MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2019ME41Docket: And-17-553Argued: October25,2018Decided: March14,2019Revised: July16,2019Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Majority: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Concurrence: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andMEAD,J.

STATEOFMAINEv.

DAVIDT.BROWNJABAR,J.

[¶1] David T. Brown appeals from a judgment of conviction of four

counts of aggravated trafficking in scheduleW drugs (Class A), 17-AM.R.S.

§1105-A(1)(E)(1)(2018)(Counts1-4),andonecountofunlawfulpossession

ofscheduleWdrugs(ClassC),17-AM.R.S.§1107-A(1)(B)(3)(2018)(Count5),

enteredbythecourt(AndroscogginCounty,Delahanty,J.)followingajurytrial.1

Brown’sprimarycontentiononappealisthattherewasinsufficientevidence

1Brownwasalsoconvictedoffourcountsofviolatingaconditionofrelease(ClassE),15M.R.S.

§1092(1)(A)(2018)(Counts6-9),afterhewaivedhisrighttoajurytrialonthosechargespursuanttoM.R.U.Crim.P.23(a).BecauseBrowndoesnotassignerrortotheseconvictions,wedonotaddressthemfurther.

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that he traffickedwithin 1,000 feet of a school.2 Because the State did not

present evidence from which a jury could rationally conclude beyond a

reasonabledoubtthatBrowntraffickedwithin1,000feetofaschool,wevacate

the aggravating factor that elevated the crime from Class B trafficking in

schedule drugs, 17-A M.R.S. §1103(1-A)(A) (2018), to Class A aggravated

trafficking in schedule W drugs, 17-AM.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(E)(1),3 and we

remandtotheUnifiedCriminalDocketforresentencing.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2] By criminal complaint filed on February 21, 2017, and then by

indictment filed on May 5, 2017, Brown was charged with four counts of

aggravated trafficking in schedule W drugs (Class A). See 17-AM.R.S.

§1105-A(1)(E)(1).Viewedinthelightmostfavorabletothejury’sverdict,the

record supports the following facts. See State v. Adams, 2015 ME 30, ¶2,

113A.3d583.

2Brownalsocontendsthattherewasinsufficientevidencethathepossessedtherequisiteamount

of cocaine base in order to invoke the permissible inference for trafficking under 17-A M.R.S.§1103(3)(B)(2018)andtosustainaconvictionunder17-AM.R.S.§1107-A(1)(B)(3)(2018).InlightofourrecentandcontrollingholdinginStatev.McLaughlin,2018ME97,189A.3d262,weaffirmtheconvictionsonCount4andCount5anddonotdiscussCount5further.WediscussCount4onlywithregardtotheaggravatingfactoroftraffickingwithin1,000feetofaschool.

3Asrelevanttothiscase,17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E)(2018)providesthatapersoncommitstheenhancedtraffickingoffenseifthatperson“violates[17-AM.R.S.§1103]”and“[a]tthetimeoftheoffense,thepersonisonaschoolbusorwithin1,000feetoftherealpropertycomprisingaprivateorpublicelementaryorsecondaryschoolorasafezone.”

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A. FourCountsofAggravatedTrafficking

[¶3] In December 2016, an agentwith the federalDrug Enforcement

Agency (DEA) began conducting a series of controlled purchases of crack

cocaine from Brown using a confidential informant. Brown resided on the

secondfloorofanapartmentbuildinglocatedat72WalnutStreetinLewiston,

inthevicinityoftheGovernorJamesB.LongleyElementarySchool,whichis

locatedonBirchStreet.Theapartmentbuildinghastwoentrances:oneatthe

front of the building onWalnut Street and another on the right side of the

buildingonPrinceStreet.TheentranceonthePrinceStreetsideproceedsupa

flightofstairstothesecondfloor.Onthesecondfloor,adooroffthestairsleads

intothekitchenareaoftheapartment.Thereisalivingroomtotheleftofthe

kitchenandoffofthelivingroomaretwobedrooms.Thebedroomclosestto

WalnutStreetbelongedtotheowneroftheapartmentbuilding,andtheother

bedroomwasBrown’s.4

[¶4] During the first day of trial, the confidential informant testified

about the three controlled buys from Brown, each of which took place

4Theevidenceconcerningthegenerallayoutoftheinteriorofthe72WalnutStreetapartment

wasprovidedthroughthetestimonyofvariouswitnesses.Additionally,therewasonephotographtakenfromthestreetthatdepictedthefrontoftheapartmentbuildingandataxmapshowingthelocation of Longley Elementary School and a portion of Walnut Street, but not the location of72WalnutStreetspecifically.Therewasnoevidencethatshowedordescribedtheentirelayoutoftheapartment,suchasaschematicdiagram.

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somewhereinBrown’sapartment.Theconfidentialinformanttestifiedthatshe

enteredtheapartmentfromthePrinceStreetsidedoorandwouldmeetBrown

ineitherhisbedroomorthelivingroom.Withregardtotheactuallocationof

thecontrolledbuys,shetestified:

Q And where would you meet when you go inside of72Walnut?

A Usually,ifitwasn’tthelivingroom,itwashisbedroom. ....Q Okay.Okay.Soyouwouldgointothat[bedroom]andyou...

A Iusuallywouldn’tgointotheroom.Iwouldn’tgo[nowhere]

pastthedoor.Iwouldstandatthedoorlike...outthedoor.Andhehadadresser,dohisthing,giveme--ifitwasn’tthere,itwasonthatendtableinthelivingroom.

