Louvain Studies 41 (2018): 359-376 doi: 10.2143/LS.41.4.3285584 © 2018 by Louvain Studies, all rights reserved

Standing on the Shoulders of Giants On the Crucial Role of ‘Testimony’ in Biblical

Wisdom Literature and in the Book of Qoheleth in Particular

Danilo Verde

Abstract. — Within the field of epistemology, there is a growing interest in the crucial role of testimony in the human search for knowledge. Several philosophers argue that much of Western epistemology is marked by an individualistic attempt to understand the world. The purpose of this article is to show that this is not the case for Ancient Israel’s search for wisdom. Whereas several exegetes have pointed out that empirical research is pivotal to biblical wisdom literature, testimonial knowl-edge is actually much more prominent. Even Qoheleth, who is often considered an individualistic explorer of the world and a polemical thinker, draws abundantly on his community’s testimony.

Over the last few decades, epistemologists have paid remarkable atten-tion to the function of testimony in the human search for knowledge.1 In his pioneering study Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Coadey argued that Western epistemology – with the exception of Hume and Reid – has been strongly characterized by an individualistic approach to knowl-edge, overlooking the extent to which our knowledge of the world derives from so-called “testimonial knowledge,” i.e. knowledge accumu-lated and transmitted by others.2 As Pelletier has recently put it, “It is an incontestable fact of human life that much of what we say we know

* This essay was granted the Louvain Studies Theological Research Award 2017-2018.

1. John Greco, “Recent Work on Testimonial Knowledge,” American Philosophi-cal Quarterly 49 (2012): 15-28; Sanford Goldberg, Relying on Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Jennifer Lackey, Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, eds., The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Duncan Pritchard, “The Epistemology of Testimony,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 326-348.

2. C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

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depends on the word of others, whether peers, teachers, experts, etc.”3 This article intends to contribute to the ongoing research on the pivotal role of testimony in different philosophical and literary traditions by investigating biblical wisdom literature, and in particular the book of Qoheleth. At the same time, this article contributes to the current debate on biblical epistemology.4 I will show that what Western philosophy has apparently neglected is the very core of the search for knowledge in biblical wisdom tradition.5 Whereas von Rad considered the biblical wis-dom tradition as fundamentally “empirical” and based on the individual attempt to understand the world,6 I will argue that the importance of the individual observation of phenomena is actually less foregrounded than the importance of relying on testimonial knowledge (§ I). Even Qoheleth, who is often considered the most individualistic author in the biblical wisdom tradition, draws abundantly on his community’s under-standing of the world (§ II). Following the so-called Hellenistic hypoth-esis – according to which Qoheleth is the product of the Hellenistic spirit prevailing in the territories conquered by Alexander the Great during the 4th century bce7 – I will attempt to show that Qoheleth’s

3. Jenny Pelletier, “William Ockham on Testimonial Knowledge,” in Knowledge in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (London: Bloomsbury), forthcoming. I would like to thank the author for sending me in advance a copy of this paper.

4. Dru Johnson, Epistemology and Biblical Theology: From the Pentateuch to Mark’s Gospel, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Biblical Criticism 4 (London and New York: Routledge, 2017); Scripture’s Knowing: A Companion to Biblical Epistemology, Cascade Companions (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2015); Ryan O’Dowd, The Wisdom of Torah: Epistemology in Deuteronomy and the Wisdom Literature, Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments 225 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009); Mary Healy and Robin Parry, The Bible and Epistemology: Biblical Soundings on the Knowledge of God (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009).

5. Scholars traditionally consider Proverbs, Job, and Qoheleth the primary books of the wisdom tradition of the Hebrew Bible, to which the deuterocanonical books of Wisdom and Ben Sira are added. Cf. James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 32010); Maurice Gilbert, Les cinq livres des sages: Les Proverbes de Salomon, Le livre de Job, Qohélet ou l’Ecclésiaste, Le livre de Ben Sira, La Sagesse de Salomon (Paris: Cerf, 2003); Richard J. Clifford, The Wisdom Literature, Interpreting Biblical Texts (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1998); Roland E. Murphy, The Tree of Life: An Exploration of Biblical Wisdom Literature (Grand Rap-ids, MI and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 21996). For a recent attempt to radically review the very notion of wisdom, cf. Will Kynes, “The ‘Wisdom Literature’ Category: An Obitu-ary,” Journal of Theological Studies 69 (2018): 1-24.

6. Gerhard von Rad, Weisheit in Israel (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1970).

7. Scholars largely agree on Hellenism as Qoheleth’s milieu. Cf. Ludger Schwien-horst-Schönberger, ‘Nicht im Menschen Gründet das Glück’ (Koh 2,24): Kohelet im Span-nungsfeld jüdischer Weisheit und hellenistischer Philosophie, Herders biblische Studien 2 (Freiburg: Herder, 1994); Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period, Vol. 1: Text (Philadelphia, PA:

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epistemology is certainly in line with the individualistic, empirical approach to knowledge that was typical of many Hellenistic philosoph-ical schools. At the same time, however, Qoheleth very much relies on Ancient Israel’s testimony.

I. The Testimony of Biblical Wisdom and the Search for Knowledge

In his influential work entitled Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction, Crenshaw argues that one of the main characteristics of biblical wisdom literature is a specific attitude toward reality that can also be found in ancient Near Eastern cognate literature. In the author’s view, Ancient Israel’s sages were convinced that the world contains all essential answers to the human search for knowledge and that their disciples could learn l’art de savoir vivre mainly by investigating surrounding reality.8 In this regard, Crenshaw is very much in line with the position of von Rad men-tioned above. Upon closer inspection, however, in biblical wisdom litera-ture the experience of the world is by no means the ultimate criterion of truth, nor is empirical research the main path to knowledge. The sages rather suggest that their own testimony about the world has to play a crucial role in the disciples’ observation of phenomena. This clearly emerges when one considers the widespread emphasis on the cognitive value of listening in all biblical books belonging to the wisdom tradition.

