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The 16th Sustainment Brigade: Supporting the DrawdownThe Commander’s Emergency Response ProgramSustaining the Army’s First Advise and Assist Brigade
WWW.ALU.ARMY.MIL/ALOG
MAY–JUNE 2010 FORMERLY ARMY LOGISTICIAN
Stability Operationsin Iraq
Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.PB700-10-03Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy
AParadigmShiftatNTC:CSSBsThatThink“InsidetheBox” —MajorJohnM.Ruths
SustainmentintheArmy’sFirstAdviseandAssistBrigade —LieutenantColonelDavidWilson
TheCommander’sEmergencyResponseProgram: SynergisticResultsThroughTraining—MajorMarkW.Lee
MDMPforSustainmentUnits—MajorDanielMisigoy
The 16Th SuSTainmenT Brigade in iraq
The16thSustainmentBrigadeinIraq:Supporting theDrawdown—ColonelMartinB.Pitts andLieutenantColonelRobertS.Mott
FuelSupportatContingencyOperatingBaseSpeicher —LieutenantColonelVincentC.Nwafor, SergeantFirstClassThomasE.Harrell,Jr., andStaffSergeantPaulaMiller
SharetheRoad:ConvoyEscort —MajorKrisA.Kough,CAARNG, andCaptainCurtisA.GollerIII,CAARNG
LandWarNet:IsYourITWorkforceReady? —ChiefWarrantOfficer(W–3)DannieWalters
PayingAgents:TheGood,theBad,andtheUgly —MajorBillKeltner
LogisticsSupportinanAustereEnvironment: TheMissiontoSinjar—CaptainJackA.Tyer,TNARNG
ResourcingandTrainingaLevelIIILogisticsTraining andAdvisoryTeam—LieutenantColonelCarlosE.Lopez
PB700–10–03VOLUME42ISSUE3MAY–JUNE2010www.alu.army.mil/alog
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Cover:SincetheU.S.-Iraqsecurityagreementtookeffecton1January2009,U.S.andcoalitionforcesinIraqhavetransitionedtostabilityoperations.ThisenvironmentischaracterizedbyadrawdowninU.S.trooplevels,partnershipswithIraqiunitsforbothtrainingandjointoperations,andsupportofhumanitarianreliefandreconstructionefforts.Thearticlesbeginningonpages7and10andtheseriesofarticlesprofilingthe16thSustainmentBrigadebeginningonpage18 examinethesustainmentofstabilityoperationsinIraq.Inthecoverphoto,ajointU.S.andIraqiconvoylinesupbeforeleavingthestagingareaatContingencyOperatingBaseSpeichertodeliverIraqitextbookstoschoolsaroundSalahadDinprovince.(Photo by SSG Raul Elliott)
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TheHumanResourcesOperationsBranch —CaptainRodenA.Carrido
BuildingtheLocalEconomyatQ-West —StaffSergeantPatriciaMcCarthy,WAARNG
TacticalGroundReportingImprovesOperationalPicture —CaptainSpencerBrown
UnitContractingProblemsDuringOverseasTrainingExercises —MajorWilliamT.Cundy
TrainingWithIndustry—LieutenantColonelMarshallN.Ramsey
ATRADOCBestPractice:AVirtualWaytoKeep TrainingCurrent—DonaldD.Copley,Jr.
DeployedArmyBands—ChiefWarrantOfficer(W–5)JohnS.Fraser
TheGlobalizationofMilitaryLogistics —MajorChristineM.Schverak
JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
1006203
BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman
Major General James E. ChambersCommander
ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand
MembersLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson
DeputyChiefofStaff,G-4DepartmentoftheArmy
Lieutenant General William N. PhillipsPrincipalMilitaryDeputy
totheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology
Lieutenant General James H. PillsburyDeputyCommandingGeneral
ArmyMaterielCommand
Lieutenant General Edgar E. Stanton IIIMilitaryDeputyforBudget
AssistantSecretaryoftheArmyFinancialManagementandComptroller
Lieutenant General Eric B. SchoomakerTheSurgeonGeneral
Ex OfficioBrigadier General Jesse R. Cross
TheQuartermasterGeneral
Brigadier General Lynn A. CollyarChiefofOrdnance
Brigadier General Brian R. LayerChiefofTransportation
Brigadier General Mark A. McAlisterCommander
ArmySoldierSupportInstitute
Brigadier General Joseph L. BassCommandingGeneral
ArmyExpeditionaryContractingCommand
Major General James K. GilmanCommandingGeneral
ArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand
ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITYColonel Shelley A. Richardson
President
Barbara G. MroczkowskiVicePresident
STAFFRobert D. Paulus,Editor
Kari J. Chenault,AssociateEditorApril K. Morgan,AssistantEditor
Julianne E. Cochran,AssistantEditorLouanne E. Birkner,AdministrativeAssistant
GraphicsartsandlayoutbyRCW Communication Design, Inc.
Thismediumisapprovedfortheofficialdissem-inationofmaterialdesignedtokeepindividualswithintheArmyknowledgeableofcurrentandemergingdevelopmentswithintheirareasofexpertiseforthepurposeofenhancingtheirpro-fessionaldevelopment.
ByOrderoftheSecretaryoftheArmy:
GEORGEW.CASEY,JRGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy
ChiefofStaff
Official:
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Army Sustainment(ISSN0004–2528)isabimonthlyprofessionalbulletinpublishedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversity,2401QuartersRoad,FortLee,Virginia23801–1705.Periodicalspost-ageispaidatPetersburg,VA23804–9998,andatadditionalmailingoffices.
Mission:Army SustainmentistheDepart-mentoftheArmy’sofficialprofessionalbulletinonsustainment.Itsmissionistopublishtimely,authoritativeinformationonArmyandDefensesustainmentplans,programs,policies,opera-tions,procedures,anddoctrineforthebenefitofallsustainmentpersonnel.Itspurposeistoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofinformationandexpressionoforiginal,creative,innovativethoughtonsustainmentfunctions.
Disclaimer:Articlesexpressopinionsofauthors,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies,anddonotchangeorsupersede
officialArmypublications.Themasculinepro-nounmayrefertoeithergender.
Reprints:ArticlesmaybereprintedwithcredittoArmy Sustainmentandtheauthor(s),exceptwhencopyrightisindicated.
Distribution:Unitsmayobtaincopiesthroughtheinitialdistributionsystem(DAForm12series).Privatedomesticsubscriptionsareavailableat$23.00peryearbywritingtotheSuperintendentofDocuments,P.O.Box371954,Pittsburgh,PA15250–7954,orbyvisitinghttp://bookstore.gpo.govontheWeb.Forcreditcardorders,call(866)512–1800.SubscribersshouldsubmitaddresschangesdirectlytoArmy Sustain-ment(seeaddressbelow).Army SustainmentalsoisavailableontheWorldWideWebathttp://www.alu.army.mil/alog.
Postmaster:Sendaddresschangesto:EDITORARMYSUSTAINMENT/ALU/2401QUARTERSRD/FTLEEVA23801–1705.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS
HEADLINES
WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT
COMMENTARY
FOCUS
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS
HEADLINES
WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT
COMMENTARY
FOCUS
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2 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
AParadigmShiftatNTC:CSSBsThatThink“InsidetheBox”
by Major john M. ruths
ortCarson’s68thCombatSustainmentSupportBattalion(CSSB)completedaNationalTrainingCenter(NTC)rotationatFortIrwin,California,inJune2009 insupportofthe4thInfantryBrigadeCombatTeam(IBCT),1stInfantryDivision.The4thIBCT’sNTCrotationwasfocusedonOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF),andalthoughthe68thCSSBwasdeployingtoAfghanistanlaterintheyear,itfollowedtheOIFscenariowithoutanyproblems.
Duringmissionpreparation,the68thCSSB’slead-ersdiscoveredthatnoCSSBhadpreviouslycompletedarotation“inthebox,”meaning,locatedamongthemaneuverunitsinthemiddleofthefight.Instead,allCSSBshadoccupiedandoperatedoutofapartofFortIrwinthatisoftenreferredtoasthe“dustbowl,”which
isnownamedLogisticsSupportArea(LSA)Warrior.Gettingoutofthedustbowlandinsidetheboxisthesubjectofthisarticle.
TrainingatNTC“Thiswasgoingtobeourcapstonetrainingevent,”
saidLieutenantColonelThomasRivard,the68thCSSB’scommander.“Theeffortweputintoittoplan,prepare,execute,andassesswastremendous.Ourtrainingobjectiveswerebold,andthetrainingpayoffwasirreplaceable.It’smycontentionthatwecreatedthiseffectbydoingsomethingwhichhadnotoccurredbefore—fightingtotrainasa‘competitive’unit.”
Inthiscase,theterm“competitive”meansbeinglocatedforwardofthelightline,requiredtousemultiple
FThe 60th Ordnance Company trains at the combat outpost live-fire range.
MAY–jUNE 2010 3
integratedlaserengagementsystemgear,andbeingexposedtothevari-oustheater-replicatedbattleeffectsfoundatNTC—justlikeanyunitinthe4thIBCT.
Trainingatacombattrainingcenter(CTC)likeNTCisakeyele-mentofthetrainingguidancefromthe68thCSSB’shigherheadquar-ters,the43dSustainmentBrigade.Thattrainingguidanceinstructsunitsto“fighttotrain”ataCTCbeforedeployment.TheCSSBtookthisguidancefurtherbyapplyingittoallofitsformations,regardlessofdeploymentorders.
TheobjectivesofaCTCrota-tionforasustainmentcompanyorbattalionaretoexecutesituationaltrainingexercisesandfull-spectrumoperationstodeveloplethalsmallunitsthatcaneffectivelyshoot,move,communicate,andfightinlogisticsconvoysandalsotoimprovesmall-unitcommand,con-trol,communications,computers,andintelligenceprocesses.
Attheendoftherotation,theunitheadquartersreceivesfeedbackabouthowwelltheunitperformsthefollowingfunctions:command-ingandcontrollingtheirsubordi-nateformations,leveragingArmyBattleCommandSystemsandothertechnologies,conductingstaffpro-cessesandbattledrills,andexecutingthesixrequiredfunctionsofatacticaloperationscenter(TOC).
TrainingInsidetheBoxBecauseLSAWarriorislocatedonthemainportion
ofFortIrwin,unitsthereareimmunetotheopposingforceandthecounterinsurgencyenvironmentofthemaintrainingarea.Notonlydoesthisenvironmentlackaninteractiveenemy,significantdistractersexistthatdonotexistinthebox,includingtheusualvarietyofinstallationrestaurants,shopping,andentertainmentvenues.(Clearly,itcanbedifficulttofocusontrain-ingwithaStarbucksandpostexchangenearby.)AtLSAWarrior,thebattlestaffalsolacksthesituationalawarenessthatunitshavewhileinthebox.
“Asthebattalioncommander,”saidRivard,“Iwantedourrotationtohavethesamefeelasadeploy-ment,andbeinginthemaneuverboxalongwiththeIBCTwesupporteddidjustthat—andevenmore.Withourimmersionintotheenvironment,Iwasbetterabletoincorporatethefourelementsof
battlecommand,whicharetovisualize,understand,describe,anddirect.”
Theunitbenefitedfromapartnershipwiththe4thIBCTaswellasitssupportunit,the701stBrigadeSupportBattalion(BSB).Infact,thestaffcoordinationthatoccurredlaterallyandverticallywasanunintendedbenefitforeveryone.
CommandersofCSSBsthathadpreviouslyrotatedthroughNTChadsetuponLSAWarrior,justbehindtheechelons-above-brigade(EAB)buildinglocatedadjacenttotherotationalunitbivouacarea.Therea-sonsbehindthiscourseofactionincludedaccesstotheEABcommunicationsarchitecture,proximitytotheEABpersonnelandtheirbriefings,andsimplicityofcommandandcontrol.
AtNTC,EABpersonnelprovidethelogisticsassetsthatarenotresidentwiththeBSBsaswellasthesus-tainmentpushesthataBSBcouldexpectintheater.TheEABisexpertlyposturedtoprovidemostclassesofsupply,water,andtrashremovalforrotatingunits,andtheydosowithcontractorsoperatingmilitary
Soldiers from the 60th Ordnance Company handle ammunition at Forward Operating Base Reno.
4 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
vehicles.WhenaCSSBispartofanNTCrotation,itcanexpecttocommandandcontroltheEABassetsandassumealogisticssupportmissiononageneralsupportbasis.Whereyouchoosetoconductyourcom-mandandcontroldeterminesthetrainingpayoff.
Howthe68thCSSBTrainedatNTCBrigadierGeneralRobertB.Abrams,thecommand-
inggeneralofNTC,hasseveralaxiomsthatheprovidestocommanders.Threeofthoseaxiomscometomind.First,traineverydaylikeyourlifedependsonit.Sec-ond,getbettereveryday;bereadyforthefirstdayofanactualdeploymentbythetimeyourunitreachestrainingday14.Andthird,beconfidentinyourself,yourunit,andyourleaderstodeployandsucceedinthefirst30daysincountry.InternalizingAbram’sguidanceremindsusthatCSSBs“fighttotrain”inthebox.
Normally,theBCTheadquarters,BSB,andbrigadespecialtroopsbattalionoccupyNTC’slargestforwardoperatingbase(FOB),whichisFOBKing.FOBKing
isalsowhereaCSSBheadquartersbelongs.IfnotatFOBKing,thentheCSSBheadquartersshouldoccupyFOBSantaFe(usuallynotactivated),butonlyifanothertacticalforceoccupiesthisareaoriftheheadquarterscanbringitsownCisco-powerednetwork(CPN)forcommunications.
ForceprotectionisnotsomuchtheissueasisaccesstoaCPNorjointnetworknode,whichallowstheunittoseethedigitalcommonoperationalpicture.Tomaximizetraining,unitstendtobelenientaboutcertainaspectsofphysicalsecurity.Basically,thismeansthatunitsmanonlytheentrycontrolpointandassumeaguardforceontheperimeter.
Thetrainingobjectiveslistedinthe68thCSSB’sletterofintent,aswellthoseoftheCSSB’ssubordinate60thOrdnanceCompany,describedwhatitwantedfortherotation.TheCSSBaskedtoreceivetraininginthefollowingareas:❏ Convoylivefire.❏ Commandandcontrolwithdigitalsystems.
A 68th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion convoy security element prepares to leave Forward Operating Base King on an escort mission.
MAY–jUNE 2010 5
❏ CommandandcontrolofEABlogisticsconvoysusingconvoysecuritydetachmentelements.
❏ Establishmentofalogisticssupportarea.❏ Planninganddirectingsustainmentoperations.❏ Reactingtoimprovisedexplosivedevices.❏ Rulesofengagement.❏ Escalationofforcemeasures.
TheCSSBalsoaddedvarioustacticalammunitiontasksforthe60thOrdnanceCompany.Thebattalioncommander’sletterofintentconvincedseniortrainersthattheCSSBbelongedatFOBKingandnotatLSAWarriorandledthemtoapprovetheparadigmshift.
TheCSSB’sbattalionchaplainworkedwithsevenotherunitchaplainsandprovidedbattlefieldministryatthemedicalfacilityandmortuaryaffairscollectionpointlocatedattheFOBandtendedtothespiritualneedsofthenotionalcasualties.ThebattalionS–2syn-chronizedtheCSSB’sintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissanceeffortswiththoseofthe4thIBCTS–2andfocusedonpatternanalysisandgeographicintel-ligenceanalysis,includingworkingwiththechangedetectionoverlaysprovidedbytheunmannedaerialvehicleassets.TheserelationshipsprovedfruitfulandtaughttheCSSBtheimportanceofestablishingrela-tionshipswithsupportedunitsintheater.
Augmentingthe68thCSSB’sCapabilitiesDeployingtoNTCwithonlyaheadquarterscreatesa
challengingtrainingenvironmentforanybattalion,and
suchasmallforceprovideslittlebenefittotherota-tionalBCT.ByaddingassetsreferredtoasIBUs(ittybittyunits)totheArmyForceGenerationprocess,aCSSBheadquarterscanpossesscapabilitiesthataremoreinlinewithtraditionalplanning,preparing,executing,andassessing,whicharepartofSoldier,leader,staff,andcollectivetasks.
Wheneverpossible,CSSBsshouldbringhome-sta-tionunitswiththemtoNTC,andifnoneareavailable,theCSSBshouldrequestthemfromotherlocations.Fewwouldarguethateverylogisticsunitintheconti-nentalUnitedStatesshouldrotatethroughaCTConceeachyear,whethertheyhaveadeploymentscheduledornot.Bydoingso,commandersprovideacapstonetrainingexercisetoaunitthatwouldnototherwisehaveanannualtrainingfocus.
UsingenablerslikeIBUscreatesaverticalcommandandcontrolstructurethatallowstheCSSBheadquarterstoobserveitssystems,collectobjectivefeedback,andthenmakeadjustmentstofuturetrainingbasedonthisfeedback.Inthisway,theobjectiveofthetrainingrota-tionistoexercisethebattalionasalearningorganiza-tionandnotmerelyaunitthatoccupiesasiteatNTCtoexecuteroutinelogisticssupport.
AnexampleofeffectivelyintegratinganIBUwastheadditionofthe60thOrdnanceCompany,whichprovidedthe4thIBCTandthe701stBSBwithammunitioncapabilitywhileprovidingarealistictrainingopportunityforthesmallerunit.The60th
During its National Training Center rotation, the 68th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion’s tactical operations center was located at Forward Operating Base King.
6 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
OrdnanceCompany’scommanderandfirstsergeantestablishedanumberofbattle-focusedtrainingopportunitiesfortheirmilitaryoccupationalspecialty89B(ammunitionspecialist)and89A(ammunitionstockcontrolandaccountingspecialist)SoldiersattheFortIrwinammunitionsupplypoint(ASP),theBCT’sfieldASP,andtheammunitiontransferandholdingpointatFOBReno.
Atalllocations,the60thOrdnanceCompanyexpertlyreceived,stored,andissuedliveammunitionforthe4thIBCT’slive-fireevents.Inadditiontohan-dling4tonsofammunitionatFOBReno,theadditionofSoldiersandleadersalleviateda3-monthbacklogatFortIrwin’sASP.
Addingonlythe60thOrdnanceCompanywasnotwithoutitschallenges.The68thCSSBwaswithoutasolutionforconductingconvoyoperationsintheIBCT’sbattlespaceduringfull-spectrumoperations.InJanuary,4monthsbeforetherotation,theCSSBmadethedecisiontoobtain24guntrucksandusethemasaconvoysecuritydetachment.
AfterdrawingtheM1151uparmoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehiclesfromtheFortCarsonArmyfieldsupportbattalion,aguntrucktrainingmis-sionwasassignedtotheCSSB’s360thTransportationCompany,whichwasthendesignatedtodeploywiththeCSSB.Withtheadditionoftwoplatoonleadersandpla-toonsergeants,thebattalionwasthenposturedtoinde-pendentlyconductconvoyoperationsfromEABorfromwithintheIBCT,thuscreatingamultiechelontrainingopportunityfortheSoldiersandthebattalionstaff.
Withoutadoubt,thedecisiontoincludeaconvoysecuritydetachmentenablerprovidedthecapabilitytooperatemoreindependently,anditalsoprovidedavaluableenablertothe4thIBCT.
ImprovingProcessesDuringTrainingBeingtotallyimmersedintraining,the68thCSSB
staffwasfreetoimproveprocessesandvalidatebattle
drills.Afteramere14daysinthetrainingenvironment,thebattlestaffwasabletovalidatemostofitsbattledrillsandreacttomanysituations.
InadditiontodevelopingandrefiningTOCbattledrillsatFOBKing,theCSSB’sbattlestaffreworkeditstacticalstand-ingoperatingprocedures,createdsmartcards,refinedthecontentandlayoutofroutinebriefs,anddevelopedaworkablebattlerhythmfortherotation.Manyexperiencedleaderswouldagreethatworkingthesebattlestaffprocessesiseasierduringatrain-
ingdeploymentthanduringgarrisonoperationsandhavingthescenariotodrivetheseprocessesaddsvigorandrealism.
AnotheradvantageofpositioningtheCSSB’sheadquartersatFOBKingwasthatthestaffcouldvisualizethebattlefieldthroughcommunicationsequipmentbyusingtheprimary,alternate,contingen-cy,emergency,andrepository(PACE–R)taxonomy.(Seechartabove.)AboutPACE–R,LieutenantColo-nelRivardsaid,“Thisvisualizationwasinvaluabletomeasacommander,andIwasabletotranslatetheconcepttothestaffintermsofinformationmanage-ment,knowledgemanagement,andultimately,situ-ationalunderstanding.”
Havingtheopportunitytoexercisethefourcom-ponentsofbattlecommandandthesixfunctionsofaTOCusingthesesystemswasessentialtotheCSSB’slearning—anditwasatrainingobjectivethatwouldnothavebeenachievablewhilepositionedatLSAWarrior.The43dSustainmentBrigadecom-mander,ColonelEdDaly,whoprovidescommandandcontroltothe68thCSSBwhenatFortCarson,isknowntosay,“Arewetrainingthingsright...andarewealsotrainingtherightthings?”NeverbeforehadthebattalionexercisedthisnumberofArmyBattleCommandSystems,battledrills,andstafftrainingevents.
NTCofferssuperbtraining,butitismenu-driven;commandersdecidewhattrainingtheirunitsneed.CSSBcommandersshoulddeploytoNTCwithanimmersionmindsetthatallowscommandersatalllev-elstostresssystemsearly.Itisyourrotation,andthemenuisdiverse.
Major john M. ruths is the s–3 for the 68th CoMbat sus-tainMent support battalion. he holds an M.b.a. degree with a ConCentration in logistiCs ManageMent froM tui university and is a graduate of the CoMbined logistiCs Captains Career Course.
Command and Control Intelligence Sustainment
P - Primary Field Manual Tactical Ground Reporting System
Battle Command Sustainment Support System
A - Alternate Command Post of the Future (Ventrillo)
Distributed Common Ground System-Army
Voice Over Internet Protocol
C - Contingency Blue Force Tracker Command Post of the Future
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
E - Emergency Movement Tracking System
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
Field Manual
R - Repository Command Post of the Future
Tactical Ground Reporting System
Battle Command Sustainment Support System
The 68th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion identified these decision- making tools using the PACE–R taxonomy.
MAY–jUNE 2010 7
T he4thBrigadeCombatTeam(BCT),1st ArmoredDivision,embarkeduponitsmission readinessexercise(MRX)attheNationalTrainingCenter(NTC)atFortIrwin,California,inJanuary2009fullypreparedtoexecutecounterinsurgencyoperations.ButwhileatNTC,thebrigadereceivedwordthatitwouldinsteadbedeployingastheproofofprinciplefortheadviseandassistbrigade(AAB)mission.
TheAABMissionTheAABisanaturalevolutionoftheroleofthe
BCTinastabilityoperationsenvironment.U.S.SoldiersnowadviseandassistIraqiSecurityForces(ISF),whichincludetheIraqiArmy(IA),IraqiNationalPolice,andDepartmentofBorderEnforcement.InadditiontotheAABmission,the4thBCTwouldalsobeenablingcivilcapacityeffortsoftheU.S.DepartmentofStateprovin-cialreconstructionteamsinthesouthernIraqiprovincesofDhiQar,Maysan,andMuthana.
Thisboldshiftinmissiondrewallleaderstolooktothisunifiedactionwithakeeneyewhileensuringthatitwasnestedacrossalloperations.FieldManual(FM)3–0,Operations,definesunifiedactionas“thesynchro-nization,coordination,and/orintegrationoftheactivitiesofgovernmentalandnongovernmentalentitieswithmili-taryoperationstoachieveunityofeffort.”
Tofacilitatethenewmission,thebrigadereceivedadditionalpersonnelwhowerethenembeddedwiththeISFonIraqibases.Militarytransitionteams(MiTTs),borderenforcementtransitionteams,portofentryteams,policetrainingteams,andstabilitytrainingteamsround-edoutthebrigadepersonnel,andthebrigadealignedwithsupportedIraqiunitstoaccomplishtheadviseandassistmission.
TrainingatNTCThe4thBCTsawthechangeinmissionasanoppor-
tunitytoexecuteanontraditionaltrainingregimenthatwouldsettheconditionsforsuccessasitassumedtheadviseandassistmission.Thecommandersawtheimplicationsofthemissionandknewthatallentitieshadtoworktogethereffectivelytoachievethecam-paignendstate.
WhileatNTC,thebrigadestaffwasgivenclearguid-ancebyitscommander,ColonelPeterNewell,toworkthroughtwolinesofeffort:first,tobuildcivilcapacityacrossthelinesofgovernance,essentialservices,eco-nomicdevelopment,andruleoflawsecurity;andsec-ond,toadvise,assist,andenabletheISF.
The4thBCT’sbrigadesupportbattalion(BSB),the121stBSB,receivedthisnewfocusfortheBCT’smissionandsawsustainmentcrossingalllinesof
effort.ThisallowedtheBSBtostickwiththefundamentalsofrequirementsdeterminationforoperationsandcapabilitiesreviewsforthesustainmentmission.AsstatedinFM4–0,Sustainment,“Successfulsustainmentenablesfreedomofactionbyincreasingthenumberandqualityofoptionsavailabletothecommander.”
Theunfamiliarelementofthebattalion’sMRXwasthepartner-shipwiththeISF.Asthestaffworkedthroughtheconcept,it
SustainmentintheArmy’sFirstAdviseandAssistBrigade
by Lieutenant CoLoneL DaviD WiLson
Partnership and Tactical Overwatch
Advises Iraqi Army units on—
•Sustainment at the division, brigade, and battalion levels.
•Mission planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.
•Sustainment procedures.
•Employment of logistics enablers.
•Field workshops, headquarters support companies, motorized transportation regiments.
• Fights together with an Iraqi Army unit.
• Assists with missionpreparation.
• Provides mobile training teams that conduct focused sustainment training.
• Provides command and control of logistics training and advisory teams.
• Acts as the Iraqi Army link to coalition enablers.
Adviser Element(Military Transition Team)
Partner Unit(Brigade Support Battalion)
Through their logistics training and advisory teams, brigade support bat-talions are responsible for assisting their Iraqi partner units. Military transition teams are responsible for advising those Iraqi units.
8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
soughtassistancefromNTC’sGoldminerobserver-controllerteam.TheGoldminerteamwasabletopro-videtheBSBwithinstantfeedbackfromthePhoenixAcademyatCampTaji,Iraq.ThebattalionlearnedthatMulti-NationalSecurityTransitionCommand-Iraqwascreatinglogisticsmaintenanceadvisoryteams(LMATs)toworkinconjunctionwiththeMiTTstobuildtheISF’slogisticscapacitythroughtraining.ThisnewinformationpromptedtheBSBtoanalyzehowitcouldbecomeanenablerofthisvitalmissionofthesustainmentwarfightingfunction.
AcriticalstepintheprocesswasdeterminingwhatthetrainingrequirementswouldbeandiftheISFhadanyprocessresemblingamission-essentialtasklist.Therewereseveralunknowns,suchasthetypesoflogisticsunitstheISFhad,thestatusoftheironhandequipment,theironhandpersonnelstatus,andtheorga-nizationoftheirlogisticsunits.WithoutanswerstothesequestionsinitiallyduringtheMRX,theBSBfocuseditstrainingonpartnership,negotiation,andbilateralengage-ments.ThisallowedtheBSBstafftopreparethecom-manderforkey-leaderengagementsandtoworkthroughtheBATNA[bestalternativetoanegotiatedagreement]andZOPA[zoneofpossibleagreement]tobeachievedbytheengagements.
TheroleplayersatNTCwhoassistedinthetrainingwerefromtheMulti-NationalDivision-SouthregionofIraq.TheyservedtheBSBwellbypressingfortrainingoftheirforces,whichdidnothaveadequateequipment,funding,andresources.OneoftheBSB’smanylessonslearnedwasthatU.S.unitsmustlettheISFdrivethetrainingprioritiesandmustcoachthemthroughbuildingcapacityacrossallsustainmentandcombathealthsup-portfunctions.
DeployingasanAABFollowingtheNTCrotation,the4thBCTattended
thepredeploymentsitesurvey(PDSS)andgained
furtherknowledgeoftheLMATrequirementsthatwerebeingdevelopedaswellastheMulti-NationalCorps-Iraqrequirementforunitpartnershipintheater.ThisrequirementstatedthatBSBsweretopartnerwithIraqimotorizedtransportationregiments(MTRs)andforwardsupportcompaniesweretopartnerwithheadquartersandsupplycompaniesofIraqiArmybrigades.
AfterthePDSS,theBCTstudiedtheinformationreceivedduringitsvisitwiththe4thBCT,1stCavalryDivision,whichtransferredauthoritytothe4thBCT,1stArmoredDivision,andtooktimetodevelopitsstrategyfortrainingandpartnership.Thestrategyfollowedacrawl-walk-runmodel,andthebrigadelookedatdevel-opingthetrainingandpartnershipalongthreelines:trainthejundees(IAprivates),trainthetrainer,andfocusonjointoperations.
ThroughfactfindingandthePDSS,the121stBSBrealizedthatU.S.militarylogisticsisnotthesameasISFlogistics.Thisallowedthebattaliontofocusonimprov-ingtheISFlogisticsposturebygettingISFsustainmentunitstoworkefficientlyusingtheircurrentsystemandnottheU.S.system.TheISF’slackofconfidenceintheirsystemwasimmediatelyobvious.TheBSBdecidedtoapproachISFtrainingwiththecommander’smodelforsupportoftheAAB,theTAPE[train,advise,partner,andenable]model.(Seefigurebelow.)
The121stBSB’slogisticianshadtobreaknewgroundindetermininghowtodeliverinstructionthatwouldbuildlogisticscapacityfortheISF.Thiseffortstartedwithanassessmentofwhatthepreviouspartnerunithadestablished.The27thBSB,4thBCT,1stCav-alryDivision,hadmadegreatstridesinembracingtheembeddedlogisticsMiTTaspartoftheirteamandhaddevelopedatrainingplanthatwouldsetguidelinesfortheMiTTtofollowintheirengagementwiththeMTR.
MuchofwhatwasbeingdeliveredfocusedontheindividualtrainingofIraqisoldiers.Thisservedasagoodfoundationandlaidthegroundworkforthe121stBSBtotrain,advise,partner,andenable.
TheBSB’sapproachwastobuildontheactionsalreadyinplaceasittransitionedandmovedfromtrain-ingindividualIraqijundeestothetrain-the-trainermode.Thetrain-the-trainermodegavetheIraqipartnersthecapabilitytodelivertheinstructionthemselves,withcoalitionforcesprovidingadviceonthedeliveryoftheinstructionoradjustmentsnecessarytomovetheinstruc-tiontoahigherlevel.
TheMTRcommanderusedtheBSB’sfeedbacktodevelophistrainingprioritiesforsubsequentengage-ments.Inessence,thisallowedtheISFtopickthetrain-ingthattheyweremostinterestedinreceiving,basedontheprioritiesoftheMTRcommander.
Abigpartinmovingtothetrain-the-trainermode
Train
Advise
Partner
Enable
Identify issues and trends
Reinforceand facilitate
Coach, teach,and mentor
The TAPE Model
Enabling Iraqi partner units consists of three tasks: train-ing, advising, and partnering.
MAY–jUNE 2010 9
wastheestablishmentofthe121stBSBlogisticstrainingandadvisoryteam(LTAT).TheLTATwasmadeupofseniornoncommissionedofficers(formerdrillsergeants,instructors,andlinguists)andaunitcommanderprovid-ingoversighttofocusthetrainingeffortsandidentifyanyfuturekey-leaderengagementsbetweentheISFandBSBcommanders.
AfteramonthoftrainingwiththeISF,theBSBcouldtellthattheMiTTwastheenhancerandtheBSB(throughtheLTAT)wastheenabler.TheMiTTreliedontheBSB’strainingcapabilitiestoassisttheMTRcommanderinachievinghistraininggoalswhilethetrain-the-trainereffortsandthepushforpartnershipstartedtogainground.
JointLogisticsConvoysSuccessinthispartnershipwasevidentwhenthe
MTRcommanderprovidedISFsoldiersandassetstopartnerwiththeBSB’ssustainmentreplenishmentopera-tions.TheMTRcommandersawthepartnershipasanopportunitytoimprovehisownconvoyoperations.
Throughgoodfaiththatdevelopedfromtherelation-ship,theMTRbeganrunningjointlogisticsconvoyswiththeBSB.Thiseffortwasexecutedincrementallyandstartedwiththetrainingofgroundandconvoycom-mandersformovingcommoditieswithinthecoalitionforceandISFlogisticsformation.
Thecommandersreceivedinstructionsontroop-leadingprocedures,tacticalconvoyoperations(basedonthe121stBSB’sConvoyLeader’sGuide),escalationofforce,andsharingtheroad(amethodthatpreventssustainmentmovementsfromimpedingthehighwaysthatbelongtotheIraqipeople).Thistrainingculminatedwithconvoyleadercertificationforthegroundandcon-voycommandersandmovedtothestage-setterphaseofexecutingalogisticsconvoy.
ThejointlogisticsconvoyprocessfortheISFandcoalitionforceswasbasedona96-hourtimelinedevel-opedbythe121stBSB.Theconceptofoperationsdevelopedatthebrigadelogisticscommandpostbythesupportoperationssection(futureoperations)andthemissionsupportorderdevelopedbytheBSBS–3sec-tion(currentoperations)settheconditionsfortheISFtoreceivetheinformationneededtocoordinatethejointoperation.
TheconceptofoperationsalsoallowedtheMiTTtotracktheIAheadquarters’planningoncetheyreceivedthemission.Thegroundandconvoycommandersattendedthesustainmentsynchronizationmeetingatthebrigadelogisticscommandpostandensuredthatthecommoditiestobemovedwereontrackastheybeganprecombatchecksandinspectionsforthemissionset,whichoftenincludedKBRlogisticsassetswithintheconvoy.ThisallowedtheISFtoseethecriticalsynchro-nizationandcoordinationthatoccursbeforeany121stBSBconvoy.
ThetimeleadinguptothejointIAandcoalitionforcelogisticsconvoywascoinedthe“twominutedrill”orthe“NASCARpitdrill”bytheBSBcommanderbecauseoftheintensityoftheoperations.Atthistime,theBSBwouldquicklycheckthevehiclesformaintenanceneedsorhaveaqualitycontrolteaminspectvehiclesintheBSBmotorpool.Criticalstaffsections,suchastheS–1,wouldverifymanifestsforthetacticalconvoysystem,andtheelectronicwarfareofficerwouldensurethatallcounterremote-controlledimprovisedexplosivedeviceelectronicwarfaresystemswereinworkingorderpriortodeparture.
Alsoduringthistime,thecoalitionforceandIAcon-voymemberswouldshareamealandattendtheBSBS–2’sjointthreatbriefthatcenteredonroute-focusedintelligencepreparationofthebattlefieldandtheconvoycommander’sconvoymissionbrief.Followingallbrief-ingsandthefinalprecombatchecksandinspections,thecoalitionforce,ISF,andKBRconvoymemberswouldconductajointgroundrehearsaltopracticeactionsdur-ingmovement,actionsoncontact,actionsatdestination,andpreparationsforreturn.Therehearsalswerecomplet-edwithBSBinterpretersembeddedintheISFandcoali-tionforceformations(astheywouldbewhenmounted)sothattheBSBcouldensurethattheIAfullyunderstoodthemissiontobeconductedaswellasthetactics,tech-niques,andproceduresforconvoyoperations.
After-actionreviewsfromallstagesofthepartner-shipwereprovidedtotheMTRcommanderandtheIAdivisionMiTTsothattheISFcouldsettheprioritiesforfuturetraining.ThereviewsalsoprovidedtheMiTTwithagoodassessmentofwheretheISFpartnerwasonthescalefortheoperationalreadinessassessment—aunitstatusreport—providedtotheIraqiMinistryofDefenseeverymonth.
