State of Afghanistan

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    State of Afghanistan

    Dr Ashok Behuria

    IDSA

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    Facts

    Total Population: 32.7 million

    Pashtuns constitute 44 % of thepopulation (ANA-45%, ANP-42%),

    Tajiks constitute 25% of the population(ANA-35%, ANP-42%),

    Hajaras constitute 10% of the

    population (ANA-10%, ANP-5%), Uzbeks constitute 8% of the population

    (ANA-6%, ANP-6%)

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    ANSF

    The total number ofANSF is 344,108 (The goalfor ANA by November 2012 is 195,000 soldiersand for ANP is 157,000).

    The attrition rate which was as high as 4.2% inDecember 2009 has come down to about 0.8%by March 2012.

    The pay package for the soldiery varies from$245 a month for a soldier, $535 a month for amajor, $805 a month for Brigadier to $1095 amonth for a General.

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    International Presence

    As of August 2012 there are roughly 84,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.(includes troops under ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom.

    In addition there are about 34,550 foreign troops in different capacities.

    Apart from these, there are about 90,000 private defence department

    contractors (primarily employed by US companies, but many of them arenon-Americans), 19,000 private security contractors (most of them localnationals) and about 12,000 civilian US government officials inAfghanistan.

    US War Expenditure: The US has spent about $443.5billion in warefforts alone during 2001-2011. It will spend an additional $113

    billion in 2012.

    Annual US developmental aid to Afghan government: About $1billiona year during 2001-2009. Touched $4 billion in 2010 and stood about $2.3billion in 2011-2012.

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    Security Situation

    The number of insurgent attacks (IEDs, Mines, Direct andIndirect attacks), throughout 2011-2012: About 500+ per week.

    Green on blue attacks (ANSF against Allied troops): 21 attacksin 2011 causing 35deaths, 32 attacks between January-August

    21, 2012 causing 40 deaths (26 Americans)

    As of August 31, 2012 there have been at least 2,000 U.S.fatalities and 1120+ non U.S. fatalities in Afghanistan. TheUS has lost about 186 helicopters and 25 aircraft during 2001-12.

    Corresponding ANSF casualties : On an average there havebeen about 900 casualties every year since 2007. (2011- 1400and 2012 till July -1000)

    Civilian casualties:3000+ in 2011, 1100 till July 2012 (77%due to militants)

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    Poppy cultivation: It has increased since 2001. From about 70,000

    hectares under poppy cultivation (37% of global cultivation) in 2000, itrose consistently to about 180,000 hectares (82% of global cultivation)in 2008. It has since come down to about 125,000 hectares (63% ofglobal cultivation) in 2011. The provinces that top in poppy cultivation are

    Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Uruzgan and Nangarhar in that order.

    Poppy production: From about 3,276 Metric tonnes (70% of globalproduction) in 2000 to about 8,200 MTs (92% of global production) in2008 and has come down to 5,800 Mts (74% of global production) in2011.

    In terms of governance, in the global annual corruption perception

    index (brought up by Transparency International) Afghanistan has risenfrom 117th position (out of 159 countries) in 2005 to 180th position(out of 182 countries) in 2011.

    IDPs: 35200 till December 2011

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    Power situation: Installed capacity (diesel, hydro andrenewable) for power production: 1028 MW, Operational capacity60%, 15% of households in urban centres and 6% of householdsin rural areas have access to electricity.

    Education: Less than a million are enrolled in primary/secondaryeducation). Proportion of boys to girls is 5:3

    Healthcare: Basic package of Health Care (BPCH)programme is now being implemented in 82% of the districtsin Afghanistan (it was 9% in 2002).

    Asylum applications from Afghanistan which had gone up to

    52000+ in 2001, had come down to9900 in 2009. It hasincreased consistently since 2009,to about36000 in 2011.

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    Assured Help Post-2014

    Afghan Central Bank estimated in early 2012 that Afghanistan wouldrequire about $6 billion a year for a decade to sustain the pace ofeconomic development.

    On top of it, in May 2012, in Chicago NATO Summit it was estimated thatAfghanistan will require about $4.1 billion to maintain a force-strength of

    about 228,500 beyond 2014. However, US could only muster pledge ofabout $1.3 billion from its allies.

    Amid talks of donor fatigue and war weariness, inJuly 2012,representatives from about 80 nations and international organisationspledged $16 billion in aid over four years.

    Afghanistan received about $35 billion in aid during 2001-2010, butmuch of it could not reach the people, amid allegations of widespreadcorruption and poor implementation of programmes aimed atreconstruction and development. Under mutual accountability provisions,about 20% of the pledged amount will be contingent on Afghangovernment ensuring economic reforms and good governance.

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    Afghan government has held investment in agriculture andmining sector as critical for boosting economic growth.

    It is believed that Afghanistan has up to $1 trillion worth ofmineral wealth.

    China and India have expressed their interest in theminerals of Afghanistan and bid for Iron, Copper andhydrocarbon among other things.

    However, until and unless Afghanistan stabilizes, it woulddifficult for countries invest there. In the absence ofinternational help, the security situation is unlikely toimprove beyond 2014.

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    Analysis: Half Glass Full

    The engagement of the international community during thelast one decade has laid the foundations of a NewAfghanistan.

    The US may not leave Afghanistan entirely. This is likely to

    deter Taliban and Pakistan to launch an all out offensiveagainst the Afghan government post 2014.

    International community may not abandon Afghanistan likeit did in the 1990s. International assistance may not dry up.This may be enough to get the Afghan government going.

    Some factions of the Taliban may join the government

    Taliban are not monolithic. There are divisions withinTaliban which can be exploited. Popular support for Talibanin Pashtun majority areas shinking.

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    Analysis: Half Glass Empty

    Afghan situation remain precarious.

    ANSF is too ill-equipped, ill-trained and ill-paid to counter theTaliban onslaught. It may get divided along ethnic lines.

    Taliban shows no sign of pursuing reconciliation with the US. It

    is unlikely to accept Bonn process.

    There is a vast gulf between the ways the internationalcommunity and Pakistan look at Afghan stability.

    Pakistan is determined to regain its strategic depth inAfghanistan and deny space to India.

    It does have tremendous potential to shape the future ofAfghanistan, given its influence and control over Afghaninsurgents. However, it is more interested in getting its proxiesin Kabul by all means than in stability in Afghanistan.

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    Pakistan continues to view Afghan Taliban as an asset andstrongly believes that Talibans return is inevitable.Therefore, it thinks that Talibans return is a precondition forstability of Afghanistan.

    The Taliban resolve is a function of Western fatigue inAfghanistan.

    International community too polite in it dealing withPakistan.

    Lack of consensus among regional countries, lack resources

    No political consensus among major groups. Leadership

    crisis

    Economy not in shape to support transition

    International resolve lacking. Global economic melt-down.Domestic reactions in western countries unfavourable.

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    Ethnic disharmony

    Pervasive culture of militancy

    Warlordism

    Poor governance

    Radicalisation continues

    Difficult to sustain the tempo of reconstruction

    Growing public apathy.

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    Way Out

    Pakistans nuisance potential needs to be effectively dealtwith

    Afghan leadership will have to find a way of evolving apolitical consensus to deal with the challenges that confront

    them.

    International community will have to stay engaged.Regional countries must be persuaded to upscale theirinvolvement in developmental activities.

    Every possible measure should be taken to stop Talibanfrom overrunning Kabul through military means.

    Abandoning Afghanistan is no longer an option