[¶5]ThefirstcountofaggravatedtraffickinginscheduleWdrugsstems

from the first controlled purchase, which occurred on December 23, 2016.

Duringthiscontrolledbuy,Brownsoldtheconfidentialinformant2.8gramsof

crack cocaine in exchange for $400. Describing this buy, the confidential

informant testified that Brownwas “in the bedroom” and that she gave the

moneytohiminreturnforcrackcocaine.

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[¶6]Thesecondcontrolledpurchase,whichwasthebasisofthesecond

count of aggravated trafficking in schedule W drugs, took place on

December29,2016. During thiscontrolledbuy,Brownsold theconfidential

informant1.737gramsofcrackcocaineinexchangefor$400.Theconfidential

informantdidnottestifyaboutpreciselywhereshewasinsidetheapartment

duringthisbuy.

[¶7] The third and final controlled purchase was conducted on

February10,2017,whenBrownsoldtheconfidentialinformant1.69gramsof

crackcocainefor$300.Thiscontrolledbuyledtothethirdcountofaggravated

trafficking in schedule W drugs. Again, the confidential informant did not

testifyaboutthepreciselocationofthisbuy.

[¶8] Following the three controlled buys, law enforcement officers

obtainedandexecutedasearchwarrantfortheapartmentat72WalnutStreet.

While searching Brown’s bedroom, a DEA agent discovered a bag of crack

cocaineweighingapproximately27grams.Thisformedthebasisforafourth

count of unlawful trafficking in scheduleWdrugs based on the permissible

inferenceprovidedin17-AM.R.S.§1103(3)(B)(2018)thatBrown’spossession

of fourteen grams or more of cocaine constituted unlawful trafficking in

scheduleddrugs.

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[¶9]TheStatechargedallfourcountsasaggravatedtrafficking,alleging

that the drugs were discovered, and the controlled buys occurred, within

1,000feetoftherealpropertyofLongleyElementarySchool.See17-AM.R.S.

§1105-A(1)(E)(1).

B. EvidenceConcerningtheDistanceBetween72WalnutStreetandLongleyElementarySchool

[¶10] The court held a three-day jury trial from September 25 to

September27,2017.Onthefirstdayoftrial,aDEAagenttestifiedthatheused

a measuring wheel to measure the distance between the front entrance of

72Walnut Street and the property line of Longley Elementary School.

Specifically, the DEA agent started his measurement at the “front step” of

72WalnutStreet, tookadiagonalrouteacrossWalnutStreet,andproceeded

downHoweStreet inastraight linetoLongleyElementarySchool,wherehe

ended the measurement “four or five feet” onto school property. This

measurementtotaled958.9feet.

[¶11] The followingmorning, after being informed that the “vertical

distance” to the location where the drug transaction occurred should be

accountedfor inthemeasurement,theDEAagentreturnedtotheapartment

andconductedadditionalmeasurements.Whenhetestifiedabouthissecond

set ofmeasurements, the DEA agent explained that he entered the building

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usingtheWalnutStreetentranceandthen“measuredfromthelivingroomto

theexteriorofthebuilding,whichwas16.9feet. Andfromthatsecond-floor

exteriorofthebuildingtotheground,whichwas,Ibelieve12.4feet.”Hethen

addedinthedistancefromthespotonthegroundouttothelocationonthe

platformwherehehadbegunhisinitialmeasurements.Allfourmeasurements,

added together, totaled 996.2 feet. On cross-examination, the agent

acknowledgedthat,intakinghis interiormeasurements,hehadbegunatthe

doorwaytoBrown’slivingroom,andthatitwas“unlikely”thatthebuyshad

occurredinthatdoorway.5

C. JuryInstructionsandVerdict

[¶12]Duringjurydeliberations,thejurysentanotetothecourtasking

whetherverticaldistancemustbeincludedinmeasuringthedistancefromthe

traffickingtotheschoolandrequesting“[c]larificationonthelawonwhatis

1,000feet:astraight-linedistance,awalkingpath,aradius?”Despitedefense

counsel’s objection—that there was no evidence presented about what a

straight-linemeasurementwouldbe—thecourtgave the jury anewwritten

5AftertheStatepresenteditscase-in-chief,defensecounselmovedforajudgmentofacquittalon

the aggravating trafficking charge, which the court denied, stating, “I do acknowledge that theevidencewith respect to thedistance from the school, there is conflicting evidence, but that isamatterforthejurytosortout.”

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instruction, stating, “The 1,000 feet is a straight-linemeasurement from the

locationwheretheoffenseoccurredtothepropertylineoftheschool.Maine

law is silent as to vertical feet. If there is a reasonable doubt or ambiguity

because of a vertical measurement, it must be resolved in favor of the

defendant.”

[¶13]Thejuryreturnedaguiltyverdictonallfourcountsofaggravated

traffickinginscheduleWdrugs.OnDecember4,2017,Brownwassentenced

to ten years in prison on the four convictions of aggravated trafficking in

scheduleWdrugs. Brown timely appealed the judgment of conviction. See

15M.R.S.§2115(2018);M.R.AppP.2B(b)(1).

II.DISCUSSION

[¶14]Brownarguesthattherewasinsufficientevidenceforthejuryto

findthathisdrugtraffickingoccurredwithin1,000feetoftherealpropertyof

LongleyElementarySchool. “Whenadefendantchallengesthesufficiencyof

theevidencesupportingaconviction,wedetermine,viewingtheevidence in

thelightmostfavorabletotheState,whetheratrieroffactrationallycouldfind

beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged.” State v.