ThissustainmentmissioninsupportoftheAABallowed121stBSBlogisticianstoworkwithIraqipart-nerstobuildtheircapabilitiesforsustainmentwhilesupportingthe4thBCTinabattlespacethesizeofSouthCarolina.Buildingtheconceptofsupportthroughsus-tainmenttargetingmeetingssynchronizedsustainmentacrosstheBCTandallowedtheBSBtoincorporatecon-tractors,ISFlogisticians,andtheBSB’sorganicsustain-mentplatformsintoitsreplenishmentoperations.
SynchronizingsustainmentwhilepartneringwiththeISFallowedcoalitionforcestomodeltheexactbehaviortheISFwantstoemulate.ThosecapabilitieswillendurelongaftertheBSB’smissioniscomplete.Logisticsisthemusclethatenablesthefisttostrike!
lieutenant Colonel david wilson is the CoMMander of the 121st brigade support battalion, 4th brigade CoMbat teaM, 1st arMored division. he is a graduate of the Citadel, the Military College of south Carolina, and holds a Master’s degree in general adMinistra-tion froM Central MiChigan university.
10 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
TheCommander’sEmergencyResponseProgram:SynergisticResultsThroughTraining
TheCommander’sEmergencyResponseProgram(CERP)allowsfieldcommandersinIraqandAfghanistantofundprojectsdesignedtowinheartsandminds,huntenemies,andencour-agethegrowthoflocalinstitutionsinwartime.CERPprovidesU.S.GovernmentappropriationsdirectlytotacticalunitsforthepurposeofmeetingtheemergencyneedsoflocalIraqiandAfghancivilians.
However,CERP’sverynoveltyandimportancecanpresentchallengesinitsimplementationbecausetheundisciplinedoruncoordinateduseofCERPfundscouldresultinCongressabruptlyendingthem.Suchafateisworthavoidingbecausetheprogram’searlysuccessdemonstratesthatrelativelysmallamountsofmoneyspentlocallyandintelligentlybycommanderscanyieldenormousbenefits.
OriginsofCERPCERPbeganasanefforttoprovidecommandersin
IraqwithastabilizationtooltobenefittheIraqipeo-ple.Initialresourcesforthateffortcamefromstock-pilesofill-gottenBa’athistPartycashleftbehindbySaddamHussein’sregime.Thiscash,alongwithotherregimeassetsrecoveredintheweeksandmonthsthatfollowedtheoverthrowofSaddamHussein,providedasourceoffundingforprojectsthatrespondedtotheemergencyneedsoftheIraqipeople.
IncontrasttothedevioushandlingofthesefundsbyseniorBa’athists,theAmericanmanagementoftherecoveredassetswastransparent,well-documented,andsubjecttolaw.Fieldcommandersandseniorpolicy-makersensuredthatseizure,control,anddispositionofformerregimepropertycompliedwithinternationallawonarmedconflictandoccupation.Inparticular,theU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)publicizedthat,
inseizingthefunds,coalitionforcesweretakingpos-sessionofandsafeguardingmovablepropertyoftheStateofIraqratherthanthepersonalpropertyofIraqicitizens.Evidencethatmanyoftheassetshadbeenobtainedfromcriminalskimmingofprofitsfromoilsales(inviolationofUnitedNationssanctions)causedcoalitionleaderstorejectthenotionthatindividualseniorBa’athistsweretherightfulowners.
ThelackoffunctioningIraqicivilinstitutionsfol-lowingSaddamHussein’soverthrowresultedinamassofemergencyneeds.Clearingstreetsofdestroyedvehicles,bulldozingmountainsofgarbage,distributingrations,repairingdamagedroofs,wells,andsewers,rehabilitatingbroken-downjailsandpolicestations,andtendingtoavarietyofurgentmedicalneedsbecamethebusi-nessofU.S.Soldiers.Thesereliefandreconstructionactivitieswereundertakenwhenthepaceofcontinuingcombatoperationsagainsthostileelementspermit-tedor,insomecases,whengravecollateraldamagedemandedaquickU.S.response.
CERPTodayThepurposeofCERPremains
unchanged:toenablecommand-erstosuccessfullyrespondtourgenthumanitarianreliefandreconstructionrequirementswithintheirareasofresponsibil-itybycarryingoutprogramsthatimmediatelyassistthelocalpop-ulation.Theseprogramsinclude
by Major Mark W. Lee
Judicious spending by commanders can yield significant results in meeting the humanitarian needs of local populations and gaining their trust and cooperation.
Iraqi workers wet down dirt so they can mix cement to be used in constructing the Basra Talent School and the Al Jameat and Al Quibla markets in Basra, Iraq. The projects were financed
through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. (Photo by SSG Chrissy Best)
MAY–jUNE 2010 11
makingcondolencepaymentsaftercombatoperations,dispersingfundsfornecessaryrepairsresultingfromcombat,purchasingorrepairingcriticalinfrastructureequipment,andperforminglarge-scaleciviccleanupsthatemployasmanylocalinhabitantsaspossible.
CERPhasalsobecomeavitalcapabilityinthecom-mander’stoolboxforstabilityoperations.CERPhasprogressedtobecomeabroadermeansfortacticalcom-manderstoconductthenumerousstabilityoperationstasksrelatedtodevelopmentthattraditionallyhavebeenperformedbyU.S.,foreign,andlocalprofessionalcivil-ianpersonneloragencies.Thesetasksincludeestab-lishingcivilsecurityandcontrol,promotingeconomicdevelopment,andrestoringanddevelopingessentialservices,governance,andinfrastructure.
WhiletheU.S.Armyisuniquelytrained,manned,andequippedtooperateinunstableregions,itlacksthedevelopmentexpertiseandcapacityofitscivilianpartnersinconductingthesetasks.Butciviliandiplo-maticanddevelopmentagenciesareoftenchallengedtoundertakesuchtasksinunstableareaswiththeirtra-ditionaldeliverysystems.
Giventhesechallenges,DepartmentofDefense(DOD)policy,outlinedinDODDirective3000.05,MilitarySupportforStability,Security,Transition,andReconstruction(SSTR)Operations, directsthatU.S.militaryforcesbepreparedtoperformalltasksneededtoestablishormaintainorderwhencivilianscannotdoso.CERPisonetooltheU.S.Governmenthasprovid-edtomilitarycommanderstomeettheserequirementsandothertheater-specificstrategicobjectives.
Examplesoftheater-levelobjectivesforCERPinclude—❏ Ensuringthaturgenthumanitarianreliefand
reconstructionrequirementsaremetforthelocalpopulation.
❏ Improvingthecapacityoflocalgovernmentsbypart-neringwithprovincialgovernmentagenciesinidenti-fying,prioritizing,selecting,anddevelopingprojects.
❏ Ensuringthatlarger,strategicprojectsandservicesareconnectedtotheenduserinlocalcommunities.
❏ Creatingmomentumandconditionsforeconomicrecoveryanddevelopment.
❏ Empoweringmajorsubordinatecommandandtacticalcommanders,incoordinationwithlocalofficialsandotherU.S.Governmentagencies,todevelopandapproveCERPprojectsconsistentwiththeater-specificguidance,theirrespectivefundingapprovalauthority,andbudgetavailability.
SignificanceofCERPHavingbeenacclaimedforitseffectivecontribu-
tionstostabilizationeffortsinIraq,CERPhasbecomebothanimportantdevelopmentinlawandapotentiallytransforminginfluenceonmodernU.S.militaryopera-tions.ThesignificanceofCERPisthat,byauthorizingandfundingaprogramfordiscretionaryhumanitarianprojectsbybrigadeanddivisioncommanders,Con-gresshasrecognizedtheneedfornewtoolstoconductmajorstabilityoperations.
AuthoritytouseacertainamountofoperationandmaintenancefundsisessentialtoensuringthatCERPremainseffectivedespiteoverlappingrulesandpoliciesthatplacesimilarauthorityelsewhere.Con-gressionalacknowledgmentoftheneedfornewtoolsisessentialbecausetheConstitution,whileitvestsauthorityoverforeignaffairsandnationaldefenseinthePresident,vestsseparate,broadauthorityoverthepurseinCongress.
Sincethemilitary’sconventionalroleofpreparingforandfightingtheNation’swarscontinuestodefinedefensebudgetsandfundingmechanisms,noncon-ventionalmilitaryoperationsbringintohighestreliefthiscongressionalpowertoinfluenceforeignaffairsandnationaldefensethroughtheappropriationsprocess.
AstheSupremeCourthasmadeclear,the“estab-lishedruleisthattheexpenditureofpublicfundsisproperonlywhenauthorizedbyCongress,notthatpublicfundsmaybeexpendedunlessprohibitedbyCongress.”Thisrule—surelyasoundandproperonetosafeguardthepeople’streasureinaconstitutionaldemocracy—requiresnospecialsupplementduringpeacetimetrainingandexercises.However,duringamilitaryoverseascontingencyoperation,theabsenceofcongressionalauthorityforcommanderstodecideontheirowninitiativetoquicklyspendsmallamountsofGovernmentfundsonurgenthumanitarianprojects
12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
canspelldefeatinthestruggletopersuadelocalpopulationstoviewU.S.intentionsasfriendlyandenduring.ByprovidingasourceoffundingforCERP,Congresshasfurnishedsuchauthority.
CERP’sFutureThereisbroadagreementamongmilitaryleadersthat
CERP’simpactwillcontinuetobeprofound.TheChair-manoftheJointChiefsofStaffhasdescribedCERPasoneofthemosteffectivemeanswehaveinOperationEnduringFreedomofpersuadingordinaryAfghanisthatwearetheretohelpthemandtheirfamilies.
Theeffectivenessoftheprogramintheneartermwillrequirethosewithoversightresponsibility,bothwithinDODandinCongress,towithstandtheten-dencytoburdenCERPwithpurpose-basedfiscalprohibitions.Suchaprohibitionwouldbeanypolicy
statementorexpressionofcongressionalintentstating,forexample,thattopayarewardorpurchaseapolice-man’suniformorbuildadamisanimproperpurposeforappropriatedCERPfundsasamatteroffiscallaw.
Whilecontrolsonexpenditureofpublicfundsarenecessaryandappropriate,CERP’spositiveimpactwillcontinuetostemfromcommanders’abilitytomakejudgmentcallsquicklyabouthowbesttobenefitlocalpopulations.Commanderswillmakethesejudgmentcallsbasedpartlyoninformationthat,amongU.S.orga-nizations,onlythemilitarywillreceive,thankstonor-malpatrollingbySoldiersinaffectedcommunities.
Overthelongerterm,CERPshouldbemadepartoforganicauthorizinglegislationandcodifiedintitle10oftheU.S.Code.CommanderswhocancountonlegalauthorityandcongressionalfundingforCERPduringadeploymentwillmakeCERParoutinepartoftheirtrainingprogram.Combattrainingcenterandinstitutionalprecommandcoursepersonnelshouldlike-wiseestablishastabletrainingprogram,collectlessonslearned,andincorporatethoselessonsintoleaderdevel-opmentprograms.Proactivetrainingandleaderdevel-opmentwillprovidethebestcontrolwhilemaximizingcoordinatedanddisciplineduseofCERPwithoutimposingtheheavyhandoftheAnti-DeficiencyAct.
Whilenosystemofcontrolcaneliminateeveryill-chosenproject,divisionandbrigadecommanderswilldemonstrate,astheyhavedonetimeandagain,thatthebestsystemisonethatencouragestheinitia-tiveofleadersandreliesontheirgoodjudgment.Theunorthodoxoperationsweundertaketodayhavechal-lengedourGovernmenttoprovidenewmechanismswithinthelawnolessthantheyhavechallengedourArmedForcestoemploynewtechnologies,weapons,organization,andtactics.CERPpromisestobeonepartofananswertothesechallengesandisnosmallchangeinsoldiering.
Commander’s Emergency Response Program or (CERP) funds are a relatively small piece of the war-related budgets . . . But because they can be dispensed quickly and applied directly to local needs, they have had a tremendous impact—far beyond the dollar value—on the abil-ity of our troops to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan. By building trust and confidence in coali-tion forces, these CERP projects increase the flow of intelligence to commanders in the field and help turn local Iraqis and Afghans against insurgents and terrorists.
—Secretary of Defense Robert M. GatesTestimony to Senate Committee on Appropriations
February 2007
Students gather at the official reopening cer emony for Agam High School in Afghanis tan’s Nangarhar province. The school was rehabilitated by a Marine Corps unit with $25,000 in Commander’s Emergency Re sponse Program funds. (Photo by CPT Dan Huvane, USMC)
MAY–jUNE 2010 13
ImprovingCERPTrainingCENTCOMcommanderGeneralDavidH.Petraeus,
ina23September2009memoaddressedtotheChiefofStaffoftheArmyandtheCommandantoftheMarineCorps,identifiedaneedtoestablishaCERPpre-deploymenttrainingprogram.Thebasisofthememowas“recentGAO[GovernmentAccountabilityOffice]andAAA[ArmyAuditAgency]findings[that]characterize[d]CERPtrainingasinadequate”andfoundthat“thereisnotrainingprogramatanyleveldesignedtohelpadequatelypreparethewarfighterontheproperexecutionofCERPpriortoarrivalintheater.”
InresponsetothePetraeusmemo,Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy,publishedExecutionOrder048–10:Pre-DeploymentTrainingforContractingOfficers,whichcitestrainingrequirementsforcon-tingencycontracting,operationalcontractsupport,andCERPfunctionalcomponents.TheArmyTrain-ingandDoctrineCommandwasdesignatedtodeliverCERPfunctionaltrainingnolaterthan30March2010,andtheU.S.ArmyFinancialManagementSchool(USAFMS)wasdesignatedastheleadforpre-deploy-mentinstitutionalCERPtraining.
Respondingproactively,TerryHancock,aUSAFMStrainingdeveloper,immediatelydeployedtobothIraqandAfghanistantoconductinterviews,observepro-cedures,andgatherdocumentationtoformulateaneffectivetrainingstrategyinsupportofthisinitiative.Basedonthecontactsshemade,aswellastheurgentneedforthistraining,theaterfinancialmanagementwarriorsassistedinformulatingandreviewingtrainingmaterialstoensurethattheywererealistic,relevant,andreflectiveofcurrentCERPexecution.
TheUSAFMSissimultaneouslyaddressingthedistributedlearning(dL)trainingrequirementintwophases.Thefirstphase,scheduledtobeavailablenolaterthan30March2010,isaweb-based,16-hourdLCERPcoursethatprovidesaprogramoverviewandinstructiononroles,responsibilities,andprocessesaswellasscenario-basedpracticalexercisesthatrequirestudentstoworkthroughthreedifferentprojectsfrombeginningtoendstate.AllCERPparticipantswillcompletethe16-hourdLcourseandreceiveacoursecompletioncertificate.
Thesecondphaseisamultifunctional,multitrack,40-hour,module-baseddLCERPcoursethataddresseseachstakeholder.Eachparticipantwillcompleteaspe-cifictrackthatcorrespondstohisparticularfunctionalarea(forexample,commander,resourcemanager,orpurchasingofficer).Thiscoursewillbetheprimarypre-deploymentinstitutionalCERPtrainingfordep-loyingindividualsandwillincorporatetactics,tech-niques,andproceduresfromU.S.Forces-IraqandU.S.Forces-Afghanistan.
Theintentistomakethecourseavailablewithnoaccessrestrictions(otherthanacommonaccess
card)viatheWorldWideWebortheSoldierSup-portInstituteenterpriseBlackboarddomainorbyCD–ROMforthosewithlimitedornoconnectiv-ity.Theendstateistodevelopindividualswhoaretrainedthroughrealistic,relevant,immersive,andengagingdistributedlearning,functionallydrivenbyassignment,andwhocanultimatelyachievetacticalcommanders’desiredstrategiceffects.
InadditiontotheeffortsoftheUSAFMS,theArmyForcesCommandisintheprocessofdevelopingmobiletrainingteamsthatwillconductscenario-based,predeploymenttrainingforpayingagents,purchasingofficers,projectmanagers,andunitsandcommandersduringrotationsattheNationalTrainingCenter,JointReadinessTrainingCenter,BattleCommandTrainingProgram,andJointMultinationalReadinessCenter.
ThechallengethatCERPpresentstocommandersistomanageprojectsinasynchronizedanddiscip-linedmanner.CoordinatingCERPprojectswiththeeffortsofallindividuals,teams,andunitsthatarepursuingthesameobjective(insidethebrigadeaswellasoutside)willyieldmaximumeffectsperdollarspent.Focusingexpendituresontheurgenthumanita-rianneedsofthecivilianpopulaceratherthanoninfrastructureandsecurityforceinvestmentswillyieldvictories,bothshortandlongterm,intheintricateworkingsofheartsandminds.
Major Mark w. lee is a CoMptroller and re sourCe Manager instruCtor at the arMy fi nanCial ManageMent sChool at fort jaCkson, south Carolina. he previously served as dep uty g−8 and regional CoMMand east re sourCe Manager in afghanistan. he holds a b.s. degree in MatheMatiCs, an M.b.a. degree with a ConCentra-tion in publiC adMinistration, and M.ed., j.d., and ph.d. degrees. he is Cur rently attending the air CoMMand and staff College.
An Army captain helps a local child in Afghanistan use a new hand water pump provided by the Com mander’s Emergency Response Program.
14 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ustainmentcommandersandstaffsfearthe militarydecisionmakingprocess(MDMP) becausetheytypicallydonotunderstandit.Forsomeofficers,theironlyexposuretotheMDMPisattheschoolhousewhentheyattendtheCombinedLogisticsCaptainsCareerCourse,CombinedArmsandServicesStaffSchool,andIntermediateLevelEducation.Likewise,noncommissionedofficers(NCOs)maybeexposedtotheMDMPonlyduringtheBattleStaffNCOCourse.OtherofficersandNCOsmayhavebeenexposedtotheMDMPbyworkingwithamaneuverbattalionorbrigadestaff.Theseexperienc-esoftenleadofficersandNCOstobelievethatMDMPisunfeasibleorirrelevantinnonmaneuverunitsorunitsthatarenotassignedanareaofoperations(AO).
Thepurposeofthisarticleistoidentifythediffer-encesbetweenanMDMPforland-owningunitsandforunitswithoutanassignedAO.Thesedifferencesshouldshapetheunitheadquarters’battlerhythmandexecutionofanMDMP.AcommanderandstaffwhoarewellversedindoctrineunderstandtheoperationalframeworkoftheirmissionsandtheMDMPandwillbeabletomakebetteruseoftheirtimeandresourcestoplan,prepare,andexecuteamission.
DefiningMDMPFieldManual(FM)5–0,ArmyPlanningandOrders
Production,definestheMDMPasfollows:
Themilitary decision making processisaplanningmodelthatestablishesproceduresforanalyzingamission,developing,analyzing,andcomparingcoursesofactionagainstcriteriaofsuccessandeachother,selectingtheoptimumcourseofaction,andproducingaplanororder.
TheMDMPisnothingmorethantheproblem-solvingprocess—thescientificmethodappliedtomilitaryproblems.Itisamodelformakingdecisionsbasedonalargeamountofinformation.Fundamental-ly,everypersonconductsthisprocessinhismindformuchsmallertasks.Weidentifyaproblem,considertheinformationathand,considerouroptions,andmakeourdecisionbasedonwhatweknowandwhatweassumewillhappen.
HowamaneuverunitconductsitsMDMPisclearlydifferentfromhowotherheadquartersconducttheirMDMPs.Thegreatestdifferenceisspecifiedtasks.Maneuverunitswillreceivemorespecifiedtasksandpurposesthroughoutanoperationthanotherunits.Thesespecifiedtasksareclearlyposi-tionedthroughouttheoperationandareusuallyaddressedinthecommander’sintent.Bycontrast,asustainmentunitwilltypicallyreceiveonespecifiedtask:to“providesustainmentto”thesupportedunit.Thistaskneverchanges.Atmost,thesustainmentunitmaybetaskedtoconductmissionsinadditiontosustainment,suchasbasedefenseanddetaineeopera-tions.However,nofurtherguidanceisprovidedonthesustainmentmission.
Typically,theconceptofsupportdevelopedbytheG/S–4andthesupportoperationsofficer(SPO)duringthehigherheadquarters’MDMPbecomestheconceptofoperationsforthesustainmentunit.Therefore,partofthesustainmentunit’sMDMPiscompletedbeforehigherheadquartersissuesanorder.Thisshouldleadasustainmentunittodevelopadirectedcourseofaction(COA)andwargameonlythatoneCOA.
AlthoughSunTzuteachesusto“seetheenemy,seetheterrain,andseeourselves,”thesustainmentstaffmustalsoseethesupportedunit.Thisisakeycomplexitythatsustainmentstaffsshouldrecognize.Theymustalsotakeintoaccountfriendlyactionsaswellasenemyactions.Staffsmustunderstandthecomposition,disposition,andschemeofmaneuverforthesupportedunitandfortheirownunits.Ifthesustainmentstaffcannotseethemselvesandthesup-portedunit,theconceptofsupportissubjecttoshort-fallsandpossiblefailure.
Sustainmentofamajoroperationisusuallydividedintobefore,during,andafterphases.The“before”phasetypicallystartswiththefirstwarningorder(WARNO)orevena“bepreparedto”taskfromthepreviousoperationandendsbeforethecurrentopera-tionbegins(unitscrossingthelineofdeparture).Thisrequiressustainmentunitstoexecutetasksastheplanisbeingdevelopedinordertosettheconditionsfortheoperation.
S
MDMPforSustainmentUnitsby Major DanieL Misigoy
Many members of sustainment units are often uncomfortable with the military decision making process (MDMP) and do not understand its importance to the successful completion of their jobs. This article offers some suggestions to help sustainers make the MDMP work for them.
MAY–jUNE 2010 15
KeystoSuccessAformalanddeliberateMDMPhas128steps.A
staffandcommanderwhoareknowledgeableandpro-ficientintheMDMPcanidentifywhichstepstomod-ify,expand,oromit.AnMDMPisveryrelevantandnecessaryforsustainmentunits.However,becauseofthefactorsdiscussedintheprevioussection,sustain-mentunitsmustmodifyhowtheyconductanMDMP.Threewaysthatasustainmentunitstaffcanmaximizeitstimeandeffortstoyieldaflexible,integratedplanarecollaborativeplanningwithhigherheadquarters,detailedandupdatedrunningestimates,andadetailedwargamingsession.
Collaborative planning.Sustainmentunitsmustconductcollaborativeplanningwiththeirsupportedunits.CollaborativeplanningisdefinedinFM5–0as“thereal-timeinteractionamongcommandersandstaffsattwoormoreechelonsdevelopingplansforasingleoperation.”ThetraditionalwaysustainmentunitsexecutethistaskisbyhavingtheSPOparticipateinthesupportedunit’sMDMP.Othermethodsaretousealiaisonofficer(LNO)orforthehigherheadquar-ters’G/S–4toprovidethelinkbetweenthesustain-mentunitandthesupportedunit.Themethodselectedshouldbeplannedoutandbepartoftheunit’sstand-ingoperatingprocedures.
ThesustainmentunitstaffmustprovidetheLNOorG/S–4withitscommander’sintent,updatedrun-ningestimates,andtheCOAstheyaredeveloping.TheLNOorG/S–4mustprovidethesustainmentunitstaffwithrunningestimatesfromthehigherheadquar-ters,COAsdeveloped,theschemeofmaneuverfromthechosenCOA,andanoperationalsynchronizationmatrixwithallwarfightingfunctions.Sharingthisinformationshouldbearegularpartofbothstaffs’battlerhythmstoensurethattherightinformationisavailablefortheappropriatestaff.
Detailed and updated running estimates.Develop-ingandmaintainingtherightrunningestimatesiscru-cialtocollaborativeplanningandproperlymanagingtime.AlthoughFM5–0presentsagenericformatforarunningestimatethatmirrorsastaffstudy,therun-ningestimateshouldbeinaformatthatbestconveysinformationthatcanbequicklyanalyzedforrapiddecisionmaking.Thisformatmaybecharts,tables,orspreadsheets,dependingontheinformation.Runningestimatesthatthesustainmentunitstaffshouldmain-tainandupdatearethe—❏ Intelligenceestimate,whichshouldmirrorthe
higherheadquarters’S–2estimate.❏ Supportedunitandsustainmentunitcombatpower
andmaintenanceposture.❏ Supportedunitsupplystatusforallclassesof
supply.❏ Sustainmentunitsupplystatusofdirectsupport
stocks.
❏ Supportedunitandsustainmentunitpersonnelstatus.
❏ Estimatedrequirementsforallclassesofsupplyneededforthesupportedunittoexecutethemission.
❏ Casualtyestimatefortheoperationappliedintimeandspace.Theserunningestimateswillfeedinformation
directlytotheSPOandG/S–4astheydeveloptheconceptofsupportduringthehigherheadquarters’MDMP.Detailedrunningestimatesthatareconstantlyupdatedwillfeedthemissionanalysisprocess.Thiswillallowthestafftofocusontheanalysisandpro-videthecommanderwithaclearervisualizationoftheoperationwithoutspendingtimecollectingdataaftertheyreceivethemission.
Wargaming.COAanalysis,orwargaming,isessen-tialtosynchronizingtheplanandidentifyingcriticaltasks,branches,andsequels.FM5–0states—
Wargamingstimulatesideas,highlightscriticaltasks,andprovidesinsightsthatmightnototh-erwisebediscovered.ItisacriticalstepintheMDMPandshouldbeallocatedmoretimethananyotherstep.
Ironically,sustainmentunitsoftenspendtheleastamountoftimeonwargaming.Theresultofthisisaplanthatisunclear,uncoordinated,andunsynchro-nized.Asthisplanisissueddowntothecompanylevel,crucialdetailsaremissing,whichleadstopoorsituationalawarenessandnocleartaskandpurposeatthesquadandplatoonlevels.Thefollowingvignettehighlightsseveralproblems.
The brigade is planning for two battalion task forc-es to conduct a coordinated attack on the enemy, who is occupying the three western towns in the brigade AO. The brigade support battalion (BSB) is tasked with sustaining the brigade and with being prepared to support consequence management. The BSB staff decides to execute this task by pushing a convoy with fuel, ammunition, construction materials, and medi-cal supplies to the closest forward operating base and conducting a follow-on mission to move to the objec-tive. The planning is conducted using a Microsoft Pow-erPoint slide from the brigade’s concept of operations story board for the operation. Once the task organi-zation is finalized, the BSB cuts a fragmentary order directing A Company to plan and execute a convoy and other companies to provide assets.
Sincethestaffdidnotwargame,itwasunclearwhattheconvoy’staskandpurposewere.Theywereessentiallytoldtogotoanotherforwardoperatingbaseandwait.Butwhatweretheywaitingfor?Nodecisionpoints,conditionchecks,ortriggerswereeveridenti-fied.Informationandinstructionsforcoordinationandlinkupwithotherunitswerenotprovided.Theseare
16 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
allissuesthatshouldbeidentifiedduringthewargame.Theconsequencesofanunsynchronizedplanrangefromashortfallinsupporttofratricide.Itisimpor-tantthatkeydetailsbeidentifiedduringtheplanningprocessandprovidedtosubordinatecommanderstoensuremissionsuccess.
ExecutinganMDMPMissionAnalysisThesustainmentunitstaffcanstartitsMDMPwhen
itreceivesthefirstWARNOfromitshigherorsup-portedheadquarters.Insomecases,thesustainmentstaffcanbeginearlier.Thisrequiresusingcommand,control,communications,andcomputersystemstoprovideacommonoperationalpictureoffutureopera-tionsandtoallowLNOstogainandpassrelevantinformation.
TheexecutiveofficeralertsthestafftogathertheirtoolsandpreparetheplanstentfortheMDMPatadesignatedtime.StaffsectionsupdatetheirestimatesbeforetheMDMPstarts.TheS–3postsintheplanstentanygraphics,theoperationaltimeline,andtheinitialcommander’sintentfromthehigherheadquarters.
Oncethestaffgathers,theyconductaninitialassessmentbasedoninformationfromtheLNO,thehigherheadquarters’WARNO,andtheirrunningesti-mates.Thestaffidentifiesanyinitialsustainmenttasksthatneedtobeaccomplishedbeforetheoperationandobtainsthesustainmentcommander’sinitialguidance.ThestaffproducesaWARNOforitssubordinateunits.Therunningestimatesareupdatedandexpandedbythesustainmentstaffandarepasseduptothehigher
Combined Arms and Services Staff School students use the military decision making process to wargame a particular, hypothetical stability operations scenario. For many sustainment Soldiers, this type of classroom MDMP exercise is their only MDMP experience. (Photo by MAJ Christopher LeCron)
MAY–jUNE 2010 17
headquarters’G/S–4andLNO,ensuringthatthestaffsshareacommonoperationalpictureandthatthecon-ceptofsupportdevelopedisfeasible,suitable,andacceptable.
Missionanalysislaststhelongestofanystepandwillbeconductedtwoorthreetimes.ThesustainmentstaffcontinuesdoingmissionanalysisuntilthehigherheadquartershascompleteditswargameandissuedWARNO3.However,thisdoesnotmeanthestaffstaysintheplanstentthroughout.Asthehigherheadquar-terscompletesanMDMPstep,thestaffreceivesaWARNOandinformationfromtheLNO.Thethreecyclesofmissionanalysisforthesustainmentstaffare:❏ Missionanalysisbrief(WARNO2).❏ COAdevelopment.❏ Wargaming(WARNO3).
MissionAnalysisBriefAsthestaffexecutesthecyclesofmissionanalysis,
theyupdatetheirrunningestimates,identifyingspecifiedandimpliedtasks,criticalfactsandassumptions,con-straints,requiredversusavailableassets,andinformationrequirements.Attheendofeachcycle,theyinformallybriefthecommander,issueafragmentaryordertosub-ordinateswithimmediatetasks,andprovideupdatedrunningestimatestotheLNOandG/S–4.Attheendofmissionanalysis,thestaffprovidesaformalbriefingtothecommanderandthesubordinateunitcommanders.Subordinatecommandersareincludedinordertofacili-tateparallelplanningandsotheycanreceivethecom-mander’sintentwhenthestaffreceivesit.
COADevelopmentCOAdevelopmentforthesustainmentstaffbegins
whenthehigherheadquarterscompletesitswargameandissuesWARNO3.ThesustainmentstaffconductsafocusedCOAdevelopmentsincetheframeworkfortheCOAwasalreadydevelopedbytheG/S–4duringhigherheadquarters’MDMP.Theconceptofopera-tionsforthesustainmentunitisbasedontheconceptofsupportdevelopedbytheG/S–4.ThismakesCOAdevelopmentforthesustainmentstaffarelativelyeasyprocess.Thesustainmentstaffstillneedstodevelopspecifiedtasks,assignthemtosubordinateheadquar-ters,anddevelopaCOAstatementandsketch.TheendstateisaCOAbrieftothecommanderandsubordinatecommandersforapproval.
WargamingOncethecommanderhasapprovedtheCOA,
thestaffmustconductadetailedCOAanalysis,orwargame.ThisisarguablythemostimportantMDMPstep.Wargamingallowsthestafftosynchronizetheplanbothinternallyandexternally.Externalsynchro-nizationiscrucialsincetheirsubordinateunitswilloperateinanotherunit’sAOandwilllikelytraverse
multipleunits’AOs.AccordingtoFM5–0,COAanal-ysisenablesthestaffto—❏ Furthervisualizethebattle.❏ Determineconditionsandresourcesrequiredfor
success.❏ Identifythecoordinationneededtoproduce
synchronizedresults.Inadditiontotheprocessforwargamingdescribed
inFM5–0,thestafftakesstepstotailorthewargametotheirrequirements.First,thestaffobtainsthehigherheadquarters’operationalsynchronizationmatrixandrecordofitswargame.Thecriticaleventswargamedbythesustainmentstaffarenestedwiththecriticaleventsoftheirhigherheadquarters.Insomecases,thesecriti-caleventsmayneedtobedividedintotwocriticaleventsforthesustainmentstaff.
Thehigherheadquarters’synchronizationmatrixalsotellsthestaffwhatadjacentunitsandenablersareexpectedtodooverspaceandtime.Thisshouldbeincorporatedintothewargamebyexpandingthecyclesforeachcriticalevent.Onecycleincludes—❏ Actionbythemaneuverunitandenablers.❏ Actionbythesustainmentunit.❏ Reaction(enemyactiononthesustainmentunitpri-
marilyandotherunitsasneeded).❏ Counteractionbythemaneuverunitandenablers.❏ Counteractionbythesustainmentunit.
Asthestaffcompleteseachcycle,itvisualizesthebattleinordertoidentifyadditionalimpliedtasks,decisionpoints,andrequiredcoordination.ThestaffcompletesitsoperationalsynchronizationmatrixandupdatesthesustainmentsynchronizationmatrixfortheG/S–4.Theresultofthewargameisasuitable,feasi-ble,andcompleteconceptoftheoperationsthatidenti-fiesrequiredcoordinationandrehearsalswithadjacentunitsandisreadytobepublishedinanoperationorderforsubordinates.
TheMDMPisaninvaluabletoolforanystaff.Sustainmentunitscanusethetechniquesdescribedinthisarticletostreamlineandfocustheirplanningandrapidlyprocessinformation.Theprocessusesalinearplanningtimelinedrivenbyhigherheadquar-ters’MDMPs.Thenextstepforthesustainmentstaffistonesttheirplanningprocessintheirhigherhead-quarters’targetingcycle.BymaximizingtheuseofanLNO,maintainingdetailedrunningestimates,andexecutingadetailedwargame,thestaffwillbeabletobettermanagetimeandinformation,whichwillleadtogreaterproductivity.
Major daniel Misigoy is a fellow at the u.s. agenCy for international developMent. he holds a baChelor’s degree froM boston university and a Master’s degree froM the national defense intelligenCe College and is a graduate of the arMy CoM-Mand and general staff College.
18 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
sthesurgeofU.S.forcesinIraqthathadbegun in2007waswindingdownduringthelatter halfof2008,the“KnightWarriors”oftheBam-berg,Germany-based16thSustainmentBrigadebeganassumingresponsibilityforsustainmentoperationsinMulti-NationalDivision-Northfromtheircounterpartsofthe3dSustainmentBrigade.Theseoperationswerecon-ductedatContingencyOperatingBase(COB)QayyarahWest(Q-West)andotherforwardoperatingbasesstretch-ingfromtheIraq-TurkeyborderatHaburGatetoJointBaseBalad(formerlyLogisticsSupportAreaAnaconda).
AlthoughthesurgeprovedtobeaclearsuccessinBaghdadandAlAnbarProvince,thecitiesofMosulandKirkukremainedhotspotsforenemyactivity.ProvidingsustainmenttocoalitionforcesinandaroundMosulandKirkukrequiredwell-trained,disciplined,andtacticallypatientleadersandconvoyescortteamsatalllevels.
SharetheRoadTheendofthesurgebroughtwithitmajorchanges
inhowsustainmentforcesaccomplishedtheirmissions.Oneofthesechangeswasthe“SharetheRoad”con-ceptforexecutingconvoys,whichwasintroducedatthistimebyMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq(MNC–I).(Seerelatedarticleonpage23.)ThisinitiativewasanefforttobringasenseofnormaloperationsbacktotheroadsofIraq.Coalitionforcesconvoyswereinstructednotto“owntheroad,”whichmeantthattheyhadtoceasesomeoftheconvoypracticestheyhadusedinthepast,suchasdrivingdownthecenteroftheroadandmakingoncomingtrafficmovetothesideoftheroadandstop.
Othertactics,techniques,andproceduresthatcoali-tionforcesconvoyshadimplementedovertheyearsandceasedduringthedrawdownincludedsettinguphastytrafficcontrolpointswheneverconvoyshadtoturnontoadifferentroute,operatingconvoysina“bubble”bynotallowingciviliantrafficwithin500feetofacoalitionforcesconvoy,andhanging“StayBack;DeadlyForceAuthorized”signsonguntrucks.
UndertheSharetheRoadinitiative,thesignswereremoved,civilianvehicleswereallowedtominglewithcoalitionforcesconvoys,andconvoysbeganoperatingpredominantlyatnighttoavoidaddingtocongestedciviliantraffic.The16thSustainmentBri-gadesuccessfullyimplementedSharetheRoadacross
thebrigade’sfootprint,exceptwithinMosul,wherethepersistentenemythreatrequiredstrictermeasurestomaintainconvoysecurity.
