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Statement to Disqualify Judge Richard G. Cline Superior Court of California County of San Diego North County Division
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P a g e | 1
STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATIONS
THE HEIRS OF DAVID L. BEDOLLA
Petitioners,
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO NORTH COUNTY DIVISION
In Re DAVID L. BEDOLLA LIVING TRUST ESTABLISHED JULY 24, 2007 THE HEIRS OF DAVID L. BEDOLLA
Petitioners,
vs.
ALEJANDRA BEDOLLA, Respondents,
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
CASE No.: 37-2010-00150342-PR-TR-NC
STATEMENT OF
DISQUALIFICATIONS
CCP 170.1; 170.1 (a)(6)(A)(i); 170.1
(a)(6)(A)(ii); 170.1 (c)(6)(B); 170.3; 170.1
(B0(2)(A); 170.6 (a) (2); 170.3(c)(1);170.3(a)
(1);170-170.9 JUDGE: Hon. Richard G. Cline DEPT. NC-2 COMPLAINT FILED: July 15, 2010
INTRODUCTION
Overview: Purpose of Statement of Disqualifications
I.
To Command the Superior Court for the State of California for the County of San Diego North
County Division Judge Richard G. Cline to Recuse or Disqualify Himself as Judicial Officer for
Subject Case No. 37-2010-00150342-PR-TR-NC.
A. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
P a g e | 2
Our case and many cases were transferred/rotated from Honorable Judge Harry L. Powazek to
Hon. Judge Richard G. Cline. Our case was in Judge Harry L. Powazek for one year and a half.
When we went to the fist hearings set forth by Defendant's attorney Roland Achtel there was a
posting in front of Judge Cline's door in the message board. The sign read:
judicial Reassignment North County Division Probate
Effective January 30, 2012
"Judge Richard G. Cline will be judicial Officer assigned to hear the probate calendar effective
January 30, 2012. Cases previously assigned to Judge Harry L. Powazek in Department 23 will
be reassigned to judge Richard G. Cline on D-2
Pursuant to Code of civil procedure 170.6 (a) (2) peremptory challenges are due within 15-days
after notice of the case reassignment, or if the party has not yet appeared in the action, then 15
days after the appearance."
Petitioners filed a Peremptory Challenge per CCP 170.6 the following day after the first hearing
with Judge Cline on March 2, 2012.
On March 2, 2012 our Peremptory Challenge was denied as untimely by Judge Cline.
B. JUDGE RICHARD G. CLINE SHOULD BE DISQUALIFED FROM OUR CASE
Judge Cline's and his staff are prejudice against us for representing ourselves before his court,
this has prejudice our case. In the interest of justice. Where there is bias or appearance of bias a
presiding judge must be disqualified. Per C.C.P. Sec. 170.1; 170-170.9 Judge Cline must be
disqualified from this case.1 (B) Bias or prejudice toward a lawyer [self represented individual]
in the proceeding may be grounds for disqualification. (CCP §170.1(a)(6)(A)(i)),
1 C.C.P. Sec. 170.1 enumerates the specific circumstances under which a California judge may be disqualified for cause: ...for any reason, believes that his disqualification would further the interests of justice, that there is a substantial doubt as to his capacity to be impartial, or that a person aware of all relevant facts might reasonably entertain a doubt about his ability to be
P a g e | 3
Petitioners have substantial doubt that Judge Cline could be impartial (CCP §170.1(a)(6)(A)(ii)),
A person who was aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt about the judge’s
impartiality (CCP §170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii)); Commentary to Cal Rules of Ct, Code of Judicial Ethics,
Canon 3E. See Housing Auth. of Monterey County v Jones (2005) 130 CA4th 1029, 1041–1042,
30 CR3d 676 (judge who decided pretrial motions against defendant in limited civil case was
disqualified under CCP §170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) from sitting on appellate division panel that heard
defendant’s appeal); DCH Health Servs. Corp. v Waite (2002) 95 CA4th 829, 833, 115 CR2d
847 (recusal may be required on basis of mere appearance of impropriety); Gai v City of Selma
(1998) 68 CA4th 213, 230–233, 79 CR2d 910 (this provision does not apply to administrative
hearing officers).
The most common examples of disqualifying bias are a judge’s personal bias against a party,
which may not be waived (CCP §170.3(b)(2)(A)), and bias toward a lawyer in the proceeding
(CCP §170.1(a)(6)(B)). See In re Buckley (1973) 10 C3d 237, 256, 110 CR 121 (judge must be
so personally embroiled with lawyer that judge’s capacity for impartiality is destroyed). Bias
toward a witness is also grounds for disqualification. In re Henry C. (1984) 161 CA3d 646, 653,
207 CR 751.
In this instant case Judge Cline was biased toward us and could not see our case beyond the self
representation. Judge Cline's personal bias against us caused him to sanction us without due a
process and disregarded our written and oral responses. Judge Cline disregarder an entire year of
proceedings before Judge Powazek in less than five minutes. Judge Cline's actions were evident
impartial. With the enactment of Sec. 170.1, however, a party seeking to disqualify a California judge for cause was no longer required to prove that the judge was actually biased.
