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Who Participates in Democratic Revolutions? A Comparison of

the Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions

Mark Beissinger, Amaney Jamal, and Kevin Mazur

Princeton University

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Abstract:

This paper uses highly unusual, individual-level data on protest participation in the Tunisian and

Egyptian revolutions to evaluate the leading causal theories behind the Arab Spring (and

democratic revolutions, more generally) by connecting a representative sample of the population

involved in protest activism with the conditions impelling their participation. It does so by

evaluating a series of hypotheses about who should be expected to participate in these

revolutions if specific theoretical explanations hold true. After establishing the patterns of who

participated, we compare them with those of another democratic revolution outside the region

the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The paper also investigates who among the participants

in these revolutions prioritized civil and political rights over other ends (i.e., constituted the

democratic vanguard within these revolutions). We find that explanations emphasizing value

change, secularization, and absolute material deprivation are wanting. Protesters in both Egypt

and Tunisia were predominantly males of middle class occupational and income profiles, and at

least as religious as other members of their societies. The evidence also shows that most

participants were motivated primarily by economic demands (and to a lesser extent, corruption),

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The revolutions of the Arab Spring witnessed massive political upheavals, as citizens

across a number of Arab countries rushed to the streets in protest against their respective

regimes. In a matter of weeks two longstanding authoritarian regimesthe Ben-Ali dictatorship

in Tunisia and the Mubarak dictatorship in Egyptfell, while leaders in other Arab countries

braced for the worst. As the Arab Spring unfolded across the region, both spectators and

participants labeled these protest movements as democratizing revolutions that were sweeping

the Arab world. Indeed, free-and-fair elections were held in the aftermath of protests in both

Egypt and Tunisia. To many, it appeared that democratic change had finally reached the Arab

world.

Yet these transformations leave us with many more questions than answers. For one

thing, other than impressionistic accounts from journalists or eyewitnesses, we know little about

the individuals who filled Tahrir and November 7 Squares 1 and who acted to bring about regime

change, or about the individual grievances and preferences that motivated them to mobilize in

the face of likely repression. If these revolutions are rightly understood as democratic

revolutions, 2 what were the attitudes of the protestors toward democratic freedoms and liberties?

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they similar or different from the societies from which they hailed? What does this tell us about

the political processes underlying democratic revolutions more generally?

Several schools of thought directly point to the important role that individuals play in

demanding democracy, and theories of democratization and revolution provide us with a basic

roadmap of expectations for predicting which individuals would likely participate in a

democratic revolution. However, rarely do we have available to us systematic information in

order to be able to evaluate those expectations. As we know, revolutions typically occur

suddenly, taking both observers and participants by surprise (Kuran, 1995). Therefore, it is

highly unusual to have a detailed cross-sectional record of the attitudes and backgrounds those

who participated in a revolution, or to be able to compare them with other members of society. 3

In this paper we are able to do precisely that for two revolutions. Using an original dataset from

the Second Wave Arab Barometer, which includes surveys administered in Tunisia and Egypt

after the Arab Revolutions, we examine the extent to which the backgrounds, attitudes, and

behaviors of those who participated in the protest movements in Egypt and Tunisia map onto

theoretical expectations.

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comparisons of who participated in these revolutions with analogous data on protestors in

another democratic revolution outside the regionthe 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

Fourth, we take our analysis of the Arab Spring revolutions to the next level by examining who,

among those who protested, specifically prioritized democratic demands as opposed to other

issues. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for our

understanding of democratic revolution and post-revolutionary political processes.

The paper demonstrates a number of important findings. First, we show that economic

grievances (and to a lesser extent, grievances over corruption) dominated the concerns of

participants in both revolutions, while civil and political freedoms ranked low among priorities

for the vast majority of participants. Thus, for most participating in democratic revolutions,

democratic revolutions are not necessarily about achieving democratic values, but about other

issues. This finding is consistent with Rustows (1970) well-known observation that democracy

is not the deterministic result of certain structural configurations or cultural proclivities but the

fortuitous by-product of a struggle between societal actors. Second, we show that the Egyptian

and Tunisian revolutions were composed disproportionately of middle-class males, with

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Revolution in Ukraine, as it was not based on the kind of sharp regional and identity cleavages

that characteristic of the Ukrainian case. Thus, democratizing revolutions have a variety of

coalitional patterns that are not summed up by any single theory. Third, we find that among those

who participated in these revolutions, participation in civil society associations is the factor most

closely associated with whether participants prioritized democratic values or saw the revolution

as primarily motivated by other factors. Thus, the nuts and bolts of democratization such as

civil society are critical in underpinning the democratic direction of democratic revolutions.