The invitation to listen in order to acquire wisdom is an insistent refrain in Proverbs from the very outset of the book (e.g. Prov 1:5: “Let the wise listen and he will increase insight, and the discerning will acquire shrewd guidance”).9 The numerous imperative forms of the verb šm‘, “to listen” (e.g. Prov 1:8; 4:1, 10; 8:6, 33; 19:20; 22:17; 23:22), as well as the repeated expression haṭ-’oznekā, “incline your ear” (e.g. Prov 4:20; 5:1; 22:17) and its variation, “apply (hābî’āh) your ear” (e.g. Prov 23:12) suggest that the sense of hearing is the one most involved in the human search for wisdom. The object of listening is usually Lady Wisdom, as well as the parents’ and sages’ teachings.10 From the perspective

Fortress, 21981), 115-130; Rainer Braun, Kohelet und die frühhellenistiche Popularphiloso-phie, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 130 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973). For a different proposal, cf. Choon Leong Seow, Ecclesiastes: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, Anchor Bible 18c (New York: Double-day, 1997).

8. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, 10.9. All biblical translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.10. E.g. Prov 1:8, 33; 4:1, 10; 5:7, 13; 7:24; 8:6, 32, 33, 34; 12:15; 13:1;

15:31, 32; 18:13; 19:20; 21:28; 22:17; 23:19, 22; 25:12; 28:9.

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of Proverbs, therefore, one does not acquire knowledge through a mere individualistic exploration of surrounding reality, but rather by looking at the world through the lenses of an already established interpretation of the world. Prov 3:5 explicitly invites the disciple not to rely on his/her own insights (“Trust wholeheartedly in yhwh, put no faith in your own perception”). Prov 16:25 boldly states that what seems right to the disciple very often is “a way of death” (“There is a way that some think straight, but it leads in the end to death”). The book of Proverbs cer-tainly mentions the eye (‘ayin, 47×) and the seeing (r’h, 10×), and Prov 20:12 might be read as a recognition of the epistemological value of both listening and seeing (“The hearing ear and the seeing eye, yhwh has made them both”). Only on some occasions, however, does the book of Proverbs explicitly refer to the epistemological value of observing phe-nomena (e.g. Prov 6:6; 7:7; 24:12). As Fox argues, “The sages of Prov-erbs undoubtedly saw many things that provided ingredients for wis-dom, but this is not the decisive factor in what counts for them.”11 The testimonial knowledge that the sages have accumulated and that they attempt to transmit to the new generations has priority over indi-vidual experience.

The same emphasis on the cognitive value of listening can be found in the deuterocanonical book of Ben Sira. According to the Greek ver-sion of Sir 3:29, the wise desires the sages’ teaching (“A wise heart understands proverbs, the attentive ear is the desire of the wise”12). According to Sir 51:16, Ben Sira himself received wisdom from the sages (“I inclined my ear a little and received, and I found for myself much instruction”13). In both the Hebrew and the Greek text of Sir 6:33, the secret of wisdom consists in listening, receiving instruction, and inclin-ing the ear (“If you listen you will receive, and if you incline your ear, you will become wise”14). In Sir 39:1, Ben Sira describes the wise person

11. Michael V. Fox, “The Epistemology of the Book of Proverbs,” Journal of Biblical Literature (2007): 669-684, here 674. Cf. also Tomas Frydrych, Living under the Sun: Examination of Proverbs and Qohelet, Supplements to Vetus Testamentum 90 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 67.

12. The Hebrew text (MS A) is slightly different: “A wise heart understands the proverbs of the wise and an ear that attends to wisdom will rejoice.” See Pancratius C. Beentjes, The Book of Ben Sira in Hebrew: A Text Edition of All Extant Hebrew Manu-scripts and a Synopsis of All Parallel Hebrew Ben Sira Texts, Supplements to Vetus Testa-mentum 68 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 24.

13. The Greek text corresponds to the Hebrew text in MS 11QPs. MS B, how-ever, contains a different reading of the first part: “I constantly prayed in my youth.” Ibid., 93 and 125.

14. Hebrew Text (MS A): “If you love listening and incline your ear, you will be corrected.” Ibid., 29.

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as one who is concerned with the wisdom of the ancients (“He researches [into the wisdom] of all the ancients, he occupies his time with the prophecies”15). Sir 39:2 underscores the importance of keeping in mind the sayings of the famous and studying the subtleties of parables (“He preserves the discourses of famous men, he is at home with the niceties of parables”16). In other words, knowledge primarily derives from a scru-pulous investigation of the testimony of tradition. Like Proverbs, Ben Sira also refers to the epistemological value of observing phenomena, but only occasionally. In his book, the verb r’h usually has the meaning of “to see” (e.g. Sir 6:36; 13:7; 15:7; 23:18; 24:34; 30:5; 37:9.24), or “to reflect/think” (e.g. Sir 2:10; 46:10), rather than “to observe.” In Sir 16:5, the verb r’h does have an epistemological nuance, but listening is still more prominent (“Many such things my eye has seen, and my ear has heard things more striking than these”). Although Ben Sira says that he has seen/observed many things during his travels (Sir 34:12), according to Sir 16:21 and 43:32 most of the human works remain hidden/secret/unknown. On the contrary, for Ben Sira wisdom can be found in the Torah, or more precisely, wisdom is the Torah (Sir 24).17

Likewise, the deuterocanonical book of Wisdom presents wisdom as something that one can only receive from God, rather than something that one can acquire through a personal exploration of the world. Israel’s knowledge of God does not depend on the people’s efforts but only on God’s free choice (Wis 16; 7–9; 10–19). In order to increase the knowl-edge of both God and l’art de savoir vivre, one needs to receive God’s wisdom, which reveals God and his will to humankind. Wisdom is achievable not by empirical investigation of the world, but rather through prayer, following Solomon’s example (Wis 9:1-5).18 Humans can cer-tainly observe creation and think about the Creator, but these attempts often fail and even lead to idolatry, as Wis 9:14-15 make clear: “For the

15. The Hebrew Text is missing.16. The Hebrew Text is missing.17. Maurice Gilbert, L’«éloge de la Sagesse»: Siracide 24, in id., Ben Sira: Recueil

d’études – Collected Essays, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 264 (Leuven: Peeters, 2014), 143-164; Shane Berg, “Ben Sira, the Genesis Creation Accounts, and the Knowledge of God’s Will,” Journal of Biblical Literature 132 (2013): 139-157; Greg Schmidt Goering, Wisdom’s Root Revealed: Ben Sira and the Election of Israel, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 139 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 1-20; Alexander Di Lella, “The Meaning of Wisdom in Ben Sira,” in In Search of Wisdom: Essays in Memory of John G. Gammie, ed. Leo G. Perdue (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1993), 133-148.