170-170.9 (2) There shall be no waiver of disqualification if the basis is either of the following: (A) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.
P a g e | 4
in that he did not believe that a self represented person was competent and capable, of
understanding legal matters.2
Due to Judge Cline's prejudice against them Petitioners cannot receive a fair hearing or trial in
his courtroom. CCP §170.6(a)(2).3 CCP §170.6(a)(3). A party may obtain the disqualification of
a judge for prejudice The judge must make an instant determination no trial judge,
commissioner, or referee may try any civil or criminal case or hear any matter involving a
contested issue of law or fact if it is established that the judicial officer is prejudiced against a
party or attorney or the interest of a party or attorney. CCP §170.6(a)(1).
Section C of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge should recuse upon
motion of a party, or on the judge’s own initiative, whenever “the judge’s impartiality may
reasonably be questioned.” The Canon then lists specific instances when recusal is appropriate.
The list is not intended to be exhaustive.
C. THE SPECIFIC INSTANCES IN WHICH A JUDGE SHOULD DISQUALIFY
2 No actual bias required. Actual bias need not be present. Roitz v Coldwell Banker Residential
Brokerage Co., supra, 62 CA4th at 723. If an average person could entertain doubt about the judge’s impartiality, disqualification is mandated. Catchpole v Brannon (1995) 36 CA4th 237, 246, 42 CR2d 440. An appellate court will not speculate about whether the bias was actual or merely apparent; reversal is required in such a case, with remand of the matter to a different judge for a new hearing on all issues. CCP §170.1(c); In re Wagner (2005) 127 CA4th 138, 147–149, 25 CR3d 201; Roitz v Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., supra, 62 CA4th at 723; Catchpole v Brannon, supra, 36 CA4th at 247; 3 The right to exercise a challenge against a judge is a creature of statute; it did not exist in the
common law predating the enactment of CCP §170.6. Home Ins. Co. v Superior Court (2005) 34 C4th 1025, 1031, 22 CR3d 885. This right is an extraordinary right that should be liberally construed to promote justice. Nissan Motor Corp. v Superior Court (1992) 6 CA4th 150, 154, 7 CR2d 801. See Hemingway v Superior Court (2004) 122 CA4th 1148, 1158, 19 CR3d 363 (courts must refrain from any tactic or maneuver that has practical effect of diminishing this important right). The statute allowing a peremptory challenge must be liberally construed in favor of allowing a challenge, and a challenge should be denied only if the statute absolutely forbids it. Stephens v Superior Court (2002) 96 CA4th 54, 61–62, 116 CR2d 616.
P a g e | 5
The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.
While, Canon 3C states that a judge should recuse when “the judge’s impartiality may
reasonably be questioned.” Case law states a judge should be disqualified when “a reasonable
man knowing all the circumstances would have doubts about the judge’s ability to rule . . . in an
impartial manner.” McClendon v. Clinard, 38 N.C. App. 353, 356, 247 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1978).
In State v. Fie, 320 N.C. 626, 628, 359 S.E.2d 774, 776 (1987).
• Judge Cline violated our constitutional due process, and statutory rights and sanctioned
us $ 1,200 without cause or due process of laws. Based on Judge Cline's bias against us
in his courtroom we believe and declare Judge Cline did not follow the spirit of the law
and the Judiciary Code of Conduct and Ethics.
• Judge Cline did not maintain professional competence in judicial administration.
• Judge Cline did not cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration
of court business.
• Judge Cline actions were negligent, in bad faith, and violated public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Based on the fact that Petitioner Silvia Peters was denied the transcripts of the proceedings by
Judge Cline's Court Reporter. We do declare, that the account of events is true and correct to the
best of our recollections.
WHEREFORE, The Disqualification of Judge Richard G. Cline is the only adequate remedy.
II.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
P a g e | 6
Our case and many cases were transferred/rotated from Honorable Judge Harry L. Powazek to
Judge Richard G. Cline to be refereed herein after as, "Judge Cline." Our case was in Judge
Harry L. Powazek for one year and a half. It is important to note that in that year and a half we
never had any problems with anyone in Judge Powazek's department or Judge Powazek himself.
