Stategic Plan for the Remainder of ICRH Dec 2010

8/6/2019 Stategic Plan for the Remainder of ICRH Dec 2010

1/38

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR

THE REMAINDER OFTHE IHRCS MANDATE

DECEMBER 2010


2/38

- 1 -

FROM RELIEF TO RECOVERY

In July, six months after the earthquake, only 19 % of pledged funds had beendisbursed. The domestic community was still in shock and the internationalcommunity voiced a crucial need for everyone to act faster in getting help where it is

needed the most. The IHRC responded. At its August meeting, Prime MinisterBellerive presented a series of three-month priorities for the government in six keyareas.

Now, 11 months after the earthquake, funding has started to come, if slowly. Thedomestic and international communities are starting to work together moreeffectively. The IHRC is taking an active role in this cooperation, as evidenced by theprojects approved by the IHRC (valued at $3 billion) for which internationalorganizations have partnered with Haitian ministries. Other examples of cooperationinclude, to name only a few, the provision of sector expertise to the IHRC by

international organizations, direct collaboration between international organizations inagriculture programs, and joint working sessions between IHRC and Haitianministries to expand and refine the recovery plans presented at the United Nations inMarch.

These positive developments have taken place through the determined efforts ofdonors, project implementers, the Government of Haiti and the IHRC. However, thefunds contributed by the public sector and invested by the private sector remaininsufficient even to meet the most pressing needs for recovery created by theearthquake, let alone the longer-term needs for development to help the Haitianpeople out of systemic poverty. For instance, funding of recovery priorities is

unevenly spread among sectors, in a way that does not necessarily reflect the prioritiesof Haiti outlined in the Plan of Action for the National Recovery and Development(PARDN). Further, as donors begin to fulfill their pledges and have difficultyaccessing the facts about what is needed most on the ground, many are asking how toprioritize their spending.

Pursuant to the its responsibilities under the emergency law and the presidentialdecree creating the IHRC, it is therefore offering a plan to help guide projectimplementers, donors and investors as they guide the disbursement of their pledges and add much needed new funding to the recovery and development of Haiti.Developed jointly by the Commission, international experts and ministry leaders, this

plan outlines many of the most important things needed in Haiti by October 2011, theend of IHRCs mandate.

The remainder of this document outlines the plan and is organized into 3 mainsections:

A pressing need now describes the rationale for developing a targeted plan forthe end of the commissions mandate

A path to impactdescribes what the most important outcomes are on the groundfor the people of Haiti and how to achieve these outcomes

A call to action outlines how everyone should contribute to ensuring that themost important outcomes are achieved.


3/38

- 2 -

Going forward, this plan will serve as a much needed point of departure for guidingall the involved parties. In the immediate future, the IHRC will work with itsstakeholders, to further identify and develop concrete programs needed to achieve theimpact envisioned by this plan. This will include developing specific requests forprojects to fit in the needed programs and working with the Government to developimplementable solutions to the policy questions and institutional needs identified.


4/38

- 3 -

A PRESSING NEED NOW

At the moment, theAction Plan for the National Recovery and Development of Haiti(PARDN) guides the evaluation of projects reaching the IHRC. The PARDN offers abroad framework for action that will continue to guide the action of the Government

and its backers.

There is now a need to accelerate delivery on the ground, to make a tangibledifference for the population, building on the will of the Haitians themselves toconstruct a better future and on the international communitys commitment to help.Top priorities must be clear and more binding. This document consolidates thepriorities into a concise plan, to guide donors and investors and attract additionalfunding. These priorities and how to achieve them are presented in this document. Allof those priorities were developed in partnership with the Haitian ministries and areintended to suggest what will be most important to achieve Haitis recovery and

development through October, 2011.

This plan has two objectives:

A. Identify the priority outcomes on which the IHRC will focus its efforts until theend of its mandate and provide measurable goals and targets to clearly define whatsuccess looks like

B. Indicate what must be done to achieve these priority outcomes and what roleeveryone must play. The plan will detail four types of input needed to achieveeach target:

1)

Programs that will contribute to achieving the quantified impact on the ground

2) Funding needed to pay for the required programs

3) Policy decisions and institutional enablers that will be necessary to make

implementation of these programs possible in the prescribed time frame

4) Interdependencies with other sectors that have an impact on the ability to

achieve the listed priority outcomes, and their implications

Concurrently to the IHRC developing this strategic plan, the Government has started

to prepare its second Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), itself based on the PARDN.The IHRC will be working closely with the ministries concerned to ensure that thePRS, the PARDN and the present document are mutually reinforcing.


5/38

- 4 -

A PATH TO IMPACT

To ensure the goals of this plan are aligned with the best interests of Haiti and arerelevant to IHRCs mission, the IHRC prioritizes goals and outcomes that:

Prioritize sectors directly affected by the earthquake, where we can reduce thevulnerability of the people, notably through a build back better approach;

Create tangible impact on people's lives, with particular focus on the mostvulnerable;

Achieve significant, measurable progress within the 18-month mandate of theCommission;

Lay foundation for longer-term development.

Seven areas (priority outcomes) were identified: housing, debris, education, energy,health, job creation and water & sanitation. To these seven areas, an eighth one willact as a success factor for the execution of all other priorities: capacity building ofHaitian institutions.

The proposed targets to be achieved by the end of the IHRCs term follow:

Area Target outcome

1 Housing Ensure that ~400,000 people who own or rent houses are able torelocate from camps

2 Debrisremoval and

management

Remove 40 % of debris in a way that is environmentally sound

3 Education Build and staff 250 temporary structures Build and staff 60 primary schools in communal sections where no

public schools exist Equip up to 3000 schools (public and private) Feed 250,000 children Provide up to 500,000 children with an education kit (manuals and

uniforms) Provide up to 500,000 children with financial assistance in private

schools

Train 5,000 teachersAbridged

4 Energy Increase hours of service for 30,000 urban households by 20% Expand electricity service to 10,000 rural households

5 Health Improve service delivery through targeted reconstructions andconstructions of 40 hospitals, 75 clinics and an ambulance network toconnect communities to health care services;

Increase the health care workforce through the reconstruction orreinforcement of 4 medical schools, 4 nursing schools and the launchof training programs able to reach 4,000 allied health professionals

Pilot and expand approaches to healthcare financing including

ensuring access to care for children under 5 and expanding access forpregnant women.


6/38

- 5 -

6 Job Creation Provide full-time employment to hundreds of thousands additionalHaitians

Outside of Port-au-Prince jobs will be mainly created inagriculture, water shed management and road construction

Within Port-au-Prince jobs will mainly be created housing anddebris related development activities

Begin construction of 2 public and 3 private industrial parks

7 Water &Sanitation

Bring the sustainable access rate to controlled potable water from 2%to 50%

Bring the access rate to toilet / latrine meeting international standardsfrom some 10% to at least 27%

8 CapacityBuilding

Reinforce / create necessary sector tables Assist ministries in developing strategies and investment plans


7/38

- 6 -

HOUSING

Targets

The main target outcome is to reduce camp population by 400,000 people.

Other outcomes will include:

Complete registration of all earthquake-affected households and identify ahousing solution for each (return, reconstruction, relocation) along with afinancial support mechanism.

Provide temporary housing or reinforced shelter to families still in camps.

Complete the strategic plan for urban redevelopment of Port au Prince(phase 1) and other important urban areas and outlines for financial plans.

Put in operation a credit program for single and multifamily housing.