LogisticsTrainingandAdvisoryTeamsItwasaroundthissametimethatMNC–Ibegana
renewedefforttoassisttheIraqiSecurityForces(ISF)intrainingtheirlogisticsunits.U.S.Armydivisionsandthe3dExpeditionarySustainmentCommand(ESC)directedtheformationoflogisticstrainingandadvisoryteams(LTATs).TheLTATsbeganadeliberatetrainingprocessforIraqimaintenancecompaniesattheorgani-zational,division,locationcommand,anddepotlevels.
The16thSustainmentBrigadewasdirectedtoimmediatelystanduptwoLTATs,oneatK–1(Kirkuk)andoneatAlKasik,withanon-ordermis-siontostanduptwomore.AlthoughMNC–IhadarecommendedLTATstructuremodel,thecompositionofthe16thSustainmentBrigade’sLTATsfocusedonsubject-matterexpertsandtrainers;theLTATsthere-forehadmorewarrantofficersandnoncommissionedofficersthancommissionedofficers.AsanexampleoftheLTATs’success,bytheendofthebrigade’sdeployment,theIraqirepairmaintenancecompany(RMC)atK–1hadreceivedanawardfromtheIraqiArmyDirectorofElectricalandMechanicalEngineer-ingforbeingthetopRMCinIraq.
CombatPatrolsVersusConvoysWhilethe16thSustainmentBrigadewasinthe
processofimplementingSharetheRoadandstand-ingupLTATs,theU.S.andIraqiGovernmentssignedthenewbilateralsecurityagreement.TheagreementrequiredcombatpatrolstobepartneredwithISFatalltimes.Beforethesecurityagreement,sustainmentconvoyshadbeencalled“combatlogisticspatrols,”or“CLPs,”forseveralyears.Soifa“CLP”wasaformofcombatpatrol,thenithadtohaveanIraqiescort,eventhoughthesecurityagreementstipulatedthatlogisticsconvoyswerenotrequiredtohaveISFescorts.
Subsequently,on1January2009,the16thSustain-mentBrigadestoppedusingtheterm“CLP”andsub-stituted“convoy”inordertoensurethatsustainmentconvoyswereoperatingwithinthetermsofthesecurityagreement.Thischangeprovedtobequitechalleng-
The16thSustainmentBrigadeinIraq:SupportingtheDrawdown
by CoLoneL Martin b. Pitts anD Lieutenant CoLoneL robert s. Mott
The “Knight Warriors” faced the challenge of supporting operations in the transition from the surge to the drawdown.
A
MAY–jUNE 2010 19
ingbecause“CLP”hadawarriorconnotationand“convoy”seemedtoindicateagarrisonmentality.Eventually,theESCwouldpublishapolicyletteronusingtheterm“convoy”inplaceof“CLP”todem-onstratethatthechangeinterminol-ogyhadgeneral-officercommandemphasis.
IncreasedIraqiResponsibilityThe16thSustainmentBrigade
hadapproximately6monthsbeforethenextstepinimplementingthesecurityagreementcameintoeffecttogetusedtotherenewedemphasisonreturningIraqtonormalcondi-tionsandworkingthroughIraqiSecurityForces.ThatstepcalledforallcoalitionforcestobeoutofIraqicitiesby30June2009.ThisnewbenchmarkontheroadtofullIraqisovereigntybroughtevengreaterchallengestothetaskofcoordinatingthemovementofconvoysthroughthecityofMosul.
ISFandtheNinewaOperationsCommandfeltempoweredandconfidentthattheycouldridthecityofMosulofviolentextremistswithminimalassistancefromcoalitionforces.Consequently,toremainconsistentwiththemessageoftheirinformationoperationscam-paign—thatcoalitionforceswerenotoperatingwithinthecity—theISFonlyallowedcoalitionforcessustain-mentconvoysadaily4-hourwindowtomovethroughthecitylimitsofMosul.The4-hourmovementwindowcausedthe16thSustainmentBrigadetoincreaseitscoor-dinationeffortswithlocalbattlespaceowners.
HumanResourcesandFinanceDespitethefluxintheoperatingenvironment,the
deploymentaffordedthe16thSustainmentBrigadeagreatopportunitytosynchronizehumanresourcesandfinancialmanagementfunctionsamongthebrigade,thesupportoperationsoffice(SPO),andthespecialtroopsbattalion(STB).Followingsustainmentbrigadedoctrine,thesefunctionswereeffectivelymanagedbytheSPOandcommandedandcontrolledbytheSTB.Thisrelationshipshouldbethetemplateforbothcom-batdeploymentsandgarrisonoperations.
The16thSustainmentBrigadeSPOwasabletobuildandmonitornumerousconvoysthatrelocatedexcessequipmentfromnorthernIraqtosouthernIraqforeven-tualshipmentoutofthetheater.Thebrigade’seffortstoclearthecentralreceivingandshippingpointyardsofexcessequipmentinnorthernIraqwilleventuallyleadtoaseamlessandefficientredeploymentofSoldiersandequipmentfromtheJointIraqiOperationalArea.That,inturn,willallowthenewadviseandassistbrigadesto
focusonISFtrainingandtransitionandnotjustonret-rogradelogistics.
Duringits15-monthrotationinIraq,the16thSus-tainmentBrigadeplayedanintegralroleinlayingthefoundationfortheresponsibledrawdownofforcesoverthenext2½years.WiththebrigadeactingasthemayoroftheHaburGateborder-crossingsite,thebri-gade’splannerswereinapositiontoprovidedetailedinformationoninfrastructureandotherdatarequire-mentsforstrategiclogisticsplanningefforts.AstheseniormissioncommandofCOBQ-West,thebrigadealsowasabletoprovidevaluableinformationontheinfrastructureandoperationalintricaciesoftheCOB;thisinformationwillsupporttheCOB’s(planned)futureexpandedresponsibilitiesascoalitionforcesshifttoapostureofstrategicoverwatch.
Colonel Martin b. pitts was the CoMMander of the 16th sus-tainMent brigade during its deployMent to operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. he was previously the u.s. arMy europe deputy g–4 in heidelberg, gerMany. he holds Master’s degrees in publiC adMin-istration and strategiC studies. he is a graduate of the arMy CoM-Mand and general staff College and the arMy war College.
lieutenant Colonel robert s. Mott was the s–3 offiCer in Charge for the 16th sustainMent brigade during its deployMent to operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. he was previously the exeCu-tive offiCer for the 16th speCial troops battalion at baMberg, gerMany. he holds a baChelor’s degree in international relations froM ohio university and is a graduate of the arMy CoMMand and general staff College and the CoMbined logistiCs offiCers advanCed Course.
The commander of the 16th Sustainment Brigade and a local Iraqi community leader discuss the security situation in the community and at Contingency Operating Base Q-West in the village of Jaddilah Soflih, Iraq. (Photo by SFC Adam V. Shaw, 16th Sustainment Brigade PAO)
20 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
FuelSupportatContingencyOperatingBaseSpeicher
by Lieutenant CoLoneL vinCent C. nWafor, sergeant first CLass thoMas e. harreLL, jr., anD staff sergeant PauLa MiLLer
oldiersatContingencyOperatingBase(COB)SpeicherinIraqandacrossMulti-NationalDivision-North(MND–N)receivedthefuelsupporttheyneededduringOperationIraqiFreedom08–10thankstothepositiveleadershipandconcertedeffortsofthe16thSustainmentBrigade’s391stCom-batSustainmentSupportBattalion(CSSB)andthe3dExpeditionarySustainmentCommand(ESC).
ConvoysfromCOBSpeicherprovidedfood,water,ammunition,andotherclassesofsupplytoArmyunitsthroughouttheregion.Fuelforthoseconvoysandforotheroperationswasavailablewhenandwhereitwasneeded.TheSoldiersfromthe391stCSSBensuredcontinuityinfueloperationsatSpeicherbyusingasynchronizedfuelsupportnetwork,skillfulmain-tenanceofconsumptionfactors,andoptimumonsitefuelstoragecapacity.
SynchronizedFuelSupportThesupporttoCOBSpeicherwaspossiblebecause
ofthe3dESC’ssynchronizedfuelsupportnetwork.The3dESCwasresponsibleformanagingallstrategicfuelsourcescomingintotheIraqitheaterofoperations.AmongthesesourceswasthenortherngroundlineofcommunicationcomingfromHaburGateattheIraq-Turkeyborder;thislineprimarilysupportedCOBSpeicher.TheESCalsowasresponsiblefortheaterfuelstockageatdirectsupportandgeneralsupportfuelsites.The3dESCinfluenceddailyfueloperationsbypublish-ing96-hourfueldistributionrequests,whichdictatedeachfuelsite’sfuel“push”or“pull”supplyoperations.
Asanessentiallinkinthefuelsupportnetwork,the16thSustainmentBrigade,asubordinateelementofthe3dESC,wasresponsibleforthefuelflowfromHaburGatetodirectsupportandgeneralsupportfuelsitesforMND–N.Thebrigaderesuppliedthosefuelsitesbasedonthedailypetroleumreportsprovidedbysubordinatebattalions.
Soldiersfromthe391stCSSBwereresponsibleforfueloperationsatCOBSpeicher.Byworkingtogether,theunitsofthe3dESCfuelsupportnetworkensuredresponsivefuelflowandthebestfuelstockage.
ConsumptionFactorsandStorageCapacityFuelflowedfromHaburGatetotheCOBSpeicher
fuelfarmdaily.Nomiddlemanwasinvolvedinthe
throughput.Foreignnationalfueltankersescortedbythebrigade’sconvoyprotectionvehiclesdeliveredthefuel.Theidealturnaroundtimeforthesefueltankerswas72hours.Thestatusofthefueltankerswasbriefedatthebattalion,brigade,andESClevels.Thesebriefingsdem-onstratedcommandinterestinfuelsupplyoperationsandconstitutedoneofthereasonsthatfuelsupportatCOBSpeicherwasreadilyavailableandresponsive.
AccuratemaintenanceofconsumptionfactorsandoptimumonsitefuelstoragecapacitywerecriticaltoachievingsuccessfulfuelsupporttoCOBSpeicher.The3dESCusedaquarterlyconsumptionfactor;basedontheconsumptionfactor,Speicher’sfuelfarmstockageobjectivewassetat7daysofsupply.The391stCSSB’sexperienceshowedthatmaintaining7daysofsupplyofferednobuilt-inbuffertoaccommo-dateanydisruptionsintheresupplylineorotherexigencies,suchasbadweather,whichwerepartandparceloftheoperationalenvironment.Theriskwasmitigatedbymakingstoragecapacitymanytimesgreaterthanthestockageobjective,whichallowedactualfuelstockagetobewellabove7daysofsupply.Speicherbenefitedfromthefuelstockpileconcept.
The391stCSSB’sconstantcoordinationwithallpar-tiesinvolvedwasimportanttosuccessfulfuelsupport.Thebattalion’scollaborativeeffortswithdivisionele-mentsfosteredanticipatorysupport.TheCSSB“leanedforward”anddeliveredbulkfueltothebrigadesupportbattalion’ssatellitelocationsandprovideddedicatedfuelsupporttotheaviationsupportbattalion.TheCSSB’scoordinationwiththeMarinestoprovideretailfuelsup-porttotheirgroundassaultconvoyspassingthroughthebasewasparticularlysatisfying.
TheCSSB’sverticalcoordinationwiththe16thSustainmentBrigadeandthe3dESCwaspivotalinhelpingthefuelfarmtoprovideandreceivebackupresupplytoandfromtheJointBaseBaladgeneralsup-portfuelsite.DuringOperationIraqiFreedom08–10,theCSSB’sfuelteamdidwhatitdidbest:itcoordi-natedwithhigherheadquartersandsupportingunitstoprovidefuelwhenandwherecustomerswantedit.
TheFuelFarmCOBSpeicherfueloperationsfeaturedafuelfarm
andaretailfuelpoint,bothoperatedbycontractors.KBR’sCorpsLogisticsSupportServicesconducted
S
MAY–jUNE 2010 21
thefueloperations,andKBR’sTheaterTransportationMissiondistributedthefuel.Thefuelfarmandretailpointeachhaditsownworkforceofahandfulofexpa-triatesoverseeingsubcontractors.Thesecontractoremployeesreceivedfueltankers,downloadedthefuel,processedreceipts,madeissues,accountedforthefuel,andmaintainedthefacilities.
Day-to-dayfuelfacilityoperationsrestedonthebacksofthesubcontractorworkers.TheCOBSpeicherfuelfarmandretailfuelfacilitiesworkedlikeaSwissclock;theywereunderonemanager,thecommandclimatewasamiableandconducivetoseamlessopera-tions,andcross-talksbetweenthefuelfarmworkersandretailoperatorswereregular.
Retailfuelreplenishmentwasalsoprovidedonaregularbasis.Abouthalfoftheretailfuelissueddailywenttoonpostmobilerefueling(toppingoffgenera-torsandmaterials-handlingequipment).Theotherhalfwasissuedinsupportofmotortransportinandaroundthebaseandtoconvoyspassingthrough.Althoughtheretailfueldailyconsumptionratiowasaboutthesameastheretailfuelstoragecapacity,thefacilityneverran
outoffuel.Theretailfuelpointhadlocal-haultankersonstandbyandmadereplenishmentrunsasneeded;thispracticeprovidedanothersafetyvalvethatensuredsuccessinfuelsupportoperations.
Itshouldbementionedthatfueloperationsbecamecapitalizedunderthe391stCSSB’sleadership.Capi-talizationmeantthatthebulkfuelinventorywastransferredfromArmytoDefenseEnergySupportCenter(DESC)ownership.Asacapitalizedsite,bulkfuelissuedtonon-Armyunitswaschargedtothemilitaryserviceoftherespectiveuser.Beforethecapitalization,thecostofbulkfuelissueswasabsorbedbytheArmy.
ThefuelfarmoperatedunderstringentDESCrules.Thefuelfarmemployeescapturedallthebulkfueltransactions(receiptandissue)withrelatedtempera-tureconversionreadingsandenteredtheresultingdataintotheweb-basedFuelsAutomatedSystemEnter-priseServer.TheFuelsAutomatedSystemEnterpriseServerisanautomatedinformationsystemdesignedtosupportDESCandtheservicesinperformingtheirresponsibilitiesinfuelmanagementanddistribution.
391st CSSB Coordinates , sync hronizes , and manages COB Speic her fuel suppor t operations.
3d ExpeditionarySustainment CommandManages all s trategic fuel
sources into ITO. Manages theater fuel s tockage. Generates 96-hour
DS/G S fuel distribution request.
16th Sustainment BrigadeManages fuel resupply
from strategic source to DS s ites at MND–N. R esupplies or
redistributes fuel among its subordinate battalions .
Bulk Fuel F arm SupportRetail fuel point resupply.
BSB satellite locations push.ASB pull. JBB pull.
Retail Fuel Point Support COB Speicher tenant customers.
Convoy support center.
BSB and ASBProvide fuel
requirements to 391st CSSB.
COB Speicher Fuel Support Model
L egendAS B = Aviation support battalionB S B = Brigade support battalionC OB = Contingency operating base C S S B = Combat sustainment support battalion DS = Direct supportG S = General supportIT O = Iraqi theater of operationsJ B B = Joint Base Balad MND−N= Multi-National Division-North
The COB Speicher fuel support model shows the co operative management that was the basis for suc cessful fuel operations.
22 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Inputtingthedatafromfuelinventorystrappingchartswasasignificantpartofthedailytasks.[AccordingtoDODM4140.25,DODManagementofBulkPetroleumProducts,NaturalGas,andCoal,tank“strappingisthetermcommonlyappliedtotheprocedureformeasuringtankstoprovidethedimensionsnecessaryforcomputingcapacitytablesthatwillreflectthequantityofproductinatankatanygivendepth/level.”]TheCOBSpiecherfuelfarmcanproudlysaythatitmettheDESCstandardsduringOperationIraqiFreedom08–10.
ContractManagementStructureBecausethe391stCSSBhadtaskingauthorityover
thecontractors,thebattalionwasultimatelyaccount-ableforallfuelsupportoperationsatCOBSpeicher.Thebattalionpersonnelwhowereactivelyimmersedintheday-to-dayfueloperationsincludedtherespon-sibleofficer(RO),thecommoditymanager,andthecontractingofficer’srepresentative(COR).
TheRO,aqualifiedseniorpetroleumsupplyspecialist,providedoversightofCOBSpeicher’scapitalizedfuel-farmDefenseWorkingCapitalFundaccount.TheROacceptedaccountabilityandassumedrelatedpecuniaryliability.TheROdeter-minedandverifiedwhodrewfuelandensuredthatthefuelfacilitymaintainedanaudittrailforallfueltransactionsinaccordancewithDESCpetroleummanagementpoliciesandprocedures.TheRO’sgoalwastokeepthefuelfarm’sinventoryintoler-anceattheendofeachmonth,andthatgoalwasachieved.[Toleranceistheacceptablelevelofdevia-tionfromastandard.]
Thecommoditymanager,apetroleumsupplyser-geant,managedthedailyfunctionsoffuelsupportoperations.Thosefunctionsincluded—❏ Acknowledgingreceiptsoffuelresupplyandsend-
ingconfirmationreceiptstoDESC-Europetoallowthefuelsuppliertobepaid.
❏ Monitoringbulkpetroleumequipmentreadiness.❏ Providingtechnicalassistanceandguidancetocon-
tractoremployees.❏ Conductingonsiteinspectionsandaudits.❏ Analyzingfuelreports.❏ Projectingcurrentandfuturemissionrequirements
basedontheconsumptionfactorandstockageobjective.
❏ Transmittingthedatatothe16thSustainmentBri-gade,whichallowedthebrigadetomaketimelyandinformeddecisionsthatkeptthefuelfarmsuffi-cientlyresupplied.
ThecommoditymanagerservedastheCOR.Inthatcapacity,thesergeantensuredcontractorcompliancewiththeperformanceworkstatement.WhiletheCORmonitoredcontractorperformancedaily,formalfeed-backtothecontractorwasprovidedthroughmonthlyauditandprogramevaluationbriefs.
The391stCSSB’srelationshipwiththecontractorswasoneofmutualinterest:bothwerededicatedtoprovidingsuccessfulfuelsupport.Frankly,theCOBSpeicherfuelsupportmodelwasaproductofpositiveleadership—allelementsworkingwithacommongoaltogetthecustomersthefueltheywanted.
Thebattalion’ssuccesscontradictsafamousstate-mentfromGeneralNormanH.Schwarzkopf,thecom-manderofOperationsDesertShieldandDesertStormfrom1990to1991:“Youlearnfarmorefromnegativeleadershipthanfrompositiveleadership,becauseyoulearnhownottodoit.And,therefore,youlearnhowtodoit.”ThepositiveleadershipandunityofeffortseenintheCOBSpeicherfuelsupportmodelprovidedaninvaluablelearningexperienceonhowtomanageanddistributefueltoabase.
IfthefamousWorldWarIIGermancommanderFieldMarshalErwinRommel,knownasthe“DesertFox,”hadhadaccesstoafuelsupportnetwork,thechronicfuelshortagesthatplaguedtheGermansinNorthAfricamightnothavehappenedand“militarysupplyfailures”mightnothavebecomepartofourhistoricallexicon.PoorcommunicationbetweenRom-melandhislogisticsstaffhasbeencitedasafactorintheGermans’logisticsproblems.
IntheCOBSpeicherfuelsupportmodel,asynchronizedfuelsupportnetworkwasinplace,openlinesofcommunicationflourishedbetweenthesupportedandsupportingunits,mutualinter-estensuredsuccessfulsupportbetweenmilitaryandcivilians,andcustomersgotfuelwhenandwheretheyneededit.
lieutenant Colonel vinCent C. nwafor is the logistiCs operations Chief of standing joint forCe headquarters, u.s. afriCa CoM Mand. he Co-authored this artiCle when he was the support operations offiCer of the 391st CoMbat sustainMent support battalion in iraq. he holds a b.s. degree in aCCounting froM southern uni-versity at new orleans and an M.b.a. degree froM southeastern louisi ana university. he is a graduate of the arMy CoMMand and general staff College, the arMy logistiCs exeCutive developMent Course, and the arMy petroleuM offiCers Course.
sergeant first Class thoMas e. harrell, jr., was the petro-leuM supply operations re sponsible offiCer for the 391st CoMbat sus tainMent support battalion during the dep loyMent to iraq. he holds a baChelor’s degree in business adMinistration froM Central texas College. he is a graduate of the arMy water treatMent, petroleuM laboratory speCialist, and petroleuM logistiCs supply and serviCe Courses.
staff sergeant paula Miller served as a pe troleuM supply nonCoMMissioned offiCer for the 391st CoMbat sustainMent support bat talion in support of operation iraqi freedoM. she has CoMpleted the advanCed nonCoM Missioned offiCer aCadeMy petroleuM and water Course and the online defense distri bution ManageMent Course.
MAY–jUNE 2010 23
SharetheRoad:ConvoyEscort
ForthefirstfewyearsofOperationIraqiFreedom,theheightenedsecuritypostureontheroadsofIraqledcoalitionforcestoadoptaggressiveconvoytactics,techniques,andprocedures(TTP).Coalitionforces“owned”theroads.Simplyput,convoysdidnotsharetheroadswithIraqis.
Astacticalsituationsdictated,patrolorconvoycommandersinstructedtheirunitstodriveagainsttheflow—crossintooncomingtrafficanddriveagainsttraffic—ortodriveovermedians.Unitsmaintained“bubbles,”preventingciviliantrafficfromintermin-glingwithcoalitionforces.Civilianvehiclesenteringaconvoy’sbubblewereconsideredhostile.Anothertypicalcoalitionpracticewasspeedingorforcingmilitaryvehiclesthroughtraffic.ThesewerecommonpracticesthroughoutmostoftheIraqtheaterofoper-ationsuntiltheendof2008.Unfortunately,injuryanddeathofciviliansresultedfromtheaggressivenatureofthesepracticesthatwereintendedtoprotectcoalitionforces.
DecliningattacksledMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq(MNC–I)leaderstobelievethatitwastimetolowertheoverallsecuritypostureoftheirforcesontheroadsthroughoutthetheater.On1October2008,MNC–Iinstitutedthe“SharetheRoad”initiative,whichwasstartedjustbeforethesecurityagreementbetweentheUnitedStatesandIraqtookeffecton1January2009.CoalitionandIraqiforcesexpectthisinitiativetoresultinareturntonormalcy.Onthemainandalternatesup-plyroutes,SharetheRoadresultsingreatercivilianfreedomofmovementandasmallercoalitionforcefootprint.ThisinitiativeisbelievedtobeintegraltotheultimategoalofsuccessfullygivingcontrolofIraqbacktotheIraqipeople.
SharetheRoadRulesTosuccessfullyreturntheroadstotheIraqis,coali-
tionforceshavetochangetheirTTP.SharetheRoadisoneofthemethodsusedtomakethatchange.Someoftherulesofthisinitiativeinclude—❏ Travelintherightlanewhenfeasibleandallow
civiliantraffictopassfromthefrontandrear.
❏ Trafficmayinterminglewithaconvoyinthepro-cessofpassingbutshouldnotbeallowedtolingerinoralongsidetheconvoy.Itmustshowaprogres-siveattempttoexitormoveforward.
❏ Convoyswillnotpreventthenaturalflowoftrafficorforcetraffictostopunlessspecificcircumstancesorsafetyconcernsdictatedoingso.
❏ Convoyswillnotclearpathsthatarenotintendedfornormaltrafficflowunlessanemergencysitua-tionexistsorthemissionrequires.
❏ Considerallvehiclesfriendlyuntilprovenotherwise.❏ Continuoussituationalawarenessandvigilanceis
necessarybecauseofsomeIraqis’erraticdrivingpractices.Soldiersmustmakemeasureddecisionsandexecutetacticalpatiencewhenconsideringescalationofforce.
❏ Coalitionforcesmaynothave“StayBack”signsontheirvehicles,includingthe“Danger:StayBack100Meters”andallsimilarsigns.
❏ Unitsarepermittedtohavesignsthatstate“WhenSignaled,ProceedandPassWithCaution.”
❏ Convoyscanflowwithtrafficandareexpectedtoobeyalltrafficrulesunlessanemergencydictatesotherwise.
Underthisnewphilosophy,civilianvehiclescantravelwithconvoysandareconsideredfriendlyuntildeterminedotherwise.Thischangerequiresatotalshiftinthinkingonthepartofcoalitionforces,muchmoresothanonthepartoftheIraqipeople.However,theseguidelinesdonottakeawayaSoldier’sinher-entrighttoself-defense.Ifapotentialthreatexists,escalationofforceproceduresshouldbeinitiatedtodeterminehostileintentoraction.
ProblemsWithSharingtheRoadSharetheRoadistherightsteptotakeinorderfor
Iraqisocietytomoveforward.ItshowstheIraqisthatwecareabouttheirwell-beingandwantthemtotakeresponsibilityforthesecurityandsafetyoftheirroadsandcountry.AlthoughSharetheRoadisthewayfor-ward,thisinitiativecannotbeappliedtoallcoalitionforcemissions.
ConvoysecuritycompaniesescortingmilitaryandcivilianconvoysinaSharetheRoadenvironmentencountermanycomplexchallenges.Thesechallengesfallintwobasicareas:coalitionforcesecurityandIraqiciviliansafety.Forexample,atypicalcombatpatrol(4to5vehicles)caneasilysharetheroadwhilemaintainingpositivecommandandcontrolofitsele-ments.However,alogisticsconvoyescortingmilitary
by Major kris a. kough, Caarng, anD CaPtain Curtis a. goLLer iii, Caarng
Share the Road is the right step to take in order for Iraqi society to move
forward.
24 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
vehicles,KBRelements,orthird-countrynationals(upto50trucks)isextremelydifficulttoexecutesafelywhilesharingtheroad.
Withsmaller,nonlogisticsconvoys,onecanmain-taincommandandcontrolvisuallyandwithradiocommunicationswhileciviliantrafficmovesthrough-outtheelement.Thispatrolmayonlyspanacoupleofhundredmeters.Becauseofthesizeoftheunit,vehiclecommandershavebettersituationalawareness,makingreactiontimeshorter.
However,thesituationchangesdrasticallywhenthenumberofvehiclesintheconvoyincreasesgreatly(aswithlogisticsconvoys).Convoysecuritycompaniesescortlogisticsconvoysofupto50vehiclesthatfre-quentlyspanadistanceofmorethan5kilometers.Thiscreatesmanysecurityandcommandandcontrolprob-lems.Withonly6guntrucks,itisdifficulttosecurealargeconvoyof40to50trucks.Whenaconvoyisstretchedout,guntrucksmorethanlikelywillnothaveaviewoftheotherguntrucks,thusmakingoverlappingsecurityfortheconvoydifficult.Thesecurityelementhaspositivecontrolatthefrontandrearoftheconvoy,whereattacksaremostlikelytooccur,butcivilianvehiclesmayentertheconvoyatanytimefromthesideswithoutthesecurityelement’sknowledge.
SecurityRisksIraq’sroadsarenotinthebestcondition.Manyare
unstablefrompotholes,erosion,improvisedexplosivedevice(IED)detonations,andfrequentdigging(whichis
anindicatoroffutureIEDemplace-ment).Theshouldersoftheroadsarealsoverydangerousbecauseoferosionortamperinganddigging.UnderSharetheRoad,convoysaredirectedtostaytothesideoftheroadsociviliansmaypass.Unfortu-nately,thesideoftheroadiswheremostIEDattacksoccur.
Anothersecurityproblemforconvoysisproperexecutionofescalationofforce.WiththeSharetheRoadinitiative,weeliminatetheexistingsafestandoffdistancebetweencoalitionforceandcivil-ianvehicles,thuseliminatingthedistanceandtimeaSoldierhastodistinguishbetweenaninnocentbystanderandanindividualwithhostileintentoroneinitiatingahostileact.Wespendmanyhourstrainingonescalationofforceand
therulesofengagement,yetwehavereducedthetimehehastomakelifeordeathdecisions.
Vehiclesarepermittedtoapproachtheconvoysandpasswhendirected,movinginandoutoftheconvoyattheirleisure.Onceavehiclehasenteredtheconvoy,guntrucksmaynotbeabletoseethisvehiclebecauseoftheirplacementwithintheconvoy.Theoretically,avehiclecouldhideintheconvoyandtravelwithit.DuringourdeploymenttoIraqin2008and2009,weencounteredvehiclesemployingthistactic.Surprisingly,wealsofoundthatciviliantrucksenteredourconvoysinordertotravelundertheprotectionofourguntrucks.
Erraticdrivinghabitsofcivilianscanalsocreatesecurityproblemssincegunnersoncoalitionforce
vehiclesmaynotbeabletodistinguishbetweenaggressivedrivingwhileattemptingtopassandhostileintentortheinitiationofahostileact.
CivilianSafetyInadditiontothesafetyofcoalitionforcesandthe
securityrisksweacceptwhileexecutingthisinitiative,wemustexamineSharetheRoadbylookingatthe
A convoy travels along Main Supply Route Tampa in Iraq. Note the condition of the road and the shoulder of the road.
Most logistics convoys travel at night where
the highways are not lit, and drivers are always
fearful of being attacked at any moment.
MAY–jUNE 2010 25
risktociviliansafety.TheroadsthatcoalitionforcesandIraqisshareareinpoorconditionandindesper-ateneedofrepair.Theyareverynarrow,whichmakesthemdifficultforwidetruckstonavigate.
IraqiSecurityForcecheckpointsalongthemainroadschanneltrafficintofewerlaneseverycoupleofmiles.Manythird-countrynationaldriverscomefromallovertheMiddleEastandTurkey.Thismeansthatthosedrivershavedifferentlevelsofdriver’straining,vehiclemaintenancerequirements,andlicensingpro-cedures.Somedrivershavelittleornoexperiencedriv-ingbigrigs.
Mostlogisticsconvoystravelatnightwherethehighwaysarenotlit,anddriversarealwaysfearfulofbeingattackedatanymoment.DuringourmissioninIraq,weencounteredmanythird-countrynationalaccidentscausedbydriversfallingasleepatthewheel,faultybrakes,andmiscellaneousmaintenancebreak-downs.Manyoftheseincidentscouldhavebeencata-strophicifcivilianshadbeeninterminglingwiththelogisticsconvoys.
Theerraticdrivingbehaviorofsomecivilians,combinedwiththatofthethird-countrynationaltruckdrivers,increasesthenumberofaccidents.Thesecond-andthird-ordereffectsofthisinclude—❏ Slowerconvoytimesasthesecurityelementsofthe
convoysrespondtoaccidents.❏ Reducedavailabilityofquickreactionforcesthat
mustrespondtocivilianaccidents.❏ Increaseddemandsforrecoveryassetsbecauseof
increasedIEDdetonations.❏ Increaseddemandforairandgroundmedicalevacu-
ationbecauseofaccidentsandIEDdetonations.Attemptingtopassa50-vehicleconvoyisnotawise
decisionineitherIraqortheUnitedStates.Finally,whenconsideringtheconditionsoftheroadsandthedrivinghabitsandtrainingofthird-country-nationaldriversandcivilians,thesafestdecisionistoavoidlargeconvoysandtrucksatallcosts.
MitigatingSecurityandSafetyConcernsConvoysecuritycompanieshaveattemptedto
mitigatethechallengesofSharetheRoadbyimplement-ingvariousTTP.TheyhavebeeninstructedtoinstallredstrobelightsonleadandtrailvehiclestoprovideIraqiswithasignaltopass.Trafficintegrateswithconvoysinsomeinstances,suchasmaintenanceandemergencyhaltsandsmallerconvoys.Whenconvoysarehaltedonthesideoftheroadandvehiclesarenotseenasa
threat,theyarewavedbythelastguntruck.Informa-tionispassedtotheforwardguntrucksothatitcanmonitorcivilianvehiclespassingthehaltedconvoy.
Ontheotherhand,whenconvoysarehaltedforpossibleoractualIEDs,trafficishaltedinbothlanes.ThisisnottoimpedetheIraqis’righttousetheroadsbuttoensuretheirsafetyuntilthesituationisdealtwithappropriately.
Whenacivilianvehiclewantstopassasmallercon-voyandthedriverdoesnotappeartobethreatening,itisallowedtopass.Theconvoymonitorsitsmovementandensuresthatitcontinuestomoveuntilitclearsthefrontoftheconvoy.Civilianvehiclesarenotallowedtomeanderwithintheconvoys.ThisTTPtendstoworkwithsmallerconvoys,wherecommandandcontrolandsecuritycanmaintain“eyeson”thepassingvehicle.
Althoughdifficultattimes,convoysecuritycompa-niescontinuetoimprovetheirTTPtomeetthespiritoftheSharetheRoadpolicy.
Afterconductingover1,200missionsandtravel-ingalmostamillionmiles,ourtaskforcedidnothaveasingleaccidentinvolvingIraqicivilians.Itaccomplishedthisremarkablegoalwhilemaintain-inganappropriatesecuritypostureandrespectingtheIraqipeople’srighttohavesafefreedomofmove-mentontheirroads.SharetheRoadisthewayahead,anditworksforsmallerpatrols.However,toomanyuncontrollablevariablesmakeitadauntingtaskfora50-vehiclelogisticsconvoy.
Major kris a. kough, Caarng, is the exeCutive offiCer for the 1st battalion, 185th arMor regiMent (1–185th arMor) of the California arMy national guard. he was the battalion operations offiCer and perforMed a battalion seCurity forCe Mis-sion during operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. he holds a b.a. degree in history froM texas a&M university and a M.s. degree in eduCation adMinistration froM California state university, ful-lerton. he is a graduate of the arMor offiCer basiC and advanCed Courses, the CoMbined arMs and serviCes staff sChool, and the arMy CoMMand and general staff College.
Captain Curtis a. goller iii, Caarng, was the CoMMander of C CoMpany, 1–185th arMor, and was ConduCting Convoy seCurity operations in Multi-national division-north, iraq, when he wrote this artiCle. he holds a b.s. degree in business adMinis tration froM California polyteChniC state university at san luis obispo. he is a graduate of the arMor offiCer basiC and Captains Career Courses.
After conducting over 1,200 missions and travel ing almost a million miles, our task force did not have a single
accident involving Iraqi civilians.
26 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
LandWarNet:IsYourITWorkforceReady?
by Chief Warrant offiCer (W–3) Dannie WaLters
hensomeoneinyourunitinadvertently erasestheentirebattalionoperationsdatabase, wouldyouprefertorequestrestorationofthedatabasefromtheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)enterprisehelpdesk,whichisoperatedbyaDODemployeeorcontractormilesaway,orfromyourownresidentinformationtechnology(IT)personnel?Mostwouldprefersomeoneonsite.SohowcanyourunitcontinuetomaintainaneffectiveITworkforce?Thisarticleexploreschangesinthenetwork,identifiessomeofthechallengesunitsarefacing,andofferssomesug-gestionsonhowtoprepareyourITworkforce.
LandWarNetistheArmy’spartoftheDODITinfrastructurethatenablesoperationalforcesto“reachback”forinformationintheformofhigh-definitionintelligenceproducts,voice,video,andfigures.SinceLandWarNet’sinceptioninFebruary2004,itsgrowthhasspiraled,tacklingonemilestoneatatime.
Onecrucialmilestonewastopreparetheworkforceresponsiblefortheinnerworkingsoftheoperation.AsspecifiedinDODDirective(DODD)8570.1,Informa-tionAssuranceTraining,Certification,andWorkforceManagementDirective,DODdeviseda5-yearplantoupgradeitsworkforce“withtheknowledge,skillsandtoolstoeffectivelyprevent,deter,andrespondtothreatsagainstDODinformation,informationsys-tems,andinformationinfrastructures.”Inshort,DODrequiresitsITworkforcetohaveandsustaincommer-cialITindustrystandardcertifications.
