START_ SMA-AFRICOM_Boko Haram Deep Dive_Jan2015.pdf

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BokoHaram:AnAssessmentofStrengths,Vulnerabilities,andPolicyOptionsReporttotheStrategicMultilayerAssessmentOffice,DepartmentofDefense,andtheOfficeofUniversityPrograms,DepartmentofHomelandSecurityJanuary2015


AboutThisReportTheauthorofthisreportisAmyPate,ResearchDirectoratSTART.QuestionsaboutthisreportshouldbedirectedtoAmyPateatapate@start.umd.edu.ThefollowingNigerianconsultantsassistedwithfieldinterviews:BukolaAdemolaAdelehin(Abuja),KopepDabugat(AbujaandKano),andChrisKwaja(Jos).SadiqRaddaassistedinidentifyinginformantsandcollectingadditionalpublishedmaterials.Theresearchcouldnothavebeencompletedwithouttheirparticipation.Thefollowingresearchassistantshelpedwiththebackgroundresearchforthereport:ZannIsaacson,GregShuck,ArielleKushner,andJacobSchwoerer.MichaelBouvetcreatedthemapsinthereport.ThisresearchwassupportedbyaCentersofExcellenceSupplementalawardfromtheOfficeofUniversityProgramsoftheDepartmentofHomelandSecuritywithfundingprovidedbytheStrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)officeoftheDepartmentofDefensethroughgrantawardnumber2012ST061CS000103madetotheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START).TheauthorstraveltothefieldwassupportedbytheDomesticNuclearDetectionOffice(DNDO)oftheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)throughContractHSHQDC10ABOA36.Theviewsandconclusionscontainedinthisdocumentarethoseoftheauthorandshouldnotbeinterpretedasnecessarilyrepresentingtheofficialpolicies,eitherexpressedorimplied,ofSMA,DoD,DNDO,DHS,orSTART.AboutSTARTTheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)issupportedinpartbytheScienceandTechnologyDirectorateoftheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecuritythroughaCenterofExcellenceprogrambasedattheUniversityofMaryland.STARTusesstateofthearttheories,methodsanddatafromthesocialandbehavioralsciencestoimproveunderstandingoftheorigins,dynamicsandsocialandpsychologicalimpactsofterrorism.Formoreinformation,contactSTARTatinfostart@start.umd.eduorvisitwww.start.umd.edu.CitationsTocitethisreport,pleaseusethisformat:Pate,Amy.BokoHaram:AnAssessmentofStrengths,Vulnerabilities,andPolicyOptions.ReporttotheStrategicMultilayerAssessmentOffice,DepartmentofDefense,andtheOfficeofUniversityPrograms,DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.CollegeParkMD:START,January2014.


Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options

ContentsExecutiveSummary...............................................................................................................................................................................iIntroduction.............................................................................................................................................................................................1DataandMethodology.........................................................................................................................................................................1ContextualizingBokoHaram............................................................................................................................................................2GeographyandDemographics.....................................................................................................................................................2Politics....................................................................................................................................................................................................3

BritishColonialism......................................................................................................................................................................3PostIndependence......................................................................................................................................................................4TheFourthRepublic...................................................................................................................................................................5

TheNigerianEconomy....................................................................................................................................................................6IslaminNigeria...................................................................................................................................................................................7KeyDynamicsinNigeria..............................................................................................................................................................10

BokoHaram...........................................................................................................................................................................................11FoundingandEvolutionunderMohammedYusuf..........................................................................................................11BokoHaramafterYusuf...............................................................................................................................................................13

IdeologyandGoals....................................................................................................................................................................13LeadershipandDecisionmakingStructures................................................................................................................15RecruitmentandMembership.............................................................................................................................................16PatternsofViolence.................................................................................................................................................................18RelationshipswithOtherActors.........................................................................................................................................22Funding..........................................................................................................................................................................................23

ResponsestoBokoHaram..............................................................................................................................................................25LegalFramework............................................................................................................................................................................25FederalResponses.........................................................................................................................................................................26

SecurityResponses...................................................................................................................................................................26Negotiations.................................................................................................................................................................................31CounterradicalizationandDeradicalization..............................................................................................................33VictimSupport............................................................................................................................................................................37DevelopmentalResponses....................................................................................................................................................39

StateandLocalGovernmentAuthorities.............................................................................................................................41Overview.......................................................................................................................................................................................41



Evaluation.....................................................................................................................................................................................41CivilianGroups.................................................................................................................................................................................42

NonSecurity................................................................................................................................................................................43Security..........................................................................................................................................................................................44

InternationalResponses..............................................................................................................................................................46Overview.......................................................................................................................................................................................46Evaluation.....................................................................................................................................................................................48

AssessingStrengths,Vulnerabilities,andPolicyOptions..................................................................................................50BokoHaram:StrengthsandVulnerabilities.......................................................................................................................50PartnersandPolicyOptions......................................................................................................................................................50



ExecutiveSummaryTheIslamistgroupJama'atuAhlasSunnahliDa'awatiwalJihad,commonlyreferredtoasBokoHaram,hasemergedasaviolentchallengertotheauthorityoftheNigerianstate.TheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)wastaskedwithexaminingBokoHaraminsupportoftheU.S.EngagementOptionsinSubSaharanAfricaproject,fundedandcoordinatedbytheStrategicMultilayerAssessmentOffice(SMA)oftheDepartmentofDefense.Specifically,STARTexploredthefollowingresearchquestions:

1. WhatareBokoHaramsstrengthsandpotentialvulnerabilities?2. WhatpoliciescanbeemployedtocounterBokoHaramsstrengthsandexploititsweaknesses?3. WhatareUSAFRICOMoptionsforengagingU.S.governmentandforeignpartnerstodeploy

policiestocounterBokoHaram?Datainformingthiscasestudycamefrommultiplesources.Opensourcematerials,includingmediareports,academicanalyses,governmentdocuments,andintergovernmentalreports,wereobtainedfrommultiplewebbaseddatabases.TheauthoralsotraveledtoNigeriatoconductfieldinterviewsfromAugust11throughAugust28,2014.Duringthatperiod,theauthorandlocalconsultantsconducted46interviewsinAbuja,Kano,andJoswithgovernmentofficials,diplomaticsources,andcivilsocietyactorsworkinginmissionspacesrelatedtothecrisisengenderedinnortheasternNigeriabyBokoHaramactivities.TheauthoralsoprocuredadditionalpublishedmaterialswhileinthefieldthatwerenotavailableintheUnitedStates.SeveraldynamicsshapetheNigerianpolityinwaysthatfacilitatethatriseofgroupssuchasBokoHaram,including:

ThepersistentdividebetweentheNorthandSouth,withtheNortheconomicallyandincreasinglypoliticallymarginalized;

Pervasivecorruption,withpoliticalpoweraprimarymeansofeconomicempowerment;and Recurrentethnicandsectarianconflict.

Takentogether,thesedynamicserodesocialtrust,resultinwidespreaddisillusionmentwiththegovernment,andcontributetoapoolofpotentialrecruitsforextremism.FoundedbyMuhammedYusufin2002inMaiduguri,BornoState,BokoHaramwasinitiallyfocusedondawaandthecreationofamicrosocietyexemplifyingpureIslam.Salafistinorientation,thegroupsgoalwastheIslamizationofNigeria.However,itwaslargelynonviolentuntil2009.MemberswererecruitedviathecharismaticnatureofYusufandfinancialincentives.AfterYusufsarrestandextrajudicialexecutionbyNigerianpoliceinJuly2009,AbubakarShekauemergedasthenewleaderofthegroup.UnderShekausleadership,BokoHaramhasshifteditsfocustojihad,withadramaticincreaseinthefrequencyandlethalityofitsattacks.Inthepastyear,thegrouphasreliedmoreheavilyonconscriptionforrecruitmentwhilealsoseizingandtryingtoholdterritory,ashift



fromprevioushitandruntactics.Despitedeclaringacaliphate,BokoHaramhasmadelittleattemptatgoverningtheterritoryithascaptured.TheanalysishasidentifiedthefollowingaskeystrengthsofBokoHaram:

Abilitytouseungovernedspacesforstrategicretreatandregrouping Maintenanceofresourceflows(bothmaterialandfinancial)throughuseofhighlevelcriminal

activity,includingrobberies,extortion,kidnapping,andlooting; Infiltrationofvarioussecurityservicesandcapacityforintelligencegathering;and Superiorandadaptivefightingtechniques,ascomparedtoNigerianforces.

Theanalysisalsoidentifiedthefollowingvulnerabilities:

Growingrelianceonconscription; Dependenceonlocalresources,whichmaybeincreasinglydepleted;and Needtomaintaincontrolofterritory,aswellasexpand.

TheNigeriangovernmenthasreliedoverwhelminglyonmilitaryresponsestoBokoHaram,whichhavefailed.Overrelianceonmilitaryresponseshasempoweredratherthandefeatedtheorganization.Therefore,goingforward,amorebalancedandcoordinatedapproachtocounteringthegroupiscalledfor.PossiblepolicyoptionstocountercontextualconditionsthatadvanceBokoHaraminclude:

Supportanticorruptionreformers; Supporteffortstobuildnationalnarrativesandidentities;and Increasedevelopmenteffortsinnortheast.

PolicyoptiontocounterBokoHaramsstrengthsinclude:

PartnerwithneighboringcountriestorestrictaccesstosafehavensforBokoHaram; Worktocountermilitarycorruption;and Supportbetterintelligenceandinformationsharing.

PolicyoptionstoexploitBokoHaramsvulnerabilitiesinclude:

Increasecounterradicalizationandderadicalizationefforts,includingprovidingexitoptionsfornoncommittedfighters;and

Usenegotiationstoincentivizedefections.


Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options 1

IntroductionTheIslamistgroupJama'atuAhlasSunnahliDa'awatiwalJihad,commonlyreferredtoasBokoHaram,1hasemergedasaviolentchallengertotheauthorityoftheNigerianstate.Despiteasignificantinfluxofmilitarypersonneltotheareasofitsstrongholds,BokoHaram2remainscapableoflaunchingsignificantattacks.TheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)wastaskedwithexaminingBokoHaraminsupportoftheU.S.EngagementOptionsinSubSaharanAfricaproject,fundedandcoordinatedbytheStrategicMultilayerAssessmentOffice(SMA)oftheDepartmentofDefense.Specifically,STARTexploredthefollowingresearchquestions:

4. WhatareBokoHaramsstrengthsandpotentialvulnerabilities?5. WhatpoliciescanbeemployedtocounterBokoHaramsstrengthsandexploititsweaknesses?6. WhatareUSAFRICOMoptionsforengagingU.S.governmentandforeignpartnerstodeploy

policiestocounterBokoHaram?Thisreportisstructuredasfollows.First,themethodologyforthestudyisoutlined.BackgroundinformationonNigeria,includingafocusonthedevelopmentofIslamistmovementsinthecountry,isthenprovided.ThereportthenturnstoadeepdescriptiveanalysisofBokoHaram.FollowingananalysisofcurrentpoliciesdeployedbyNigerianandinternationalactorstocounterBokoHaram,thereportprovidesanassessmentofoptionsforpolicyengagementbyAFRICOMandotherU.S.actors.

DataandMethodologySincetheimpositionofastateofemergencyinMay2013inthethreeNortheasternstatesinwhichBokoHaramactivitiescenterBorno,Yobe,andAdamawainformationandreportsonBokoHaramactivitieshasbecomelimited.Fieldinterviews,especiallywithindividualswhonormallyliveintheNortheastorregularlytravelthere,canhelpprovideinformationonvisible,butotherwiseunreportedBokoHaramactivities..Atthesametime,however,inthemidstofgovernmentrestrictionsoninformationandtheinevitablelimitsofindividualfirsthandknowledge,rumorsandunconfirmedallegationshaveproliferated.Additionally,withnationalelectionsscheduledforFebruary2015,thereisthepossibilityofmanipulationofinformationforpoliticalgain.Therefore,totheextentpossible,triangulationthrough

1BokoHaramisfrequentlyreportedasbeingHausaforWesterneducationisforbidden.Whilethatishowthetermisusuallyinterpreted,bokoisbettertranslatedasinauthentic,fraudulent,orinvolvingdeception.Byextension,incommonunderstanding,coloniallyimposedWesternformsofeducation(aswellasothervehiclesforWestern,andspecificallyWesternChristian,culture)areculturallyinauthenticandfraudulent.Forafulleranalysisoftheetymologyofboko,seeNewman,Paul.2013.TheEtymologyofHausaboko.MegaChadResearchNetwork.http://www.megatchad.net/publications/Newman2013EtymologyofHausaboko.pdf.2LeadersofBokoHaramaswellassomescholarswhofollowthegroupandpolicymakersseekingtocounterthegrouphaverejectedthenameBokoHaram,arguingthatthegroupshouldbecalledbyitsselfgivenappellationortheabbreviationsJASorJASLAW.Theseconcernsareherenoted,butthetermBokoHaramwillbeusedthroughoutthisreport,duetoitsubiquityinWestern,andspecificallyAmerican,accounts.ThemostprevalentnameforthegroupamongtheaudiencesforthisreportisBokoHaram.



multiplesourcesunrelatedtooneanotherisdesirableto,wherepossible,validateinformationandplacetheviewsoffieldinterviewsubjectsintotheappropriatecontext.Datainformingthiscasestudycamefrommultiplesources.Opensourcematerials,includingmediareports,academicanalyses,governmentdocuments,andintergovernmentalreports,wereobtainedfrommultiplewebbaseddatabases.TheauthoralsotraveledtoNigeriatoconductfieldinterviewsfromAugust11throughAugust28,2014.3Duringthatperiod,theauthorandlocalconsultantsconducted46interviewsinAbuja,Kano,andJoswithgovernmentofficials,diplomaticsources,andcivilsocietyactorsworkinginmissionspacesrelatedtothecrisisengenderedinnortheasternNigeriabyBokoHaramactivities.4TheauthoralsoprocuredadditionalpublishedmaterialswhileinthefieldthatwerenotavailableintheUnitedStates.

ContextualizingBokoHaramBokoHaramdidnotemergenordoesitexistinavacuum.Rather,itisaproductofandresponsivetoNigeriandemographics,history,politics,andeconomics.Thus,inordertounderstandthegrowthofBokoHaramandtoevaluatepolicyoptionstocounterthegroup,itisnecessarytocontextualizeBokoHaramwithinNigeria.ThissectionreviewskeyfactorsregardingNigeriangeographyanddemographics,itspoliticalhistoryandcurrentdynamics,theNigerianeconomy,andIslamisminNigeria.GeographyandDemographicsNigeriaislocatedinWestAfricaontheGulfofGuineaandisborderedbyBenin,Niger,Chad,andCameroon.Thecountrys36statesaredividedintosixgeopoliticalzones,adoptedin1995:

NorthEastern:Taraba,Borno,Bauchi,Adamawa,Gombe,andYobe; NorthCentral:Kogi,Niger,Benue,Kwara,Plateau,Nassarawa,andtheFederalCapitalTerritory; NorthWestern:Kaduna,Kebbi,Zamfara,Sokoto,Kano,Jigawa,andKatsina; SouthEastern:Ebonyi,Enugu,Imo,Abia,andAnambra; SouthSouthern:AkwaIbom,Bayelsa,Edo,CrossRiver,Rivers,andDelta;and SouthWestern:Ekiti,Oyo,Ogun,Lagos,Ondo,andOsun.5

3TheauthorstraveltothefieldwasfundedbytheDomesticNuclearDetectionOffice(DNDO)oftheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)throughContractHSHQDC10ABOA36.4InAbuja,interviewswereheldwith10governmentactorsand22civilsocietyactors.InJos,interviewswereheldwithsixgovernmentactorsandfourcivilsocietyactors.InKano,interviewswereheldwithonegovernmentactorandfivecivilsocietyactors.WhilethelocationsofinterviewswereAbuja,Kano,andJos,severaloftheinformantswerenormallybasedorregularlytraveledtotheNortheast,inparticularMaiduguri,BornoState,fortheiractivities.Toprotectconfidentiality,especiallyofthoseinformantswholiveorworkintheNortheast,noindividualnamesororganizationalaffiliationswillbecitedinthisreport.Instead,citedinformantswillbedescribedintermsoftheirgovernmentalversuscivilsocietystatusandintermsofthemissionspaces(e.g.,security,humanitarianassistance)inwhichtheywork.5TheSixGeopoliticalZonesofNigeria.2012.ReportsonNaija.July2.http://reportsonnaija.blogspot.com/2012/07/sixgeopoliticalzonesofnigeria.html;Odiegwu,Mike,OziomaUbabukoh,LekeBaiyewu,andAllwellOkpi.2012.Constitution:SixGeopoliticalZonesDivideNorth,South.August12.Punch.http://www.punchng.com/news/constitutionsixgeopoliticalzonesdividenorthsouth/.



NigeriaisthemostpopulouscountryinAfrica,withanestimated2012populationof166.6million.6Nigeriacontinuestohaveahighfertilityrate,andasignificantyouthbulgewithnearly71percentofthepopulationundertheageof307andover40percentundertheageof14.8Nigeriaspopulationisdiverse,withmorethan250distinctethnicgroupswithmorethan500languagesanddialectsspoken.9ThethreelargestethnicgroupsaretheHausaFulani,whocompriseapproximately29percentofthepopulation,theYoruba,atanestimated21percent,andtheIbo(orIgbo),with18percentofthepopulation.10Despitesignificantinternalmigration,ethnicgroupsremainfairlyconcentratedindistinctregionsofthecountry,withYorubamainlyintheSouthWestzone,HausaFulaniinthethreenorthernzones,andIbointheSouthEasternzone.11Othersignificantethnicgroups,eachwithapopulationofmorethanonemillion,includetheKanuri(concentratedintheNorthEast,whereBokoHaramactivityismostprevalentwithpopulationsalsoinneighboringNiger,Chad,andCameroon),Tiv,andIbibio.12ReligioninNigeriais,ingeneral,affiliativeratherthanascriptive.Thatis,individualslargelychoosethepracticeofaparticularreligiousfaith.However,ethnicdivisionstendtocoincidesomewhatwithreligiousdivisions.13Muslims,whomakeupanestimated50percentofthepopulation,areconcentratedinnorthernzones,whileChristians,withanestimated40percentofthepopulation,areconcentratedinthesouth.Theapproximate10percentofthepopulationthatpracticestraditional,animisticreligions,isalsoconcentratedinthesouth.14PoliticsBritishColonialismNigeriafellunderBritishcolonialruleinthelate19thcentury,withformalestablishmentofaBritishcolonyonNigerianterritoryin1900,underSirFrederickLugardasthefirstHighCommissionerofNorthernNigeria.15WhileSouthernandNorthernNigeriawereinitiallygovernedasseparateentitiesdue