On our first hearing with Judge Cline on March 1, 2011. I and my brothers and sister had three
hearings submitted by Defendant's attorney Roland Achtel on that day. 4
Defendant's attorney Roland Achtel had made a motion to Compel Interrogatories/ discovery
documents, an Ex Parte Application and a CMC hearing for the same day and time. There was
no Tentative Ruling posted online. However a copy of the Tentative Ruling was made available
to Defendant's attorney Roland Achtel prior to the hearing. We checked the court's online
Tentative Rulings everyday from Monday thru Thursday March 1, 2012. We checked for the
Court's Tentative Ruling throughout the day on Thursday through 2:00 p.m. on Thursday
afternoon.
The afternoon of the hearing motions [two motions] for Defendant's motion to Compel
Interrogatories and Production of Records and Defendant's Motion for Production of Records for
Maria Bedolla were calendared and held on March 1, 2012. The CMC was calendared for March
1, 2012 at 9:30 a.m. we the Petitioners were present but were informed that it was moved to 2:30
on the same day March 1, 2012.
As we arrived to Judge Cline's courtroom, there was a signup sheet and next to it were on or
about six copies of the tentative ruling. I glanced at the ruling for about 30-seconds.
Judge Cline came out, took the bench and asked if we had seen the Tentative Ruling. We stated
that it was not posted online and we noticed it was placed on the table but had not had a chance
to read it. He asked if we needed five to six minutes to review the ruling before the hearing.
4 Before we left Judge Powazek and before Judge Powazek had an opportunity to hear the motion to Compel Interrogatories. Attorney Roland Achtel submitted a false declaration under penalty of perjury claiming he had not been served with a reply to his motion to compel. That was a lie and Judge Powazek extended and continued the motion.
P a g e | 7
Silvia stated that there were about five to six pages and that there was not be enough time to read
the Tentative Ruling. Not posting the ruling for our review denied us an opportunity to respond
the inaccuracies in the Tentative Ruling.
After we stated our names for the record, Judge Cline began the hearing by looking at us and
stating, "Just because you are not an attorney don't expect special privileges...." and repeated
several times throughout the hearings "get yourself counsel," he was very irritated we were
representing ourselves in court. He made negative comments like, "next time don't turn in a pile
of loose documents to the court."
The documents that were turned into the court were attached in a packet but not loose. The court
system is starting to scan documents. If any documents were loose, it was not caused by
Petitioners rather court employees.
Judge Cline asked, "do you have anything to say?"
I said, "your honor we have a right to self representation in this court, Section 35 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92, enacted by the First Congress and signed by President
Washington one day before the Sixth Amendment [422 U.S. 806, 813]. That right is codified in
28 U.S.C. 1654. Bounds v. Smith (430 U.S. 817, the 1977; (430 U.S. 817, the 1977; Ex Parte
Hull, 312 U.S. 546. (1941); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 708 (1961)5 [See exhibit No 1].
Judge cline said, "let's move on, what do you have to say."
Silvia stated, "we filed complete responses to Defendant's Interrogatories on three separate
occasions and complete separate responses. The complete responses were filed [for the second
5 Defendant Attorney Achtel CMC 4.C attached notes claimed that "Petitioner Silvia Peters repeatedly appeared on behalf of ALL the petitioners acting as the attorney for all Petitioners. This has occurred over respondents objections." On Exhibit attached Attorney Roland Achtel gave false testimony under penalty of perjury and claimed that Silvia Peters was acting as an attorney. I am a Petitioner in this action and I have a right to represent myself, my sister Margarita Frias who is also a Petitioner in this action has been in attendance at every hearing and represented herself. My brother Jesus Bedolla has been at some meetings he is a disabled man who had a brain aneurism and attends when he is able but is representing himself as well and so is my brother Jose Bedolla.
P a g e | 8
time] on July 8, 2011 June 27, 2011 and the beginning of July 2011. The answers were filed and
served by mail they were due on the 24th [Friday June] and were sent on the 27th. The time
extended by Civil Code of Procedure Sec. 10136 (California Accounts, Inc v. Superior Court
(1975) 50 Cal app. 3d 483 [123 Cal Rptr. 304]. The original responses were sent to attorney
Achtel on June 27, 2011 [Letter from attorney Jenny Goodman dated July 1, 2011 and Email
from Silvia Peters sent to Roland Achtel on Monday June 27, 2011 12:40 AM.]
Silvia asked, "you honor did you read our response and looked at the exhibits we provided?"
Judge Cline did not answer. I offered the documents for his review and he refused to accept
them.
Judge Cline said, "the time is extended by five calendar days."
Judge Cline turned to Respondent's attorney Achtel and asked, "did you get the responses?"