Sohowdoesthatapplytoyourunit?WithLand-WarNet,aunitneedsmorethananappointmentlet-ter,familiarizationtraining,andon-the-jobtrainingtohaveaccessprivileges.Today,youhavetomeetallthenewrequirementsspecifiedinDODD8570.1ifyouwanttohaveaneffectiveITworkforcethatcanmeetyourunit’sITdemands.Otherwise,yourunitmustrelyheavilyonoutsidesourcestomeetitscommunicationandautomationneeds.
MoreITProductsWhathaschangedintheArmy’snetwork?One
immediatechangeisthatcomputers,collaborativesuites(suchasAdobeNetMeetingandMicrosoftBreeze),andArmyBattleCommandSystem(ABCS)equipmentareavailableinallunitsfromthebrigadetothecompanylevel.
LandWarNetdeliversservicesdirectlytothewar-fighters.Becauseofthisincreasedcapability,thenumberofITproductstomanagehasincreasedexpo-nentially.Fromtheperspectiveofthoseontheground,theamountofnewproductsandservicesseemsover-whelming.DuringmytourinOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF)08–10withthe16thSustainmentBrigade,atleasttwodozenprogramswereintroducedtoeithertheArmyorbrigade-andbattalion-levelunits.
ModularityisoneofthereasonsfortheincreaseinthenumberofITproductsatthebrigadeandbattalionlevels.Tokeepupwithallthechangesthatmodularitypresents,aunitshoulddocumentthem.Aseasyasthatsounds,manyunitsgothroughthetoilofresearchandotherbureaucraticstepstofixaproblemorinstallaservicebutfailtodocumenttheirsolutions.Duringourtour,wecouldhavesavedalotoftimeifwehadusedaspreadsheetofportnumbersandotherspecificationstohelpusdescribethenewsystemstothenetworkadministratorresponsibleforconfiguringthefirewall.
AnotherreasonfortheincreaseinITproductsistheArmy’sefforttoprocurecommercialoff-the-shelfequipmentthatappliestheconceptof“everythingoverInternetprotocol(EOIP).”Thisconcepthasbroughtanavalancheofnewproducts,suchasvoiceoverIPtelephones,videooverIP,videoteleconference(VTC)suitesoverIP,andevenradiooverIPproducts.Toitscredit,theArmyhaschosen,aspartofitsstrategicgoals,toreplacemanyoftheoldproprietarysystemswithcomparableEOIPequipmentthatiseasiertoinstallandmanageandcomplementsanemergingbroadband-data-capableworld.
EOIPequipmentpresentsafewchallengestobri-gadesandbattalions.Unitsusedtohavetotalcontrolovermostofthesystemsmentionedabove.Mostelec-tronicsnowhaveIPaddresses.Inthepast,equipmentlikeVTCsuites,securetelephoneequipment(STE),andconferencecallingequipmentjustneededanactivetelephonelinetooperate.Today,LandWarNetpro-videsthesameservicesbutwithasubtleprice:aunitdoesnothavetotalcontrolovertheproduct.TheunitcannotrelocateitsVTCsuitetotheconferenceroomdownstairsormoveasecuretelephonetoanotherareawithoutcallingthenetworkservicecenter(NSC)tomakethenecessarychangestoallowthistohappen.Incontrast,STEcouldbemovedwiththeapprovaloftheunit’ssecuritymanager.
W
MAY–jUNE 2010 27
Anotherbigchangeisthataunitdoesnotownitsportionofthenetwork.Thisincludesitsorganicsig-nalassets.Gonearethedayswhenaunitcouldbringitsownequipment,setitupaccordingtoitsstandingoperatingprocedures,andthencontractforservicestoalocalstrategicentrypoint(STEP)ortunnelthroughanotherInternetserviceprovider(ISP)foraccesstothelargernetwork.LandWarNet’sgoalisto“developandmaintainasecure,seamless,interdependentLand-WarNetnetworkbyleadingdevelopmentandenforc-ingtheuseofintegratedenterprisearchitecture.”Thisisadifficultconceptforunitstoaccept,butjustliketheequipment,Soldiersmustalsoevolve.Unitsmustmovetheirfocusfromowningtheequipmenttounder-standingthattheyarepartofalargernetworkwiththesharedriskandvulnerabilitiesassociatedwiththedigitalworld.
EnterpriseArchitectureIdeployedtoIraqinsupportofOIF08–10with
the16thSpecialTroopsBattalion,16thSustainmentBrigade.Itwasmysecondtimedeployingtothisregion,andthewaywemanagedthenetworkwasattimesextremelydifferentfromthefirsttime.Aswesataroundthetableforourfirstcontingencyoperatingbase(COB)S–6meeting,thefirstthingInoticedwasthatthiswasnotanall-Armynetwork.Beingaproductofthemobilesubscriberequipment(MSE)days,IwasusedtofieldingourownArmy-drivennetwork.Thistime,wesharedthenetworkwithDODciviliansandservicemembersfromotherbranchesandthisentitycalledthe“enterprise.”
Althoughtheenterprisewasnotaperson,wetalkedaboutitalotasweallcametogripswiththerealityofthenewenterprisearchitecture.Theissueofwhodidwhat—ownership—alsofrequentlyenteredourconver-sations.Tofigureoutownership,mostpeopleneedareferencepoint:theArmydoesitthisway,ortheAirForcethisway.Sowhichwayisright?TheframersoftheLandWarNetconceptanticipatedthissituationandoptedforacentralizedapproachthroughtheNSCs.Asmostunitsthathavedeployedarefindingout,theyarenotinchargeofthenetworkoreventheirpartofthenetwork,althoughtheycannegotiatemanyoftheterms.
SoWhatDoSignalSoldiersDo?Iwouldbelessthantruthfulinsayingthatwehad
alotofITworktododuringourOIF08–10deploy-ment.TheNSCdidmostoftheworkforus.Wespentourtimetryingtoavoidduplicationofeffort.ThiswasfrustratingtoalotofthesignalSoldiers,butitwasanunfortunatesideeffectofchange.Weareundoubt-edlyheadingintherightdirectiondespitethedrasticdeclineinITworkattheunitlevel.
Managersonthegroundshouldestablishmemo-randumsofagreementtosharetheworkandgivethetrainedpoolsofSoldierstheopportunitytoparticipateandexcelingroupprojects.
Agoodtimetosharetheworkloadiswhenthereisasurgeinpersonnelandextralaborisneededtopreparecomputers,improvethewiringofabuild-ing,orinstallcommunicationsequipmentinanewbuilding.Inadeployedlocation,manyjobscouldbeassignedtosignalSoldierstokeepthemproficientintheirskills.UnitsshouldcommunicatewhatresourcestheyhaveandofferthemtotheirNSC.Byseekingsolutionsjointlyandsharingthework,anorganiza-tionanditsNSCcancreateaworkingrelationshipthatcanultimatelybenefitsignalSoldiersandtheircustomers.
OurbrigadeS–6section(especiallythenoncommis-sionedofficers),incoordinationwithourCOBNSC,didagreatjobofrewiring,documenting,andinstall-ingnewservicestobuildingsontheCOB.Noonetoldthemtodoit;theydidittoprovideservicestothewarfighter.ImprovementswereseenallovertheCOB,andlessonslearnedwereusedtohelpdesigntheinter-nalinfrastructureofnewbuildings.
ObtainingCertificationAsDODspecifies,andasSoldiersofunitsthathave
returnedfromthewarzonehavefoundout,nooneisexemptfromtheITworkforcerequirements.Allper-sonnelwhosupporttheglobalinformationgridmustmeetthecertificationrequirements.
ThegoodnewsisthattheArmyandDODhavemanyresourcesforsupportingSoldiercertificationefforts.Duringourdeployment,wefoundthattryingtogetcertifiedistimeconsumingandchallenging.BothourSoldiersandtrainingmanagerswerebusyprepar-ingthemselvesthroughvariousmethods.SomeSol-diersenrolledinITprogramsofferedbycollegesanduniversities.Othersusedself-studymethodstopreparefortheircertifications.Duringthedeployment,myunitpurchasedITstudykits,startedatestingcenter,andformedstudygroupstohelpthosewhowantedassis-tancewiththeirself-studyefforts.
StartingatestcenterwaseasierthanIthought,althoughonoccasionwehadtocallthetechnicalassis-tancedeskforhelp.Fortunately,theywerehelpfulandpatientenoughtoassistusinestablishingourauthorized
By seeking solutions jointly and sharing the work, an organization and its
NSC can create a working relationship that can
ultimately benefit signal Soldiers and their customers.
28 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
testcenter.Eventually,wegotourtestcenterupandrunning.Mostofthepersonnelwhousedthefacil-ityappreciatedhavingatestcenterontheCOB.ThealternativewouldhavebeentotraveltoanotherCOB,whichinsomecaseswouldhaveremovedpersonnelfromtheirprimaryjobsforseveraldaysorevenweeks.Atthebeginning,aboutsixindividualstookthetestand50percentpassed.Althoughthiswasnotbad,weimmediatelystartedtofindwaystoimprovethepassrate,suchasestablishingstudygroups.
Duringourtour,wehosted4studygroups,whichamountedtoabout40studentswhowouldcometoourafterworkclasses3daysaweek.WecalledthesestudygroupsinsteadofinstructionalclassesbecausewedidnothavecertifiedinstructorstoteachComputingTech-nologyIndustryAssociation(CompTIA)Network+,CompTIASecurity+,orotherclasses.Thepercentageofthosepassingthecertificationtestimprovedslightlybutnotenough.
WeorderedtrainingmaterialsfromCarnegieMel-lonUniversity,whichprovidesDODD8570.1training.AlthoughtheirclassesaredeliveredviatheWeb,inourbandwidth-challengedenvironmentthecoursesoftentookalongtimetodownload,whichwasdis-tractingforstudents.WecontactedCarnegieMellonUniversity,andtheyprovideduswiththesamecoursecontentonaDVD.Withtheirpermission,wedupli-catedtheDVDformorethan124personnel.
ManyofourSoldiersthoughttheDVDswereagreatsourceofinformationthatgavethema“handsonapproach”whenparticipatingindemonstrationsandlabs(alsoincludedontheDVD).Mostappreci-atedhavinganactualinstructorgivingthemalectureonthesubjectinsteadofjustreadingitoutofastudykit.WiththeDVDs,wereceivedthepreparatorycoursesonComputerTechnologyIndustryAssocia-tion(CompTIA)Network+,CompTIASecurity+,CiscoCertifiedNetworkAssociate,andevenCerti-fiedInformationSystemSecurityProfessional.IfstudentspurchasedthesamecomparableinstructionalDVDsinthecommercialmarket,theywouldpaymorethan$5,000.
MakingtheITWorkforceSuccessfulHowcanaunitpostureitsITworkforcetosuc-
ceedinaccordancewithDOD8570.1–M,InformationAssuranceWorkforceImprovementProgram?ThankstotheinputIreceivedfromotherwarrantofficersandotherITprofessionals,Iofferthesesuggestions:❏ SurveyyourITinfrastructure,addthetraining
requiredtomanageyourITassets(suchasbootcampsandofficialcourseware),andrememberthatthisisanannualrequirement.
❏ KeepupwiththeeffortsoftheSignalCenterandtheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,andadjustyourtrainingplansaccordingly.
❏ FindtheDODD8570.1trainingbeingofferedinyourregion.Ifyoudonotknowwheretoask,thentryyourservicingNSCforhelp.
❏ BecomefamiliarwithDODandArmyInformationAssurancebestpracticesandincorporatethemintoyourtrainingplansandSOPs.
❏ AppointatrainingmanagerforyourITworkforce.❏ Yourtrainingmanagershouldregisterallofhis
workforcethroughtheArmyTrainingandCertifica-tionwebsite.
❏ Counselthemembersofyourworkforceonthetrainingrequirementsfortheirdutyposition,setadeadlinetogetthetrainingcompleted,andholdthemaccountable.
❏ RequestfreevouchersfromyourunitortrainingNCOforyourSoldiersandDODcivilians.
❏ NotifyyourdirectreportingunitorArmycom-mandofyourITworkforceposture,andworkoutastreamlinedagreementformanagingyourownsubunit.(Remembertopresentyourproposalasawin-winsituation,andensurethatyouworktogeth-erasoneteamtooperate,maintain,andprotectthenetwork.)
❏ EstablishaworkingrelationshipwithagoodITcertificationtrainingprogram.(Youmaybeabletoworkwithotherunits,piggybackontheirtraining,andlearnfromtheirchallenges.)
❏ LocateatestcenternearbysothatyoucanarrangeforyourSoldierstotestwhentheyareready.
❏ RecruitlocaltalentfromyourITworkforceorfromReserveComponentSoldierswhomaybequalifiedtoprovidesuchtrainingintheircivilianjobs.
❏ InvestinITself-studycertificationkits,whichwillnotonlyserveasready-referencematerialforyourITpersonnelbutwillalsoprovidematerialforthosewhohavethedesiretostudyontheirown.
LieutenantGeneralJeffreyA.Sorenson,theDepart-mentoftheArmyG–6,hasobserved,“BecausetheArmyismovingtoamodular,expeditionaryforce,LandWarNetmustfollowsuitandbecomemorestreamlinedthroughanenterprisestructure.TheArmyplanstoachievethatgoalwiththeuseofthenetworkservicecenters,whichfederatenetworksandcreatesaseamlessnetworkwhereveraSoldieris.”Whilethesechangesbringgreatadvantages,theycanleavesustain-mentunitsfeelingthattheyhavelostalevelofcontrolovertheircommunications.ThesolutionistotraintheITworkforcetooperateinthenewenvironment.
Chief warrant offiCer (w–3) dannie walters was a net-work ManageMent teChniCian for bravo CoMpany, 16th speCial troops battalion, 16th sustainMent brigade, during operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. he holds a baChelor’s degree froM the university of MiaMi and possesses CoMptia network+ and CCna CertifiCations.
MAY–jUNE 2010 29
hereisanoldsaying,“Afoolandhismoney aresoonparted.”Afterrecentnewsreportsof illegalactivitiesbysomeunscrupulousArmypayingagents(PAs)inIraq,perhapsanewadageisathand:“Adummyandhisdinararesoondamned.”AsthefinancialcostofOperationIraqiFreedomapproachesthecostoftheVietnamWar,billionsofdollarshavebeenentrustedtoPAs.
Thefinancialmanagementsupportoperationssec-tion(FMSPO)ofthe16thSustainmentBrigadewasresponsiblefortheoperationaloversightofaround300PAsinnorthernIraqwhilethebrigadewasdeployedfromJuly2008throughOctober2009.ThosePAswerefundedover$125millioninfiscalyear2009topayforprocurementandservicesdeemedvitaltosupportthewareffort.
PAsintheNewsItwouldappearthatthepresshasliftedaninfested
carpettorevealmaladroitembezzlerswhoarescram-blingoutlikecockroaches.Accordingtothepress,therehasbeena“waveofprosecutionsemergingfromthetangledandexpensivereconstructioninIraqandAfghanistan,”asKimMurphyreportsintheLos Angeles Timesarticle,“SomeU.S.troopstemptedbyreconstructioncash”(12April2009).
Murphygoesontosay,“TheJusticeDepartmenthassecuredmorethanthreedozenbribery-relatedconvic-tionsintheawardingofreconstructioncontracts;atleast25theftprobesareunderway.”ThearticledescribeshowanArmycaptaininIraqmanagedtoskimalmost$700,000incashfromreconstructionprojectsandpay-mentstoaprivateIraqisecurityforceknownastheSonsofIraq.Thecaptainis“accusedofpackingcashintoboxesandmailingthemtohisfamily’shome.”All
thewhile,hisleadersbelievedhewasmakinggreatcon-tributionstothewareffort.
Notallthenewsisbad.Inhis5June2008storyentitled,“MountainBrook,Alabamaofficerisplanner,paymasterinIraq,”TomGordonofThe Birmingham Newspostedapositivestoryaboutalieutenant,anotherPAinIraq,whousedmoneytoimproveavillage’seco-nomicstructureanditsattitudetowardthecoalition.However,thissamelieutenantwasinvestigatedafterheincurredamajorlossoffunds.SoarePAsheroeswhoaccomplishamissionthatisvitaltosuccessinIraq?Oraretheyactuallyabunchofscoundrelsrobbingusblind?Thetruthisnotalwayscutanddried.
RolesandResponsibilitiesofaPALetusstartourjourneyfortruthbytakingalookat
PAdutiesaccordingtotheproceduresinMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq’sstandingoperatingprocedure,MoneyasaWeaponSystem,andFieldManual1–06,FinancialManagementOperations.PAsareappointedbyafield-gradeofficerintheirchainofcommand.Theyrepresentfinancialmanagementcompany(FMCo)commanders,whodisbursecashtothemthroughthecompany’sdis-bursingagentstopayforcrucialwartimerequirements.TheservicingFMCotrainsPAsonallrequirementsfordrawingandsafeguardingfundsandclearingaccounts.
Beforedrawingfunds,PAsmustsignstatementsacknowledgingthattheyunderstandtheirdutiesandacceptpecuniaryliabilityforthosefundsiftheyhavealoss.PAsarenotauthorizedtodelegatetheirrespon-sibilities.APAmustalsofollowtheinstructionsofeithertheprojectpurchasingofficer(PPO)orfieldorderingofficer(FOO)whorepresentsthecontractingoffice,directsthePAtodrawfunds,andapprovesallpurchases.
PayingAgents:TheGood,theBad,andtheUgly
T
by Major biLL keLtner
Paying agents in Iraq have recently been scrutinized for mishandling Department of Defense funds. This article recounts some of those cases and provides lessons learned from the 16th Sustainment Brigade’s investigations into major losses of funds.
Critical support missions can be halted by PA losses. These losses equate not only to lost funding for the Army
but also to lost man-hours as investigating officers must be summoned to conduct a month-long investigation.
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PAsmustnotcommingleanyfunds,publicorprivate.And,veryimportantly,PAsmustsecurefundsasspecifiedinchapter3oftheDepartmentofDefenseFinancialManagementRegulation(DOD-FMR),Volume5.ThismeansthatifthefundsarenotinthePA’sphysicalpossession,theymustbesecuredinanapprovedsafetowhichonlythePAhasthecombination.
CriticalsupportmissionscanbehaltedbyPAlosses.TheselossesequatenotonlytolostfundingfortheArmybutalsotolostman-hoursasinvestigatingofficersmustbesummonedtoconductamonth-longinvestigation.
InvestigationsofMajorLossesofFundsThe16thSustainmentBrigade’sFMSPOoversaw
fiveinvestigationsintocircumstancesinvolvingmajorlossesoffunds.(Amajorlossisalossof$750ormore.)Mostoftheseinvestigationsdeterminedthatthelosseswerecausedbycarelessness.Theinvestigationsalsosometimesrevealeddeeperproblemsoffraud,waste,andabuse.
Onelossof$4,580.43wasdiscoveredwhenadis-bursingagentattemptedtoclearaPA’saccount.ThePAmaintainedthathehadalreadyturnedhismoneyinseveralmonthsearliertoapreviousdisbursingagent,whohadclearedhimandthenredeployed.However,thePAkeptnocopyoftheDepartmentofDefenseForm1081,StatementofAgentOfficer’sAccount,whichwouldhaveservedasproofofhisclearingtheaccount.Itdidnothelpmattersthatthenextdisburs-ingagentwaitedover4monthstoclearthePA.Bythetimetheinvestigationwasrequested,thepreviousdis-bursingagentwasnolongerintheArmy.
Inanothersituation,$1,000waslostbecauseadis-bursingagentwhowascoveringforanotherdisbursingagentonrestandrelaxation(R&R)leavefundedthewrongPAtomakea$1,000rewardpayment.ThisPAfailedtopayattentiontotheemailedinstructionsofhisPPO,whotoldthePAnottomakethepayment.ThePAclaimedthatafterreceivingthefunds,heaskedaround,foundtheawardee,andpaidhim.Later,theotherdisbursingagentcamebackfromR&R,butnoreconciliationhadbeendone.Consequently,thisdis-bursingagentfundedthecorrectPA,whoalsopaidtheawardee,thuscreatingadualpayment.
Anotherlossof$17,498.69wasreportedandinvesti-gatedbecauseaPAwasunabletoobtainthedocumen-tationneededtoclearhisaccountduringanongoinginvestigationintothequestionablepracticesofhisFOO.TheDefenseFinanceandAccountingService(DFAS),whichisresponsibleforgatheringevidenceanddeter-miningliabilityforlosses,laterreleasedthePAfromliabilitybutheldtheFOOliableforthelostfunds.
AnothercaseinvolvedaPAlosing$9,087.87becausehecommingledfundsanddelegatedauthor-
itytootherstomakepayments.Healsodidnotfollowestablishedtimelinesrequiringhimtoclearhisaccountevery30days.Hisclearingtookplace111daysafterhedrewfunds,andhedidnotmaintainaledger.
ThelieutenantwhowasmentionedfavorablyinThe Birmingham News wasironicallyalsothesubjectofamajorlossoffundsinvestigation.HewasdoinggreatworkasaPAfundingSonsofIraq,whoareformerSunniinsurgentswhoprovidesecurityservicesandhavebeencreditedwithhelpingcalmviolenceinthecountry.How-ever,helost$14,366.96.How?Hedidnotuseasafe.
Theinvestigationrevealedthatthelostcurrencyhadbeeninanassaultpackonachairinsidehislivingquar-tersand,incredibly,thathelefthisquartersunlocked.Heclaimedthatoneoftheunit’sinterpretersmayhavestolenthemoneywhilethefundswereunsecured.Clearly,thisofficerdidnotproperlysecurethefundsentrustedtohim.
ThePAlaterproducedawitnesswhoclaimedthatthePAhadaskedhiscommand,notonce,butseveraltimesforasafe.Inlightofthiswitness’sstatement,DFAScon-cludedthattheproximatecauseofthelosswasnotthathehadleftthefundsunsecuredinhisunlockedquartersbutthathiscommanderhadnotprovidedhimasafe,asshouldhavebeendoneinaccordancewiththeDODFMR.
Asofthiswriting,itappearsthelostfundswillnotberecovered.ThePAprobablywillnothavetopaybackthelostmoney,andDFASisleaningtowardholdinghiscommandertoblame.However,whilethelegalwheelsslowlyturnedandallowednewwitnesstestimonyforthedefense,thePA’scommanderredeployed.Regardless,commandersdonotholdpecuniaryliabilityforPAfundsinanycase.
However,nothavingasafewasjustthetipoftheicebergoffinancialmismanagementbythisPA’sunit.AnotherfactdiscoveredduringtheinvestigationwasthatthePA’sunitdidnotcallthemilitarypoliceafterthemoneywasallegedlystolen.Later,thesameunitincurredamajorlossoffundsbyanotherPA.
Totopthatoff,thissecondPAclaimedhisunit’slead-ershaddirectedhimtoshiftfundsfromapprovedcon-tractstopaytheSonsofIraq,whichwasnotproperlyauthorized.TheleadersclaimedtheSonsofIraqwascrucialtothesecurityoftheirtroops,andtheinvestigatorconductingthecommander’sinquiryrecommendedthatallpartiesbeonlycounseled.
FixingtheProblemsTohelppreventlosses,the16thSustainmentBrigade
FMSPO,the101stFMCo,the469thFinancialMan-agementCenter(FMC),andthe18thFMCinitiatedprogramstohelpPAs.Forinstance,theFMSPObeganmakingstaffassistancevisitstothePAs’locations.ThesevisitsallowedtheFMSPOtosharelessonslearnedandtoseeifPAswerefollowingpropersafeguardingproceduresbysecuringfundsaccordingtotheDODFMR.Theyalsoprovidedopportunitiestofindoutifanypressure
MAY–jUNE 2010 31
wasbeingputonPAstomakeimproperpurchases.StaffassistancevisitsandinspectionswerefundamentaltoimprovingthePAs’success.
ThesiteassistancevisitsrevealedthatmanyPAswerenotstoringfundsproperly.Inoneinstance,aPAwasstoringfundsinafilingcabinet.Inanother,aPAhadseveralthousandsofdollarsinatoysafethatcouldeasilyhavebeencarriedaway.Thesediscoveriesofnon-compliancewithsafeguardingprocedurespromptedtheFMSPOtosubmitanupdatetoMoneyasaWeaponSystemtowarnunitcommandersthattheymaybesubjecttoadverseadministrativeactioniffundsarelostbecauseofnegligence.
Topreventdualpayments,the101stFMCoestablishedadatabasefordisbursingagentstouseintrackingpay-ments.Nowproceduresrequirethatnewlyassigneddis-bursingagentsmakecontactwithalltheirPAstofurtherensureaccountabilityoffunds.
The469thFMCandthe18thFMCimplementede-Commerceinitiativestoremovecashfromthebattle-fieldandbuildconfidenceinlocalfinancialinstitutions.Onesuchinitiativewasapilotprogramfortheuseoflim-iteddepositoryaccountsatIraqibankssothatPAsmaywritechecksinsteadofcarryingcash.Furtherdecreasingtheneedforcashonthebattlefield,theFMConowpro-cessescontractsthatrequiremostlyelectronictransac-tionsasthemethodofpayment.
ThePAclearingpolicywasalsochangedafteraPAwaskilledbyaroadsidebombwhiletravelingtoclearhisaccount.ThepolicynowallowsPAstoclearviaemailiftheydonothaveanycashtoturninorpickup.
TofurtherassistPAs,sustainmentbrigadecom-mandersshouldusetheirspecialtroopsbattalions(STBs)forsupportinoverseeingPAoperations.TheSTBcanbetaskedtoprovidepersonnel,equip-ment,andtransportationcoordinationtosupportarobuststaffassistancevisitprogram.ThiswouldhelptoensurethatPAsareproperlysafeguardingfunds,especiallyatlocationswheretheSTBalreadyhasadministrativecontroloverfinancialmanagementunits.TheSTBcommandercouldtasktheFMCocommandertoensurethatdisbursingagentswithintheirfinancialmanagementdetachmentstaketimetoperiodicallyvisitPAslocatedattheircontingencyoperatingbases.
Improvingfinancialmanagementonthebattlefieldevenfurther,anew,enhancedPAtrainingprogramthatincorporateslessonslearnedisunderwayinIraq.Also,the469thFMCisinchargeofplanningandexecuting
thisyear’sDiamondSaberexercise,whichistheArmy’spremierannualfinancialmanagementtrainingexercise.TheexerciseprovidesrealistictrainingforFMwarriorsofallcomponentsandwillassistintheirpreparationfordeploymenttotheatersofoperations.Thisyear,allsustainmentbrigadeFMSPOswereinvitedtoattendDiamondSaberatFortMcCoy,Wis-consin,from6to19June.
Anylossoffundscapturesourattention,andincorpo-ratinglessonslearnedintotrainingreducesthelikelihoodtheywillhappenagain.Thelossesmentionedabovearetheexception,andasbadaslossesare,thingshavenotexactlygonetopieces.Almost300PAsinnorthernIraqarecurrentlydoingagreatjobspendinghundredsofmil-lionsofdollarsintheireffortstofundcrucialmissionrequirements.Stridesarebeingtakentoassisttheunsungheroeswhorisktheirlivesindangerousterritoriesastheyprovidecriticalsupportandsecurityforourtroops.
Onedisbursingagentdescribedthetrulyoutstand-ingaccomplishmentsofthePAsworkinginhisareainthisway:
AsPAsforSonsofIraqandtheCommanders’EmergencyReliefProgram,theyassumedrespon-sibilityfornineSonsofIraqcontractsandalargeliteracyprogram.Theyeachdisbursedaround$1,000,000astheyworkedcloselywiththe[dis-bursingagent]toensurethecorrectdenominationsofIraqidinarwererequestedandonhand.Duringtheirwatch,theprogramprogressedfrompayingtheSheiksdirectlybylumpsumtoconductingpaydayactivitieswhereeachindividualSonsofIraqcontractorwaspaidbythePA.TheirworkasPAssavedlivesandimprovedthelivingconditionsintheirareaofoperations.
Perhapsthereareafewbadapplesinthebunch.Buttruthfully,theArmy’sPAsareoutstandingheroeswhosustainthewarfighterbyhelpingcommandersusemoneyasaweaponsystemandasanonlethalmeanstoachievevictoryonthebattlefield.
Major bill keltner serves as the Chief of training and operations for the 469th finanCial ManageMent Center. he was the Chief of finanCial ManageMent operations for the 16th sustainMent brigade during its 15-Month deployMent in iraq. he holds an undergradu-ate degree in english froM the university of south alabaMa and is a graduate of the adjutant general offiCer basiC and advanCed Cours-es, the planning, prograMMing, budgeting, and exeCution systeMs Course, and the CoMbined arMs and serviCes staff sChool.
The site assistance visits revealed that many PAs were not storing funds properly. In one instance, a PA was storing funds in a filing cabinet. In another, a PA had several thousands of
dollars in a toy safe that could easily have been carried away.
32 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
LogisticsSupportinanAustereEnvironment:TheMissiontoSinjar
by CaPtain jaCk a. tyer, tnarng
hemissionoftheU.S.MarineCorpsat Sahl-Sinjar(referredtoasSinjar)maywell beoneoftheunsungsuccessstoriesofOperationIraqiFreedom.Setuptopreventweap-onsfromenteringIraqfromSyria,themissionwasoriginallyintendedtobeoneofshortduration.BecauseoftheirinitialsuccessinblockingaccessfromtheSinjarMountains,theirlongpatrolrange,andtheirrapidstrikecapabilities,theMarines’missionwasquicklyextendedfrom90daysto“tobedetermined.”
The30thCombatSustainmentSupportBattal-ion(CSSB),locatedatQayyarah-West(Q-West),becameawareoftheMarine’smissioninSeptember2008.Thesupportoperationsserviceandsupportofficerinchargeimmediatelybeganworkonhisunit’sconceptofsupporttosupplementtheopera-tion,whichwastobeginthefollowingmonth.
AlreadytaskedwithaheavyoperatingtempoinageneralsupportroleforMulti-NationalDivision-NorthatQ-West,the30thCSSB,underthe16thSustainmentBrigade,supportednorthernIraq—about20,000squaremiles—withfreight,food,andfuel.TheadditionofthedirectsupportmissionfortheMarinesrequiredthe30thCSSBtoresponddirectlytotheneedsoftheunitatSinjar.Thiswasadeparturefromitsregularmethodofoperation.
ProvidingSupportThevicinityofSinjarisasdesolateasonecould
imagine.TheMarineCorpshasareputationforselectingausterelocationstosetupoperations,andtheirbasecampwasanexampleofthistendency.TheMarinessetupcampwithnopermanentbuild-ingswithintheirenclave.Infact,thebasecamp’sonlypermanentconstructionwastheairstripandtaxiway.TheexterioroftheMarinecamp’sperim-eterandalloftheprotectivebarrierswerepushedupearth,whichwouldhavebeenT-walledconcreteandHescobarriersinapermanentcamp.
TheMarinesmovedintoSinjarandsetupshopinlateOctober2008.Theirlivingandofficespacesweretents.Becauseoftheausterityoftheoperat-ingenvironment,theyhadtobringeverythingtheyneededfortheoperationfromAlAsadandTaqqa-dum,includinganexpeditionaryairfieldcontroltower.TheMarinesprovidedmaildistributionanddisbursementservicesfrom20-footcontainers.
AsanexampleoftheexpeditionaryspiritpresentatSinjar,alloftheelectricalwiringwasinstalledbyMarineelectricianjourneymenfromthe1stMarineLogisticsGroup.Theunitconstructedsanitaryfacili-tieswithplywoodand55-gallondrumscutinhalftocontainwaste.ThedisposalofsaidwasteinvolvedthejudiciousapplicationofJP8andatorch.Withnopub-licworksandnocontractorspresent,theMarinestookcareofbusiness“theold-fashionedway.”
The30thCSSB’ssustainmentconsistedoffoodandwater,fuel,andemergencyrepairparts.Withatentativeplanforsupportinplace,the30thCSSBselectedthe51stTransportationCompanytoprovidesecurityforthefirstmissionon3November2008.Escortingthe353dTransportationCompanytoSinjar,theconvoycarried98,000gallonsofJP8,2,000gallonsofbulkwater,and5daysofsupplyofbothfoodandbottledwater.
Theconceptformovementwasassimpleasitwasefficient.WithForwardOperatingBase(FOB)
T
MAY–jUNE 2010 33
SykeshalfwaybetweenQ-WestandSinjar,theSoldiersofthe30thCSSBwouldtraveltoFOBSykesandremainovernight.(ThecityofTalAfarlaybetweenQ-WestandFOBSykes.Theday-timetrafficcongestioninTalAfarhadlongbeenasourceofdelay,withdaytimetrafficcapableoflengtheninga3½-hourdrivetoasmuchas9hours.)TheywouldpushoutfromFOBSykestoSinjarearlyonthesecondday,deliverthepayload,andreturntoFOBSykesforanotherovernightbeforereturningtoQ-West.
WhiletheMarineunitwasmovingtoSinjar,the371stSustainmentBrigadeatAlAsadwasshippingashower,laundry,andclothingrepair(SLCR)teamtoSinjarviaQ-West.Inaninterbrigademovementbetweenthe371stSustainmentBrigadeandthe16thSustainmentBrigade,whichwasalsolocatedatQ-West,theSLCRunitwaspickedupatJointBaseBaladandshuttledouttoFOBSykestoawaitmovementtoSinjarwhentheMarineswerereadytoinstallit.
ThefirstconvoyleftQ-Weston3NovemberandarrivedatSinjarthenextdaywithoutincident.Withthefirstconvoysuccessfullycompleted,theMarinesandSoldiersbegantoworktogethertobuildasuc-cessfulrelationship.
CorrectingDeficienciesOneofthefirstglaringdeficiencieswasinthe
estimateforclassI(subsistence).Theoriginalesti-mateforunitgrouprations(UGRs)submittedtothe16thSustainmentBrigadebythe2dMarineExpeditionaryForcecalledformanymoreUGRsthantheMarinescoulduse.BecausetheMarineshadnofieldkitchenincampandwereconstantlyatoutpostsoronpatrol,theyusedthreetimesasmanymealsready-to-eat(MREs)asoriginallyrequest-ed,andtheUGRssatmostlyunused.Whilethe
A contract carrier resupplies bulk water for use in the laundry
and shower facilities.
Armored forklifts unload palletized water that was delivered by armored tractors.
34 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
MarinesconsumedmostlyMREsandsomeUGR–Es(express),whichareself-heatingandself-containedrationsthatfeed18troops,theSoldiersofthe30thCSSBworkedtorestoreabalanceintherationcycle.Ultimately,the30thCSSBprovidedeightcontain-ersforclassIstorageandtheMarinessetupafieldkitchenattheSinjarcamp.
Bulkfuelwasanotherinitialissueofconcerntobothparties.The30thCSSBwaspushing98,000gal-lonsofJP8andwasinitiallyinformedthatthiswasthebase’smaximumfuel-storagecapacity;however,theMarineswereactuallyabletostoremuchmore.Withtwofuel-issuepointssetup,oneforaviationandoneforgroundvehicles,theirpotentialfuelconsumptionrateswerealsogreaterthanoriginallyassessed.
Withtheirtwokeysustainmentresourcesinastateofdisarray,theMarinesandthe30thCSSBreal-izedtheyneededaliaisonofficer(LNO)inplacetoreducethechanceforanymiscommunication.LateinNovember2008,aMarinegunnerysergeantwenttoQ-WesttoactastheLNO.Immediately,theArmyandMarineunitsbegantoworktogetherbetter.
MakingDeliveriesSettinguparesupplycycleoftwodeliveriesaweek,
the30thCSSBpushedoutfromQ-WestonMondaysandFridays,deliveringtoSinjaronTuesdaysandSat-urdays.WithbottledwaterandrationscomingfromQ-West,the30thCSSBpickedupanaverageof30,000gallonsofbulkwateratFOBSykesusingKBRassetsandtransporteditwiththeresupplymission.Thispro-videdfreshwaterfortheSLCRteam,whichhadsetupbothshowersandlaundryfacilitiesforcampsupport.
SoonaftertheLNOarrived,the30thCSSBbeganshippingrationsupplementstoSinjartoaugmentfieldrations.ThiswasamilestonefortheMarinesinthefield.Theadditionofanoccasionalcoldsoda,bagofchips,andsnackcakeorhoneybunimprovedthevari-etyoftheMarines’dietconsiderably.
