STATE OF COLORADO Ralph L. Carr Judicial Center · STATE OF COLORADO Ralph L. Carr Judicial Center 2 East 14th Avenue ... Bartley v. People, 817 P.2d 1029 ... People v. Castaneda,

COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF COLORADO

Ralph L Carr Judicial Center

2 East 14th

Avenue

Denver Colorado 80203

Weld County District Court Honorable Thomas

Quammen and Case Number 14CR1421

Plaintiff-Appellee

THE PEOPLE OF THE

STATE OF COLORADO

v

Defendant-Appellant

Christopher Alan Taylor

Douglas K Wilson

Colorado State Public Defender

JOSEPH PAUL HOUGH

1300 Broadway Suite 300


Phone (303) 764-1400

Fax (303) 764-1400

Email PDAppServicecoloradodefendersus

Atty Reg 34384

Case Number 15CA794

DEFENDANTrsquoS OPENING BRIEF

DATE FILED January 15 2016 849 AM

i

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with all requirements of CAR 28 and

CAR 32 including all formatting requirements set forth in these rules

Specifically the undersigned certifies that

This brief complies with the applicable word limit set forth in CAR 28(g)

It contains 5873 words

This brief complies with the standard of review requirement set forth in CAR

28(a)(7)(A)

For each issue raised by the Defendant-Appellant the brief contains under a

separate heading before the discussion of the issue a concise statement (1)

of the applicable standard of appellate review with citation to authority and

(2) whether the issue was preserved and if preserved the precise location in

the record where the issue was raised and where the court ruled not to an

entire document

I acknowledge that my brief may be stricken if it fails to comply with any of the

requirements of CAR 28 and CAR 32

_________________________________

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE amp FACTS BELOW 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 ARGUMENT I The prosecution failed to prove that the defendant committed the offenses of second degree kidnapping and accessory to a crime 6 II The trial court reversibly erred by failing to grant the defendantrsquos motion to suppress his statements and evidence 14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 28

TABLE OF CASES

Bartley v People 817 P2d 1029 (Colo 1991) 1528

Bernal v People 44 P3d 184 (Colo 2002) 1528

Clark v People 232 P3d 1287 (Colo 2010) 710

Crider v People 186 P3d 39 (Colo 2008) 27

Dempsey v People 117 P3d 800 (Colo 2005) 6

Grassi v People 320 P3d 332 (Colo 2014) 1823

Grissom v People 115 P3d 1280 (2005) 913

Jackson v Virginia 443 US 307 (1979) 7

Kogan v People 756 P2d 945 (Colo 1988) 7

McCall v People 623 P2d 397 (Colo 1981) 25

iii

Oliver v United States 466 US 170 (1984) 24

Payton v New York 445 US 573 (1980) 24

People v Adkins 113 P3d 788 (Colo 2005) 14

People v Ayala 770 P2d 1265 (Colo 1989) 13

People v Brunsting 224 P3d 259 (Colo App 2009) 24

People v Brunsting 307 P3d 1073 (Colo 2013) 2025

People v Castaneda 249 P3d 1119 (Colo 2011) 22

People v Duran 272 P3d 1084 (Colo App 2011) 8

People v Garcia 752 P2d 570 (Colo 1988) 26

People v Gomez 632 P2d 586 (Colo 1981) 25

People v Hardin 607 P2d 1291 (Colo 1980) 7

People v Holmes 981 P2d 168 (Colo 1999) 24

People v Jansen 713 P2d 907 (Colo 1986) 25

People v King 16 P3d 807 (Colo 2001) 22

People v Marez 916 P2d 543 (Colo App 1995) 26

People v McCoy 870 P2d 1231 (Colo 1994) 2223

People v Miller 773 P2d 1053 (Colo 1989) 25

People v Miralda 981 P2d 676 (Colo App 1999) 14

People v Navran 483 P2d 228 (Colo 1971) 22

iv

People v Perry 68 P3d 472 (Colo App 2002) 15

People v Rahming 795 P2d 1338 (Colo 1990) 23

People v Rodriquez 945 P2d 1351 (Colo 1997) 27

People v Schreyer 640 P2d 1147 (Colo 1982) 22

People v Sprouse 962 P2d 300 (Colo App 1997) 14

People v Stark 691 P2d 334 (Colo 1984) 13

People v Wehmas 246 P3d 642 (Colo 2010) 26

People v Welsh 58 P3d 1065 (Colo App 2002) 15

United States v Zimmerman 943 F2d 1204 (10th

Cir 1991) 10

Wong Sun v United States 371 US 471 (1963) 27

TABLE OF STATUTES AND RULES

Colorado Revised Statutes Section 17-2-103 CRS (2012) 18 Section 18-1-603 CRS 8 Section 18-3-302(1) CRS (2014) 8 Section 18-8-105(1) CRS 11 Section 18-8-105(2)(e) CRS 11

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES

United States Constitution Amendment VI 24 Amendment XIV 24 Colorado Constitution Article II Section 7 24

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED

I Whether the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant committed second degree kidnapping

and also was an accessory to a crime

II Whether the trial court reversibly erred by failing to grant the

defendantrsquos motion to suppress his incriminating statements and

physical evidence offered against him

STATEMENT OF THE CASE amp FACTS BELOW

Christopher Taylor the defendant was charged with a class four felony of

second degree kidnapping (pursuant to a theory of complicity) as well as accessory

to a crime a class five felony(CFp160-61) After trying his case to a jury Taylor

was found guilty as charged and subsequently sentenced to a total term of four

years in prison followed by three years of mandatory

parole(RTr(21915)p58(32715)p23)

