Wang Shaoguang

State Effectiveness and Democracy

Shaoguang WangDepartment of Government & Public Administration

The Chinese University of Hong KongShatin, NT, HONG KONG

Tel. +852-2609-7515Fax +852-2603-5225

Email: wangshaoguang@cuhk.edu.hk

July 19, 2002

1

Wang Shaoguang

“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficult lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”

Madison: The Federalist, No. 51

Introduction

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the “third wave” of democratization

(Huntington 1991) began to spread from South Europe and Latin America to East

Asia, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere, many

were very optimistic about the future of the unfolding “worldwide democratic

revolution." Now, a decade later, the optimism has somehow faded away. Although

the U.S. Government continues to claim, "At long last, democracy is triumphant,"1

those who have made efforts to assess the progress of the third wave find that the

reality is not as rosy as people once tended to believe. Among nearly 100 countries

that appeared to be moving away from authoritarian rule in the early 1990s, at present,

only fewer than 20 are “clearly en route to becoming successful, well-functioning

democracies” (Carothers 2002). In addition to over a dozen countries that have

suffered “democratic breakdown” or “democratic reversals” (e.g., Pakistan, Kenya,

Lebanon, Lesotho, Niger, Peru, Sierra Leone, Zambia, and several post-Soviet states),

most transition states seem to have stuck in what Larry Diamond terms "twilight

zone" (Diamond 1999b) or what Thomas Carothers calls “gray zone” (Carothers

2002). Falling in between outright dictatorship and well-established democracy, those

political systems have recently earned new labels, such as “semi-democracy,”

“formal democracy,” “electoral democracy,” “façade democracy,” “pseudo-

democracy,” “weak democracy,” “partial democracy,” “virtual democracy” (Collier &

Levitsky 1997), “illiberal democracy,” (Zakaria 1997) and “broken-back democracy”

(Rose & Shin 2001). However, ever adding qualified adjectives to characterize those

systems is still misleading, because most of them are not democratic at all.

Why are so many third wave transition countries in trouble? Or more

generally, what are the conditions under which democracies can survive and function?

1 On June 26-27, 2000, at a two-day conference to celebrate the spread of democracy held in Warsaw, the U.S. State Department, one of the conference sponsors, claimed, "At long last, democracy is triumphant." Over the last quarter-century, the department says, the world has witnessed "a profound democratic revolution." Electoral democracies now represent 120 of the 192 existing countries and 58 percent of the world's population.

2

Wang Shaoguang

The standard answer to this question normally points to three key variables as the

preconditions for a successful venture into stable democracy, namely, a relative high

level of economic development (which is associated with such intervening variables

as a high standard of living, a high level of literacy, a sizable and strong middle class)

(Lipset 1959; Fukuyama 1993, Barro 1999; Przeworski et. Al 2000), a vibrant civil

society (Putnam 1993; Linz & Stepan 1996),2 and a strong civic culture (Almond &

Verba 1963; Inglehart 1997; Diamond 1999). There is no doubt that these are in fact

attributes which characterize the old and stable democracies, nor that they are

generally lacking in most of the transition countries. However, they are by no means

the only things that are absent in the majority of third-wave countries. Another things

those countries are commonly wanting seems to be coherent, functioning states.

In most countries that once belonged to the former Soviet Union and former

Yugoslavia, no national state institutions had existed before they began transition.

Thus they had to struggle with difficulties of building states from scratch when they

became independent. They are still struggling. Throughout much of sub-Saharan

Africa, states exist but are largely incoherent, nonfunctional, and instable. Latin

American countries fare not much better. They mostly entered their attempted

democratic transitions with “a deep legacy of persistently poor performance of state

institutions” (Carothers 2002). Elsewhere in the third world, transition away from

authoritarian rule often unfolded in the context of extremely weak state structures,

which are unable to cope with most of the major problems facing these societies, from

crime and corruption control to the provision of basic public services, such as health,

education, and social security. Almost all of countries with non-performing states are

stuck in the “gray zone”, suffering the syndrome of either “feckless pluralism” or

“dominant power politics” (Carothers 2002). Interestingly, it is in those third wave

countries where state building did not appear to be a major challenge that democratic

progress seems to have made much headway. They are primarily countries in

Southern and Central Europe as well as the Baltic region, though there are also a few

in South America and East Asia. Examples include Spain, Portugal, Greece, Poland,

Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Uruguay, Chile, Taiwan and South

Korea (Linz & Stepan 1996; Carothers 2002).

2 According to Linz and Stepan (1996), in addition to civil society, other four “interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must exist or to be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated,” which include political society, a rule of law, a state bureaucracy, and a economic society.

3

Wang Shaoguang

This observation sharply contrasts with a misconception about democratic

transition that was prevailing all over the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At

that time, people normally thought that democracy was associated with minimal

government, and that democracy and state therefore were antitheses against each

other. Since the state was viewed as an obstacle to political opening, then

democratization entailed “destatization.” To increase the survival probability of

democracy, it was widely believed, state capacity should be weakened rather than

strengthened. As a result, democratizing initiatives in many parts of the world, driven

by both domestic reformers and international advocates, often focused primary

attention on dismantling the structures of control and reducing the extent of state

involvement in the economy and society. Only after a decade of experimentation with

“shrinking the state” did a growing number of reformers come to realize the critical

importance of having a capable state, not just a minimal one, if democracy were to

perform effectively and to be consolidated (Grindle 1997)

Similarly, transitology has also taken a detour before rediscovering the state.

Initially, studies of third wave democratization largely ignored the role of the state.

The focus then was on such questions as what could be done to foster a strong civil

society, how to institutionalize competitive election, what form of legislative-

executive relative was more desirable, etc. The existence of an effective state was

either taken for granted or considered inconsequential. As time goes by, however,

students of democratization become increasingly aware that in many third wave

countries, something is missing. What is it? “The short answer is: basic institutions of

the modern state” (丁学良 2000; Rose & Shin 2001). O’Donnell’s (1992) was among

the first to remind us that the progress of democratization is contingent on the

institutional viability and the effectiveness of state institutions. Then in the mid-

1990s, Przeworski (1995) as well as Linz & Stepan (1996) arrived at the same

conclusion that, without an effective state, there can be no democracy. Now more and

more scholars agree that the presence of an effective state is a prerequisite for

democracy (Rose & Shin 2001; Carothers 2002). That is true especially among those

who study Africa (du Toit 1995; Mengisterab & Daddieh 1999) and the states of the

former Soviet Union (Holmes 1997; Kuzio, Kravchuk, & D’Anieri 1999; Sperling

2000; Kopecky & Mudde 2000).

4

Wang Shaoguang

Although a new consensus has begun to emerge about the imperative of

effective state institutions for successful democratic transition and consolidation, the

exact linkages between the two has not yet been systematically explored; and

therefore many crucial questions remain unanswered. This research is designed to fill

out this vacuum. The paper is organized as follows. The Section I tries to re-

conceptualize democracy. Whiles most define democracy as a type of political

regime, the section emphasizes that it is also a form of public authority. As such, it

needs to acquire what Michael Mann calls “infrastructural power” (Mann 1993: 59-

61). The Section II deals with the concept of state effectiveness. In addition to offer a

definition of the state, it attempts to identify the nuts and bolts of an effective modern

state. By doing so, the section is intended to provide a framework for comparing state

effectiveness across countries. The Section III endeavors to answer the central

question of the paper: why democracy can work and last without an effective state.

Based upon the insight that an effective state is a prerequisite of a high-quality and

sustainable democracy, the Section IV derives six hypotheses concerning conducive

or adverse circumstances for democratic transition and consolidation. The final

section is a brief summary. The upshot of the arguments presented in this paper is that

democracy is unlikely to flourish where it is not based upon a solid infrastructure of

state institutions.3

I. Democracy

Democracy as a Type of Regime

Democracy is one type of political regimes. What distinguishes democracy

from various types of non-democratic regimes lies in that democracy enables people

to manage power relations and thus control rulers, while others do not (Shapiro

2001).4 The most influential twentieth century approach to the democratic

management of power relations is one pioneered by Schumpeter (1942). According to

Schumpeter, democracy is an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political

decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive

struggle for the people’s vote” (1942: 269). In such a political system, rulers are held

accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, not by directly involving 3 The purpose of this study is very modest. Focusing on the relationship between state effectiveness and democracy, it attempts neither to explain why state building is more successful in certain countries than others nor to examine how state capacity can be strengthened. 4 For typology of non-democratic regimes, see Linz & Stepan (1996) and Brooker (2000)

5

Wang Shaoguang

in decision-making process, but indirectly through the competition and cooperation of

their elected representatives (Schmitter & Karl 1993).