Attorney Achtel response was "yes but they were incomplete and had many objection" [Attorney
Acthel motion and argument on the documents was made based on the presumed allegations in
which, he claimed our responses were late.]
Judge Cline turned to us and Silvia said, "his questions were indirect, vague, incomplete and
asking for generalities. For example every question asks, what proof do you have that David L.
Bedolla was abused by Alejandra. What proof do you have that Roberto Bedolla abused his
6 California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1013 (a) In case of service by mail, the notice or other paper shall be deposited in a post office, mailbox, subpost office, substation, or mail chute, or other like facility regularly maintained by the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope, with postage paid, addressed to the person on whom it is to be served, at the office address as last given by that person on any document filed in the cause and served on the party making service by mail; otherwise at that party's place of residence. Service is complete at the time of the deposit, but any period of notice and any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall
be extended five calendar days....
Petitioners were not late in filing the response to the Defendant's Interrogatories. Which was the basic argument in Defendant's Motion and on Defendant's moving papers.
P a g e | 9
father... further the answers were in the documents that were given to him and the court. Records
from the hospital and his own attorney file"7 I enclosed a CD and went beyond the request by
scanning the documents into PDF files." Once again I asked, "your honor did you read the reply
and the exhibits we filed?" Judge Cline did not answer.
Judge Cline said to us, "you were suppose to list all the documents and what they are for them."
Silvia answered, "the documents are listed as exhibits and are exhibits introduced in detail in the
trial brief8 on file with the court and several copies were given to them. The Respondent's
attorney was provided with these documents several times."9
7 Section 2030.060 Sub. (d) provides: "each interrogatory shall be full and complete in and of
itself. No preference or instruction shall be included with a set of interrogatories unless it has been approved by the Judicial Council of California.."All special interrogatories are subject to the requirements of this section and to presumptive numerical limitation of section 2030.030 Sub. (b) providing with certain exceptions that "no party shall, as a matter of right, propound to any other party more than 35 specially prepared interrogatories..[see section (s) 2030.040, 2030.070.) Limit of 35 on the number of interrogatories that may be propounded without leave of court or stipulation. Deyo v. Kilbourne [84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 780-781: (2Hogan & Weber, Cal, Civil Discovery, Supra, Proposed Cal. Civil Discovery Act of 1986 and reporter's notes, appen. D, p. AppD-57.) 8 Exhibits are also listed in details one by one in Petitioners Separate Statement in response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings. Defendant's did not file a Separate Statement in their motion for Summary Judgment moving motion as required by the rules as well.
1. 9 Exhibits provided to Defendant Alejandra Bedolla by Petitioners [there were
literally on or about 10 times documents were provided to them in moving papers
submitted to the court]. Page 2- list of exhibits and identifies what they are.
Document dated July 15, 2011.
2. Examples of another document detailing Exhibits provided to Defendant
Alejandra Bedolla by Petitioners. List of Exhibits begins on page 2-6. Document
dated August 24, 2011.
3. Examples of another document detailing Exhibits provided to Defendant
Alejandra Bedolla by Petitioners. List of Exhibits begins on page 2-5. Document
dated August 24, 2011.
4. Examples of another document detailing Exhibits provided to Defendant Alejandra Bedolla by Petitioners. List of Exhibits begins on page 6-15. Document dated November 10, 2011. All documents were served to the attorneys office and were accompanied by proof of service.
P a g e | 10
Attorney Roland Achtel misled the court and stated, "he did not receive the documents and that
all of our responses were always late."
Our case was previously assigned to Honorable Judge Harry L. Powazek who reviewed the case
for one year and a half. During the time there was a discovery cutoff date of October 28, 2010.
Parties were to submit detailed brief and list of witnesses by November 18, 2010. Judge
Powazek had previously denied Defendant's attorney Motion for Extension of Time and motions
for production of documents.
Judge Cline was on vacation for two weeks prior to our March 1, 2012 and only hearing in his
courtroom. Judge cline did not read our court records [over four large volumes] or the motions
that were before him. Judge Cline only reviewed and relied on the Law clerk [possibly Nadia
Jamil Keilani] notes and written Tentative Ruling. Judge Cline affirmed the ruling and
sanctioned us $ 1,200.00 but failed to state why we were sanctioned.
The Motion to Compel was based primary [also oral arguments] on the allegations that we were
late and because we were late we lost our right to object to the questions. At the hearing even
Judge Cline acknowledged that we were not late.
Secondly, Attorney Roland Achtel alleged on the pleading papers that our answered
interrogatories were not complete and introduced the first set of interrogatories reply as
evidence. To began with there were two consecutive responses that followed the first set and the
later were full and complete. Yet, attorney Achtel wrote and gave false testimony to the court.