Rationale

The best approach for rehousing people affected by the earthquake in Haiti will be tohelp as many as possible return to their original neighborhoods while progressivelyimproving the safety and quality of life in those neighborhoods, and relocating thosewhose safety cannot be assured. This approach also favors interventions that allow thelargest number of people to move out of camps and into improved conditions in theshortest possible time, while maintaining the social networks and livelihoods onwhich camp residents rely for survival. Doing this requires improving constructionstandards, reducing the vulnerabilities of housing sites and neighborhoods, and

improving land use and expanding public services in neighborhoods. The rebuildingprocess should also provide economic opportunities in construction and related fieldsand be accompanied by new financing options for qualified families.

Yet not all can or should return to their former living arrangements, and allhouseholds do not need the same assistance. Therefore, the reconstruction programmust provide a range of shelter and housing solutions that meet the needs of theaffected families and options tailored to the needs of various groups: owners andrenters, the displaced and non-displaced, and urban and rural households. Many in theaffected population have already moved more than once, so care must be taken to seethat assistance does not result in renewed displacement (e.g. repeated relocation, rent

increases, or disputes over tenancy or land).

The goals are therefore to: (i) restore the status of households to what it was beforethe earthquake, that is, to help owners rebuild and to assist renters to reestablish theirrights as tenants; (ii) improve the safety of houses, and the safety and functionality ofneighborhoods that are reoccupied through community planning and a building backbetter approach; (iii) reduce the number of houses and neighborhoods in unsafe andundesirable locations using risk assessment and relocation; and (iv) ensure that bothreconstruction and new construction contribute to urban renovation and regionaldevelopment, as envisioned in the governments long-term rebuilding plan.


8/38

- 7 -

Required programs

The targets identified above are based on assumptions that more than 1,000 newhouses can be built per month during 2011, and that more than 2,000 houses permonth can be repaired. This requires the coordination of a large number of housingreconstruction actors, and the creation of a significant coordination and support

system for neighborhoods and reconstruction agencies.

Priority actions include: (1) designing and launching projects that provide financialand technical assistance to neighborhoods, and households for repair andreconstruction, in accordance with guidelines that reflect government policies (seedetails goals for 2011); (2) the registration of all earthquake-affected households, sothat all those affected become candidates for assistance; (3) the training of severalhundred builders in improved repair and reconstruction guidelines; (4) support forneighborhoods and municipalities, including the training of community planners andmobilizers and the establishment of community resource centers; and (5) the rapidcompletion of strategic urban development plans in Port au Prince and other affectedcities, so that the land use changes required by these plans require can be taken intoconsideration in replanning neighborhoods. Other programs to help specific groups,such as the development of credit programs, and targeted assistance for owners ofrental property, will also be needed.

Specific projects for 2011 include:

Demolition of 30% of all red houses (27,000 houses = 172,000 people movingback)

5,400 houses are rebuilt and 32,000 transitional shelters are provided inneighborhoods for ex-residents of red houses

Repair or retrofitting of 25% of all yellow houses (24,000 houses = 164,000people moving back)

Provision of basic services in neighborhoods to 67,000 returning households

Construction of 5,500 permanent or transitional relocation housing units in newsites (= 24,000 people)

Provision of temporary housing or reinforced shelter (121,000 units = 685,000people)

Funding requirements

The funding requirement to rehouse Haitis displace population will be enormous, butonly a portion of it will be spent on housingper se. Much more will be needed toremove rubble, and to improve the conditions in neighborhoods through serviceimprovements and risk reduction that will allow private investment in housing to takeplace.

Original funding commitments for the housing sector totaled $174 million.Reconstruction agency funding commitments to date have focused largely ontemporary shelter, so reconstruction commitments are still difficult to determine and

are often provided only in terms of number of houses. Nevertheless, projectionsfrom a number of agencies for the overall reconstruction to date total 21,000 repairs


9/38

- 8 -

and 15,000 new houses, against an estimated need of 23,000 repairs, 11,000 newhousing units, and 160,000 improved temporary shelters in 2011 alone to reach theproposed targets. For the entire reconstruction process, approximately 90,000 houseswill need to be rebuilt, and 93,000 repaired.

Funding needed to meet the targets for 2011 alone is estimated at $350,000,0001 ofwhich perhaps 40% is committed by various agencies, but is programmed to be spentover a longer time period (3 to 4 years). Government must remove the impedimentsthat are making it difficult for donors to spend the funding they have available (seebelow). Once that is done, agencies may then need to be encouraged to spend theirfunding commitments on more urgent needs, such as rubble removal, yellow houserepairs, and site preparation, rather than reserving it specifically for housingconstruction or reconstruction.

Policy decisions and institutional enablers

There are a number of policy decisions by government that will enable housingreconstruction to proceed more rapidly. They are shown in the following table:

Policy Area Issue Proposed Resolution

1 Landownership

Lack of clarity on status ofappropriated landspreventing agencyinterventions andencouraging land invasion

Government completes orabandons appropriationsprocesses for land declared ofpublic utility

2 Tenure

security

Risks for households

associated with lack ofsecurity of tenure ininformally settledneighborhoods

Government establishes

procedures to ensure tenurerights in enumerated informalneighborhoods

3 Registrationof households

Only those in camps havebeen registered, causingthem to stay in camps inorder to be eligible forexpected assistance

Registration of affectedpopulation is completed

4 Risk

management

Doubts about which

neighborhoods people cansafely return to

Government and donors agree on

strategies for mitigating risk inneighborhoods

5 Scaling upbuilding

Need to greatly expandcapacity to repair, retrofit,

Need for large scalegovernment-sanctioned training

1 This figure includes:$55 million for construction of new houses in new sites; $60 million to upgrade shelters or provide temporaryhousing;$30 million for new construction in existing neighborhoods$35 million for enumeration in neighborhoods$53 million for yellow house repairs

$30 million for housing reconstruction in neighborhoods$52 million to return temporary services to reoccupied neighborhoods$35 million for risk mitigation in neighborhoods


10/38

- 9 -

back better and rebuild safely, applyingnew building guidelines

program for builders,homeowners, and localgovernments; need forretrofitting guidelines

6 Financialassistance

Variety of proposals but noclarity on financial assistancefor households for housing

Government and donors developa unified financial assistancestrategy for households

7 Reconstruction policy

Lack of clear policyframework for housingreconstruction slowingagency interventions andmaking outcomes uncertain

Government approvesNeighborhood Return andHousing Reconstructionframework

Interdependence with other sectors

Housing and neighborhood reconstruction is not a single sector, but instead combinesinterventions in several IHRC sectors, including water and sanitation, disaster riskreduction, job creation, health, and education, among others. Housing decisions arealso strongly influenced by decisions made about investments in other sectors such astransport. Therefore, close coordination is needed among other sectors and housingand neighborhood investments.

This will be particularly important, for instance, when households are relocated fromcamps. In order to make it feasible for families to return, projects sponsors will needto ensure that there is safe drinking water, sanitary conditions, and health andeducation services operating in these neighborhoods. Without this coordination,

families may choose to remain in the camps.


11/38

- 10 -

DEBRIS REMOVAL AND MANAGEMENT

Introduction

Debris removal is key to most development and recovery priorities. Very little debrishas been removed few neighborhoods are mostly clear of debris and there are feworganizations that are removing debris on a large scale. Furthermore, existing work isbeing carried out without the guidance of an overall framework.

Debris removal has been slow to start in part because key policy decisions have notbeen made for instance not all buildings categorized as being beyond repair can yetbe demolished. Further, there is no reliable tracking mechanism in place to adequatelymonitor progress and there is not yet a full assessment of how much debris exists,making planning difficult.

A challenge of this complexity and magnitude demands an overall strategy. The

strategy should recognize multiple debris removal methods based on theireffectiveness given the particularities and constraints of each geographical area ratherthan a blanket strategy for the whole country.