As a device for managing power relations, democracy in a minimum must

meet two criteria at once, namely, what Dahl calls “inclusiveness” and “public

contestation.” The former refers to participation, or more precisely, the right for

virtually all adults to vote and contest for office. The latter refers to opposition rights,

or creating institutionalized channels for meaningful opposition by those who are

adversely affected by government policies. A political system cannot be called

democratic unless both inclusive participation and political competition are present.

By the end of the eighteenth century, for instance, Britain has already had a highly

developed system of public contestation, but only a very small proportion of its

population were permitted to take part in political competition. Thus, despite the

existence of competitive pluralism, one cannot call the Britain of the nineteenth

century a democracy, because one-person-one-vote, which is widely seen as a non-

negotiable requirement of democracy, was absent. Britain did not become a modern

political democracy until the early twentieth century when all adult citizens were

franchised and “entitled to participated on a more or less equal plane in controlling

and contesting the conduct of the government” (Dahl 1971: 4). Almost all the Western

democracies have followed this public-contestation-first-and-popular- participation-

later path to democracy. Conversely, in some political systems, people are allowed

and sometimes required to participate in politics, but are stripped the right to oppose

government policies. Such systems are not democratic either, for without meaningful

opposition, it is not possible for people to control and contest government behavior.

Only when contestation and participation are combined, it is realistic for people to

curtail domination. Then the system is qualified to be called democratic.

Democracy as a Form of Governance

Most scholars define democracy only as a type of regime. We think it is

necessary to emphasize that democracy is also a form of governance of a state.

Democracy differs from other forms of regimes in its distinctive way of governance,

but, as Bagehot (1949:3-4) pointed out, every political system must gain authority and

then use authority. In other words, “authority has to exist before it can be limited”

(Huntington 1968: 8). If a government cannot perform basic state functions, no matter

how democratic its form is, the people of the country would not be able to benefit

6

Wang Shaoguang

from it. In this sense, “the issues pertaining to the state are logically prior to those

concerning the political regime” (Przeworski 1995: 13). Without an effective state, no

democracy is meaningful. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 17).

The separation between regime type and state allows us to conceptualize

democracy as a compound of democratic institutions and state institutions (Rose &

Shin 2001). The former refers to institutions that revolve around four stages of

democratic representation: pre-voting, voting, post-voting and inter-election period

(Shapiro 2001). More specifically, democratic institutions include bundles of rights

and obligations associated with citizenship, methods of organizing interests, electoral

system, arrangements of dividing and supervising powers, and so on. The central

distinctive task of democratic institutions is to limit power (Przeworski 1995). As for

state institutions, we will deal with them in the following section. Suffice it to say

here that the main purpose of state institutions is to furnish the government with

authority and thereby enable it to govern.

In the literature, democratization has often been defined as the process of

regime change, which involves the emergence of institutionalized contestation and the

expansion of participation in the contestation to groups that have been excluded from

political life. The conceptualization of democracy as both a type of regime and a form

of governance sheds new light on the real meaning of democratization. From this

perspective, democratization consists of two separate processes: a process of

transition from a non-democratic regime to a more or less democratic one as well as a

process of state building or re-building (Rose, 333). Similarly, the concept of

consolidation of democracy needs to be reconsidered. In addition to “routinizing”

democratic practice and internalizing democratic values (Linz & Stepan 1996: 5), a

consolidated democracy must also be able to effectively govern the full territory over

which it claims sovereignty. Thus, state-(re)building should be an indispensable

undertaking throughout democratization and consolidation. It is ill advised for third

wave countries to damage or weaken essential state capacities during their transition.

Wherever and whenever the efficacy of the state is in doubt, a crisis of governance is

likely to emerge; if unsettled in due course, the crisis of governance may eventually

give rise to the crisis of democracy.

II. State Effectiveness

7

Wang Shaoguang

Because state effectiveness is so vital to democratic transition and

consolidation, we devote the section to examining this topic.

What is the state? The state may be defined, in the Weberian sense, as a set of

institutions that monopolize the legitimate use of force and rule-making within a

given territory. The monopolization of physical force is the very foundation the state’s

existence rests, which endows the state with power to make authoritative binding

decisions and to perform its other functions.5 Without power, a state cannot be

effective.

Power, of course, has many faces. Following Mann (1993), we believe it

useful to distinguish two types of state power: despotic and infrastructural powers.

The former refers to the power state elites can exercise “without routine negotiation

with civil society groups” (Mann 1993: 59). State despotic power is measured by its

intrusiveness or extensiveness. While such power is broad and sometimes unlimited in

non-democratic settings, it is more constrained, albeit in varying degrees, in

democratic systems. Infrastructural power, on the other hand, is measured by its

effectiveness. According to Mann’s definition, “infrastructural power refers to the

capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically

political decisions throughout the realm.” (Mann 1986: 114). Infrastructurally most

powerful states are found in today’s Western democracies, where the state’s capacity

to penetrate everyday life surpass that of any historical or contemporary third world

state. States in other times and other places may be intrusive and ruthless, but they

often encounter enormous difficulties in penetrating people’s social and economic

life. State infrastructural power in Western democracies, however, is so pervasive that

their citizens cannot even find “hiding place from the infrastructural reach of the

modern state” (Mann 1986: 114).

Despotic power and infrastructural power are analytically two independent

dimensions of state power. While the former defines the nature of the state (or regime

type), the latter conditions state capacity and effectiveness. Democratization by

definition will weaken state despotic power, but it would be unwise to bring collateral

damage to the infrastructural power of the state in the process. A less intrusive state

does not entail a less effective state. One can even argue that democracy probably

5 The monopolization of physical force is of course an ideal assumption. In no country does the state has complete monopoly of the use of force in practice. However, all but a few states have a legitimate monopoly in the sense that most people believe that the state should have a monopoly.

8

Wang Shaoguang

needs more infrastructural power to function effectively, efficiently and sustainably

than other forms of government.

Where state infrastructural power is deficient, efforts must be made to build

essential state institutions and capabilities. In the literature about the state, “state-

building” is often vaguely defined as a process in which the state accumulates power.

In our understanding, state building involves accumulating only infrastructural power,

not despotic power.

The above discussion leads to two fundamental questions of this paper: What

specific infrastructural power does a state have to possess to be effective? Why is an

effective state a prerequisite of sustainable democracy? Despite growing evidence that

state effectiveness underpins democracy, to our knowledge, these questions have not

been systematically examined. The rest of this section tries to answer the first

question and leaves the second to the next section.

Given the broad and growing scope of state activities, state effectiveness

obviously is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. No single index seems

able to capture all aspects of state effectiveness. Thus, we need to identity some key

state functions and use the state’s capability to perform them to gauge the

effectiveness of various states. There are six most critical functions we believe

effective states should have capacities to perform (Pye 1966; Binder et al 1971; Grew

1978):

1. To monopolize the legitimate use of violence

2. To extract resources

3. To shape national identity and mobilize consent

4. To regulate the society and economy

5. To maintain internal coherence of state institutions

6. To redistribute resources

The first two sets of functions are those that define any state, including pre-

modern states. According to Weber, as long as there were people or groups that used

or threatened to use physical force to pursue their interests, political power existed.

But the state did not emerge until there was a political organization that was able to

monopolize the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order in a

given territory Even pre-modern states were characterized by the creation of regular

armies and a taxation system (Weber 1978 I: 54-6). The other four functions are the

features of modern nation-state, which add “routine, formalized, rationalized

9

Wang Shaoguang

institutions” of wider scope not only over its citizens but also to a very large extent

over all actions taking place in the areas of its jurisdiction (Mann 1993: 56).