Judge Cline prejudiced our entire case and refused to read our reply, exhibits or accept the
documents I had on the hearing as proof attorney Achtel was giving false testimony before him.
Judge Cline did not read the reply motions; he did not review the exhibits and was not familiar
with the case. Without going into the ruling but just to state as an example of the Tentative
Ruling the first paragraphs begins with the subheadings:
P a g e | 11
1. Attorney of Record
The Tentative Ruling's position, is an argument that Petitioners did not make and further states,
"Petitioners argument that Respondent's CCP Sec. 2030.040 declaration is invalid because
attorney Goodman is not the attorney of record is without merit."
Petitioners had argued in the reply brief that, "Attorney Goodman [Respondent Ex I] stated in
her email to Petitioners that her justification for an extension of time to file a Motion to Compel
was to give the parties an opportunity to "meet and confer" before the motion was filed. That
the parties never had a meet and confer before the motion was filed and that attorney Goodman
stipulated and we agreed that there would be a meet and confer before the motion was filed.
Petitioners quoted CCP sec. 2030.040 to state that their questions exceeded the statutory
limitation per code. Not to state that attorney Goodman's declaration was invalid. Important to
Note that the declaration was submitted and written by attorney Achtel and a letter by attorney
Goodman. Completely different issues, the declaration submitted by attorney Achtel in support
of the Motion to Compel makes no mention that there was a meet and confer as required by the
CCP code and statute.
2. Meet and Confer. - the ruling states,
"....In the instant matter, it appears Petitioners are under the impression that the parties must
literally 'meet" in order for the meet and confer requirement to be satisfied....Reviewing both the
communications between the parties and their context, it appears a good faith effort was made to
effectuate discovery without seeking court intervention and that was unfruitful, any further
action would have been redundant and unproductive. "
Petitioners had argued in their reply brief that Respondent's attorney did not meet and confer
prior to filing the motion to Compel as agreed upon by attorney Goodman and Petitioners. We
did not believe that the parties had to have a face to face meeting and we never stated this in our
argument. There were no discussions either through email, mail or phone or face to face.
P a g e | 12
Further, Petitioners stated that there have never been any meet and confer discussions between
the parties in any shape or form as required by the statute.10
Attorney Roland Achtel has intentionally and consistently lied the Court under penalty of perjury
in every CMC form for over a year and a half. In this instant case attorney Achtel is stating that,
"a motion to compel is pending because Petitioners have not provided complete responses to
written discovery despite extensive meet and confer from Respondent."
Judge Cline did not read the the replies to the motions and motions and did not read or looked at
the exhibits provided to the court in the reply briefs or while we offered them for review at the
March 1, 2012 hearing oral arguments:
CCP codes required that a motion to compel must be accompanied by an attorney declaration
that says that the parties 'meet and conferred.' This was not the case and our written argument
showed that even Attorney Achtel's own exhibits showed that he did not 'meet and confer'
before filing the motions. [Achtel Exhibit I & H].11 There was also a mutual stipulation by
Petitioners and attorney Goodman to meet and confer prior to filing the Motion to Compel. The
Law Clerk believed and Judge Cline affirmed the Tentative Ruling that it was not necessary
because it would be unfruitful. Even when the meet and confer was a requirement by CCP
codes prior to filing of the Motion to Compel and even if there was a mutual written agreement
by both parties to meet and confer prior to filing the instant Motion to Compel.
In addition, California Rules of Court Rule 335. Format of discovery motions (a) [Separate
statement required] Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses
to such a request shall be accompanied by a separate statement. The motions that require a
separate statement include:
10 A requirement of some courts that before certain types of motions or petitions are heard by the judge, the lawyers (and sometimes their clients) must meet (usually, in person or on the phone) to try to resolve the matter. This can resolve many problems and limit the amount of court time needed to resolve disagreements. 11 CCP 2030.300 (b); 2016.040
P a g e | 13
(1) a motion to compel further responses to requests for admission;
(2) a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories;
(3) a motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection of documents or tangible
things.
Attorney Achtel did not file a Separate Statement with the moving Motion to Compel
Interrogatories and Production of Records as required by the California Rules of the Court. In
essence, Judge Cline was asking us at the hearing to draft one for Attorney Achtel. We were
ordered by Judge Cline to right down what each and every document said for Achtel.
Attorney Achtel lack of filing of a Separate Statement accompanied with his Motion to Compel
as required California Rules of Court §§ 0331-0341; California Rules of Court Rule 335. (b)
prejudiced us; denied us; violated our due process rights to justice and have meaningful access to
the court. Attorney Achtel failure to file a Separate Statement denied us the opportunity to
respond to each and every document he alleged was not provided for him or to respond to the
questions he said were not answered.