For the most part the facts below were undisputed and are as follows Upon

leaving her abusive and violent husband of nearly eighteen years Denise Kilker

(the victim) visited her friend Jason Stapelton in the home he shared with his son

2

Trent(RTr(21715)p237-43) As the three were preparing dinner Shawn Kilker1

(the victimrsquos estranged husband) began pounding on Stapeltonrsquos door demanding

to speak to Denise(RTr(21715)p243-44)

Eventually Denise stepped outside to converse with Shawn and shortly

thereafter Christopher Taylor (the defendant and the victimrsquos brother-in-law) and

two other men (the defendantrsquos brother Duane Taylor and friend Phillip Ramsey)

arrived on the scene (at Shawnrsquos behest) in the defendantrsquos

vehicle(RTr(21715)p245-47) By all accounts the scene was chaotic with all

parties yelling and screaming at one another(RTr(21715)p245-47)

While Denise spoke with Shawn he repeatedly demanded that she ldquogo with

himrdquo in his vehicle (ostensibly to reconcile their relationship) but she refused to do

so stating ldquoIrsquom not going anywhere with you I donrsquot trust

yourdquo(RTr(21715)p245-46) Suddenly and unexpectedly Shawn accosted

Denise placed his hand over her mouth drug her over to the defendantrsquos car

opened the door and shoved her into the backseat(RTr(21715)p247) According

to Denise at that time Taylor (the defendant) was just standing there in a ldquodazerdquo

before Shawn ordered him (as well as Duane and Phillip) to get into the

vehicle(RTr(21715)p248)

1 Just over a month after kidnapping Denise Kilker Shawn Kilker murdered the

couplersquos fourteen-year-old son before committing suicide(RTr(21715)p237-43)

3

Once inside and after Trent Stapelton shattered the vehiclersquos back window

with some implement Phillip (who was commanded by Shawn to ldquoDriverdquo) drove

the group a couple of blocks before Shawn ordered him to stop the car (ldquoLet us

outrdquo) and told Taylor to ldquoKeep your phone on you Wersquoll be in

contactrdquo(RTr(21715)p25235) Shawn (who was in the backseat with Denise)

then pulled the victim out of the vehicle (by her hair) and into a field as the

defendant (and Duane) drove away(RTr(21715)p253) According to Denise

while they were in the field Shawn threatened and repeatedly physically assaulted

her causing some minor injuries to her face and body(RTr(21715)p254-57)

Eventually however Shawn released Denise and she followed him for a

matter of time before he telephoned Taylor to come pick up the

couple(RTr(21715)p256-57) When Taylor arrived he appeared ldquonervous and

scaredrdquo Shawn opened the vehiclersquos door and Denise entered before Shawn

ordered Taylor to drive a short distance to a rental property owned by both Shawn

and Denise(RTr(21715)p256-57)

Inside the rental house Taylor (who was clearly ldquoconcernedrdquo for Denisersquos

well-being) brought the victim a pair of dry clothes and a cigarette (from his

nearby residence) and attempted to ldquoconsolerdquo her after Shawn left to retrieve his

vehicle(RTr(21715)p257) According to Denise she assured the defendant that

4

there was nothing he could do to prevent Shawn from acting out against her and

the two then exchanged a heartfelt embrace(RTr(21815)p37) Approximately

ten to fifteen minutes later Shawn returned and he and Denise drove home

together without further incident(RTr(21815)p26338-39) Weeks later after

Shawn Kilker murdered his teenage son and committed suicide the kidnapping

incident was reported to police((RTr(21815)p38-39)

Importantly during trial Denise (the victim) testified (and indeed had

always maintained) that Taylor neither encouraged assisted nor was involved in

any manner with Shawnrsquos kidnapping and assault of her(RTr(21815)p2642-

4354-55) To the contrary Denise regarded the defendant as ldquofamilyrdquo (like a real

brother) and indicated he was an uncle to her children (they ldquolove himrdquo) and had

rendered aid to her numerous times in the past ldquoEvery time I needed something he

was there I didnrsquot have to askrdquo(RTr(21715)p239-40(21815)p26)

According to Denise there was nothing that Taylor could have done that

would have prevented Shawn from victimizing her ldquo[N]obody is going to stop

Shawn Shawn he has his own mindhellipShawn is going to do what he

wantsrdquo(RTr(21815)p44-45) Furthermore given Shawnrsquos long and well-known

history of violence and threats Denise believed that if Taylor had attempted to

intervene in some way against Shawn (by perhaps alerting the police) the situation

5

would have escalated in severity ldquo[I]f the cops would have been called it would

have been worserdquo(RTr(21815)p54-55) Indeed Denise maintained that Shawn

would have most likely murdered her that evening had the defendant not acted as

he had ldquoI believe that if [Taylor] wouldnrsquot have picked us up that night that I

would probably be dead in that fieldhellipI guess that is how he helped me by picking

me up picking us uprdquo(RTr(21815)p43)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