If a state is capable of performing all of those functions well, we call it an

effective state. If a state is only capable of performing some of the functions, we call

it less effective. When a state is unable to perform any of those functions, it can

legitimately be called a failed state. By contrast the distinctive attributes of effective

states with those of less effective or totally failed ones, we should be able to identify

the essential infrastructural power an effective state must possess. While the particular

manifestations of effective states may vary from country to country, they all may

share certain basic ingredients.

Let’s examine those six state capacities one by one in little detail.

The capacity to monopolize the legitimate use of violence

By Weber’s definition, the basic test of the existence of a state is whether or

not its national government can lay claim to a monopoly of force in the territory under

its jurisdiction. Obviously, the monopoly of force is a “means” rather than an “end”

for the state. Its end is to encounter external threat to the sovereignty and internal

threat to social order. To achieve this goal, all states must build up and deploy armed

forces and police forces, with the former primarily to defend against possible foreign

invasion and the latter to prevent and punish deviant conduct and repress social

unrest. Such institutions are vital to state power. Here we want to emphasize the

importance of developing a professional, resourceful, dedicated, disciplined, and

uniformed police. Repressive regimes are often called “police states”. This is actually

a wrong label. In fact, the ratio of policemen to population is highly correlated with

the degree of freedom. Put differently, the ratio tends to be low in so-called “police

states,” while it is much high in so-called “free countries” (史天健 2001).

Clearly, if the territory of a country is carved up by foreign forces, its

government cannot claim to be an effective state (e.g., Palestine). Similarly, if several

internal rival groups coexist in a country and all of them possess organized violence,

none would be in a position to establish permanent control of the contested territory.

Wherever such a situation is present, we may call it “statelessness” (e.g., Afghanistan,

and many African countries such as Angola).

The capacity to extract resources

10

Wang Shaoguang

State monopoly of physical force did not come cheap. In order to do so, states

needed to “extract from the population a share of the yearly product of its economic

activities” (Poggi 1990: 66). Thus, as early as in the sixteenth century, when the

modern nation-state just began to emerge, Jean Bodin already realized, "Financial

means are the nerves of the state" (Cited from Kugler & Domke 1986: 45). Not long

after, Esmund Burke came to the same conclusion: “The revenue of the state is the

state. In effect all depends upon it…” (Cited from Levi 1988: 122).

Indeed, just like a human being cannot be alive without blood, a state cannot

function without revenue. It is the availability of resources that permits the state to

carry out its other tasks. In this sense, an effective government has to be fiscally

viable. More specifically, a state that is unable to generate sufficient resources for

realizing its policy goals cannot be effective. In contrast, a political system must be

effective if it can extract sufficient resources from the society, aggregate those

resources into a national pool, and use them for national purposes.

In the last century or so, the scope of state operation has expanded

considerably. To finance bigger governments, states need to explore more productive

extractive devices. In the past, states raised revenue mainly through such mechanisms

as military or colonial ventures, the sale of offices, tax farming, monopolies,

donations, and even drawing on state elites’ private wealth (Poggi 1978, 97). Now,

“the regular, unobtrusive levying of taxes on various phases and aspects of the

modernized economic process” has largely replaced those less efficient instruments

(Poggi 1990, 66). As a result, in Western democracies, government spending typically

increased by three- to five-fold, if not more, in the twentieth century (Poggi 1990:

109-110). At present, it commonly accounts for one-third to a half of the gross

domestic products (GDP) in those countries. And people in the West have become

more or less used to a strong extractive state.

Elsewhere, state extractive capacity varies greatly from country to country and

generally is much weaker. In the 1950s, after conducting several case studies in the

third world, Nicholas Kaldor, a British economist, came to the conclusion that there

were no inherent obstacles to raising the rate of government financial extraction. For a

variety of reasons, however, few developing countries followed his prescriptions

(Waldner 1999: 45). What started in the West centuries ago thus has barely been

underway in much of the third world.

11

Wang Shaoguang

The capacity to shape national identity and mobilize consent

Backed by extractive capacity, coercive capacity is the most basic aspect of

state power. But it would be extremely costly to maintain domestic peace by coercion

alone. For any political system to operate effectively, there must exist some shared

identities and shared values. This is especially true in diverse societies. Let’s first deal

with the necessity of national identity.

In the early phases of state development in the West, and in the third world

today, the state is one among many autonomous power centers (families, villages,

localities, ethnic groups, religious organizations, and governments) that compete for

people’s loyalty. Thus, the construction of state coercive and extractive capacities

must be followed by rationalization of authority and nation building. The former

refers to the centralization of political power, involving the replacement of traditional

familial, local, religious, and ethnic authorities by a single, secular, national authority

(Huntington 1966). The latter means “internal homogenization” (Tilly 1975: 661),

involving the transformation of “peoples’ commitment and loyalty from smaller

tribes, villages, or petty principalities to the larger central political system, creating a

common national culture of loyalty and commitment” (Almond & Powell 1966: 36).

The formation of national identity is very important. The breakup of the Soviet

Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia and ethnic conflicts in Indonesia, Sri Lanka,

and many African countries vividly demonstrate that the absence of national identity

could be a powerful centrifugal force. When a significant proportion of the population

perceive themselves distinct ethnically, culturally, linguistically, or religiously from

other people who live within the same boundaries, they may be motivated to create

their independent states or join other states.

It is true that multiethnic and multicultural states normally have greater

difficulties in winning and maintaining the allegiance of diverse population. But this

observation should not lead us to the conclusion that ethnic, cultural, religious or

linguistic identity is primordially given and thereby any effort to shape a national

identity in such diverse societies is doomed to failure. In fact, almost all nations

started out as very diverse culturally, linguistically, religiously or ethnically. The

presence of a strong national identity in some but not all countries implies that

identity is amendable. All states have a tendency to assimilate populations within a

12

Wang Shaoguang

given territory into a single nation through education and other socialization

channels.6 Thus the formation of national identity is best understood as an outcome of

purposeful state efforts to overcome heterogeneity in the society, although some

exogenous historical accidents may also affect the outcome. If a society is fragmented

where opportunistic politicians can use the strategy of exacerbating minuscule

differences to pursue their personal interests, “it is more likely a consequence of

institutional failure rather than a cause of it” (Przeworski et al 1995: 21).

In addition to shaping national identity, the state also endeavors to shape its

citizens’ values and beliefs. By doing this, it hopes to further reduce the costs of

ruling. Emile Durkheim put a great deal of emphasis on the existence of a common set

of values and beliefs in any society. He contends that only when most members of a

society share such a set of core values, moral unity could be retained. Without moral

unity, any system would degenerate sooner or later (Durkheim 1951). (Ritzen)

This goal of anchoring people in a common set of core values can be achieved

through a range of strategies. Where people’s values and beliefs happen to be

congruent or consonant with the state’s preferences, the state is inclined to reinforce

societal convergence, deference, and indifference to forestall the emergence of values

and attitudes that diverge from the state’s. Where state and societal preferences do

diverge, the state may use various tactics to change societal values and beliefs to

make them congruent or consonant with its own (Nordlinger 1981: 74-117).

Moreover, every state strives to inculcate certain values and beliefs upon children so

as to make these future citizens more obedient and more disciplined (Creveld 1999:

210-17)

Once state instilled values and symbols become widely shared, largely

unquestioned values and symbols in a society, it is easy for the state to wrap up

authoritative actions with these values and symbols. Then citizens may feel obligated

to comply with state policies (Poggi 1978: 101).

Wherever states are unable to mold national identity and to implant in the

masses official value systems, they are unlikely to be effective, because a great deal

more resources and energy would have to be diverted to fighting against centrifugal

forces, subduing nonconforming ideas, and cracking down defiant behaviors.

The capacity to regulate the society and economy

6 For the example of France, see Weber (1976).

13

Wang Shaoguang

The regulative capacity is defined as the ability of the state to change and

subordinate behavior of individuals and groups away from their own inclination and

in favor of the behavior prescribed by the state. While the capacity to mobilize

consent concerns people’s internal convictions, the regulative capacity deals with

people’s external behavior.