Anderson,2016ME183,¶30,152A.3d623(quotationmarksomitted).The

juryispermittedtodrawallreasonableinferencesfromtheevidencepresented

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attrial.Statev.Hopkins,2018ME100,¶51,189A.3d741.“Theinterpretation

ofastatuteisalegalissuewereviewdenovo.”Statev.Cannady,2018ME106,

¶7,190A.3d1019(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶15]Thenarrowquestionpresentediswhether,basedontheevidence

presented,ajuryrationallycouldhavefound,beyondareasonabledoubt,that

Browntraffickedwithin1,000feetofschoolproperty.Althoughweconsidered

asimilarissueinStatev.Barnard,2003ME79,828A.2d216,wehaveyetto

explicitlydeterminehowthedistanceoughttobemeasuredinordertosustain

aconvictionunder17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E)(1)-(6)(2018).Wedosotoday

by determining (1) what two points must be measured, (2) whether the

straight-line or the pedestrian-route approach applies, and (3)whether the

1,000-footdistanceincludesanydifferenceinelevationbetweenthetwopoints

tobemeasured.

A. MeasuringtheDistanceBetweentheRealPropertyoftheSchoolandtheLocationoftheOffense

[¶16]Inordertoconductameasurement,onemustknowthetwopoints

thatmark thedistance tobemeasured. InBarnard, “weassume[d],without

deciding, that interior distances from the entrance closest to the school

property to the site of the transaction should be counted in calculating the

1,000-footdistance.”2003ME79,¶24n.7,828A.2d216.Today,weexplicitly

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hold that, in order to sustain a conviction under 17-A M.R.S.

§1105-A(1)(E)(1)-(6),thedistancetobemeasuredisthedistancebetweenthe

realpropertyoftheschoolandthelocationofthedrugtraffickeratthetimeof

theoffense.

[¶17]Pursuantto17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E):

1.Apersonisguiltyofaggravatedtraffickinginascheduleddrugifthepersonviolatessection1103and:

....

E.Atthetimeoftheoffense,thepersonisonaschoolbusorwithin1,000feetoftherealpropertycomprisingaprivateorpublicelementaryorsecondaryschoolorasafezone........

Readcarefully,thelanguageofthestatuteprovidesakeydistinctionbetween

the two points betweenwhich the distance is to bemeasured. The statute

requiresthatameasurementbemadebetweenapointon“therealproperty”of

the school or safe zone and the point at which “the person” is trafficking.

17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E)(emphasisadded).

[¶18]TheLegislature’suseoftheterms“realproperty”and“person”in

section1105-A(1)(E)iscriticalbecause,hadtheLegislatureintendedtohave

jurorsandcourtsdeterminethedistancebetweentheschoolpropertyandthe

propertywherethetraffickingoccurred,itwouldhaveuseddifferentlanguage.

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Instead,theLegislaturechosetofocusonthelocationofthetraffickeratthe

timeofthedrugtransaction.Forustodisregardthisdistinctionwouldbeto

rendertheterm“theperson”meresurplusage,and“becausenolanguageisto

be treated as surplusage if it can be reasonably construed, we must give

meaning to this language.” McLaughlin, 2018 ME 97, ¶ 16, 189 A.3d 262

(alterationomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶19]Althoughtheplainlanguageofsection1105-A(1)(E)isdispositive

inouranalysis,wenotethatfederalcourtshaveinterpretedcomparablefederal

statutesthesameway.SeeUnitedStatesv.Applewhite,72F.3d140,144(D.C.

Cir.1995)(holdingthatthegovernmentmustprovethatthedistancebetween

theschoolandthe“locusofthedrugoffense” is lessthan1,000feet);United

States v. Johnson, 46 F.3d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he government

inexplicablyofferedevidencenotofthedistancefromaschooltothepointin

thehousewhere[thedefendant]possessedthedrugs,butonly...toapointfive

feet up the walkway to [the defendant’s] house.”). Thus, for purposes of

measuringthe1,000-footdistanceunder17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E),theState

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the distance between the real

propertyoftheschoolandthelocationoftheallegeddrugtraffickeratthetime

oftheoffenseiswithin1,000feet.

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B. Straight-LineMeasurementversusPedestrian-RouteMeasurement

[¶20] InBarnard,2003ME79,¶¶5,24,828A.2d216,weaffirmeda

defendant’sconvictionofaggravatedtraffickingaftertheStateestablishedthat

thetraffickingoccurredwithin757feet,4inchesofaschool.Indoingso,we

reliedonprecedentfromtheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheFirstCircuit

and determined that a straight-line measurement rather than a

pedestrian-route measurement should be applied. Id. ¶¶ 21, 24 n.7 (citing

UnitedStatesv.Soler,275F.3d146,154-55&n.6(1stCir.2002)).

[¶21] Because the reasoning behind employing a straight-line

measurementismostpersuasive,wereaffirmourholdinginBarnardthatthe

1,000-footmeasurementmustbecalculatedusingastraight-linemeasurement.