It is also vital that a global strategy address how debris will be disposed and possiblyrecycled. The current uncontrolled dumping that is the norm for many sites may causefuture issues. The environmental impact of rubble disposal has been studied and therubble is an inert material that poses little significant risk, with source separation ofmunicipal & other waste streams. The plan also needs to address disposal sitemanagement, including best practices for site operation, enforcement mechanisms andcreating income generation opportunities through debris recycling where possible &

practical.

To date, there have been several estimates of the amount of debris generated by theearthquake. For the purpose of this document, it is assumed that there is a volume of10 million cubic meters of remaining debris to be removed.

The IHRC has created an approach targeted to remove 40% of debris by the end of itsmandate. Now is the time for immediate action. The international community mustcome together to execute the plan.

Debris removal efforts under way

There are many fragmented debris removal efforts underway. Supplementing thecontinuous effort of the Government of Haiti (GOH) on debris removal, variousNGOs, bi-lateral and multilateral actors have implemented debris removal projects onspecific streets and /or facilities. A proper strategic implementation led by theGovernment of Haiti requiring all organizations removing debris to provide periodicreports on progress made is needed to create a global view of all on-going efforts.

Recycling

Separating the rubble from waste is currently conducted, for the most part when it

occurs, on the collapsed or demolished structure site by hand. The rubble iscommonly reused in a number of ways:


12/38

- 11 -

Fill areas where there are issues with the condition of the land

Increase land mass near the sea front

Rehabilitate dirt roads

Fill holes in land when preparing terrain for shelter installation by crushing andlaying out the rubble

Construct gabion houses.

This use of the rubble may be utilizing an unskilled Haitian work force and can be asource of income to otherwise unemployed citizens, in addition to minimizing finaldisposal of reusable material. An advantage of this recycling alternative is that itrelieves the demand on construction material that will be necessary to repair andreconstruct the large number of affected structures. The process, however, can betime consuming and the rubble has to be stored relatively close to the site where itwill be used. It is also worth noting that sustainable practices and cultural acceptanceare of concern.

Several studies have been done and are continuing regarding the use of processedrubble as aggregate in concrete mix, for low strength concrete. Most studies so far arerecommending further studies before committing to the adequacy of such use.

Debris removal strategies

There are several approaches each with their respective set of advantages anddisadvantages:

1) The Neighborhood Approach (adopted by the UN, NGOs, American Red Cross),

entails working on debris removal in certain neighborhoods with the goal of

diminishing the various camps population. This approach requires close

coordination with government entities that oversee the area for efficient operation

and to address land ownership and dispute when occurring.

2) The Sector Grid Approach addresses debris removal by zones, using a one-

kilometer grid and a sub-sector 100 meter grid. This division does not take into

account existing jurisdiction boundaries, but have the advantage to cover the

entire area affected.

3) Systematic (US Army Corps of Engineer) Neighborhood Approach sectors the

impacted areas primarily by using the 10 Departments limits, further subdivided

into smaller sectors considering existing political, social, and economic

subdivisions. This approach, according to the US Army, should facilitate

assignment of debris management responsibility. That approach, similar from the

neighborhood approach, differs from it in the fact that entire affected area is

considered, divided, and prioritized prior to debris removal projects

implementation.


13/38

- 12 -

The time and cost to implement these strategies is different:

1) Neighborhood Approach: with an estimated ten such contracts working

simultaneously, and considering a total of 10 Million cubic meters remaining of

debris in the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan area, it can be anticipated that it will

take at best approximately 4 years to complete the effort, assuming a 7 day workweek. Further, using an average debris removal cost of $35 per cubic meter, this

effort can be implemented at a total cost of approximately $350 million.

2) Sector Grid Approach: if the debris removal effort was mainly implemented using

contracts similar to those using in downtown Port au Prince under contract for the

Government of Haiti, such contract shall require 18 months to complete an effort,

in large scale open areas such as the downtown government corridor also

assuming a 7 day work week. At a cost of $40 per cubic meter, the effort can be

implemented at a total cost of $400 Million. This does not address the

neighborhood specific programs, nor the density issues associated with same

3) Systematic Neighborhood Approach: as recommended, making use of existing

efforts (Neighborhood) supplemented by the GOHs own efforts, making use of

in-house forces and out-sourcing contracts may be the best solution to maximize a

variety of benefits. That may not be the most economical or the faster approach,

but the benefits in term of socio-economic and environmental considerations are

essential to a better future for the country. An estimated $ 400 million will be

required over 24 to 30 months.

The IHRC recommends a Systematic Neighborhood Approach: it would combineboth the neighborhood and the US Army approaches to ensure that entire earthquakeaffected areas are addressed without overlooking certain neighborhoods. In order toachieve this, the GOH will need to work closely and track the various organizationswork on debris removal and develop a plan to compensate areas not currentlyaddressed and/or incite additional interest from others capable of implementing debrisremoval projects. This plan will have the advantage of working within areas underthe jurisdiction of local authorities, for more effective coordination between allparties. In addition, a number of efforts already in progress can continue whileadditional resources are sought to complement them. This approach may also havesignificant costs savings potential with multiple disposal sites and strategic

implementation.

Target

By October 2011, 40% of all debris, representing 4 million cubic meters will beremoved


14/38

- 13 -

Rationale

Despite its higher cost, the systemic neighborhood approach is preferred over otherapproaches as it ensures debris removal in a relatively time efficient manner. This isessential for the recovery of Haiti for three primary reasons. First, the safety & health

of the people in Haiti. Secondly, the removal of debris is a clear prerequisite for otherdevelopment priorities such as housing, hospital and school construction. Thirdly, theremoval of debris will serve as a very visible manifestation of developmentimprovements.

Required programs

To reach this target will require a debris removal operation characterized as follows

24 separate & independent removal operations, each working a 6 day work week

Minimum of 12 disposal sites, with a minimum capacity of 333,000 cubic meters

each

These operations shall be distributed into various projects / contracts, but it isessential that they be supported by a central coordinating unit, ideally under theMTPTC and monitored to international standards for transparency

Funding requirement

Using the systemic neighborhood approach, an average cost of $40 per cubic meter isestimated. To remove 4 million cubic meters by October 2011 (40% of 10 million

cubic meters total debris), would therefore cost $160 million. The remaining 60% ofdebris would have a cost of $240 million, making for a total cost of $400 million, withsignificant cost saving potential through strategic goals and management thereof


Three things are particularly important to enable the execution of this debris removalprogram:

1) Government of Haiti to approve a minimum of 12 disposal sites, based on already

developed suggestions and additional new developments

2) Government of Haiti to develop and make public a policy for demolishing red

buildings, when the following conditions exist: A) Building conditions present a

danger to the community in general, based on proximity to public area or B) The

building has entirely collapsed or C) The building has not collapsed but damage is

so severe that it is beyond repair

3) Government of Haiti to create a team to support the coordinating efforts of the

MTPTC, with specific tracking mechanisms, onsite consistent daily inspection

and monitoring personnel, with daily reporting & confirmation.

The IHRC is ready and able to support the Government in developing these solutions.


15/38

- 14 -

Interdependencies with other sectors

The removal of debris is a key requirement for ensuring progress in otherdevelopment areas requiring construction. The selection of sites for debris removalmust therefore be seen in connection with other development plans. This coordination

can be enabled using detailed mapping, allowing for the assignment of priority sectorsfor debris removal.


16/38

- 15 -

EDUCATION

Introduction

This chapter is based on the Five-Year Plan of the Government that was finalizedthrough a joint effort of the Government, the Presidential Commission on Education

and main donors.