18. Maurice Gilbert, “La connaissance de Dieu selon le livre de la Sagesse,” in id., La sagesse de Salomon: Recueil d’études – The Wisdom of Salomon: Collected Essays, Ana-lecta Biblica 189 (Rome: Gregorian and Biblical Press, 2011), 311-335.

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reasoning of mortals is worthless, and our designs are likely to fail; for a perishable body weighs down the soul, and this earthy tent burdens the thoughtful mind.”19 Like Proverbs and Ben Sira, the book of Wisdom also refers to the cognitive value of the sense of hearing (Wis 6:12; 11:13). The sense of seeing, on the contrary, is not considered very effec-tive, since people see but do not understand (Wis 4:14-18; 13:1).

Finally, the book of Job mainly consists in the sages’ attempt to convince Job to accept the testimony of tradition, as the many invita-tions to listen suggest (e.g. Job 15:17; 33:1, 31, 33; 34:16; 37:14). The sages argue that, since they observed the world, Job should listen to them and even explore the world as well, but only in order to confirm their testimony (e.g. Job 4:8; 5:3). Job, however, is not satisfied by either the sages’ words or their observation of phenomena. Rather, he wants to find a solution in a direct dialogue with God: “Look, my eye has seen all this, my ear has heard and understood it. What you know, I also know; I am not inferior to you. But I would speak to the Almighty, and I desire to argue my base with God” (Job 13:1-3).20 Job, therefore, seems to depart from wisdom tradition, which sounds very unconvincing to him. Phe-nomena, however, are not convincing either. Asking where wisdom can be found, Job looks at the world and realizes that there is no accessible wisdom: “But where does Wisdom come from? Where is Intelligence to be found? No human being knows the way to her, she is not to be found on earth where they live” (Job 28:12-13).21

To sum up, despite the fact that wisdom literature is commonly described in terms of the empirical investigation of the world, in my view the attribute “empirical” can only be used if taken in a broad sense. Biblical wisdom is certainly grounded in the observation of the world. The criterion of truth, however, is not constituted by empirical observa-tion but rather by Ancient Israel’s testimonial knowledge, on which, with the exception of Job, everybody else appears blindly to rely.

19. Greg Schmidt Goering, “Election and Knowledge in the Wisdom of Solo-mon,” in Studies in the Book of Wisdom, ed. Géza György Xeravits and József Zsengellér, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 142 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 163-182. In the same volume, see also Luca Mazzinghi, “Law of Nature and Light of the Law in the Book of Wisdom (Wis 18,4c),” 37-60.

20. Pierre Van Hecke, From Linguistics to Hermeneutics: A Functional and Cogni-tive Approach to Job 12–14, Studia Semitica Neerlandica 55 (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

21. It is true that Job finds peace only after God asks him to observe several phenomena (e.g. Job 40:15; 41:1). I doubt, however, that the observation of those phenomena has been the turning point in Job’s experience. Job had already observed many other phenomena without great results (cf. Job 28). More likely, what changes Job is the fact that he eventually has a genuine, direct confrontation with God, as Job 42:5 suggests: “I had heard of you by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees you.”

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II. Qoheleth: Between His Senses and His Tradition’s Testimony

So far, we have seen that in biblical wisdom literature the search for knowledge is primarily based on the sages’ testimony. This even applies to Qoheleth, whose individual exploration of the world is certainly based on his own sensory perception of reality, in line with many Hellenistic schools of philosophy. Qoheleth, however, also draws on Ancient Israel’s testimonial knowledge.

Qoheleth’s Senses and the Hellenistic Path to KnowledgeQoheleth’s search for knowledge very much relies on his own observa-tion of the world. In Qoh 1:13, for instance, Qoheleth explicitly refers to his own investigation of phenomena (“I devoted my heart to examine and to explore, by wisdom, all that is done under the heavens”), an idea on which he insists in Qoh 1:14 (“I have observed all the deeds that are done under the sun”).

The importance of individual research in Qoheleth’s experience is underpinned by the widespread textual references to the sematic field of eyesight.22 Whereas in a group of texts the references to visual perception do not have epistemological value (e.g. Qoh 5:10; 6:5; 7:11; 8:16; 11:7), the semantic field of eyesight is more often employed to indicate both the process of exploring the world and the final acquisition of knowledge. See, for instance, Qoh 2:12-13: “So I turned to observe [r’h] wisdom, and madness and folly […]. Then I understood [r’h] that wis-dom is more beneficial than folly, as light is more beneficial than dark-ness.” The role of eyesight is pivotal to Qoheleth’s search for wisdom, to such an extent that in Qoh 2:14 the difference between the wise man and the fool is that the former has eyes (and thereby light/knowledge), whereas the latter gropes in the darkness/not knowledge (“The wise have eyes in their head, but fools walk in darkness”). In Qoheleth’s view, therefore, the process of searching for knowledge consists in opening one’s eyes wide to the phenomena, and the acquisition of knowledge is described as a profound and an extensive vision of the world.

Qoheleth’s phenomenological approach, however, does not lead to a definite and satisfactory acquisition of knowledge. Qoh 1:8 seems to

22. The verb r’h, “to see/to look at” occurs 47 times (Qoh 1:8, 10, 14, 16; 2:1, 3, 12, 13, 24; 3:10, 13, 16, 18, 22; 4:1, 3, 4, 7, 15; 5:7, 12, 17; 6:1, 5, 6; 7:11, 13, 14, 15, 27, 29; 8:9, 10, 16, 17; 9:9, 11, 13; 10:5, 7; 11:4, 7; 12:3), the lexeme ‘ayin, “eye” counts 10 occurrences (Qoh 1:8; 2:10, 14; 4:8; 5:10; 6:9; 8:16; 11:7, 9), and mar’eh, “sight” occurs twice (Qoh 6:9; 11:9).