WiththeinitialoperationalsuccessoftheMarines’presence,theoperationatSinjarquicklyexpandedandwasextended.Originallynumbering2,100,theMarines’headcountswelledtoalmost3,300,andtheirendofmissionwentfrom“90days”to“tobedeter-mined.”Thistroopsurgeforcedthe30thCSSBtoreevaluateitssupportstrategy.
Expeditionary forces are protected by built-up earth berms.
MAY–jUNE 2010 35
Now,alreadyusingmilitaryhaulassetsfromthe353dTransportationCompany,the30thCSSBtaskedthe51stTransportationCompanyandthe497thTransportationCompanytoprovidehaulassetsandplacedaforwardlogisticselementfromthe497thTransportationCompanyonthegroundatFOBSykestoincreaseresponsivenesstothemission.
Withaself-supportingelementnowonly3hoursfromSinjar,the30thCSSBcouldshuttleitssuppliesstraighttoFOBSykesandtheforwardlogisticsele-mentcouldsendthemonwithanylast-minuteadjust-ments.Inthisway,the30thCSSBcould“push”alittleheavytoFOBSykesandhavesomeflexibilityincasetheMarines’requirementsincreased.
Havingestablishedsomesenseofcivility,despitethedesolateconditions,theMarinesnextlookedatfurtherimprovingtheirposition,includingset-tingupafieldkitchen.The30thCSSBincreaseditscapabilityfortransportingrefrigeratedfoodanddeliveredfreshfruitsandvegetablestocomplementtheupgradedrationsthattheMarinespreparedintheirfullyfunctionalfieldkitchen.
After5monthsofchallengesandsuccesses,theMarinesandthe30thCSSBhadproducedfruitfulresultsbyworkingtogether.BytheendofMarch2009,the30thCSSBhadshipped1,748,000gal-lonsofJP8,64,260casesofbottledwater,andover32,000casesofMREsandUGRstoSinjar.
Followingthiscontinuedtrackrecordofsupporttoabarren,desolatearea,theMarinesatSinjarreceivedasteadysupplyofclassesI,IIIB(bulkpetroleum,oils,andlubricants),andwhenneeded,emergencyclassIX(repairparts).
Captain jaCk a. tyer, tnarng, is the transportatin offi-Cer for the 30th CoMbat sustainMent support battalion, tennessee arMy national guard. he wrote this artiCle while deployed to operation iraqi freedoM. he holds a b.a. degree in gerMan froM the university of Mississippi and is a graduate of the assoCiate logistiCs exeCutive developMent Course, the joint logistiCs Course, the Multinational logistiCs Course, the CoMbat developMents Course, and the arMy airborne sChool. he was sCheduled to graduate froM the theater logistiCs studies prograM in May.
Although they are housed in tents, the food service and laundry and shower facilities are greatly appreciated by the Marine personnel.
36 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ResourcingandTrainingaLevelIIILogisticsTrainingandAdvisoryTeam
by Lieutenant CoLoneL CarLos e. LoPez
ustainmentbrigadesandcombatsustainment supportbattalions(CSSBs)deployingto OperationIraqiFreedommustbepreparedtoassumeavarietyofmissions.OnemissiontheseunitsmustbereadyforisapartnershipwithIraqilogisticsthird-line(levelIII)units,whichtheU.S.Armyreferstoasdirectsupportunits.Thisarticleisintendedtohelpsustainmentunitsunderstandwhatisrequiredtotrain,resource,andprepareforthelevelIIIlogisticstrainingandadvisoryteam(LTAT)mission.
SustainmentbrigadesandCSSBsprovidethenecessaryqualifiedpersonneltotrainandadvisetheIraqiArmy(IA)astheytransitiontoaself-sustaininglogisticsforce.Helpingthird-lineIAlogisticsunitstooperatemoreeffectivelyandprofessionallyremainsachallengethatrequiresfullunderstandingoflevelIIIlogisticsproceduresandpoliciesaswellasfamil-iarizationwithotherlevelsofIAlogisticsunitsandtheirpartneredcoalitionunits.Sustainmentunitper-sonnelmusthaveculturalawarenesstohelpIraqisachievethedesiredself-reliantIAlogisticsposture.
TheObjectiveofSelf-SufficiencyAsU.S.forcescontinuetoreducetheirpresence
inIraq,thepossibilityofastableIraqdependsheav-ilyontheabilityoftheIraqiSecurityForces(ISF)tobeself-reliantandcapableofsustainingtheirforceswithoutexcessivecoalitionoversight.Theobjectiveofself-sufficiencyisthemaingoalofU.S.andcoalitionlogisticspartnering.
In2005,theIraqiAssistanceGroup(IAG)wascre-atedaspartoftheMulti-NationalSecurityTransitionCommand-Iraq(MNSTC–I)toserveasacoordinat-ingagencybetweenIraqicombinedworkinggroupsandMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq.IAGhasprovidedbehind-the-scenessupporttomilitarytransitionteamsandpartneringunitsastheyhelptobuildforwardISFcapability,allowingtheIraqistoadaptandleadtheireffortsinachangingoperationalenvironment.ThistrainingandassistancepartneringbroughtearlyimprovementstotheIA’sfourlevelsoflogisticssus-tainmentanddistribution.
Despitethecoalition’ssteadyemphasis,progresstowardself-sufficiencyhasbeenastruggleforIraqipart-nerunits.Iraqilogisticiansstilllackdisciplineinadher-ingtoestablishedprocessesanddependoncoalitionforcestohelppromotesuccess.Asinglestandardized
Iraqilogisticssystemisfarfrombeingareality;whatcanbeaccomplishedeasilyinoneIAdivisioncanbeachallengeinanother.
Nowandinthenearfuture,thedeployedexpedi-tionarysustainmentcommands(ESCs)inIraqmustemphasizetheprofessionaldevelopment,training,andprogressoftherepairmaintenancecompanies(RMCs)thatoperateinthe13IAlocationcom-mands(LOCOMs),whichprovidedirectsupporttobrigade-and-belowIAunits.AnRMC’smissioncanbestbeequatedtothatofaU.S.Armydirectsup-portmaintenancefacilityorsupplysupportactivity.ThesustainmentbrigadesandCSSBstrainingtheselevelIIIunitswillbechallengedbytheanticipatedreductioninresourcesandfewerU.S.capabili-tiesinthetheater.ESCs,thesustainmentbrigades’higherheadquarters,willcontinuetopartnerandsynchronizelevelIIIcapabilitieswithotherlevelsofcoalitionlogisticspartnerunitstoensurethatastrongandself-reliantIraqisustainmentnet-workremainsrelevantandcapabletosupportISFdemands.
ThegoalofESCsandtheirsubordinatecom-mandsistoreachan“overwatch”phase(alsoknownas“partneringwithpurpose”),inwhichthird-lineLTATsassumealessactiverolewhileprovidingregularadviceandfeedbacktotheirIApartneringunits.LTATsfacilitatethisbyattend-ingreviewandanalysismeetingstoensurethatcoordinationisavailableamongalllevels.Duringtheoverwatchphase,third-lineLTATsshouldbepreparedtosupporttheRMCsifsupporttoISFisseverelyinterrupted.
AccuratelyassessingtheprogressofIraqiself-sufficiencyisachallenge.Manyreportingchannelsexistthroughthevariouschainsofcommandandthedifferentlevelsofcoalitionpartnership.OtherunitstrainingandadvisingIAunits,suchasbrigadesupportbattalions(BSBs)andmilitarytransitionteamsthatsupportlevelsIandIIoperations,reporttotheirtacti-calpartnersandIAG.
Alogisticsmilitaryadvisoryteam(LMAT)isanothertypeofpartneringunitthathelpstrainandadvisetheIALOCOMs.LMATsreportthroughMNSTC–Ichannels,andthesustainmentbrigadeLTATsreporttoESCs.Sometimestheunitsreportdif-ferentperspectivesoftheIraqis’self-sufficiency.This
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MAY–jUNE 2010 37
couldbealleviatedbymakingtheLMATsthesolereportingauthorityformeasuringtheprogressofIraqilogisticsself-sufficiencyinIAdivisions.BSBswouldprovidecustomerinputtoLMATs,LTATswouldreporttheIraqis’directsupportcapabilities,andtheLMATswouldanalyzetheinformationandconsoli-dateitintoonereport.
SustainmentbrigadecommandersworkspecificissuestoimprovetheoverallperformanceofRMCsbypersonallyconductingkeyleaderengagementswiththird-lineIAleadership.TheRMCs’progressandcapabilityassessmentsarereportedtotheESCcommanderthroughweeklyandmonthlyreportsandscheduledperiodicLTATreviews.ThesustainmentbrigadeISFcellisresponsibleforcoordinatingactionsbetweentheESCISFcellandtheLTATs,aswellasplanningkeyleaderengagementsforthesustainmentbrigadecommander.
PreparingfortheLTATMissionDuringthepredeploymenttrainingphase,sustain-
mentbrigadeandCSSBcommanderscanpreparetheirstaffsandsubordinateunitstobetterunderstandthetaskorganizations,commandandcontrol,andsup-portrelationshipsamongcoalitionforcesandIAunits.SustainmentbrigadeandCSSBcommandersshouldalsocoordinatewiththedeployedunitsthattheywillreplaceintheatertoidentifyanyuniqueissuesinresourcingandtrainingthattheirLTATwillberesponsibleformanaging.
Beforedeploying,CSSBsshouldidentifyspecificmilitaryoccupationalspecialties(MOSs)andkeylead-ersneededfortheLTATmission.TheorganizationofeachLTATisuniqueandmustbetailoredtopartnerwithitsassignedIARMC.
Undernormalconditions,athird-lineLTATisledbyacompany-gradeofficer(oranexperiencedwar-rantofficer)andtwoexperiencednoncommissionedofficers(NCOs).DependingonthetaskorganizationoftheRMC,someLTATsareorganizedwithanaddi-tionalNCOwhoservesastheteamNCO-in-charge.SoldierswithadditionalskillsetsareroutinelysenttoanLTATtoprovidereachbackcapabilityandtosupportspecifictrainingrequirementsplannedbytheLMATsandLOCOM.
ExamplesofreachbackMOScapabilitiesthataCSSBshouldconsiderduringmissionanalysistosup-portRMCsincludetransportation,ammunition,fuel,small-armsrepair,andpowergenerationrepair.OneofficerfromtheCSSBstaffshouldbeassignedtheresponsibilitytocoordinateandsynchronizerequire-mentsamongtheLTAT,sustainmentbrigade,andESCISFcells.
TherelationshipbetweentheLTATandtheLMATmustremainstrong,synchronized,andreadytoachievetheoveralltrainingobjectivesthatsupporttheLOCOM.
LTATResponsibilitiesAthird-lineLTATisresponsiblefortrainingand
advisingRMCsinmaintenance,supply,anddistribu-tiontasks.ThesetrainingtasksareassignedbytheESCstothesustainmentbrigadesandhelptheLTATstoremainproficientintrainingandadvisingtheRMCsthatsupportIAdivisions.Thetasksarecriticalinassistingthird-lineIAlogisticianstosustainthetacticalandstrategiclevelsoftheISFlinesofoperations.
Maintenance. MaintenancetasksincluderepairtoIAvehiclepowertrains,differentials,andwiring.Maintenancetrainingmustalsoincludewelding,bodywork,andpainting.Themaintenancefocusmustbeonallrepairsthattakemorethan36man-hourstocom-plete.Jobsthatrequiremorethan72hoursareevacu-atedtolevelIV.
Supply.SupplytasksincludeclassIX(repairparts)supplyandsupportactivities.RMCsmustattainabaselineunderstandingofhowtoissue,store,receive,andprocessparts.OnceanunderstandingofclassIXpartsisachieved,trainingtaskswillexpandtootherclassesofsupply.
Distribution.DistributionincludeslevelsIandIImotorizedtransportationregiment(MTR)distribu-tioncapabilitiesandlevelIVgeneraltransporta-tionregimentdistributioncapabilities.TheRMC,withoutorganictransportation,musthaveasolidunderstandingofhowtomonitorandtracktheflowofpartsandequipmenttoandfromalllevelsoforganizations.
UnderstandingtheIraqiArmySustainmentbrigadelevelIIILTATsmustunder-
standIraqiculture,doctrine,andprocessestodevelopIAleadersandensurekeyoperationallogisticssuccess.EachRMCisuniqueandrespondsdifferentlybasedontheareaofoperations,regionalatmosphere,andperson-alityofindividualIAcommanders.EachtrainingandadvisoryteamisuniquelyorganizedtoprovidetrainingthatistailoredtosustainIAorganizationswithintheirassignedareaofoperations.TheESCcoordinatesthetrainingofallsustainmentbrigadeLTATpersonnelandtheirleadersthroughIAGchannels.
A single standardized Iraqi logistics system is far from being a reality; what can be accomplished
easily in one IA division can be a challenge in another.
38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ThePhoenixAcademyoffersLTATsandotherpersonnelsupportingtheISFa6-daycoursethatcov-ersmanyimportanttopics,includingArabic,thehis-toryofIraq,ISForganizationsandtheirfunctions,IAlogisticspractices,andLTATpartnering.ThecoursealsoincludesanoverviewandterrainwalkoftheTajiNationalDepot.TheseandothermaintopicsaredesignedtogiveLTATsandotherISFsupportingteamsthenecessaryinstitutionalknowledgetobegintheirmissionsupporttoIAlogisticstraining.
LTATsmustunderstandtheflowofsupportusedbyIAunits.LTATsdonotfixproblemsfortheirpartnerunits,buttheyencouragethemtodiscoverbylearningwhileteachingthemtotrusttheirsystem,whichisessentialtoacquiringinstitutionalknowl-edgeandpromotinglearning.Again,thegoalofalevelIIILTATistominimizehands-onparticipationandtomovetoanoverwatchposition.LTATsshouldnottrytoconvincetheIraqistochangetheirsystem;theyshouldencouragethemtolearnthemethodschosenbytheIraqiMinistryofDefense.LTATsandothertransitionteamsshouldassistbyreinforcingtheIAmethods.
LogisticsTechnologyAlackofinteractivesoftwareprogramsforrequest-
ing,tracking,andintegratingsupplieslimitstheIA’slogisticscapabilitiesandtheirprospectsfordevelop-inganefficientlogisticsinfrastructurewithstrongnetworks.TheIAMaintenanceProgram(IAMP)isadatabaseusedtotrackrequisitionsandallowsIraqilogisticianstolocallymanagemaintenanceworkordersandrepairpartsrequests.TheIAMPisnotastand-alonesystemandlacksinteractivesoftwareforself-tutoring.TheprogramwasdevelopedinEnglish(theArabicversionisnowavailable)andisaweb-basedprogramthatusesMicrosoftSQL.
TheIAMPrequiresdatatobemanuallyenteredintotheIA101universalsupplyrequisitionform,whichisusedtorequest,track,andreceivesupplies.Oncetheinformationisrecordedandallsignaturesareobtainedontheform,theinformationistransferredintotheIAMP.Theprogramcantakealongtimetooperatesinceitrequirestheusertogoinandoutofdifferentareastogatherthedesiredinformation.
AlthoughIAcombatunitshaveimprovedtacticallyandoperationally,theirsupportcapabilitieshavenot
Iraqi Army Logistics Structure
Strategic Operational Tactical
Level IVDepot Level
Level IIILocation Command Repair
Maintenance Company Level
Level IIDivision Level
Level IUnit Level
Fourth-line maintenance and repair parts support is performed at the Taji National Depot, shipbuilding facilities, contracted aircraft-specific facilities, or other contracted facilities. These organizations are the highest level of maintenance support within the Iraqi Army logistics system and are responsible for heavy-grade maintenance support.
Third-line maintenance and repair parts support is established at each of the location commands and other locations to meet operational requirements. These organizations are responsible for medium-grade repairs, including replacement of major assemblies and modules.
Second-line maintenance and repair parts support is performed by the motor transportation regiment (MTR) maintenance company.
Field workshops will soon replace MTRs as the second line of maintenance support for divisions. MTRs will only provide first-line maintenance support for division headquarters and separate brigades. MTRs will continue to provide second-line support for all other classes of supply.
First-line maintenance and repair parts support is principally performed by maintenance platoons in the headquarters and services company at the unit and brigade levels, where light-grade repairs are conducted. Equipment operators, including vehicle drivers, are also allowed to perform limited operator maintenance on the equipment.
U.S. equivalent: Army Materiel Command
and Defense Logistics Agency
U.S. partner unit:Combat sustainment support
battalion level III logistics training and advisory team
U.S. partner unit: Brigade support battalion level II logistics training
and advisory team
U.S. partner unit: Military transition
team
MAY–jUNE 2010 39
fullymaturedintoanefficientsystemthatcansignifi-cantlyextenduninterruptedcombatoperations.Theself-relianceofIAlogisticswilltaketimeanddependsgreatlyontheinterestthatIraqishaveintheprocess.MostIraqileadersandtheirunitsdemonstratetherightskillstotakeupandembracenewsystems.
Thesystemusedtomanagelogisticsisnotstream-linedanddependsonmanyhandstomakeitworkproficientlyandethically.UsingtheIA101universalsupplyrequisitionformisastringentpaper-basedmethodthatrequiresmanydaysforonesinglerequesttomakeitthroughthebureaucraticlevelsofIAcom-mands.ThissystemrequirespatienceandaggressivemanagementskillsfromIAlogisticians.
Uptothispoint,IraqishaveshownlittlepatienceandtrustinusingtheIAMP,andnottrustingthesys-temcanleadtocounterproductivepractices.SomeIraqileadershavechosentocircumventthesystem.Forexample,itiseasierforIAlogisticianstofindarepairpartindowntownKirkuk,Iraq,thantogetthelastsignaturerequiredtocompletetheIA101formandeffectivelycoordinatetransportationtoreceivethepart.
LTATScenariosDeployingsustainmentbrigadesandCSSBsshould
startLTATtrainingathomestation.Theseunitscancontacttheoutgoingunitstogatherasmanydetailsaspossibleabouttheirupcomingmissions.Theycanusethefeedbacktoplanhowtoworkthroughcommonpracticesoranyspecificchallengestheirfuturepartnerunitmightface.ThefeedbackcanbeusedtocreatetrainingscenariosformissionrehearsalexercisesandgivesustainmentbrigadeandCSSBcommandersandstaffsthebasicunderstandingtheyneedtopreparefortheirupcomingmissions.
Thefollowingscenariosarebasedonobservationsandexperiencesgatheredby16thSustainmentBri-gadethird-lineLTATs.ThesevignettesareintendedtohelpillustratesomeofthechallengesIraqisfaceintheirquestforself-reliance.WhatmightworkforoneRMCinoneLOCOMsimplywillnotworkinanotherarea.SomeIAsoldiershavedifficultyvisualizinganationwide-armyconcept—asystemthatisintercon-nectedanddependentonoutsideinfluencestomakeitwork.AnIAsoldier’stribalbackgroundandalle-giancetohisregionalbeliefsmayaffectthewayheinterpretshowthisindistinctsystemwillprovideforhisorhisunit’swelfare.
Scenario 1. AnIAdivisioninnorthernIraqisreceivinganinadequateresupplyofrepairpartsataLOCOM.TheIAdivisiondoesnothavevalidrequisi-tionsintheIAMPsystem.Inthepast,third-lineunitswereallowedtosubmitrequestsforprescribedloadlist(PLL)stock.Lastyear,theDirectorofElectricalandMechanicalEngineering(EME)publishedanew
policythatstatedthatunitscouldnolongerrequestpartsforstockatanylevel.Thispolicychangemademostoftherequisitionsthatwerealreadyinthesys-teminvalid.
ManyoftherequestsareoldandnolongerrequiredbecausethepartswerepurchasedontheeconomybeforeIAunitsbeganreceivingparts.Somerequestsforbrakepads,forexample,havebeeninthesystemforover300days.
NoneoftherequestsintheIAMPsystemcontainvehiclechassisnumbers.Sincetheunitnameislistedbybattalion,butnotbychassisnumber,itisnearlyimpossibletoensurethatpartswillarrivewhereneed-ed.Whenthepaper-copyIA101sarescrubbedagainstwhatislistedinthesystem,theinformationdoesnotmatchupbychassisnumber,date,oritemrequested.
Recommendation. TheunitshouldcontinuetoworkwiththeMTRtoensurethatitiscorrectlysub-mittingIA101stotheLOCOM.LevelIILMATsandLTATsshouldcontinuetoprovidefeedbacktotheirIraqicounterpartstoensurethatwhentheMTRsubmitsanIA101tolevelIII,theMTRkeepscop-iesoftherequestsonfiletoensuretheyreceiveacopyoftheformthatisgeneratedwhenarequestisenteredintotheIAMPoroperationsdatabase.Oncetherequestsareinthesystem,theMTRmaintenancecompanymusttrackallopenedrequisitionsandfol-lowupwiththethird-lineRMCtogetstatusesforthosepartsrequests.
IAunitleadersmustkeeptrackofpartsrequestsbecausetheircommandersandmaintenanceofficersfromtheIAdivisionarenotrequiredtoexplainthestatusofpartsrequeststhroughhigherechelons.Thisisdirectlylinkedtomaintenancemanagement.AllinvalidrequestsintheIAMPsystemshouldbepurged.Thiswillhelpalleviatethebackloginthesystem.
ThelevelIIIRMCmanagestheavailabilityofstocksandsubmitsregularrequestsforsparepartstoEMEforfirst-andsecond-linemaintenancebyvehicletypeintheIAfleet.Thesesparepartsareneededateachmaintenanceactivitytoavoiddepletingtheirstocklevels.
Scenario 2.IAcommandersandstaffofficersdonotplaceadequateemphasisonmaintenanceman-agementwithinthedivision.Aunithasnotfollowedcorrectformatsorproperlyconductedweeklyormonthlymaintenancemeetings,despiteeffortsbyLMATandLTATmemberstogetthemtosticktoagendas.Thislackoffocusonmaintenancemanage-mentleavestheIAdivision’scommandinggeneralandhisstaffwithoutafairassessmentofmainte-nanceandclassIXissues.Subordinatecommandersandstaffofficersinthiscommandarenotbeingheldresponsibleforthemaintenanceprogramintheirunits.Thishasproventohaveanegativeimpactonthedivision’soverallreadiness.
40 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Recommendation. TheG–4adviser,MTRmain-tenanceadviser,LMAT,andLTATmustadvisetheircounterpartsoftheconsequencesofnothavinganeffi-cientmaintenanceprogram.Leadersshouldensurethattheirmeetingshavesetformatsandfollowagendas.Thiswillhelpprioritizeinformationandhelpthecom-mandinggeneral’sstaffcoordinateactions,allowingthemtorunaneffectiveandefficientmaintenancepro-gram.TheIAcommandinggeneralmustbeprebriefedonallmaintenance-relatedissuessothatheispreparedtoasktherightquestionsduringthemeetings.
IAleadersmustconductmaintenancemeetingseverymonth,noteveryothermonth.Theyshouldalsouseweeklymaintenancemeetingstoreviewrecurringjobsandtotrackthedetailsonthosejobsthatcannotbeclosed.Unfinishedjobsmustbebriefedduringthemonthlymeetings.
Scenario 3. IApersonnelhavelittletrustintheIraqilogisticssystem.Thesystem’sprocessesarenotstreamlinedanddonotalwaysprovideresults.Itisoftenmucheasiertobuythepartsofftheshelf.
AnMTRteamrecentlystartedworkingonanIA101packettorequestthreevehiclebatteriesfromthethirdline.Ithastakenover2weekstogetalltherequireddocuments(includingtwooriginalIA101sforeachbatteryandthepaperworkforeachvehicle),signatures,andstamps.TheMTR’scommander,MTRS–4,MTRmaintenancecompanycommander,andheadquartersandservicecompanywarehouseofficerinchargeallhadtosignandstampthepacket.
Becauseitismucheasierandfastertobuypartsoffthelocaleconomy,manyIraqiofficersdosoinsteadoftryingtousetheIAsystem.Proceduresareunclearandareconstantlychanging.Everyweeklymainte-nancemeetingisspentclarifyingprocedures.
Recommendation.Everypaper-basedsystemhasitsinherentchallenges.TheIraqisystemisnotstream-lined,anditwilltakealotofefforttomakeitworkefficiently.However,theIAmustcontinuetoenforcetherulesofthesystem.Havingeffectivemaintenancemeetingseachweekcanexpediteprocessesandbuildtrustinthesystem.
Thedivisionshouldhaveamaintenancestandingoperatingprocedure(SOP)towhicheachsubordinateunitmustadhere.TheLOCOMadviserswillworkwiththeG–4torecommendthattheIAcounterpartsdeveloptheirownSOPthatprovidessufficientdetailsastowhodoeswhatateachlevel.
AsU.S.andcoalitionforcesdrawdowncapabili-tiesandstartwithdrawingfromIraq,thesupportrelationshipsandoperationaltiestheyhavebuiltmustnotbeforgottenbytheirIApartnerunits.Iraq’sfuturefightingcapabilityandabilitytoregeneratecombatpowerremainapendingtestinconfidenceintheIraqilogisticiansatalllevels.FortheIAtotransitionintoaself-reliantandcompetentarmy,itslogisticiansmustcontinuetolearn,adapt,andgainnecessarytrainingexperiencesfromlevelIIILTATsandothertransitionteamsassistingintheirprofes-sionaldevelopment.IraqilogisticiansmustlearntoimplementIAmethodsandtrustthesystemestab-lishedbytheMinistryofDefense.
OnceLTATsareresourcedandcompletelyestab-lishedinthe13LOCOMs,thesethird-linetrainerswillberesponsibleforteaching,coaching,andmentoringtheRMCsonthespecificlevelIIItasks.LevelIIILTATsmustbeawareofrolesandresponsibilitiesandremainsynchronizedwiththeLMATpartneredwitheachLOCOM.ThisknowledgeisimportantforthelevelIIILTATs,whicharenormallycolocatedwiththeLMATandaredirectlyresponsibleforprovidingtheadditionaltrainingresourcesthatdevelopthetrainingstrategiesfortheLOCOMs.Theyshouldbefamiliarwiththecapabilitiesofferedbyfirst-andsecond-linecoalitionforcesteamsthatarepartneredwithIAdivisionalunitsandtheorganizationspart-neredwithfourth-linestrategicsupportIAunits.
TheprogressreportsforIAunitsprovidedbyeachcoalitionforcespartneringteammustbemonitoredandchanneledthroughonesingleagentintheareaofopera-tions.Thiswillensurethattheinformationflowsandisvalidatedbyalllevelstosupportonedesiredobjective.
Strongpartneringandsynchronizationatalllevelswillcontinuetopavethewaytoaself-reliantandpro-fessionalIAlogisticsforce,capableofsustainingIAcombatoperations.SustainmentcommandsmustreachthepartneringwithpurposeoverwatchphasesetbytheESCandremainobservantandreadytotakeactionifaninterruptiontoIAlogisticsthreatenssupporttoISFoperations.ThisphasewillaidintransitioningpowerfromthemilitarytotheGovernmentofIraqandassistintheoverallIraqistabilityplan.
lieutenant Colonel Carlos e. lopez was the support opera-tions offiCer for the 18th CoMbat sustainMent support battalion deployed to Mosul, iraq, in support of operation iraqi freedoM 08–10.
For the IA to transition into a self-reliant and competent army, its logisticians must continue to learn, adapt,
and gain necessary training experiences from level III
LTATs and other transition teams assisting in their
professional development.
MAY–jUNE 2010 41
TheHumanResourcesOperationsBranchby CaPtain roDen a. CarriDo
venasahumanresources(HR)professional,Ididn’tknowwhatthehumanresourcesoperationsbranch(HROB)ofasustainmentbrigade’ssupportoperations(SPO)sectionwasorwhatrolethebranchplayedwithinthesustainmentcom-munity.Usually,AdjutantGeneralofficersexpecttobeassignedtoacompany-level-and-aboveunitasapersonnelclerkorS–1.IexpectedtobeassignedasabattalionorbrigadeS–1withthe16thSustainmentBrigadeatBamberg,Germany.IlearnedaftermyarrivalattheunitandbeforewedeployedtoIraqinsupportofOperationIraqiFreedom08–10thatIwasgoingtobepartofthebrigade’snewHROB.
WhatistheHROB?TheHROBisanembeddedelementofsustain-
mentbrigadeandexpeditionarysustainmentcommand(ESC)SPOs.ItisalsoamodularelementthatmeetsthenewStandardRequirementCode12(SRC12)[HumanResources]structure.
TheHROB’smissionconsistsofplanning,syn-chronizing,andmanagingthesetupandoperationofpostal,casualty,andR5(reception,replacement,rest
andrecuperation,returntoduty,andredeployment)ele-mentsinconjunctionwiththeSPO’sconceptofsupportforservicingthesustainmentbrigade’sorESC’sareaofresponsibility.TheHROBplaysavitalroleinthesus-tainmentcommunitybyprovidingtechnicalguidancetothebrigadecommanderandtheHRcompanyrespon-sibleforthecommandandcontrolofsubordinateHRelementsintheareaofoperations.(Theexecutionguid-ancefortheHRcompany,however,canonlycomefromthesustainmentbrigadecommander.)
The16thSustainmentBrigadeHROBwasthesec-ondHROBtocoverMulti-NationalDivision-North(MND–N).TheHROBconceptisnew,andthechal-lengesaremany.HRSoldierscontinuetolearnthefunctionoftheHROBasleaderscontinuetodeveloppoliciesandstandingoperatingprocedurestosolidifytheHROB’sroleasaserviceproviderwithinthesus-tainmentcommunity.
Oneofthefirstchallengesfacedbythe16thSus-tainmentBrigadeHROBwashowitwouldintroduceHROBcompetenciesintosustainmentexercisesduringfieldoperations.ThiswouldintroduceleaderstotheHROBandconvincethemofthevalueaddedbytheasset.ThiswasachievedbysynchronizingHR-relatedexerciseswithsustainmentoperations(forexample,coordinatingtransportationforpostaldelivery).Beforeandduringourdeployment,theHROBbuiltrelation-shipswithotherelementsinthesustainmentcommu-nitythatwouldprovidethesupportitwouldneedforpostal,casualty,andR5operations—theHROB’sthreeprimarycorecompetencies.
PostalOperationsChallengesAswithalllogisticsoperationsandfunctionsthat
theSPOplans,coordinates,synchronizes,monitors,andcontrols,postaloperationsprovidedeployedSol-diersemotionallifesupportandaffecttheirmorale.WhiledeployedtoIraqfor15months,ourHROBmis-sionwaspostal-heavybecauseofever-changingsupportrequirementswithinourareaofoperations.MostoftheHROB’splanningandcoordinatingeffortsfocusedon
thetimelydeliveryofmailthroughoutMND–N,anarearoughlythesizeofPennsylvania.OurplacementintheSPOallowedustorapidlycoordinatefortheexternalsustainmentresourcesneededtoexecutethismission.
Whileunitsmoveandbasepopulationsincreaseordecrease,theHROBensuresthatproperpostalsupportisprovidedtotheunitsandtheirSoldiers.Thefirstchal-lengetheHROBfacedwasareductioninthesizeofitspostalplatoons.AnareathesizeofMND–Nrequiressixplatoons,butbecauseofincreasingOperationEnduringFreedomrequirements,thebranchwasexpectedtouseonlythreeplatoonstoperformthesamemissionwithnodegradationinthequalityofsupport.
Toresolvethisissue,the16thSustainmentBrigadeworkedwiththeESC’sHROBandHRcompanytodevelopaninternalmitigationstrategyandareposturingplantosustainHRoperationsthateffectivelyclosedthecapabilitygapinpostaloperationssupportofMND–N.
E
The HROB plays a vital role in the sustainment community by providing tech nical guidance to the brigade commander
and the HR company responsible for the command and control of subordinate HR elements in the area of oper ations.
42 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Allpostalplatoons,withtechnicalguidancefromtheHROB,allowedcoalitionunitstodispatchintertheatermailtoallpermanentpostoffices,satellites,andmobileoperationsinsupportofoutlyingunits.
PostalOperationsOversightThemainArmypostofficesaremannedbycon-
tractedcivilianpersonnelwhorunallaspectsofpostaloperations.Soldiersmonitortheoperationsascontractingofficer’srepresentatives(CORs)andtech-nicalinspectors.
HROBSoldiersprovideoversightandpostalguid-ancetotheHRcompanyinexchangeforcontractorperformancefeedback.TheHROBconsolidatesthecommentsfromtheHRcompany,providesthosecom-mentstotheLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram’smonthlyNegativeCommentBoard,andfollowsuponissuesasneeded.
TheappointmentofaCORisthecheckinthesys-temthatholdscontractorsaccountableforthequalityoftheirwork.UnitsmustensurethatCORsareclearlyinformedabouttheirresponsibilitiesandauthoritybecauseCORsareresponsibleforassessingthecon-tractors’performance.HavinganactiveCORhelpscorrectdeficiencies,preventsdeliverydelaystotheArmypostoffices,andensuresthatmailgetstotheSoldiersontime.Evaluationsnotonlyserveasatoolformonitoringcontractorperformancebutalsodocu-menttheCOR’sperformance,providingvaluablefeed-backtotheCORandperformanceappraisalinputthatcanbeusedbytheCOR’ssupervisor.
CasualtyOperationsCasualtyoperationsareanothercriticalHROBmis-
sion.Casualtyliaisonteams(CLTs)assignedtotheHRcompanyandlocatedwithlevelII+orIIImedicaltreat-mentfacilitiesensurethetimelyandaccuratecollectionandprocessingofcriticalcasualtyinformationsoitcanbeforwardedtothecasualtyassistancecenterforjudi-ciouscasualtynotification.TheHRcompanycommand-erandCLTplatoonleaderareresponsibleforensuringthatreportsarecompletedandsubmittedwithin3hoursofanincident.TheHROBissolelyresponsibleforsup-portingCLTplanningandforcemanagement.
CLToperationsarethemostmentallyandemo-tionallychallengingworkanHRSoldiercanendure.Inadditiontoverifyingtimelyandaccuratecasualtyreports,boththeHROBandHRcompanyassessthementalwell-beingofCLTSoldiers.CLTsnotonlyprovidecasualtyinformation;theyserveasliaisonsforaffectedcommandersandunits,provideupdatedstatusreportstoaffectedunits,andinformunitswhenaffectedSoldiersleavethetheater.CLTSoldiersmayseedisturbingwoundsorinjuriesandmightshowsignsofemotionalstresswhileonduty.TheHROBmakesrecommendationstorotateindividualSoldiersorteams
intootherHRpositionswithintheHRcompany’sothersupportelementstomaintainCLTreadiness.
R5OperationsR5operationsrequiretrackingSoldierswhoenter,
transit,anddeparttheatersofoperations.R5teamsareemplacedatmostair-passengerterminals,especiallythoseprocessinganaverageflowof600ormoreper-sonnelperday.TheprimaryresponsibilityoftheR5teamistoaccountfortheseSoldiersusingtheDep-loyedTheaterAccountabilitySystem.
TheR5missionofthe16thSustainmentBrigadeHROBdidnotchangeoverthecourseofthedep-loymentintermsofaccountingfortheinter-andintra-theatertransferofpersonnel.Areducedoper-atingtempoandautomationsystemsthatwereemplacedbypreviousR5teamsprovidedthecapabil-ityforthiscorecompetencytobecontractedtocivil-ianpersonnel.
HRandtheSpecialTroopsBattalionOfallthechallengestheHROBfacedwhilesustain-
ingandsynchronizingtheHRmission,themostper-plexingwasdeterminingtheextentofthesustainmentbrigade’sspecialtroopsbattalion’s(STB’s)involve-mentintheHRcompany’smission.UndertheSRC12modularstructure,theHRbattalionwasremoveddur-ingtransformation,leavingnoHRcommandsabovecompanylevel.Asaresult,theHRcompanywasattachedtotheSTBforadministrativecontrolandtoensureHRmissionexecution.Thelossofbattalion-levelHRplanningandoversightledtotheHROB’sestablishmentwithinthesustainmentbrigadeanditsplacementundertheSPO.