6NigeriaProfile:Facts.2013.BBC.May21.http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica13949547.7Kingsley,Patrick.2014.DoesaGrowingGlobalYouthPopulationFuelPoliticalUnrest?March19.TheGuardian(London).http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/growingyouthpopulationfuelpoliticalunrestmiddleeastsouthamerica.8Nigeria.2014.TheWorldFactbook.CIA.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworldfactbook/geos/ni.html.9Nigeria.2014.TheWorldFactbook.CIA.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworldfactbook/geos/ni.html.10Nigeria.2014.TheWorldFactbook.CIA.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworldfactbook/geos/ni.html.11AboutNigeria:People.2012.FederalRepublicofNigeria.http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/20121029110546/people.12AboutNigeria:People.2012.FederalRepublicofNigeria.http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/20121029110546/people.13Thereinforcingnatureofethnicandreligiouscleavagesresultsinmanycommunalconflictsbeinglabeledalternatelyasethnicorreligiousinnature,attimestosuitthedesiresorpreconceptionoftheanalystorthedominantdiscourseatagiventimeratherthanreflectingthenatureoftheconflict.Forexample,conflictsinPlateauStatethatwereformerlylabeledasethnicinnaturehaveinrecentyearsbeendescribedasreligious,althoughtheprimaryactorshavenotchanged.14AboutNigeria:People.2012.FederalRepublicofNigeria.http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/20121029110546/people;Nigeria.2014.TheWorldFactbook.CIA.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworldfactbook/geos/ni.html.15Hickey,Raymond.1984.The1982MaitatsineUprisingsinNigeria:ANote.TheRoyalAfricanSociety83,no.331:251.



toculturaldifferences,theBritishunifiedtheirgovernancein1914foreconomicreasons.16However,evenafterunification,northandsouthremainedseparateasthecolonialsystemofindirectrulegoverningtheprotectoratesthroughindigenousrulersmerelyinstitutionalizedexistingdivisions.17Colonialadministrators,rulingthroughtraditionalrulerswhoacquiescedtotheirdirectives,didsetclearlimitsontheactivitiesoftraditionalrulers.18BritishcolonialismhadseveraldistincteffectsonNorthernNigeria.First,colonialismresultedintheintroductionofWesternformsofeducationintoanarenathathadbeenafocalpointofIslamiceducationforcenturies,withitsowntraditionsandelites.Thus,Westerneducationwasseenasbothathreatandasymboloftheincreasingimpactofanalien,colonial,Christian,materialistandcorruptprocessofWesternization.19Second,theeconomicpoliciesofcolonization,includingthedevelopmentofinfrastructureinthenorth,resultedinthemigrationofsouthernlaborers,particularlyethnicIboandYoruba,intoNorthernNigeria.ThesegroupsformedhomogenouspocketswithinlargelyHausaFulanicities,initiatingasharpindigene/settlerdichotomythatbecameapowerfultoolthroughwhichpoliticiansmobilizedsupportersfornarrowpoliticalmotives.20ThepotentialforthisdynamictocontributetosocialviolencecanbeseenintheKanoriotsof1953,whichisnotedaswhenthefirstcollectiveoutburstbetweentheSouthernersandtheNorthernersormorecorrectly,betweenthemajorpoliticalparties,wasrecorded.21Theindigene/settlerdichotomycontinuestocontributetosocialconflicttothepresent.PostIndependenceNigeriagainedindependencefromtheUnitedKingdomin1960andestablishedarepublicunderthepresidencyofNnamdiAzikiwe.Thefirstpostindependenceelectionswereheldin1964.However,amilitarycoupin1966,ledbyYakubuGowon,endedthebriefexperimentwithdemocraticrule.InFebruary1966,thelargelyethnicIjawNigerDeltaVolunteerForcedeclaredanindependentrepublicandfoughtwithfederalforcesfor12daysbeforebeingdefeated.22Shortlythereafter,inresponsetoincreasesinethnicviolence,anethnicIboseparatistmovementdeclaredtheRepublicofBiafrainMay1967withintheEasternRegionofNigeria.23Civilwarbrokeout,resultinginuptothreemilliondeathsandmass

16Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.17Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.18Hill2010,1419Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.13920Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.21Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:856.22Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:856.23Duruji,MosesMetumara.2009.SocialInequity,DemocraticTransitionandtheIgboNationalismResurgenceinNigeria.AfricanJournalofPoliticalScienceandInternationalRelations.3:1.5465.http://www.academicjournals.org/article/article1379759106_Duruji.pdf



displacementofIbos.Additionally,withtheBiafranstatelocatedintheoilproducingregionsofNigeria,theeconomywasshattered.Thefederalgovernmentwereabletoreassertcontrol,withtheBiafranresistancesurrenderinginJanuary1970.24LeadershiptransitionbycoupandcountercouphavebeendominantinNigeriaspostindependencehistory.MurtalaMohammedoustedGowonin1975inacoup,whileMohammedhimselfwaskilledinafailedcoupattemptin1976andwassucceededbyOlusegunObasanjo.Obasanjo,overaperiodofthreeyears,ledconstitutionalreformleadingtoarestorationofciviliangovernmentin1979.However,onceagain,democraticrule,underPresidentAlhajiShehuShagari,provedtobeshortlived.NigeriasSecondRepubliccametoanendonDecember31,1983,whenthemilitaryunderMuhammaduBuharionceagainseizedpowerinacoup.BuharialsofelltoacoupledbyGeneralIbrahimBabangidainAugust1985.Babangida,in1993,ledtherestorationofcivilianruleunderanInterimNationalGovernment;however,lessthansixmonthslater,inNovember,GeneralSaniAbachaoverthrewtheinterimgovernmentandinstalledhimselfasdictator,apositionhemaintaineduntilhisdeathin1998.25TheFourthRepublicAfterAbachasdeath,hischiefofdefenseAbdulsalamiAbubakarledthetransitiontocivilianrule,overseeingfirstlocal,thenstate,andfinallynationalelectionsbetweenDecember1998andFebruary1999.FormermilitaryleaderObasanjowonthepresidencywithhisparty,thePeoplesDemocraticParty(PDP)alsowinningalegislativemajority.WhileNigeriahasmaintainedcivilianandelectedrulesince1999,ithasnotexperiencedanychangeinpartyleadership.ThePDPhaswoneverypresidentialelectionsince1999,withUmaruYarAduawinningpresidentialelectionsinApril2007.26CurrentpresidentGoodluckJonathansucceededYarAduaafterthelattersdeathin2010andwonreelectionin2011.27ThenextfederalelectionsarescheduledforFebruary2015.ThedominantpoliticalpartyisthePeoplesDemocraticParty,which(priortoJonathan)hadaninformalinternalpolicytoalternateleadershipbetweenMuslimNorthernersandChristianSoutherners.WithJonathan,thisinternaldynamichasbrokendown,whichhasalsoexposedthepartytodefections.28TheprimaryoppositionpartyistheAllProgressivesCongress(APC),whichwasestablishedin2013whenfouroppositionpartiestheActionCongressofNigeria,theCongressforProgressiveChange,theAllNigeriaPeoplesParty,andpartoftheAllProgressivesGrandAlliancemergedinordertochallengethedominanceofthePDP.2924CountryProfile:Nigeria.2008.Washington,DC:LibraryofCongress.July.http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf.25CountryProfile:Nigeria.2008.Washington,DC:LibraryofCongress.July.http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf.26CountryProfile:Nigeria.2008.Washington,DC:LibraryofCongress.July.http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf.27Profile:NigeriasGoodluckJonathan.2013.BBC.September11.http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica12192152.28Campbell,John.2011.WhyNigeriasNorthSouthDistinctionIsImportant.February7.TheHuffingtonPost.http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ambjohncampbell/whynigeriasnorthsouth_b_817734.html.29AboutAPC.2013.AllProgressiveCongress.http://apc.com.ng/index.php/aboutapc.



UndertheFourthRepublic,Nigeriahasexperiencedaseriesofintercommunalandsectarianconflicts,includingtheriseofBokoHaram.TheNigeriaSocialViolenceProjectrecordednearly30,000deathsfromsocial(largelycommunal)violencebetweenJanuary1998andAugust2014.From1998through2008,societalviolencewasconcentratedintheSouthSouthandtheMiddleBeltstates.Since2009,socialviolencehasshiftedtotheNortheast.30IntheNigerDelta,ethnicmilitiasmostrecentlyastheMovementfortheEmancipationoftheNigerDelta(MEND)haveengagedinviolenceregardingtheexploitationofoilresources.31ViolenceintheMiddleBeltstatesisrelatedtoavarietyofconflicts,includingfarmerpastoralistcompetition,indigenesettlerrivalries,andinterethnicandinterreligiousconflicts.32TheNigerianEconomyNigeriaisnowthelargesteconomyinAfrica,havingrecentlysurpassedSouthAfrica.Despiterecentimprovementsinthenonoilsector,drivenbyagricultureandtradeandservices,theeconomycontinuestobedominatedbythepetroleumindustry,whichprovided96percentofexportearningsin2013aswellas60percentoffiscalrevenue.33NigeriaisthefifthlargestOPECproducerandamajorexporterofoiltoWesternstates,includingtheUnitedStates.34Ithasalsoexperiencedhigherthanaverageeconomicgrowth(comparedtobothWestAfricaandsubSaharanAfricaasawhole)inrecentyears,withestimatedgrowthof7.4percentin2013and6.5percentin2012.35ThebenefitsofthiseconomicgrowthareconcentratedtoafewNigerians.DespitesomegainsinachievingMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,anestimated63percentofNigeriansremaininpoverty.36Povertyratesalsovarybyregion,whichreinforcesothersectarianandidentitybaseddividesinNigeria.Inthenorth,whereBokoHaramemerged,povertyrateshoverabove70percent;thiscomparestoratesof27percentinthesouth(includingthecommercialcapitalofLagos)and25percentintheNigerDelta(theoilproducingregion).37

30NigeriaSocialViolenceProject.August2014.http://www.connectsaisafrica.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/Social_Violence_Summary_Web3.pdf.31ElBushra,Judy,SarahLadbury,andUkohaUkiwo.2013.FromDesigntoImplementation:AddressingtheCausesofViolentConflictinNigeria.Stability:InternationalJournalofSecurity&Development.3:1):1.118,DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.cy.32ElBushra,Judy,SarahLadbury,andUkohaUkiwo.2013.FromDesigntoImplementation:AddressingtheCausesofViolentConflictinNigeria.Stability:InternationalJournalofSecurity&Development.3:1):1.118,DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.cy.33Barungi,Barbara.2014.Nigeria.AfricanEconomicOutlook.AfricaDevelopmentBank.3.http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Nigeria_EN.pdf.34Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:861.35Barungi,Barbara.2014.Nigeria.AfricanEconomicOutlook.AfricaDevelopmentBank.2.http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Nigeria_EN.pdf.36Barungi,Barbara.2014.Nigeria.AfricanEconomicOutlook.AfricaDevelopmentBank.12.http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Nigeria_EN.pdf.37Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:861.



