unit atTonopah?". Additionally, the new unit did not need an obviousfrontline combat identity, a secondline test-unit designation fitting infar better with a number of possible cover stories.

Thus the USAF formed the 4450th Test Groupon 15 October 1979, under the pretence thatthe new unit was an A-7 equipped unitoperating in the avionics test role. It wasnominally based at Nellis AFB, Nevada,where its A-7 aircraft were occasionally seen,though in reality, the unit conducted most ofits operations from Tonopah. Although theexistence of the 4450th Test Group was not initself a secret, the USAF often used themeaningless designation A-Unit to furtherhide the operation. The Group's constituentunits were originally simply numbereddetachments of the 4450th TG, but they soonbecame numbered squadrons (flying andground-based) and had similar, randomlyallocated alphabetical alternative designationsbetween B-Unit and Z-Unit.

The unit's A-7Ds were used as a cover for

Left: As far as everyoneoutside the Senior Trendprogramme wasconcerned, the 4450thTactical Group was a testand trials unit, nominallybased at Nellis AFB, andequipped solely with thevenerable A-7 Corsair.Known as the SWF(Short Little Ugly F*****;the A-7 was the epitomeof aeronautical beauty bycomparison with theangular F-117A. Used fortraining, liaison anddisinformation, the A-7swere able to visitpotential operatinglocations by day.Significantly theseincluded airfields in theUK, South Korea andJapan.

the F-11 7As, to maintain flight currencybefore the F-11 7As were delivered, andbefore the unit had built up to full strength.The A-7D was also a useful trainer for the F-117 itself, with similar performancecharacteristics. In particular, prospective F-117A pilots practiced flapless landings in theA-7, to prepare themselves for the high-speedflat approach of the F-117. The aircraft wereeven used for miscellaneous test duties,including chase for SLCM firings. A-7 flightoperations began in June 1981, by whichtime Britain's Prime Minister and some seniorRAF officers were being kept fully appraisedof the program's progress, in preparation forRAF participation and for the use of Britishairfields as forward operating bases. Some A-7s operated from Tonopah from thebeginning, and care was taken to leave themoutside the hangars, so that prowling satellite;could see that Tonopah operated nothingmore exciting than some clapped-outCorsairs. These aircraft were nominally basedat Nellis AFB, but wore unique LV (for LasVegas) tailcodes. There is no suggestion thatthis code was ever applied to the F-11 7As,which remained very anonymous-looking

SECRET STRIKE FORCE

until after they emerged from the black world.The 4450th Tactical Group's A-7D Corsair Ms

were used to conduct limited operations frompotential operating locations, to familiarizepilots with bases they might eventually have touse 'for real'. In some cases, the A-7's 'role'was 'leaked'; this 'secret' cover story being thatthe aircraft were testing atomic anti-radardevices. The aircraft often carried black-

painted modified napalm canisters, these beingfitted with a red warning light, a radiationwarning notice and an ominous-looking portlabelled 'reactor cooling filler port'. When A-7Ds equipped with these pods visited Korea,USAF policemen closed the base, surroundingit with machine-gun-armed jeeps, and forcinggroundcrew to lie face down on the ramp asthe mystery A-7s taxied by.

Above: A 4450th TGpilot walks out to his F-117A at Tonopah as duskfalls. Missions wereroutinely carried outfrom inside the aircraftshelters, and not from aflightline, except for thecamera!

F- I I 7A

PILOT CONVERSIONWith an aircraft, a base and an operating unit designation, all thatwas missing was personnel. Since no-one knew about the program,there was no way of attracting volunteers, yet clearly the aircraftwould demand the most highly motivated maintenance personneland pilots. When it came to pilots, the new unit required tacticalfighter pilots with sufficient experience and maturity to be able toadapt to the new aircraft, its unusual role, and the unique need forcomplete confidentiality. Most came from the F-4, F-111 and A-10communities initially. Potential pilots for the program, withoutstanding records and at least 1,000 hours of fighter time, werecarefully screened and those who looked promising were askedwhether they were interested in a job which would involve 'a greatdeal of A-7 flying' but without specifying what or where that jobwas. They were expected to make their decision within five minutes!

Below: Pilots for the F-117A trained with the417th TFTS, previouslyknown as Z-Unit andthen as the 4453rd TES.With no dual-controlledtrainer, F-117A pilotsrelied on groundschooland simulator training toprepare them for theirfirst flight.

Potential squadron commanders andcandidates for other senior flyingappointments were even more carefullyscreened. Every effort was made to appoint'fast-track' high-fliers (known as 'Fast Burners'within the USAF) who were on their way tothe very top, to General rank at least. This, itwas felt, would deliver two key advantages.First, the USAF would soon have a spectrumof senior officers who knew about and

understood the F-117A, and who could thusmake proper use of the force. Second, the F-117A would have some powerful andinfluential friends.

As more pilots joined the program, theselection procedure changed slightly, withStealth pilots themselves being asked torecommend their own acquaintances for theprogram. After selection, pilots were sent tothe Arizona Air National Guard's 162nd TFGfor conversion to the A-7D. Even after the4450th started receiving its F-117As(beginning with 80-0787 on 23 August 1982),pilots could expect to fly the A-7 nearly asoften as they flew the F-117A, and thisremained true for several years. When theyarrived at Nellis AFB, new personnel for the4450th were shown into a secure lecturetheatre, where they were shown a brief silentfilm, in which the extraordinary F-11 7A wasseen emerging from a hangar, taxying to therunway and taking off. This is what you guyswill be working on", the briefing officerwould say; and - to the pilots - "This is whatyou guys will be flying". At this point, the

SECRET STRIKE FORCE

suppliers, security policemen and otherindirectly involved personnel would beushered from the room, while pilots andmaintainers were shown a second, moredetailed, film with an informative soundtrack.

Before the F-117A actually entered servicewith the 4450th, pilots underwent groundschool with Lockheed at Burbank, and werethen rotated through the flight test facility atGroom Lake between 1981 and 1982 wherethey were briefed by Lockheed's test pilots,and where they could sit in the cockpit, andhave the sensors and systems demonstrated.The first Senior Trend arrived at Tonopah on23 August 1982, and the first flight by a TAGpilot was made on 1 5 October 1982. (Thepilot was Major Alton C.Whitley, commanderof the Tonopah-based Detachment 1 whilethe rest of the 4450th TG remained at Nell is,and subsequently commander of the 4452ndTS (Q-Unit), the 'Goat Suckers'). Whitleyreceived a commemorative plaque 'InRecognition of a Significant Event, October15 1982'. He could not tell his wife what thatevent was for eight years!

The first F-11 7As were delivered to Q-Unit,which became the 4452nd TS ('GoatSuckers') in September 1982. Later in theyear, l-Unit (already designated as the 4450thTS, 'Nightstalkers') started to receive F-117s.A-7s were assigned primarily to the 4451 st TS(P-Unit, 'Ghostriders'). The 4453rd TES (Z-Unit, 'Grim Reapers') activated in October1985 and took over the training role. A finalunit was R-Unit, which never received anumerical squadron designation, but whichperformed acceptance testing and local areafamiliarization flying and which parented theflight test detachment of USAF test pilots atGroom Lake and at Tonopah.