SeeUnitedStatesv.Clavis,956F.2d1079,1088(11thCir.1992)(statingthatif

apedestrian-routemeasurementwererequired,“[a]traffickercouldoperate

free of the statute by placing his operation within tossing distance of the

schoolyardfenceifhecouldfind—orcreate—alongenoughfootpathleading

to it”);United States v. Watson, 887 F.2d 980, 981 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Only a

straightlinemeasurementcreatesareadilyascertainablezoneofprotection.”);

United States v. Ofarril, 779 F.2d 791, 792 (2d Cir. 1985) (reasoning that a

pedestrian-routemeasurement“wouldviolatetheplainmeaningofthestatute”

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and“generateneedlessandtime-consumingdebate,andultimatelyhamperthe

statute’senforcement.”).

C. DifferenceinElevationBetweentheTwoPointstobeMeasured

[¶22] Next, we address whether, for purposes of measuring the

1,000-foot distance under 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(E), the difference in

elevationbetween the twopoints—theboundaryof theschoolpropertyand

thelocationofthetraffickeratthetimeoftheoffense—shouldbeaccountedfor

inthecalculation.Weconcludethatitshould.

[¶23]Althoughsection1105-A(1)(E)doesnotexpresslystatethatany

differenceinelevationmustbeconsidered,wefindcriticalguidanceinwhatit

doesanddoesnotprovide:thestatute(a)identifiesthebeginningandending

points of themeasurement; (b) states that the distance between those two

points necessary to enhance a sentence under this section is less than

1,000feet;and(c)doesnotrequirethatthedistancebemeasuredonlyalonga

horizontal plane. 17-AM.R.S. §1105-A(1)(E). Moreover, because the plain

languageofthestatuteis“reasonablysusceptibletodifferentinterpretations”

with regard to whether any difference in elevation must be considered,

Cannady,2018ME106,¶7,190A.3d1019(quotationmarksomitted),andthe

recordoftheLegislature’sdeliberativeprocessdoesnotshedanylightonthe

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Legislature’s intent with regard to elevation, L.D. 1740, § 119 (120th

Legis.2001),we considerother relevant indiciaof legislative intent. Dyerv.

Dyer,2010ME105,¶7,5A.3d1049.Amongthoseindiciaaretwointerrelated

canons of statutory construction: the rule of lenity and the rule of strict

construction.Statev.Blum,2018ME78,¶10n.5,187A.3d566.“Pursuantto

eachoftheserules,anyambiguityleftunresolvedbyastrictconstructionofthe

statutemustberesolvedinthedefendant’sfavor.”Statev.Pinkham,2016ME

59,¶14,137A.3d203(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶24] Consistent with Barnard, the distance between the two points

mustbemeasuredalongastraight line fromonepoint to theother,and the

courseofthelinemustnotdeviateonaccountofanyobstaclesinitspath.Our

discussion in Barnard, together with the aforementioned legislative

considerations and simple logic, allows us to conclude that the straight-line

measurement between the school boundary line and the location of the

traffickerinthiscasemustaccountforanydifferenceinelevationbecausethat

difference could place the transaction site outside of the aggravating zone,

whereasalinearhorizontalmeasurementmightnot.

[¶25] This leads toarelated inquiryregarding thepropermethod for

measuring the distance between these points at different elevations. Other

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courts have approached this issue differently. In Soler, the First Circuit

suggested that the distance between the school boundary and a drug

transaction site located in an upper floor of a building could be measured

horizontallyalongtheground,thenverticallyupthesideofthebuilding,and

thenhorizontallyagaintotheprecisesiteofthetransaction,movingalongthe

various external and internal surfaces of the building. 275F.3d at 154-55.

Althoughthereisnoquestionthatmeasuringinthiswaycreatesalinebetween

the twopoints that runs in a straightdirectionwhen seen fromabird’s-eye

view, itdoesnotcreateastraightlineconsistentwithBarnard. 2003ME79,

¶¶21,24n.7,828A.2d216.6

[¶26] Incontrast, theUnitedStatesCourtofAppeals for theEleventh

Circuit employed a simplermethodology by extending 1,000-foot radii from

andaroundeachpointontheboundariesoftheschoolpropertytocaptureany

drugtransactionsitewithinthatarea.7Clavis,956F.2dat1088(“Thewayto

6 A straight line is one that extends in “the same direction throughout its length; having no

curvatureor angularity.” Straight,Webster’sNewWorldCollegeDictionary (5th ed. 2016). TheseriesofstraightlinesandrightanglesresultingfromtheUnitedStatesv.Soler,275F.3d146,153-55(1stCir.2002)measurementaremoreakintothepedestrianroutewehavealreadydismissedinStatev.Barnard,2003ME79,¶¶21,24n.7,828A.2d216.

7Aradiusis“anystraightlineextendingfromthecentertotheperipheryofacircleorsphere[or]the circularareaordistance limitedby the sweepof such a line.” Radius,Webster’sNewWorldCollegeDictionary(5thed.2016).

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createadefiniteandidentifiablezoneisbyextendingradiioutwardaroundthe

propertyonwhichtheschoolislocated.”).AlthoughClavisinvolvedmeasuring

thedistanceonlyonahorizontalplane,id.,avariationonthatapproachmaybe

appropriate for measuring whether two points at different elevations are

within1,000feetofeachother.8Forexample,extendingastraightlinefromthe

trafficker’s locationandadjusting thedirectionof that lineatanangleupor

downdirectly to its intersection, ifany,with theboundary lineof theschool

property creates a single, unbroken straight line rather than a series of

connected straight lines—heading in the same direction but extending at

differentangles—assuggestedinSoler.9

[¶27]However,becausetheStatedidnotpresentevidencefromwhich

ajuryrationallycoulddeterminewithanycertaintytheexactlocationofanyof

thetransactionsatissue,asisnecessarytobeabletofindbeyondareasonable

8UnlikethecreationofanareaonahorizontalplanearoundtherealpropertyasinUnitedStates