Judge Cline blamed me for Achtel's failure to file and said something like, "if you believed that,
you did not file the proper documentation, therefore you have to provide them with all the
documents. " Even when Silvia stated many times that we had based on the request and questions
that were made by attorney Achtel.
Silvia said, "he wants me to write it for him" [Achtel].
judge Cline answered, "how do you know what he wants, you cannot read his mind."
Silvia said, "I don't know what he wants, I cannot write a report on every page that has been
submitted to the court by March 15,2012 [two weeks]. There are almost five volumes of
documents." Judge Cline said, "if you don't know what you are doing get yourself an attorney."
P a g e | 14
The Separate Statement must be submitted with the motion by the moving party. I was not the
moving party.12 [CRC 3.1020(a).]13
12 The California Rules of Court relating to discovery are set forth in California Rules of Court §§ 0331-0341. California Rules of Court Rule 335. (b) [Separate statement not required] A separate statement is not required when no response has been provided to the request for
discovery. (c) [Contents of separate statement] A separate statement is a separate document
filed and served with the discovery motion that sets forth all the information necessary to
understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue. The separate
statement shall be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other
document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Material shall not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference. The separate statement shall include-for each discovery request (e.g., each interrogatory, request for admission, deposition question, or inspection demand) to which a further response, answer, or production is requested-the following:
(1) the text of the request, interrogatory, question, or inspection demand; (2) the text of each response, answer, or objection, and any further responses or answers; (3) a statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute; (4) if necessary, the text of all definitions, instructions, and other matters required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it; (5) if the response to a particular discovery request is dependent on the response given to another discovery request, or if the reasons a further response to a particular discovery request is deemed necessary are based on the response to some other discovery request, the other request and the response to it must be set forth; and (6) if the pleadings, other documents in the file, or other items of discovery are relevant to the motion, the party relying on them shall summarize each relevant document. (Subd (c) repealed and adopted effective July 1, 2001.)
(d) [Identification of interrogatories, demands, or requests] A motion concerning interrogatories, inspection demands, or admission requests shall identify the interrogatories, demands, or requests by set and number.
(Subd (d) relettered effective July 1, 2001; adopted as subd (b) effective January 1, 1984; previously amended effective July 1, 1987; previous subd (d) repealed effective July 1, 2001.) Rule 335 amended effective July 1, 2001; adopted effective January 1, 1984; previously amended effective July 1, 1987, January 1, 1992, and January 1, 1997.
13 A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that sets forth all the information necessary to understand each discovery demand and all the responses to it that are at issue. The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full demand and the full response. Material must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference. [CRC 3.1020(c).] [CRC 3.1020(c).]
P a g e | 15
On the second motion for Production of Documents for Maria Bedolla and followed after the
Motion to Compel. Attorney Achtel was making this ex parte motion as well as the motion to
compel well passed the discovery date of October 28, 2011. Well, after Honorable Judge Harry
L. Powazek had denied his motions for continuance and motion for discovery after the cutoff
date.
On the ex parte motion before the court Achtel was seeking the records from San Diego County
Adult Protective Services for Maria Bedolla a person not a party to this action.
Attorney Achtel:
• Filed a subpoena on behalf of Roberto Bedolla and Graciela Meza on December 7, 2011,
for the records of Maria Bedolla. Attorney Achtel was not representing Roberto and
Graciela Meza on December 7, 2011 when he wrote and sent the subpoena.
• Roberto and Graciela were not a party to the action when Attorney Achtel filed the Ex
Parte Application with Roberto Bedolla and Graciela Meza's name in the subpoena and
proof of service. The Ex Parte Application was submitted February 9, 2012 by attorney
Roland Achtel. Roberto and Graciela were represented by attorney Robin Montes Wood.
The parties [Petitioners Roberto & Graciela/ attorney Robin Montes] had entered into an
agreement signed by Hon. Harry Powzek by January 7, 2011. Both Graciela and Roberto
were no longer parties to the action when attorney Achtel submitted the subpoena and
when he submitted the Ex Parte Application.
• Attorney Achtel filed the Ex Parte Application for release of records for Maria Bedolla
and had a release of records form signed by Maria Trinidad Villagomez AKA Maria
Villagomez. The names did not match.
• Attorney Achtel filed the Ex Parte Application after the motion for continuance was
denied by Hon. Judge Harry L. Powazek.
• Attorney Achtel filed the Ex Parte Application after the October 28, 2011 cutoff date.
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• Attorney Achtel did not seek leave of the Court before he filed either the Ex Parte
Application or the Motion to Compel.