The 4450th Test Group gained IOC (InitialOperating Capability) on 28 October 1983,with the delivery of its 14th F-117A. It passedits ORI (Operational Readiness Inspection) inOctober 1984. The second squadron gainedits IOC in the same year. There has neverbeen a twin-stick, two-seat Stealth Fighter,although Lockheed proposed building an F-117 trainer (which would probably havebecome the F-117B) using the hulk of the firstproduction F-117A, which had been writtenoff in a pre-delivery crash. This made pilotconversion a difficult enough process, evenwithout the further complication that allflights (even first flights) had to be made atnight. Fortunately, all F-117 pilots werealready experienced fast jet jockeys, and allhad converted to the A-7 from their previous

type. During their A-7 training, their ability tolearn and absorb information and techniquesquickly was quietly analyzed. Before flyingthe F-11 7A, the pilots would fly the F-15,whose landing characteristics were said to beextremely similar to those of the F-117 itself.

The first group of potential Black Jet pilotsbegan conversion with ten days of intensiveground school, this phase increasing steadilyuntil the textbook and chalkboard phaselasted for several weeks. This was followedby seven sorties in the fixed-base simulator,before the so-called 'Sortie 1' which consistedof two hours going through the checklists in apowered-up cockpit. 'Sortie 2' was closer to areal flight, consisting of a high-speed taxyrun, with a real brake chute deployment. Thiswas a vital skill to learn, since in a crosswindthe chute could become wrapped around atailfin, causing damage to the skin. Until theaircraft left the black world, the pilot's firstreal flight in the F-117A was made (like allother flights at Tonopah) at night. An A-7Dflew chase, and the pilot would get used tothe aircraft's handling, usually flying somegentle aerobatics before returning to Tonopahto shoot a couple of instrument approaches.The conversion course took some fivemonths, and included between 30 and 40flying hours. Certain operational techniquescould not be taught in the simulator, since thesimulator staff were not cleared to knowthem, and these had to be taught on thesquadrons themselves, in actual flights. Afterthe aircraft came out of the black worldconversion, training could be undertaken byday, and T-38 Talons replaced the Corsairs.On a first F-11 7A solo, the T-38 would takeoff first, flying a visual circuit and picking upthe Black Jet as it climbed out, slipping intothe eight o'clock position.

Above: When the F-117Aemerged from the blackworld, Northrop T-38Talons replaced Corsairsfor training and chaseduties. This aircraft ofthe 37th TFW wearsTonopah's TR (forTonopah test Range)tailcode, whereas today,the 49th FW's T-38s wearan HO code signifyingtheir base at HollomanAFB, New Mexico.

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UNDER COVER OF DARKNESSEarly operations at Tonopah were extremely restricted. AlthoughTonopah is extremely remote, and sparsely populated, there arepeople in the scattered mining town nearby, and to maintainabsolute security extraordinary measures had to be taken. For years,the F-117A never flew by daylight, and there was even a strictembargo on opening individual hangar doors before nightfall. If an F-117A did have to venture outside its hangar during daylight, thewhole area was secured, and reference was made to acomprehensive listing of satellite overflights. If there was theslightest risk of detection, the aircraft remained under cover. Anyaircraft flying near the airfield and its airspace was carefullyinvestigated, and even trucks on nearby public roads were monitoredand, if necessary, apprehended while the drivers were questioned.The base security personnel operated a fleet of UH-1N helicoptersand a wide range of vehicles. Crews undergoing Red Flag exercises atNellis were prohibited from going anywhere near Tonopah, and anywho broke the rules were given a very hard time indeed on landing.

Below: Suction reliefdoors in the roof of eachintake are open as thisF-117A prepares to taxyout from its Canyon atTonopah.

While there was no absolute prohibition ongoing into the town of Tonopah, such tripswere discouraged, and the process was madedeliberately difficult. The policy wassuccessful: few locals had any idea what wasgoing on at the airfield. Tonopah airfield itself

was an interesting location to operate from,and the F-11 7As of the 4450th TG reportedlyshared the base with a number of highlyclassified programs. For a brief period afterthe F-11 7A emerged from the black world andbegan flying daylight missions at Tonopah, itis said that F-117A pilots could findthemselves taxying out behind the MiG-21sand MiG-23s of the 4477th Test andEvaluation Squadron - a far cry from theLuftwaffe Phantoms and Tornados with whichthey share their current base at HollomanAFB, New Mexico.

The 4450th Tactical Group had an unusualand unenviable working week. The pilots(apart from a handful standing alert) spent theweekends with their families at Nellis AFB, orin the nearby towns in which they had theirhomes. They would fly out to Tonopahaboard the chartered Boeing 727 and 737airliners provided for the purpose, arriving atbetween 0800 and 0900. The 4450th TG alsooperated a Mitsubishi MU-2 for outsideairline-hours transport of small groups of

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personnel. Anybody on board one of theseflights was specially cleared, some visitors toTonopah in the early days arrived aboard UH-1 helicopters with blacked-out windows onone side, and were whisked from aircraft toops building in a blacked-out car. Mondaywould be a relatively easy day, however, withan early finish to the night flying. Every effortwas made to ensure that the last landing wasbefore midnight, even during the summermonths. Pilots would then fly moreintensively on Tuesday, Wednesday andThursday, returning to Nellis on the Friday.The separation from families during the week(which they were not allowed to explain) washard enough, but the change from a primarilynocturnal existence during the week to a'normal' existence at weekends wasreportedly shattering and made it difficult tosustain a normal family life. Some felt that theposting was a guaranteed divorce, but theUSAF soon stepped in to provide extra flightsurgeons (a high proportion of whom werereportedly psychiatrists and counsellors) andenforce regulations relating to time off, resthours and duty time.

F-117A pilots lived off-base, in a housingcompound seven miles from the center of theairfield facilities, far enough away for aircraftnoise not to be a problem to sleepingaircrew. Their accommodation had heavyblack-out curtains to allow them to getproper sleep even in daylight hours. The

Right: 'Use of Deadly Force is authorised' againstanyone who attempts to compromise the strictsecurity surrounding every F-117A in service.

compounds were linked only by a shuttle buswhich plied the single-track desert road byday and night. This ran almost arrow-straightto Tonopah airfield, with a gentle left handerthrown in mid-way to prevent the bus driverfrom falling asleep at the wheel. The buspulled up outside the central compound, andthere was no exception to the requirementthat every man should clear security, eachand every working day.

Above: Tonopah'scorrugated Canyons weremuch larger thanrequired for a singleF-117A, leading many towonder if they had beendesigned with a still-secret follow-on in mind,perhaps the much-rumoured 'Aurora'?