Participation in Democratic Revolution: Theories and Hypotheses

The literatures on democratization and revolutions provide us with a basic roadmap of

expectations about which citizens should be playing significant roles in bringing about

democratic revolutions and why. Indeed, most bottom-up accounts of democratizationthose

that argue that societies are important agents for democratizing changecontain explicit or

implicit arguments about the types of citizens who act as agents of democratization. For

example, a large number of the classic works in the fieldfrom Almond and Verba (1963) to

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Some of these theories also posit that particular categories of citizens should be at the

forefront of democratizing mobilizations, given the nature of the value-change process. Lipset

(1959), for example, places particular emphasis on education as a key determinant of democratic

values, leading one to believe that the more highly educated citizens should disproportionately

participate in democratic revolution. In other modernization formulations, there is the built-in

assumption that societies undergoing modernization will witness cohort shifts where newer

generations will hold more modern, egalitarian, and democratic worldviews (Inglehart, 1990), so

that youth in particular should be expected to be at the forefront of revolutionary democratic

change. Indeed, several journalists, scholars, and policy makers covering the events of the Arab

Spring linked the events to a youth population that was more oriented towards a set of universal

democratic values. 4 "#$%$ &'()*+ ,$)-$'% .,(/0 0#$ 12., 342-56 $74#.%-8$9 0:( -50$2;2$).0$9

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Civil society accounts of democratization and democratic revolution have emphasized the

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networks necessary for mobilizing individuals, and helps the development of a democratic

culture of tolerance and bargaining (Diamond and Plattner, 1989). In the Egyptian context,

Hamalawy (2011) notes that activism around the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000 and the Iraq

war in 2003 created links among activists and a space for criticism of the regime that would

facilitate the 2011 protests. Several accounts of the Arab revolutions hold that labor unions and

mosques played critical roles in mobilizing people into the streets (Beinin, 2011). Thus, one

might expect that those most likely to participate in democratic revolutions and most likely to

champion democratic values within those revolutions would be individuals who are involved in

civic associations and who have high levels of social capital. 5 Yet, civil society associations in

authoritarian settings have been known in some instances to reflect the orientations of the regime

(Jamal, 2007). There is also some question of the role played by face-to-face association (i.e.,

strong ties) in promoting democracyparticularly at a moment in history when the weak

ties of the internet have come to play such a critical role in mobilizational politics.

Another set of accounts of democratic change focuses on the role of religion in society.

The secularization thesis argues that, as modernization proceeds, people become less religious

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liberal democratic orientation. In a similar vein, Fish (2002) maintains that Islam hurts

democracy, because Muslims lack the necessary tolerance towards women that is crucial for the

foundations of a society based on equality. Thus, a number of theories would lead one to believe

that Arab citizens who are more religious would be less likely to champion democracy or to

participate in a democratic revolution.

Other theories focus on specific class-based actors as the likely participants in

democratizing revolutions. Both Moore (1966) and Huntington (1991), in different ways,

highlighted the emergence of new economic forces in society through economic development (in

particular, the emergence of autonomous bourgeoisie and middle-class sectors) as critical to the

democratization process. In Huntingtons account, for instance, a broad and expanding middle

class, consisting of businesspeople, professionals, shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants,

managers, technicians, and clerical and sales workers, sees democracy as a means for securing

their own interests; as he writes (1991, 67), In virtually every country the most active supporters

of democratization came from the urban middle class. Others, by contrast, influenced by

developments in Latin America and Southern Europe, highlight the mobilized actions undertaken

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driver of democratization (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). On the basis of these

assumptions, one might expect that those participating in democratizing revolutions might be

predominantly the relatively disadvantaged, prioritizing economic gains and redistribution over

democratic values. By contrast, the collective action paradigm (and the resource mobilization

school associated with it) would lead us to believe that those most likely to challenge a

dictatorial government in high-risk collective action would be those who derive their income or

resources independently of the government (i.e., those not employed in the public sector) (Olson,

1971; Tullock, 1971; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Hardin, 1995; Lichbach, 1995).

Thus, based on this review of the literature, we can stipulate the following hypotheses to

be tested concerning who participated in the Arab Spring revolutions:

HI: Those who participate in democratic revolutions should predominantly be those

citizens who prioritize democratic values over other concerns.

H2. More highly educated citizens should be expected to participate disproportionately in

democratic revolutions and to champion democratic ends within those revolutions.

H3: Youth should be more likely to participate in democratic revolutions than older

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H5: Individuals who are less religious should be more likely to participate in democratic

revolutions and defend democratic values within those revolutions, particularly in predominantly

Islamic societies.

Those participating in and championing democratic values within democratic revolutions

may or may not be predominantly from a certain class, as the literature is divided over whether

class plays a significant role in democratization, and which class, if class any, plays the leading

role. Therefore we advance four competing hypotheses:

H6A: Those participating in and championing democratic values within

democratic revolutions should be predominantly from the urban middle class.