v.Clavis,956F.2d1079,1088(11thCir.1992),theradiusmethodologycouldbeapplieddifferentlyto determinewhether the trafficking occurred in a protected areawhere the trafficking and theschoolareatdifferentelevations.Relevanttothefactsinthiscase,thosepointscouldbemeasuredalongastraightlinethatistheshortestdistancebetweenasingleidentifiedpoint—thetransactionsiteonthesecondfloorofabuilding—andtheground-levelboundaryoftheschoolproperty,whichhasanuntoldnumberofpointsarounditsperimeter.Forthatreason,thestraight-lineradiusshouldextendfromthetransactionsitetoitsclosestpointofintersection,ifany,withtheschool’sboundary.

9Theresourcesorformulaeusedtocalculateormeasuretheactualdistancebetweentwopointsatdifferentelevationsmayvarydependingonthecircumstancesofeachcaseand,withoutlimitation,could include available technology,maps, line-of-sightmeasurement, or a relevantmathematicalformulation(forexample,thedistancebetweentwopointsatdifferentelevationsmaybeascertainedusingthePythagoreanTheorem).

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doubtthatBrowntraffickedwithin1,000feetofschoolproperty,thiscasedoes

notrequireustodecidethepropermethodformeasuringthedistancebetween

these points. See infra ¶¶ 32-41. We hold only that the measurement of

1,000feet, which acts as an aggravating element pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.

§1105-A(1)(E), must—in some way—include any difference in elevation

between the location of the trafficker at the time of the offense and the

boundaryoftherealpropertyoftheschool.

D. SpatialLeeway

[¶28] In somecases involving the1,000-footdistance forpurposesof

enhancing a sentence for trafficking in scheduled drugs, federal courts have

determined that “[p]recisemeasurementsmaybeunnecessary ...where the

spatialleewayisrelativelygreatandthegapinthechainofproofisrelatively

small.”Soler,275F.3dat154;seeUnitedStatesv.Baylor,97F.3d542,546-47

(D.C.Cir.1996).TheFirstCircuithasdescribedspatialleewayasanexception

toitsgeneralinsistencethatthegovernmentprovethe1,000-footdistancewith

precisemeasurements,andithasexplainedthatitmaybeappliedinsuchcases

where“commonsense,commonknowledge,androughindicesofdistancecan

carry the day.” United States v. Diaz, 670 F.3d 332, 338 (1st Cir. 2012)

(quotationmarksomitted).Thus,spatialleewaymaybeappliedincaseswhere

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evidenceofprecisemeasurementsislackingbuttheamountofspatialleeway

allowsafact-findertoreasonablyinferfromotherevidencethatthedistanceis

stillwithin1,000feet.

[¶29] In Applewhite, the government presented evidence that the

distancefromaschoolto“theaddress”ofthedefendant’sapartmentbuilding

wherethedrugoffenseoccurredwas920.2feet,adistancethat“clearly[did]

notincludethedistancebetweentheentrancetothebuildingandtheplacein

[thedefendant’s]apartmentwherethedrugswerediscovered.”72F.3dat142.

Rejecting the government’s argument that the jury reasonably could have

determinedthatthedistancefromthebuildingentrancetothepreciselocation

ofthedrugswasnotmorethan79.8feet,theUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfor

theDistrictofColumbiaCircuitreasoned,

[T]he jury couldnotknowhowmanyotherapartmentunits in thesamebuildingalsofrontedupon[thesamestreet],northeirlocationrelative to [the defendant’s apartment where the drug offenseoccurred],northeirdimensionsnor,therefore,thedistancebetweenthe building entrance and [the apartment’s] living roomwall, norevenwhether[the]apartmentwasonthefirstfloor.

Id.at144.

[¶30]InBarnard,weappliedthespatialleewayprinciplewhenweheld

that the jury reasonably could infer that the distancewaswithin 1,000feet.

2003ME79,¶¶2,24,828A.2d216.BecausethefactsinBarnardestablished

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that“anylocationwithinthebuildingwas,necessarily,evenclosertotheschool

property”andtheState’smeasurementleft242feet,8inchesofspatialleeway,

westated,

Even if the interior distance to [the defendant’s] apartment iscounted fromeither thebackdooror the frontdoor, there isnoquestionthatthejurycouldconclude,basedonalloftheevidence,that [thedefendant’s]apartmentwaswithin the242-foot,8-inchdistancenecessarytobringthetransactionwithin1000feetoftheschool,beyondareasonabledoubt.

Id. ¶ 24. In reaching this conclusion, wewere guided by the First Circuit’s

“observation that precisemeasurementsmay be unnecessary in some cases

wherethespatialleewayisrelativelygreatandthegapinthechainofproofis

relativelysmall.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶31] Insum,wehold that17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E)requiresproof

beyondareasonabledoubtthatthelocusofthedrugtraffickeratthetimeof

theoffensebewithin1,000feetoftherealpropertyofaschool,measuredina

straight lineandaccounting foranydifference inelevationbetween the two

points. Additionally, in cases where the State fails to offer a precise

measurementofthedistancebetweenthetwopointsbutthespatialleewayis

greatenough tomakeup forsuchevidentiarygaps, the juryreasonablymay

inferthatthetraffickingoccurredwithin1,000feetoftheschool.Theconcept

of spatial leeway does not excuse the State from proving the 1,000-foot

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distance, however; it only recognizes that jurors are well-equipped in

appropriate cases to apply their “common sense, common knowledge, and

roughindicesofdistance”whenfactsprovedbeyondareasonabledoubtpermit

a jury to reasonably infer distances not precisely accounted for. Barnard,

2003ME79,¶24,828A.2d216(quotationmarksomitted).