F- I I 7A

INSIDE THE COMPOUNDAt Tonopah, the central rectangular compound, which contained thehangars, operations building, maintenance area and ATC tower, wasbordered on all sides by double barbed-wire-topped fences. The gapbetween the fences was permanently floodlit, and was seeded withproximity and other sensors. The handful of entry points wereheavily guarded, and each was equipped with special turnstilesincorporating palm-print scanners. A palm is as unique to anindividual as a fingerprint, and comparing a print electronically witha recorded image is quicker than it would be to check papers, passesand documents manually. The scanner also allowed comparison ofthe relative sizes and orientation of an individual's fingers, furtheraiding differentiation between individuals. The palm-print scannersincorporated channels for the four outspread fingers of the righthand, with a projecting pin to be positioned between the second andthird fingers. This ensured that a given hand would always be placedon a scanner in the same way, aiding the recognition process. Thescanner unit incorporated a row of lights, the last two of which werea simple green (ACCESS) and a red (NO ACCESS). The only exitswithout turnstiles were the four to the east of the compound, leadingto the runway, which were manned by armed guards, and which hadmassive sliding double steel gates across access taxiways.

Within the compound, personnel woreprominent 'line badges' indicating how farthey were cleared into the program. A whitesquare, for example, indicated that its wearercould see the F-117A, but could not touch it;while the green square, worn by crew chiefsand maintainers, indicated that the wearercould work on the aircraft, had a broadunderstanding of the aircraft's role andcapabilities and understood some of itssystems. Most pilots wore a black square,indicating that they had been briefed on the'no-kidding' radar cross section (still a highlyclassified figure), though some had a highercategory (details of the badge relating to thisare, you've guessed it, still classified). Theseofficers, who tended to be weaponsinstructors and senior guys involved in thedevelopment of tactics had a broader-basedknowledge of the aircraft's exact capabilities,and may have been the only pilots cleared tostand alert.

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Above: The 37th FighterWing lost its Tacticalprefix on 1 October1991, when TACdisbanded and itsfunctions were takenover by the new AirCombat Command. ThisF-117A is pictured in itsnew markings atTonopah during early1992, before the move toHolloman.

Left: 'Chocks away!' Infront of the aircraft, themarshaller stands readyto uncross his hands tosignal 'Brakes off', oncethe groundcrew areclear, and the pilot isready to taxy. For manyyears, hangar doorsremained firmly closedduring daylight hours,with complex rules andregulations as to howlong after sunset doorscould be opened, whenaircraft could taxy, andwhen they could fly.

Right: When working onthe F-117A groundcrewwore protectiveoverboots to preventdamage to the RAM skin.

F- I I 7A

46SOME DAY THEY'LL KNOW 99A typical working day might begin at 1500 for a pilot assigned asmission planner on a given day. Having risen at noon, and perhapsspent an hour running or in the gym, the planner might have eaten anormal lunch before having an hour or two free. Arriving in thewindowless operations building, he would pick targets and routesand nominate a realistic scenario. Normally all of the pilots flying ona particular 'wave' would fly the same route and the same mission,or one of two missions, usually simulating the same scenario. Asimple navigation exercise culminating in a simulated attack on aparticular dock in a Marine on Lake Tahoe, for instance, might haveto be flown as though it were a strike against a target in Teheran,with all the implications that had on likely defenses, target weatherconditions and the like. Often, every turn-point included a target tobe located, identified, and locked onto with the IRADS. Workingbackwards, the planner would deconflict routes and launch times,and would then plan them in detail, preparing the tapes which thepilots would program into their computers.

Below: The aim of the F-117A's designers was toproduce a shape whichwould present no surfaceat right angles to enemyradars. They achievedthis through faceting.

The chow truck (like an ice cream van, butserving hot food) would come round between1700 and 1800, allowing the planner tosnatch a quick bite to eat, while pilotsscheduled to fly would start to arrive. Somewould sit in the ready room, with its massive

wall-slogan 'Someday they'll know', whileothers would go to the vault in which flightmanuals were kept, perhaps to learn or reviseemergency procedures, perhaps just to beable to get the required 'tick in the box' forhaving read the Flight Manual that month.Such work was much more difficult in the F-11 7 A community since pilots could not keeptheir own flight manual. The books were notallowed out of the vault, and even in thevault the manual had to be physically in thepossession of the officer who'd signed it out.If he had to take a phone call, or go to thetoilet, he'd first have to sign the manual backin, see it locked away, then return and gothrough the whole rigmarole again. At 1830the planner would supervize a mass brief,outlining the mission, routes, required timeson target, and giving actual en-route weatherand a time back. The briefing would alsoinclude the simulated weather for thesimulated target area, giving actual weatherconditions for Teheran and its environs in ourexample. A simple brief might last only 20minutes, but between 30 and 40 minutes wasmore normal.

Following the brief, pilots would not needto flight-plan their route formally, since theywould already have a tape with the turnpoints

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and timings provided by the planner. Theywould inevitably want to check this, however,and would want time to study their route andany target intelligence (for the actual target ortargets they would be finding that night, andfor the simulated Teheran target, in case ofawkward questions during the debrief). Theywould also need to make careful notes as totheir call sign, and any radio frequencies theywould be using. One last-minute checkbefore leaving operations was to ensure thatthe pilot was carrying a letter from theTACDO (a two- or three-star General)addressed to whom it may concern for use inthe event of an unscheduled diversion andenjoining any base commander to do as hewas told by the pilot carrying the letter! It isnot known whether such letters were everused 'in anger'.

With preparations complete, the first wavepilots would be driven to the individualhangars accommodating their assignedaircraft. At Tonopah the hangars werearranged in blocks of six, six, nine and six perrow, in two close parallel rows. Those closestto the runway bore odd numbers, from 1 to53, while those in the rear row were even-numbered, from 2 to 54. The first 24 hangarsdiffered slightly from the next 18, havingvents on their roofs and with concertina-typedoors. These differed from the first batch of

shelters in having sliding panel doors in eightsections, and themselves differed from the last12 hangars. The overall effect was one ofuniformity, however. All were constructedfrom corrugated steel sheet, and all werepainted in a pale sandy color, with anidentical black number board on the left handedge of each door. All had identical cleanwhite floors with neatly painted taxiguidelines, and a parking point (with fulllatitude and longitude) indicated to allowabsolute precision when aligning the INS.

Above: The DLIR sensorcan be seen below thenearest of these two F-117'As, to the right of thenosewheel, ahead of thered anti-collision light.

Below: The SandiaNational Laboratoriesairstrip at Tonopah wastransformed into amodern air base for theF-117, in utter secrecy.

F- I I 7A

TAKE OFF

Arriving at the correct shelter, the F-117 A pilot entered through asmall personnel door, going into the hangar through a small unlitannexe. This meant that no light showed when the small door wasopened. The main hangar doors remained firmly shut until officialtwilight (half an hour after official sunset), with official twilight,sunset, and moonrise charts being consulted to determine the time atwhich doors could be opened. Some reports suggest that thisprohibition was backed up by the use of a sensor which could detectwhen no direct sunlight was hitting the unit. This was used toconfirm the official sunset time. In addition to these precautions, itwas ruled that from two hours after sunset until two hours beforesunrise, the hangar lights had to be turned off whenever the doorswere opened, however briefly.

Above: The pilot of theF-117A has his view ofthe outside worldseverely constrained bythe heavily-framedcanopy. The pilot of thisStealth Fighter wears theinsignia of the 57thFighter Wing on hisshoulder. This Nellis-based unit conductsweapons, and tacticstraining anddevelopment andincorporates a 2-3aircraft F-117A element.