IslaminNigeriaIslamfirstappearedintheterritorythatisnownortheastNigeriasometimeduringtheseventhandeighthcenturiesofthecommonera,althoughitwasslowtospreadintermsofnumbersofconverts.MaiIdrisAlooma,leaderoftheKanemBornuempire(whichcoveredmuchofwhatisnownortheastNigeriaaswellasneighboringareasofCameroonandNigerandmostofChad),attemptedtoestablishIslamiclawinthe16thcentury.38IslaminnorthernNigeriawaslargelypropagatedbytheQadiriyaandTijaniyaSufibrotherhoods,whichcontinueasthedominantIslamicordersincontemporaryNigeria.39Intheearly19thcentury,SheikUsmandanFodiolaunchedanIslamicreformmovement,aimedatremovingHausaleadershesawascorruptandasindulgingunIslamicpractices.40Withhisfollowers,hedeclaredajihadbetween1802and1812,41bywhichtimeheestablishedafederationofIslamicstatesknownastheSokotoCaliphateundertheleadershipoftheSultanofSokoto.42TheSultanruledthroughanetworkofemirs.Atitsheightinthemid1800s,thecaliphatecoverednorthernNigeria,partsofsouthernNiger,andnorthernBenin43andremainedintactuntil1903,whenoverthrownbyBritishcolonization.However,evenundercolonization,theimplementationofindirectrulebytheBritishallowedformorecontinuitythandisruptioninthecaliphatesinternallegalauthoritystructures.44Followingindependence,theformalpoliticalpoweroftheSultanofSokotowasremoved;however,thepositionmaintainsastatusastheleaderofNigeriasMuslims.Whilethesultanhasnoformalpoliticalpowers,hisinfluenceisconsiderable.45ContemporaryIslamistmovementsinNigeriafrequentlyclaimthelegacyofUsmandanFodiosjihad,withthe(re)establishmentofacaliphatewithformalpoliticalpoweraswellasreligiousauthorityastheultimategoal.46NigeriahasseentheriseofseveralinfluentialIslamistmovementsfromwhichBokoHaramsleadershiphasdrawn,tosomedegree,inspiration.Asonescholarnotes,Inmomentsofcrisisandrapidsocialchange,theologicalargumentsacquireparamountimportancefortheselfdefinitionofanewreligiousmovement.47AmongthemostprominentofthesemovementshavebeenMaitatsine,YanIzala,andtheIslamicMovementofNigeria.CentraltoeachofthesemovementswascritiqueanddesiretoreformNigerianpoliticalinstitutions,aswellascritiqueoftraditionalreligiouselites.38Sodiq,Yushau.1992.AHistoryofIslamicLawinNigeria:PastandPresent.IslamicStudies.31:1.85108.39Mahmud,SakahSaidu.2013.ShariaorShura:ContendingApproachestoMuslimPoliticsinNigeriaandSenegal.NewYork:LexingtonBooks.18.40Sodiq,Yushau.1992.AHistoryofIslamicLawinNigeria:PastandPresent.IslamicStudies.31:1.85108.41Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.42Hickey,Raymond.1984.The1982MaitatsineUprisingsinNigeria:ANote.TheRoyalAfricanSociety83,no.331:251.43Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.44Reynolds,JonathanT.1997.ThePoliticsofHistory:TheLegacyoftheSokotoCaliphateinNigeria.JournalofAsianandAfricanStudies.32:12.5065.45Hill,JonathanN.C.2010.SufisminNorthernNigeria:ForceforCounterRadicalization?StrategicStudiesInstitute:Carlisle.15.46Lubeck,PaulM.2011.Nigeria:MappingaShariaRestorationistMovement.InShariaPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,255.47Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23..



TheMaitatsinemovement,calledNigeriasfirstviolentextremistgroup,48wasestablishedbytheCameroonianMuhammedMarwa,whosettledinKanoandestablishedalargecommunityofsupportersthere.49Marwa,whowascalledMaitatsine,50wasimprisonedandthendeportedin1962forhisradicalpreaching,butlaterreturned.MaitatsinepreachedtheradicalrejectionofallnonQuranicinnovation,51whichincludedpracticesfromrelyingonhadithtotheuseofwristwatches.52Manyofhisteachingswereheterodox,includingrejectionoftheProphetMohammedanddeclaringhimselfaprophet.53Maitatsinerecruitedfromtheurbanpoor,inparticularthealmajiris,54whocametoKanoasacenterofIslamiclearning.55MaitatsinessupporterswereinvolvedinviolentclashesinKanoasearlyas1972,withincreasingviolencein1979and1980.56In1980,anestimated6,000peoplewerekilledbytheNigerianarmywhenMarwaandhisfollowerstriedtostormamajormosque,includingMarwahimself.57However,Marwasdeathdidnotleadtotheendofhismovement,andclasheseruptedin1982,1984,1985and199358inmultiplelocalesinnorthernNigeria,includingYola,Gombe,outsideKaduna,andnearMaiduguri.59WhileBokoHaramdrawssupportersfromsimilarsocialstrataasdidMaitatsine,itismorecloselyrelateddoctrinallytoJamaatIzalatalBidaawaIqamatasSunna,commonlyknownasYanIzala.YanIzalaisthelargestreformmovementinNigeriaandanoutspokenopponentoftheestablishedSufi48Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.49Isichei,Elizabeth.1987.TheMaitatsineRisingsinNigeria19801985:ARevoltoftheDisinherited.JournalofReligioninAfrica.17:3.194.50Maitatsineistranslatedasonewhodamns,amonikerearnedthroughMarwasfiercecondemnationofpracticeshedeemedunIslamic,inparticularNigerianstateinstitutionsandWesterntechnologies.SeeAdesoji,Abimbola.2011.BetweenMaitatsineandBokoHaram:IslamicFundamentalismandtheResponseoftheNigerianState.AfricaToday.57:4,101.51Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.14014152Isichei,Elizabeth.1987.TheMaitatsineRisingsinNigeria19801985:ARevoltoftheDisinherited.JournalofReligioninAfrica.17:3.196;Kastfelt,Niels.1989.RumoursofMaitatsine:ANoteonPoliticalCultureinNorthernNigeria.AfricanAffairs.8:350,83.53Isichei,Elizabeth.1987.TheMaitatsineRisingsinNigeria19801985:ARevoltoftheDisinherited.JournalofReligioninAfrica.17:3.196;Kastfelt,Niels.1989.RumoursofMaitatsine:ANoteonPoliticalCultureinNorthernNigeria.AfricanAffairs.8:350,83.54AlmajirisareyoungboyswhoattendKoranicschoolsunderthetutelageofIslamicscholars.However,theymayreceivelittleeducation,areusedforbegging,andaresubjecttoabuse.TheNigeriangovernmenthasattemptedtomodernizethesystemofIslamiceducation,integratingKoranicschoolswithWesternstyleeducation.However,numerousunregulatedschoolsandscholarspersist.55Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.14014156Isichei,Elizabeth.1987.TheMaitatsineRisingsinNigeria19801985:ARevoltoftheDisinherited.JournalofReligioninAfrica.17:3.194.57Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.14014158Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.14014159Isichei,Elizabeth.1987.TheMaitatsineRisingsinNigeria19801985:ARevoltoftheDisinherited.JournalofReligioninAfrica.17:3.194.



orders.60Foundedin1978byIsmailaIdrisinJosunderthespiritualleadershipofSheikhAbubakarGumi,YanIzalaisaSalafistorganizationthatembracesalegalistandscripturecentricunderstandingofIslam,withagoalofpurgingthepracticeofIslamofforeignideasandpractices.Toaccomplishthis,IzalaproponentsencouragethefaithfultolivebyitsquiteliteralinterpretationoftheQuran,sunnah,andhadith;toemulatethesalafs.61YanIzalahasbeenattheforefrontofthemovementfortheimplementationofshariainnorthernstates,andinsomecities(suchasKano)itsmembersmakeupthecoreoftheIslamicpolice(thehisba).62Furthermore,asdiscussedbelow,BokoHaramfounderMohammedYusufwasinfluencedbytheteachingsofYanIzala,andBokoHaramsearliestrecruitsreportedlycamelargelyfromYanIzala.YanIzalaappealedtoyouth,especiallyunemployedgraduates,withitsemphasisonindividual,unmediatedexaminationoftheSunna.63Additionally,withitsfocusonpurifyingNigerianIslamfromunIslamicpractices,YanIzalarejectedmanysocialcustomsthatyouth,inparticular,foundconstraining,includingmarriagepayments.64Thus,whilejoiningYanIzalamaymeanbreakingwithparentsandtraditionalpractices,italsoallowedforgreaterindividualfreedomandagencyforsome.65YanIzala,despiteitsSalafiststance,alsoattractedsignificantfemaleparticipation.Unlikesomeofitsideologicalcolleagues,YanIzalahaspromotedIslamiceducationforwomenandtheparticipationofwomeninthepublicsphere(althoughunderlimitationsofseparatebutequalactivities).YanIzalathereforerepresentsamoreindividualautonomycenteredIslamistoptioninsomesensesthantraditionalIslamicpracticesinNorthernNigeria.66ShiaIslamwaspracticallynonexistentinNigeriauntilthe1980s,67withfewerthanfivepercentofNigeriasMuslimpopulationthatisShia.68DespitethedemographicweaknessoftheShia,theIslamicMovementinNigeria(IMN),foundedbyIbrahimalZakzaky,69isasignificantplayerintheNigerianlandscape.InspiredbythesuccessoftheIranianRevolutionin1979,Zakzakybegantopromotethecause

60Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.14361Hill2010,1862Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.14663Lubeck,PaulM.2011.Nigeria:MappingaShariaRestorationistMovement.InShariaPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,264.64Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.141;Lubeck,PaulM.2011.Nigeria:MappingaShariaRestorationistMovement.InShariaPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,265.65Lubeck,PaulM.2011.Nigeria:MappingaShariaRestorationistMovement.InShariaPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,265.66Lubeck,PaulM.2011.Nigeria:MappingaShariaRestorationistMovement.InShariaPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,265.67Umar,Farouk,andEstelleShirbon.2008.TensionsbetweenMuslimsSimmerinNigerianCity.Reuters.March19.http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/20/usnigeriamuslimsidUSL1880839220080320.68ForumonReligion&PublicLife.2009.MappingtheGlobalMuslimPopulation:AReportontheSizeandDistributionoftheWorldsMuslimPopulation.October.PewResearchCenter.40.http://www.pewforum.org/files/2009/10/Muslimpopulation.pdf.69Hill2010,20



ofIslamicrevolutioninNigeria,beginninginthe1980stothepresent.TheIMN,whichincludessomeSunnisaswellasShias,haspetitionedforthefullimplementationofsharialaws,70arguingthatsecularauthoritieswerenotfittoholdpower,andthatthetraditionalreligiousrulers,eitherthroughcowardiceorselfservinginterest,facilitatedtheirabusesbyrefusingtostanduptothem.71ThegroupallegedlyreceivesfundingfromIran,usingittoprovidesocialservicesandeducationtothepoor.72TheIMNreportedlyrecruitedamongthemostradicalelementsoftheIslamistcommunity,callingforcampaignsagainsttheWest,Christians,theYanIzala,andthemilitarygovernments.73SomesourcesallegethatMohammedYusufinitiallyapproachedtheIMNasapossibleorganizationalvehicleforhisvision,althoughhisinvolvementintheIMNcannotbeconfirmed.74TheIMNalsohasatrainedmilitiaunit,theHoras.BasedontheRevolutionaryGuardsinIran,theyaretaskedwithprovidingsecurityatgroupmeetingsandevents.Inthepast,theyhaveclashedwithrivalgroups.75

KeyDynamicsinNigeriaSeveraldynamicsshapetheNigerianpolityinwaysthatfacilitatethatriseoftheIslamistgroupsdiscussedabove,aswellasmoreviolentmanifestationssuchasBokoHaram.Firstisthepersistentdividebetweennorthandsouth.Thenorth,largelyMuslim,remainseconomicallyunderdeveloped76and,increasingly,politicallymarginalized.77Accesstopoliticalpowerisaprimarymeansforbothindividualandcollectiveenrichment,whichencouragessometouseextrememeasures,includingasometimesrecklessexploitationofethnicandreligiousidentities,inordertoobtainpoliticalpower.Asoneanalystnotes,Nigerianpoliticswereandremaincharacterizedbyakeencompetitionforsocioeconomicresourceswiththestateseenasthemaindispenserofthesebenefit.[I]nthecompetitionforallocationofpoliticalpowerandresources,ethnoreligioussentimentsareexploited.78Anothernotes,PoliticsinNigeriaisthegatewaytosuddenwealth,anostentatiouslifestyleandselfaggrandizement.Itisazerosumgame,whichproducesabsolutewinnersandlosers.Thischaracterofpoliticsencouragestheresorttoanymeans,includingviolenceandmobilizationofethnicandreligioussentiments,aswellastheradicalizationoforganizationssuchasBokoHaram.79Aswillbeseenbelow,BokoHaraminitsearlyyearswasempoweredandprovidedresourcesasamanifestationofthesedynamics.70Hill2010,2371Hill2010,2372Hill2010,242573Lubeck,PaulM.2011.Nigeria:MappingaShariaRestorationistMovement.InShariaPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,266.74Adesoki,AbimbolaO.2011.BetweenmaitatsineandBokoHaram:IslamicFundamentalismandTheResponseoftheNigerianState.AfricaToday57,no.4:100.75Hill2010,2376Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:861.77Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:862.78Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.4.79Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:868.



ThepreviousfactorsareexacerbatedbypervasivecorruptionintheNigerianstate.Spoilsaccruetothefewelites,withlimiteddistributionviapatronagesystems.Thus,despiteawealthofnaturalresourcesandconsiderableeconomicgrowthinrecentyears,manyNigerians(especiallythoseinthenorth)remainshutoutfromeconomicopportunities.Finally,sincedemocratizationin1999,Nigeriahasbeenshakenbyrecurrentethnicandsectarianviolence,drivenlargelybycompetitionforpoliticalandeconomicresources.Morethan30,000Nigerianshavediedintheseconflicts,80erodingsocialtrustandfurtherintensifyingthezerosumnatureofpoliticalandeconomiccompetition.Thestatesresponsetosuchconflictshasalsobeenlargelycoerciveandrepressive,aswellasattimesindiscriminate,81weakeningtrustintheNigeriangovernment.

BokoHaramFoundingandEvolutionunderMohammedYusufMohammedYusuffoundedthemovementthatwouldevolveintoBokoHaramin2002inMaiduguri,thecapitalofBornoState.82YusufwasastudentofSheikAbubakarGumi,spiritualleaderoftheIzalamovement,intheearly1990s83andwasalsomentoredbySheikJafaarAdam.84Reportedly,manyofYusufsearliestfollowerswerefromtheIzalamovement.85HemovedintoaleadershippositionattheNdimiandDaggashmosquesinMaiduguri,BornoState,althoughhewasexpelledfrombothby2002duetohisincreasingextremism.86AfterhisexpulsionfromNdimiandDaggash,YusufestablishedhisownmosqueandIslamicschooltoserveasamagnetforprimaryandsecondaryschoolpupilswho,inresponsetohisteachings,wouldabandonWesternizedschoolsinthebeliefthatWesterneducation[Boko]isasin[Haram].87PreachingradicalsermonsagainsttheMuslimestablishmentaswellasthestate,Yusufattractedawidefollowing,

80NigeriaSocialViolenceProject.August2014.http://www.connectsaisafrica.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/Social_Violence_Summary_Web3.pdf.81Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:857.82Hill,JonathanN.C.2010.SufisminNorthernNigeria:ForceforCounterRadicalization?StrategicStudiesInstitute:Carlisle.2683Ulph,Stephen.2013.BokoHaram:InvestigatingtheideologicalbackgroundtotheriseofanIslamicmilitantorganization.WestminsterInstitute.20.84Owolade,Femi.2014.BokoHaram:HowaMilitantIslamistGroupEmergedinNigeria.GatestoneInstitute,March27.http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/bokoharamnigeria#85Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.86Owolade,Femi.2014.BokoHaram:HowaMilitantIslamistGroupEmergedinNigeria.GatestoneInstitute,March27.http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/bokoharamnigeria#87Owolade,Femi.2014.BokoHaram:HowaMilitantIslamistGroupEmergedinNigeria.GatestoneInstitute,March27.http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/bokoharamnigeria#;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria.



originallycalledtheYusufiyya,innorthernNigeriaandborderingareasofChadandNiger.88InfluencedbySaudiArabianscholarAbubakarbinAbdullahAbuZayad,YusufrejectedthemodernIslamicschoolsembracedbytheIzalamovementaswellasseculareducation.HealsoturnedagainsttheNigerianstateandrejectedthesultanofSokotoasthenominalheadofallNigerianMuslims.Initiallynonviolent,Yusufattracteddisillusionedyouthwhoviewedhimasamoralcrusader.89Yusufgavegrantsandfinancialassistancetohisrecruits,includingloanstostartupsmallbusinesses;90inturn,recruitscontributedfunds(gainedeitherlicitlyorillicitly)backtothecommonpurse.91In2004,Yusufandseveralthousandofhisfollowersestablishedasettlement,calledAfghanistan,nearKannamma,Yobestate,reportedlyinemulationoftheProphetMohammedsmigration(orhijra)fromMeccatoMedina.92MultipleinformantsnotedthatformerBornoGovernorAliModuSheriffempoweredYusufsgroupinitsearlyyearsbyarmingandotherwisefinancingthemandemployingthemforelectioneeringactivitiesinapersonalmilitiaknownasEcomog;buildingpersonalmilitiasduringelectionseasonisarelativelycommonpracticebypoliticians.93SmallskirmishesbetweenYusufsfollowersandNigerianauthoritiesfirsteruptedinlate2003andearly2004.TheNigerianmediathenlabeledthegrouptheNigerianTaliban,94oneofseveralnicknamesthegroupwouldgainoveritsevolution.InSeptember2004,followingmoreattacks,theNigerianarmywentontheoffensiveagainstthegroup,dismantlingtheAfghanistansettlementandkilling27followers.95ViolencesubsideduntilJune2009,althoughthegroupdidnotdisband.Thenextconfrontationwaspromptedbynewlawsregardingmotorbikes,includingabanondrivingatnightandrequirementtowearahelmet.Policecheckpointswereusedtoenforcethenewrules.Followingtherefusalbythesectsmemberstofollowthenewlaw,aclasheruptedwithpoliceinBauchistateinwhich17memberswere