First even in the light most favorable to the prosecution the evidence

presented was undeniably insufficient to establish that Taylor ldquoaid[ed] abet[ed]

advise[d] or encourage[d]rdquo Shawn in the ldquoplanning or committingrdquo of Denisersquos

kidnapping and also that the defendant shared Shawnrsquos ldquointent to promote or

facilitaterdquo that crime Additionally no evidence was presented that Taylor actually

performed any act (whether that be cleaning up glass or replacing a window) so as

to have committed the offense of ldquoaccessory to a crimerdquo

Second concerning the defendantrsquos motion to suppress his statements the

prosecution failed to carry its burden to prove that any officers (who might have

been operating ldquopursuant to a coordinated investigationrdquo or the so called ldquofellow

officer rulerdquo) possessed adequate probable cause to believe Taylor was anything

more than a mere ldquosuspectrdquo and therefore his arrest and subsequent interrogation

6

was unlawful and his incriminating statements therein should have been

suppressed Additionally as to the defendantrsquos motion to suppress the physical

evidence against him the prosecution failed to demonstrate that Taylorrsquos vehicle

and its contents posed an ldquoimmediate riskrdquo of being removed or destroyed and as

such the carrsquos warrantless seizure from the defendantrsquos property was unlawful and

subjected the evidence obtained to suppression

ARGUMENT

I The prosecution failed to prove that the defendant committed the

offenses of second degree kidnapping and accessory to a crime

Standard of Review amp Preservation

Appellate courts review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence was sufficient in both quantity and quality to sustain a conviction

Dempsey v People 117 P3d 800 807 (Colo 2005) In assessing sufficiency

appellate courts must determine whether the evidence both direct and

circumstantial when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution is

substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a rational trier of fact that the

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt Id Evidence is considered

sufficient when ldquoa rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubtrdquo and insufficient when ldquoreasonable jurors

7

must necessarily have a reasonable doubtrdquo Clark v People 232 P3d 1287 1291-

92 (Colo 2010)

Again even though the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable

to the prosecution it must nevertheless be substantial and sufficient enough to

allow a reasonable person to conclude that the defendant is guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt See Kogan v People 756 P2d 945 (Colo 1988) This standard

gives concrete substance to the presumption of innocence by requiring the

factfinder to reach ldquoa subjective state of near certitude of guiltrdquo before convicting

the accused Jackson v Virginia 443 US 307 315 (1979) see People v Hardin

607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)

Here at the close of the prosecutionrsquos case-in-chief defense counsel moved

for a judgment of acquittal and contended that the prosecution had failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise that Taylor had aided or encouraged

Denise Kilkerrsquos kidnapping and also possessed the ldquointent to promote or facilitaterdquo

it(RTr(21815)p169-170) Furthermore argued counsel there was no evidence

that (for purposes of the accessory to a crime count) Taylor did anything or had

any intent to hinder delay or prevent the discovery of Shawn Kilkerrsquos kidnapping

of Denise despite the prosecutionrsquos argument that the defendantrsquos supposed

cleaning up the glass from his vehiclersquos broken window amounted to such a

8

crime((RTr(21815)p171174-75) Though the trial court ultimately denied the

defendantrsquos motion as to both counts it candidly acknowledged that the

prosecution had ldquobarely met their burden in this matterrdquo((RTr(21815)p183)

Law amp Analysis

Concerning the offense of second degree kidnapping that particular crime is

accomplished when ldquoany personhellipknowingly seizes and carries any person from

one place to another without [her] consent and without lawful justificationrdquo sect 18-

3-302(1) CRS (2014) Furthermore to be liable as a complicitor for such an

offense the person must have had the ldquointent to promote or facilitate the

commission of the offenserdquo while he ldquoaids abets advises or encourages the other

person in planning or committing the offenserdquo sect 18-1-603 CRS see People v

Duran 272 P3d 1084 1090-91 (Colo App 2011) (ldquoTo be a complicitor the

person must have knowledge that the principal intends to commit the crime must

intend to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense and must aid abet

advise or encourage the principal in the commission or planning of the crimerdquo)

Here Taylorrsquos involvement in Denisersquos kidnapping was minimal at best

and according to the victim herself had the defendant not acted in the manner he

did that evening she might not have survived Indeed while Taylor was most

certainly aware that Denise had been and perhaps was continuing to be kidnapped

9

when he picked the couple up from the field he never ldquoaid[ed] abet[ed] advise[d]

or encourage[d]rdquo Shawn (the sole perpetrator) in the ldquoplanning or committing the

offenserdquo Simply because Taylor was present in the vehicle with Shawn and Denise

(during the initial phase of the kidnapping) and then later drove the couple to their

rental property (at Shawnrsquos direction) does not mean that the defendant

necessarily aided or encouraged the kidnapping Rather according to the victim

herself Taylor (who Denise regarded as a brother and someone who had always

been there to help her) did nothing that evening to assist facilitate or promote

Shawnrsquos kidnapping

However even assuming for the sake of argument that Taylorrsquos mere

presence in and operating of the vehicle could conceivably be regarded as

ldquoaid[ing] abet[ing] advis[ing] or encourag[ing]rdquo in the commission of the

offense clearly insufficient evidence was presented to prove that the defendant

also shared Shawnrsquos ldquointent to promote or facilitaterdquo the kidnapping See Grissom

v People 115 P3d 1280 1286 (2005) (An alleged complicitor simply cannot be

held liable for the principalrsquos act ldquounless [the two] were engaged in a common

enterprise and the complicitor knew the principal was enlisting the complicitorrsquos

help in order to engage in criminal conductrdquo) Despite the prosecutionrsquos argument