Overall, 10 years after the launching of the National Plan for Educationin 2000, anddespite a substantial increase in the number of schools and students, the nationalsystem continued to be characterized by:

Inadequate educational structures relative to the size of the population with over500,000 children deprived of any schooling, and 135 communal sections withoutany public schools of which 23 without any school facilities whether public orprivate;

Poor quality education which translates into low success and high loss ofstudents on the way;

Poor teaching performance at all levels;

Weak governance at all levels, including capacity by the Government to plan,monitor, supervise, and more generally to play its expected normative role.

The impact of the earthquake is well known and has been described in the PARDN.For instance, in the West Department, which receives 50 percent of entire caseload,80 percent of all structures were destroyed or damaged, representing some 3,804schools. On the human side, several thousands of students died, together withapproximately 1,350 teachers and 180 non-teaching personnel. In the South East, 279schools were destroyed or damaged. All vocational training centers of the countrywere either destroyed or severely damaged. Over 80 percent of the national universitystructures were seriously affected or totally destroyed.

In a context where everything is to be done, a stringent prioritization exercise wasundertakenwhich prioritized primary schooling that would benefit the majority of theyoung Haitians. The Five-Year Plan and more immediately this present plan needhoweverto remain ambitious so that Haiti does not face yet another lost generation, ina country that places education very high in the priority of the households, regardless

of the income.

Targets, rationale and programs

The short-term objectives are therefore in line with the longer-term ones, notably freeand compulsory access to quality education, and in particular the first 9 educationalyears as of 2021. Secondary and tertiary levels, vocational training and specializededucation are also important components of the Five-Year Plan although they do notfeature in the short-term at the same level as basic education. The Five-Year Plansoverall requirements have been estimated at some $4.3 billion. It is estimated thatHaiti will be able to cater for 25 percent of its needs and therefore a major

international effort will therefore be required over many years.


17/38

- 16 -

Priority will go in a first phase to rebuild, better, what was destroyed by theearthquake and build new schools in areas that had none to date. An equal prioritywill be given to fill the gap between expenditures and needs in the short and longerterm, keeping free educationfor the first 9 years in particularas the goal to attainwithin 10 years. In parallel special efforts will be devoted to improving thegovernance of the education sector as a whole. This includes strengthening the

ministrys capacity to plan, supervise and train, while increasing the States capacityto provide schooling to its young citizens.

The reality on the ground and the ambitious objectives of the country meet in thespecific goals that will need to be reached by the end of 2011, namely:

Infrastructure and equipment for fundamental schools

Clear 150 sites for schools and build 250 temporary structures

Build and staff 60 fundamentalschools in communal sections where no public

schools exist Equip up to 3000 schools (public and private)

Feed 250,000 children

Provide up to 500,000 children with an education kit (manuals and uniforms)

Provide up to 500,000 children with financial assistance in private schools ofUS$ 125/year

Train 5,000 teachers

Provide 10,000 teachers with a teaching kit

Overhaul the national Curriculum

Vocational training

Renovate and equip 3 vocational training centers

Literacy

Install and equip 1750 literacy centers

Tertiary education

Create a fund to support the rebuilding of universities

Develop and consolidate public university network in the regions, starting withLes Cayes/South, Gonaives/Artibonite and Cap Haitian/North), start to expandthe network to Jacmel/South east and Hinche/Centre.

Governance/support to the MENFP (including infrastructure)

Reinforce the Ministry at central and departmental levels


18/38

- 17 -

Others

Rebuild and equip 3 (out of a previous total of 23) centers for handicappedchildren

Funding requirements

The gap to implement this short-term effort stands at US$ 152.6 million as follows:

Sub-category Gap Cost ($152.6m2)

Infrastructure and equipment for fundamental schools $50m

Vocational training $25m

Literacy $4.6m

Tertiary education $15m

Governance/support to the MENFP (includinginfrastructure)

$56m

Others $2m

A major effort had already been undertaken in the spring and summer of 2010 toensure that as many children as possible could return to school for the autumnsemester 2010. Although dozens of thousands of students have benefitted fromefforts on this front, over half of the total requirements remained unmet.

Meeting the objectives outlined above will create a virtuous circle: an increasingnumber of children will be able to attend school, including many who were never ableto attend; over 10,000 temporary jobs will be created in the construction activities andseveral hundred permanent jobs will be created for the new schools to be built. Localproduce will be purchased for school feeding that will help improve farmers incomeboth in the short and long terms. The financial burden on poor households will bedecreased through more public schools and increase in the number of childrenreceiving financial assistance, thus decreasing the vulnerability of the poorest.

2 Does not include school feeding, financial assistance to children and supply of kits to children and teachers


19/38

- 18 -

ENERGY

Targets

Improve hours of electricity service to 30,000 urban households in Metropolitan

Port-au-Prince by 20% Expand electricity service to a minimum of 10,000 currently un-served families

in rural areas outside of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

Rationale

Even before the earthquake of January 2010, the power sector in Haiti was among themost problematic in the world. Only about one quarter of the population has access toelectricity service, of which half are connected illegally to the grid. Althoughresidential tariffs in Haiti are relatively low compared with other fossil fuel dependentcountries in the region, commercial and industrial tariffs are amongst the highest atabout $.35/ kWh. Lack of access to affordable and reliable power hinders investmentin the country, constrains the development of productive businesses, prevents the fullprovision of high quality social services, and degrades living standards for residentialcustomers.

Providing electricity service is by nature a process that has long lead times andrequires significant up front investment before tangible results are readily realized interms of actual service to customers. To address the problems endemic in the sectorrequires an approach that addresses the structural deficiencies in the management andgovernance of the sector and well as commits significant capital commitments to the

sector. As such, in addressing the developments possible in the sector during the 18-month mandate of the IHRC, one must by definition address on-going activities in thesector and determine to what degree these activities and projects can assist the IHRCis addressing the problems in the sector in the post-earthquake period.

Investments currently underway or being proposed for the short- term includeupgrading targeted distribution circuits, sub-station repairs, metering (particularly oflarge customers), relay coordination, and customer registration. Completion of theseprojects in Port-au-Prince will facilitate the improvement of service and help achievethe targeted goals. The projects will result in increasing the number of hours ofservice from the approximately 6-8 hours on average by at least 20%. This would

result in tangible results for citizens currently plagued by unreliable service.

Required programs

In terms of rural energy service, given the very low access rates in rural areas, off-gridor mini-grid solutions seem to be most appropriate, such as: (i) construction of hybridmini-grids with renewable energy and diesel back-up, and (ii) installation of solar PVpanels in more isolated, less densely populated areas, focusing on schools and healthcenters as a first step.

MTPTC must prepare a large-scale rural access plan that might define priorities andapproaches for access to off-grid communities. A rural access plan will help define anationwide strategy for rural access. Pilot projects to test potential models and


20/38

- 19 -

financing schemes could be launched immediately, involving local communities andthe private sector.

Funding requirement

For the short- and medium- term, investments for rehabilitating the distributionnetwork, including metering, in Port au Prince alone total about $65 million.

In the rural areas, the provision of electricity service of approximately 10,000families using renewable energy technology would require approximately $20

million3.

Thus overall program costs are approximately $85 million, of whichapproximately $20 million are currently committed by existing projects.


An appropriate institutional, legal and regulatory framework must be established toincrease transparency and accountability in the sector. There must be adequateauthority and institutional capacity to provide regulatory oversight of contracts withthe private sector and implement government policy with respect to the power sector.

A fundamental requirement would be the strengthening of the MTPTCs Unit deGestion de Secteur Energtique including the possible development of sub-sectoralunits focusing on renewable energy, rural electrification, and household energy andthe preparation of studies for the promotion of renewable energy, energy efficiency,and the development of an electricity access and household energy strategy.