The first wave might typically begin to takeoff at 2100, and all 12 aircraft would havedeparted by 2300. With a typical 90-minutesortie time, the aircraft would land between2230 and 0030 and a second wave wouldtake off from 0000 to 0100, landing between0130 and 0230. Within about 35 minutes oflanding, the F-11 7 A pilot would be back inthe Operations Building, ready to debrief.

Although Tonopah had a small controltower, it was not too hard-worked. Evenwhen F-117As going off range communicatedwith other agencies pretending to be A-7Ds,they usually operated 'radio silent' at Tonopahitself. The most important role for Tonopah's

air-traffic controllers was to monitor theairspace surrounding the base for intruders!

The planner would be among the last toleave after the last aircraft had landed, sincehe would also act as a flying supervisor andmight be required to debrief the returningpilots, going over their tapes with thesquadron's weapons officer. On Thursdays,everyone would tend to retire to the TOCACLafter the end of flying, to have a beer andwatch the sun-up, before returning to theaccommodation annex to get ready for theKey Airlines flight back to Nellis. OnMondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays, (withflying the next night) pilots might also have abeer at the TOCACL, but were far morecareful to get back to their beds before thesun rose. During the week, Tonopah wasoften likened to a Vampire Convention, withpersonnel rushing to hide themselves beforethey could be touched by the sun's rays. Thiswas an essential precaution, since the humanmind will not allow the body to rest properlyonce it has seen daylight, 'knowing' that itshould be active. The Tonopah working weekwas hard enough, without risking disruptedsleep patterns.

Black Jet pilots typically logged betweenten and twelve F-117A flights per month, with

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five or six further missions in the A-7.Virtually all flight time was spent practicingrealistic operational profiles, though therewas little opportunity for the dropping of liveordnance, since few ranges were active atnight and use of the laser 'off-range' wasprohibited. On the rare occasions that liveordnance was dropped, the 4450th made useof the same 'broadband, wide-spectrum,inexpensive, expendable point-source target'invented by the flight test team at GroomLake - a barrel filled with glowing charcoal!In-flight refuelling was a vital element inBlack Jet operations, and was thereforepracticed more often, with each pilot able topractice refuelling once a week. Weather hada disproportionate effect on F-11 7 Aoperations, with snow or a full moonpreventing the aircraft from flying 'off-range'at all, and with even 50% moonlight closingmany of the approved 'off-range' trainingroutes. The risk of hail (which would havedamaged the aircraft's RAM) was enough tokeep aircraft firmly under cover. In the veryearliest days, weather had an even greatereffect, since early aircraft had unheatedpilots, so were prohibited from flying incloud, or when icing was predicted.

Left: A pair of F-117Astaxy out at Tonopah. Theaircraft's flattened, shell-like fuselage andprimarily nocturnalhabits led some to applythe unflatteringnickname 'Cockroach'.The F-117A provedsimilarly elusive, but verymuch more deadly. TheF-117A normallyoperates alone, andformation sorties (evenby as few as two aircraft)are exceptionally rare.

Below: One F-117A takesoff from Tonopah asanother sits on Tonopah'staxyway. The StealthFighter's take offperformance is adequate,though withoutafterburner, it is neverspectacular. The basic F-117A carries only arelatively small pay load,a pair of 2,000 Ib LGBs,or less.

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ON THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS

Once sufficient aircraft were available, some 12 F-117As weremaintained on standby, ready for any mission ordered by thePresident. Two aircraft were ready to go at a mere two hours' notice.But while the aircraft were ready to undertake any mission, the orderto go was never given. Twice aircraft were armed for strikes andpilots were briefed, but on each occasion the missions werescrubbed before takeoff.

Above: An F-117A overone of the aircraft's mostfrequent training targets,Lake Tahoe. Marinas andeven individual boatspresented difficulttargets, with littledifference in IR signatureto the surrounding water.No.802 was the 18thproduction F-117A, andwas named 'Black Magic'during the Gulf War.

During October 1983 F-11 7's wereconsidered for use in support of the USinvasion of Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury)but were judged not ready according tosome reports. During the same monthseveral F-11 7As (variously reported as five,seven or ten) had their INS equipment fullyaligned ready for a strike against PLO targetsin the Lebanon. It was planned that theaircraft would fly to Myrtle Beach, wherethey would land and refuel, and where thepilots would have a face-to-face brief withtheir tanker crews and the pilots of 'othersupport aircraft'. Four aircraft (plus air

spares) would then have flown direct to thetarget. The mission was cancelled only 45minutes before the planned takeoff. It hasalso been reported that another operationalmission was planned in 1983 by Lt ColOliver North. This would have reportedlyinvolved a strike against Colonel Gaddafi byF-117As operating from Rota in Spain. On1 5 April 1986 an unknown number of F-117As were readied for participation inOperation El Dorado Canyon, the retaliatorystrike against Colonel Gaddafi followingLibyan military actions against US Navyships in the Gulf of Sidra and Libyan-sponsored terrorist outrages against UStargets. In the event, the mission was notregarded as being important enough to riskcompromising the F-11 7A, and their takeoffwas cancelled one hour before it was due totake place. The raid was flown by carrier-borne strike aircraft and UK-based F-111Fs.

Although F-117As did not undertakeoperational bombing missions before'coming out of the black' there is plenty ofcircumstantial evidence to suggest that theymay have deployed to overseas OLs(Operating Locations). There werewidespread reports that British enthusiastsheard an aircraft declare an emergency anddivert to RAF Lakenheath, where the roadsround the base were rapidly closed by USAFpolicemen just before a 'strange sounding'machine landed. This was apparently putstraight into a shelter, departing some nightslater, when roads were again closed. Otherreports suggested that the aircraft operatedfrom Alconbury, Sculthorpe and Wethersfield(all RAF stations accommodating USAFunits) and Binbrook, an RAF fighter station.The Binbrook 'rumor' was more detailedthan most, with suggestions that the F-117Awould take off in close formation with abased Lightning (which would explain night-time aircraft noise and provide a radar blip)before flying off on a representative sortieprofile along (or even just over) the IronCurtain, testing the aircraft against the latestSoviet air-defense systems. The inclusion ofan RAF exchange officer in the programgave credence to these rumors, since RAFofficers in the U-2 (and possibly in the SR-71 and RB-69 programs) won their places asreciprocation for the use of British bases. Inthe case of the U-2, RAF and CIA pilotsmade the crucial overflights of the USSR,which USAF U-2 pilots were not permittedto fly.

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Above inset: The red-outline on the rearunderfuselage of the F-117A surrounds the bayfor the arrester hook,which has to bedeployed explosively, andis an 'emergency only'piece of kit.

Right: An unusual side-onview showing typicaltoned down markings,with a simple three-digitserial, the TAC badge(until 1981) and a wingbadge on the intakes.

An F-117A cruises overhigh clouds. Even in theinvisible-to-radar F-117,the wise pilot wouldavoid flying immediatelyabove or belowunbroken cloud, againstwhich he might besilhouetted.

F- I I 7A

FRONTLINE SERVICESTEALTHPUBLIC

GOESBelow: A Tonopah-basedStealth Fighter flies overthe Half Dome inYosemite National Park.Daylight flights werevirtually unheard ofduring the early days ofthe programme.