Regulations are necessary because modern societies are full of hazards

engendered from industrialization, commercialization, urbanization, and asymmetrical

distribution of power and information. To protect people and the nature, the state

needs to regulate not only such clearly deviant social activities as murder and assault,

but also many aspects of economic and social life, including, among other things,

weights and measures, contract, industrial R&D, road construction, public utility

services, food and drug quality, garbage collection, mail delivery, labor-management

relations, working conditions, safety standards, the relief of destitution, consumer

protection, the protection of the environment and natural resources, health, education,

sports, marriage, the promotion of the arts, and even parental responsibility.

It is by no means easy for the state to regulate the society and economy. To

facilitate effective regulation, for instance, the state must collect and store a massive

amount of information about everyone living and working in the country.7 In

developed countries, this is not a problem. Birth, schooling, marriage, divorce,

occupation, income, ownership of house and automobile, honor, misconduct, exit

from and entry into the country, and death are all constantly under state watch.

Nothing seems to be able to escape state screening. In the developing world, however,

even statistics on such basic items as population size and distribution are often

deficient, not to mention information about mobile tax bases or practices of food

handling. For countries that are not capable of monitoring the whereabouts and

behaviors of their populations, it is unrealistic to expect their states to possess much

regulative capacity.

Since the rise of “regulatory state” in the West in the first half of the twentieth

century, there have been complaints about the growing power of the state. The

complaint is mainly leveled against the state’s regulatory encroachment into “a much

expanded and differentiated range of social [and economic] activities” (Poggi 1990:

109). However, no one can deny a simple fact that, in today’s world, all those well-

7 Emerged just before 1800 in English and all European languages, the word “statistics” means data pertaining to the state (Mann 1993: 361).

14

Wang Shaoguang

ordered societies, whether democratic (e.g., Norway) or not (e.g., Singapore), are

highly regulated. Where governments lack adequate regulative capacity, again

whether democratic (e.g., India) or not (e.g., Egypt), people there typically have to put

up with frequent industrial accidents and environmental disasters, untreated water,

broken draining system, chaotic traffic, appalling work conditions, tense labor-

management relations, shoddy consumer products, horrendous medical services, and

the like. The contrast between the two types of countries clearly points to the

significance of regulative capacity for any modern state.

The capacity to maintain internal coherence of state institutions

To modernize and broaden the collection of taxes, to shape national identity,

to inculcate official ideology into citizens, to control for negative externalities of the

market, to coordinate economic actors’ behavior, to improve people’s quality of life,

to structure social conflicts, and to maintain order and a rule of law, the state must be

backed up by a an effective bureaucracy. “The vast bureaucratic structure of modern

states with their tens of thousands of officials make them the core of modern

government” (Friedrich 1963: 464). As an instrument of execution of the authoritative

decisions of the government, the bureaucracy must be professionalized and

meritocratic so that its recruits have technical talent and requisite training to be

competent for tasks assigned to them. But, just as important from the perspective of

the state is an ability for it to maintain internal coherence of bureaucratic institutions.

The modern bureaucracy is a complex and sophisticated organization made up

of multiple, minute organs. Though all the activities of the bureaucracy are supposed

to be ultimately sanctioned by and directed from a single center, there is a danger of

the coherence of the system being undercut by the inertia and departmentism of

bureaucratic agencies and the particularism and corruption of individual bureaucrats.

It is often the case that political executives’ policy-making efforts are thwarted

by the bureaucracy not so much because it intends deliberately to sabotage those

political leaders as because large organizations tend to proceed from inertia and to

persist in their routine unless stopped. In addition, bureaucrats and their organizations

tend to believe that they understand the policy area in question better than the political

executives (Peters 1987).

A more acute problem with bureaucracy, however, is that each agency “seeks

to maximize the state resources it commands, and to assign priority to its own

15

Wang Shaoguang

concerns over all others” (Poggi 1990: 30-1). This kind of desire may motivate

bureaucratic agencies intentionally to hinder or block the collection of vital

information for centralized decision making and to involve in pointless competition

against each other. As a result, the ultimate authority of the state may find it difficult,

if not impossible, to enforce its policy agenda and to prevent its agents from deserting

their strictly implementary role. The corporate coherence of the state then becomes

the casualty of “bureaucratic free enterprise” (Tullock 1965)

The most detrimental problem with the bureaucracy, especially among third

world countries, is particularism and corruption, namely, officials using their offices

to favors their relatives and friends or to maximize their personal wealth, power, and

status. Rather than dehumanize administrative process as expected by Max Weber

(1946: 215-16), officials who practice particularism allow love, hatred, and other

personal elements to affect their decisions made in the name of the state. Corrupt

officials also give preferentiality to people related to them in the execution of state

directives, but not out of emotion, but out of careful calculation of potential gains and

risks (Ackerman 1999). Despite the difference in motive, both particularism and

corruption impair the impartiality of public administration, breed a distrust of public

authorities, set off political alienation, and, in extreme case, may even lead to system

breakdowns (Klitgaard 1988).

An well-functioning state is supposed to operate as a machine in which the

wheels and gears are precisely adjusted to one another, a machine “propelled by

energy and directed by information flowing from a single center in the service of a

plurality of coordinated tasks”(Poggi 1978: 98). In large part, the ability of a state to

accomplish its goals is a function of the coherence of its political institutions. Where

government institutions do not mesh with each other and particularism and corruption

are rampant, intrastate and state-society conflicts are bound to increase, thus

undercutting the ability of the whole system to control the flow of tax resources and to

achieve other policy goals.

The capacity to distribute resources

The distributive capacity refers to the authoritative redistribution of scarce

resources between difference social groups. This is a relative new measure of state

effectiveness that did not take form until the advent of the welfare state in the West in

the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The purpose of redistribution

16

Wang Shaoguang

is to provide the least fortunate members of the society with economic security as well

as to reduce inequality in income and wealth distribution. Urbanization, higher

literacy levels, the demonstration effect of the Western welfare states have all

increased the volume and intensity of pressures for the state to use its coercive power

to redistribute income, wealth and opportunity worldwide. Even in many developing

countries, people now expect their governments to mitigate social risks and narrow

the gaps between the “haves” and “have not” through some forms of redistribution.

Some contends that since the welfare state is primarily a Western luxury that only rich

countries can afford, the effectiveness of a state should not be measured by its

distributive capacity (Gros 1996). To the extent that inequality often increases the

probability of political instability (Alesina, Ozler, Roubini & Swagel 1996; Alesina &

Perotti 1996), the distributive capacity in effect is one that helps to maintain domestic

public order and enhance its legitimacy. Given the importance of public order and

legitimacy for any regime, the instrumental value of redistribution should not be

underestimated.

In summary, an effective state is defined by its ability to defend its sovereignty

and territory, to exert coercive control over the population, to tax compulsorily, to

inculcate a sense of common identity, to regulate human activities in economic and

social realms, and last but not least, to centrally coordinate its agencies and agents so

as to interlock them into a unitary whole. Clearly, these state capacities are

interdependent to each other. Developing and integrating these capacities is essential

for any state to become effective. 8

Why is an Effective State a Prerequisite of Sustainable Democracy?

Having defined both “democracy” and “state effectiveness,” we now turn to

the relationship between the two. There may be a wide range of necessary conditions

for democracy to work and last. We argue that the existence of an effective state is

one of those necessary conditions, and probably the most important one. Without an

effective state, there can be no democracy. This point, of course, is by no means

8 There are many reasons why in many territories of the world no such state exists. But it is an issue that we cannot cover in this short essay. The focus of this paper, as stated before, is on the relationship between state effectiveness and democracy.

17

Wang Shaoguang

novel. Several scholars have called attention to the role of the state in recent years

(O’Donnell 1992; Przeworski 1995; Linz & Stepan 1996, Rose & Shin 2001). What

we would like to add to the literature is to provide theoretic explanations about how

the operation of democracy is contingent on the viability and the effectiveness of state

institutions.

For a democracy to work and last, there must exist an effective state that is

capable of performing the following tasks.

To define the political community within which democracy operates

Democracy can be simply defined as rule by the people. But, who are the

people? Obviously, the concept of the people does not mean everyone in the world.

No country, no matter how democratic it is, allows foreigners, including those who

obtain legal residence, to vote. Rather, only adult citizens have the right to do so.