Theconfusionreallylieswiththelinesofcommu-nicationamongtheHROB,STB,andHRcompany.Withinlegacystructures,linesofcommunicationflowedfromtoptobottomandreverse(forexample,platoontocompanyandcompanytobattalion).Undermodularity,technicalguidancerequestsandotherinformationmovedirectlyfromtheHRcompanytotheHROBattheSPOandvice-versa.TheSTBisnotdirectlyinvolved.
TheSTBisresponsiblefortheadministration,sup-ply,maintenance,training,andreadinessoversightof
While units move and base populations increase
or decrease, the HROB ensures that proper postal support is provided to the units and their Soldiers.
MAY–jUNE 2010 43
HRcompanypersonnel,butnotfortechnicaloversightoftheHRmission.Naturally,onecouldmaketheargument,dependingontheirinterpretationofcur-rentdoctrine,thattheSTBshouldhaveHRperson-nelassignedtooverseetheHRcompanysinceitisasubordinatecompanyoftheSTB.(Thiswasacommonmovemadeamongthesustainmentbrigadesintheaterduringtheyearbeforethe16thSustainmentBrigade’sdeployment.)BesidestheHRmission,however,theHRcompanyoperatesjustlikeanyothercompany.
SynchronizingHRSupportThehumanresourcessustainmentcenterdetermined
thatHROBplacementinsidetheSTBwasnotcontrib-utingtotheHROB’soverallsustainmentmissionasanexternalassetwhileassignedtotheSPO.TheHROBcontainssubject-matterexpertswhoprovidethetech-nicalguidancerequiredtoassisttheHRcompanyincarryingoutitsHRsupport—afunctionthatissimilartotheonetheSPOperformsinplanning,coordinating,synchronizing,monitoring,andcontrollingotherlogis-ticsservices.
Whiledeployed,ourHROBpersonnelremainedattheSPOandprovidedtechnicalguidancethroughtheSPOtothesustainmentbrigadecommanderandtheHRcompany.WepassedalonganyinformationabouttheHRcompany’soperationalrequirementstotheSTB.
TheSTBandSPOHROBdevelopedamutuallysupportiverelationship,synchronizingbothtechnicalHRoperationsandcommandandcontroloversightofHRsupportpersonnel.Forexample,theSTBprovidedaugmenteepersonnelforataskforcecreatedtoback-fillanHRcompany;thatcompanyhaddepartedanditsreplacementsdidnotarriveuntil90daysaftertheunitleft.ThecoordinatedplanningeffortsbetweentheHROBandtheSTBensuredcontinuousHRsupporttoMND–N.ThiscombinationofHROBcommandlead-ershipandSTBpersonnelprovidedthecommandandcontrolforourHRassetsofoneR5team,fiveCLTs,andthreepostalplatoons,allofwhichweresynchro-nizedtoexecutetheHRmission.TheseeffortsresultedinnomissiondegradationandcontinualoversightofsubordinateHRunits.
PostaloperationscontinuedtobetheHROB’sgreat-estchallengethroughoutthedeployment,butwithsup-portfromtheSPOandsustainmentbrigade,assistancefromtheESC,andcooperationfromtheSTBand
HRcompany,weeffectivelyovercameourchallengesandprovidedtopnotchpostalsupporttoMND–N.GoodcommunicationbetweenallHRelementswithinMND–NwasthekeytosuccesswhilesupportingthesustainmentmissionofprovidingbasicandemotionallifesupporttoSoldiers.
Captain roden a. Carrido is the huMan resourCes operations branCh plans and operations offiCer for the 16th sustainMent brigade support operations offiCe. he holds a b.s. degree in politiCal sCienCe froM san diego state university. he is a graduate of the adjutant general offiCer basiC and advanCed Courses.
A Soldier from the postal detachment, 847th Human Resources Company, lifts a bag of mail out of a cart in preparation to sort it. The 847th, an Army Reserve unit from Fort Snelling, Minnesota, was subordinate to the 16th Sustainment Brigade during its deployment to Iraq and was one of the units helping with mail operations. (Photo by SGT Jill Fischer, 116th Public Affairs Detachment)
44 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
BuildingtheLocalEconomyatQ-Westby staff sergeant PatriCia MCCarthy, Waarng
hearrivaloftwoWashingtonArmyNationalGuardunits,the81stBrigadeSpecialTroops
Battalion(BSTB)andtheheadquartersandheadquarterscompany(HHC)ofthe181stBrigadeSupportBattalion(BSB),atContingencyOperatingBase(COB)QayyarahWest(Q-West),Iraq,broughtaboutsignificantchangesonandofftheinstallation.ThetwounitsworkeddiligentlytoimproveeconomicconditionsinthevillagesaroundQ-Westbyprovidingbasiclifesupportandemploymenttolocalresidents.
“ThepeopleofIraqareanxioustowork;educatedmenarewillingtoperformunskilledlaborinordertofeedtheirfamilies,”statedGee-GeeKitzler,theIraqiFirstInitiativeoperationscoordinatorforKBR,Inc.Byestablishinggoodrelationshipswiththelocalvillageleaders,coalitionforceswereabletodevelop
multiplestrategiesforimprovingtheeconomicstateofthelocalIraqipopulation.Theunitsmadenotewor-thyprogressbylayingthegroundworkforemployingmanylocalnationals.
NonlethalEngagementTeamOnestrategyforimprovingthelocaleconomywas
theuseofthe81stBSTBnonlethalengagement(NLE)team,whichcomprisedU.S.Soldierswhofocusedonimprovingrelationshipsbetweencoalitionforcesandlocalnationals.TheeffortsoftheNLEteamimmense-lystrengthenedtheunits’connectionstothevillagessurroundingCOBQ-West.TheNLEprogramenabledthe81stBSTBtonotifylocalleadersofopportunitiesforimprovingtheirlivingconditionsandtodeterminewhichvillageswereindireneedofemployment.TheNLEteamdecidedwhichvillagesitwouldusetostageitsoperationsandthennotifiedthelocalmuktars,orvillageleaders,abouttheemploymentopportunitiesavailableforeachvillage.
AspartoftheNLEprogram,theteambegantwomilitaryconstructionprojects:thedevelopmentofanewnorthentrycontrolpointandtheconstructionofaperimeterfencetobordertheCOB.Mostofthelabor-ersinvolvedinthesetwoprojectswerefromvillagesaroundtheinstallation.These2militaryconstructionprojectswereexpectedtorequirebetween50and100workersforayearofemployment.
Asidefrombasiclifesupportnecessities,likecleanwater,food,andshelter,thelargestneedexistingwithinthelocalcommunitieswasemployment.“Ifyoucanfixthejobsituation,youalsofixthelifesupportissues,”saidLieutenantColonelKennethGarrison,the81stBSTBcommander.
The81stBSTBNLEteamtraveledtovariouslocalvillagesseveraltimesaweektogatherunemploymentdataforthoseareas.TheBSTBdiscoveredthatveryfewpeopleweregainfullyemployedwithinthesmallervil-lages.“Inthosecases,hiringevenonepersonprovidesatremendousbenefit,”saidLieutenantColonelGarrison.
TheNLEteamwassuccessfulinprovidingjobsandimprovingthelocalpopulation’seconomicsitua-tion.CaptainDavidRaines,battlecaptainforthe81stBSTB,said,“Hiring5outof50peopleinonevillagemakesalargeimpactinthatvillage.”Employing1localnationalimprovesthelifestylesofanadditional10to20relativesinhishousehold.
T
An Iraqi vendor sells merchandise at the monthly souq at Contingency Operating Base Qayyarah West.
MAY–jUNE 2010 45
MonthlySouqsFirstLieutenantAnthonyMarion,officer-in-chargeof
theQ-WestIraqi-BasedIndustrialZone(I–BIZ)team,reported,“OnewaythatHHC181stBSBisimpact-ingfamiliesinlocalvillagesaroundCOBQ-Westandhelpingmakeachangeintheeconomyisbysponsoringmonthlysouqs.”AsouqisamarketwithintheCOBthatallowsbothIraqivendorsfromtheinstallationandexternalvendorstoselltheirmerchandisetoSoldiers.
IndependentIraqivendorMiahiHawwas,a19-year-oldmanfromthelocalvillageofJedallah,soldhisproductsatthesouqformanymonths.Miahiwasquotedsaying,“Nosouq,nowork.”Therevenueheearnedatthesouqsupportedhiswifeand17otherfamilymemberswhoresidedinhishousehold.Miahiisaprimeexampleofthesubstantialeconomiccontributionthe181stBSBHHCmadebysimplyhostingthismonthlyevent.
Equallyimportant,theHHChostedinformationalbriefingsknownasVIPluncheonsforvillageleaders.Thesemeetings,heldinconjunctionwiththemonthlysouqs,affordedthevillageleadersanopportunitytocommunicatetheirissuestomilitaryleaders.Thepri-marycoalitionattendeeswereprincipalleadersfromtheCOB,suchastheinstallationcommanderColonelMartinPittsandgarrisoncommanderLieutenantColo-nelAlanDorow.Bybringingtheseleaderstogether,issuesandconcernswereconfrontedandresolved.Moreover,theVIPluncheonwasanopportunetimeforthecoalitionforcestoadvertiseanyemploymentvacanciesthatcouldbenefittheIraqileaders’villages.
I–BIZAnothermeansofimprovingtheIraqis’economic
positionwasI–BIZ.I–BIZisatheater-wideprogramthatoffersIraqi-basedcontractorsandIraqiretailersaper-manentlocationoncoalitionbases.TheoriginalintentoftheI–BIZprogramwastoencouragethesaleofIraqicommoditiestoSoldiersanddramaticallyimprovetheeconomicstateoflocal-nationalbusinessowners.
FirstLieutenantMarionandStaffSergeantAlvinFernandez,bothstaffmembersoftheQ-WestI–BIZproject,workedextensivelywithotherreconstruc-tionelementsatQ-WesttoencouragebusinessesfromthelocalvillagestobecomemembersoftheI–BIZprogram.TheI–BIZstaffalsotriedtoinfluenceinde-pendentIraqibusinessownerswhowerecontractedbythemilitarytobecomeaffiliatesoftheprogram.“Bydoingthis,wedirectmoneyintotheIraqieconomyandhelpstabilizesecuritybyprovidingjobssoIraqiscansupporttheirfamilies,”saidFirstLieutenantMari-on.Withoutadoubt,anemployedIraqiislesslikelytoturntoinsurgentactivityformoney.
Aftertheofficialtransferofauthorityofthe181stBSBHHC,theunitplacedsignificantemphasisonIraqibusinessesinQ-West.FirstLieutenantMarionemphasized,“OurmainfocussincearrivingatQ-West
hasbeenontheIraqibusiness.”Whenthisarticlewaswritten,12IraqibusinesseswereofficiallyassociatedwiththeI–BIZprogramatQ-West.
IraqiFirstInitiativeAnotherprogramtheunitsemployedtoimprove
thelocalIraqieconomywastheIraqiFirstInitiative.Theprograminvolvesthepreferentialhiringoflocalnationalsfromcommunitiesaroundtheinstallation.ThegoaloftheIraqiFirstInitiativeistobalancesecu-rityandeconomicobjectivesbyexpandingtherecon-structionofIraq’seconomyandsupportingmilitarycounterinsurgencyefforts.
On23March2009,theQ-WestI–BIZsectionhostedajobfairattheCOBtoinformIraqisofemploymentopportunitiesavailabletothemonthebase.Withtheassistanceofvillagedignitaries,over30Iraqisattendedtheevent.Thedignitariesalsoprovidedalistthatidenti-fiedbetween100and300localnationalsforpotentialemploymentatCOBQ-West.Afterward,thegarrisoncommanderanddeputybrigadecommanderforQ-WestmetwithrepresentativesfromKBR,I–BIZ,andthebadgingofficetodiscusstheprocessofhiringlocalnationalsmentionedatthejobfair.
ThehiringprocessinvolvedacomprehensivesecuritybackgroundinterviewconductedatthebadgingofficeandaKBR-facilitatedmedicalscreening.AlthoughtheIraqiFirstInitiativeatQ-Westbeganbyemployingonly20localnationals,the181stBSBHHCcontin-uedtostrivetoincreasethenumberoflocalnation-alsemployedbyKBR.“ThereisnospecificnumberofIraqisthatQ-Westislookingtohire.ThenumbersarebasedontheneedforKBRsubcontractors,”saidLieutenantColonelDorow.KBRdoesnothavealocal-nationalhiringquota,buttheHHC’sintentwastoofferemploymenttoasmanylocalIraqisaspossible.
The81stBSTBandthe181stBSBHHCprovidedeconomicrelieftotheIraqipopulationsurroundingQ-West.Whentheyredeployed,theseunitsleftIraqamuchmorestabilizednationandhadcontributedtothePresident’soverallmissionofemployinganeffectiveexitstrategyinIraq.Theeconomicdevelopmentstheseunitsmadehelpedanationtobecomemuchmoresus-tainableinitseconomy.Astrongereconomywillhelplayafoundationforlastingpeaceandsecurity.
staff sergeant patriCia MCCarthy, waarng, served as the Multi-national forCe-iraq aCCess Control badging nonCoMMis-sioned offiCer and retention nonCoMMissioned offiCer for head-quarters and headquarters CoMpany, 181st brigade support battalion, 81st heavy brigade CoMbat teaM, whiCh was deployed in support of operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. she is Currently working toward a degree in business adMinistration and is a gradu-ate of the national guard reCruiting and retention Course and the huMan resourCes basiC nonCoMMissioned offiCer aCadeMy.
46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
TacticalGroundReportingImprovesOperationalPicture
by CaPtain sPenCer broWn
O perationsIraqiFreedomandEnduringFree- domhaveforeverchangedhowinformation isdisseminatedandsharedonthebattlefield.Asthemilitaryconductsthewaronterrorism,theoneconstantisthatvaluableinformationisgatheredattheplatoonandsquadlevelsandpasseduptohigherechelonsformilitaryintelligenceSoldierstoanalyze.Everyday,Soldiersexitthewireonpatrolsorconvoysandengagethelocalpopulace.Indoingso,SoldiersarecollectingmoreinformationthananypieceoftechnologyintheArmy’sinventory.Havingrecognizedthis,theArmyhascoinedthephrase“everySoldierisasensor.”
TacticalGroundReportingThe“everySoldierisasensor”conceptwas
improvedbytheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency(DARPA)in2006withthedevelopmentofacomputer-basedprogram,theTacticalGroundReport-ing(TIGR)system,thatenablesseamlesscommunica-tionofinformationacrossthebattlefield.
TIGRisaweb-basedtoolthatoffersauniquemulti-mediaperspectiveofthebattlefieldtoSoldiersonpatrolaswellastheirhigherheadquarters.TIGRmakesiteasiertoaggregateinformationbyprovidingcompany-levelSoldierstheabilitytouploadpatroldebriefsandcreatereportsondatacollectedfrompatrols,whichare
The Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR) system, shown in this screenshot, provides its users with a platform to consolidate report information and share that information with intelligence analysts and commanders at higher echelons. Its capability to provide near-real-time information provides patrols and convoys with an up-to-date look at their surroundings before they head out on a mission. (Photo by DARPA)
MAY–jUNE 2010 47
thenstoredinasystemthatissearchable.TIGRallowsSoldierstotailordatabasesearchesusinganumberofdifferentparameters,anditofferssearchresultsthatareexportabletoMicrosoftExcelandPowerPoint.
Aftercompletingamission,SoldiersandconvoycommandersrecordinTIGRanyobservationsandeventsthatoccurredalongtheirroutes.TIGRalsoenablesaconvoycommandertouploadpertinentpicturesorstreamingvideoinadditiontothetextreport.Forexample,ifaconvoycommandernoticesasuspiciousvehiclealongtherouteandisabletogetapicture,description,andgridlocationforthevehicle,hecanthenuploadthedataandmediatoTIGRforalltoview.
CompaniesusingTIGRcanstoredatainacommondatabase,whichenableseasieranalysis,collaboration,andinformation-sharing.Intelligence-deriveddatacanthenbedisseminatedandretrievedbyallechelons.
The16thSustainmentBrigadeExperienceTIGRwasintroducedtothe16thSustainmentBri-
gadeinSeptember2008andhasbeenexceedinglybeneficialtobothbattalion-andcompany-levelopera-tions.Innear-realtime,the16thSustainmentBrigade’sbattalionsusedTIGRtoeasilyaccessreportssubmittedbycompanies.The264thCombatSustainmentSupportBattalion(CSSB),asubordinateunitofthe16thSus-tainmentBrigade,routinelyintegratedTIGRreportingintotheirdailybattlerhythm.
Oneofthe264thCSSB’smissionswastoprovidedisabled-vehiclerecoverysupportforunitstravelingwithinMulti-NationalDivision-North.Ononeocca-sion,the264thCSSBwascalledtorecoverarouteclearancemine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehiclethatwasdisabledbyanimprovisedexplosivedevice(IED).Thisrequiredthe264thCSSBtoquicklyconductanalysisoftheroutetotherecoverylocation,whichwasonaroadrarelytraveledbytheunit.
Withinminutes,thebattalionintelligenceofficer(S–2)usedTIGRtoretrievetheinitialSPOT[situa-tion,position,observation,troopsandterrain]reportfromthemaneuverunitandprovidethebattalionoperationsofficerwithanalysisonthebestroutetotaketotherecoverylocation.TheS–2printedoutmapsandsatelliteimageryfromTIGRtouseinbriefingtherecoveryconvoycommanderandhis
driversofthethreatsandenemytactics,techniques,andproceduresinthearea.Withthisinformation,theconvoycommanderwasarmedwithenhancedsitu-ationalunderstandingandawarenessandthe264thCSSBwasabletoconducttherecoverymissionwith-outfurtherincidenttotheirunit.
Battalionsnowhavetheresourcestheyneedtodevelopanaccuratecommonoperationalpicture(COP)thatcanbedisseminatedlaterallyandtohigherheadquarters.TIGRalsogivesbattalionsthetoolstooverseeeventsoccurringwithintheirsub-ordinatecompaniesandprovidethoseunitswithinstantfeedback.
Brigade-levelstaffscanviewallreportssubmittedbysubordinatebattalionsandadjacentbrigades.Inthisway,TIGRhasstreamlinedinformationdissemination,whichgreatlyenhancessituationalunderstandingandawareness.
TIGR’sStrengthsandWeaknessesOften,initialSPOTreportsreceivedatthebrigade
levelfromadjacentunitscontaingapsininformation.Toclarifyorobtainadditionalinformation,TIGRpro-videsuserswiththeabilitytocontacttheindividualwhosubmittedthereportthroughemailoritsforumfunction.TIGRenablesalluserstosubmitpostingsandreports.ThisisbothoneofTIGR’sstrengthsandoneofitslimitations—thelevelofdetailandspecific-ityofareportdependsontheindividualsubmittingit.IfacompanysubmitsaninaccurategridlocationtoTIGR,thosecoordinateswillbewidelypassedalongtobattalionandlateralunits.
TIGRisnotamandatoryreportingrequirementforunits.Asaresult,manyeventsthatmaybebeneficialtootherunitsthatuseTIGRgounreported.Thiscangivecommandersatlowerechelonsafalserepresentationofthebattlefield.(BattalionsandbrigadesareabletogetinformationfromtheCommandPostoftheFutureandDistributedCommonGroundSystem-Army.)
TIGR,whenemphasizedbybrigadeleaders,willreduceinaccuratereportingfromsubordinateunitsandprovideasolidCOPwithintheunitstructure.TIGRisapositivesteptowardclosingthetimegapbetweensenderandreceiverofcriticalreporting.TheArmy’sadoptionofthisprogramtakesadvantageofthemilitary’smosteffectiveandvaluableinformation-gatheringresource—theSoldier.BoththemodernandfuturebattlefieldsrelyheavilyonprogramslikeTIGRtoassistingatheringandprocessinginformationfromtheasymmetricalbattlefield.
Captain spenCer brown served as the assistant intelligenCe offiCer for the 16th sustainMent brigade while deployed in sup-port of operation iraqi freedoM 08–10. he is a graduate of the Military intelligenCe Captains Career Course.
After completing a mission, Soldiers and convoy
commanders record in TIGR any observations and events
that occurred along their routes.
48 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
UnitContractingProblemsDuringOverseasTrainingExercises
by Major WiLLiaM t. CunDy
heArmyconductsmultipletrainingexercisesinforeigncountrieseveryyear.Theseexercisesusuallyareexecutedincoordinationwiththearmedforcesofthehostcountries.
Contingencycontractingteams(CCTs)supportingthesemultinationalexercisestypicallyencounterprob-lemsinfiveareas:❏ Micro-purchasecapabilitiesoftorchandadvanced
echelon(ADVON)parties.❏ Deployingunits’understandingofthecontract
requirementsdefinitionandapprovalprocess.❏ Useofthemortuaryaffairsblanketpurchaseagree-
mentprocess.❏ CCTcommunicationrequirements.❏ ArmyVeterinaryCommand(VETCOM)-approvedrequirementsandproducts.
ThesefiveproblemareascanbeaddressedbeforeanexercisewithproperplanningandtheinclusionoftheCCTintheplanningprocessfromtheearliestopportunity.
Unitplannersandlogisticspersonnelneedtoensurethatthefiveproblemareasareaddressedatinitialplanningmeetingsandarerevisitedateachsubsequentplanningmilestone.Unitleadersandplannersneedtoincorporatethecontractingassetsavailabletothemintotheplanningprocess,andCCTpersonnelshouldbeincludedateveryplanningconferenceoncethemis-sionisassigned.
Unitsalsoneedtounderstandthat,inordertohaveallcontractarrangementsinplacewhentroopsarriveinthetheater,CCTsshouldbeincountryseveralweekstomonthsbeforethearrivalofunitpersonnel.Thecostsofcontractsusuallyarepaidforfromtheexercisebudget,whichisanotherreasonwhyCCTsneedtobeincludedintheplanningphases.ACCTmayneedtomakemultipletripstoensurethatallcon-tractarrangementsareset.
Micro-PurchasesbyAdvancePartiesAmicro-purchaseisaGovernmentpurchaseofsup-
pliesorservicesthatinvolveslessthan$3,000forasinglepurchase;itdoesnotrequirecompetitionandisnormallyconductedinformallyusingacreditcard.TorchandADVONpartiescommonlydonotdeploywithamicro-purchasecapability,whichcanseri-ouslyinhibittheirabilitytorespondtounanticipatedrequirementsencounteredduringtheinitialoccupation
andsetupattheexerciselocation.Lackofmicro-purchasecapabilitycanalsocauseproblemswiththeprocurementofsuppliesneededfortrackingcellsandexerciseprepa-rationcells.
UnitscaneasilyavoidtheseproblemsbyensuringthattorchandADVONpartiespossessamicro-purchasecapability.Unitscanaccomplishthisbydeployingper-sonnelwithGovernmentpurchasecards.Anotheroptionistodeployfieldorderingofficersandpayagentswithafundedpurchaserequestandcommitmentcapabilitybeforetheexercise.
UnderstandingContractRequirementsDefiningcontractrequirementsisanongoingpro-
cessbecausecontractchangeswillalwaysbepartoftheplanningprocessforanexercise.However,anychangesinrequirementsmustbecommunicatedtocontractingpersonnelimmediately.
Whilecontractingpersonnelusuallycanmakechang-estocontracts,thecostofthosechangescanbedramat-icallyaffectedbytheamountoftimeneededtoinstitutethem.Contractingpersonnelunderstandthatrequire-mentschange,areupdated,andinsomecasesareevendeletedfromanexercise.Duringtheplanningphase,unitsneedtodifferentiatebetweennice-to-haveandmission-essentialrequirements.Thiscanbeaddressedduringtheformalmilitarydecisionmakingprocessandrockdrillsconductedduringplanningconferences.
Unitsalwayswantflexibilityintheircontracts.Flexibilitycanbeachieved,butthecostwillincreasebecausethecontractorisacceptingrisk.Themostimportantfactorinreducingcostsgeneratedbycon-tractchangesiscommunicationbetweencontractingpersonnelandtheunit.TheCCTneedstobeinformedassoonaspossibleaboutanypossiblechangestorequirements.Agoodruletorememberisthatchangeswillbemoreexpensivetheclosertomissionexecutiontheyaremade.
MortuaryAffairsBlanketPurchasesBecauseofitsimpactonSoldiersandtheirfami-
lies,themortuaryaffairsblanketpurchaseagreementprocessisperhapsthemostsignificantproblemarea.Unitsconductingmultinationalexercisesinnon-NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationcountries,inparticular,needtofullyunderstandandplanforthemortuaryaffairsprocessesrequiredforconductingtheexercise.
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MAY–jUNE 2010 49
Thecommandresponsiblefortheareaofoperationswilldeployamortuaryaffairsteamtothecountrybeforetroopsarrive.Thisteamwillinspectandcer-tifymultiplemortuarybusinessesforuseduringtheexercise.Theprocessformovingandstoringremainswillbespecifiedintheinternationalagreementsignedbeforetheexercise.Theunitshouldrequestthatthemortuaryaffairsteamthoroughlyexplaintheprocessandtheservicesrequiredfromaspecificcontractortotheunit’splanningandlogisticsteams.
InmosteasternEuropeancountries,thegovern-mentgenerallyhasalevelofcontroloverthemortuaryaffairsprocessthatneedstobeunderstoodbyallpar-ties.TheCCTwillhaveanonfundedcontractinplacetocoveralltherequirementsidentifiedbythemortu-aryaffairsteam.TheCCTmayfindthatamortuarybusinesslackstheauthoritytosignaU.S.contract(ablanketpurchaseagreement),andtheUnitedStatesgenerallywillnotsignaforeigncontract;theseissuescanbeworkedoutgivenenoughleadtime.
Adirectrelationshipexistsbetweenthemortuaryaffairsproviderandthepathologyrequirementsoftheexercise.Thepathologyrequirementsneedtobespeci-fiedbytheregionalmedicalcenterresponsiblefortheexercisearea.
Theearliermortuaryaffairsagreementscanbeenteredinto,themoreflexibilitythecontractingoffi-cerswillhavetoadaptthemtospecificexercises.Unitplannersandlogisticspersonnelshouldhavecopiesoftheinternationalagreementsandmortuaryaffairspro-cessesonhandattheunit’sheadquarters.
CCTCommunicationRequirementsCCTsnormallyconductoperationsontheProcure-
mentDesktopDefense(PD2)system,whichprovidesautomated,streamlinedstrategiccontractmanagementsupport.InmanyexercisesconductedinEurope,theCCTcouldnotestablishcommunicationwithsharedserverslocatedinGermany.TheseserversmaintainthePD2contractingsoftwareandarethegatewaytosharinginformationacrossrelevantDepartmentoftheArmyandDepartmentofDefenseorganizations,suchasresourcemanagementofficesandtheDefenseFinanceandAccountingService.
ACCTneedstohaveaccesstoitshome-stationservertoconductcontractingactionsusingPD2.ACCTusuallyacquiresaccessthroughavirtualprivatenetworkconnection(usingacommercialInternetser-viceprovider).CCTsusecommercialInternetserviceprovidersbecauseofthebandwidthlimitationsoftacticalcommunicationsequipment.Unitsmustbepreparedtoplan,identify,andfundtheCCT’smovetoalocationthatcanprovideaccess.
Beforedeployment,CCTsandunitsshouldhavetheirinformationmanagementofficerinvestigateandprovidethecommunicationrequirementsneededto
operateremotelyusingPD2.TheCCT’srequirementscanbeidentifiedandaddressedduringtheplanningphaseoftheoperationbyworkingwiththeexercisingunit’ssignalpersonnel.
VeterinaryCommandRequirementsManyexercisesencounterashortageofsometype
ofclassI(subsistence)orwaterforseveraloften-over-lookedreasons.Forexample,ifcommonlyprojectedwaterconsumptionratesdouble,thereasoncouldbesubstandardhost-nationsanitaryconditionsandlaundrysupport,lackofpropertrackingofconsumedproducts,customsissuesaffectingdeliveriesofwater,orlackofatriggerordecisionpointthatpreventedtheunitfromelevatingtheissueorpursuinganalternatecourseofactionuntiltheproblembecamecritical.
Beforethestartofanyexercise,alllogisticsdeci-sionmakersshouldknowthelocationsofclassIandwatersourcesinthearea,includingthoseinsurroundingcountries,andthetimerequiredtodeliverallVETCOM-approvedclassIandbottledwatersupplies.Unitlogisti-ciansmustbeawareofthepoliticalandculturalsituationsinthecountriesinwhichtheyoperate.Forexample,duringoneexerciseinEurope,theexercisingunitidentifiedaVETCOM-approvedwatersourceinaneighboringcountry,buttradebetweenthetwocoun-trieshadbeensuspendedbecauseofpoliticalproblemsandthewatercouldnotbedelivered.
UnitsshouldalsoensureVETCOMinspectorsareavailableduringtheexercisesitesurveytocoordinateandconductinspectionsofpotentialclassIsourcesofsupply.TheyshouldcontacttheclosestVETCOM-approvedsourcestogaugehowlongitwilltaketodeliv-erclassIsupplies;doingsowillallowthemtoestablisharealisticdecisionpoint.
Contractingformultinationalexercisesisacomplexanddifficultprocess.However,withproperplanningandcoordination,unitscanconductsuccessfulexer-cisesinavarietyoflocations.Ifunitsaddressthefivepotentialproblemareasdiscussedabove,theywillimprovetheirchancesofasuccessfulexercise.How-ever,thesefiveareasarebynomeanstheonlyonesunitsneedtoaddress;theyarejustthemostcommonlyneglectedoreasilyignoredones.Thekeystoaddress-ingtheseareasbeforeanexerciseareproperplanningandincludingtheCCTintheplanningprocessfromtheearliestpossibleopportunity.
Major williaM t. Cundy is an adMinistrative ContraCting offi-Cer at the defense ContraCt ManageMent agenCy in grand rapids, MiChi gan. he holds a baChelor’s degree in aC Counting and finan-Cial ManageMent froM CleMson university and is a graduate of the arMor offiCer basiC and advanCed Courses, the CoMbined arMs and serviCes staff sChool, and the arMy CoMMand and general staff College.
50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
rainingwithIndustry(TWI)providescompeti- tivelyselectedofficers,warrantofficers,and noncommissionedofficers(NCOs)withexten-siveworkexposuretocorporateAmerica.TheTWIprogramwasoriginallyestablishedtoexposemilitarypersonneltoprivate-sectorproceduresandpracticesnotavailablethroughexistingmilitaryoradvancedciviliantrainingprograms.
ThefirstTWIstudentsparticipatedexclusivelyinprogramsthatsupportedthedevelopmentofskillsinmaterielacquisitionandlogisticsmanagement.Sol-diersreceivedindustrytrainingfor12consecutivemonths,duringwhichtheywereexposedtoinnova-tiveindustrialmanagementtactics,techniques,andproceduresthatbenefitedtheArmy.Aftercompletingthetraining,participantswereimmediatelyplacedinmandatoryfollow-onArmyassignmentsfor2yearstoimprovetheArmy’sabilitytointeractandconductbusinesswithindustry.Today,theTWIprogramhasevolvedtoincludetrainingprogramsthatsupportmar-keting,finance,andotherareasofbusiness.
ProgramAllocationsInfiscalyear(FY)2002,theSecretaryof
DefenseorderedacomprehensivereviewoftheexternaluseofmilitarypersonnelinfellowshipsandTWIprograms.Hisintentwastoreducesuchprogramstominimum-essentiallevels,thusincreas-ingtheoperationalstrengthofDepartmentofDefense(DOD)organizations.ADODexternalutilizationreviewboardrecommendedsuspendingtheFY2003TWIselectionsandreducingthenum-berofallottedspacesthatserveasabaselineforfutureTWIprograms.TheboardalsorecommendedrequiringthatTWItoursbefollowedwithanimme-diatetourinabilletthatwouldmakeuseoftheexperiencegained.
Sincethen,TWItrenddataonallocationsforFY2004through2010showthattheArmyhashad75slotseachyear.Thecurrentbreakdownis51officer,12warrantofficer,and12NCOpositions.Ofthose,sustainmentslotsfluctuatedfrom25inFY2004toalowof20inFY2007andFY2008to27atpresent.
TrainingWithIndustryby Lieutenant CoLoneL MarshaLL n. raMsey
T
4
105
2
27
15
25
2020 2322 21
The Army Combined Arms Support Command, Sustainment Center of Excellence, has 1/3 of the Army’s slots (27 of 75), including 15 officers,6 warrant officers, and 6 noncom-missioned officers.
Sustainment Training-With-Industry Allocations
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
FY10FY09FY08FY07FY06FY05FY04
OrdnanceQuartermasterTransportation
LogisticsAdjutant General
Financial ManagementTotal
The Army had 75 slots each year from fiscal year (FY) 2004 to FY 2010.
50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
MAY–jUNE 2010 51
Adjutantgeneralandfinancialmanagementalloca-tionsgenerallyaccountfortheincreasednumberofsustainmentslotssincetheywereaddedtohistoricalprogramsthatsupportedthedevelopmentofmaterielacquisition-andlogisticsmanagement-relatedskills.TheAcquisitionCorpsispartofsustainment;addingintheir10slotsbringsthesustainmentslotsto37,orroughlyone-halfoftheArmy’s75slots.
ProgramExecutionAnumberoforganizationsplayvitalrolesin
executingtheTWIprogram.Inparticular,thepro-ponentsforadjutantgeneral,financialmanagement,logistics,ordnance,quartermaster,andtransporta-tionattheArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand(CASCOM)SustainmentCenterofExcellenceserveastheirrespectivetrainingprogramcoordinators.Theyalsoserveasliaisonsamongindustry,TWIstudents,andtheArmyHumanResourcesCom-mand.Theyestablishandcontrolthestudent’strainingprogrambyvalidatingfieldrequirements,developingtrainingobjectivesandtrainingplans,reviewingtrainingreportsandtravelplans,andvali-datingtraining.
SustainmentleadersaregenerallysatisfiedwithcurrentTWIallocations,consideringcurrentover-seascontingencyoperations.CASCOMschoolscon-tinuetorefinethenumberandtypeofslotsinordertobetterprepareforfuturetrainingrequirements,includingrecommendingadditionsforammunition,mobility,andpetroleumwarrantofficersandpetro-leum,mortuaryaffairs,andelectronicmaintenanceNCOs.Inthemeantime,theycontinuetomonitoranypotentialreallocationofslots.
TWIprovidesSoldierswithtrainingandskillsinbestbusinesspracticestosupportDODrequire-ments.Afterward,participantsusethattraininginavalidatedTWIassignmentposition.Overall,sus-tainmentpositions(minusthoseintheAcquisitionCorps)receiveone-thirdoftheTWIprogramalloca-tions,andtheseallotmentsareincreasing.TWIslotsnowincludemarketingandfinance.Proponencyofficesareinformingcompetitiveofficers,warrantofficers,andNCOsofTWIopportunities.Topara-phrasetheChiefofStaffoftheArmy,takeTWIasanotheropportunitytopicksomethingthatsuitsyouandbroadenyourself.
lieutenant Colonel Marshall n. raMsey is the Chief of the logistiCs branCh proponenCy offiCe at fort lee, virginia. he holds a baChelor’s degree froM the university of tennessee and a Master’s degree froM Central MiChigan university. he is a gradu-ate of the quarterMaster offiCer basiC Course, the ordnanCe offiCer advanCed Course, the arMy CoMMand and general staff College, and the joint forCes staff College.