E. ApplicationtothisCase

[¶32] Turning to theevidence in thiscase,whichweview in the light

mostfavorabletotheState,seeAdams,2015ME30,¶2,113A.3d583,theDEA

agent’s testimonywas sufficient to establishbeyonda reasonabledoubt the

following measurements. First, the distance between the “front step of

72WalnutStreet,”whichisattheWalnutStreetentrance,and“fourorfivefeet”

onto the realpropertyof LongleyElementarySchool amounts to958.9 feet.

Moreover,becausetheDEAagenttestifiedthataterminusofhismeasurement

was“fourorfivefeet”pastLongleyElementarySchool’spropertyline,thejury

could reasonably infer that the actual distance between the front step of

72Walnut Street’s front entrance and the real property line of Longley

ElementarySchoolwas953.9feet. SeeBarnard,2003ME79,¶23,828A.2d

216. Second, the juryrationallycouldhave found,basedon theDEAagent’s

testimony about his additional measurements and from other testimony

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regardingthelayoutoftheapartment,thatthedistancebetweenthe“doorway

thatopensintothelivingroom”fromtheWalnutStreetentranceandthefront

stepof72WalnutStreet,wheretheinitialmeasurementbegan,constitutesan

additional37.3feet. Therefore,basedontheevidencepresentedattrial, the

jury rationally could conclude that the distance between the “doorway that

opensintothelivingroom”andtherealpropertylineofLongleyElementary

Schoolwas991.2feet.10Asaresult,theevidenceestablished,atamaximum,

8.8feetofspatialleeway.

[¶33] In an attempt to use the spatial leeway exception, the State

contendsthat,becauseitsmeasurementsincludedaverticaldistanceusingthe

method suggested in Soler and employed a pedestrian-route measurement

ratherthanastraight-lineroutemeasurement,thejurycouldhavereasonably

inferredthattheapartmentwasevenclosertotheschool.Weareunpersuaded

bythisargumentfortworeasons.

[¶34] First, because the difference in elevation between the school

boundarylineandthelocationofthetraffickeratthetimeoftheoffensemust

10Again,thiscalculationcomesfromthe953.9-footmeasurementconductedwiththemeasuring

wheelandacceptingtheDEA’sagent’stestimonythathewentfivefeetpastthepropertyline,plusthethreemeasurementsconductedonthemorningoftheseconddayoftrial,whichtotaled37.3feet.Together,thesemeasurementsequal991.2feet.

22

beaccountedforinthemeasurementrequiredby17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E),

the vertical distance included in the State’s measurement does not provide

morespatial leeway that the jurycouldhaveapplied inreasonably inferring

thatBrowntraffickedwithin1,000feetofLongleyElementarySchool.Second,

theState’s argument that the jury could reasonably infer that a straight-line

measurement would have provided evenmore spatial leeway that the jury

couldhaveappliedinreasonablyinferringthatBrownwastraffickingwithin

1,000 feet of Longley Elementary School is also unavailing. The DEA agent

measured thedistance fromLongleyElementarySchool to72Walnut Street

using a pedestrian-route measurement, and the State provided no

“straight-line”measurementforthejurytoconsider.Therefore,therewasno

evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that, if a

straight-linemeasurementhadbeenconducted,thedistancewouldhavebeen

within1,000feet.SeeJohnson,46F.3dat1169.Althoughcommonsensewould

dictate that a pedestrian-route measurement is necessarily longer than a

straight-linemeasurement,itwouldbepureguessworkforajurytodetermine

how much shorter the straight-line measurement would have been. See

Applewhite, 72F.3d at 143 (“[T]here is no evidence in the record here from

which the jury could have derived the shorter straight-line distance. The

23

Government’s case must therefore stand or fall upon the adequacy of [the

government’spedestrian-routemeasurement].”).

[¶35] Because8.8 feetof spatial leeway is very slight, “and [because]

personallibertyisatstake,[we]mustexaminethe[State’s]proofwithamore

critical eye.” Soler, 275F.3dat154. Indoing so,weevaluate each countof

aggravatedtraffickinganddeterminewhethertherewassufficientevidenceto

convictBrownofthatcount,applyingtheruleoflenityintheabsenceofany

cleardirectionastohowtoaccountforthedifferenceinelevationbetweenthe

schoolandthevarioustransactionsites.SeeBlum,2018ME78,¶10n.5,187

A.3d566;Pinkham,2016ME59,¶14,137A.3d203.

1. Count1

[¶36]Theconfidentialinformantspecificallytestifiedthatthefirstbuy

occurredatthedoorwayofthedefendant’sbedroom.However,withregardto

Count1,thereisnoevidencefromwhichthejurycouldreasonablyinferthat

thedistancefromthedoorwayofthelivingroomtoBrown’sbedroomdoorway

iswithinthespatialleewayof8.8feet.Theonlyevidencedepictingtheinside

oftheapartmentbuildingwereseveralphotographsoftheinsideofBrown’s

24

bedroom11andseveralcloseshotsofspecificpiecesofevidencefoundinthe

apartment. Although photographs may sometimes allow a jury to make a

reasonable inference concerning distance, see United States v. Harrison,

103F.3d986,990(D.C.Cir.1997),12thatisnotthecasehere.