Then, who are citizens? Webster ’ s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary defines

“citizen” as “a native or naturalized member of a state or nation who owns allegiance

to its government and is entitled to its protection.” Thus, “without a state, there can be

no citizenship; without citizenship, there can be no democracy” (Linz & Stepan 1996:

28).

Indeed, a democracy presupposes a well-defined territorial-social unit, for, as

pointed out by Robert Dahl, democratic methods “cannot solve the problem of the

proper scope and domain of democratic units” (Dahl 1989: 207). The majority

principle, for instance, would not work unless we know exactly the boundary of the

whole political community. We call such community a “territorial-social unit,”

because it is not purely territorial; its rightfulness has to be accepted by the people.

Perhaps, the word “accepted” is not strong enough. Dankwart Rustow is more to the

point when he argues that what is actually required is a “prior sense of community,

preferably a sense of community quietly taken for granted that is above mere opinion

and mere agreement” (1970: 350). Only when the vast majority of citizens “have no

doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to” (Rustow

1970: 351) then it is possible for them to organize their life in a democratic fashion.

Conversely, if large segments of the population in a territorial-social unit

refuse to accept the unit as an appropriate entity to make legitimate decisions, and

desire to create their independent states or to merge with other states, then unit faces a

serious “stateness” problem (Linz and Stepan 1996). Under such a circumstance,

18

Wang Shaoguang

democratic procedure can neither work nor solve the problem of identity. Here the

key challenge is to cultivate a strong identification with the territorial-social unit. In

Western Europe, the process of nation building was generally guided by coercive

governments, which used a wide range of instruments to repress and eliminate

multilingualism and multiculturalism in their territories. Those methods are not

acceptable by today’s moral standards. Nevertheless the resultant nation-states had

defined the political communities within which democratization could take place later

(Linz & Stepan 1996: 33-33). The lesson from the first wave of democratization is

that state and nation building should precede democratization and that the existence of

a viable nation-state is a prerequisite for a modern democracy.

To protect citizens’ basic rights

For democracy to exist, all full citizens must enjoy such basic civil rights as

freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, the right

to a fair trial, etc. But, “the conditions necessary to exercise them are not

automatically generated by the mere existence of democratic institutions; a viable

state is necessary to make their exercise possible” (Przeworski 1995: 12).

During the Cold War era and soon after, when all political evils seemed to

stem from "too much government," the state was often regarded as the biggest threat

to civil liberty. Political rights then were primarily understood as “negative rights,” as

"walls" erected against state power, or as shields used to protect vulnerable

individuals from abusive governments. It was widely believed that only by limiting

the power of the state could personal liberties be secured.

By now, however, the inadequacy of this notion of rights has become evident,

because people in Russia and many other transition countries still cannot enjoy much

real liberties even after dictatorship ended, official indoctrination disappeared, new

political parties sprung up like mushrooms, dissidents were released from jails, and

censorship was removed. The governments in those countries were simply too

disorganized and too week to enforce their own laws. What happen in those countries

makes excruciatingly clear that liberties could be threatened just as thoroughly by

state incapacity as by repressive state apparatus. This observation leads Stephen

Holmes (1997) to conclude, “liberal rights depend essentially on the competent

exercise of a certain kind of legitimate public power.”

19

Wang Shaoguang

Why individual liberty depends on some sort of state power? The reason

behind this is that only in a society composed of angels where power resources were

equally distributed could its member enjoy liberties without the presence of public

authorities. The problem is that this kind of society exists only in our dream. In the

real world, “individuals are partial to themselves and, left to their own devices, the

strong and the deceitful have an irresistible proclivity to exempt themselves from

generally valid laws.” Therefore, “without a well-functioning public power of a

certain kind there will be no prevention of mutual harm, no personal security…”

(Holmes 1997). In this sense, the distinction between “negative” and “positive” rights

is a false dichotomy. No right is simply a right to be left alone by public authorities.

Defined by law, all rights amount to entitlements that require governmental

authorities to deliver rather than merely to forbear (Holmes 1999). State power is

needed to guard property rights, to prevent harm, to repress force, to contain fraud,

and above all, to extend its protection to the vulnerable. Viewed from this angle,

rather than a threat to personal freedoms, a liberal state is “the largest and most

reliable human rights organization” (Holmes 1997). A liberal state, of course, must be

limited in many ways, but to enforce and protect citizens’ rights, a liberal state must

be able to exercise effectively its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force

in the territory and to mobilize sufficient resources (Holmes 1999). “For this reason, a

non-performing state cannot be a liberal state” (Holmes 1997).

To create and maintain a rule-based polity

“Rule of law” means the predominance of law over discretionary authority. A

state based on the rule of law is not necessarily democratic (e.g., Singapore), but a

high-quality democracy must be ruled by law rather than by arbitrary decisions of a

ruler or his agents (Rose & Shin 2001). In a democracy, laws constitute not only a

tool to control the masses but also an instrument to constrain officials and bureaucrats.

In essence, laws are rules governing human behavior in a given society.

Democracy is a rule intensive polity. In addition to the legal provision of civil rights,

there must be rules with regard to citizenship, election, distribution of power,

relationship between different branches of government, etc. The guidance provided by

those rules enables political actors to coordinate their behavior, thus helping reduce

uncertainty and create order in human interactions. Without rules, it is hard to imagine

how democracy can function.

20

Wang Shaoguang

For rules to be effective in guiding actors' future courses of action, they must

have the following three characteristics. (1) Rules should clear so that proper

interpretation is possible, general so that like case are treated alike, inclusive so that

no one may avail herself of loopholes, and non-contingent so that nothing can excuse

rule-breakers. (2) Rules are ex ante restrictions that bind the ex post behavior of all

parties. The purpose of rules is to define the way the game is played. Therefore, no

one in the game should be allowed unilaterally to change these rules after the fact.

Political actors' incentives are often not time-consistent. They may have incentive to

accept certain rules in principle; but when the situation changes, it may become

tempting for them to revise the rules. For rules to be effective, they have to be able to

restrain the ex post behavior of all parties. (3) Rules must be enforced in such ways

that ensure compliance. Although rules can be self-enforcing when it is in everybody's

interests to live up to these rules, another method to ensure compliance seems to be

more important in most cases: the threat of external sanction. Only with enforcement

of sanction against offenders can rules be sustainable (Wang forthcoming).

When rules meet the above criteria in a political system, we may call it highly

institutionalized. Only when a state is highly institutionalized can democratic

procedures be constraining. In contrast, if rules (particularly those defining the scope

and limits of power) are vague, unbinding, and not supported by a credible

enforcement mechanism, they work at best as a soft source of constraint on political

actors' options. There would be a considerable gap between the formal rules of the

game and widely accepted informal practices, and ex-ante procedures would not

matter that much. In such a context, democracy cannot operate properly because those

in power have too much discretion, while others lack effective means to restrain them.

When those in power retain widespread discretion in interpreting and applying rules

(laws), they could effectively turn the rules into a controlling mechanism against the

general public. Consequently, the accountability of the state would be low. In this

sense, a polity lacking the rule of law is not compatible with democracy.

To vitalize civil society

The last two decades of the twentieth century witness the revival of the

concept of civil society. Many believed that civil society played a crucial role, if not

the leading role, in fostering, deepening, and consolidating democracy. How does

civil society promote democratic transition and consolidation? Citing from

21

Wang Shaoguang

Huntington, Larry Diamond’s explanation is brief yet to the point (Diamond 1999:

239):

“The first and most basic democratic function of civil society is to provide ‘the

basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society,

and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of

exercising that control.’ After the transition, this involves checking, monitoring, and

restraining the exercise of power by formally democratic states and holding them

accountable to the law and public expectations of responsible government.”

If the 1980s and early 1990s was a decade of romantic adoration of civil

society, more recent years have become a time of reflection (Diamond 1994b; Foley

& Edward; Berman 1997; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1997; Rieff 1999; Carothers

1999). While still treasuring the potential positive value of civil society for

democracy, people now come to realize that, on the one hand, civil society is by no

means a paradise epitomized by harmony, 9 and on the other hand, the state-society

relationship is far more intricate than unrefined civil society theorists tend to believe.

For the purpose of this paper, we focus on the latter reflection.