(during the defendantrsquos request for a motion for judgment of acquittal and to the

10

jury) that Taylorrsquos ldquointent to promote or facilitaterdquo the kidnapping was evident

because ldquoHe didnrsquot call police He didnrsquot call for help He didnrsquot walk awayrdquo

there is no responsibility under the law to attempt to mitigate against or prevent

such a crime from occurring See eg United States v Zimmerman 943 F2d

1204 1214 (10th Cir 1991) (ldquoIt is well established that a person who sees a crime

being committed has no legal duty to either stop it or report itrdquo)

The evidence presented below undoubtedly demonstrated that while perhaps

not intervening to the extent that he could or should have in a strictly moral sense

Taylor offered nothing but concern comfort consolation and protection to Denise

while also attempting to diffuse the situation and prevent its escalation Indeed as

Denise herself testified ldquoif the cops would have been called it would have been

worserdquo and if the defendant had not ldquopicked us up that night I would probably be

dead in that fieldhelliphe helped me by picking me up picking us uprdquo Thus even in

the light most favorable to the prosecution the evidence was far from ldquosubstantial

and sufficientrdquo to prove beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise that Taylor was

guilty of Denisersquos kidnapping even in the role as an alleged complicitor See

Clark supra at 1291

Turning now to Taylorrsquos additional conviction for accessory to a crime that

offense is accomplished when ldquowith intent to hinder delay or prevent the

11

discovery detection apprehension prosecution conviction or punishment of

another for the commission of a crime [the accused] renders assistance to such

personrdquo sect 18-8-105(1) For purposes here the term ldquorenders assistancerdquo means to

ldquoconceal destroy or alter any physical or testimonial evidence that might aid in

the discovery detection apprehension prosecution conviction or punishment of

such personrdquo sect 18-8-105(2)(e)

In this case the prosecution represented to the trial court that the crime of

accessory was based on Taylorrsquos allegedly taking the ldquocar to a safe place cleaning

up the glass that was shattered from a windowrdquo and ldquoreplac[ing] the glass in the

carrdquo(RTr(21815)p174-75) Likewise during closing argument the prosecution

contended to the jury that Taylor was guilty of accessory to a crime because of the

ldquostuff he did after the fact to help aid and conceal the crimerdquo specifically (1)

when Taylor and Denise ldquotry to put the car in the garagerdquo (2) because Denise said

ldquoShawn went over to help Chris clean out the glass from the carrdquo (3) and because

ldquothe back windshield [of the defendantrsquos vehicle] had been

replacedrdquo(RTr(21915)p18-21)

However the testimony concerning what Taylor may have done with or to

his carrsquos shattered window (broken by Trent Stapelton during the initial phase of

the kidnapping) was minimal at best and most certainly failed to establish beyond

12

a reasonable doubt that any sort of crime was committed by the defendant in that

respect For instance Denise testified that while she and Taylor were briefly left

alone in the rent house (when Shawn left to retrieve his truck) she was ldquoafraid that

you know the cops would see [Taylorrsquos] car smashed so we ndash I tried to help him

put it in the garage and it wouldnrsquot fit So we just left it

alonerdquo(RTr(21715)p257) (emphasis added) Additionally according to Denise

the morning after the kidnapping once she and Shawn had reconciled to some

extent Shawn indicated that he was going to help Taylor ldquoclean the glass out of the

carrdquo(RTr(21715)p264)

Thus there was no clear testimony or evidence that Taylor either cleaned up

the broken window fragments or that he himself replaced his vehiclersquos back

window Rather Denise simply testified that Shawn intended to help Taylor ldquoclean

the glass out of the carrdquo not that that necessarily ever happened Furthermore the

photographic evidence introduced at trial merely reflected that Taylorrsquos back

window had been replaced at some time by someone perhaps by the defendant

perhaps not Accordingly as an initial matter there was simply insufficient

evidence to show that Taylor had actually done anything to ldquohinder delay or

prevent the discovery detection apprehension prosecution conviction or

punishment of another for the commission of a crimerdquo

13

However even assuming for the sake of argument that the prosecution had

presented enough evidence proving that Taylor had cleaned the glass out of his

vehicle andor replaced the back window it cannot be said that in doing so his

purpose was established to be to cover up evidence of a crime thwart the

enforcement of justice or ldquorender assistancerdquo to Shawn as opposed to merely

cleaning and repairing a broken window To say otherwise would require one to

engage in generous ldquoguessing speculation or conjecturerdquo well beyond the realm

of reasonable inference and presumption See People v Ayala 770 P2d 1265

1268 (Colo 1989) (ldquo[p]resumption and inferences may be drawn only from facts

established and presumption may not rest on presumption or inference on

inference and this rule is doubly applicable in criminal casesrdquo) People v Stark

691 P2d 334339 (Colo 1984) (guilty verdicts ldquomay not be based on guessing

speculation or conjecturerdquo)

In sum then even in the light most favorable to the prosecution the evidence

presented here was undeniably insufficient to establish that Taylor ldquoaid[ed]

abet[ed] advise[d] or encourage[d]rdquo Shawn in ldquoplanning or committingrdquo of