We attempted to explain this to Judge Cline and Silvia included the documents as exhibits in the
Ex Parte Application Reply Brief. We offered the documents to Judge Cline at the hearing as
well. Attorney Achtel gave false testimony to Judge Cline and stated he was working on the
subpoenas since back in October 2011.
I had the documents that proved otherwise on my hand, I said, "he is lying."
Judge Cline said, "wait a minute there will be no name calling."
Judge Cline turned to Achtel and asked him, "tell me what you want."
Attorney Achtel said, he did not recall any discussions of cutoff dates or trial brief and witnesses.
Judge Cline repeated, "tell me what you want."
Attorney Achtel said he needed to do interrogatories.
Judge Cline asked Achtel, "what else do you want."
Attorney Achtel said, "depositions, and requested to extend the discovery date."
Judge Cline asked, "what else do you want"
Attorney Acthel said, "trial till after his first baby was born and have the trial in June."
Further attorney Acthel complained to judge Cline that Petitioner Silvia was acting as an
attorney. Judge Cline accepted attorney Achtel's allegations and admonished Petitioners.
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In this Ex Parte Application Judge Cline states, "I am going to deny the motion because the
discovery cutoff date has expired."
A minute later Judge Cline proceeded to grant the Ex Parte Application and extend the cutoff
date without a pending motion to extend the cutoff date filed or seeking leave of the court.
In five minutes Judge Cline threw out every motion and ruling Hon. Judge Harry Powazek had
made in a year and a half. Without reading the court file, without reading the motions and
replies. Judge Cline fined us $ 1,200. without explanation or cause.
Attorney Acthel presented a proposed Court Order, Judge Cline said, "that is not going to work
let's do it this way, I will take care of it."
When we walked outside the courtroom, attorney Achtel had a big smirk on his face and said,
"oh yeah those records. Just send me a letter that says the records you sent me, are all the
records you have."
Attorney Achtel once again gave false testimony under penalty of perjury on the briefs and
inside the court on the record stating that Petitioners did not provide him with any documents.
This was part of his argument, he clumped up with the Motion to Compel interrogatories.
Judge Cline and the Law Clerk who wrote the Tentative Ruling did not acknowledge that
attorney Achtel had not followed the rules of procedure, statutes or Rules of the Court. Despite
the record and our argument that we have produced the documents required. The documents filed
by attorney Achtel were not filed in compliance with CCP or Cal Court Rules of Procedure or
local rules of the court and every single document attorney Achtel submitted was defective.
Judge Cline willingly welcomed and accepted attorney Acthel written and oral false testimony
under penalty of perjury, with multiple violations of CCP and Cal Court Rules of Procedure or
local rules of the court. The fact that there was no Statement of Facts as required by the statute
and no Tentative Ruling available prior to the hearing violated Petitioners Constitutional Right to
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have meaningful Access to the Court. Judge Cline's prejudice against pro per litigants further
compounded the prejudice against Petitioners.
The following day on or about 2:30 p.m. Silvia went to Judge Cline's courtroom to drop off a
preemptory challenge form (CCP §170.6 (a)(2)). Silvia was asked by the bailiff to sit down
while the court was in session and wait. Silvia sat in the courtroom and observed several cases
appearing before Judge Cline. When the judge took a break the bailiff followed him behind with
the preemptory challenge form. At this point Silvia asked the court reporter [possibly named
Peggy Tiess] if she could tell her how much the transcripts would be for the March 1, 2012
hearings. The Court Reporter saw that Silvia had her original preemptory form and asked that
she give it to her so that she could make a copy. She went back to make a copy for a few
minutes.
Afterward she said, "they are going to be expensive." Silvia asked her to tell her how much the
audio cost as well.
The Court Reporter once again said, "they are going to be expensive $ 200.00 after three weeks
and $ 400.00 if you want them sooner. Believe me you don't want them, there is going to be a
lot of stuff missing it's not worth it. Let me give you some good advice, if I were you, I would take
those $ 200.00 dollars and hire an attorney.
Silvia said, "I know I understand the system is very institutionalized."
The Court Reporter answered, "no it's your fault you were all over the place, you don't know
what you are doing. You are better off getting an attorney."
Silvia said, "your comments and the judge's comments are precisely the reason I did a
preemptory challenge. I have seen too many people mistreated in this courtroom."
The Court Reporter said, "you are a very difficult person and walked away."
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Silvia had never spoken to this Court Reporter before and had never had any form of interactions
with her prior to this date of March 2, 2012.
III.