88Adegbulu,Femi.2013.BokoHaram:TheEmergenceofaTerroristSectinNigeria20092013.AfricanIdentities.11:3,266.DOl:10.1080114725843.2013.839118.89Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.90Governmentactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August18,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Religioussocietyrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Civilsocietyactor(media).InterviewedbyAmyPate.August24,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentsecurityofficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August27,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.91Governmentsecurityofficial.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria.92Hill,JonathanN.C.2010.SufisminNorthernNigeria:ForceforCounterRadicalization?StrategicStudiesInstitute:Carlisle.26.93CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyBukolaAdemolaAdelehinandKopepDabugat.August16,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August21,2014.Jos,Nigeria94Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.15095Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.150



shot,96settingoffaseriesofattacksandcounterattacks.97TheviolencespreadfromBauchitofouradditionalnorthernNigerianstates,withatleast900killedinMaidugurialone.98Yusufwastakenintopolicecustodyandextrajudiciallyexecuted.99ThemomentofYusufskillingbyNigeriansecurityagentsiswidelyseenasthecriticalturningpointintheevolutionofBokoHaram.100BokoHaramafterYusufFollowingYusufsdeathandthesubsequentcrackdownonsuspectedsupporters,BokoHaramwentunderground.Nigerianauthoritiesannouncedvictoryoverthegroup.However,ayearlater,inSeptember2010,thesectreemergedundertheleadershipofYusufssecondincommandAbubakarShekauwithanattackonaNigerianprison,resultingintheescapeof700prisoners,including150BokoHarammembers.101UnderShekausleadership,BokoHaramhasevolvedfromafringereligiousmovementintooneofthemostlethalterroristorganizationsintheworld.102IdeologyandGoalsTheideologyofBokoHaramisborrowedfromSalafistthoughtandwritings,103whichtreatsanythingwesternascompletelyunIslamic.104YusufwasreportedlystronglyinfluencedbythewritingsofthemedievalscholarIbnTaymiyya,105whocalledforjihadagainstrulers(includingMuslimrulers)whodid

96Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.15197Agbiboa,DanielE.2014.PeaceatDaggersDrawn?BokoHaramandtheStateofEmergencyinNigeria.StudiesinConflict&Terrorism.37:56.DOI:10.1080/1057610X.2014.853602.98Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.15199Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.151100Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Loimeier,Roman.2012BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.AfricaSpectrum.47:23.151.101Abubakar,Aminu.2010.ManhuntBeginsAfterPrisonBreak.September9.IOLNews.http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/manhuntbeginsafterprisonbreak1.680173#.VBgRSPldUYM.102Simonelli,Corina,MichaelJensen,AlejandroCastroReina,AmyPate,ScottMenner,andErinMiller.2014.BokoHaramRecentAttacks.STARTBackgroundReport.May.https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf.103Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Ulph,Stephen.2013.BokoHaram:InvestigatingtheideologicalbackgroundtotheriseofanIslamicmilitantorganization.WestminsterInstitute.20.104Youths,RadicalisationandAffiliationwithInsurgentGroupsinNorthernNigeria.2014.MonographSeries,No.20.CLEENFoundation,Lagos.18.http://www.cleen.org/Youths,%20Radicalisation%20and%20Affiliation%20with%20Insurgent%20Groups%20in%20Northern%20Nigeria.pdf105Ulph,Stephen.2013.BokoHaram:InvestigatingtheideologicalbackgroundtotheriseofanIslamicmilitantorganization.WestminsterInstitute.20.



notfollowandapplysharialaw.106WhileattheNdimimosque,healsospecializedinthehadithcollectionentitledRiyadhalSalihin,byMuhyialDinalNawawi.Thiscollection,whichfocusesonethics,mannersandconductforapiousMuslim,alsoemphasizesthevirtueandsuperiorityofmilitantjihadandthosethatpursueit.107However,inBokoHaramsearlydays,thefocusoftheorganizationwasprimarilyondawa(proselytizingandconversion).108ItwasaftertheextrajudicialexecutionofYusufthatthefocusturnedtojihad.109Yusuf,andBokoHaram,alsoembracedaredistributionisteconomicideology.UmarMamodu,aBokoHaramhistorianandscholar,states,Yusufbelievedinthecreationofaneworderinwhichthewretchedshouldinherittheearth.110Thisrejectionofthecurrentsociopoliticalhierarchyhasprovenappealingtothepoor,theunemployed,andtheuneducated.111Whilethegrouphasespousedredistribution,italsorejectsthevaluationofgroupsorindividualsonthebasisoftheirmaterialwealth.Instead,membersaretoldtovaluespiritualandmetaphysicalachievements.112BokoHaramisbestknownforitsrejectionofWesterneducation.113Westerneducation(aswellasotherformsofWesterninfluence,intermsoflifestyles,entertainment,andgovernance)areviewedasinauthentictonorthernNigeriaandasinfiltratingthenorthstraditionalwayoflife.114ThereisaperceptionwithinnorthernNigeriathatWesterneducation,whichwasintroducedinitiallybyChristianmissionaries,isavehicletoconvertnorthernMuslimstoChristianity.115So,notonlydoesBokoHaramrejectWesterneducationbecauseofsomeofthecontentofthecurriculum,butalsobecauseevangelismdeceptivelycamouflagedasWesterneducationisIslamicallyunacceptable.116ItshouldbenotedthatBokoHaramdoesnotrejectthecontentofWesterneducationinitsentiretyithasembracedtechnicalandengineeringsolutions,forexample.Rather,asYusufexplicatedduringhisinterrogationbyNigerianpolice,PeopleshouldnotseektheknowledgethatcontravenestheteachingofIslam.AllknowledgethatcontradictsIslamisprohibitedbytheAlmightysihiri[sorceryormagic]isknowledge,butAllahhas

106Jansen,JohannesJ.G.19871988.IbnTaymiyyahandtheThirteenthCentury:AFormativePeriodofModernMuslimRadicalism.QuadernidiStudiArabi.5/6,394295.IbnTaymiyyahwaswritinginthecontextoftheMongolinvasionofMuslimlands.107Ulph,Stephen.2013.BokoHaram:InvestigatingtheideologicalbackgroundtotheriseofanIslamicmilitantorganization.WestminsterInstitute.20.108Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.109Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.110Owolade,Femi.2014.BokoHaram:HowaMilitantIslamistGroupEmergedinNigeria.GatestoneInstitute,March27.http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/bokoharamnigeria#111Mohammed,Abdulkareem.2010.TheParadoxofBokoHaram.Kano:MovingImageLimited.43.112Alao,DavidOladimejiandAlao,Oluwafisayo.2012.BokoHaramInsurgenceinNigeria:TheChallengesandLessons.SingaporeanJournalofBusinessEconomics,andManagementStudies,IlishanRemo,Nigeria.1:6113Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria114CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.115Mohammed,Abdulkareem.2010.TheParadoxofBokoHaram.Kano:MovingImageLimited.44.116Mohammed,Abdulkareem.2010.TheParadoxofBokoHaram.Kano:MovingImageLimited.44.



forbiddenit,shirk[polytheismorsharingorassociatingpartnerstoAllah]isknowledgebutAllahhasforbiddenit.117SpecificWesternteachingsorscientifictheoriesthatBokoHaramrejectsincludethewritingsofvariousphilosopherswhoquestiontheexistenceofgod,theBigBangtheory,Darwinism,thelawofconservationofmatterandenergy,andtheraincycle.118BokoHaramsgoalscenterontheIslamizationofNigeriansocietyinallitsfacetspolitical,economic,andsocial.119Initially,YusufandBokoHaramexpressedthisgoalthroughwithdrawalfromwhattheyviewedasacorruptsocietyandthecreationofamicrosocietywherepureIslamcouldbeexpressed.Eventually,though,theambitionshiftedtothedisplacementofthesecularNigerianregimeforaSalafistgovernment.120Thisincludes,accordingtoitsspokesman,theapplicationofshariathroughoutNigeria(includingmajorityChristianareas).121YusufalsoresolutelyrejecteddemocracyasanappropriateformofgovernanceforaMuslimsociety.122WhatislessclearbothinYusufsstatementsandwritingsaswellasinBokoHaramscurrentconfigurationisthegeographicscopeofBokoHaramsambitions.TheestablishmentofanIslamicstateinNigeriaisclearlyagoal;however,itremainsanopenquestionifBokoHaramalsoseekstheterritorialexpansionofsuchasstateintoneighboringcountriesorWestAfricaasawhole.123LeadershipandDecisionmakingStructuresShekauistheemirofBokoHaram,sittingatthetopoftheleadershipstructure.HeissupportedbyaShuraCouncil,124althoughhedoesmakesdecisionsattimeswithoutreferringtothecouncil.125MembersoftheShuraCouncilhaveresponsibilityforspecificcellsofthegroup,whichhaveeitherfunctionalor