Today, even some of those most convinced of the indispensable role of civil

society agree that the relationship between the state and civil society is one of "mutual

empowerment" or "synergy," rather than a zero-sum one (Evans 1997). The two are

interrelated in many ways:

1. At best, civil society can act as a counter weight to the leviathan of state

power. But it can never provide a substitute for the organized public

institutions of the state.

2. When civil society acts as a counter weight to state power, it should check

and limit the despotic but not infrastructural power of the state.

3. It makes sense for civil society to aim the state as an object of its efforts

only when the state is an effective one. If the state is incapable of solving

any economic and social problems, there is no point of dealing with it.

9 Civil society consists good as well as bad actors. Some may work at high-minded aims, but most are simply single-issue groups that are preoccupied with the pursuit of parochial self-interests. The proliferation of the latter “could choke the workings of representative institutions and systematically distort policy outcomes in favor of the rich and well-connected or, more simply, the better organized” (Carothers 1999). Moreover, when institutional environments are unfavorable, a strong civil society cannot even save existing democracies, not to mention bringing about or helping consolidate new democracies (Berman 1997).

22

Wang Shaoguang

4. Only robust state institutions can provide an arena in which civil society

can operate (Motyl 1993). A growing body of recent works suggests that

an effective state is a prerequisite to civil society. Crisis of the state more

often than not leads to a degeneration of civil society rather than its

revival. Conversely, when the state is relatively strong and resilient, civil

society is more likely to thrive (O’Donnell 1993; Chazan 1994; Shue

1994). This is so because “just as modern markets depend on economic

decisions being nested in a predictable institutional framework, likewise

‘civic engagement’ flourishes more easily among private citizens and

organized groups when they have a competent public sector as an

interlocutor” (Evans 1997).

5. Civil society can improve the ability of the state to govern. When civil

society and the state both are relative strong, the vibrancy of the former

itself may make citizens more respectful and hence obedient to the latter

(Diamond 1994b). In Putnam’s words, "civic associations are powerfully

associated with effective public institutions…strong society, strong state"

(1993: 176).

If the above remarks are right, one may conclude as Evans does, “a sustained

efflorescence of civil society may well depend on the simultaneous construction of

robust, competent organizational counterparts within the state…[A] move toward less

capable and involved states will make it more difficult for civic associations to

achieve their goals, thereby diminishing incentives for civic engagement. (Evans

1997)

To meet peoples’ basic demands

For three reasons, democracy, especially a premature one, has to deliver some

basic public goods and services in order to survive. First, many people embrace

democracy not for the sake of democracy but as a solution for the crisis their country

faces, including political as well as social and economic crises. Second,

democratization is likely to heighten political and social citizenship, which may give

rise to the pressure for uniformity of treatment, the reduction of social risks, higher

living standards, better quality of life, and greater degree of equality. Third,

democracy itself offers people more freedoms, opportunities, and power to push for

policy changes.

23

Wang Shaoguang

To make the society a humane one, for instance, a democratic system must be

able to regulate the market so as to eliminate, or at least limit, the damage the market

may bring about. As Robert Dahl notes, “Democracy would almost certainly lead to

the destruction of certain economic orders… [including] a strictly free market

economy” (1993). Otherwise, unregulated markets will unavoidably generate

unfairness and chaos, which in turn may weaken the political support of the regime.

Moreover, in societies characterized by severe inequality, a democratic

government needs make efforts to more or less narrow the gap between the “haves”

and the “have nots” via some sorts of redistribution. As a matter of fact, all matured

democracies have established elaborate systems of social welfare to make their

societies more coherent. When a democracy fails to ensure basic economic security

for large segments of the population, it will become politically very fragile.

Regulation and redistribution are just two examples. More generally, if a

democratic system proves unable to provide such essential public goods and services

as external security, domestic order, justice, basic education, prevention of epidemic

diseases, some compensations for those hurt by market swings, and some alleviation

of gross inequality, its poor performance will make people increasingly more

frustrated, thus eventually leading to legitimacy crisis and probably the breakdown of

democracy (Linz & Stepan 1996: 12-13).10 This danger tends to increase as a brief

“honeymoon period” of democratization passes and “the memories of authoritarian

failure fade” (Huntington 1993: 10)11

Only a state with strong capacities is able to perform well in generating social

well being. Coupled with democratic institutions, it should also be willing to satisfy

people’s demands. That is why both Linz & Stepan (1996) and Pzeworski (1995)

consider the efficacy and effectiveness of the state is the key to democratic legitimacy

and stability.

In summary, if a democracy is to work and last, the state must be able to

define the community in which it operates, to protect citizens’ basic rights, to create

and maintain a rule-based polity, to vitalize civil society, and to meet peoples’ basic

10 Weil (1989), however, argues that poor state performance may lead to a crisis of confidence, but it is unlikely to lead to a legitimation crisis or a rejection of democracy.11 Pierre Du Toit (2001) noted, “At the end of South Africa's ‘miracle transition’ in 1994, carried along by the momentum of positive thinking, we tended to be optimistic about the prospects of democratic consolidation. Since then, however, much appears to have gone wrong, and a lot of this has to do with the performance of state institutions, especially those engaged in delivering public safety.”

24

Wang Shaoguang

demands. Only an effective state can perform those tasks. Without these capacities,

there can be no democratic governance.

How Does State Effectiveness Affect Democratic Consolidation?

Based upon the insight that an effective state is a prerequisite of sustainable

democracy, we intend in this section to derive some propositions concerning

conducive or adverse circumstances for democratic consolidation.12 Most of them

have been put forward by others before, but their underlying assumptions and logics

are not necessarily identical with mine. For us, the key intervening variable that

affects the outcome of democratic consolidation is the degree of state effectiveness

measured by the six capacities discussed in the Section II. The higher the degree of

state effectiveness is, the less difficult the democratic consolidation becomes.

Conversely, for whatever reason, where state infrastuctural power is deficient,

democracy is less likely to function well and survive. Of course, state effectiveness is

merely one of necessary conditions for democratic consolidation, not a sufficient

condition, for an effective state may or may not be a democratic one.

Proposition 1: There may not be any specific preconditions for

democratization, but an effective state is a prerequisite to democratic consolidation.

The third wave demonstrates that democratization can occur anywhere,

including such “the most unlikely and unexpected places” as Mongolia, Albania, and

Mauritania, but consolidated and stable democracies are much harder to find because

many of third wave countries do not have effective governments (Carothers 2002).

Proposition 2: Democratic consolidation is more likely to be successful where

state and regime was distinguished from one another under the old regime.

This is so because the previous regime types may define the characters of state

institutions. Under certain types of regimes (e.g., the sultanistic regime, the regime

ruled by a strongman or a hegemonic party), there are in effect no distinction between

the regime and state. Consequently, when democratization begins, the state apparatus

are likely to collapse along with the old regime. The statelessness gives rise to a large

number of difficult challenges that newly democratizing country has to face, which in 12 Limited by space, we are unable to test these propositions even in the most rudimentary way.

25

Wang Shaoguang

turn makes democratic consolidation extremely difficult, if not entirely impossible.

The regime under the Shah’s rule in Iran was an example (Fishman 1990; Shain &

Linz 1995).

Proposition 3: The more disruptive the transition process is, the more difficult

it is to consolidate democracy.

The type of transition that hurts state capacity least is more likely to produce

consolidated democracy. Transition may be initiated by reformist incumbents of the

old regime or by opposition forces. The form of transition may be gradual and

peaceful or radical and violent. As far as democratic consolidation is concerned,

incumbent-initiated transition (Spain, Korea, and Taiwan) are preferable to an

opposition-led transitions (the Philippines); orderly and peaceful transitions are

preferable (the former Czechoslovak) to ones preceded by revolutionary wars, ethnic

wars, or widespread riots (Indonesia). Put differently, where a state remains intact

during the process of regime transition, it may help the new regime to consolidate;

where transition undermines state cohesion and institutional hierarchy, it is more

difficult for the new regime to consolidate (Di Palma 1990; Fishman 1990; Shain &

Linz 1995).

Proposition 4: The more heterogeneous a society is, the more difficult it is to

consolidate democracy.