Key interventions would focus on: (i) creating sustainable and long-term governmentcapacity to govern and oversee the power sector; (ii) enhancing macroeconomicgovernance through transparent financial flows; including for Independent PowerProducers contracts, Power Purchase Agreements, and cross-subsidies; (iii) improvingoversight of corporate governance at the enterprise level, (iv) establishing modalitiesfor a balanced and efficient participation of the private sector; and (v) supporting thepromotion of clean energy.


Through the education sector, there is an immediate need to establish trainingfacilities in the area of renewable energy training. This will ensure that the gainsrealized over the period of this mandate are sustainable in the long term through thework of trained technicians with the ability to service such technologies. TheMTPTCs energy unit will have to work directly with the Ministry of Education to putin place the foundations of an education program to provide technicians with therelevant skill set.

3 The conservative assumption in this scenario is that each family on average would require approximately 100watts of service. This includes the larger systems that service clinics, schools and community centers. The

assumed cost is approximately US$20/watt. This is a figure on the high end of current market conditions totake into account the uncertainties in the market conditions in supplying large scale systems in Haiti. It is apossibility that this figure can be reduced with efficient program implementation.


21/38

- 20 -

HEALTH

The health sector goals outlined in this document are based on recommendations ofthe IHRC Health team in close collaboration with the Ministry of Health,conversation with other Ministries, input from Donor supported technical assistants,and comments from group or individual sessions with NGO or private sector partners.The targets are consistent with the IHRC Health Teams overall strategy and approachas follows:

Supporting strategic planning and key policies of the Ministry of Health with anemphasis on developing a clear and comprehensive long term health strategy thataddresses key policy issues such as health care financing

Encouraging stakeholder alignments by working closely with stakeholdersacross sectors (public, private, NGOs) to support reconstructions and newconstructions according the public sectors priorities, directly address the needs ofareas affected by the earthquake, and contribute to the relocation process and

the long term geographic poles of development

Encouraging project submissions and support the project review process withefforts aimed at increasing the breadth of programs presented and ensuringalignment with the relevant IHRC sectors (e.g., housing, education)

The health sector target outcomes are segmented into two categories. Those thatsupport direct increases in clinical care referred to as Service Delivery and thosethat support the public and social structures in their ability to respond and monitor arereferred to as Institutional Strengthening with specific intervention areas as follows:

A. Service Delivery:

Infrastructure

Human Resources

Financing and Access to Care

B. Institutional Strengthening

Strategic Planning

Public Sector Capacity Strengthening

Civil Society Outreach

For each of the six areas mentioned above, the document below lays out targets,rationale, programs and funding requirements.

In addition to the two main categories, this plan also addresses the current situation ofthe cholera outbreak


22/38

- 21 -

Intervention area A: Service delivery

Infrastructure

1) Strategically strengthen health infrastructure to cover all major population centers

by supporting constructions that rebuild damaged structures, bring new clinicalservices to the relocation sites of the neighborhood approach and encourage

constructions that support the overall regional poles through the completion or

launch of 40 hospitals and 75 clinics

2) Create an emergency care network to reduce trauma fatalities by establishing

properly equipped emergency rooms and departmental ambulance networks

Restoring and increasing access through hospital and clinic infrastructure:

The earthquake left Haitis health infrastructure severely damaged. In the disaster

zone, 30 out of 49 hospitals collapsed or became unusable together with theMinistrys main building. There is a clear need to build and rebuild the infrastructureto a level that is beyond pre-earthquake levels in strategic locations with strongconstruction norms. Projects should first address the immediate reconstruction needsthat remain from the earthquake. Second, infrastructure should support IDPrelocation sites according to the Neighborhood Return and Housing ReconstructionFramework. Finally, the long term construction projects should reflect the economicpoles as described in the PARDN. This three-step approach will allowreconstructions of health care facilities in a way that responds to current needs,supports social services during relocation and contributes to the long term health carenetwork.

Currently, there are 32 hospitals projects and 57 clinics that are under construction orin the planning stage. While this is an impressive start, this pipeline needs to beexpanded to include 40 hospitals and 75 clinics. The IHRC has the followingexpectations for October 2011:

Specific Goals/Projects Gap Cost ($98m)

10 hospitals built or rebuilt20 hospitals constructions launched

10 hospitals with construction financing in place

$80m

30 clinics built or rebuilt30 clinics with constructions launched15 clinics with construction financing in place

$18m

Improving disaster response and reducing trauma related deaths by increasing

Emergency Care Network

Haitis emergency infrastructure was weak prior to the earthquake with few wellequipped hospitals and no publically administrated ambulance system. TheGovernment is targeting the refurbishing and provisioning of 20 hospitals (including

all 10 departmental hospitals) and the establishment of an ambulance network


23/38

- 22 -

administered by coordination centers at the departmental level. Current MSPP andRed Cross ambulances would become part of this network.


Fully equip 20 emergency rooms (in 10 departmentalhospital + 10Hpital Communautaire de Rfrence) $2m

Implement 60 ambulances in National Ambulance Network(public + Haitian RC)

$3m

Establish an Ambulance Network coordination centers ineach of the 10 departments

$1m

In order to successfully coordinate the reconstruction effort across sectors, aNeighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction Framework with a clear set ofrecommendations for social support needs to be developed and validated. A keycomponent will be developing a Carte Sanitaire (health infrastructure map) thatwould take into account current service gaps and population movements to guideprioritized areas for health care services, and facilitate the transition frommobile/temporary clinics to permanent service sites. Building codes that take intoaccount multi-disaster risk management and access for those with disabilities will alsobe needed, in alignment with the overall reconstruction and housing efforts. Lastly,the Emergency Room minimum package of services should be revisited to take intoaccount lessons learned from the earthquake and the cholera epidemic.

Human resources

Strong human capital is a fundamental component of service delivery and mustaccompany the infrastructure efforts in order to achieve a well functioning health caresystem. The earthquake damaged three out of the four accredited medical schools.The largest nursing school was destroyed in Port-au-Prince, tragically killing almostthe entire second year class. Four health technical schools were also destroyed. Thisis a huge setback to an education system that was, even prior to the earthquake,struggling to produce and retain enough health care workers to serve the Haitianpopulation.

For this reason, the IHRC is calling for projects that address the human resourcedeficit in the health sector, including administrative capacity to serve in central and

departmental public offices. Reinforcement projects are listed as follows:

Specific Goals/Projects Gap Cost ($21.5m)

Reinforce 4 medical schools and 10 specialty trainingprograms

$10m

Reinforce 4 nursing schools $5m

Launch the training of 4,000 Allied Health professionals $3m

Complete the training of 3,000 Health Agents $3m

Support training of 10 individuals for a Masters in PublicAdministration

$0.1m

Fund 10 scholarships for Masters in Public Health $0.4m


24/38

- 23 -

In the context of continued losses of trained physicians and nurses, a reviewed publicsalary grid should be considered to ensure the long term success of reinforced traininginstitutions. To encourage public sector retention and improve the public sectorsability to monitor and coordinate the re-designed health care system, professional

development of current staff as well as clear career plans for future employees, assuggested by the recent Ministry institutional audit, should also promoted. Alliedhealth professionals will play a major role in the new healthcare system andguidelines about the priority fields (i.e. psychologists, physical therapists) will beneeded, along with reflections and recommendations on training and approaches toabsorption of newly trained professionals.

Financing and Access to Care

A system-wide health systems financing method to ensure increased access to health

care will be needed. There are multiple proposals on how to achieve this goal, yetnone has been developed into a comprehensive strategy.