Denisersquos kidnapping and further that the defendant also shared Shawnrsquos ldquointent to

promote or facilitaterdquo that crime and engaged in some ldquocommon enterpriserdquo in

furtherance of that offense See Grissom supra at 1286 Moreover no evidence

14

was presented that Taylor actually performed any act (whether that be cleaning up

glass or replacing a window) so as to sufficiently cause him to have committed the

offense of ldquoaccessory to a crimerdquo And even if he had done so his purpose was not

most certainly not proven to be criminal Accordingly Taylorrsquos convictions for

second degree kidnapping and accessory to a crime should be reversed vacated

and remanded for dismissal below See People v Sprouse 962 P2d 300 304

(Colo App 1997) (a conviction based on insufficient evidence of the crucial

elements of an office constitutes a denial of due process and is therefore

constitutionally infirm) People v Miralda 981 P2d 676 680 (Colo App 1999)

(if every element of a particular offense is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt

state and federal double jeopardy principles prohibit the defendant from being

retried on that count)

II The trial court reversibly erred by failing to grant the

defendantrsquos motion to suppress his statements and evidence


The denial of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and

fact meaning appellate courts will defer to the trial courtrsquos findings of fact if

supported by the record but a trial courtrsquos conclusions of law are reviewed de

novo People v Adkins 113 P3d 788 790 (Colo 2005) Furthermore where the

error is one of constitutional dimension reversal is required unless the court is

15

convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt Bartley v

People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

The constitutional harmless error test is ldquonot whether in a trial that occurred

without the error a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered but whether

the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the

errorrdquo People v Welsh 58 P3d 1065 1072 (Colo App 2002) (citing Bernal v

People 44 P3d 184 (Colo 2002)) Put another way if the record shows that the

defendant could have been prejudiced the error cannot be considered harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt People v Perry 68 P3d 472 476 (Colo App 2002)

Here preserving the issue for appeal the defendant filed three pretrial

motions (numbered 5 8 and 9) to suppress his statements (introduced at trial as

Peoplersquos Exhibit 15 a videotaped ldquoconfessionrdquo) and physical evidence that were

unlawfully gathered by the police(CFp45-48146-47) Specifically the defense

contended that Taylor was arrested and interrogated by officers without probable

cause (or even reasonable suspicion for that matter) and therefore his

incriminating statements were ldquoimproperly obtainedrdquo as ldquofruitrdquo of the poisonous

tree and should be suppressed(CFp146-47) Furthermore Taylorrsquos vehicle (the

one involved in the kidnapping) was unlawfully seized from his property and

16

thereafter photographed and searched without a warrant (permitting the initial

seizure) or any valid exception to the warrant requirement(CF149-50)

At a subsequent hearing on the motion the prosecution called Dan Boyle

who testified that as a Detective with the Weld County Sheriffrsquos Office he became

aware of the defendant because he was ldquoan acquaintance of an incident that

happened in Keenesburg of a murdersuiciderdquo (Shawn Kilkerrsquos murder of his son

and subsequent suicide) and the defendant was believed to have been ldquoinvolvedrdquo

somehow in a kidnapping incident(RTr(12414)p3-5) Because Taylorrsquos parole

officer (James Van Hook) happened to be ldquoon scenerdquo Van Hook ldquosaid that he

would track [the defendant] downrdquo(RTr(12414)p5-6) Boyle indicated that at

the time Van Hook arrested Taylor there was ldquoan understanding that there was

some investigation in place regarding the kidnappingrdquo that had occurred

approximately a month earlier(RTr(12414)p6)

Once Taylor was formally arrested (by Van Hook) and was being housed in

a custodial facility Detective Boyle met with him and proceeded to interrogate the

defendant primarily in regards to the kidnapping incident(RTr(12414)p7-811)

Boyle agreed with the prosecutor that during the videotaped interrogation which

the trial court reviewed prior to the hearing the defendant went into ldquofairly

extensive detail about what happened during that at least alleged kidnapping and

17

what his role in it wasrdquo(RTr(12414)p9) Indeed according to Boyle Taylorrsquos

own admissions during the interrogation directly ldquoresult[ed] in filing charges

against him for kidnappingrdquo(RTr(12414)p9)

At that second hearing on the matter Van Hook testified that he was a

ldquosworn peace officerrdquo and parole officer ldquofor the Colorado Department of

Correctionsrdquo and was acting in that capacity when he ldquotook [Taylor] into custodyrdquo

According to Van Hook though he was serving as the Taylorrsquos parole officer at the

time he had never actually met the defendant before arresting

him(RTr(121814)p15-16)

Importantly Van Hook indicated that before arresting Taylor he was simply

ldquoadvisedrdquo (by Deputy Matt Moll) that the defendant was but a mere ldquosuspect in a

case that they hadrdquo and Van Hook then ldquooffered to go attempt to locate

himrdquo(RTr(121814)p16-17) After Taylor met Van Hook at the Lochbuie Police

Department Van Hook arrested him before Deputy Moll arrived to transport the

defendant to another detention facility(RTr(121814)p17-18) Van Hook

explained that he took Taylor ldquointo custody for a parole violation for investigative

purposesrdquo but was previously provided no other information or facts on which to

base his decision to arrest the defendant(RTr(121814)p17-20)

18

Based on the evidence presented at the hearing or rather the lack thereof

defense counsel argued that when Taylor was taken into custody neither Van

Hook nor any other police officer associated with the kidnapping case had

sufficient probable cause to arrest him as the Federal and State constitutions (and

even applicable parole statute (sect17-2-103 CRS (2012)) all require probable

cause to believe that ldquoa crime has been` committed and that the parolee has

committed such a crimerdquo before an arrest may be made(RTr(121814)p33-34)