H6B: Those participating in and championing democratic values within

democratic revolutions should be predominantly from the working class.

H6C: Those participating in democratic revolutions should constitute a national,

cross-class coalition.

H6D: Those participating in democratizing revolutions should be predominantly

the relatively disadvantaged, who prioritize economic gains and redistribution

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administered in eleven Arab countries. The survey was fielded in Egypt in July 2011 and in

Tunisia in April 2011shortly after the revolutionary tide that swept across these countries. The

Arab Barometer survey was not originally designed as a survey aimed at studying the Arab

Spring revolutions. However, an additional battery of questions on the revolutions was added to

the survey in this round that not only allow us to identify who participated in these revolutions,

but also their attitudes toward and understanding of these revolutions. In Egypt, 1,220 people

were surveyed, while in Tunisia 1,196 were surveyed. 6

In Egypt 8 percent of the sample reported participating in demonstrations surrounding the

revolution, compared to 16 percent of those surveyed in Tunisia. The difference in rates of

participation between Egypt and Tunisia may seem puzzling at first glance. However, as will be

shown below, somewhat different segments of Egyptian and Tunisian societies participated in

these revolutions. Differences in population size and dispersion also provide some basic

intuitions about why one might expect divergent rates of participation in Egypt and Tunisia.

Tunisia is a state of 10.7 million people, whereas Egypts population is 82.5 million (World

Bank 2011). Scaling participation rates up to total population (an enterprise that needs to be

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provincial town, Sidi Bouzid, and slowly made their way to the capital over the course of several

weeks. The Egyptian protests, by contrast, began in the countrys two major cities, Cairo and

Alexandria, and had millions on the street within four days of the first protest. Because the

Egyptian protests began rapidly in the place where all revolutionary movements aim to end up--

at the seat of power, they afforded less opportunity than the Tunisian protests for undecided

individuals to throw in with the revolution.

Who Participated in the Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions

Protest participants in both Tunisia and Egypt tended to be overwhelmingly male, with

above average levels of income and education, and from professional or clerical occupational

backgrounds. The profiles of protesters in each country differed most strikingly by age. Though

protesters were younger than the overall population mean in both countries, Tunisian youth

comprised a larger portion of the demonstrators, with 60 percent of demonstrators under the age

of 35, compared with 44 percent in Egypt (This age group comprised 43 percent of the total

sample in both countries). Rather, in Egypt, the 35 to 44 year old group had the highest rate of

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Tunisian demonstrators but only 3 percent of Egyptian demonstrators. 7 This difference is not

reducible to age, as Tunisian students participated at strikingly high rates. Within the 18 to 24

age group, which contains over 90 percent of the student population in both countries, 37 percent

of Tunisian students participated, compared to 25 percent of non-students. Among Egyptians of

the same age group, the figures were 8 percent among students and 8 percent among non-

students. 8 The cross-tabulations alone give lie to folk theories that the Arab revolutions were

caused primarily by youth frustration or had among them a single set of causal factors; whereas

youth (and especially students) participated at high rates in Tunisia, a group nearing middle age

formed the core of the Egyptian demonstrators. The age of Egyptian protesters implies that

modernization theses emphasizing value change due to cohort effects (Hypothesis 3) seem not to

be operating in Egypt.

Explanations linking protest to absolute levels of material deprivation (Hypothesis 6D)

are similarly unsupported by the data. Given the amount of scholarly and popular attention

devoted to poor employment prospects as a cause of frustration and revolution in the Arab

world, 9 one might expect unemployment to be a significant positive predictor of protest

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unemployed and 5 percent of demonstrators unemployed. The unemployed constituted a far

larger share of the demonstrators in Tunisia, both in absolute terms and relative to their share of

the general population; unemployed comprised 22 percent of the Tunisian demonstrators but 18

percent of the general population. 10 Unemployment is highly correlated with age in both

countries, but the unemployed population in Egypt is on average younger than in Tunisia

(Tunisians under 35 comprise 43 percent of the sample but 66 percent of the unemployed, while

in Egypt this age category constitutes only 43 percent of the sample but 80 percent of the

unemployed). Income profiles lend further credence to the notion that absolute deprivation was

not a major factor. If frustration among the most disadvantaged segments of the population was

the primary cause of participation in the revolutions, we would expect to see high levels of

turnout among the lowest income segments. Yet as shown in Table 1, the poorest two income

quintiles had the lowest rates of participation in both countries, and a bivariate regression of

participation on income quintiles (Table 3) indicates that the likelihood of protest rises with

increasing income.