A common approach involves using existing platforms for maternal and child health.Programs such as Soins Obsttriques Gratuits (SOG/free obstetrics care) havebenefitted over 60,000 women, out of an estimated 280,000 women who give birthevery year. A companion pilot program introduced after the earthquake provided freecare in several institutions to children under 5 years old. By October 2011, theIHRCs aim is to help provide support so that free obstetrics care can be expanded toserve 100,000 women. This will not only require the program to be launched inadditional institutions, but will also need continued outreach to encourage women to

engage with clinics during and after their pregnancy.


Maternal and Newborn access to care for 100,000pregnancies (35% of estimated total)

$12m

The Government will work with the IHRC and partners towards a comprehensivestrategy for health care financing beyond the SOG and other pilots underway.

A review of current approaches, engagement with the Private Sector and feasibilitystudies based on projected growth should be considered by the Government and itspartners. Moreover, these studies should be completed with the goal of implementingthe strategy as part of a larger government social sector plan.

Intervention area 2: Institutional strengthening

Strategic planning

In addition to encouraging project submissions, the Government also works with itspartners and the IHRC to develop long term strategic planning. This is a critical

component of institutional strengthening, as it facilitates government leadership overa more coordinated sector. The goals for October 2011 include:


25/38

- 24 -


Assist in developing and then begin implementing the longterm strategic health plan

Develop a comprehensive disaster plan that involves thekey government offices affected and addresses the HR,technical and basic logistics needs of an effective publicsector response

Support cross sector planning for key policies such asschool based health programs, healthcare financing,occupational and employee health, use of technology forpublic safety and social support for the vulnerable

$5m

These strategic documents will need the input of all major ministries and donors. Fullcooperation and coordination is critical to the creation and adoption of such plans.

Public Sector Capacity Strengthening

The Ministry of Healths capacity to both respond and manage the response to the2010 earthquake and cholera outbreak has been strongly affected by the loss in HRand structures. Current staff has had to work long hours and have had to face newchallenges in their efforts at coordinating a significantly higher number of nationaland international partners. As noted in the Ministrys institutional audit, careerdevelopment programs will play a key role in effectiveness and retention. Fundsshould thus be allocated to support continuing education for public health officials in

key areas like leadership, conflict management, epidemiology, supply management,public health forecasting and coordination. In terms of physical infrastructure, theMSPP departmental offices are in great need of upgrades since the facilities lack thebasic necessities required for an appropriate work environment capable of supportingthe national move towards decentralization. Additionally, the central MSPP office,which is currently housed in a temporary structure, will need to be rebuilt.


Create continuing education program for public healthofficials (leadership, coordination, budgeting)

$5m

Construct/Refurbish 10 departmental health offices $0.5m

Rebuild MSPP $1.5m

Funding organizations committed to public sector strengthening will be essentialpartners in reinforcing and expanding the Ministry of Healths capacity.

Civil society outreach

For effective and grounded policies that ensure responsible local society engagement,reinforcement and, when needed, full support will be required for civil society groupsthat are able to advocate for communities or vulnerable groups in need. Beyond


26/38

- 25 -

funding, technical support including IHRC outreach sessions to support target groups,such as the disabled, or rural associations will be considered.

Specific Goals/Projects Cost ($5m)

Provide vulnerable groups access to IHRC and MSPPthrough information sessions, ministry liaisons andfinancing

$5m

This strategy will need to be coordinated both internally (with the Social Recoverysectors) and externally (with different ministries levels of government) with a clearlist of priority target groups. Lessons can be learned from HIV globally and locallyprograms that enable people living with HIV the ability to provide recommendationsto policymakers.

Cholera Response Strategy

As of December 8th, 2010, the MSPP data shows that cholera has killed more than2,120 people and has sickened at least 90,000 in all 10 of Haiti's departments.Epidemiological modeling carried out by PAHO/WHO and the U.S. Centers forDisease Control and Prevention (CDC) for planning purposes projects an estimated400,000 cases over the first 12 months, with as many as half those cases occurring inthe first three months of the epidemic. The Government of Haiti began an activeresponse and the IHRC Health team joined the effort by providing technical assistancein keeping with its usual 3 areas of work as follows:

Alignment of StakeholdersUnderstanding the MSPP and Public Sector needs at the central and local levels

In the emergency phase, the Ministry of Health quickly activated its responsemechanism and worked with the media and international partners on the response. Asthe Epidemic spread, the Presidents office activated the COUN (national emergencyresponse system), and the IHRC health team provided technical assistance to theMinistry and the COUN, as they established a list of most pressing needs to respondto the cholera epidemic. It has been able to determine departments needs in terms ofinstallation of clinical services (new Cholera Treatment Centers and Units), outreach,

and sanitation, logistics (transport and storage), supplies, human resources andtreatment of medical waste.

Coordination

The Government, with its partners, notably the IHRC Health Team, has taken anactive part in coordinating the proper allocation of partners resources givendepartmental needs. Members of the health cluster and interclusters, along with theprivate sector and country partners, were brought to the COUN, where the barriersthey faced towards a rapid response were addressed.


27/38

- 26 -

Advocacy

All partners were actively encouraged to align their interventions with the MSPPthree-level national strategy and accompany public entities in their response. Sincethe epidemic is expected to last months, close coordination and leadership by theGovernment will be essential with partners in academia, the private sector and others

on alternative approaches to dealing with the epidemic and minimizing its impact ifand when it becomes endemic to the country.

Project Approval

With the epidemiologic projections, the Cholera epidemic will become a major healthissue for months to years and represents a true tragedy. Given the many partnersinvolved in the response, the IHRC may decide to encourage submission of projectsrelated to the cholera epidemic in so far as they reinforce the capacity of theGovernment both centrally and across departments in its ability to manage this orsimilar outbreaks now and in the future. An emphasis would therefore be on programs

that address the essential elements needed to manage outbreaks over time and inreducing the mortality associated with such epidemics, like improvements in waterand sanitation infrastructure or support for public sector response.


28/38

- 27 -

JOB CREATION

Targets and rationale

Job creation is a top priority for Haitis recovery. While employment statistics aredifficult to measure, Haiti has the highest unemployment rate in the region and likelythe whole developing world. At least 70% of the population does not have stable jobsand the percentage of the population below 18 only increases the urgency of creatingmeans for stable income earning.

Job creation is necessarily a cross-sectoral effort and is often a result of indirectstimuli many new jobs will come through a strong recovery and increasedinvestment. Targets are therefore directional and more heavily dependant on theprogress of the overall recovery effort. Nevertheless, in the spirit holding itself andthe international community accountable, the IHRC puts forward the followingaspirations:

If the pledged funds for 2011 arrive in time to kickoff projects that maximize jobcreation, the Commission estimates that hundreds of thousands of additionalHaitians can have full-time employment by the end of its mandate. These shouldinclude:

Jobs outside Port au Prince, primarily in agriculture, watershed managementand road construction

Jobs from housing and debris related development activities

In addition, by October 2011, the Commission targets 2 public and 3 privateindustrial parks to have commenced construction.

Programs required and interdependencies with other sectors

There are several ways in which the IHRC can stimulate job growth:

Ensure that the activity of the recovery (e.g., debris removal or house repair)maximizes the temporary local jobs created and provides the skill buildingnecessary for helping workers find more sustainable jobs

Target specific projects to increase the number of permanent jobs available in

sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing; the means can be diverse rangingfrom creating a credit facility to building industrial parks, for example

Carry out effectively the work of the Commission to speed up Haitis recovery,kickoff needed infrastructure projects, build government capacity and directinternational investment to make the country an attractive environment forforeign direct investment as a way to create an environment suitable for rapid

job creation.