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suggest that the search for knowledge produces the dissatisfaction of both the senses and the human attempt to say something about the experience of the world (“The eye is not satisfied with seeing, or the ear filled with hearing”).23 On the one hand, the eyes long for knowledge and not only did Qoheleth follow his eyes’ desire (Qoh 2:10: “I denied my eyes nothing that they desired”), he also recommended his disciples to do the same (Qoh 11:9: “Follow the ways of your heart and eyes”). On the other hand, the world remains not fully intelligible: “All this I have tested by wisdom. I said, ‘I will be wise’, but it was far from me. That which is, is far off, and deep, very deep; who can find it out?” (Qoh 7:23-24). On my reading, the elusiveness of both the world and the human search for wisdom is one of the most important aspects of the enigmatic expression hăbēl hăbālîm hakkōl hābel (Qoh 1:2), which can be translated “sheer elusiveness, everything is elusive.”24

Furthermore, as Van Hecke has already observed, in the book of Qoheleth the verb r’h “to see/to look at” occurs much more often than the verb šm‘, “to hear/to listen” (47 occurrences versus 8).25 Van Hecke also points out that the book of Qoheleth abundantly uses expressions indicating the subject’s movement towards the object of inquiry (e.g. pnh, “to turn,” sbb, “to turn about, to go around, to surround,” šwb, “to return,” ḥpr, “to search,” bqš, “to seek,” drš, “to seek,” mṣ’, “to find,” twr, “to explore,” nsh, “to test, to try”). This suggests the prominent role of intentional, active observation in Qoheleth’s search for knowledge.

23. In the book of Qoheleth, the human experience is afflicted by two great, disquieting dissatisfactions, namely the desire for knowledge and the desire for wealth (e.g. Qoh 1:8; 4:8; 5:9, 11; 6:3).

24. Qoheleth’s famous adage has been variously understood, and many different meanings can certainly be implied by such a dense expression. Cf., inter alia, Norbert Lohfink, “Ist Kohelets hbl-Aussage erkenntnistheoretisch gemeint?,” in Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom, ed. Anton Schoors, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 136 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1998), 41-60; “Zu hbl im Buch Kohelet,” in Studien zu Kohelet, Stuttgarter biblische Aufsatzbände 26 (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1998), 215-257; Douglas B. Miller, “Qohelet’s Symbolic Use of הבל,” Journal of Biblical Literature 117 (1998): 437-454; Michael V. Fox, “The Mean-ing of Hebel for Qohelet,” Journal of Biblical Literature 105 (1986): 409-427.

25. Pierre Van Hecke, “The Verbs ראה and שמע in the Book of Qohelet: A Cognitive-Semantic Perspective,” in The Language of Qohelet in Its Context: Essays in Honour of Prof. A. Schoors on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday, ed. Angelika Berle-jung and Pierre Van Hecke, Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 164 (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 203-220. Cf. also Annette Schellenberg, Erkenntnis als Problem: Qohelet und die alttestamentliche Diskussion um das menschliche Erkennen, Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 188 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002), 161-200; Antoon Schoors, The Preacher Sought to Find Pleasing Words: A Study of the Language of Qoheleth, Part II: Vocabulary, Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 143 (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 59-75.

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Not only is sensorial perception particularly prominent in Qoheleth’s epistemology, even the senses’ pleasure are connected with the experience of knowledge. Looking for wisdom, Qoheleth consciously decided to expe-rience the body’s pleasures, which seem to form part of his exploration of “folly” (Qoh 2:1-3). Such an exploration results in a complex attitude towards the pleasures of life. On the one hand, Qoheleth considers the experience of joy nonsensical. In Qoh 6:9, Qoheleth argues that knowl-edge (“the sight of the eyes”) is better than the wandering of desire (“Bet-ter the object seen than the desire’s roaming”), and in Qoh 7:1 he consid-ers a good reputation much better than a precious ointment (“Better a good name than costly oil”). Such a negative view of life’s pleasure might derive from the dissatisfaction accompanying sensual pleasures (Qoh 6:7: “All toil is for the mouth, yet the appetite is never satisfied”), or by the phenomenon of social injustice connected with the luxurious life of the aristocrats (Qoh 10:16-19). On the other hand, Qoheleth constantly invites one to enjoy life (Qoh 2:24; 3:12-13; 5:18-20; 8:15; 9:7-9), to such an extent that he has often been considered – exaggerating somewhat – “the preacher of joy.”26 For Qoheleth, therefore, the senses can simulta-neously be misleading and revealing of the ultimate truth about the world, namely that everything is hebel, utterly elusive.

Qoheleth’s Epistemology and the Hellenistic SpiritQoheleth’s emphasis on the sensory exploration of the world becomes much more understandable when we consider his Hellenistic milieu. For many Hellenistic schools of philosophy, knowledge was first and fore-most “a corporeal event”27 originating in the encounter between the human body and the bodies of phenomena.

According to Epicurus, for instance, the criteria of truth are sensa-tion, anticipation (or prolepsis), and emotion, the first of which is definitely the most crucial.28 Epicurus argued that the repeated sense- experience of

26. Y. S. Pahk, Il canto della gioia: L’itinerario sapienziale espresso dall’unità let-teraria in Qohelet 8,16–9,10 e il parallelo di Gilgamesh Me. III (Naples: Istituto univer-sitario orientale, 1996); Augustinus Gianto, “The Theme of Enjoyment in Qohelet,” Biblica 73 (1992): 528-532; Norbert Lohfink, “Qoheleth 5:17-19: Revelation by Joy,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 52 (1990): 625-635; Roger N. Whybray, “Qohelet, Preacher of Joy,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 32 (1982): 87-98.

27. Lloyd P. Gerson, Ancient Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 93.

28. Epicurus synthesises his epistemology in his Letter to Herodotus, which can be found in Pamela Mensch and James Miller, eds., Diogenes Laertius: Lives of the Eminent Philosophers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 10, 35-83. For Epicurus’

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the world generates basic concepts, which constitute the pre-conceptions for the creation of further ideas.29 According to Epicurus, our opinions can be either true or false, insofar as they are either confirmed or contra-dicted by sensorial experience.