By 1988, the F-1 17A's Black status wasseriously restricting operations. Moreserious than the inability to fly by day wasthe impracticality of operating alongsideother units (since to do so would havecompromised security). Even in-flightrefuelling was difficult, since only a handfulof tanker crews from two refuelling wings(at March and Beale) were let into thesecret and cleared to refuel the StealthFighter. Moreover, rumors of strangeaircraft flying in Nevada were growingstronger.

The F-11 7 A finally 'came out of the closet'on 10 November 1988, when the Pentagonreleased a single, heavily distorted,retouched, and electronically alteredphotograph. Lockheed joined in the fun byreleasing a piece of artwork based on thephoto, in which the facets were moreapparent (though completely altered inalignment) and with a tiny pilot in thecockpit which made the aircraft look B-52sized! This allowed a change in operatingprocedures, including limited daylight flyingand participation in exercises. The possibilityof daylight operations had an immediateeffect on the training and conversion process,meaning that F-11 7 A pilots no longer had to

FRONTLINE SERVICE

Above: Release of asingle distortedphotograph allowed the4450th to begin daylightoperations, but it was 17months before the typewas publicly unveiled atNellis, on 21 April 1990.

Below: The 4450thTactical Group becamethe 37th TFW in 1989.

make their first flight in the aircraft indarkness. The ageing A-7s were replaced inthe chase role by cheaper-to-operate T-38sfrom January 1989, the latter being assignedto the 4453rd TS, while the A-7-equipped4451st TS ran down. The 4452nd TSinactivated on 30 May 1989, while the R-Unit inactivated the same day, continuing tooperate at Tonopah as an undesignatedsubordinate of the 6510th Test Wing. Morephotos of the aircraft (taken by intrepid

photographers who trekked out into thedesert) soon emerged. These revealed manynew features, among which was the adoptionof unit markings by the Black Jets. Beforetheir existence was revealed, the aircraft flewwith a three-digit serial on the tailfin, and alow conspicuity rendition of the Tactical AirCommand badge on the fin tips. Someaircraft also had a 4450th TG crest on theengine intakes. Now the aircraft hadprominent white 'TR' tailcodes, and Groupand Squadron markings became morecommon.

On 5 October 1989, the unit took a furtherstep into the 'normal' world, when it adoptedthe designation and traditions of the 37thTFW, an F-4G Phantom Wild Weasel wing,which had just disbanded at George AFB. There-designated Stealth unit remained atTonopah, however. The 4450th's survivingthree squadrons were redesignated, with the4450th TS becoming the 41 5th TFS, retainingits 'Nightstalkers' name and badge. The4451st TS (hitherto an A-7 unit) gained F-117As and a new designation as the 416thTFS, 'Ghostriders'. The 4453rd TES becamethe 41 7th TFTS (Tactical Fighter TrainingSquadron) 'Bandits'.

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TARGET PANAMA

On 19 December 1989, the 37th TFW finally took the F-117A intoaction for the first time. Six F-117As took off to attack two sets oftargets in Panama during the US operation to topple Noriega. Two ofthe aircraft turned back when the attack on their targets wascancelled (they had been assigned to support special operationsforces who hoped to capture Noriega himself, and the mission wascancelled when it became clear that he could not be located). Twomore aircraft flew only as air spares. The final two aircraft attackedbarrack buildings near Rio Hato, with the stated aim of droppingbombs near enough to stun and disable the defenders, but withouteither destroying the buildings or causing major casualties.

Above: Six F-117As tookoff from Tonopah toparticipate in 'JustCause', the operation totopple Panama's dictatorNoriega.

Below: Three F-117Aslined up outside Canyons1, 3, and 5 at Tonopah.

This unusual mission was intended tominimize casualties among parachute-landingUS troops from the 2nd and 3rd RangerBattalions. Unfortunately, a last minute changeof plan led to the lead pilot dropping hissingle GBU-27 bomb where the secondaircraft should have aimed (while also failingto compensate for the wind), while the secondpilot's aim point was an unspecified point aset distance and bearing from the first aircraft's

bomb. Once the first bomb went awry, thesecond was bound to be even further off-target.

Instead of generously missing two barrackbuildings the two CBU-27s narrowly missed athird barracks, generating a fireball whichgutted it and destroyed an empty cantina. Theaccuracy of the bombs was further hamperedby the poor performance of the F-11 7A'sIRADS sensor, which was hampered by thehumidity and vegetation in the target area,which lowered contrast to a barely acceptablelevel. There were those who questionedwhether an F-117A was strictly necessary inorder to guarantee a hit on an empty field (letalone to miss its target within that field!), andthere were criticisms that the raid had been'unnecessary show-biz' designed primarily towin funding for the program. Others felt thatthe use of the F-117A had been justified bythe need for bombing accuracy, and by thedesire to minimize collateral damage. The

FRONTLINE SERVICE / PANAMA

truth is probably that the aircraft had to beused in Panama, mainly so that Congresscould actually see some return from the BlackProgram which they had unwittingly beenfunding for so long, but which they now knewabout.

At the end of the day, however, the F-11 7 A

mission was judged a success by the'customer', and the Rangers' commanderjudged that the aircraft's bombs did causeconfusion among the defenders, and did savelives on both sides. Fortunately, the F-117A'snext combat experience was altogether moresuccessful.

Above: The pilot of theF-117Ahasa vital ifunglamorous role, for heis the unseen assassin,using the cover of nightto attack his targetundetected.

F- I I 7A

BLACK JETIN THE GULF

Above: On 19 August1990, en route to theGulf, the 22 F-117'As ofthe 415th TFS (includingfour spares) made arefuelling stop at LangleyAFB, Virginia, where thepilots grabbed a night'srest before crossing theAtlantic and flying on to'Tonopah East', a newlyrebuilt and modernisedairbase near KhamisMushayt in Saudi Arabia.

When Saddam Hussein invaded neighboringKuwait, the international community wasremarkably unanimous in its condemnationof his actions. Even more remarkably, theUSA was able to organize a relatively largecoalition of countries prepared to usemilitary force, initially to try to intimidatethe Iraqis to withdraw, and later to actuallyforce them out of Kuwait. It was clear that astraightforward direct attack on Iraqi forcesin Kuwait was not the best way of achievingthe coalition's aims, since such an attackcould have resulted in massive casualtiesamong the Iraqis in their prepared defensivepositions, and might have wreaked terribledestruction on Kuwait itself. It was felt that aheavy but limited blow against Iraq's militarymachine and command infrastructure couldprevent the reinforcement of the forces inKuwait. This strategy would also allow atargeted offensive, preventing Iraq fromcontinuing its occupation and resisting alliedoperations, while simultaneously destroyingthe will to fight.

But the coalition was a fragile one, and itwas apparent from the start that every effortwould have to be made to keep casualties onboth sides very low, and to minimizecollateral damage. Seeing US servicemenbeing brought home in body bags wouldhave rapidly wiped out public support for theoperation. It was clear that any militarycampaign would have to be limited induration and extent, to avoid claims that thewar was being fought for control of oil in theregion, and not simply to right a wrong. Tohave killed large numbers of enemy civilians,or to have destroyed a religious buildingwould have handed Saddam Hussein victoryin the propaganda war, and might have madeit difficult to keep some Arab members of thecoalition 'on board'.