It is far more difficult to consolidate democracy in multiethnic and

multicultural societies than in homogeneous societies. As Huntington points out, “the

more complex and heterogeneous the society, the more the achievement and

maintenance of political community become dependent upon the working of political

institutions” (Huntington 1968: 9). Thus, state-building challenges tend to be more

acute in a multiethnic and multicultural society than in a society where all people

consider themselves as members of the same community. When state building is not

very successful, what J.S. Mill calls “fellow-feeling” (1958: 230) would be absent

among the people. When a large proportion of the population do not want to be part of

the community upon which the state is founded, the issue of crafting democratic

norms, practices, and institutions becomes secondary to what Linz & Stepan call “the

problem of stateness” (1996). The presence of the stateness problem may damage the

prospects of democratic consolidation in two ways. First, to solve the stateness

26

Wang Shaoguang

problem, the new democratizing regime would have to make great effort in nurturing

national identity, which will inevitably divert tremendous amounts of scarce resources

and precious energy from its effort to consolidate democracy (Kuzio et al. 1999, 6-7).

Second, “some ways of dealing with the problems of stateness are inherently

incompatible with democracy” (1996: 29).13

Proposition 5: The larger state size is, the more difficult it is to consolidate

democracy.

This proposition is partially related with the last. A large population is

statistically more heterogeneous: The larger a society, the more likely it encompasses

many religious, racial, ethnic, and linguistic groupings, which increases the difficulty

of governance. In addition to the heterogeneity problem, larger countries are also

likely to encounter considerable problems of vertical integration and horizontal

coordination, which further lowers the effectiveness of the state. Indeed, there is

empirical evidence suggesting that the quality of governance is correlated with the

size of the country (Treisman 2000). As a result, it is much harder for larger

democracies to consolidate.14

Proposition 6: Stable democracy is more likely to appear in old than in new

states.

The longer time a country has existed, the more likely it has been successful in

crafting state loyalty. On the contrary, new states are very likely to run into the

challenges of nation building, unless only one nation with nearly cultural uniformity

exists in each of them. Such perfect congruence between the nation and the state is

rare among newly independent countries, especially those in Africa. It would be

logically and empirically impossible for a new state to consolidate democracy before

it solves the problem of national identity. If the priority were given to nation-building,

13 Dahl’s 1971 study confirmed that the higher degree of subcultural pluralism, the less likely a political system is to be democratic or nearly so. Among the 114 polities he studied, 58% with a low degree of subcultural pluralism, 36% with moderate pluralism, and only 15% with market pluralism were polyarchies, or near-polyarchies (1971: 110-111).14 Dahl & Tufte (1973) and Diamond (1999: 117-160) find significantly greater incidence [of stable democracy] in very small countries. Another study discovers that the predicated probability of being democratic is much higher in small than large countries. Interestingly, if a country is both small and an island, the predicated probability for it to be a democracy is even higher (Ott 1995). This makes sense because it is relatively easy to govern a small island that is protected by a nature from foreign invasion. Perhaps, we should put forward a related proposition: In those countries that face less challenges to their governance capabilities, it is easier to develop and consolidate democratic regime.

27

Wang Shaoguang

however, at least for the time being, either democracy would not emerge at all, or it

emerges but would not be stable (Linz & Stepan 1996). Even if the new state chooses

to pursue democratization and nation-state at once, its chance to consolidate

democracy would be smaller than its older counterpart, because the former confronts

simultaneously the problems that the latter may enjoy the luxury of solving

sequentially over fairly long historical periods (Huntington 1968: 397-397). This

explains why the most stable democracies in today’s world are still those that

emerged from the first wave of democratization.

Implications

The central argument of this essay is that, without an effective state, there can

be no stable democracy. If our basic points are right, then it would be suicidal for

democratic reformers intentionally or unintentionally to undermine or weaken state

institutions in the process of democratization, especially in those countries where

states are nonexistent or extremely weak to begin with. Of course, during the

democratic transition, the ways state power being exercised must change, but state

power itself should not be enfeebled Rather than single-mindedly trying to restrain

state power, democratic reformers should make more efforts to build national state

institutions where none existed before, and to strengthen state capacities where they

are weak.

There are three additional reasons for democratic reformers to pay more

attention to the issue of state building when studying democratic transition and

consolidation. First, where state effectiveness—a precondition of stable democracy—

is lacking, it cannot be supplied through the practice of democracy itself (Emerson

1966: 7). Specific efforts must be made to strengthen state capacities. Second, the

democratic regime probably needs a more effective state as its foundation than other

types of regime, because it allows more social forces to take part in political

competition. While non-democratic regimes may be able to survive with low levels of

state building, a functioning and stable democracy is possible only in the presence of

a set of effective state institutions. Otherwise it cannot meet the new challenges set off

by liberalization and democratization. Finally, democratization may unleash forces

that are likely to put enormous pressures on the system. For instance, the breakdown

of authoritarianism may trigger territorial disintegration; popular respect for

government may plummet in a new political environment; rising expectations may

28

Wang Shaoguang

overload the government, exceeding its capacity to respond; the demise of the

previously dominant party may leave both the state and society disorganized, thus

creating institutional vacuum; and pressures for greater uniformity (a result of

expended citizenship) may expose regional, ethnic, class, and religious differences

previously obscured and to stimulate resistance (Przeworski 1995).

29

Wang Shaoguang

Bibliography

丁学良. 2000. “转型社会的法与秩序：俄罗斯现象”《清华社会学评论》第二期。

史天健. 2001. “国家建设与民主化: 对于一些基本理论问题的探讨” 未刊稿。Ackerman, Susan Rose. 1999. Corruption and Government. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Alesina, Alberto, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Philip Swagel. 1996. "Political Instability and Economic Growth." Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 1 (June).

Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. 1996. “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment.” European Economic Review 40: 1203-28.

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. 1983. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso.

Almond, Gabriel and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. 1966. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bagehot, Walter. 1949. The English Constitution. London: Oxford-World’s Classics.

Barro, Robert. 1999. “Determinants of Democracy.” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 6: 158-183.

Berman, MicSheri. 1997. "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic." World Politics, (April).

Binder, Leonard, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner. 1971. Crisis and Sequences in Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Brooker, Paul. 2000. Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government & Politics. New York: St. Martin Press.

Burkhart, Ross E. and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. 1994. "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis." American Political Science Review 88 (1994):903-10.

Carothers, Thomas. 1999. “Think Again: Civil Society.” Foreign Policy (Winter).

-----. 2002. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy 13.1: 5-21.

Chazan, Naomi. 1994. "Engaging the State: Associational Life in Sub-saharan Africa." In Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds.), State Power and

30

Wang Shaoguang

Social Forces: Domination and Transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 255-289.

Collier, David and Steven Levitsky. 1997. "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," World Politics 49 (April 1997): 430-51.

Creveld, Martin van. 1999. The Rise and Decline of the State. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press.

-----. 1993. “Why All Democratic Countries Have Mixed Economies?” In John Chapman and Ian Shapiro, eds., Democratic Community. New York: New York University Press, pp. 259-82.

Dahl, Robert A and Edward R. Tufte. 1973. Size and Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Deutsch, Karl W. 1961. "Social Mobilization and Political Development." American Political Science Review 55 (1961):493-514.

Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1990. To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Diamond, Larry. 1990. "Three Paradoxes of Democracy." Journal of Democracy (1990).

-----. 1992. Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered. In Reexaming Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset. Ed. Marks, Gary and Larry Diamond. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage Publications.

------. 1994a. Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.

-----. 1994b. “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July).

-----. 1996. "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 20-37.

Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Platter. 1998. Democracy in East Asia. Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, Larry, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien. 1997. Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University press.

Diamond, Larry Jay. 1999a. Democracy in developing countries. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diamond, Larry Jay. 1999b. Developing democracy toward consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

31

Wang Shaoguang

Domínguez, Jorge I and Abraham F Lowenthal. 1996. Constructing democratic governance Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Du Toit, Pierre. 1995. State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa: Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995.

-----. 2001. “Gelding: A New Approach to Rebuilding the State.” An unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch.

Durkeim, Emile. 1951. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. New York: Free Press.

Emerson, Rupert. 1966. The Erosion of Democracy. Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1-8.