Stoicism agreed with Epicurus on the crucial role of the senses in the human search for knowledge, as well as on the main purpose of philosophy, namely the search for happiness.30 However, the Stoics dis-agreed with Epicurus on two main points. First, in the Stoics’ view, some representations, such as those of non-corporeal realities, do not derive from the senses, but are created by the mind. Second, sensations require the assent of the mind (“cataleptic representation”), which judges to what extent sensations are reliable and distinguishes between reality and imagination. In this view, the mind’s judgement depends on the sensa-tions’ intensity: the more intense the sensation is, the more compelling and reliable it is considered by the mind.

Whereas Epicureism and Stoicism shared the idea that sensation is the main criterion of truth, the sceptics considered their epistemologies extremely dogmatic.31 Pyrrho argued that neither our perceptions nor our beliefs are able to say anything reliable about the world. In his view, the world is impenetrable to human comprehension. From Pyrrho’s per-spective, since there is no knowledge of the world that can be proved, one needs to abandon any cognitive endeavour, embracing the only pos-sible wise attitude, i.e. the so-called epochè (suspension of judgement). As Pyrrho says: “Is honey really sweet? We shall not say Yes, we shall not say No. Nor shall we say Yes and No, nor even Neither Yes nor No. Rather, we shall say No more sweet than not.”32

Although the senses played a crucial role in the search for knowl-edge, at least for Epicureism and Stoicism, in their view the senses can

epistemology, cf. Elizabeth Asmis, “Epicurean Epistemology,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 260-294; Gerson, Ancient Epistemology, 90-111.

29. Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” in Diogenes Laertius, 10.31,2. 30. For the Stoics’ epistemology, cf. Håvard Løkke, Knowledge and Virtue in Early

Stoicism, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 10 (Dordrecht: Springer Neth-erlands, 2015); Early Stoic Epistemology (Berlin: Springer, 2012); Constance Meinwald, “Ignorance and Opinion in Stoic Epistemology,” Phronesis 50 (2005): 215-231.

31. For the Sceptics’ epistemology, cf. Richard Bett, The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, Cambridge Companions to Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Pyrrho: His Antecedents and His Legacy (Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity, 2000); Robert J. Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

32. Quoted in M. R. Stopper, “Schizzi Pirroniani,” Phronesis 28 (1983): 265-297, here 274.

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also prevent one from gaining knowledge, when one indulges in the senses’ desires. In this regard, the three major Hellenistic schools agree on the necessity of renouncing the senses’ pleasures, or at least of being moderate. While the wise is the one who follows the logos, the fool is the one who has a tumultuous experience of the senses’ pleasures.

Hellenistic epistemology, therefore, presents two groups of ideas. On the one hand, the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers emphasized the senses as the criteria of truth. On the other hand, the Sceptics attempted to demonstrate the inadequacy of an epistemology that relies on sensorial perceptions. Both sides, however, share the same rejection of those opin-ions that are not supported by experience. Finally, Epicureism, Stoicism, and Scepticism consider the senses’ pleasures as something incompatible with the search for knowledge.

When we compare Qoheleth to these Hellenistic schools, both similarities and dissimilarities emerge. Qoheleth certainly shared with Hellenistic epistemology an empirical approach to knowledge, the emphasis on the involvement of the senses and on personal research, as well as the other side of the coin, namely the refusal of relying tout court on traditional teachings. However, contrary to Epicureism and Stoicism, Qoheleth is too sceptical to completely rely on the senses. Contrary to Scepticism, he is too “sensual” to abandon the senses’ longing for knowl-edge. Furthermore, Qoheleth’s epistemological consideration of the senses’ pleasure stands in contrast to Epicureism, Stoicism, and Scepti-cism, according to which the ideal wise person is free from any bodily pleasure. Finally, despite the fact that in Qoheleth’s approach to knowl-edge the sense of the eyesight (through which one looks at phenomena) seems to be more prominent than the sense of hearing (through which one lends an ear to testimonial knowledge), the testimony of tradition still plays a remarkable role, as the following paragraph will show.

Qoheleth and Ancient Israel’s TestimonyThe extent to which Qoheleth draws on Ancient Israel’s testimonial knowledge cannot be determined merely by looking at hypothetical direct quotations of biblical wisdom in Qoheleth’s book. Several studies have suggested that Qoheleth explicitly quotes biblical wisdom in order to either support his statements or criticize his tradition.33 Fox, however,

33. According to Gordis, for instance, Qoheleth quotes traditional wisdom in Qoh 4:5-6; 5:2; 7:6; 10:18; 11:1. Whybray suggests that biblical quotations can be found in Qoh 2:1; 4:5-6; 7:5-6a; 9:17; 10:2, 12. Lohfink adds Qoh 1:18; 2:2; 4:5-6;

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rightly pointed out that neither Qoheleth nor scholars provided objective criteria in order to distinguish what is original to Qoheleth and what derives from other biblical books.34 The fact that Qoheleth draws on and is in critical dialogue with Ancient Israel’s testimonial knowledge can be based on (1) some of Qoheleth’s statements, (2) the conclusive com-ments to the book, and (3) intertextual connections between Qoheleth and other biblical books.

(1) In Qoh 7:5, Qoheleth clearly says that it is better to listen to the sages’ criticism than to the fools’ songs (“Better attend to the repri-mand of the wise than listen to a song sung by a fool”). On at least three occasions, Qoheleth’s reference to ḥokmāh, “wisdom/knowledge,” may indicate the transmitted wisdom in which he has been educated and by00h he investigated the world. This is the case in Qoh 1:13 (“I applied my mind to seek and to search out by wisdom everything that happens under heaven”), Qoh 2:3 (“I searched with my mind how to cheer my body with wine – my mind still guiding me by wisdom), and Qoh 7:23 (“All this I have tested by wisdom”). Although the lexeme ḥokmāh has a very broad “meaning potential,”35 it cannot be excluded that by “wis-dom” Qoheleth means his education.36 Even if Qoheleth is speaking ironically, as Bartholomew suggested,37 the testimony of his cultural