These unusual requirements dictated thatthe military campaign to oust Iraqi forcesfrom Kuwait would have to be undertakenwith speed and with surgical precision.General Chuck Horner's plan envisaged thedestruction of 84 key targets in the first week

FRONTLINE SERVICE /THE GULF

Above: The 415th TFS lined up atLangley AFB, the largest gatheringofF-117As ever seen outsideTonopah, and perhaps the largestnumber ever seen in the open, onthe ground, at once.

Right: ColonelAl Whiteley, COof the 37th TFWduringOperationDesert Storm.

of air operations - a highly ambitious aim. Itwas obvious that the F-117 A would be anextremely useful tool in any such campaign,since it offered the potential ability to tear outthe eyes, ears and heart of Iraq's militarymachine. Accordingly, the USAF deployedthe 415th TFS to Khamis Mushayt in SaudiArabia, 900 miles from Baghdad (as the crow,but not the military airplane, flies). Thedeployment began at 0645 on 19 August,when three cells of twelve KC-135s took offfrom Beale AFB, California. At 0800 the 22 F-11 7As joined the tankers and flew on toLangley AFB, Virginia, refuelling three timeson the way. The Black Jets night-stopped atLangley, while the KC-135As flew on to SaudiArabia, waiting only for three aircraft whichhad landed at Pittsburgh after heavycrosswinds forced a refuelling stop. The nextday, the F-117As flew to Saudi Arabiathemselves, accompanied by KC-10AExtenders from March AFB. This non-stopflight took 15 hours, and was a severe test ofthe endurance of aircraft and aircrew alike.

F- I I 7A

TONOPAH EASTThe Saudi airfield had many parallels with the F-117's home base,located in a similar desert and at a similar elevation (6,776 ft forKhamis, 5,500 ft for Tonopah). When they arrived, the Black Jetsoccupied brand-new shelters very similar to those they had leftbehind in Nevada, but each accommodating eight aircraft in fourbays, parked nose to tail. The front aircraft would be towed outsideto start, but the second could start up within the canyon itself. Theshelters were fully hardened and were serviced by revetted taxiways.The quality of the facilities was hardly surprising, since the base hadbeen rebuilt by the USA during the early 1980s, with extra shelterareas provided to support deployments by USAF units. The sheltersused by the 415th ITS actually still had seals on their doors.Inevitably, the Saudi base came to be nicknamed 'Tonopah East'.

Far right: The sheltersand taxyways at Kingkh.ilid air base, KhamisMushayt, were wellprotected against airattack, with reinforcedconcrete covered andcamouflaged with rocks,and with plentifulrevetments. The shelterareas were far more likereal canyons than the so-called Canyons atTonopah.

Below: Two of the 42 F-777,4s deployed toKhamis Mushayt beingprepared for a missionoutside their shelters.Late in the war it wasapparent that the risk ofair attack by Iraq wasnegligible, and aircraftoccasionally operatedfrom flightlines.

If anything, the F-117 pilots actually enjoyedbetter facilities at Khamis than they had atTonopah. They slept, four to a room, inbedrooms attached to the shelters, each ofwhich had a massive generator, with facilitiesfor over-pressurization in the event of NBC(Nuclear, Chemical or Biological)contamination outside.

The F-11 7As were operational by 26August, and the unit began intensive training,until the process of briefing, starting andflying to the tanker drop-off point was secondnature to every pilot. The unit also got itslogistics and maintenance organization upand running very quickly. Having deployedwith extra spares in the shape of warreadiness spares kits, a repair program foravionics units was instituted while thesquadron's avionics maintenance vans werestill en route to the Gulf. Aircraft were alsocannibalized for spares when necessary,resulting in a readiness and serviceability ratewhich was actually higher than was normalback home at Tonopah.

FRONTLINE SERVICE / THE GULF

F- I I 7A

TARGET BAGHDAD

Following a September 1990 visit to the F-117A force at KhamisMushayt, the air-force Chief of Staff General Dugan opined that theair campaign's "cutting edge would be in downtown Baghdad", andhinted that Saddam himself would be a key target. This was anextremely accurate prophecy, but to admit that the enemy leaderwould be personally targeted was unacceptable, and earned Dugan asummary dismissal. The capabilities and effectiveness of Iraq's air-defense system were consistently overestimated during OperationDesert Shield, and no-one seemed able to predict the level ofdislocation that would be caused by first night strikes against it.

Left and below left: DLIR imagery of targets attackedby F-117As in the Gulf. Once the cross-hairs werecentred on a target, the mission objective wasachieved, or so it seemed. In fact, the F-117A wasvulnerable to the effects of low cloud and smoke, andrequired clear weather over the target to operate.

The US Studies and Analysis Agencyproduced detailed computer models based onGeneral Chuck Horner's plan for thecampaign, and these showed that non-stealthy warplanes would suffer unacceptablyhigh losses if they attempted to hit targets inthe Iraqi capital, and even predicted thatnumerous F-117As would be shot downbefore they reached their targets. This was aserious finding, and prompted thedevelopment of complex plans for thebombing of F-11 7A wreckage if any aircrafthad been downed. This was felt to be the bestway of ensuring that the aircraft's secretswould not be compromised. Some urged thedevelopment and incorporation of 'self-destruct' systems similar to those developedfor the U-2, for activation by the pilot onejection, but this was not felt to be practicalor desirable. But if the F-117A was felt to bevulnerable to hostile defenses, it wasconsiderably less vulnerable than any othertype, and it was allocated the most importanttargets. Within a month of Dugan's outburst itwas confirmed that the F-11 7A andunmanned cruise missiles would be the onlyweapons used against Baghdad itself.

Half of the problem was that the verysecrecy which had kept the F-11 7'scapabilities hidden from potential enemieshad meant that its own commanders knewtoo little about the aircraft and how it couldbe best used. The Desert Storm aircommander, General Chuck Horner, wasinitially apprehensive as to how the aircraftmight shape up in combat. "We had a lot oftechnical data, but I had no way of knowingthat we would not lose the whole (F-11 7) fleetthat first night of the war. We were bettingeverything on the data proving thetechnology - but we had no real experiencewith the airplane to know for certain howwell it performed under fire. We sent thoseboys in naked and all alone. As it turned out,the data was right on the mark. But weshould've known that before the first attack."In Horner the USAF had a gutsy commanderprepared to take the risk.

In early November, the USAF decided todeploy a second F-11 7A unit (the 416th TFS)

FRONTLINE SERVICE / THE GULF

to Saudi Arabia, as it became increasinglyclear that Saddam would not be backingdown. The Ghostriders finally arrived intheatre on 4 December 1990, leaving only askeleton training force at Tonopah under the41 7th TFS. As the role to be played by theBlack Jet increased, support assets increasedproportionately. Initially, the KC-135s fromBeale AFB were assigned as the F-117A's in-theatre tankers, but these were joined by theKC-1 35Rs from the AFRes tanker unit atGrissom AFB, Indiana.