[Table 3 here]

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but only 17 percent of the total population. The bivariate regression of participation on education

is substantively and statistically significant in both cases (Table 3), and this relationship holds

when subjected to multivariate controls. 11 While statistical tests on observational data cannot in

themselves prove a causal relationship, the correlation between education and protest turnout

provides some tentative support for the theory that education creates certain predispositions

towards democracy (H2).

In view of protesters educational attainments, both Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions

could be interpreted as predominantly middle class revolutions (Hypothesis 6A). Classical

Marxist accounts of democratization, like that of Moore (1966), identified the crucial middle

actor as an active class of merchants and entrepreneurs in towns. 12 Yet the set of small

bourgeoisie opposed to landed interests in a largely agrarian economy responsible for English

industrial takeoff and democratization seem not to be present in the 2011 Egyptian and Tunisian

cases; not only is the production structure in both Egypt and Tunisia far more manufacturing-

and service-oriented than that of early developing England, but the owners of Egyptian and

Tunisian capital are to varying degrees aligned with the state. 13

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Occupation section of Table 1). Four of the occupational categories accord with Huntingtons

(1991) definition of the urban middle class: professional, employer or director of an institution,

government employee and private sector employee. 14 These categories are overrepresented

among protesters relative to their share of the general population in both states. Only private

sector employees in Tunisia participate at average levels for the general population (Table 1).

These four categories, if taken together as a middle class, constitute 55 percent of the Egyptian

demonstrators but only 25 percent of the general population. In particular, professionals stand

out as an especially active group in the Egyptian revolution, constituting 17 percent of

demonstrators but only 5 percent of the population. Their prevalence in the protesting group does

not seem to be an artifact of other demographic factors; an ordinary logistic regression of protest

participation on a professional dummy variable with age and gender controls shows the

professional category to be statistically significant. By contrast, the professional category is not

statistically different from zero in the same regression for Tunisia. 15 In Tunisia, the four middle

class categories comprise 30 percent of the demonstrators but only 19 percent of the population.

In this respect, while the middle class was significantly over-represented among participants in

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workers constituting 17 percent of participants, students19 percent, and the unemployed21

percent.

The high rate of participation among government employees (21 percent of Egyptian

protesters versus 13 percent of the total population, and 12 percent of Tunisian protesters versus

7 percent of the total population) casts doubt on the resource mobilization theories predicting that

individuals whose income is tied to the state will be more likely to be quiescent (Hypothesis 7).

The most direct beneficiaries of state largesse, such as Ben Alis son-in-law Mohamed Sakher al-

Materi (who kept tigers on his personal residence and had frozen yogurt flown in on his private

jet from St. Tropez) were obviously unlikely to protest against these regimes (Raghavan 2011).

But the data show that most civil servants were given insufficient perquisites to bind them to the

regime; Egyptian government employees were at the 62 nd percentile in the income distribution

and their Tunisian counterparts were at the 74 th percentile.

The picture when one defines the middle class by income and consumption patterns, as

economists normally do, is less clear. The canonical definition in this scholarship is from

Thurow (1987), who locates the middle class between 75 percent and 125 percent of mean

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anchored line at which a middle class begins. Banerjee and Duflo (2008) argue that the middle

class in the developing world consists of people earning between $2 and $10 a day, and

Milanovic and Yitzaki (2002) draw the upper and lower bounds for the middle class at the mean

per capita incomes of Brazil and Italy ($PPP 3470 and $PPP 8000 in 2002 dollars, respectively).

Ravaillon (2009) criticizes the $2 per day lower bound for being arbitrary and low, proposing

bounds of $9 to $13 for a category of developing world upper middle class. Whatever the

exact bounds of the middle class, it is a useful exercise to investigate the participation of

individuals from an income range considered propitious for democracy in other contexts The

median per capita annual income in the Egyptian sample was $1,937, or $5.31 per day and in

Tunisia, $4,690 and $12.85, respectively; the 80 th percentile in Egypt was $8.91 per day or

$3254 per year, and in Tunisia, $17 per day or $6298 per year. 17 On the Ravaillon definition, the

Tunisian case appears not to be a middle class revolution, as the excluded top quintile

contributed the largest share of protesters (28 percent) of any quintile in the sample. The middle

class defined by Milanovic and Yitzaki for both states, and by Ravaillon for Egypt, includes the

top income quintile and, more generally, the income groups that participated at the highest

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spite of this limitation, individuals near the top of the Egyptian and Tunisian distributions, and

therefore in the middle of the global income distribution, formed a disproportionate bloc of

demonstrators in both revolutions.