6:11–9:8. Cf. Robert Gordis, “Quotations in Wisdom Literature,” Jewish Quarterly Review 30 (1939): 123-147; Roger N. Whybray, “The Identification and Use of Quota-tions in Ecclesiastes,” in Congress Volume: Vienna 1980, ed. John A. Emerton, Supple-ments to Vetus Testamentum 32 (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 433-451; Norbert Lohfink, Kohelet, Neue Echter Bibel: Altes Testament 1 (Würzburg: Echter, 1980). For the state of the art, cf. Franco Piotti, “Rivisitando alcuni studi sull’ordine dei pensieri in Qoheleth,” Bibbia e Oriente 57 (2015): 81-116; “Lavoro e pigrizia in Qo 4,4-6 alla luce del libro dei Proverbi,” Bibbia e Oriente 55 (2013): 185-216. Scholarly research on the presence of biblical quotations in Qoheleth certainly has the merit of trying to solve the problems of Qoheleth’s apparent contradictions without speculating on conjectural redactional layers. Nevertheless, not only did this research produce more conjectures, it also overlooked that what seems to be contradictory in Qoheleth’s thoughts might be read as the mirror of the many contradictions of life, to which Qoheleth gives voice.

34. Michael V. Fox, A Time to Tear Down and a Time to Build Up: A Rereading of Ecclesiastes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 20-23.

35. In cognitive semantics, the notion of “meaning potential” refers to all the meanings that a single lexeme can potentially convey. Cf. Jens Allwood, “Meaning Potential and Context: Some Consequences for the Analysis of Variation in Meaning,” in Cognitive Approaches to Lexical Semantics, ed. Hubert Cuyckens et al., Cognitive Lin-guistics Research 23 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003), 29-65.

36. Luca Mazzinghi, Ho cercato e ho esplorato: Studi su Qohelet, Biblica (Bologna: Dehoniane, 2001), 166.

37. Craig G. Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, Baker Commentary on the Old Testa-ment: Wisdom and Psalms (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 123, 131, 264.

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heritage is presented as forming part of the “stock-in trade” of Qoheleth’s personal exploration of the world.

(2) In Qoh 12:9, Qoheleth is said to have thoroughly listened to many proverbs: “Furthermore, because Qoheleth was wise, he constantly taught the people knowledge, he listened, analysed, and corrected many proverbs.”38 Qoh 12:9 forms part of the so-called “epilogue” (Qoh 12:9-14), which scholars usually attribute to one or more external editors.39 The conclusion of the book of Qoheleth seems to many exegetes an editorial attempt to “tame” the book, making Qoheleth more acceptable and in agreement with biblical wisdom, even at the price of betraying the teacher.40 I wonder, however, how a few lines could have the power to make a “scandalous” book acceptable. Besides, the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament is full of controversial voices that Israel’s tradition kept, with-out bothering to even them out. Hence, rather than being a betrayal of Qoheleth, the epilogue might be considered a hermeneutical support to help the reader to correctly understand Qoheleth, namely as a sage pro-foundly embedded in Israel’s wisdom tradition and within the horizon of Israel’s faith in yhwh. The three verbal forms used by Qoh 12:9, namely wǝ’izzēn, “he weighed/considered carefully” wǝḥiqqēr, “he searched out/investigated/explored,” and tiqqēn, “he made straight/corrected/edited,” suggest that Qoheleth did draw on Ancient Israel’s testimonial knowledge. At the same time, the three verbs suggest that wisdom is not something that the sages just pass on to their disciples. Wisdom is a

38. I understand (1) wǝyōtēr ýas an adverb, syntactically separated by the rest, as the disjunctive accent suggests, (2) ‘ôd as expressing a continuous action (cf. Gen 46:29), and (3) tiqqēn as expressing the activity of correcting/making straight (cf. Qoh 1:15; 7:13).

39. For the scholarly debate on the so-called “epilogue” of Qoheleth, cf. inter alia Luca Mazzinghi, “Date da un solo pastore (Qo 12,11): L’epilogo del Qohelet e il pro-blema dell’ispirazione,” Ricerche Storico Bibliche 12 (2000): 59-74; Craig G. Bartho-lomew, Reading Ecclesiastes: Old Testament Exegesis and Hermeneutical Theory, Analecta Biblica 139 (Rome: Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1998), 158-171; Jean Marie Auwers, “Problèmes d’interprétation de l’épilogue de Qohélet,” in Qohelet in the Context of Wis-dom, ed. Schoors, 267-282; Norbert Lohfink, “Les épilogues du livre de Qohélet et les débuts du canon,” in Ouvrir les Écritures: Mélanges offerts à Paul Beauchamp, ed. Pietro Bovati and Roland Meynet, Lectio Divina 162 (Paris: Cerf, 1995), 77-96; Michael V. Fox, “Frame-Narrative and Composition in the Book of Qoheleth,” Hebrew Union College Annual 49 (1977): 83-106; Gerald H. Wilson, “‘The Words of the Wise’: The Intent and Significance of Qohelet 12:9-14,” Journal of Biblical Literature 103 (1984): 175-192; Gerald T. Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qohelet as Theological Commentary,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 39 (1977): 182-189.

40. James L. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes: A Commentary, Old Testament Library (Lon-don: SCM, 1988), 190.

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process and a relational matter, which consists of careful listening, per-sonal investigation, and even correction of what has been transmitted.

(3) Finally, although the intertextual relationships between Qoheleth and other biblical texts still need to be thoroughly and extensively researched, some scholars have already suggested many connections.41 The book of Qoheleth refers to the Torah/Pentateuch,42 as well as to other wisdom books, especially to the book of Proverbs43 and Job,44 and to the so-called “doctrine of retribution.”45 The relationship between Qoheleth and the psalms has also been noted.46

I shall here provide only a few examples concerning the concept of God to show how profoundly Ancient Israel’s testimony imbued the book of Qoheleth with its knowledge. Qoheleth’s theology is one of the most controversial topics in the book since, at first sight, the God of Qoheleth appears to be very different from the God of Israel.47

41. Katharine J. Dell and Will Kynes, eds., Reading Ecclesiastes Intertextually, Library of Hebrew Bible / Old Testament Studies 587 (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

42. José Vilchez Lindez, Ecclesiastes o Qohelet, Nueva Biblia Española: Sapien-ciales 3 (Estella: Verbo Divino, 1994), 91-92; Charles C. Forman, “Koheleth’s Use of Genesis,” Journal of Semitic Studies 5 (1960): 256-263.