On 1 6/1 7 January 1991, the first night ofDesert Storm, the 41 5th and 41 6th TFSlaunched two waves of F-11 7As againstBaghdad. The first was led by the 41 Sth's CO,Lt. Col. Ralph Getchell, while Al Whitley, COof the 37th and de facto detachmentcommander, led the second. The enemy AAAbarrage over Baghdad was incrediblyspectacular, while SAMs were being fired inhuge numbers. Many of the F-11 7A pilotsflying over Baghdad that night were quiteconvinced that their number was up, andmore than one dreaded returning to KhamisMushayt as the sole survivor of the evening'seffort, so convinced were they that no-onecould survive in the maelstrom of fire. Of 65F-117A pilots deployed, only four had anycombat experience, and one of them hadonly one combat mission to his credit. Eventhe old hands, including Wing CommanderColonel Alton Whitley, who had flowncombat missions over Vietnam, found theintensity of the Iraqi flak quite incredible. Butwhile the barrage of AAA looked impressive,it was entirely blind, and was ineffectual. Notone F-11 7A was hit on that or any othernight. Nor did the barrage force the F-11 7Asto drop their bombs wildly or inaccurately,which was its primary purpose. But the pilotswere not to know any of that. After the warGetchell affected a studied nonchalance:"Most of the guys figured that since we'dalready been in Saudi Arabia for six months,and in the air for a little over two hours, itwould be kind of foolish to turn around andgo back, so we went ahead." This wasactually heroism of the highest order (sincemost pilots admitted to fear, which theyovercame), and it must have felt like flyinginto the dragon's jaws. The list of targets hitby the Black Jets during their first night ofoperations is quite frightening.

The first wave of Black Jet targets hit inBaghdad included the 370-ft Al Quarkcommunications relay tower (attacked byCapt.Marcel Kerdavid, who won the SilverStar for this attack and his subsequent attack

on the National Command Alternate Bunkerat North Tajii), the Al Karak main telephoneexchange, colloquially known as the AT&Tbuilding (Captain Paul Dolson), the Iraqi air-defense headquarters (Captain MarkLindstrom), and the National Air DefenseOperations Center (Lt.Col. Ralph Getchell).Moments later, more F-117As attacked. MajorJerry Leatherman, for example, aimed twoGBU-1 Os through the hole in the roof of theAT&T building punched by Dolson's GBU-27A/B penetrator. Lee Gustin wrecked thepresidential palace east of Baghdad's airport.Pilots who still carried a bomb went on toattack other targets, with Kerdavid attackingthe National Command alternate bunker atNorth Tajii, with little apparent effect. Thesame target was attacked twice more by F-117As, then was finally taken out by F-111 Fslater in the war, using specially developedbunker-busting bombs.

Above: Stress is clearlyetched in the face of thisF-117A pilot. In the earlydays, the intensity of thebarrage of AAA andSAMs led many Stealthpilots to wonder if theycould possibly survive. Itsoon became clear thatBaghdad's defences werefiring blind, however.

Below: Jokey messageswere de rigeur on bombsdropped on Iraqi targets.These reflected the highmorale among USAFarmourers, and perhapsa subconscious desirenot to think too muchabout the deadly purposeof such lethal ordnance.

F- I I 7A

BUNKER BUSTING

But before the main force of F-117s reached Baghdad, other BlackJets added to the mayhem and confusion, initially striking theintercept operations center near Nukhayb (which controlled thefighters at H1 and H2 airfields), and the sector operations center atH-2, near Ar Rutba, in Western Iraq. Both of these targets were hitby the same pilot. Major Greg Feest, the man who dropped the firstbomb in Panama dropped the first bomb of the Gulf War, too,watching as the doors blew off the Nukhayb bunker before turningtowards his second target. This effectively put the southern fighterbases out of action, and further deprived Iraqi air force and air-defense chiefs of information. Moments later, Captain BlakeBourland sent the Sector Operations Center at Tallil off-line. The warhad begun with attacks by US Army AH-64 Apaches and US MarineAH-1 Cobras on surveillance radar sites close to the border,effectively punching two huge holes in the border defenses, throughwhich strike aircraft (including the F-117As) began to pour. Cruisemissiles had then attacked communications relay and power stationsin Baghdad, waking the defenses.

Left: The F-117A used two types of weapon during theGulf War, both 2,000-lb LGBs. This is a GBU-27,before installation of the Paveway III guidance kit.

Even after the Black Jets left Baghdad, andeven after a second wave of cruise missilestargeted against ministry buildings andtelephone exchanges, the Iraqi air-defensesystem remained in reasonable shape. USNavy A-6s and F/A-18s launched some 137TALDs (simulating full-sized attack aircraft) atBaghdad, and these were mostly engaged anddestroyed by the defenses, though in doingso, they marked themselves for destruction bya massive force of 'Wild Weasel' F-4GPhantoms and F/A-18 Hornets.

The second wave of F-11 7As whichattacked on the first night re-visited the AirForce Headquarters and the National AirDefense Operations Center, while other SOCselsewhere in the country were taken out bythe Black Jets. Many senior Iraqi air-force andair-defense officers were killed during theattacks. Of the survivors, more were executedbecause of the dismal performance of thesystem they controlled.

The 37th TFW soon ran out of strategictargets, and was soon allocated tacticaltargets, from Iraqi aircraft sitting on the ground(reportedly including one of the scarce AdnanAEW aircraft and a group of Tu-1 6 bombersbeing readied for an attack using chemicalweapons), to captured Kuwaiti HAWK SAMsites and Iraqi hardened aircraft shelters.

FRONTLINE SERVICE / THE GULF

Despite the fact that it provided only 2.5%of the 'shooters' in theatre on day one ofDesert Storm, the 37th TFW hit 31% of thefirst night targets. During the war as a whole,the force flew 1,271 combat sorties and over6,900 combat flying hours, carrying 2,567bombs to their targets. These scored 1,669direct hits, and 418 misses, though there werealso 480 no drops due to weather. In doingso, it was claimed that the Black Jet had"demonstrated a level of accuracy unmatchedin the history of air warfare". Not a single F-117A was even touched by enemy airdefenses. Some other coalition aircraftenjoyed very low loss rates, but none weresent into the teeth of such danger. Perhapsmost importantly, collateral damage wasinsignificant. Military facilities wereobliterated without touching nearby mosques,and throughout the war, the civilianpopulation felt safe enough to walk thestreets.

TAC's commander, General John Loh, toldthe US Senate that the F-117A had been eighttimes more efficient than non-Stealthwarplanes in putting its bombs on target.Congress urged the USAF to cancel itsrequirement to buy an additional 72 F-16s,and to buy 24 new F-117As instead, but theplan came to naught, probably because thevery success of the aircraft was starting tothreaten planned future programs. The bigworry was that Congress might say, "If the F-11 7 can do all this, why do you need JSF, or

JAST, or whatever?" It was not an easyquestion to answer. Senior figures began torun down the F-117A, with Homer's Gulf Wardeputy, General Buster Glossom, chargingthat the F-11 7A represented "archaic, 1 5 year-old technology" that was "a nightmare tomaintain". Lockheed themselves werecarefully warned that lobbying for a re-opening of the F-117A production line wouldbe a threat to their own F-22.