In contrast to the elusive middle class, the working class seems not to have been critical

in either revolution (Hypothesis 6b). It is true that that 58 percent of union and professional

syndicate members participated in Tunisia, compared to 15 percent of non-members; in Egypt 19

percent of Egyptian union members participated, compared to 7 percent of non-members. But an

investigation into the occupational profiles of these union members confirms that members came

overwhelmingly from the professional strata identified earlier. Only 2 percent of Egyptians who

identified their occupation as worker were members of unions, and government employees

constituted the largest occupational group of union members (39 percent of total union

members), followed by professionals (23 percent). In Tunisia, no self-identified workers were

union members, and government employees similarly constituted the largest group of union

members (44 percent of all union members), followed by the other employed (19 percent) and

professionals (14 percent). 18 Workers in fact participated at average levels in both countries,

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internet usage in Tunisia was even higher, at 33 percent for society as a whole, and 62 percent of

demonstrators.20

The correlation between internet usage and protest participation is robust to

inclusion of all the aforementioned markers of middle class membership in multivariate analysis

(Table 2). Clearly, the internet served as a mechanism for protesters to coordinate, as evidenced

by the importance of the We are all Khaled Said Facebook page for organizing the first protests

in Egypt on January 25th

(Herrera 2011). But it is not clear from the cross-tabulated data on

internet use and participation alone whether internet use inculcated attitudes propitious to protest

behavior of whether it functioned merely as a conduit for logistical details. Analysis of the

relationship between internet use and participant attitudes is taken up in the following section.

As Hypothesis 4 would predict, civic association membership was strongly associated

with protest turnout in both Egypt and Tunisia, and this relationship holds up in both bivariate

and all multivariate specifications (Tables 2 and 3). Survey respondents saying they belonged to

at least one civic organization comprised 46 percent of demonstrators in Egypt, though they

constituted only 15 percent of the population. Similarly, members of non-political organizations

in Tunisia constituted 21 percent of the protesting population but only 6 percent of the overall

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(3 percent), but contributed protesters at a rate disproportionate to their share of the population

(10 percent of all protesters). Though we have no direct evidence on the religious character of

civic organizations, it is reasonable to infer that many of were religious in character; Islamic

charitable societies and religious movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda

in Tunisia exemplify this tendency. Neither Ennahda nor the Muslim Brotherhood were involved

in the organization of the early protests, but civic organization membership has a statistically

significant positive correlation with religiosity (measured by a fifteen-point scale) for Tunisia

though not for Egypt. 21 Thus religious groups are likely to be among the important civic

organizations in both countries, though not the decisive actors driving protest behavior in either

country.

Secularization theses associating decreased religiosity with increased support for

democracy (Hypothesis 5) find little support in the Egypt and Tunisia data. To capture levels of

piety, we constructed a fifteen-point scale variable measuring the frequency at which individuals

perform five behaviors associated with religiosity, including reading the Quran or Bible and

praying. 22 The average score for Egypt was 9.33 and for Tunisia 6.10, indicating that Egyptians

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secularization hypothesis, showing an inverse relationship between religious practice and

participation in these revolutions; while the religiosity variable is not significant in the Egyptian

case, it is positively associated with turnout in the Tunisian case (see Table 2). These correlations

decisively dispel the notion that Islam somehow generates in its adherents a strong aversion to

challenging any form of political authority (cf. Kedourie 1994).

Finally, a striking fact about the profile of demonstrators in both countries was that they

were overwhelmingly male; 77 percent of Egyptian and 79 percent of Tunisian demonstrators

were men. One might infer from these statistics that women were as a rule excluded from

participation in demonstrations, but disaggregating women by occupation reveals a more

complex story. Housewives comprised 77 percent of Egyptian women and only 52 percent

female demonstrators; women in the categories of professional and government employee

comprised only 10 percent of the Egyptian female population but 39 percent of the

demonstrators. In Tunisia, similarly, housewives comprised 51 percent of the female population

and only 18 percent of the demonstrators. The remaining female demonstrators were spread

across several other employment categories, including unemployed (26 percent), government

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value 0.36). That women who work participate in patterns similar to those of their male

counterparts suggests that women with the resources allowing or economic exigencies

compelling their entry into the workforce are less bound by the patriarchal norms depressing the

participation of housewives.