43. Peter T. H. Hatton, Contradiction in the Book of Proverbs: The Deep Waters of Counsel, Society for Old Testament Study Monographs (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 117-136; Thomas Krüger, Kohelet, Biblischer Kommentar Altes Testament 19 (Neu-kirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2000); Christian Klein, Kohelet und die Weisheit Israels: Eine formgeschichtliche Studie, Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten und Neuen Testament 132 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994).

44. Frank Crüsemann, “The Unchangeable World: The ‘Crisis of Wisdom’ in Koheleth,” in God of the Lowly: Socio-Historical Interpretations of the Bible, ed. Willy Schottroff (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984), 57-77; “Hiob und Kohelet,” in Werden und Wirken des Alten Testaments: Festschrift für Claus Westermann zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Rainer Albertz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 373-393.

45. Horst Dietrich Preuss, Einführung in die alttestamentliche Weisheitsliteratur, Kohlhammer Urban-Taschenbücher 383 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1987), 114-136; Hartmut Gese, “The Crisis of Wisdom in Kohelet,” in Theodicy in the Old Testament, ed. James L. Crenshaw, Issues in Religion and Theology 4 (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1983), 141-153. These authors argue that Qoheleth reacts against the Proverbs’ mechan-ical view of the correspondence between actions and consequences. For a different, more convincing reading, cf. Raymond C. Van Leeuwen, “Wealth and Poverty: System and Contradiction in Proverbs,” Hebrew Studies 33 (1992): 25-36.

46. Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 93; Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Poetry (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 68-70.

47. Among the many contributions on Qoheleth’s theology, see Carey Walsh, “Theological Trace in Qoheleth,” Biblical Theology Bulletin 42 (2012): 12-17; Antoon Schoors, “Theodicy in Qohelet,” in Theodicy in the World of the Bible, ed. Johannes C. de Moor and Antti Laato (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 375-409; Vittoria D’Alario, “Struttura e teologia del libro del Qohelet,” in Il libro del Qohelet: Tradizione, redazione, teologia, ed. Giuseppe Bellia and Angelo Passaro (Milan: Paoline, 2001), 256-275; Mazzinghi’s chapter entitled “Dio e il temere Dio,” in Mazzinghi, Ho cercato e ho esplorato, 409-432;

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Notoriously, Qoheleth never refers to the divine by using the tetragram yhwh, sacred to Israel. Except for Qoh 12:1, in which the divine is called “Creator,” Qoheleth always uses the more general term ’ĕlōhîm, “God.” Nor does Qoheleth ever employ phrases such as “God of your/our fathers/ancestors,” “God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” and themes such as the exodus, the covenant, the conquest of the land, etc. that are typical of Ancient Israel’s theological language. In the book, the divine is never addressed as a “Thou”: Qoheleth does speak of God, but never to God, who does not talk to him either. The divine never appears to be a salvific presence, at least not in the terms in which yhwh is involved in Ancient Israel’s fortunes and misfortunes in much of biblical litera-ture. As Gorssen put it, Qoheleth gives the impression of being “non sans Dieu, mais sans un Dieu de salut,”48 an idea that is very remote from the core of Ancient Israel’s faith. The gulf between the divine and the human seems to be unbridgeable for Qoheleth: “God is in heaven, and you upon earth” (Qoh 5:1).

When we consider the relationship between Qoheleth’s theology and Ancient Israel’s testimony about God, however, we need to remem-ber that in the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament there is not such a thing as “one theology” but there are many, different theological traditions.49 Ancient Israel’s way of thinking/talking of God is inherently multiform and open to novelty. In spite of its uniqueness, Qoheleth’s theology bears clear signs of his community’s many theological discourses. For instance, Qoheleth’s idea that God is the Creator and the giver of life (Qoh 3:11, 14; 7:14, 29; 8:15, 17; 12:1, 7) is part of Ancient Israel’s most “mature testimony” about yhwh, as Brueggemann says.50 The positive view of eating, drinking, and enjoying life as the gift of God (Qoh 2:24; 3:13; 5:17, 18, 19; 8:15; 9:7, 9; 11:9) is very much in line

Roger N. Whybray, “Qohelet as a Theologian,” in Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom, ed. Schoors, 239-265; Alexander A. Fischer, Skepsis oder Furcht Gottes? Studien zur Kom-position und Theologie des Buches Kohelet, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 247 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997); Lavoie’s chapter entitled “La divinité (ha) ‘elōhîm dans le Qohélet,” in Jean-Jacques Lavoie, La pensée du Qohélet: Étude exégétique et intertextuelle, Héritage et projet 49 (Québec: Fides, 1992), 227-244; von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, 292-306; Loretz’s chapter entitled “Das Verhältnis zwischen Gott und Menschen,” in Oswald Loretz, Qohelet und der alte Orient: Untersuchung zu Stil und theologischer Thematik des Buches Qohelet (Freiburg: Herder, 1964), 277-289.

48. Leo Gorssen, “La cohérence de la conception de Dieu dans l’Ecclésiaste,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 46 (1970): 282-324, here 314.

49. George Fischer, Theologien des Alten Testaments, Neuer Stuttgarter Kommen-tar: Altes Testament 31 (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 2012).

50. Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1997), 145.