Evans, Peter. 1997. “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization.” World Politics, No. 50 (October): 62-87.

Evans, Peter B, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. 1985. Bringing the state back in. Cambridge Cambridgeshire, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fishman, Robert M. 1990. “Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s Transition to Democracy.” World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3 (April): 422-440.

Foley, Michael and Bob Edward. 1996 "The Paradox of Civil Society," Journal of Democracy, (July)

Friedrich, Carl. 1963. Man and His Government. New York: McGraw-Hill Inc.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1993. "Capitalism and Democracy: The Missing Link." Dialogue 2 (1993):2-7.

Gallo, Carmenza. 1997. “The autonomy of weak states: States and classes in primary export.” Sociological Perspectives, 1997, Vol. 40 Issue 4, p639, 22p, 1 graph

Gerth, H. H. and Wright C Mill. 1946. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press.

Grew, Raymond, ed. 1978. Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Grindle, Merilee S. 1997. “The Good Government Imperative: Human Resources, Organizations, and Institutions.” In Merilee S. Grindle, ed., Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing Countries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gros, Jean-Germain. 1996. Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and... Third World Quarterly, Sep96, Vol. 17 Issue 3, p455, 17p

32

Wang Shaoguang

Haggard, Stephan. 1990. Pathways from the periphery the politics of growth in the newly industrializing countries. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Hagopian, Frances. 2000. “Political Development, Revisited.” Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 33, No. 6/7: 880-911.

Holmes, Stephen. 1997. “What Russia Teaches Us Now: How Weak States Threaten Freedom.” American Prospect, Vol. 8, No. 33.  

Holmes, Stephen and Cass R. Sunstein. 1999. The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “Democracy’s Third Wave.” In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-25.

-----. 1997. Democracy for the Long Hall. In Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Ed. Diamond, Larry, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University press.

Huntington, Samuel P and Joan M. Nelson. 1976. No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Culture, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inkeles, Alex and David H. Smith. 1974. Becoming Modern. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Johnson, Chalmers A. 1972. Conspiracy at Matsukawa. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Johnson, Chalmers A. 1982. MITI and the Japanese miracle the growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Johnson, Chalmers A. 2000. Blowback the costs and consequences of American empire. New York: Metropolitan Books.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. "Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities." Comparative Political Studies 33 (2000): 845-79.

Klitgaard, Robert. 1988. Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Knight, Jack. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kopecky, Peter & Cas Mudde. 2000. “What has Eastern Europe taught us about the democratization literature (and vice versa)?” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 37: 517-539.

33

Wang Shaoguang

Kugler, Jacek and William Domke. 1986. "Comparing the Strength of Nations." Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1.

Kuzio, Taras, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D’Anieri, eds. 1999. State and Institution Building in Ukraine. New York: St. Martin Press.

Kuzio, Taras. 2001. “Nationalizing States or Nation-building? A Critical Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence.” Unpublished manuscript, Yale University.

Levi, Margaret. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1978. Latin America, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Linz, Juan J and Alfred C Stepan. 1996. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review 53 (1959):69-105.

Mann, Michael. 1986. “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results.” In John A. Hall, ed., States in History. London: Basic Blackwell, pp. 109-136.

-----1993. The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mengisteab, Kidane and Cyril Daddieh. 1999. State Building and Democratization in Africa: Faith, Hope, and Realities. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Migdal, Joel S., Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue. 1994. State Power and Social Forces: Demination and Transformation in the Third World. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mill, John Stuart. 1958. Considerations on Representative Government. New York: Liberal Arts Press.

Motyl, Alexander J. 1993. Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

-----. 1995. “The Conceptual President: Leonid Kravchuk and the Politics of Surrealism.” In Patterns in post-Soviet leadership. Ed. Colton, Timothy J and Robert C Tucker. Boulder: Westview Press.

Murrell, Peter. 1991. "Can Neoclassical Economics Underpin the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1991):59-76.

34

Wang Shaoguang

Nader, Lauder. 1974. Up the Anthropologist: Perspectives Gained from Studying Up. In Reinventing anthropology. Ed. Hymes, Dell H. New York: Vintage Books.

Nettl, J. P. 1968. “The State as a Conceptual Variable.” World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 4 (July): 559-592

Nordlinger, Eric A. 1981. On the Autonomy of the Democratic State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1992. “Delegative Democracy?” East-South Systems Transformation, University of Chicago, Working Paper No. 21.

-----. 1993. "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: A Latin American view with glances at some post-communist countries." World Development, Vol. 21, No. 8.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: Johns Hoptins University Press.

Ott, Dana. 1995. Political Democracy, Political Protest and State Size: Some Empirical Findings. www.microstate.net/reports/ott1.htm.

Pei, Minxin. 1998. The Fall and Rise of Democracy in East Asia. In Democracy in East Asia. Ed. Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Platter. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Peters, B. Guy. 1987. “Politicians and Bureaucrats in the Politics of Policy-Making.” In Jan-Erik Lane, ed., Bureaucracy and Public Choice. London: Sage Publications.

Poggi, Gianfranco. 1978. The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

-----. 1990. The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1986. “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy.” In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Ed. O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Przeworski, Adam and Group on East-South Systems Transformations. 1995. Sustainable democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." World Politics 49 (1997):155-83.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press.

35

Wang Shaoguang

Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pye, Lucian W. 1966. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Rieff, David. 1999. "The False Dawn of Civil Society." The Nation, (February 22).

Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. “Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April).

Rose, Richard and Doh Chull Shin. 2001. “Democratization Backward: The Problem of Third Wave Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31: 331-354.

Schmidt, Steffen W., Laura Guasti, Carl H. Lande, and James Scott. 1977. Friends, Followers, and factions: A reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Schmitter, Philippe C. and Terry Lynn Karl. 1993. “What democracy is…and is not.” In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 39-52.

Schumpeter, Joseph. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper.

Shain, Yossi, and Juan J. Linz. 1995. Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shapiro, Ian. 2001. “The State of Democratic Theory.” In Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, eds., Political Science: The State of the Discipline. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.

Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W Vishny. 1998. The grabbing hand government pathologies and their cures. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Shue, Vivienne. 1994. “State Power and Social Organization.” In Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 65-88.

Smith, Adam. 1910. The wealth of nations. London, New York: Dent. Dutton.

Sperling, Valerie, ed. 2000. Building the Russian state: institutional crisis and the quest for democratic governance. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Stepan, Alfred. 1986. Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations. In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Ed. O'Donnell, Gullermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Stepan, Alfred C. 1978. The state and society Peru in comparative perspective. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

36

Wang Shaoguang

Thomas, George M. and John W. Meyer. 1984. “The Expansion of the State.” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 10: 461-482

Tilly, Charles. 1975. “Reflections on the History of European State-Making.” In Charles Tilly and Gabriel Ardant, eds., The Formation of national States in Western Europe. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Treisman, Daniel. 1999. “Decentralization and Corruption: Why are Federal State Perceived to be More Corrupt?” Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September.

-----. 2000. “Decentralization and the Quality of Government.” Unpublished paper, University of California, Los Angeles.

Triska, Jan F. and Paul M. Cocks. 1977. Political Development in Eastern Europe. New York: Praeger.

Tullock, Gordon. 1965. The Politics of Public Bureaucracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Verba, Sidney Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1997. "The Big Tilt: Participatory Inequality in America." The American Prospect, No. 32 (May-June): 74-80, <http://epn.org/prospect/32/32verbfs.html>.

Wade, Robert. 1990. Governing the market economic theory and the role of government in East Asian industrialization. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Waldner, David. 1999. State Building and Late Development. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Wang, Shaoguang. Forthcoming. “Defective Institution and Its Consequences: Lesson from China, 1980-1993.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies.

Weber, Eugene. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Weber, Max. 1946. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.

Weber, Max and Max Rheinstein. 1954. Max Weber on law in economy and society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society, 2 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weil, Frederick D. 1989. “The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies: A Consolidated Model Tested with Time Series Data in Six Countries Since World War II.” American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 5 pp. 682-706.

37

Wang Shaoguang

Weiner, Myron and Ergun Özbudun. 1987. Competitive elections in developing countries. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. “The rise of illiberal democracy.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6: 22-43.

38