CASCOMFY2010TWILocationsCommissionedOfficersArmy Adjutant General School (two slots)
•MicrosoftCorporation,Redmond,Washington •LockheedMartinMissilesandFireControl,
GrandPrairie,TexasArmy Combined Arms Support Command (one slot)
•LMI,McLean,VirginiaArmy Financial Management School (five slots)
•ArmedForcesBank,FortLeavenworth,Kansas •GlobalExchangeServices,Gaithersburg,
Maryland •GETransportation,Erie,Pennsylvania •Motorola,Inc.,Schaumburg,Illinois •TheBoeingCompany,St.Louis,Missouri
Army Quartermaster Center and School (four slots) •LMI,McLean,Virginia •ExxonMobilFuelsMarketingCompany,Fairfax,
Virginia •Sunoco,Inc.(R&M),Philadelphia,Pennsylvania •LabattFoodService,SanAntonio,Texas
Army Transportation Center and School (three slots) •FederalExpressIncorporated,Memphis,
Tennessee •LandstarSystem,Jacksonville,Florida •LMI,McLean,Virginia
WarrantOfficersArmy Ordnance Center and School (two slots)
•LockheedMartinMissilesandFireControl,EastCamden,Arkansas
•CaterpillarDefenseandFederalProducts,Mossville,Illinois
Army Quartermaster Center and School (three slots) •LMI,McLean,Virginia •CompassGroup,Charlotte,NorthCarolina •AirborneSystemsNorthAmerica,SantaAna,
CaliforniaArmy Transportation Center and School (one slot)
•CrowleyMarineServices,Inc.,Seattle,Washington
NoncommissionedOfficersArmy Ordnance Center and School (two slots)
•LincolnElectricCompany,Cleveland,Ohio •GeneralDynamicsLandSystems,Sterling
Heights,MichiganArmy Quartermaster Center and School (three slots)
•TheCulinaryInstituteofAmerica,HydePark,NewYork
•TheAmericanCulinaryFederation,St.Augustine,Florida(twoslots)
Army Transportation Center and School (one slot) •A.P.Moller-MaerskTerminals,Inc.,Portsmouth,
Virginia
52 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ATRADOCBestPractice:AVirtualWaytoKeepTrainingCurrent
by DonaLD D. CoPLey, jr.
llArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)schoolsconductcriticaltasksiteselectionboards(CTSSBs)biannuallyorwhensignificantchangesoccurindoctrineorequip-ment.Thisprocessallowstrainingdeveloperstokeepinstitutionalcoursewarerelevant.AsanArmySoldierSupportInstitute(SSI)pilot,theRecruitingandReten-tionSchool(RRS)hasconductedvirtualCTSSBsanddevelopedindividualcriticaltaskreportsusingthecollaborativeArmyLearningManagementSystem(ALMS)softwarecalledCentra.
TheTRADOCaccreditationteamhostedbySSIatFortJackson,SouthCarolina,from13to24July2009identifiedthevirtualCTSSBasabestpractice.ThisarticledescribesanddefinestheprocessesusedtoleveragetechnologytoconductavirtualCTSSBinageographicallydispersedcommandwhilemini-mizingtheimpactonrecruitingandtemporaryduty(TDY)costs.
Becauseofthefast-pacedchangesoccurringintheU.S.ArmyRecruitingCommand(USAREC),anequallyrapidprocesswasneededtoensurethatallcriticaltasks,Soldiertrainingpublications(STPs),andtrainingproductsforrecruitingSoldiersandcivi-liansremainedrelevant.UndertheguidanceofSSI,RRSdevelopedacompletelyvirtualprocesstocon-ductCTSSBprocedures.Byleveragingtechnology,continuousimprovement,andinnovativethinking,RRScontinuestoshapethefutureoftrainingdevel-opment.ThisnewlydesignedprocesshasallowedRRStoupdatecriticaltasksforall18recruitingskilllevelswithina2-weekperiod.
BeforetheBoardsTrainingdevelopersnormallyfollowtheCTSSB
processwhenconductingajobanalysis.TheRRSproceduresincludejobanalysis,taskanalysis,andtaskmanagement.Duringthe4to16January2010CTSSBs,RRSconducted18differentskill-leveltaskreviewpanels.Throughthesepanels,RRScompletedallthreemajortasksforindividualtrainingdevelop-mentasspecifiedinparagraphsVI–1throughVI–3ofTRADOCRegulation350–70,SystemsApproachtoTrainingManagement,Processes,andProducts.
TheRRStrainingdevelopmentshop,inconjunctionwiththeUSARECdoctrineteamandtheSSIqual-ityassuranceteam,hostednineCTSSBpanelsduringthefirstweekandninemorepanelsduringthesecondweek.TheRRSqualityassuranceevaluator(QAE)developedtheAutomaticSurveyGeneratorsurvey,whichwassenttoallUSARECpersonnel.ThissurveyisthebeginningoftheprocessandiscrucialtothesuccessoftheCTSSBs.
Thesurveycoveredallcurrentcriticaltasks,know-ledge,andskills.Bycapturingdatafromfieldusersbeforetheyarrivedfortheboards,RRSwasabletoidentifysystemchanges,performancechanges,andanyotherenvironmentalchangesthatmightaffecttheperformanceofthecriticaltasks.RRSdoesnotrelyonpanelmemberstosimplyserveassubject-matterexperts.Byusingthesurveysystem,RRScanachievegreaterconsensusfromfieldusersandthereforecon-ductamoreorganizedCTSSBproceeding.
Afterorganizingthesurveydata,10Centraclass-roomswerecreatedinALMS.Theseclassroomsweredesignatedasthesitesforeachweek’sninepanelsandonecentralcontrolpanel.TheRRScommandant,whoisalsotheproponentforcareermanagementfield79(recruitingandretention),approvedtheUSARECopera-tionorder(OPORD)establishingtheCTSSBtasking.Inthisorder,theRRSdirectoroftraining(DOT),theSSIQAE,andtheUSARECdoctrinechiefweretaskedtobepresentduringthepanels’proceedings.
TheRRScommandant,whoservedasthechairmanforall18panelsoverthe2weeks,appointedtheDOTtocoordinatetheCTSSBs.TheDOTselectedthepanelfacilitators,whohostedtheboardproceedingsbasedontheirtrainingdevelopmentbackgrounds.Eachtrainingdeveloperhostedacompletepanelforonespecificskilllevelduringeachofthe2weeks.Thesetrainingdevel-opersusedSharePointtohousetheaudittrailfilesfortheproceedingsandalldocumentationusedduringeachpanel.ThetrainingdevelopersconductedliverehearsalseveryThursdayfor6weeksbeforehostingtheCTSSBs.
TheDOTalsocoordinatedtohavetheSSIQAEpresentfortheproceedingstoserveastheevaluator.Theevaluatorensuredthatrecommendationsoftasksascriticalornoncriticalwerebasedonanappropriate
A
The Army Soldier Support Institute hosted an Army Training and Doctrine Command accreditation team visit in July 2009. This article is the first of three that will share the best practices identified during that visit.
MAY–jUNE 2010 53
taskselectionmodel.HealsoensuredthattasktitlesmettherequirementsofTRADOCregulations.TheQAEalsohelpedpanelmemberstounderstandtheirrolesintheCTSSBprocess.
Subject-matterexpertswerechosenthroughtheOPORDannouncement.USARECbrigadeleadershipteamsnominatedallsubject-matterexpertstopartici-pateintheCTSSBs.Nomineeswerescreenedagainstregulatoryrequirementstoensurecompliance.Subject-matterexpertsshouldbeoneskilllevelhigherthanthejobforwhichtheyarerecommendingtasksandshouldhaveatleast1yearofexperienceperformingthosetasks.Theyrecommendchanges,providetechnicalinformation,determinecriticaltasks,anddevelopindi-vidualperformancestepsandmeasuresforeachtaskdesignatedascritical.
DuringtheBoardsDay1ofthevirtualCTSSBallowedpanelmem-
berstobecomefamiliarwithterminology,otherpanelmembers,andperformanceexpectations.Thecom-mandantdeliveredopeningremarksandthenintro-ducedtheDOT,whoconductedabriefoverviewofCTSSBproceduresandoutlinedthedailyprocesses.
Allpanelmemberswererequiredtomeetinthecen-tralcontrolclassroomatthestartandendofeachday;thispermittedinterpaneldiscussions,additionalvotingasneeded,andtie-breakingproceedingsfortheday’sactivities.Allmeetingswereheldfrom1000to2000hoursEasternTime,whichallowedforaneast-to-west-coasttimeadjustmentforallpanelmembers.Duringtheday,panelmemberswenttotheirrespectiveroomsfordeliberations,discussions,andtaskdevelopment.
Inthemainpanelduringday1,theprimaryvotingwascompletedforeachskilllevel.Aparliamentarypro-cedurewasusedtoensureorderlyvotingontasks.AllmemberswererequiredtovoteusingthesurveyengineinsideCentra.Thisallowedindividualvotingtoremainanonymousandavoidedundueinfluenceonpanelmem-berstovoteinanyonedirection.Tasktitle,conditions,standards,anddifficulty,importance,andfrequencymodeldesignationwereallputtoavote.Oncevotingforalowerskilllevelwascompleted,thepanelsbrokeintoseparateCentrasessionstodevelopindividualtasks.
Trainingdevelopershostedeachofthe18skilllevelsinapanelforumusingCentrasoftware.Thesesessionshadallofthecapabilitiesneededtoconductvirtualreal-timecollaborativework.TrainingdevelopersbroughtuptheSTPs,taskworksheets,knowledge,andskillsrequiredtoensurethatallaspectsoftaskdevelopmentweredonewithinTRADOCguidance.
Subject-matterexpertsusedelectronicpublica-tions,application-sharingtechnology,SharePointfiles,RecruitingProNet-threadeddiscussions,andanyothertechnologyneededtotransferfiles,discussoperatingsystems,andintegratetechnologyintoeachcritical
task.Alltrainingdevelopersoperatedoutofthesameofficetoensuretheavailabilityofsupportstaff.
AftertheBoardsOncethepanelswerecompleted,theRRScom-
mandantsignedtheCTSSBexecutivesummarytoapprovethecriticaltasklist.Thiswasanotheradvan-tageofhavingthecommandantserveasthechairman.Hecouldimmediatelyapprovethetasklistbecausehewasactivelyinvolvedinthedeliberationprocessandtaskdiscussions.
Partoftheexecutivesummaryincludedthetotaltaskinventorybyjobandskilllevel.Withinthepanels,theRRStrainingdevelopmentshopreviewed18occupa-tions:recruiter,recruitingstationcommander,guidancecounselor,recruitingoperationsnoncommissionedofficer,recruitingmastertrainer,healthcarerecruiter,healthcarestationcommander,recruitingfirstsergeant,recruitingcompanycommander,recruitingbattalionexecutiveofficer,recruitinghumanresourcesofficer(S–1),recruitingbattalionoperationsofficer,recruitingbattalionadvertisingandpublicaffairs,recruitingbat-talioninformationofficer,recruitingbattalionmissionandmarketanalyst,recruitingbattalionsupplyspecial-ist,recruitingbattalionbudgetspecialist,andrecruitingbattalioneducationservicespecialist.
OncetheCTSSBpanelswerecompleted,theDOTconductedtaskmanagement.TheRRStrainingdevelopersusedthenext2weekstouploadtaskdataintotheAutomatedSystemsApproachtoTraining(ASAT)database(soontobereplacedbytheTrainingDevelopmentCapability[TDC]).Thispermittedsub-missionofanupdateddatabasecapturetotheDigitalTrainingManagementSystem(DTMS)team.Thispro-cessprovidedthefieldforcewiththenewcriticaltaskdatawithin3weeksofcompletingtheCTSSBprocess.InadditiontotheDTMSupdate,newSTPsandofficerandcivilianfoundationstandardmanualswerecre-atedinaspiraldevelopmentprocessandpublishedtomatchtheDTMSdatabase.
ThisnewCTSSBprocesshasdoneamazingthingsforUSAREC.TheUSARECG–4/G–8hasrecognizedthattheeliminationofTDYcostrequirementshasresultedinannualsavingsof$400,000.ThenewdesignallowsfortheCTSSBprocesstobeperformedbiannually.Thisprocessishelpingtokeepcriticaltaskscurrentwhilekeepingpacewiththeever-changingneedsofUSAREC.
donald d. Copley, jr., is the direCtor of training and personnel developMent at the arMy re Cruiting and retention sChool at fort jaCk son, south Carolina. a retired arMy CoMbat veteran, he holds a baChelor’s degree in Mar keting and Master’s degrees in huMan re sourCe ManageMent and huMan resourCe developMent, and he is working on a ph.d. de gree in applied ManageMent and deCision sCi-enCes with a speCialization in leadership and organizational Change.
54 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
DeployedArmyBandsby Chief Warrant offiCer (W–5) john s. fraser
rmyBandsbegandeployinginsupportofOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF)in2003andinsupportofOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)in2004.Currently,fourbandsareinIraq,threeatthedivisionlevelandoneatthecorpslevel.The56thArmyBand,ICorpsBand,fromJointBaseLewis-McChord,Washington,isservingastheUnitedStatesForces-Iraqband.The3dInfantryDivisionBandfromFortStewart,Georgia,isservingastheU.S.Division-NorthBand,the1stArmoredDivisionBandfromWiesbaden,Germany,astheU.S.Division-CenterBand,andthe34thInfantryDivisionBand,MinnesotaArmyNationalGuard,astheU.S.Division-SouthBand.The34thInfantryDivisionBandwillbereplacedbythe1stInfantryDivisionBandfromFortRiley,Kansas.
In2004,elementsofthe25thInfantryDivisionBandprovidedinterimbandsupporttoU.S.forcesinAfghani-stan.In2005,elementsofthe10thMountainDivisionBanddidthesame.ArmybandshavehadapermanentpresenceinAfghanistaninsupportofOEFsince2006.Leadingthewayin2006wasthe10thMountainDivi-sionBand.After12months,itwasrelievedbythe82dAirborneDivisionBand,whichwassubsequentlyrelievedin2008bythe101stAirborneDivisionBand.The82dreturnedthefavorandrelievedthe101stin2009andiscurrentlyonstation.
TheArmyBandMissionArmybandsinIraqandAfghanistanhavethe
opportunitytoaccomplishtheircoremission:toprovidemusicthroughoutthespectrumofmilitaryoperationstoinstillinourforcesthewilltofightandwin,fosterthesupportofourcitizens,andpromoteournationalinter-estsathomeandabroad.
Divisionandcorpscommandersandbandcommand-ersmustconsiderusingArmybandsinastrategicratherthaninanoperationalortacticalsense.Bandsinafor-wardtheaterprovidemorale-supportperformancesforU.S.forces.Theyalsohaveauniqueabilitytoinfluencethefutureofthepeopleandnationtowhichtheyaredeployed.Armybandscanalsoinfluencethefuturerela-tionshipsamongU.S.citizensandtheU.S.Governmentandthecitizensandgovernmentsofothercountries.ThenumberofmissedopportunitiestoemployArmybandsinthismannerisincalculable.Armybandsdeployforonereason:toprovidemusicsupportforthecommand-er’sstrategicvision.
TypesofBandSupportDeployedArmybandsprovideseveraldifferenttypes
ofsupport.Theseincludestrategicoutreach,forcesup-port,familysupport,publicdiplomacy,communityrela-tions,education,andrecruiting.
Strategic outreach. Asstrategicoutreach,deployedArmyBandsprovidelivemusicinvirtuallyeverygenre,includingmodernrock,rock-and-rollclassics,swing,countryandwestern,salsa,martial,classical,traditionalAmericana,patriotic,andceremonialmusic.
Force support. Armybandsintheaterhavesup-portedbirthdaycelebrationsoftheMarineCorps,Navy,andAirForce,inadditiontotheArmy’sbirth-day.DeployedArmybandshavealsosupportedArmy
A
The 1st Armored Division Band performs songs during Operation Iron Tuba for the people of Balad, Iraq. (Photo by SGT Kani Ronningen)
MAY–jUNE 2010 55
branchcelebrations,unitorganizationaldays,andcoalitionforceactivities,includingtheAustraliaandNewZealandArmyCorps[ANZAC]DayandtheBritishRemembranceDayobservances.Alltradition-alU.S.holidaysaresupportedinmultipleiterationsbythevarioustheatercommandsandorganizations.ArmybandmembershaveevenparticipatedinthesupportofAmericancitizennaturalizationceremo-nies.Armybandsalsosupportmemorialceremoniesforfallencomrades.
Family support.Throughtoday’sadvancedtechnol-ogies,alldeployedArmybandscontributetofamilysupport.ExamplesincluderecordingaudioandvideomusicalselectionstobeairedatimportanteventsathomestationandwebcastingChristmasconcertsfromIraqinrealtime.
Public diplomacy. DeployedArmybandshavepro-videdprofessionalmusicinsupportoftheembassiesoftheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdomattheirhomesitesaswellasattheirsatellitelocations.NotonlyhaveArmybandsdirectlysupportedtheoperationalanddip-lomaticmissionsoftheembassies,buttheyalsohaveprovidedmorale-supportperformancesforDepartmentofStateemployees.ArmybandsupportoftheseStateDepartmentmissionsrangesfromhigh-visibilityeventsfordignitariestoquiet,behind-the-scenesevents.
Community relations.Whiledeployed,Armybandmembersparticipateinanumberofactivitiesthatfosterthesupportofthehostnation’scitizensandpromoteU.S.nationalinterests.Theseactivitiesensurethatthefuturerelationshipsamongourcitizens,governments,andcultureshavememorableandpositivefounda-tions.CommunityoutreachcanbeassophisticatedasadvancedmusicclassesatlocalschoolsoffineartsorassimpleasteachingahandfulofBoyScoutsandGirlScoutstoplayrecorders.
Education. EverythingArmybandsdoisrelatedtoeducation.Notonlyaretheyengagedinthemusiceducationofhost-nationyouthandadults,buttheyalsoeducatetheirownforcesonwhatthebandbringstothefight.Allbandmembersshouldeducateleadersonhowtousetheband’suniquecapabilitytodirectlyenhancethemissionor,throughmoraleperformances,indirectlyenhancethemissionbyrejuvenatingthemilitaryper-sonnelthroughmusic.
Recruiting. Inacombattheater,recruitingmayseemlikeanunusualmissioninanunusualvenue.AnyArmybandleaderwhohasbeenaroundawhileknowsthatourforceshavemuchuntappedmusicaltalentthatgoesunnoticed.Whilebandsusuallydonotactivelyrecruitinacombattheater,potentialArmybandsmenoftencometothebandleaderwithinterestintheArmybandprogram.Thismaybeduetobandshavingmuchmoredirectcontactandinteractionwithforcesinacombat
theaterthanwedoinacontinentalUnitedStatesgar-risonenvironment.
TransportationArrangingfortransportationisaconstantmission
challenge.Withtheexceptionofbuglersupportformemorialceremonies,routinebandmissionsarealowpriorityforaviationassets.Travelingbyairplaneisgenerallynotaproblem.However,travelingbyheli-copterorgroundtransportationcanbeasignificantlogisticschallenge.
Armybandmemberswouldliketotakeeverythingtheyownoneverymission,butwhenusinghelicop-tersandevensomegroundtransportation,theloadmustbekeptsmallandlight.Fifteenhundredpoundsofequipmentisaboutthelimit.Beforetheadventofmine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehicles,bandsfacedthechallengeofmovingabrassquintetbyup-armoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicle(HMMWV)convoy.AHMMWVsimplyhasnoplacetoputatubainaroadcase.Now,withtheadventofvariousiterationsofMRAPsandup-armoredlightmediumtacticalvehicles,movingabandbyconvoyislessofachallenge.
InstrumentMaintenanceAnotherchallengeismaintainingmusicalinstruments
whiledeployed.Maintenanceofmusicalinstrumentsabovetheuserlevelisnonexistentintheaterunlessthebandhasanoncommissionedofficertrainedtoaccom-plishthistask.Bandpersonnelareprohibitedfromper-forminginstrumentmaintenancetasksforwhichtheyhavenotbeenadequatelytrained.Anamateurefforttorepairaninstrumentcouldresultinpermanentdamagetoitsprecisionmechanisms.
Instrumentrepairisamastercraftthattakesyearstolearn.Trainingopportunitiesareavailableandrangeinintensityfromafewdaysatamilitaryrepairfacilitytoayearatonlyafewcollegesinthecountry.Mostcivilian
The 1st Armored Division Band’s strategic support mission includes performing for the local community. (Photo by SGT Kani Ronningen)
56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
instrumentrepairtechnicianslearntheold-fashionedway:throughapprenticeshipwithamastercraftsman.
Armyleaderssupportingbandsmustensurethatadequatefacilitiesandresourcesareprovidedforthebandtoconductapreventivemaintenanceprogram.Thisincludesinstrumentrepairkitsauthorizedbythemodificationtableoforganizationandequipment,acleanworkingenvironment,adeepsinkforwashingoutbrassinstruments,plentyofmaintenancesupplies,andadditionalequipmentandsuppliesasdeterminedbythebandcommander.
Bandleadersatalllevelsmustensurethatpropercareistakenandmaintenanceperformedtopreventprematureagingofinstruments.Inevitably,manymusi-calinstrumentsaredamagedbeyondrepairbyexcessivewearandtearinaperformanceenvironmentforwhichprofessionalmusicalinstrumentswereneverintended—thedeployedtheater.Bandleadersmustplanforinstru-mentrepairandreplacementthroughtheresetprocess.ThisprocesshasbeenverychallengingforArmybandssinceallmusicalinstrumentsandmusicalsupportequipmentarecommercialoff-the-shelfproducts.
ResetTheArmyForceGenerationprocess,asthepar-
entplanofreset,shouldbemodifiedforArmybandsbecausebandinstrumentsmustberepairedorrefur-bishedquicklyafterredeployment.Armybandmembersmustbewithouttheirmusicalinstrumentsfortheshort-esttimepossibleforseveralreasons.
Theabilitytopracticeisthemostcriticalreasonthatbandmembersmustkeeptheirequipmentwiththem.Withoutcontinualpractice,musiciansquicklylosetheirhighlyperishableindividualandcollectivemusi-calskills.Aswithanyphysicalrequirement,thelonger
onedoesnotexercisespecificmusclegroupsorskills,thelongeritwilltaketoregainthoseskills.ForArmybandmembers,thoseskillsarespecificallyestablishedanddelineatedbyregulationandassessedbybandcom-manders.Onceindividualskillsareregainedtostandard,collectivetrainingcanbegin.
AnothercriticalreasonthatbandmembersmusthavetheirequipmentwhentheyredeployisthatArmybandmissionrequirementsanddemandsforArmybandpar-ticipationdonotdecreaseafterredeployment.Actually,justtheoppositeistrue.Followingredeployment,Armybandsaremoreindemandbytheircommandandotherorganizationsthattheynormallysupport.
Forthesetworeasons,aredeployedArmyband’smusicalinstrumentsandsupportequipmentmustberepairedorreplacedasquicklyaspossible.Bandswiththeforesighttoidentifymusicalinstrumentstoreplacebeforeredeploymentshoulddosowhiletheunitisstilldeployed.Thiswillensuremissioncapabilityaftertheirreturn.
DoctrineDoctrineonhowArmybandsshouldbeemployedis
sometimesmisinterpreted.Armybandcommandersareexpertsinallbandmatters,includingemploymentoftheirbands.ByArmydoctrine,ArmybandoperationsisahumanresourcescorecompetencythatrequirestheG–1’sattention.Inbothagarrisonandadeployedenvironment,theG–1ordeployedC–1ofacommandresponsibleforanArmybandmusttakeownershipofthatband.Alongwiththebandcommander,theG/C–1handlesallbandmatters,includingoperations,undertheguidanceofthecommandchiefofstaff.
Armybandsnevershouldbedeployedwithapre-conceivedplanofmissionsforwhichtheyhavenotbeentrained.Armybandscancontributetothecom-mondefenseoftheirhomebase,aconvoy,oraremoteforwardoperatingbasewhenandonlywhenthetacticalsituationdictates.Theuniqueindividualandcollectiveskillsofbandmembersshouldneverbeignored,takenforgranted,orwasted.Armybandsbringtotheareaofoperationsauniquecapabilitythatnootherunitpos-sessesandthatshouldbeusedtothefullest.Leadersshouldalwaysbeencouragedtotakeownershipofthecommand’sbandandtoadvocatesupportingthebandcommanderandbandoperations.
Chief warrant offiCer (w–5) john s. fraser is the CoMMander of the 56th arMy band, i Corps band, at joint base lewis-MCChord, washing ton. he holds a b.s. de gree in liberal arts froM the state university of new york and is a gradu ate of the arMy band seCtion/group leader Course, the arMy band enlisted bandleader Course, the warrant offiCer bandMaster Course, the warrant offiCer ad vanCed Course, the war rant offiCer staff Course, and the warrant offiCer senior staff Course.
Members of the 34th Infantry Division Band perform as the “Red Bulls” rock band at Contingency Operating Base Adder on 14 June to celebrate the Army’s 234th birthday. The Red Bulls are part of the 34th Infantry Division Band, Minnesota Army National Guard. (Photo by SGT Mark Miranda)
MAY–jUNE 2010 57MAY–jUNE 2010 57
heUnitedStates,initsninthyearofcombatoperationsinSouthwestAsia,employsatleastoneciviliancontractorforeveryservicememberonthebattlefield.1EventhoughhalfofthePentagon’sbudgetpaysfortheseprivatecontractors,282percentofthemarenotU.S.citizens.3Onemightask,sowhat?WhiletheglobalizationofU.S.militarylogis-ticsrevolutionizedbattlefieldsupport,italsofundamentallychangedhowdevelopednationsprocuremilitaryresources.Economicglobalizationhascreatedarequirementforstrategicresourcemanagement.AlthoughtheUnitedStatesisleveragingtheinternationaleconomytosupportitsoperationsinIraqandAfghanistan,itisnotyetstrategicallymanagingtheresourceconsequences.OthernationswillmimicU.S.globallogisticstechniques.Whentheydo,iftheUnitedStateshasnotlearnedtomanageitsresourcedependencies,itsmilitaryadvantagewillbeblunted,ifnotbroughttoascreechinghalt.
TheU.S.Military’sGlobalizationofLogistics In1985,theArmybeganitslarge-scaleforayintocontractedlogisticssupportwiththe
LogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram(LOGCAP),4aprogramdesignedtosupportshort-termmilitaryoperations.5Theprogramalsoreducedthetooth-to-tail6ratiooftheArmy.7Strategi-cally,thedevelopmentofLOGCAPisnottherealnewsstory.Therealnewsiswhathap-penedwhenLOGCAPbecameintegratedintoaworldwidelogisticsnetwork.In2003,whentheUnitedStatesbeganOperationIraqiFreedom,thespiralingneedforcontractedlogisticssupportjusthappenedtocoincidewithanexponentialgrowthinthesocialandpoliticalphe-nomenonthatwascoinedthe“globalization”oftheworldmarketplace.8Together,thesefac-torscontinuetofueltheunprecedenteduseofforeigncontractorstoprovidelogisticstoU.S.troopsandallotherU.S.Governmentagenciesintheater.
Bylate2007,over180,000contractorsand160,000U.S.troopssharedtheIraqbattle-field.9Bylate2009,over104,000contractorsand64,000troopssharedtheAfghanistan
TheGlobalizationofMilitaryLogistics
by Major Christine M. sChverak
1JamesJayCarafano,Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts,PraegerSecurityInterna-tional,Westport,Connecticut,2008,p.38.
2Ibid.,p.66.3MosheSchwartz,Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis,CongressionalResearchServiceReport
forCongress,14December2009,pp.10and13.4Ibid.,pp.43–44.5Ibid.,p.43.LOGCAPisapragmaticinitiativewithintheDepartmentofDefensetoreducebothlogisticscostsandtheeffectsofmanpower
shortagesontheaterlogistics.ArmyRegulation700–137,LogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram,statesthatLOGCAP’spurposeis“topreplanfortheuseofciviliancontractorstoperformselectedservicesinwartimetoaugmentArmyforces.Utilizationofciviliancontractorsinatheaterofoperationwillreleasemilitaryunitsforothermissionsorfillshortfalls.ThisprovidestheArmywithanadditionalmeanstoadequatelysupportthecurrentandprogrammedforce.Specificadvancedacquisitionplanningobjectivesareasfollows:a.Resolvethecombatsupportandcombatservicesupportunitshortfallsrepresentedinoperationsplans(OPLANS)andintheArmyprogram.b.Considerconversionofexistingsupportunitsbaseduponavailabilityofcontractsupportinwartime.c.ProviderapidcontractingcapabilityforcontingenciesnotcoveredbyglobalOPLANS.d.Provideforcontractaug-mentationincontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)duringmobilization.”
6Tooth-to-tailisametaphorfortheideaofallocatingpersonnelandresourcestothefighters(theteeth)whilereducingmilitarypersonnelandresourcesallocatedtothesupplyline(thetail).Facingbudgetshortfalls,theideaistokeepaleanArmybyresourcingprimarilythewarfighters.WithLOGCAP,theArmyisabletomeetthedemandforlogisticssupportincontingencieswithoutcarryinglargelogisticscapabilityasaninhousemilitaryfunctioninpeacetime.
7LOGCAPtook7yearstoimplementanddidnottrulybecomearealityuntil1992whenBrown&RootServices(nowKBR)wonthefirstcon-tracttoprovidesupporttoU.S.forcesinSomalia.Carafano,pp.43–44.
8Globalizationis“thedevelopmentofanincreasinglyintegratedglobaleconomymarkedespeciallybyfreetrade,freeflowofcapital,andthetap-pingofcheaperforeignlabormarkets.”Merriam-Webster’sOnlineDictionary,<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/globalization>,accessedon25February2010.ThewebpagefortheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophydiscussesglobalizationasa“fundamental[change]inthespatialandtemporalcontoursofsocialexistence....Asthetimenecessarytoconnectdistinctgeographicallocationsisreduced,distance[iscompressed]...[such]thatalterationsinhumanity’sexperiencesofspaceandtimeareworkingtounderminetheimportanceoflocalandevennationalboundaries.”(WilliamScheuerman,“Globalization,”StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,21June2002,<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/globalization>,accessedon25February2010.
9T.ChristianMiller,“ContractorsOutnumberTroopsinIraq,”The Los Angeles Times,4July2007.AstheUnitedStatesdrawsdown,thesenum-bersaredecreasing.Inlate2009,theUnitedStateshadover113,000contractorsand130,000troopsinIraq—aratioof.87to1.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS
HEADLINES
WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT
COMMENTARY
FOCUS
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58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
battlefield—aratioof1.63to1.10Buttheincreaseinbattlefieldcontractorsisnotthemostimportantaspectofthisglobalizationphenomenon.Realinsightcomesfromexaminingthecontractoremployees’countriesoforigin.
In2007,contractorsinIraqcomprisedroughly21,000Americans,43,000foreigncontractors,and118,000Iraqis.11In2007,7ofthetop10corporationsdoingbusinesswiththeU.S.GovernmentinIraqwerenotevenU.S.companies.12Bylate2009,contractorsinAfghanistancomprisedroughly9percentU.S.employ-ees,16percentthird-countrynationals,and75percentlocalnationals.13
UnplannedMilitaryOrganizationalChangeBychoosingtohireforeignlogisticscontractors,the
UnitedStatesstrategicallyaltereditsnationallogisticssystemfromaprimarilyclosed,state-basedorgani-zationalsystemtoaprimarilyopen,non-state-based
organizationalsystem.14Historically,theUnitedStatesandmostnation-stateshaveprocuredwarresourcesfromwithintheirownborders.RearAdmiralHenryE.Ecclesdescribedthepost-WorldWarII-eraorga-nizationalsysteminhisseminalbook,Logistics in the National Defense.15Inhisbook,Ecclesdescribeda“closedorganizationalsystem”reflectingwhathecalledthe“nationallogisticsbridge.”(Seefigureatleft.)
ThenationallogisticsbridgefocusedentirelyontheUnitedStates.Itportrayedstrategiclogis-
ticsfromitsgenesisintheU.S.economy,movingontotheproductionofdefensearticlesintheUnitedStates,andendingwiththedistributionofthosedefensearticlestoatheaterofwar.ForEccles,strategiclogis-ticsstartswiththeU.S.economy’sfundamentalnaturalelements:people,rawmaterials,location,andnaturalresources.16
Today,manyeconomistswouldfindtheseelementstobesimilartothefactorsofproduction.17Eccleswrotethatthefundamentalnaturalelementscreateabasicnaturaleconomy,whichinturngeneratesagrossnationalprod-uct(GNP).18PartoftheGNPisthenextractedthroughtaxesandusedtohireU.S.companiestoproducedefensearticles.ThedefensearticlesarethentransportedsomedistancefromtheUnitedStatestothetheaterofwar,wheretheyareprovidedtoservicemembers.
Lookingtoorganizationaltheory,onecanviewEccles’logisticsbridgethroughthelensoftheresourcedependenceperspective(RDP).TheRDP,
Gross National Product(Defense Needs: Men, Materiel, Facilities, Services)
21 3
Department of Defense
Functional commands
and regional commands
Ground
Sea
Air
Jointcommands
CivilDefense
Essential Civilian Needs
Basic National Economy
1: People, raw materials, and geography2: Political social system3: Education, science and technology,
industry, skilled and unskilled labor4: Agriculture, manufacturing,
transportation
The fundamental natural elements (1)create a basic national economyconsisting of the other three elements of the economy (2, 3, and 4).
4
NationalGovernment Tactical commands
And tactical forces
FundamentalNatural Elements
Civilian surplus(Non-essentials that could be diverted to a military e�ort by reductions in standards of living.)
10Ibid.11Ibid.12Ibid.(Pleasenotethatthislistdoesnotincludethediversenationalityofallthesubcontractorsinvolved.)Inlate2009,contractorsinIraqcomprised26percentU.S.employees,
47percentthird-countrynationals,and26percentIraqis.13MosheSchwartz,p.13.14Thedifferencebetweenanopenandclosedorganizationalsystemliesintheenvironmentthattheorganizationreliesontogetitsinputsinordertoproduceanoutput.Aclosed
organizationalsystemdependsonitsowninnerenvironmenttogetitsinputs,ignoringitssurroundings.Itisimpervioustonewexternalinputs,eveniftheinputsarethere.Anopenorganizationalsystemdependsoninnerandexteriorinputstoproduceanoutputorresult.Itadaptstonewexternalinputsbyrapidlyintegratingtheinputintoitsoutput.(MaryJoHatch, Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives, OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,1997,pp.78–79.)
15HenryE.Eccles,Logistics in the National Defense,TheStackpoleCompany,Harrisburg,Pennsylvania,1959,pp.54–55.16Ibid.17CampbellR.McConnellandStanleyL.Brue,Economics,13thed.,McGraw-Hill,Inc.,NewYork,1996,pp.22–23andG-10.Factorsofproductionareacountry’seconomic
resources—itsland(includingallnaturalresources),capital(includingallmanufacturedaidstoproductionliketools,machinery,equipment,factories,transportation,anddistributionfacilities),labor,andentrepreneurialability.
18Grossnationalproductis“thetotalmarketvalueofallfinalgoodsandservicesproducedannuallybyland,labor,andcapitalandentrepreneurialtalentsuppliedbyAmericanresidents,whetherthoseresourcesarelocatedintheUnitedStatesorabroad.”Ontheotherhand,grossdomesticproductrefersto“thetotalmarketvalueofallfinalgoodsandser-vicesproducedannuallywithintheboundariesoftheUnitedStates,whetherbyAmericanorforeign-suppliedresources.Finalgoodsare“goodswhichhavebeenpurchasedforfinaluseandnotforresaleorfurtherprocessingormanufacturing(duringtheyear).”(McConnellandBrue,pp.G-13andG-11).
This chart represents Henry Eccles’ national logistics bridge. Eccles wrote that the fundamental natu-ral elements create a basic natural economy, which in turn generates a gross national product.
MAY–jUNE 2010 59
developedbyJeffreyPfefferandGeraldR.Salancik,isatheorythat“emphasizesthepointthattheenvironmentisapowerfulconstraintonorganizationalaction.”19
UsingtheRDPtheorytoanalyzeEccles’logisticsbridge,theNation’sabilitytowagewarislimitedbyitsresourceenvironment—itsownfundamentalnatu-ralelements.Underthisclosed-systemmodel,theUnitedStatescanonlywagewartotheinsularlimitsofitspeople,itsindustrialcapacity,andmostimpor-tantly,itsGNP.
Eccles’systemisaclosedorganizationalsystembecausedefenseneedsaremetfromelementsorresourc-esthatareassumedtocomefromwithinthecountryitself.Thisresultsinarelativelystableandsomewhatmechanisticsystemsviewofthelogisticsbridge.(Seefigureattopleft.)Ecclesnotesthatthissystemisregen-erativeinthattheproductionofallthedefenseneedsinsidetheUnitedStatesfuelsanincreasedGNPovertime.