117Mohammed,Abdulkareem.2010.TheParadoxofBokoHaram.Kano:MovingImageLimited.104.118Mohammed,Abdulkareem.2010.TheParadoxofBokoHaram.Kano:MovingImageLimited.52.119Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria120Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.121Owolade,Femi.2014.BokoHaram:HowaMilitantIslamistGroupEmergedinNigeria.GatestoneInstitute,March27.http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/bokoharamnigeria#122Alao,DavidOladimejiandAlao,Oluwafisayo.2012.BokoHaramInsurgenceinNigeria:TheChallengesandLessons.SingaporeanJournalofBusinessEconomics,andManagementStudies,IlishanRemo,Nigeria.1:56123Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria124DifferentsourcesprovidedifferentestimatesoftheShuraCouncilsmembership,rangingfrom11upto30.TheNigeriangovernmentreleasedalistof18members(notincludingShekau)in2012.SeeNwankwo,Sunny.2012.Nigeria:JTFDeclares19BokoHaramCommandersWanted.AllAfrica,November24.http://allafrica.com/stories/201211250093.html.125Walker,Andrew.2012.WhatisBokoHaram?UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).8.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/bokoharam/SR308.pdf



geographicfoci.126Accordingtoopensources,theShurararelymeetsinperson,relyinginsteadonmobilephonesformostcommunication.Membersatlowerlevelsmaynotknowmembersofothercells.127Shekauisreportedlyauthoritarianinhisleadershipstyle;128hehasorderedthedeathpenaltyforanyonewhodidnotfollowhisordersandhaskilleddefectors.129Beheadingshavebeenusedinthepasttotargetmoremoderatemembersandmemberswhohadbeenarrestedandwerethereforenolongertrusted.130ShekausleadershipstyleandhisexpansionoftargetingtosofttargetsledtotensionswithinBokoHaramanditseventualsplit,131withMammanNur(whoreportedlyintroducedShekautoYusuf)formingAnsaruin2012withamorelimitedtargetingrepertoire(primarily,thekidnappingofforeigners).WhileShekaumaintainsoverallleadership,132individualcellcommandersalsohavesomeabilitytoactunilaterallyinanopportunisticmanner,withoutdirectordersfromShekau.133RecruitmentandMembershipBokoHaramusesbothvoluntaryandcoercivestrategiesforrecruitment.Fightersjoiningvoluntarilymaybemotivatedforideologicalandreligiousreasons,butmayalsojoinduetopastvictimizationbytheNigerianmilitary,whichhasbeenaccusedofhumanrightsviolationsinthefightagainstthesect.134BokoHaramalsoreportedlyusesmonetaryincentivestoattractrecruits.135Forexample,gangmembersinDiffa,Niger(acrosstheborderfromBornoState)reportedthatBokoHaramwereregularlyrecruiting

126GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinwomensissues.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August22,2014.Jos,Nigeria;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August27,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Walker,Andrew.2012.WhatisBokoHaram?UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).8.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/bokoharam/SR308.pdf;Zenn,Jacob.2014.LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.CTCSentinel.7:2(February).27.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadershipanalysisofbokoharamandansaruinnigeria.127Walker,Andrew.2012.WhatisBokoHaram?UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).8.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/bokoharam/SR308.pdf128Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August18,2014.Abuja,Nigeria129Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Zenn,Jacob.2014.LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.CTCSentinel7,no.2(February):25.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadershipanalysisofbokoharamandansaruinnigeria130Walker,Andrew.2012.WhatisBokoHaram?UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).6.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/bokoharam/SR308.pdf131Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria132Overtheyears,Shekausdeathhasbeenreportedmultipletimes,includingatleasttwiceinSeptember2014.However,mostindicationsarethatheisstillaliveandincontrolofthegroup.However,asoneinformantnoted,Imnotsureifitmattersifhesaliveordeadtheideaofhimexists.Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.133Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinconflictresolution.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria134Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria135Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria



youthusingfinancialincentives. 136Uneducated,unskilledyouthareapopulardemographicfromwhichthegrouppulls.Youngpeopleareamongthemostaffectedbytheworseningpovertyrate,andunemployment,alongwithothersocioeconomicwoes,contributestoanindividualmoresusceptibletoradicalizationandindoctrination.137SurveysconductedinBornoandKadunastatesfoundthehighunemploymentandpovertyinthoseareasasthesecondmostimportantreasonwhyyouthengageinreligiousbasedviolence.138Almajiris139areanotherpopulationvulnerabletorecruitmentformaterialandpsychologicalaswellasreligiousreasons.140BokoHaram,initsraidsagainsttownsandvillages,alsohasroutinelykidnappedindividualswhoarelaterforcedtofightorotherwiseprovidesupporttothegroup.141Informantsalsoreportedotherusesofcoercionandintimidationtorecruitfighters,142withcoercivestrategiesbecomingincreasinglyimportantsincespring2013.143SeveralinformantsreportedthepresenceofforeignfightersinBokoHaramsranks.OneinformantreportedbeinginvolvedinthearrestofforeignfightersinKanoinpreviousyears,althoughhecouldnotdivulgethenationalityofthosearrested.144Accordingtootherinformants,attackvictimshaveidentifiedattackersasnonNigeriansandnonKanuri,145specificallyTuaregs.146TheCamerooniangovernmentalsoindicatedthatithadidentifiedtwoTuaregfightersamongBokoHarammilitantskilledinaclashinSeptember2014.147136Fessy,Thomas.2014.NigerHitbyNigeriasBokoHaramFallout.BBCNewsAfrica,April22.http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica27111884137Onuoha,FreedomC.WhyDoYouthJoinBokoHaram?2014.UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,SpecialReport348:6.http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf138Onuoha,FreedomC.WhyDoYouthJoinBokoHaram?2014.UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,SpecialReport348:6.http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf139AlmajirisareyoungboyswhoattendKoranicschoolsunderthetutelageofIslamicscholars.However,theymayreceivelittleeducation,areusedforbegging,andaresubjecttoabuse.TheNigeriangovernmenthasattemptedtomodernizethesystemofIslamiceducation,integratingKoranicschoolswithWesternstyleeducation.However,numerousunregulatedschoolsandscholarspersist.140Therrell,Lane.2014.BokoHaramRecruitsNigerianAlmajiriChildren:CameroonNextTarget?GaurdianLibertyVoice,August21.http://guardianlv.com/2014/08/bokoharamrecruitsnigerianalmajirichildrencameroonnexttarget/141CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBornoengagedinhumanitarianassistance.PhoneinterviewwithAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August16,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August21,2014.Kano,Nigeria142CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBornoengagedinhumanitarianassistance.PhoneinterviewwithAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August16,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August27,2014.Abuja,Nigeria143Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria144GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August21and22,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.145Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemolaAdelehin,andKopepDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria146GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria147Wallis,William.2014.BokoHaramOpensNewFrontagainstNigerianForces.FinancialTimes,September9.http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5aed8f88383611e49fc200144feabdc0.html#axzz3DYm0tAtp.



PatternsofViolenceFollowingShekausassumptionofleadership,BokoHaramgreatlyincreaseditsviolenceintermsoffrequencyofattacks,averagelethality,andscopeoftargets.Asoftheendof2013,accordingtotheGlobalTerrorismDatabase(GTD),BokoHaramhascarriedoutmorethan800attackssince2009whichhaveresultedinnearly4,000fatalities,makingBokoHaramoneofthemostactiveterroristgroupsintheworld,intermsofattackfrequencyandoveralllethality.148Figure1breaksdownthetargetsofthoseattacks.149BokoHaramhasalsoshown,toafargreaterdegreethanotherterroristgroups,apropensityforcoordinatedattacks,definedasattacksagainstmultipletargets(eitherinthesamegenerallocationordispersedgeographically)inthesameday.Morethan40percentofitsattacksbetween2009and2011werepartofcoordinatedevents,comparedto10percentofallattacksgloballyduringthesametimeperiod.150WithinNigeria,BokoHaramviolenceisconcentratedinthenortheast,especiallyinBornoState,itsbirthplace.BokoHaramhasalsolaunchedoccasionalattacksacrosstheborderintoCameroonandNiger.However,despiteaconcentrationofattacksinnortheastNigeria,BokoHaramhasdemonstratedanabilitytostrikefurthersouth,includinghighprofileattacksinAbuja,thecapital.Figure2mapsthegeographicandtemporaldistributionofattacksfrom2010through2013intermsoffrequency,whileFigure3mapsthegeographicandtemporaldistributionofattacksbetween2010and2013intermsoflethality.151Thesefiguresrevealseveralpatterns.First,althoughBokoHaramhaslaunchedattacksacrossthenorthandMiddleBeltregionsofNigeria,themajorityofattacksareinthenortheast,withBornoStatetheprimaryareaofconcentration.Second,thisdynamicseemstohaveintensifiedsincetheimpositionofthestateofemergencyinMay2013,withanoticeablegeographiccontractionofBokoHaramactivityin2013ascomparedto2012.Third,whilethefrequencyofBokoHaramattacksdecreasedfrom2012to2013,148Simonelli,Corina,MichaelJensen,AlejandroCastroReina,AmyPate,ScottMenner,andErinMiller.2014.BokoHaramRecentAttacks.STARTBackgroundReport.May.https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf.149Simonelli,Corina,MichaelJensen,AlejandroCastroReina,AmyPate,ScottMenner,andErinMiller.2014.BokoHaramRecentAttacks.STARTBackgroundReport.May.https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf.150Menner,Scott,andErinMiller.2013.FTODesignation:BokoHaramandAnsaru.STARTBackgroundReport.November.http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/br/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaram_Nov2013.pdf.151NationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START).2013.GlobalTerrorismDatabase[Datafile].http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

FIGURE1:BokoHaramTargetTypes,20092013



lethalityincreased.Thatis,theaveragenumberofdeathsassociatedwithaBokoHaramattackhasincreased.Thisislikelyduetoashiftinthegroupstacticalrepertoire,asitdecreaseditsuseofbombingandassassinationandincreaseditsarmedassaults(sometimeswith200to300militantsinvolved)ontownsandvillages.Inotherwords,in2013,BokoHarambegantorelymoreoninsurgencyorguerrillawarfarethanclassicterroristtacticsperhapsinresponsetothedeclarationofthestateofemergencyandinfluxofmilitarypersonnelintothenortheast.Duringthesummermonthsof2014,BokoHarambeganseizingcontroloftownsinnortheastNigeriainashiftfromitsprevioushitandruntactics.Shekau,mimickinglanguageusedbytheIslamicStateintheLevant(ISIL),declaredacaliphate.TownsseizedincludeBama,thesecondlargestcityinBornoafterMaiduguri,aswellasastringofsmallertowns.152WhiletheNigerianmilitaryhaslaunchedcounterattacksandusedairpowerinanattempttodislodgethemilitants,theirsuccesshasthusfarbeenlimited.