ACTIONS OF JUDGE RICHARD G. CLINE
We believe that Judge Cline is prejudicial against us as pro per litigants and he prejudiced our
case. With such disgust an bias against pro per's Judge Cline prejudice and bias has and will
deny us of fair and equal access to justice and to the courts and violate our Constitutional Due
Process and Equal Protection Rights. Judge Cline does not believe pro per litigants are credible
and completely disregarded every argument and reply briefs and exhibits we brought forth.
• Judge Cline, failed to follow proper procedures and gave us no notice of the proposed
sanctions or allowed us the opportunity to justly respond to the mistakes in the Tentative
Ruling.
• Judge Cline violated our Due Process Rights by not making a court motion to show cause
as to why we should not be sanctioned and denied us equal access to the courts. When he
disregarded our reply briefs, exhibits and refused our request to review the exhibits on the
day of the hearing. Judge Cline denied us access to the courts and to justice.
• Judge Cline was not familiar and did not want to be familiar with our Court Record or
had read any of the briefs, replies and exhibits himself. Judge Cline and his court
reporter were upset that we were representing ourselves. Judge Cline violated our rights
to self representation and discriminated and prejudiced our case by refusing to acquaint
himself with the court file, read our reply briefs and completely ignore our court oral
arguments.
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• Judge Cline sanctioned us $ 1,200. when there were no violated court orders and no fact
or proof that we had violated any statutes or rules of the court.14
• Judge Cline abused his discretion in imposing monetary sanctions without due process
of laws. [Citation.]” (Moyal, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 501, 256 Cal.Rptr. 296.)
• Judge Cline's prejudicial bias against self represented litigants in his courtroom violated
Petitioners right to have meaningful access to the courts and the right to adjudicated their
case in an unbiased slanted environment. Where Judge Cline does not believe that self
represented litigants should stand before him because they do not know what they are
doing and cannot be trusted because they are not members of the bar.
• Due to Judge Cline's lack of compliance with the legal standards and purposes authorized
by CCP Codes and California Rules of the Court, the sanctions are legally erroneous,
unsupported by the record, and a prejudicial abuse of discretion.15
• Judge Cline's conduct was (1) unjudicial and (2) by sanctioning us without due cause or
due process of laws. He committed in his judicial capacity, and (3) he committed an act
he knew was beyond his lawful power and thus acted in bad faith.
14 Absent a proper basis for those findings, a sanctions award represents a prejudicial abuse of
discretion. (Moyal v. Lanphear (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 491, 501, 256 Cal.Rptr. 296 (Moyal ) [such discretion must be exercised in a reasonable manner with one of the statutorily authorized purposes in mind, and it must be guided by existing legal standards as adapted to current circumstances]; Winikow, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 726, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 413.) “[A] trial court's exercise of discretion will not be disturbed unless the record establishes it exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence [citation], failed to follow proper procedure in reaching its decision [citation], or applied the wrong legal standard to the determination [citation].” (Conservatorship of Scharles (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1334, 1340, 285 Cal.Rptr. 325.) 15 (Winikow, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 719 at p. 726, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 413; Moyal, 208 Cal.App.3d 491 at p. 501, 256 Cal.Rptr. 296; Conservatorship of Scharles, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1340, 285 Cal.Rptr. 325.)
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• Judge Cline dismissed all of the rulings Honorable Powazek's made in a year and a half.
He reversed the cutoff date of discovery without Defendant's making a motion for an
extension of time [that motion had already been denied].
• In less than five minutes Judge Cline dismissed Judge Powazek order to submit a detailed
brief listing all the witnesses and exhibits. He allowed Attorney Achtel to began
discovery a year and a half after the case was filed. By these acts, Judge Cline failed to
maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and failed to cooperate with
other judges and court officials in the administration of court business.
• Judge Cline's conduct was willful, prejudicial and lacked public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
• Judge Cline's conduct was (1) unjudicial and (2) committed in his judicial capacity, and
(3) he committed an act he knew was beyond his lawful power and thus acted in bad
faith.16
16 Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement
for recusal, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the
judicial process."). That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice." "Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989) The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt
v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty
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IV.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Petitioner hereby requests that the reviewing court take notice of the entire file as there
are too many facts contained herein which are referenced to be able to include in the
Exhibits.
V.
WHEREFORE, Petitioners pray:
An issued order for Judge Cline to be disqualified from case No. 37-2010-00150342
immediately.
March 12, 2010 ______________________________
on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a
judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of
his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself. None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect. Should a judge not
disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based on the Due Process Clause. If the court does not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself. Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a judge under certain circumstances. In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
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VERIFICATION
I, Jesus Bedolla, am the Petitioner. I have personally reviewed and am familiar with the
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records, files and proceedings described in and the subject of the present petition and know the
facts set forth to be true and correct.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
March 12, 2012 ____________________________________
Petitioner, Jesus Bedolla