To sum up, this demographic sketch of the populations protesting in Tunisia and Egypt

casts doubt upon several of the theories advanced to explain these revolutions. The poorest

segments of society were among the least likely to participate, indicating that protests were not

borne primarily of absolute levels of deprivation. Similarly, cohort-based value change and

secularization seem not to be impelling participation in these revolutions; protesters tended to be

as religious or more than the general population in both cases. In many respects, these did appear

to be predominantly middle class revolutions. Demonstrators in both states had higher levels of

education and income than the general population and tended to be engaged in urban white-collar

work. There were, however, important differences between the participations in the two

revolutions. While Egyptian revolution participants were predominantly middle class, significant

elements within the Tunisian revolution came from groups outside the middle class (workers,

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A Brief Ukrainian Comparison

It would be helpful, in contextualizing the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, to see whether

these findings accord with those from other democratizing revolutions. The paucity of

individual-level data on participants in revolutions limits our ability to do so. It is nevertheless a

useful exercise to compare these findings with the only other case for which comparable data

exist--the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From a representative sample of 1,801

Ukrainians, 25 19 percent participated in the protests of the Orange Revolution. This level of

turnout is roughly comparable to that in Tunisia (16 percent). Protesters in Ukraine tended to be

a good deal older than in the Middle East, as the mean age of Ukrainian participants was 41

(compared to 33 in Tunisia and 38 in Egypt). Yet Ukrainian participation rates by age category

look roughly similar to Tunisia; 30 percent of 18 to 24 year olds participated (compared to 30

percent in Tunisia) and 17 percent of 25 to 34 year olds participated (versus 20 percent in

Tunisia). Of course, there are quite significant differences in the age structures of these societies.

Whereas people under 35 comprise 45 percent of the Tunisian and 48 percent of the Egyptian

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those protesting in Ukraine, comprising 24 percent of all protesters. Retired people comprised

the second largest group at 19 percent, and professionals came in third at 15 percent. In Egypt

and Tunisia the highest income groups were significantly more likely to participate, but the

distribution of participants by income quintiles in Ukraine bears more of a U-shape. The

wealthiest quintile comprised 24 percent of demonstrators, and the poorest quintile comprised 23

percent of protesters, with the second poorest at 14 percent and the middle quintile at 17 percent.

A smaller proportion of Ukrainian participants (17 percent) had some higher education, in large

part because participation did not drop off as sharply for the least educated, who participated at a

rate twice that of Tunisia and four times that of Egypt.

Ironically, though Ukraine is a post-communist country, religiosity was a more salient

predictor of revolutionary participation in Ukraine than it was in either Egypt or Tunisia. The

participation rate for the religious (defined here as visiting church in ones spare time) was 29

percent, compared to 17 percent for those who reported not visiting church. It is clear that

regional cleavages and national identity issues were central motivations for participation in the

Orange Revolution, and religion (particularly true for Uniates from Western Ukraine) was one of

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The Role of Democratic Motivations within Democratic Revolutions

We turn now to look at who, among the participants in these revolutions, understood

them primarily as struggles for democratic freedoms. The Arab Barometer asked respondents to

identify the most important and second most important reasons that they believed citizens

participated in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. The answers of those who also indicated

that they had participated in the revolutionary protests (n=98 for Egypt, n=192 for Tunisia) are

presented in Table 4. We turned to this question as a way of identifying participants according to

their differing motivations for and perceptions of participation in the revolutions. We were keen

to distinguish respondents who prioritized economic or other grievances from those who

prioritized civil or political freedoms. While we recognize that the question in the Arab

Barometer did not ask participants directly why they as individuals participated in the revolution,

given that the respondents were all participants, one would expect that their answers to this

question were likely informed by their own motivations and experiences. Indeed, subsequent

analysis confirmed that the groupings of opinion on this question lined up with other questions in

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question can be used as a rough indicator of motivation for participation in the revolutions. But

even if individuals did, in some cases, answer this question in ways that differed from their own

personal motivations for participation in the revolution, the answers still provide us with a way

of identifying those who perceived these revolutions as aimed primarily at attaining civil and

political freedoms versus other purposes.

[Table 4 here]

Since respondents were asked to identify both a primary and a secondary reason for why

people participated, we used latent class cluster analysis in order to identify and simplify the

groupings by which people answered the question. 27 Latent class cluster analysis is a finite

mixture approach used to identify categories of individuals who share similar characteristics.

Individuals are classified into clusters based upon the probabilities of their membership, which

(unlike traditional k-means cluster analysis) are estimated directly from the model. 28 As

suggested in the literature, we used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the Akaike

Information Criterion with a per-parameter penalty of 3 (AIC3), and the p-value for the

likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic L 2 in order to adjudicate between models with different

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since the number of individuals in some of categories was small, and interpretation of a 7-cluster

model is cumbersome in any case. For the Tunisian participants both the BIC and p-value criteria

suggested a 5-cluster model, while the AIC3 criterion suggested a 7-cluster model (again, a more

complex variant of the 5-cluster model). For both the Egyptian and Tunisian samples all of the

models were examined in their full results; for both samples the 7-cluster models resulted in no

significant differences in interpretation from the 4-cluster Egyptian and 5-cluster Tunisian

models. Therefore, the more parsimonious, reliable, and easily interpretable 4-cluster and 5-

cluster models are reported on here.