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with the idea of the goodness of creation that one can find in many biblical passages (e.g. Gen 1:29; 2:9; Deut 7:13). Qoheleth’s view of God as judge (Qoh 3:17; 5:5; 11:9; 12:14) is probably one of the most conventional ways of picturing God in biblical literature. Suffice it to mention a few psalms, such as Pss 1:5-6; 7:7, 8, 11; 9:8, 18; 82:2-4; 96:10, 13; 82:2-4. Qoheleth’s invitation to “fear/revere” God (Qoh 5:6; 7:18; 8:12, 13; 12:13) echoes one of the major Leitmotifs of biblical wisdom tradition.51 That God tests humans (Qoh 3:18) profoundly belongs to Ancient Israel’s notion of the divine (e.g. Gen 22; Exod 16:4-5; Deut 8:2; Isa 48:10; Jer 12:3; Ezek 21:13; Pss 7:9; 11:5; Job 7:17-19, etc.). All this evidence suggests that Ancient Israel’s testimonial knowledge about God did play an important role in Qoheleth’s way of talking/thinking about the divine. At the same time, Qoheleth was not a passive recipient of his community’s testimony; on the contrary, he processed and profoundly reworked the received testimony in his own way. For instance, Qoheleth has certainly radicalized the transcendence of the divine, to such an extent that in the book God appears to be an over-powering, arbitrary, and unreachable reality (Qoh 3:14-15; 5:2; 6:10; 7:13-14), whose way of ruling over the world is ungraspable to the human mind (Qoh 2:24-26; 3:17; 6:1-2; 9:1). As Qoheleth says, “You do not understand how the wind blows, or how the embryo grows in a woman’s womb: no more can you understand the work of God, who makes everything” (Qoh 11:5). Furthermore, as Mazzinghi has pointed out, Qoheleth has radically reviewed the traditional concept of “fearing God.”52 In one of Ancient Israel’s theological traditions “fearing God” was associated with the observance of the Torah, on which human hap-piness and success ultimately depend (e.g. Deut 5:29; 6:2, 24; 8:6; 13:5; 17:19; 31:12). This view is also present in the book of Proverbs, although in a much more nuanced way than many scholars often assume, as Van Leeuwen has shown.53 Qoheleth seems to react to such a simplistic way of looking at both the world and God, since experience suggests something else to him “upright people are treated as though they were wicked and wicked people are treated as though they were upright” (Qoh 8:14). In Qoheleth, “fearing God” does not ipso facto lead to wis-dom either, as for example in Proverbs, but it mainly means to accept that God and the divine plans are not graspable.

51. See the entire chapter “Revering yhwh” in John Goldingay, Old Testament Theology, vol. 3: Israel’s Life (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2009), 75-99.

52. Mazzinghi, Ho cercato e ho esplorato, 427-432.53. Van Leeuwen, “Wealth and Poverty,” 25-36.

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In sum, whether Qoheleth rejects, corrects, radicalizes, focuses on specific aspects of his cultural heritage, he is not to be considered an individualistic explorer of the world. His empirical approach to phenom-ena is certainly unique with respect to biblical tradition. His view of sensory pleasures as means for acquiring knowledge is novel with respect to the book of Proverbs, which very often warns against uncontrolled desires (e.g. Prov 20:1; 21:10, 17; 23:20, 21, 31-33). The results of his research may also lead to a different Weltanschauung, in which there are no definite criteria of truth, the human beings struggle between their inclination towards the joy of life and their profound feeling that life actually seems to make no sense, and God is an elusive presence. Nev-ertheless, Qoheleth is still engaged with Ancient Israel’s testimonial knowledge, and his empirical approach to wisdom does not prevent him from carefully listening to the already established and consolidated knowledge.

Conclusion

According to an ancient adage, “nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu” (“there is nothing in the mind that has not previously been in the senses”).54 In this view, the search for knowledge is pro-foundly characterized by the individual attempt to understand the world through sensory perception. The individual, however, is not alone, so to speak, in his/her encounter with the world. A set of already acquired and transmitted information about the world mediates his/her exploration of reality. This is certainly true from the perspective of biblical wisdom literature.

Whereas many scholars have emphasized the empirical aspect of the biblical search for wisdom, Ancient Israel’s testimonial knowledge actu-ally plays a major role. This even applies to the book of Qoheleth. Qoheleth certainly has his own way of exploring the world and his own ideas about human life, which partly derive from his Hellenistic milieu. As Lohfink wrote, “The book of Qoheleth is the most transparent place, within the Bible, where Israel meets Greek philosophy.”55 Nevertheless, Ancient Israel’s testimonial knowledge does not disappear from Qoheleth’s horizon of research. Although Qoheleth is often seen as

54. Paul F. Cranefield, “On the Origin of the Phrase ‘nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu’,” Journal of the History of Medicine 25 (1970): 77-80.

55. Lohfink, Kohelet, 14.

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opposing biblical wisdom, he should rather be considered one of its “polyphonic voices,” as O’Dowd put it.56 Certainly, being part of a polyphonic choir simultaneously implies the interconnection between different voices and the singularity of each voice. On the one hand, Qoheleth’s constant engagement, however critical, with Ancient Israel’s testimonial knowledge makes Qoheleth profoundly connected with his community’s testimony. On the other hand, his Hellenistic approach to the investigation of phenomena and his personal re-elaboration of both his own experience and his community’s testimony makes Qoheleth Qoheleth. Ancient Israel’s testimonial knowledge is an “unfinished busi-ness,” inherently open to new thoughts and new views, rather than a monolithic block of untouchable teachings, which only need to be trans-mitted and accepted. Qoheleth is a courageous explorer of the world, who dares to stand on the shoulders of the giants (alias Ancient Israel’s tradition) to see more and further or, at least, to see aspects of the world that those giants were not able to see.57 Although, at this point, Qoheleth would probably conclude this paper by saying that this is also hebel and chasing the wind.

Danilo Verde is a postdoctoral fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) at the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, KU Leuven. He obtained the doctorate in Theology defending a dissertation on the warlike metaphors in the Song of Songs (KU Leuven, 2018). He co-chairs the EABS research unit “Metaphor in the Bible” and is member of the steering committee of the SBL research unit “Metaphor Theory and the Hebrew Bible.” He pub-lished several book chapters and articles in academic journals and series, such as Biblica and Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium. His research interests include Biblical Hebrew Poetry, Biblical Wisdom Literature, Literary Criticism, Cognitive Linguistics, Gender Studies, and Trauma Studies. He is currently working on the relationship between cultural trauma, poetry, and the body in the Hebrew Psalter (FWO postdoctoral mandate, 2018-2021). Address: KU Leuven, Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, Sint-Michielsstraat 4, box 3101, BE-3000 Leuven (Belgium). Email: danilo.verde@kuleuven.be.

56. O’Dowd, The Wisdom of Torah, 143.57. For the history of the aphorism “standing on the shoulders of giants,” cf. Rob-

ert Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript (New York: The Free Press, 1965).