152Akingule,Gbenga,andDrewHinshaw.2014.BokoHaramExtendsControloverNortheastNigerianCity:BamaRefugeesSayIslamistInsurgencyForciblyRecruitingYoungMenandKillingResidents.TheWallStreetJournal,September12.http://online.wsj.com/articles/bokoharamextendscontrolovernortheastnigeriancity1410534697.



Figure2:GeographicandTemporalDistributionofBokoHaramAttacks



Figure3:BokoHaramLethality,20102013



RelationshipswithOtherActorsOpensources,aswellasinformantsinNigeria,indicatedthatBokoHaramhasrelationshipswithotherterroristgroupsinAfrica,particularlyintheSahel.ThemostfrequentlycitedoftheseisalQaidaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM),153whichhasreportedlyprovidedtraining154andsomefinancingtoBokoHaram.155InJune2010,AbdelmalekDroukdel,akaAbuMusabAbdalWadoud,theemirofAQIM,announcedcommunicationwithBokoHaramanddiscussedpossibleassistanceforthegroup.156In2011,AbubakarAdamKambarandalBarnawi(amemberofBokoHaramsShura)reportedlymetatanAQIMtrainingcampinAlgeria.MammanNur(wholatersplitfromBokoHaramandfoundedAnsaru)alsoreportedlytrainedwithAQIM.157BokoHaramalsoreportedlysentmilitantstosupportAQIMandtheMovementforUnityandJihadandWestAfrica(MUJAO)intheirassaultagainsttheMalianstatein2012.158However,oneinformantindicatedthattherelationshipwithAQIMmayhaveweakenedinrecentyears.Keyindividualswhobrokeredtherelationship(e.g.,NurwithinBokoHaramandMokhtarBelmokhtarwithinAQIM)haveeitherbeenkilledormovedontodifferentorganizations.AQIM,withtheFrenchinterventioninMali,isalsonowmorefocusedonitsownsurvival.159ThereisnoindicationwhetherornottheTuaregsrecentlykilledfightingforBokoHaraminCameroonwerealsoaffiliatedwithAQIMoranotherSaheliangroupinvolvedinthe2012Maliuprising.SourcesalsomentionapossibleBokoHaramrelationshipwithalShabaabinSomalia,primarilyintermsoftraining.160NurreportedlytrainedinexplosivesinSomaliwiththegroup.161However,linkagesmaybepurelyindividualratherthanorganizationalinthecaseofalShabaab.162

153Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Zenn,Jacob.2014.LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.CTCSentinel7,no.2(February):24.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadershipanalysisofbokoharamandansaruinnigeria154GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria155Zenn,Jacob.2013.BokoHaramsInternationalConnections.CTCSentinel6,no.1(January):8.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/bokoharamsinternationalconnections;JointSubcommitteeHearing:TheContinuingThreatofBokoHaram,BeforetheSubcommitteeonAfrica,GlobalHealth,GlobalHumanRights,andInternationalOrganizationsandtheSubcommitteeonTerrorism,Nonproliferation,andTrade,113thCong.(2013).(StatementofJacobZenn).http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/jointsubcommitteehearingcontinuingthreatbokoharam.156Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria157Zenn,Jacob.2014.LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.CTCSentinel7,no.2(February):24.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadershipanalysisofbokoharamandansaruinnigeria158Zenn,Jacob.2013.BokoHaramsInternationalConnections.CTCSentinel6,no.1(January):8.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/bokoharamsinternationalconnections.159Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria160GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Zenn,Jacob.2014.LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.CTCSentinel7,no.2(February):24.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadershipanalysisofbokoharamandansaruinnigeria161Zenn,Jacob.2013.BokoHaramsInternationalConnections.CTCSentinel6,no.1(January):8.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/bokoharamsinternationalconnections.162Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria



FundingLikemanyterroristandinsurgentgroups,BokoHaramusescriminalitytosupportitsotheractivities.Someofthiscriminalityistransnationalandcrossborderinnature,whileotherformsofcriminalitytakeplaceintheNigeriancontext.ThissectiondetailsBokoHaramscriminalbehaviorsoutsideitsterroristandinsurgentactivity.WhileBokoHaramisfrequentlypresumedtobeactiveinillicittraffickingmarkets,fieldresearchindicatesthatthegrouphasperhapsnotexploitedNigeriasstatusasakeytraffickinghub.BokoHaramdoesusenontraffickingrelatedcriminalityextensivelyinordertosustainitselffinanciallyandmaterially,includingextortionandprotectionrackets,bankrobbery,looting,andkidnappingforransom.IllicitTraffickingBokoHaramisfrequentlycitedasanactorintheinternationalillicitweaponsmarket(forwhichNigeriaasawholeisakeymarketandoccasionaltransitpoint).WhilesomesourcesrefertoBokoHaramassmugglingweapons,163informantsbasedinNigeriadownplayedthecharacterizationofBokoHaramastraffickerandemphasizedthegroupasaconsumerwithinthemarket.ThedegreetowhichBokoHaramitselfisfacilitatingthemovementofarmsintoNigeria,versusbuyingarmsotheractorstraffickedintothecountry,wasasubjectofsomedebate.164NoinformantindicatedthatBokoHaramwasengagedinanyweaponssmugglingoutsidetheimmediateregion(i.e.,fromneighboringcountriesintoNigeriaorviceversa).SeveralinformantsalsoreferencedindicationsthatBokoHarammaybeinvolvedtosomeextentindrugtrafficking,althoughthegroupsexactrolewasnotelaborated.165DespiteNigeriasstatusasahubformultipletraffickingmarketsintheregion,BokoHaramatthispointintimedoesnotseemtobeparticipatinginextensivetraffickingbehavior,perse.166MultiplemodalitiesareusedtomoveweaponsacrossNigeriasnorthernbordersfromneighboringstates.Pickuptrucks167andothervehicleshavebeenused,witharmsembeddedinlegalgoodsorhiddeninsecretcompartments.168Therearealsoreportsofherdsoflivestockbeingused,169withleatheror

163Zenn,Jacob.2014.LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.CTCSentinel7,no.2(February):27.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadershipanalysisofbokoharamandansaruinnigeria164GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyactorengagedindevelopment.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August21,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinconflictresolution.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria165Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria166SomeofthebehaviorbeinglabeledastraffickingorsmugglinginopensourcesmaybeBokoHarammembersmovingthemselvesandtheirarmsbetweenNigeriaandCameroon,Niger,andChadforpurposesofevadingstateactorsinthoselocations.167Zenn,Jacob.2013.BokoHaramsEvolvingTacticsandAlliancesinNigeria.CTCSentinel6,no.6(June):14.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/bokoharamsevolvingtacticsandalliancesinnigeria.168Onuoha,FreedomC.2013.PorousBordersandBokoHaramsArmsSmugglingOperationsinNigeria.AlJazeeraCenterforStudies,September8.http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/09/201398104245877469.htm169Zenn,Jacob.2013.BokoHaramsEvolvingTacticsandAlliancesinNigeria.CTCSentinel6,no.6(June):12.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/bokoharamsevolvingtacticsandalliancesinnigeria.



thatchedbagsattachedtocamels,donkeysorcowstoconcealweapons.170BokoHaramhasalsousedwomentosmuggleweaponsontheirpersonsbecausetheycanfrequentlypassthroughcheckpointswithoutbeingsearched.171ExtortionExtortionwasamongtheearliestformsofcriminalityadoptedbyBokoHaram.172Thegrouphascoercedmerchantsintopayingprotectionmoney.Multipleinformantsalsorelatedstoriesofnortheasternpoliticiansortheirfamilies,particularlyinBornoState,beingthreatenedwithphysicalharmiftheydidnotdonatetoBokoHaramscause.173Informantsalsoindicatedthatpoliticiansinothernorthernstates,suchasKatsinaandJigawa,maybepayingBokoHaraminordertopreventtheirlocalesfrombeingattacked.174RobberyandLootingBokoHaramalsoengagedinacampaignofbankrobberiesinthenortheast.175A2012reportsuggestedthatBokoHaramhadstolenupto3millionUSD,althoughthatfigurecouldnotbeverified.176Whilebankrobberywasofparticularimportanceupuntilthesummerof2013,177ithasdeclinedsincethedeclarationofthestateofemergencyinMay2013.178BokoHaramhasalsoengagedinlootingwhenitattackstowns,villages,andsecurityinstallations.InformantsreportedthatwhenBokoHaramattacks,itsmembersfrequentlycarryoffeverythingofvaluethattheycanfind,includingcash,foodstuffs,toiletries,medicalsupplies,andweapons.179170Onuoha,FreedomC.2013.PorousBordersandBokoHaramsArmsSmugglingOperationsinNigeria.AlJazeeraCenterforStudies,September8.http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/09/201398104245877469.htm171Maram,Ndahi.2013.JTF,BokoHaramSuspectsFemaleVigilanteArrest.Vanguard,August17.http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=5952XMS1JBJ421T9&csi=361894&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true172Zenn,Jacob.2013.BokoHaramsInternationalConnections.CTCSentinel6,no.1(January):11.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/bokoharamsinternationalconnections173Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentsecurityofficial.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Civilsocietyactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Governmentofficial.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.174Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria175Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyactorengagedindevelopment.InterviewedbyKopepDabugat.August20,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Walker,Andrew.2012.WhatisBokoHaram?UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).5.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/bokoharam/SR308.pdf;Soniyi,TobiandSenatorIroegbu.2013.Nigeria:SevenBokoHaramMembersArraignedforBankRobbery.AllAfrica,February21.176Walker,Andrew.2012.WhatisBokoHaram?UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).5.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/bokoharam/SR308.pdf.177Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemolaAdelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria178GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August27,2

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START_ SMA-AFRICOM_Boko Haram Deep Dive_Jan2015.pdf