[Table 5 here]

Table 6 reports the conditional probabilities of cluster membership for participants in the

two revolutions. The findings point to the key role played by economic demands (and to a lesser

extent, corruption) in motivating participation in both revolutions, as well as the relatively low

priority accorded to civil and political freedoms. Among Egyptian participants, for instance, the

largest cluster (labeled Cluster 1, with 38 percent of participants) consisted of those who

identified the reasons for participation as being primarily about the economy and secondarily

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understood the Egyptian revolution as aimed primarily at attaining liberal democracy, whereas

most saw concerns over the economy and corruption as dominating participant agendas.

[Table 6 here]

Similarly, among participants in the Tunisian Revolution economic concerns and

concerns over corruption were top priorities. Demands for civil and political freedoms, however,

played a more prominent role among perceived motivations of participants in Tunisia than in

Egypt, as a significant group of Tunisian participants listed demands for civil and political

freedoms as a secondary motivation for participation in the revolution. The largest cluster of

participants (labeled Cluster 1, at 32 percent) identified the reasons for participation as primarily

the economy and secondarily corruption, while a second cluster (Cluster 2, at 26 percent)

understood the reasons for participation as primarily the economy and secondarily civil and

political freedoms. A third cluster of 21 percent (labeled Cluster 3) identified civil and political

freedoms as the primary motivation for participation and corruption as a secondary motivation.

Cluster 4 (15 percent), the inverse of Cluster 1, identified the main reason for participation as

corruption and secondarily the economy. Finally, a very small cluster (labeled Cluster 5, at 6

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We turn now to look in more detail at the individuals within these groupings and the

extent to which other variables were associated with how individuals identified and prioritized

motivations for participation in ways that might confirm or undermine particular hypotheses

about democratic revolution. In particular, we are interested in elucidating who identified civil

and political freedoms as a motivation for participation in the revolution, as opposed to other

motivations such as economic deprivation or corruption, and whether their backgrounds,

behaviors, and attitudes correspond with what various theories of democratization and

democratic revolution might predict. We probe these questions through an examination of the

demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal covariates of cluster membership for each of the

revolutions (produced in Tables 7 and 8), comparing these to the characteristics of all

participants in the revolution.

[Tables 7 and 8 here]

One conclusion that one can draw from such an exercise is that those revolution

participants who saw civil and political freedoms as a reason for participation in the revolution

not only differed substantially from other groupings within each revolution, but differed in

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of political rights between citizens and the elimination of financial and administrative corruption

than other participants in the revolution. Like their counterparts within the Egyptian revolution,

those who prioritized civil and political freedoms as the main reason for participation in the

Tunisian Revolution (Cluster 3) were, on average, more female, older, more likely to be a

member of a civil society organization, more religious, but less likely to trust Ennahda (the

Islamist party in Tunisia, and equivalent of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) than other

participants in the Tunisian revolution. And those who indicated that civil and political freedoms

were a secondary reason for participation in the Tunisian Revolution (Cluster 2) were more male,

more highly educated, more likely to be professionals, less religious, and more likely to see the

most important feature of democracy as the opportunity to change government through elections

than other participants in the Tunisian Revolution.

In both revolutions the most democratically-oriented participants were, on average, older

than other participants, raising further doubts about a generational values explanation of

democratic revolutions (H3). Those who saw the revolutions as motivated by the desire for civil

and political freedoms tended to be middle-aged in Egypt, and in Tunisia there was also no

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Egypt, those who saw revolutionary participation as championing civil and political freedoms

trusted moderate Islamist parties and favored government in accordance with Islamic law morethan other participants. In Egypt those who believed that the primary reason for participation in

the revolution was to oppose the Gamal succession (Cluster 2) were, on average, the most

religious, though significantly, they were also less trustful of the Muslim Brotherhood, and more

critical of U.S. interference in the Middle East than other participants in the revolution. Their

high level of religiosity, combined with their disproportionate mistrust of the moderate Muslim

Brotherhood and support for resistance to U.S. interference in the Middle East, marked this

group as the likely location of Salafists within the Egyptian Revolution. Similarly, in the

Tunisian Revolution the small cluster of participants (Cluster 5) who understood participation in

the revolution as aimed primarily at establishing an Islamic regime were, as one might expect,

highly observant religiously; they also disproportionately favored rule by Islamic law, trusted the

Islamist party Ennahda, and allowed the possibility of rule by Islamic law without elections. 30

At first glance, the dominance of economic motivations among the reasons participants

cited for participation in the revolution might seem to suggest a deprivation argument. But as we

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and poor and providing basic items (such as food, housing, and clothing) than other participants

in the revolution. At the same time, those who prioritized the economy were also more highlyeducated than most other participants and predominantly belonged to the middle and upper

portions of Egyptian society (only 14 percent belonged to the bottom two income quintiles,

compared to 36 percent of Egyptian society). Indeed, the poorest and least educated grouping

among Egyptian Revolution participants (with 26 percent in the bottom two income quintiles and

a quarter with only an elementary school education or less) prioritized corruption as the primary

reason for participation (and only secondarily, the economy). In the Tunisian Revolution those

who prioritized the economy as a reason for participation (Clusters 1 and 2) were also more

likely to understand the most important features of democracy as narrowing the gap between rich

and poor and providing basic items (such as food, housing, and clothing) than other participants.