The IHRC is doing all three of these things. The IHRC is mainstreaming job creationthrough its project review process, mandating that projects maximize local job

creation. It has also approved several projects, such as a $174 M industrial park, thatwill create tens of thousands of new sustainable jobs. Furthermore, the Commission


29/38

- 28 -

has always made it known that Haiti is open for investment, and is working to convertthe remarkable response from the international community into sustainableinvestment in Haitis private sector.

Donors can help achieve its job creation target in three ways.

First, they can be mindful of the Commissions criteria as they relate to job creation.In particular, with regard to using local labor and services, sourcing locally, anddesigning programs to build the capability of workers. Below is the specific criteriaused by the commission to evaluate projects that are applicable to job creation.

Criterion 8:SustainableChange

Does the project promote sustainable change?

Projectsustainability

Does the project have an adequate plan in place to ensurethat GOH or other entities or project beneficiaries will havesufficient resources and/or capabilities to sustain the project'simpact?

General

considerations

- Does the project provide for sufficient capability building

and training so that local Haitians can gain long-term

benefit from the project and/or take a greater role in its

continuing operation?

- Does the project provide for sufficient support for ongoing

operations of the infrastructure or facilities created by the

project?

- Does the project have a clear plan for transferring

responsibilities for operating costs to the Government or

other entities? Or, does the project have a plan for

establishing cost-recovery measures to ensure the project is

continuously viable?

- Similarly, does the project have a method for gaining buy-

in to the long-term success of the project from the local

community?

- Where relevant, do the projects build back better to reduce

risk from disasters, including earthquakes, fires, hurricanes

and other natural shocks?Criterion 9: Localsourcing

Where relevant, does the project intend to maximize itsuse local resources given its scope and objectives?

Local jobs Does the project appear to have taken prudent steps to createlocal jobs?

General

considerations

- Does the project use the level of local labor that might be

expected given the project objectives, the skills required to

complete the project and the skill of local labor?

- Does the project take steps to increase the amount of local

labor that it uses over time through training programs and


30/38

- 29 -

other capability building measures?

Local sourcing Does the project appear to have taken prudent steps to sourcematerial locally?

General

considerations

- Does the project use the local materials that it might be

expected to use given the objectives of the project, thematerials required and the availability/practicality of

obtaining the materials in Haiti?

-Does the project take steps to increase its local sourcing

over time?

-Does the project adequately consider whether its

procurement policies and the services it provides negatively

impact the local economy by replacing what the local

economy could have supported/provided on its own?

Examples of projects taking the above considerations seriously abound. The WorldBank submitted a housing project that willutilize and train local workers to help withthe repair and construction of Housing. A project by the Solar Electric Light Fund, anNGO, will employ 195 Haitians to install solar powered energy and will train 3Haitians to maintain the equipment permanently.

Second, donors can help achieve job creation targets by designing and submittingprojects to directly produce sustainable jobs the IHRC has specified that it wouldlike 2 public and 3 private industrial parks to be under construction by October 11.The government of Haiti, USAID and the IDB worked together on the first phase ofcreating an industrial park, which will eventually employ 65,000 people directly.

Other projects that produce sustainable jobs are, of course, welcome and will beconsidered by the Commission. For example, The IDB created a financing facility forsmall and medium enterprises, which will stimulate local job creation.

Third, by engaging with the Commission, and spreading the message about what theinternational community is investing in Haiti, donors can help to attract privateinvestment. Donors can also structure programs to incentivize private investment inthe country.


31/38

- 30 -

WATER AND SANITATION

The Government of Haiti has recently developed a strategy for water through aclosely coordinated effort of all major partners, under the leadership of the waterdepartment (DINEPA) of the MTPTC. A law on water was also passed last year anda new structure for the water department was enacted as well. These initiativesillustrate the will of Haiti to come to grip with a water problem that had become a topnational and international priority.

Substantial funds were approved by various donors (IDB and Spain notably) thatallowed for the implementation of the water strategy to be implemented. Suchimplementation will take several years due to the scale of the problem, fromprotection of water sources, construction of main pipes, renovation of water systemsin most urban areas, quality assurance, cost recovery, governance.

The cholera outbreak has illustrated the need for such a strategy. It also increased the

level of urgency associated with its implementation, resulting in a more immediateneed of additional funds.

Target outcomes

A. Bring the sustainable access rate to controlled potable water from 2% to 50%

Today hardly anyone in Haiti has access to drinkable water. By the end of2011, 6.5 million people will have access to chlorination out of whom 5million will have a guaranteed long term access to chlorination: 3 million inurban areas, 1.5 million in rural or semi-urban areas, 500,000 in remote areas

and 30,000 families in sensitive areas. Chlorination will be controlled byDINEPA on a regular basis throughout the territory.

B. Bring the access rate to toilet / latrine meeting international standards from some10% to at least 27%

Over 250,000 persons in the metropolitan area and 2.5 million other personswill have access to a latrine by end of 2011, according to the normscirculated by DINEPA.

Rationale

Facing the magnitude of the recent cholera outbreak, the DINEPA developed aresponse strategy that spans a period ending at the end of 2011. This strategy waspublicly announced on November 24th. The recent epidemic is a direct consequence ofneglected sanitary conditions and access to potable water, which in fact have beendeteriorating for the last 10 or 20 years. The DINEPA strategy, although presented inthat context, aims more broadly to develop the necessary tools for a rapidimprovement that would be controlled and measurable as well as to develop thefoundations for a sustainable management of the infrastructure.


32/38

- 31 -

The financing plan of this strategy is ambitious but fully integrates the fundingalready committed and that at work in implementation. It plans to redirect money tothose priorities or simply to accelerate the implementation process where possible.

Required programs

To achieve the above target outcomes, the following programs will need to beimplemented:

A. Bring the sustainable access rate to controlled potable water from 2% to 50%

Access to local procurement of chlorinated products along Governmentnorms.

Renovation or upgrading of the urban water networks to the standard of theDrinkable Water Supply Program.

Setting up of additional water points in remote zones in rural areas.

Creation of drinkable water stations in areas at risk (lower-Artibonite)

Certification of bottled water

B. Bring the access rate to toilet / latrine meeting international standards from 0% to27.5%

Sanitation program in the camps of the metropolitan zone.

Campaign to build and install latrines in rural and semi-urban areas.

Setting up of infrastructure and system for disposal of human wastes.

C. Programs contributing indirectly to outcomes A and B

Hygiene promotion campaign

Reinforcement of national and regional coordinating and managementcapacity.

Deployment of sanitary workers throughout the territory.

Sensitization and distribution (soap, hygienic kits) programs in schools.

Support to health centers, including cholera treatment centers and units.

Funding requirement

The total funding needed to achieve the target outcomes detailed above is $69.9M. Atotal of approximately $35M have already been directly committed to these outcomesby IDB, AECID and the World Bank. Other funds have also been committed byseveral other organizations including for instance NGOs and UN agencies, whichbring the total commitment to approximately $51M. In order to meet the aboveprescribed target outcomes, the program is therefore still in need of approximately$19M.


33/38

- 32 -


The water & sanitation sector is heavily linked with the Health sector. The Ministry ofHealth and DINEPA have shared the strategy for cholera response and plan to sign aMemorandum of Understanding. To that effect, please refer to the short description ofthe cholera outbreak response to date in the Health section of this document.


34/38

- 33 -

SUPPORTING AND REINFORCING THE CAPACITY OF HAITIAN

INSTITUTIONS

Almost one year after the earthquake accounts of the recovery have identifiedcoordination as a major challenge in both the humanitarian and development efforts.A lack of coordination is often a result of a dearth of leadership, or of recognizedleadership. The IHRC will help address this gap by making clear the central role ofGovernment in the recovery and providing the means for the Government to beeffective in its leadership role.