Above: The F-117Ademonstrated incrediblelevels of accuracy, anddelivered its deadlyweaponloads withoutrequiring massive fighteror SEAD support. Thismade it a particularlyeconomic means ofattacking enemy targets.

Left: An F-117A taxiesout for a mission as duskfalls. The aircraft carriedall of its fuel andordnance internally, topreserve its low radarcross section. Late in thewar, the ability to carry ahigher payload externallywould have beenvaluable.

Right: One by one, Iraq'sairfields were attackedand turned into ruins.Here hardened aircraftshelters have beenattacked using LGBs,blowing off their doors.The F-117A attacked airdefence installations,bunkers and bridges,among a long list oftargets.

F- I I 7A

RETURN TO IRAQThe wing, and its squadrons, finally lost the Tactical prefix on 1October 1991. Between 9 May and 7 July 1992 the F-117A tookanother step out of the secret world when it moved from its speciallybuilt Tonopah base to Holloman AFB, New Mexico, next to the WhiteSands National Monument and close to the town of Almagordo.

Above: An F-117Areturning to Langley AFBafter the Gulf War. Thepilots of the 37th TFWreturned to a heroes'welcome, and withLockheed's extravagantclaims for their aircraftthoroughly vindicated.Despite its success, theaircraft remains a rarityin USAF service, and nofurther procurement islikely.

The move to Holloman was accompanied bya further change of unit designation, with the37th FW becoming the 49th FW, previouslyequipped with F-15s at Holloman. It wasostensibly made as a "further step to integratethe F-11 7A into everyday operations", thoughthe truth may be less prosaic. There seemslittle doubt that Holloman is less well suitedto Stealth Fighter operations, with inferiorfacilities, and this has had an impact onreadiness and sortie rates. After the F-117Asleft Tonopah, security around the baseactually increased. In any case, it seemsinconceivable that Tonopah, the USAF'snewest air base, has been left empty so thequestion has to be asked - what has replacedthe F-117A at Tonopah?

Although the F-11 7A squadrons from

Tonopah initially retained their numericalidentities after the move to Holloman, allwere eventually re-designated, using theidentities of the units which had traditionallyconstituted the 49th. Thus the 415th FSbecame the 7th FS , the 416th FS became the8th FS, and the 41 7th FS became the 9th FS.There was reportedly fierce resistance to theloss of the squadron designations underwhich the Black Jet had gone to war.

The 8th FS has the 'Pacific Contingency'responsibility, and would deploy to SouthKorea in time of tension. The 7th FS has whatis known as the 'Atlantic Contingency' andwould deploy to Europe or Saudi Arabia ifrequired. There have been frequent rumorsthat single F-117 squadrons might bepermanently based in the UK and Korea, butthis seems unlikely. The aircraft has deployedto Europe, however, flying from British andDutch air bases for exercises.

Having gone to war in the colors of the37th TFW, the F-117A has also droppedbombs in anger while wearing the markingsof its present unit, the 49th FW. Following theend of the Gulf War, Iraq became

bold in its violations of the ceasefireagreement, making incursions into Kuwaitand across the boundaries of the no-flyzones imposed by the coalition allies.Allied aircraft patrolling these areas werethreatened by Iraqi air defenses, and itbecame increasingly clear that SaddamHussein would have to be taught anotherlesson. On 13 January 1993 six F-117As,

each carrying only a single bomb, attackedSAM sites, the SOC at Tallil and the IOC atAl Amara. None of the four aircraftattacking SAM sites hit their targets, thanksto broken laser locks, which were in turncaused by low cloud. The aircraft targetingthe SOC at Tallil was unable even to findthe target, but the remaining aircraftvirtually destroyed the facility at Al Amara.

Above: The F-117Aroutinely uses a brakeparachute to shorten itslanding run. These areoften black, like the restof the aircraft. The chutebay is between thetailfins, which make itsuse impossible in astrong crosswind.

Left: The F-117A played avital role in the GulfWar, as the only alliedwarplane routinelyassigned to attack targetsin heavily-defendeddowntown Baghdad.Here a pilot waits to taxyat Khamis Mushayt,watched by hisgroundcrew. The F-117Ais a unique shape in thesky, and improvedcomputer power hasallowed subsequentstealth aircraft to bedesigned with morecurvaceous shapes.

THE MISSION

FLYING TODAY'S MISSION:PREPARING TO FLYProper operational briefings are notalways so simple and straightforward asthey were during training at Tonopah,since the F-1 17 may advantageouslyoperate in conjunction with other aircrafttypes, and since unusual locations mightrequire specialized intelligence briefingsand updates. The aircraft can even makeuse of EF-1 I I Ravens for radar jamming,using jamming to mislead enemy forces asto the position and direction of the(invisible) attack force, or simply toreplace delayed detection with nodetection at all. In the USAF, the pilot willnot necessarily plan his own mission,arriving at the squadron some hours afterthe officers designated as planners thatday (a duty rotated among experienced F-I 17A pilots on a daily basis). In training atTonopah and in the Gulf War alike, F-1 17Apilots tended to act as planners on onenight and fly the next.

Tasking for the F-11 7 A might come throughnormal channels in a conventional war, ormight still come direct from the President, orfrom a specific special-operation joint-forcecommander. The tasking message willusually be very specific about the target andthe required time on target, particularly sincean F-117 strike might be carefully co-ordinated with action by special forces onthe ground, or designed to open a corridorthrough enemy air defenses for conventionalattack aircraft or bombers. The planners planthe required mission in detail, taking care todeconflict routeings and timings with otheraircraft (the F-117A will be operating 'radiosilent'). They will make use of a planningcomputer which remains one of the F-11 7A'smost closely guarded secrets to this day. Thisincorporates a digital map of known air-defense radars, with their effective rangesagainst the Black Jet. This computer allowsmission tapes to be prepared, which thenallow the F-117A to evade enemy radarsautomatically.

Since the F-11 7A pilot does not plan hisown mission, the briefing is particularlyimportant, and covers the exact routeing aswell as the attack itself. The briefing is anopportunity for the pilot to receive the verylatest target information and intelligence,together with anticipated meteologicalconditions and all the usual details, fromemergency procedures, alternate targets,

Left: Stealth Fighterpilots wear the sameflying equipment andflight safety gear as allother USAF fast jetpilots.

Above: The pilot'ssignature indicates hisformal assumption ofresponsibility for theaircraft he is about to fly.

THE MISSION

diversion airfields, radio frequencies and air-defense corridors. Exact aim points arediscussed and decided before flight, suchpoints being far more specific than areroutinely given to the pilots of other bombers.The ability of the Black Jet to hit not just abuilding, but a specific window, vent or roomwithin that building, makes it necessary totarget the most important part of a building.There is no point in taking out the store roomsif you can destroy the Minister's own office!

The accuracy of the F-11 7A's weaponssystem actually allows a more subtle approachto the 'blunt instrument' method of tacticalbombing. If F-16s were assigned to knock outan electrical plant, several aircraft would besent, attacking the major buildings as best theycould, using sheer weight of numbers todestroy the sturdy generator room and thevulnerable but easy to repair water plant. Bycontrast a single F-117 might be assigned toknock out the plant's generator, which iscritical, difficult to repair and easy to fi