Indeed argued counsel only after Taylor was unlawfully arrested and then

interrogated (by Detective Boyle) did a warrant (based on an affidavit of probable

cause) for the defendantrsquos arrest for kidnapping actually

issue(RTr(121814)p35)

In response to the trial courtrsquos suggestion that the ldquofellow officer rulerdquo as

articulated in Grassi v People 320 P3d 332 (Colo 2014) governed the outcome

here and worked against Taylorrsquos claim defense counsel again explained that no

evidence was presented that probable cause was or even could have been

communicated or imputed to Van Hook by other officers who may have been

associated with the investigation(RTr(121814)p36-38) In other words even

with all due deference to the fellow officer rule at the time of Taylorrsquos arrest there

simply was no probable cause (in the possession of Van Hook or any other officer

19

for that matter) to believe that the defendant had committed a crime Indeed at that

stage the investigation into the kidnapping case was still in its

infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

Denying the defendantrsquos motion to suppress his statements the court found

that when Van Hook arrested Taylor there had been probable cause ldquodeveloped by

Deputy Matt Mollhellipfrom the victim in this case and othersrdquo(RTr(11815)p4)

Additionally reasoned the court Van Hook ldquowas acting as a result of the

communication of the other officer and second that the police as whole must

possess the information and I find both of thoserdquo(RTr(11815)p5)

In response but to no avail defense counsel again contended that all Van

Hook was told (by Moll) was that officers were looking for Taylor as a ldquosuspectrdquo

but neither Moll nor any other officer provided any further information or detail as

to the defendantrsquos alleged involvement in the kidnapping so as to furnish probable

cause for his arrest(RTr(11815)p7) Further there must have been some

information transmitted to Van Hook ldquosufficient to warrant an arrestrdquo and ldquoin this

case all we have is they have a suspect that theyrsquore looking for that theyrsquore hoping

to talk tordquo(RTr(11815)p9)

Turning now to Taylorrsquos motion to suppress the physical evidence offered

against him through the motion (number 9) the defendant represented that again

20

without a warrant officers went onto Taylorrsquos property (the curtilage) and seized

and subsequently photographed and searched his vehicle(CFp149) Because there

was no ldquorecognized exception to the warrant requirementrdquo allowing officers to

trespass onto the defendantrsquos property to seize his vehicle any evidence obtained

from that illegality must (like the defendantrsquos statements) be suppressed(CFp149-

50)

On the record defense counsel represented that it was ldquouncontestedrdquo that on

August 6 2014 and without a warrant police officers ventured onto Taylorrsquos

property illegally seized his vehicle before towing it to an impound

lot(RTr(121814)p29) A day later officers then applied for and received a

search warrant for the car(RTr(121814)p29-30) The prosecutor agreed that

those facts were not contested and was granted additional time by the court to

research the law governing the matter(RTr(121814)p30)

At a subsequent hearing the prosecutor indicated that the ldquoissue in play here

is whether it was valid for a warrantless entry of the curtilage of Chris Taylorrsquos

property for the purpose of seizing his vehiclerdquo(RTr(1815)p14) Relying on

People v Brunsting 307 P3d 1073 (Colo 2013) the prosecutor proceeded to

argue that in order to have lawfully seized the defendantrsquos vehicle the officers

must have had both probable cause to believe the car had evidentiary value and a

21

valid exception to the warrant requirement must have existed(RTr(1815)p14-

15) In this case he contended officers had probable cause to believe that Taylorrsquos

car was involved in a kidnapping and there were also exigent circumstances

present in the form of a ldquorisk of the immediate destruction of

evidencerdquo(RTr(1815)p15-16)

In response defense counsel maintained that no ldquoexigent circumstancesrdquo

were present in this case to justify the initial warrantless seizure of Taylorrsquos

vehicle(RTr(1815)p17) Indeed argued counsel the seizure took place a month

after the kidnapping incident when Taylor was squarely in police custody and

there was simply no legitimate basis to believe at that point that the defendant

would move or dispose of his vehicle prior to officers first securing a

warrant(RTr(1815)p17-21)

Denying the motion to suppress evidence just as it had with the defendantrsquos

statements the trial court found that the police had probable cause to believe

Taylorrsquos vehicle was involved in a kidnapping and additionally ldquoconsistent with

the exigent circumstances surrounding this vehicle that there was a risk of the

immediate destruction of the vehicle because the vehicle could be driven

awayrdquo(RTr(1815)p21) ldquoSo the Court finds that there is an exception to the

warrant requirement concerning the seizure of the vehiclerdquo(RTr(1815)p21)

22

Law amp Analysis

First concerning Taylorrsquos warrantless arrest and consequent interrogation by

police it has long been settled that a ldquowarrantless arrest must be supported by

probable cause ie a lsquocourt must determine whether the facts available to a

reasonable cautious officer at the moment of arrest would warrant his belief that an

offense has been or is being committedrsquo by the person to be arrestedrdquo People v

Schreyer 640 P2d 1147 1150 (Colo 1982) (quoting People v Navran 483 P2d

228 (Colo 1971)) People v Castaneda 249 P3d 1119 1122 (Colo 2011) (same)