But they tended to be significantly poorer than other clusters (31 percent in the bottom two

income quintiles, similar to Tunisian society as a whole) and were more likely to be workers (23

percent, compared to 15 percent of society as a whole) than other clusters of participants.

Using the results of this cluster classification, we tested further for the factors associated

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Thus, while these revolutions could be characterized as middle class revolutions, the middle

class was not specifically a champion of democratic freedoms within them, challenging part ofHypothesis 6A. Model 2 for participants in the Egyptian revolution indicates a statistically

significant relationship between education and prioritization of civil and political freedoms over

corruption as a reason for participation, lending some support to Hypothesis 2. But the

relationship becomes marginally significant when controlled for other factors. Among

participants in the Tunisian revolution we no bivariate relationship between education and

prioritizing civil and political freedoms the main reason for participation, and when placed in a

multivariate context, the results indicate that the educated actually prioritized the economy over

freedom (though the results are only marginally significant).

[Table 9 here]

Rather, by far the strongest factor predicting whether participants prioritized civil and

political freedoms within these revolutions was participation in civil society associations. Even

controlling for other factors, it retains a statistically significant relationship with prioritization of

civil and political freedoms over the economy among participants in both revolutions. The

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internet mobilization was not associated with thinking about the revolution as primarily about

civil and political freedoms. Thus, the internet may make it considerably easier to mobilize largenumbers against dictators, but unlike the face-to-face ties of civil society association, it does not

seem to be instrumental in making such mobilizations more democratic.

Conclusion

To sum up what we have found, we uncovered solid evidence contradicting a number of

key hypotheses flowing from the theoretical literature on democratization and democratic

revolutions. Participants in these democratic revolutions did not prioritize democratic values over

other concerns (H1); they consisted of different age groups in each revolution, with youth

prioritizing economic concerns over democratic values (H3); they were on average at least as

religious than other members of society, though religion had little relationship with whether

participants prioritized democratic change over other concerns (H5); they were not

disproportionately from the working class (H6B) or from the disadvantaged (H6D); and they

were disproportionately employed in the public sector, seemingly dependent on the state for their

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Ukraine (the only other case for which comparable individual-level data is available), and it

lacked the defining identity cleavage that was central to driving the Orange events. Finally, weshowed that there was no consistent relationship between education and prioritizing civil and

political freedoms among those who participated in these revolutions (H2), and that while the

middle class may have participated disproportionately in these revolutions, they did not act as a

democratic vanguard championing civil and political freedoms (H6A). Instead, we found that

participation in civil society associations (H4) was the most reliable predictor of whether

participants understood these revolutions as primarily about democratic change. We also saw

that while the internet enormously facilitated mobilization, unlike the strong ties of civil

society association, internet usage was not associated with understanding these revolutions as

primarily about civil and political freedoms.

In addition to puncturing many of the folk accounts of these revolutions, these findings

raise a number of broader issues that cut to the heart of the revolutionary path to democracy

more generally. For one thing, they demonstrate empirically that democratizing revolutions do

not fit a single mold, but the constituencies that participate in them vary considerably from place

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findings suggest that civil society association plays a critical role in democratic revolutions. Not

only were citizens who rebelled against dictatorship more likely to have been members of civicassociations, but in contrast to others who participated in these revolutions (and those who

mobilized primarily through the internet), those citizens involved in civic associations held

stronger democratic commitments. Thus, the fundamental role of civil society (and by

implication, of civil society promotion) in bringing about democratic change is confirmed.

Finally, if most revolution participants are not motivated primarily by democratic values,

but rather are motivated more by other concerns (in the case of these revolutions, economic

grievances and, to a lesser extent, concerns about corruption), post-revolutionary governments

clearly face a tall order. As Goldstone (2011) has recently pointed out, the coalitional nature of

the Arab revolutions means that the sole theme uniting all participating groups was a desire to

remove a despised autocrat. Post-revolutionary governments committed to democratic change

will need to build public support for democracy within their publics (and even among those who

participated in bringing about these revolutions) while simultaneously satisfying the economic

frustrations of a diverse set of social actors and addressing the deep-seated practices of

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