[¶37] The First Circuit held in Soler that the jury could not have

determinedbeyondareasonabledoubtthattheverticaldistancenotaccounted

forinmeasurementswaswithin37feetbasedonavideotapethatwasplayed

severaltimes.275F.3dat154-55.Asitsreasoning,theFirstCircuitexplained,

Althoughthevideotapewasplayedseveraltimesforthejury,itwasneither filmedwith an eye toward elucidating relative distancesnor introduced into evidence for that purpose. Moreover, itshowed the relevant portion of the building fleetingly and as anincidental matter; the camera angles were distorted by therepeated use of a zoom lens; and the prosecutor did not evenattempttodrawthejury’sattentiontothescaleinvolved.

Id.at155.Applyingthesamereasoninghere,inlightoftheabsenceofevidence

intherecorddemonstratingthesizeoftheapartment,oreventhesizeofthe

livingroom,thejurycouldnotmakeareasonableinferencethatthedoorway

11ThesephotographsareirrelevantforpurposesofCount1becausethetransactiontookplace

atthedoorwayofBrown’sbedroom.

12SomewhatanalogoustotheaerialmapusedinUnitedStatesv.Harrison,103F.3d986,990(D.C.Cir.1997), the State did offer in evidence a tax map that portrayed an aerial view of LongleyElementarySchoolandsomesurroundingneighborhoods. However, the taxmapdidnot include72WalnutStreet.Therefore,thejurycouldnothaverelieduponthemap’sscaleasanindependentmeansoffindingthattheapartmentbuildingwaswithin1,000feetoftheschool’slocation.

25

of Brown’s bedroom was within 8.8 feet of the living room doorway. See

Goodsonv.UnitedStates,760A.2d551,554-55(D.C.2000).

2. Counts2-3

[¶38]Thereisnospecificevidenceastotheexactlocationofthesecond

and third controlledbuys. The testimonyelicitedduring trialdemonstrated

onlythatthecontrolledbuystookplaceeitherinBrown’sbedroomdoorwayor

by an end table in the living room.13 Because the State’s 991.2-foot

measurement extends only to the doorway of the living room, and the

confidential informant testified that thedrug transactions tookplacebeyond

thatlocation,ineitherthedoorwayofBrown’sbedroomorbyanendtablein

thelivingroom,therewasnoevidencethatwouldpermitthejurytoreasonably

inferthatthedrugtransactionstookplacewithinthe8.8feetofspatialleeway

permittedbytheevidencepresented.SeeSoler,275F.3dat154-55.

3. Count4

[¶39] For the fourth count of aggravating trafficking, the State was

requiredtoprovethatthelocationinsideofBrown’sbedroomwherethedrugs

were discovered was within 1,000 feet of the school property. The only

evidence presented to show—or even suggest—the distance from the living

13Thereisnoevidenceintherecordregardingthelocationoftheendtableinthelivingroom.

26

roomdoorwaytothelocationinsideBrown’sbedroomwherethedrugswere

foundwerethephotographsshowingwherethedrugswerefoundinBrown’s

bedroom.Thephotographsrevealarelativelysignificantdistancebetweenthe

doorwayofBrown’sbedroomandwherethedrugswerefoundbyBrown’sbed.

Consequently,nojuryrationallycouldfind,basedontheevidencepresented,

thatthecocainewaslocatedwithin1,000feetofLongleyElementarySchool.

[¶40] Aswe acknowledged inBarnard, “‘the governmentmust prove

beyondareasonabledoubtthatthedistancefromaschooltotheactualsiteof

thetransaction,notmerelytothecurtilageorexteriorwallofthestructurein

which the transaction takesplace, is1,000 feetor less.’” 2003ME79,¶21,

828A.2d216(quotingSoler,275F.3dat154).Here,unlikeinBarnard,theDEA

agent did notmeasure to the farthest point of the building from the school,

which might have permitted the jury to find that “any location within the

buildingwas,necessarily,evenclosertotheschoolproperty.”Id.¶24.Rather,

theDEAagentmeasuredonlytothe“doorwaythatopensintothelivingroom”

fromtheWalnutStreetfrontentrance.

[¶41]Giventheabsenceofprecisemeasurementsofthedistancefrom

the doorway that opens into the living room to the doorway of Brown’s

bedroom,thelivingroomendtable,orthelocationwherethedrugswerefound

27

inBrown’sbedroom,andgiventheactualevidenceandthelimitedutilityofthe

“spatialleeway”principle,thejurycouldnothavefound,beyondareasonable

doubt,thatanyofBrown’straffickingtookplacewithin1,000feetofLongley

Elementary School. See Johnson, 46 F.3d at 1169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“It is

entirelypossible—perhapsprobable—thatthisistrue.Ifso,wehavenoidea

whythegovernmentdidnotproveit... .Sincethereisnoevidenceofeither

thestraight linemeasurementor thedistancebetween the terminalpointof

[the officer’s] measurement and the point of possession, it is impossible to

determinewhetherornotthisequationistrue.”);seealsoSoler,275F.3dat155

(“Althoughitispossible(indeed,probable)thatthedistancefromtheschoolto

thesiteoftheheroinsaleswaslessthan1,000feet, that isnotgoodenough.

Thegovernmentmustprovetheelementsofanoffensebeyondareasonable

doubt—and its proof here simply does not conform to that high standard.”

(footnoteomitted)).