Here just as defense counsel argued below the prosecution simply failed to

carry its burden to prove that Van Hook (or any other officer investigating the

kidnapping incident for that matter) possessed sufficient probable cause to believe

that Taylor had committed a crime See People v King 16 P3d 807 813-14 (Colo

2001) (it is the prosecutionrsquos burden to prove officers had probable cause when

someone is arrested without a warrant) Indeed while Detective Boyle Deputy

Moll and Probation Officer Van Hook might have (individually or collectively)

had some suspicion that Taylor was involved in the kidnapping (beyond being a

mere ldquosuspectrdquo as he was described) this vague hunch was certainly not enough to

justify arresting the defendant at that point in time See People v McCoy 870 P2d

1231 1235 (Colo 1994) (ldquoprobable cause to arrest requires that at the time an

23

arrest is made the police have probable cause to believe a crime has been or is

being committed and probable cause to believe the person to be arrested has

committed or is committing the crimerdquo) People v Rahming 795 P2d 1338 1341

(Colo 1990) (in order to detain an individual officers must have more than an

inchoate or unparticularized suspicion)

Furthermore the Grassi case (relied upon heavily by both the court and

prosecution) does nothing to alter the analysis here For instance in Grassi our

Supreme Court held that the long-standing ldquofellow officer rulerdquo (which ldquoimputes

information that the police possess as a whole to an individual officerrdquo) extends to

officers acting ldquopursuant to a coordinated investigationrdquo when ldquothe police possess

the information at the time of the search or arrestrdquo Id at 336 338

Again however there was simply no evidence presented that any officers

(who might have been operating ldquopursuant to a coordinated investigationrdquo into the

alleged kidnapping incident) possessed adequate probable cause to believe Taylor

was anything more than a mere ldquosuspectrdquo when he was arrested Indeed only after

Taylor was arrested and thoroughly interrogated (making arguably incriminating

statements throughout) did officers then at least ostensibly have sufficient

evidence or facts to believe that the defendant had committed a crime See McCoy

supra at 1235

24

Second as for the warrantless seizure of Taylorrsquos vehicle from the curtilage

of his home the Federal and State Constitutions guarantee the right to be secure

against unreasonable searches and seizures (US Const amends IV XIV Colo

Const art II sect 7) and our Supreme Court has long recognized that ldquoan

individualrsquos residence ndash whether house apartment motel room or tent ndash is entitled

to the highest protection from governmental intrusionrdquo People v Holmes 981

P2d 168 170 (Colo 1999) Indeed ldquothe physical entry of the home is the chief

evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directedrdquo and

ldquosearches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively

unreasonablerdquo Payton v New York 445 US 573 585-86 (1980) Importantly

ldquothe curtilage immediately surrounding a private house is entitled to the same level

of protection as a residential dwelling because it harbors the lsquointimate activity

associated with the sanctity of a [personrsquos] home and the privacies of liferdquorsquo People

v Brunsting 224 P3d 259 262 (Colo App 2009) (quoting Oliver v United

States 466 US 170 180 (1984))

As defense counsel did below the appellant agrees with the trial court and

prosecution that in order to have validly ventured onto Taylorrsquos property and seize

his vehicle without a warrant the officers here must have had both probable cause

and some exception to the warrant requirement such as a valid exigent

25

circumstance See People v Brunsting 307 P3d 1073 1079 (Colo 2013)

Furthermore it is undisputable that the prosecution bears the burden of proving

that such a sufficient exigency existed so that police ldquocould not brook the delay

incident to obtaining a warrantrdquo People v Miller 773 P2d 1053 1057 (Colo

1989)

Our Supreme Court has long observed that ldquo[t]he doctrine of exigent

circumstances is limited to lsquothose situation where due to an emergency the

compelling need for immediate police action militates against the strict adherence

to the warrant requirementrsquordquo People v Gomez 632 P2d 586 592 (Colo 1981)

(quoting McCall v People 623 P2d 397 402 (Colo 1981)) see People v Jansen

713 P2d 907 911 (Colo 1986) (ldquoexigent circumstances is narrowly

circumscribedhellipand justifies dispensing with the warrant requirement only where

the prosecution has established both probable cause to search and exigent

circumstances justifying the unauthorized entryrdquo) And exigent circumstances are

generally limited to (1) the pursuit of a fleeing suspect (2) a real risk of

immediate destruction of evidence (3) and a colorable claim of emergency Miller

supra at 1057 Furthermore the risk of immediate destruction of evidence

constitutes an exigent circumstance only if the police had an articulable basis

justifying a reasonable belief that evidence was about to be removed or destroyed

26

People v Marez 916 P2d 543 547 (Colo App 1995) (ldquoThis perceived danger

must be real and immediaterdquo)

In this case the prosecution failed to demonstrate that Taylorrsquos vehicle and

its contents posed an ldquoimmediaterdquo risk of being removed or destroyed by the

defendant or anyone else for that matter Again not only did the kidnapping

incident occur an entire month prior to the vehiclersquos seizure but when officers

trespassed onto Taylorrsquos property and removed his car the defendant was being

held in a custody facility Thus there was simply and absolutely no reason why the

police here could not have first obtained a search and seizure warrant and if need

be station an officer near Taylorrsquos home to ensure the vehicle was not tampered

with in the meantime See People v Wehmas 246 P3d 642 (Colo 2010) (no

exigent circumstances where police had the opportunity to first obtain an arrest and

search warrant) People v Garcia 752 P2d 570 (Colo 1988) (exigent

circumstances exception applies only where there is a compelling need for

immediate police action)