In order for sustainable development to occur, the coordinating responsibility for therecovery needs to be placed with the government. All concerned ministries or Haitianentities must be involved at all stages from the concept, to the planning andimplementation phases of all major operations, humanitarian or development.

The best way to accomplish this in the short term is to place the government at the

center of existing mechanisms, which include the humanitarian clusters and sectortables. Ultimately, the humanitarian clusters should fold into sector tables to createforums for the wider recovery effort.

Prior to the earthquake, sector tables had been put in place with mixed results. Butthose that played a positive role had the constant support of the ministry at the highestlevel, suggesting that sector tables can succeed with strong government leadership.

A number of positive steps have already been taken over the past few months: TheGovernment has taken control of an increasing number of humanitarian clusters and isnow chairing or participating in most of them. A few sector tables have resurfaced

under the leadership of relevant ministries. But these positive developments are lostin a multitude of silo coordinating mechanisms that have only superficial links witheach other and the governmental.

These coordination structures must be adapted without delay to center around thesector tables, led by the ministries. Sector tables must be reinforced with a broadercomposition and more ambitious mandate than before the earthquake. At the sametime, it will be necessary to limit the number of sector tables in recognition to thecapacity of the main actors and avoid over-compartmentalizing development action.

The sector tables must be recreated with the following principles:

Principle Description

Ministrymanagement

The sector tables must be managed by the ministries at the mostsenior levels possible. Ministry sector table leaders must havedecision power.

Support fromdedicatedsecretariat

The secretariat must be made up of existing ministerial planningunits or similar units, with the added support of additionalexpertise as required. The IHRC should bring its own expertisein direct support to the head of the secretariat.

Broadparticipation

The composition of the sector tables must be broadened toinclude main donor and implementation partners. All partners


35/38

- 34 -

must be ready to be represented by others, to limit the number ofparticipants and facilitate decision making. The private sectorand Haitian civil society should be represented wheneverpossible too.

Dedicatedfinancial support

The cost of the secretariats should be borne by the largest donorin a given sector or by pooling resources, as eamed mostappropriate by the ministries and donors concerned

The same principles should apply, whether a ministry or an inter-ministerial set up isdeemed necessary.

This new sector table-based coordination architecture needs to follow the structure ofthe PARDN and work with the IHRC, given its coordinating mandate and strategicfocus. Well functioning sector tables or equivalent will in fact reinforce theeffectiveness of the IHRC.

Such a coordinating mechanism will require support over the long term, henceparticipants to the tables must ensure that their commitment is aligned with theselong-term requirements.

The task of the reinforced sector tables will be made easier if the humanitarianclusters concerned rapidly merge into their respective tables. This will create thesynergy necessary between humanitarian action and the broader development contextand ensure that they are mutually reinforcing. Certain clusters not covered by theabove sector tables will probably need to continue their activities, but might need toregroup to ensure an efficient interface with the tables.

The secretariats will require different levels of financial support that will depend onthe size and outside expertise required. Considering a secretariat of 5-6 persons, withoffice, equipment and other related support, including outsourcing certain activities tocomplete strategies and investment plans, an average of US$ 1.5 million yearly persecretariat is deemed necessary.

The reconstruction of Haiti with substantially more resources and larger internationalpresence requires no less than this. Beyond political support and inclusiveness, it alsorequires dedicated units in support of the coordinating role of the ministries. This is amust to meet up to the challenges of shifting from a humanitarian to a developmentmode, while accelerating the finalization of sector strategies and also accelerating

their implementation.

The following sector tables/coordinating entities with secretariats should be created orreinforced without delay:

Sector Government chair

HousingMAST, as chair of the inter-ministerialcommission on Housing

Debris removal MTPTC

Infrastructure MTPTC


36/38

- 35 -

Health and nutrition MSPP

Education MENFP

Agriculture and environment MARNDR and MOE

Food security CNSARisk reduction and management MICT

Water, sanitation and hygiene DINEPA

Rule of law MSPJ

Institutional building anddecentralization

MPCE and MEF

The IHRC must help the ministries build the needed capacity to lead

The ministries must, with the support of the international community, put in placeadequate mechanisms to fulfill their leadership role. In the immediate term, the IHRCcan help ensure that the Government builds the capacity necessary to effectively takeon its coordination responsibility. It can direct support to key ministries as they draftor update strategic and investment plans.

The IHRC can also lead the international communitys strategy for capacity buildingmore broadly. While there is a growing consensus that the central role of theGovernment is key for the success of the recovery of the country, such a consensushas yet to translate into a good understanding regarding what Haitian institutions

require. Too often, the catch phrase fragile states hides a misunderstanding as tothe real capacity of the Government. Lack of management capacity, lack of technicalcapacity, and lack of financial resources are lumped together, whereas they requiredifferent strategies to address.

The IHRC can rekindle a dialogue with the international community on how to createa concerted and coherent approach to institution building. It is critical that the donorcommunity resurrects this dialogue and build on and recommit to the work that hadalready been done before the earthquake.


37/38

- 36 -

IN SUMMARY

To achieve these important goals for Haitis recovery and development,approximately $990 m will be needed in construction or investment. The IHRC callsupon donors and investors who have already made pledges to fulfill them, and ask foreveryone to consider new pledges to fill the significant funding gaps that remain.

Over the coming weeks and months, IHRC teams will work with the implementingcommunity to map ongoing projects against the target outcomes in this plan. Togetherwith the ministries, the IHRC will soon also be calling for precise projects andprograms to be accomplished by donor and implementer communities. These requestswill clearly lay out information such as:

A description of the tangible impact pursued

A broad description of the work to be done

A list of the concrete deliverables and outputs An estimate of total cost and guidelines for unit costs where applicable

For each of the priority areas in the plan the government will play a crucial role inmaking key policy decisions and putting in place the necessary institutional enablersto make change possible. The IHRC will work with the relevant governmentalorganizations to prioritize what everyone can do to deliver the most significantimpact.

There is much to be done, and expectations are high. Delivering on these expectations

will require everyone to do their part and more. The IHRC looks forward to being apartner with the people of Haiti and those in the Haitian and International communityfor as long as its mandate continues.


38/38

A CALL TO ACTION

Achieving the targets set above will require the contribution of several keystakeholders. Four categories of stakeholders will be particularly important to theexecution of this plan; and there are specific needs from each.

Figure 1: Roles and responsibilities of recovery stakeholders

The contribution of board members representing Haitis most generous donors andrepresentatives of the Haitian community towards the execution of this strategicplan will be instrumental to Haitis recovery and development. At the upcoming boardmeeting in December, IHRCs Co-Chairs and Executive Director hope to engage in adiscussion with Board members on the implications of the strategic plan and howeveryone present can work together to make a positive difference in the lives of theHaitian people.

Roles and responsibilities

Implementers

Accelerate the implementation of projects already approved by the IHRC

Operationalize and implement additional projects called for by the IHRCin the context of the strategic plan

Adapt current projects toward strategic plan outcomes where possible

Donors/Investors

Accelerate the pace of disbursement of funds alreadycommitted/allocated to IHRC-approved projects, particularly projects inline with the strategic plan targets

Commit unallocated funds in priority to projects that will contribute directly

to targets of the strategic plan

Adapt current projects toward strategic plan outcomes where possible

IHRC

Coordinate efforts

Complete the detailing of projects towards strategic plan targets

Work with proponents to refine project concepts for implementation

Publicize the targets and request relevant projects

Government ofHaiti

Ensure outlined enablers are in place for the execution of strategic plantargets

Answer relevant public policy questions in a timely manner

Documents

Stategic Plan for the Remainder of ICRH Dec 2010