III.CONCLUSION

[¶42]Accordingly,wevacatetheaggravatingelementsoftheconvictions

ofCounts1-4andremandtotheSuperiorCourtforresentencingonfourcounts

oftraffickinginscheduleWdrugs(ClassB). See17-AM.R.S.§1103(1-A)(A),

(3)(B).

28

Theentryis:

Judgmentvacatedinpart.RemandedforentryofmodifiedjudgmentandresentencingonCounts1-4.

SAUFLEY,C.J.,withwhomMEAD,J.,joins,concurring.

[¶43]WeconcurcompletelyintheCourt’sopinion.Wewriteseparately

to draw attention to the broader consequences of the statute making drug

traffickinganaggravatedoffenseifthetransactionoccurswithin1,000feetof

therealpropertyofaschool.See17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E)(1)(2018).

[¶44]Tobeclear,theLegislature’sadoptionofastatutedesignedtokeep

school children fromobtaining drugs,witnessing the sale of drugs, orbeing

exposedtotheviolencethatcouldariseduringadrugtransactionislaudable.

Protecting our children from exposure to this pernicious activity and the

presenceof a culture that includesviolence,misery, anddeath is a critically

importantlegislativegoal.

[¶45]Thestatuteputinplacetoeffectuatesuchgoals,however,misses

itsmark.Thecaseatbarisaperfectexampleoftheunintendedconsequences

ofthisbluntinstrument.Thedrugsalesatissueoccurredinaprivatedwelling,

outsidetheviewofanychildren,youth,orparticipantsinschoolactivities.The

29

transactions had no connection to the school. Had the sales occurred in an

apartment closer to the part of the building thatwas nearest to the school,

ratherthanintheapartmentatissue,theaggravatingfactorwouldlikelyhave

beenproved,subjectingthedefendanttoalongerperiodofincarcerationfor

eachcrime,evenintheabsenceofanyschoolinvolvement.

[¶46] Worsethanthearbitrarynatureofthisaggravatingfactoristhe

potential that it may disproportionately affect defendants in more densely

populated geographic areas, where neighborhood schools are present

throughout a municipality. The result could include a disparate racial or

poverty-based impact that was unintended by the drafters. Meanwhile, in

suburban or rural areas where much of the population resides more than

1,000feetfromschoolproperty,drugtransactionsbetweenadults inprivate

homes are significantly less likely to incidentally result in convictions of

aggravatedtraffickingbasedonproximitytoaschool.

[¶47] Although thischallengewasnot raised in thematterbefore the

court, likely because challenges to similar laws based on assertions of

constitutionalinfirmityhaveregularlybeenunsuccessful,14thefactthatalaw

14SeeUnitedStatesv.Holland,810F.2d1215,1218-24(D.C.Cir.1987);Statev.Coria,839P.2d

890,894-901(Wash.1992);cf.UnitedStatesv.Falu,776F.2d46,48-50(2dCir.1985)(applyingprinciples of statutory construction). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuitobserved: “Thecourt [inFalu]concludedthatCongress intendedthatdealersbear theburdenof

30

meetsminimalconstitutionalstandardsdoesnotmakeitagoodlaw.Hence,

weraisethisissueforconsiderationbythepeople’selectedrepresentatives.

[¶48] In short, although the noble goal of the statute is to protect

schoolchildren from the ills of drug trafficking, the statute may

disproportionatelyexposepeoplelivingindiverse,urbanareastoaggravated

convictions and harsher sentences for conduct that may have no effect

whatsoever on the schoolchildren the statute seeks to protect. A more

descriptivedefinitionoftheactivitytobeproscribedwouldgreatlyenhancethe

justiceofthisaggravatingfactor,andwehopethattheMaineLegislaturewill

seriouslyconsidertheconsequencesoftheprovisionaswritten.15

ascertainingwhere schoolsare locatedand removing their operations fromthose areas.” UnitedStatesv.Cross,900F.2d66,69(6thCir.1990).“Similarly,inHolland,theD.C.Circuitstatedthatitwouldnotbeappropriatetoapplytheruleoflenityhere,wheretheapplicationwouldundercuttheunambiguouslegislativedesignofthesection.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).BasedonFaluandHolland,theSixthCircuitheldthat“thelackofknowledgeoftheproximityofaschooldoesnotviolatedueprocess.”Id.15TheLegislaturemayconsidersomeofthelanguageprovidedinasimilar,althoughprocedurally

distinct,statuteinNewJersey:

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for a violation of this section that theprohibited conduct took place entirely within a private residence, that no person17yearsofageoryoungerwaspresentinsuchprivateresidenceatanytimeduringthecommissionoftheoffense,andthattheprohibitedconductdidnotinvolvedistributing,dispensing or possessingwith the intent to distribute or dispense any controlleddangerous substance or controlled substance analog for profit. The affirmativedefense established in this section shall be proved by the defendant by apreponderanceof theevidence. Nothinghereinshallbeconstrued toestablishanaffirmativedefensewithrespecttoaprosecutionforanoffensedefinedinanyothersectionofthischapter.

31

RoryA.McNamara,Esq.(orally),DrakeLaw,LLC,Berwick,forappellantDavidT.BrownJanet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Johanna L. Gauvreau, Asst. Atty. Gen.(orally),OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forappelleeStateofMaineAndroscogginCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2017-472FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY

N.J.Stat.Ann.§2C:35-7(e)(LEXISthrough2018SecondAnnualSess.)(emphasisadded).