Clearly then just as with the trial courtrsquos erroneous determination that

sufficient probable cause existed to justify Taylorrsquos warrantless arrest the court

similarly erred in finding that ldquoexigent circumstancesrdquo authorized the warrantless

seizure of the defendantrsquos vehicle As such both the defendantrsquos incriminating

27

interview with police as well as all the evidence collected in connection with the

unlawful seizure of his vehicle should have been suppressed and excluded from his

trial See Wong Sun v United States 371 US 471 481 (1963) (The ldquofruit of the

poisonous treerdquo doctrine excludes evidence discovered as a result of a violation of

a defendantrsquos constitutional rights and ldquoextends as well to the indirect as the direct

products of such invasionrdquo) People v Rodriquez 945 P2d 1351 1363 (Colo

1997) (ldquoEvidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure is

inadmissiblerdquo)

Finally as for the harm engendered by the courtrsquos erroneous failure to grant

the defendantrsquos motions to suppress as previously noted constitutional errors

mandate reversal unless the State can prove the error was ldquoharmless beyond a

reasonable doubtrdquo Crider v People 186 P3d 39 42 (Colo 2008) In this case it

is beyond dispute that Taylorrsquos lengthy and detailed videotaped confession

(consisting of ldquofairly extensive detail about what happened during that at least

alleged kidnapping and what his role in it wasrdquo as the prosecutor below put it) as

well as testimony and photographs concerning the condition of his vehicle (broken

window glass and a replaced rear windshield) was highly incriminating Indeed

during its closing argument the prosecutor repeatedly employed Taylorrsquos own

words against him not only to impeach his credibility but also to prove the extent

28

of his involvement in the kidnapping and his supposed failure to intervene in its

commission(RTr(21915)p3-17) Thus the courtrsquos error in failing to suppress

such evidence clearly cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt or

otherwise and as such requires reversal See Bartley supra Bernal supra

DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________

JOSEPH P HOUGH 34384

Deputy State Public Defender

Attorneys for Nate Fischer



(303) 764-140

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on January 15 2016 a copy of this Opening Brief of

Defendant-Appellant was electronically served through ICCES on L Andrew

Cooper of the Attorney Generalrsquos office through their AG Criminal Appeals

account

____________________________________

i

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with all requirements of CAR 28 and

CAR 32 including all formatting requirements set forth in these rules

Specifically the undersigned certifies that

This brief complies with the applicable word limit set forth in CAR 28(g)

It contains 5873 words

This brief complies with the standard of review requirement set forth in CAR

28(a)(7)(A)

For each issue raised by the Defendant-Appellant the brief contains under a

separate heading before the discussion of the issue a concise statement (1)

of the applicable standard of appellate review with citation to authority and

(2) whether the issue was preserved and if preserved the precise location in

the record where the issue was raised and where the court ruled not to an

entire document

I acknowledge that my brief may be stricken if it fails to comply with any of the

requirements of CAR 28 and CAR 32

_________________________________

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS


TABLE OF CASES











iii




















iv










Cir 1991) 10






1














parole(RTr(21915)p58(32715)p23)




2





















3




















4




















5




















6







ARGUMENT













7


92 (Colo 2010)








607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)










8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS


TABLE OF CASES











iii




















iv










Cir 1991) 10






1














parole(RTr(21915)p58(32715)p23)




2





















3




















4




















5




















6







ARGUMENT













7


92 (Colo 2010)








607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)










8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

iii




















iv










Cir 1991) 10






1














parole(RTr(21915)p58(32715)p23)




2





















3




















4




















5




















6







ARGUMENT













7


92 (Colo 2010)








607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)










8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

iv










Cir 1991) 10






1














parole(RTr(21915)p58(32715)p23)




2





















3




















4




















5




















6







ARGUMENT













7


92 (Colo 2010)








607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)










8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

1














parole(RTr(21915)p58(32715)p23)




2





















3




















4




















5




















6







ARGUMENT













7


92 (Colo 2010)








607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)










8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

2





















3




















4




















5




















6







ARGUMENT













7


92 (Colo 2010)








607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)










8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

3




















4




















5




















6







ARGUMENT













7


92 (Colo 2010)








607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)










8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

4




















5




















6







ARGUMENT













7


92 (Colo 2010)








607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)










8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

5




















6







ARGUMENT













7


92 (Colo 2010)








607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)










8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

6







ARGUMENT













7


92 (Colo 2010)








607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)










8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

7


92 (Colo 2010)








607 P2d 1291 1294 (Colo 1980)










8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

8




Law amp Analysis
















9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

9




















10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

10

















Clark supra at 1291



11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

11




















12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

12




















13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

13




















14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

14





















15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

15


People 817 P2d 1029 1034 (Colo 1991)

















16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

16




















17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

17









him(RTr(121814)p15-16)










18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

18




















19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

19



infancy(RTr(121814)p37-3841-43)

















20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

20






50)














21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

21




















22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

22

Law amp Analysis



















23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

23



















supra at 1235

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

24















States 466 US 170 180 (1984))





25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

25





1989)















26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

26




















27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

27








inadmissiblerdquo)












28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

28





DOUGLAS K WILSON


____________________________________






(303) 764-140





account

____________________________________

Documents

STATE OF COLORADO Ralph L. Carr Judicial Center · STATE OF COLORADO Ralph L. Carr Judicial Center 2 East 14th Avenue ... Bartley v. People, 817 P.2d 1029 ... People v. Castaneda,