ThisisEccles’logic:TheU.S.Government,throughGovernmentprocurementactivities,returnspartoftheGNPbacktoU.S.businessesintheUnitedStatesbycontractingforgoodsorservices.TheU.S.businessesusethatmoneytobuildoroptimizeexistingindustrialinfrastructureandcapacity,producegoodsforthemili-taryeffort,andpayU.S.workers.
ThoseU.S.businessesandtheirworkersthenpaytaxesthatgeneratemoreFederalrevenue.Theindustri-alinfrastructurealsofuelsmorecapacityforbusiness,whichinturnfurtherincreasestheGNP.Ineffect,Eccles’logisticsbridgepositsthatalltheenvironmen-talresourceconstraintscanbeexpandedovertimebyaregenerativeGNPcyclethatoccurswhenthedefenseproductioneffortiswithinU.S.borders.20
Today’sOpenOrganizationalSystemToday,however,DODisnotusingEccles’famed
logisticsbridgeinthesameway.Globalizationhasradicallytransformedthisbridgeintoamoreopenorganizationalsystemthatcapitalizesonthewider,globalenvironment.UsinganRDPperspective,theopen-systemviewdemonstratesthatboththeavailablefactorsofproductionandtheavailablelabormarkethaveexpandedwellbeyondU.S.domesticborderstoaworldofglobalizedcompanies.Thesecompaniescanbeprivateorownedbyforeigngovernments.21
ToupdateEccles’logisticsbridge,wehavetomodifythemodeltoincludeglobalization.Today,LOGCAPhasmodifiedthelogisticsbridgebyexpandingtheresourceenvironmentthatusedtoconstraintheNation’sabilitytowagewar.(Seelowerfigure.)
Defense articles
U.S. company and national production
fuels
Gross nationalproduct
fuel
s
U.S. natural elements and basic natural economy (people,
industrial infrastructure, materials, and natural
resources)
Produces money, a percentage of
which is reinvested in the economy
World War II- Era National Logistics Bridge
19MaryJoHatch,Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives,OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,1997,pp.78–79.“ResourcedependencetheorywasmostfullydevelopedbyJeffreyPfefferandGeraldSalancikwhopublishedtheirideasin1978.TheirbookwasprovocativelytitledThe External Control of Organizationstoemphasizethepointthattheenvironmentisapowerfulconstraintonorganizationalaction.Althoughresourcedependencetheoryisbasedontheassumptionthatorganizationsarecontrolledbytheirenvironments,thesetheoristsalsobelievethatmanagerscanlearntonavigatetheharshseasofenvironmentaldomination.”
20 AcriticismofEccles’regenerativeargumentisthatitassumesthatincreasedgovernmentalspendingdoesnothaveanegativeimpact.Forexample,procuringgoodsandservic-esoverseasmayactuallyincreasetheU.S.GNP.CheaperoverseaslaborandproductionratesmayallowtheUnitedStatestopaylessforproductsandservices,leavingmoreresourcesinsidetheNationforothereconomicactivitiesthatwillincreaseGNP.
21OneexamplewouldbeSaudiAramco,anoilcompanyownedbytheSaudiArabiangovernment.
This conceptual diagram illustrates how Eccles’ bridge is a closed-loop system and how it is regenerative in that the U.S. production of defense articles results in a monetary reinvestment in the economy.
Defense articles
Foreign basic national economy and foreign GNP
Any foreign nation’s raw materials
Produces money, a percentage of
which is reinvested in the economy.
fuel
s
fuelsForeign company
Gross National Product (GNP)
fuel
s
US company andnational
production
Defense articles
Produces money, a percentage of
which is reinvested in the economy
U.S. natural elements and basic natural economy
(people, industrial infrastructure, materials,
and natural resources)
Today’s National Logistics Bridge
This diagram of today’s more open organizational system reflects how a portion of the U.S. gross national product is diverted to foreign companies.
60 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Ultimately,evenwiththemoreopenorganizationalsystem,theNation’sabilitytowagewarisstilllim-itedbyitsoverallGNP.However,thenewmodelsug-geststhattheUnitedStatesisnolongerlimitedtothefundamentalnaturalelementsandthebasicnationaleconomyexistinginsideitsborders.
TheUnitedStateshasexpandeditscapabilitiestoincludetheentireglobalmixofnaturalelementsandforeigneconomies.TheabilitytoproducedefenseproductshasbeenexpandedfromU.S.companiestoanyglobalcompanywiththecapabilitytoproducegoodsorservices.Ratherthanabridge,today’slogis-ticssystemlooksmuchmorelikeaspiderweb,withdifferentitemssuppliedthroughindependentstrands.Thisopensystemismuchmoreflexibleandcanrap-idlyadjusttochangesintheresourceenvironment.
ConsequencesofHiringForeignContractorsThesizeandscopeofthecurrentglobalizationofworld
marketsisunprecedented.Soaretheeffects.Theconse-quencesoftheuseofforeignlogisticscontractorsposebothstrategicadvantagesandstrategicchallengesfortheUnitedStatesinatleastsixkeyareas.Thefirststrategicconsequenceofthisopensystemviewiseconomic.HiringforeigncontractorsdoesnotrejuvenatetheU.S.GNPtothesameextentthatEccles’closedorganizationalsystemsuggests.WhentheUnitedStateshireshost-nationandthird-nationcontractors,theregenerativeeffectofthosecontractsiseconomicallybeneficialtothehostnationandthethird-partynations,insteadoftheUnitedStates.
Onapositivenote,itappearstheUnitedStateshasfoundanindirectwaytoharnessthefreemarketsystemforwealthredistributiontoneedynation-states.Thiscanbealong-termstrategicadvantage.Bycontracting81,000Iraqisin2007,forexample,
theUnitedStatesprovidedasignificantstabiliz-ingopportunitytoIraqaswellasanincentiveforittobecomepartoftheglobalizedeconomy.ThisisimportanttoIraq,theUnitedStates,andtheworldbecauseitcontributestoreachingthegoaloflong-termstabilityintheMiddleEast.Thegeniusofthisendeavoristhatthemoneyneverflowsdirectlyintothehandsofthenation-state,whereitcouldbediverted,squandered,ormismanaged.Itgoesdirectlyintothehandsofcommerciallyorientedentrepreneursandindividualemployees.
Ontheotherhand,becausethemajorityoftheU.S.defensebudgetisnotgoingtoU.S.corporations,theUnitedStatesgetslesstaxrevenueandlessgrowthinitsownindustries.Asaresult,whilethewareffortisnotrejuvenatingtheU.S.GNPasmuchasitcould,theGNPstillremainsthesinglemostconstrainingfactorontheNation’sabilitytowagewar.AsauthorGeoffreyParkerputit,“greatsumsofmoneyarethesinewsofwar.”22
Thesecondstrategicconsequenceofusingforeignlogisticscontractorsisintheexpansionofpersonnelavailabletoanationtoconductwar.Lookingbacktohistory,today’suseofforeigncontractorsonthebattle-fieldisanalogoustothelevée en massethattripledNapoleon’sFrencharmyin1year.Fromabout1792to1815,politicalandsocialchangesledFrancetobecomeanationofcitizensinsteadofanationofkingsandserfs.23
AfterFrancemadeeveryoneacitizen,itbecamepos-sibletocallfortheentireFrenchmalepopulationtojointhemilitary.24NationalismamongthepeoplehelpedtotriplethesizeoftheFrencharmyalmostovernight.Withsomanymenunderarms,NapoleonexpandedhisArmy’smilitarystructure,leadingtoamoremaneu-verableandsustainableforce.25Hislargerarmyandreorganizedmilitarystructureledtomultiplebattlefieldsuccesses—untilhisenemiescopiedhim.
Today,theUnitedStatesfieldsasmallvolunteerforce,butbyprivatelycontractingwithcompanies(notcountries),theUnitedStateshasessentiallyadded217,832peopleinsupportoftheatercontingencylogistics,andveryfewofthemarefromtheUnitedStates.26TheUnitedStatesthenfunnelsthelimitednumberofAmericanservicemembersintokeywar-fightingpositions.
Thethirdstrategicconsequenceisthequalityofperformance.TheuseofU.S.andforeigncontractorsonthebattlefieldhasdecidedlyledtooutstandingbattlefieldlogisticssupport.Onebenefitofprivate
22GeoffreyParker,The Cambridge History of Warfare,CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork,2005,p.430.23Ibid.,pp.57–58.24Ibid.,p.8.25StevenT.Ross,“NapoleonandManeuverWarfare,”U.S.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,FortLeavenworth,Kansas,2008,p.106;MacGregorKnoxand
WilliamsonMurray,The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–2050,CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork,2001,p.67.26ThisfigureisthenumberofcontractorsinbothIraqandAfghanistaninSeptember2009.(MosheSchwartz,p.5.)
United StatesPower
ProjectionCapability
Raw material inputs
Knowledge andequipment inputs
Industrial facilityinputs
Labor inputs
R esource Dependence P erspective Know Where Your Key Resources Come From
The resource dependence perspective illustrates how U.S. power projection capability is dependent on the sources of all its key resources.
MAY–jUNE 2010 61
foreigncontractorsisthestrategicadvantagethatcomeswithreducingthelengthofthemilitary’ssup-plylines.Historically,armieshavehadtoconcludeoperationswhensupplylinesbecometoolongbecausethelinesaretooslowandtooopentoenemyattack.Asaresult,thespeedofanarmy’sadvancehastra-ditionallydependedontheabilityofitslogisticstokeeppace.NobetterexamplecanbefoundthanthedesertexploitsoftheGermanGeneralErwinRommelinNorthAfricaduringWorldWarII.27Theadvanceofhismotorizedarmywasoftenconstrainedbyhisinabilitytopushfuelquicklytohistanks.28
Today,theUnitedStatesisreducingtheeffectoflongsupplylinesbypayinglocalandforeigncorporationstoprovidesuppliesneartheareaofoperations.Mov-ingsuppliesbyprivatemeansmakesthesupplylinelookmorelikeaweb.Privatesupplymovementinitiallymakesitmoredifficultfortheenemytoidentifysupplylines,anditmaysignificantlyshortenthedistancebasicsuppliesandserviceshavetotraveltoreachtroops.29
ThefourthstrategicconsequenceofusingforeignprivatecontractorsisalikelylossoftheU.S.“monopolyoverthetechnologyand[otherproprietary]meansusedtogeneratecombatpower.”30Essentially,globalizationissoextensivethattheUnitedStatescannotcontrolorcontainit.CompaniesunderGovernmentcontractoftenindependentlymovethephysicallocationoftheirpri-vatebusinessesoutsidethecountryorsubcontractwithforeigncompaniestomeettheircontractualobligations.
TheArmy’sfieldingoftheblackberetin2000isagoodexampleofthedebaclesthatcanensue.31AlthoughaU.S.companywonthecontracttoproducetheberet,thecompanyhadtosubcontractwithproductionfacilitiesinChinaandSriLanka.32ACongressionalResearchServiceReporttoCongressnotedthattheDepartmentofDefensehadknownfor25yearsthat
nomanufacturerwascapableofcreatingaberetmadewhollyintheUnitedStates,eventhoughthelawrequiredit.33WhilegettingfabricfromChinamaynotseemtobeabigdeal,itmostcertainlywouldbeabigdealifnomanufacturerintheUnitedStatescouldprovidetitanium,akeycomponentinaircraftandothermilitaryhardware.
Thispotentiallossoftechnologyandotherpropri-etarymeanstogeneratecombatpowertiesintothefifthandsixthstrategicconsequencesofusingforeigncontractors:resourcecompetitioninaglobalsupplychain.Thefifthconsequenceofusingforeigncontrac-torsissimplytheU.S.dependenceonthisglobalsup-plychain.Inessence,theUnitedStatesisprocuringcomponentsforitsweaponsthroughexteriorstrategiclinesofcommunication.34PartsfrommanydifferentsupplypointsconvergeintheUnitedStatesforfinalassembly,muchlikeseveraldivergentunitsconvergeonamilitaryobjective.
DuringWorldWarII,asEcclessuggests,theUnitedStatespredominantlyproduceditsweaponsbymobilizingitsownindustrialbaseandminingitsownrawmaterials.Atthattime,theUnitedStatesprocuredthemajorityofitsweaponsandcomponentsthroughinteriorlinesofcommunicationthattheUnit-edStatescontrolledandprotected.
Thenewgloballogisticsmarketfordefensearticleslookslikeaspiderweb.Eachstrandrepresentsaprivatecompanyprovidingamilitaryresource.Thewebisflex-ible,andthespider(theNation)caneasilyrepairtheweb.However,thewebisnowpartofthewargame,withmultiplespidersvyingforterritoryonthewebstrands.
Thus,thesixthconsequenceisthatasothercountriesmimicLOGCAP,resourcecompetitionwilldevelop(akeytheoreticalpointinRDP).Thisisapparentistwoways.First,asallspidersarenowonthesameweb,the
27WhenGeneralRommelenteredNorthAfricain1941,hefoundhisfuelsupplylinesatethertohis“warofmobility.”(FieldMarshalErwinRommel,Rommel and his Art of
War,GreenhillBooks,London,2003,p.135.)28GeneralRommelcontinuallypushedhismotorizedforcestotheverylimitsoftheirfuel,optimisticallyhopingforresupply.(Ibid.,p.135.)Sometimeshecountedonsupplies
fromcapturedBritishpositions,likeTobruk,Libya,aboutwhichGeneralRommelwrote,“OurvictoryatTobrukhadbeenatthecostofthelastofourstrength,sincefightinganenemywhohadsuperiornumbersofmenandequipmenthadtakenitstollonmyunits.Butnowthatwehadamassedenormousbootyintheshapeofmunitions,petrol,rationsandsuppliesofallkinds,thepreparationofanotheroffensivestrikewaspossible.”(Ibid.)Rommel’soptimisticattitudeonsuppliesinvitedcriticism.Forexample,inApril1941,RommelattackedMersaelBrega.His5thDivisiondesired4daysofrefueling.Hegavethem24hoursinstead.(Ibid.,p.65.)Rommel’sItaliancounterpart,GeneralItaloGariboldi,criticized“thatsuppliestotheItalo-Germantroopsweresolimitedthatnoonecouldassumeresponsibilityforsuchanundertaking,oranswerfortheconsequencesthatmightensue.”(Ibid.,p.66.)WhenRommel’stroopsadvancedonMechili,Libya,sometanksdidrunoutoffuel.(Ibid.,p.67.)Rommeladvancedquickly,tookMechili,andcontinued.Intheend,hepushedhismotorizedforcesover900mileswhilehismainsupplybaseremainedbehindinTripoli.(Ibid.,p.73.)OnesolutiontoRommel’slackofsupplieswastouseupto85percentofcapturedenemyvehiclesashistransportpool.(Ibid.,p.139.)Healsofocusedattacksonareasthathethoughtwouldeasehissupplyproblems,likeTobrukandBirHacheim,Libya.(Ibid.,pp.110and139.)
29Formorecomplextechnology,however,theeffectsarealmosttheexactreverse.30Carafano,p.37.31TheBerryAmendmentrequiredthattheberetbecompletelymadeintheUnitedStates.“TheBerryAmendment,codifiedat10U.S.C.2533a,isastatutepassedbyCongress
in1941that“requirestheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)togivepreferenceinprocurementtodomesticallyproduced,manufactured,orhomegrownproducts,notablyfood,cloth-ing,fabrics,[handtools,specialtytools],andspecialtymetals...[i]nordertoprotecttheU.S.industrialbaseduringperiodsofadversityandwar.”Itwasoriginallywrittentoensure“thatU.S.troopsworemilitaryuniformswhollyproducedwithintheUnitedStatesandtoensurethatU.S.troopswerefedwithfoodproductsproducedintheUnitedStates.”Otherrestrictionswereaddedlater.Therestrictionsapplytoprimecontractorsandsub-contractors.However,“theDefenseFederalAcquisitionRegulationSupplement(DFARS)[225.7002]includesexceptionsfortheacquisitionoffood,specialtymetals,andhandormeasuringtoolswhenneededtosupportcontingencyoperationsorwhentheuseofotherthancompeti-tiveproceduresisbasedonanunusualandcompellingurgency.”(ValerieB.Grasso, Congressional Research Service [CRS] Report to Congress: The Berry Amendment: Requiring Defense Procurement to come from Domestic Sources,U.S.LibraryofCongress,Washington,DC,21April2005.)
32Ibid.,p.4.33Ibid.,p.16.34“Aforceoperatesoninteriorlineswhenitsoperationsdivergefromacentralpoint.Interiorlinesusuallyrepresentcentralposition,whereafriendlyforcecanreinforceor
concentrateitselementsfasterthantheenemyforcecanreposition....Aforceoperatesonexteriorlinesofoperationwhenitsoperationsconvergeontheenemy.”(FieldManual3–0,Operations,DepartmentoftheArmy,Washington,DC,2008,pp.6-12–6-13.)
62 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
marketwilllikelyprovideothercountrieswithmilitarytechnologyoriginallydevelopedfortheUnitedStates,thusweakeningourtechnologicaledge.Itwillalsopro-videothercountrieswithproductionfacilitiesthattheUnitedStatesnolongerpossesses.Butasglobalizationexpands,allthespiders(nations)willhavetograpplewiththestrategicrealitiesinherentinaglobalsupplychainfortechnologyandsustainment.
Second,thespiderwebisalsomobile,movingout-sideanyonespider’scontrol.CompaniescurrentlyworkingwiththeUnitedStatesmayalsoseekbusinessfromothernot-so-friendlycountriesinneedofcon-tractedlogisticsandsecuritysupport.35
AsEcclescontends,acountry’sabilitytowagewarisultimatelyconstrainedbyitseconomiccapabilities,whichmaybemeasuredbyitsGNP.Inlargerglobalconflicts,theUnitedStateswillonlygetthelogisticsresourcesifitcanoutbidalltheothercompetitors.SincemostlogisticscontractorsarenotU.S.citizensorU.S.corporations,theUnitedStatescannotnational-izetheseprivatecompaniesorevenarguefornationalloyalty.Asaresult,warwillbemoreexpensiveandasavvyenemycouldbuyupkeylogisticsresourcesjusttokeepthemfromtheUnitedStates.
StrategicallyManagingResourceDependenciesGivenitscurrentdependenceonglobalcontracting,36
theUnitedStatesmaybeunabletoreturntoEccles’closedsystem,wherealltherawmaterialsforproductionareproducedsolelyintheUnitedStates.However,theUnitedStatescanlooktotheRDPtheoryforconceptualideasonhowtolessentheriskofitsglobalsupplychain.
First,theUnitedStatesmustidentifythekeypowerdependencerelationshipsitmaintainswithitsfragileglobalsupplyproviders.37Thenextkeystepistoiden-tifyanyrelationshipsthatinterferewiththeresourceexchangebetweentheUnitedStatesandtheforeigncontractors.38Thebasicideaistoestablishcountervail-ingsourcestooffsetthepotentialpowerofasingleresourceprovider.39
Inthecorporateworld,forexample,Company1maydependonCompany2forrawmaterialsneededforitsmanufacturingprocess.BecauseCompany1reliesonCompany2,itwouldseektodiluteCompany2’sstrengthbyincreasingitsnumberofsimilarsuppli-ers,buyingoutCompany2,orperhapsworkingoutanarrangementtohaveavoteonCompany2’sboardof
directors.40ProponentsoftheRDPnotethat“manag-ingresourcedependencerequirescarefuldefinitionandmonitoringoftheenvironment.Italsocallsforimagina-tionwithrespecttobalancingthepowerofothersbydevelopingthepowerofyourownorganization.”41
Justasprivatecompaniesmanagetheirresourcedependencies,theUnitedStatesmustidentifyandmanageitsglobalizedresourcedependencies.Today,theUnitedStatesdoesthisinaveryreactivemanner.Forthemostpart,theNationjustidentifiessupplyproblemswhenacriticalresourceissueisalreadyhavingadetrimentaleffectonthetroops.
WehavelawstokeepcertainresourceswithintheNation’sborders,butmoreactiveinvolvementisrequiredtotrulymanageourincreasingresourcedependencies.Inthefuture,theUnitedStatesneedsacentralizedadministrativebody(orperhapsGovern-ment-ownedcompanies)withtheproactivemissionofmanagingU.S.resourcedependenciestobalancepowerandprotecttheglobalsupplychain.
Formostofourhistory,theUnitedStatesacquirednationalmilitarylogisticscapabilitiesthrougharathermechanistic,closedorganizationalsystemthatlimitedtheresourcesavailableforwartotheresourcespresentwithintheboundariesoftheNation.Today,globaliza-tionhastransformedtheU.S.militarylogisticssystemtoamuchmoreopenorganizationalsystemwithunan-ticipatedresourcedependenciesonexternalsources.
Althoughopensystemscanreactquicklytochangeandareextremelyflexible,thechallengeistomanageanunprotectedresourceenvironmentthatincludestheentireworldpopulation.Thisevolvedsystemposessomeseriousstrategicchallenges.Becauseoftheexpectedexpansionofeconomicglobalization,futureuninterrupteduseoftheglobalsupplynetworkwillrequiretheUnitedStatestoconstantlycounterbalancesoleresourcepowersamongitsglobalsupplychain.
Major Christine M. sChverak is an aCtive duty arMy judge advoCate and an assoCiate professor of ContraCt and fisCal law at the judge advoCate general’s legal Center and sChool (tjaglCs). she has a b.a. degree in journalisM froM indiana university, a j.d. degree in law froM the university of florida, and an ll.M. degree in Military law froM tjaglCs. she is a graduate of the CoMbined logistiCs offiCers advanCed Course and the interMediate level eduCation Course at fort lee, virginia.
35Thisindustryalreadyexistsamongprivatesecuritycontractors(PSCs)hiredtoprotectgovernmentagencyofficialsinIraqandAfghanistan.AccordingtotheGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,PSCsarealreadyrecruitedandhiredbytheUnitedKingdom,SouthAfrica,Nepal,SriLanka,Fiji,Iraq,theUnitedNations,nongovernmentalorganizations,andeventhemedia.(“RebuildingIraq:DODandStateDepartmentHaveImprovedOversightandCoordinationofPrivateSecurityContractorsinIraq,butFurtherActionsareNeed-edtoSustainImprovements,”ReporttoCongressionalCommittees,UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,Washington,DC,July2008,p.7.)
36“MostanalystsnowbelievethatDODisunabletosuccessfullyexecutelargemissionswithoutcontractorsupport.”(MosheSchwartz,p.13.)37Hatch,p.78.38Ibid.,p.79.39Ibid.,p.80.40Ibid.41Ibid.,p.81.
MAY–jUNE 2010 63
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS
HEADLINES
WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT
COMMENTARY
FOCUS
QuadrennialDefenseReviewAddressesForceBalanceandContractingImprovements
The2010QuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR),releasedbytheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)inFeb-ruary,isthefirstQDRtomakecurrentconflictsthepriorityofbudgeting,policy,andprogrammingefforts.TheQDR,whichcoversfiscalyears2011to2015,seekstofurtherrebalancetheforceandreformDOD’sinstitutionsandprocessestobettersupporttheurgentneedsofthewarfighter.DODalsowantstoensuretaxpayerdollarsarespentwiselyandthatnewweaponsareusable,affordable,andtrulyneeded.
TheQDRaddressestheimportanceofpreserving,enhancing,andequippingtheAll-VolunteerForceandthecivilianworkforcesupportingit.DODplanstoexpanditsCivilianExpeditionaryWorkforcetoaugmentmilitaryefforts,concentrateonthemen-talandphysicalhealthofallitsforces,andmakethewayDODequipsthoseforcesapriorityforimprovement.
DODplanstoinstitutionalizerapidacquisitioncapabilitieswithout“sacrificingcostandscheduleforpromisesofimprovedperformance.”EffortstoimprovetheColdWar-eraU.S.exportcontrolsys-tem,whichis“hinderingU.S.industrialcompetitive-ness,”andrapidlogisticssupporttoforcesabroadarealsopriorities.
DODalsoplansto“worktoreducethenumberofsupportservicecontractors,inanefforttoestab-lishabalancedworkforcethatappropriatelyalignsfunctionstothepublicandprivatesector.”Withthereductioninthenumberandtypeofcontractorsonthebattlefieldcomesanefforttoreducethecostofcontracts.DODwillbegintoemployfixed-pricedevelopmentcontractsmorefrequently,constrainthetendencytoaddprogramrequirementsthroughcon-figurationsteeringboards,andbetterlinkthecon-tractfeestructuretoperformance.
Ontheacquisitionside,DODplanstoaddandtrain20,000personnelby2015toaddressshortfallsincontractoversight.DODwillcreate9,000newpositionsandconvert11,000contractpositionstoGovernmentpositions.DODwillalsobeincreasingitsrelianceonindependentcostanalysis“toensurethatdecisionsonacquisitionandlogisticsprogramsarebasedonthemostrealisticcostestimatespossi-ble.”Thecreationofnewprogramswillalsoundergotoughscrutinytoensurethatthebestalternativeswiththefewestrisksareselected.
ArmyContractingHeadquartersUnitstoMoveFromVirginiatoAlabama
TheArmyContractingCommandandExpedition-aryContractingCommandheadquarterswillmovefromFortBelvoir,Virginia,toRedstoneArsenal,
Alabama,byAugust2011,resultinginthereassign-mentof79Soldiersand234civilians.
BothcommandswillcolocatewiththeArmyMaterielCommandandtheArmySecurityAssis-tanceCommand,whichwillalsomovetoRedstoneArsenal.
A Leader Development Strategy for the 21st CenturyseekstobalancethedemandsoftheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)modelwiththeeducationaldemandsoftheforcebybetteraligningtimelinesforcoursesandkeydevelopmentalpositionswiththedeploymentcycle.Thestrategywasdevelopedusinglessonslearnedfromongoingconflicts,assessmentsofthefutureoperationalenvironment,theChiefofStaffoftheArmy’sGreenBookarticle,“TheArmyofthe21stCentury,”andFieldManual3–0,Operations.
Inthestrategy,theChiefofStaffestablisheseightimperativestointegratepolicies,programs,andinitiatives“todevelopleaderswiththerequiredqualitiesandenduringleadercharacteristics.”Theimperativeshighlighttheneedto—❏ EncourageanequalcommitmentbytheArmy
institution,leaders,andindividualcivilianandmilitarypersonneltolife-longlearninganddevelopment.
❏ Balancecommitmenttothetraining,education,andexperiencepillarsofdevelopment.
❏ Useoutcome-basedtrainingandeducationtoprepareleadersforhybridthreatsandfull-spectrumoperations.
❏ AchievebalanceandpredictabilityinpersonnelpoliciesandprofessionalmilitaryeducationinsupportofARFORGEN.
❏ ManagetheArmy’smilitaryandciviliantalenttobenefitboththeinstitutionandtheindividual.
❏ Prepareleadersbyreplicatingthecomplexityoftheoperationalenvironmentintheclassroomandathomestation.
❏ Produceleaderswhoarementorsandwhoarecommittedtodevelopingtheirsubordinates.
❏ Prepareselectedleadersforresponsibilityatthenationallevel.Theimperativeswillguidefurtherchangesin
leaderdevelopmentandensurethattheArmyisabletodeveloptheagileleadersneededtomakedecisionsinanever-changingenvironment.
RECENTLY PUBLISHED
64 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
SustainmentSoldiersSupportHumanitarianAidOperationsinHaiti
SustainmentSoldiersfromacrosstheArmyhavebeenprovidingearthquakevictimsinHaitiwithfood,water,andotherlogisticssupportaspartofOpera-tionUnifiedResponse.EightpersonnelfromtherapidportopeningelementsoftheMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCommanddeployedfromFortEustis,Virginia,andarrived2daysaftertheearthquakeaspartofaU.S.TransportationCom-mandteamtoidentifywhichtransportationandlogis-ticscapabilitieswouldbestsupporttherelief.
FortBragg,NorthCarolina,initiallydeployed896SoldiersfromtheXVIIIAirborneCorps,the82dAirborneDivision(AirAssault),andotherunitstoprovidehumanitariansupporttosurvivors.Inlessthanaweek,theseSoldiersdelivered54,738poundsofsup-pliesandequipment,including3,600gallonsofbottledwaterand14,400mealsready-to-eat.Overall,FortBraggisexpectedtodeployasmanyas3,000SoldierstoHaitiinsupportofOperationUnifiedResponse.
The3dSustainmentCommand(Expeditionary)(ESC)fromFortKnox,Kentucky,hadkeyleadersonthegroundwithindaysoftheearthquakeandsentoverhalfoftheESCoverthecourseofamonthtobepartofJointLogisticsCommand-Haiti.
Thefirstgroupof3dESCSoldiersworkedwiththeNavyandCoastGuardtoreopenHaiti’smainport,establishedtwologisticshubsawayfromtheair-port,andplannedfora2-weekUnitedNationsWorldFoodProgramsurgeoperation.The7thSustainmentBrigadehassincejoinedtheESC,ashaveanumberoflogisticsunitsfromacrosstheservices.
The530thCombatSustainmentSupportBattalion,49thQuartermasterGroup,fromFortLee,Virginia,joinedtheseunitsinearlyFebruary.The49thQuar-termasterGroupisprovidingmortuaryaffairssupporttoJointTaskForce-Haitiandwaterpurificationanddistribution,fuelstorageanddistribution,andlogis-ticssupporttotheWorldFoodProgram.The49thGroupSoldierswillremaininHaitiatleastthroughAugust.
Below: Parachute riggers from the 11th Quartermaster Company, 189th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, 82d Sustainment Brigade, prepare container delivery system bundles for delivery in support of Operation Unified Response. (Photo by SPC A.M. LaVey)
Left: A water purification specialist from the 82d Water Detachment, 16th Quartermaster Company, 530th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, provides fresh water in Haiti. (Photo by SPC A.M. LaVey)
Soldiers of the 331st Transportation Company, 24th Transportation Battalion, 7th Sustainment Brigade, 3d Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), assemble causeway sections to facilitate the loading of equipment onto ships prior to departing for Haiti. (Photo by SFC Kelly Jo Bridgwater, 7th Sustainment Brigade Public Affairs)
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NewArmamentResearchandDevelopmentComplexIsUnderConstruction
TheArmyArmamentResearch,DevelopmentandEngineeringCenter(ARDEC)isinthemidstofdevelopingaFuzeEngineeringComplex,whichwillbelocatedatPicatinnyArsenal,NewJersey.Thecomplexisbeingbuiltinresponsetoa2005BaseClosureandRealignmentCommissionrecommen-dationtoestablishajointcenterofexcellenceforguns,weapons,andammunitionresearchbybring-ingtogetherelementscurrentlylocatedatAdelphi,Maryland,underthesameroofasotherFuzeDivi-sionelements.
The$18millioncomplexincludesrenovationsofcurrentbuildingsthatwillbeusedasofficespace.Twonewresearchfacilitieswillalsobeconstructed:oneforfuzeexplosiveresearchandtheotherforfuzeelectromagneticresearch.Twoammunitionstor-agebunkersarealsobeingbuilt,andsomeoftheunit’sanechoic(soundabsorbent)chamberspacewillalsoberenovated.Thefacilityisexpectedtobecom-pletedbyOctober2011.
TARDECConstructingNewVehicleResearchandDevelopmentFacility
TheArmyTankandAutomotiveResearch,Development,andEngineeringCenter(TARDEC)isbuildingtheGroundSystemPowerandEnergyLaboratory(GSPEL)atDetroitArsenal,Michigan.GSPELwillbea30,000-square-footcomplexhous-ingeightlaboratoriesdedicatedtotheresearchanddevelopment,modeling,andtestingofgroundvehiclesofallsizesandtheirindividualcomponents.GSPELalsowillprovidefacilitiestosimulateawidevarietyofenvironmentalconditions—extremetem-peratures,humidity,andsolarconditions—inwhichtotestmannedandunmannedgroundvehicles.
GSPELwillbethecornerstoneoftheArmy’snextgenerationofpowerandenergyinitiativesandwillincludelaboratoriesforresearchanddevelopmentofhybrid-electricvehicles,fuelcells,alternativefuelandpropulsionsystems,criticalcombatvehiclefuelefficiency,auxiliarypower,andfieldsustainability.
TARDECworkedwiththeSouthwestResearchInstituteinSanAntonio,Texas,todevelopthedemandingequipmentandfacilityspecificationsforthecomplex.GSPELisexpectedtobecompletedbylate2011.
SustainmentCenterofExcellenceNamedTRADOCInstituteofExcellence
TheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRA-DOC)namedtheSustainmentCenterofExcellence(SCoE)atFortLee,Virginia,anInstituteofExcel-lenceon17February.TheSCoEisthefirstTRA-DOCCenterofExcellencetoearnthedesignation.
LieutenantGeneralDavidP.Valcourt,deputycom-mandinggeneralofTRADOC,presentedtheawardtoMajorGeneralJamesE.Chambers,commandinggeneraloftheArmyCombinedArmsSupportCom-mandandSCoE,fortheorganization’sInstituteofExcellenceaccreditationratingsindoctrine,organi-zation,training,materiel,leadership,personnel,andfacilities.
TheInstituteofExcellenceawardrecognizesorganizationsthathaveexcelledininternalevalua-tion,externalevaluation,andaccreditation.Giventhatthesecondtwoareasarehardtoachievewith-outproperinternalevaluation,thequalityassuranceteamswithintheSCoEplayedkeyrolesinpreparingtheinstitutionforsuccess.Theywerealsorespon-sibleforpreparingtheSCoE’ssubordinateorganiza-tions,11ofwhichachieved“InstituteofExcellence”ratingsfortheSeptember2008toJanuary2010accreditationyear.
SustainmentSymposiumandExpositionTheAssociationoftheUnitedStatesArmywill
holditsInstituteofLandWarfareSustainmentSym-posiumandExpositionfrom22to24JuneattheGreaterRichmondConventionCenterinRichmond,Virginia.Formoreinformationortoregister,visitwww.ausa.org.
InternationalDefenceLogisticsandSupport2010InternationalDefenceLogisticsandSupport
2010willbeheld29Juneto2JulyattheHotelLePlazainBrussels,Belgium.Theconferencebringstogetherover200ofthemostseniorlogis-ticsprofessionalsacrossEuropetodiscussthechallengesandsuccessesofjointlogistics.
Theconferencewillbeginwithacontractedlogisticssupportfocusday.OthertopicsincludelogisticsinAfghanistan,improvingyourlogis-ticsfootprintintheater,andworkingwithcoali-tionpartnerstoprovidesustainableandreliablelogisticssupport.Theconferencewillalsoholdsessionsaboutdevisingadrawdownstrategyandmeetingcost-cuttingrequirementswithoutcom-promisinglogisticscapabilities.
Theconferenceisdesignedforsupply-chain,procurement,acquisition,defensemateriel,anddatamanagementprofessionalsaswellasprojectteamleadersandsenioroperationallogisticians.Formoreinformationortoregister,visittheconferencewebsiteatwww.defencelog.com,call+44(0)207–368–9465,[email protected].
UPCOMING EVENTS
PERIODICALS POSTAGEAND FEES PAIDAT PETERSBURG VIRGINIAAND ADDITIONAL CITIES
ISSN 0004–2528DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYARMY SUSTAINMENTUS ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY2401 QUARTERS ROADFORT LEE VIRGINIA 23801–1705
Official Business
o SupporttothePolishMilitaryContingento AligningMetricstoAchieveSupplyChainGoalso AmmoManagementInformationSystemsChallengeso TheCorpsLogisticsPlanningandDecisionCycleo Coblenz1919:TheFirstSustainmentCenterofExcellenceo SustainingtheAfghanNationalArmyEmbeddedTrainingTeamo BCS3:TakeAnotherLooko ArmyAmmunitionIndustrialBaseinDecayo WeaponSystemSustainmentSourcingo TheEvolutionofPetroleumSupportintheCENTCOMAORo MovingTowardaMoreSustainableArmyFoodProgramo ContractOversightintheOperationalEnvironment
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