SSI Pub 940 "A New Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies"

8/9/2019 SSI Pub 940 "A New Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Priv

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A NEW DYNAMIC IN THE WESTERNHEMISPHERE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:

THE MEXICAN ZETAS AND OTHER PRIVATEARMIES

Max G. Manwaring

September 2009

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FOREWORD

There is a large number of nonstate actors in theWestern Hemisphere and around the world thatexercise violence to advance their causes, radicalizethe population, and move slowly but surely toward theachievement of their ideological and self-enrichmentdreams. In Mexico, these nonstate actors have includeda complex and enigmatic mix of transnational criminalorganizations (TCOs) (cartels and maa); enforcergangs; political and ideological insurgents; andparamilitary vigilante organizations that generateviolence and instability, erode democracy and thestate, and challenge national security and sovereignty.

The author, Dr. Max Manwaring, explains that anew and dangerous dynamic has been inserted into thealready crowded Mexican and Western Hemisphere

security arena. That new dynamic is representedby a private military organization called the Zetas.Beginning in the early 1990s, the Zetas was organizedand staffed by former members (deserters) from theMexican Armys veteran elite Airborne Special ForcesGroup (GAFES). That private military organizationnow also includes former members from the formidableGuatemalan Kiabiles Special Forces organization.Thus, the Zeta is better trained, equipped, motivated,and experienced in irregular war than the Mexicanpolice and army units that are supposed to control andsubdue them. That new dynamic, as a consequence,employs an ambiguous mix of terrorism, crime, andconventional war tactics, operations, and strategies.This, in turn, generates relatively uncontrolled coercion

and violence, and its perpetrators tend to create andconsolidate semi-autonomous political enclaves(criminal free-states within the Mexican state) thatdevelop into what the Mexican government has called


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Zones of Impunity. In such zones, criminal quasistates may operate in juxtaposition with the institutions

of the weak de jure state, and force the local populationto reconcile loyalties and adapt to an ambivalent andprecarious existence that challenges traditional valuesas well as the law.

This volatile and dangerous security situationdoes not imply that Mexico is now a failed state.Nevertheless, the threat exists and cannot be wishedaway. The purpose of this monograph, then, is to helppolitical, military, policy, and opinion leaders thinkabout explanations and responses that might applyto the unconventional, irregular, and ambiguousthreats that privatized military violence generates.This monograph is also intended to help bring abouta more relevant response to the strategic reality of theGuerrillas Next Door from the United States and the

rest of the hemisphere. The authors analysis is cogent,and the Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offerthis monograph as a part of the ongoing dialogue onglobal land regional security and stability.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING is a Professor of MilitaryStrategy in the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of theU.S. Army War College, and is a retired U.S. Armycolonel. He has served in various military and civilianpositions, including the U.S. Southern Command, theDefense Intelligence Agency, Dickinson College, andMemphis University. Dr. Manwaring is the authorand coauthor of several articles, chapters, and booksdealing with Latin American security affairs, political-military affairs, and insurgency and counterinsurgency.His most recent book is Insurgency, Terrorism, andCrime: Shadows from the Past and Portent for the Future,University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. His most recentSSI monograph is State and Non-State Associated Gangs:Credible Midwives of New Social Orders.Dr. Manwaring

holds an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Political Science fromthe University of Illinois, and is a graduate of the U.S.Army War College.


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SUMMARY

A new and dangerous dynamic has been introducedinto the Mexican internal security environment.That new dynamic involves the migration of powerfrom traditional state and nonstate adversaries tonontraditional nonstate private military organizationssuch as the Zetas, enforcer gangs like the Aztecas,Negros, and Polones, and paramilitary triggermen.Moreover, the actions of these irregular nonstate actorstend to be more political-psychological than military,and further move the threat from hard power to softpower solutions.

In this connection, we examine the macro what,why, who, how, and so what? questions concerningthe resultant type of conict that has been and is beingfought in Mexico. A useful way to organize these

questions is to adopt a matrix approach. The matrixmay be viewed as having four sets of elements: (1)The Contextual Setting, (the what? and beginningwhy questions); (2) The Protagonists Background,Organization, Operations, Motives, and Linkages (thefundamental who? why? and how questions); (3)The Strategic-Level Outcomes and Consequences (thebasic so what? question; and (4) Recommendationsthat address the salient implications. These variouselements are mutually inuencing and constitute thepolitical-strategic level cause and effect dynamics of agiven case.

The Contextual Settingexplains that the irregularconict phenomenon in Mexico is a response tohistorical socio-political factors, as well as new political-

military dynamics being introduced into the internalsecurity arena. New and fundamental change began toemerge in the 1980s. Mexico began to devolve from a


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strong, centralized, de facto unitary state that had theprocedural features of democracy, but in which the

ruling elites faced no scrutiny or accountability. At thesame time, Mexico started to become a market state thatresponded to markets and prots rather than traditionalgovernment regulation. In that connection, we see theevolution of new private, nonstate, nontraditionalwarmaking entities (the Zetas, and others) capableof challenging the stability, security, and effectivesovereignty of the nation-state. Thus, we see theerosion of democracy and the erosion of the state. Inthese terms, the internal security situation in Mexico iswell beyond a simple law enforcement problem. It isalso a socio-political problem, and a national securityissue with implications beyond Mexicos borders. The Protagonists Background focuses onorientation and motivation. In this context, the Zeta

is credited with the capability to sooner or later takecontrol of the Gulf Cartel and expand operations intothe territories of other cartelsand further challengethe sovereignty of the Mexican state. This cautionarytale of signicant criminal-military challenge toeffective sovereignty and traditional Mexican valuestakes us to the problem of response. The power todeal effectively with these kinds of threats is not hardmilitary re power or even more benign police power.Rather, an adequate response requires a whole-of-government approach that can apply the full humanand physical resources of a nation and its internationalpartners to achieve the individual and collectivesecurity and well-being that leads to societal peaceand justice. This kind of conict uses not only coercive

military force, but also co-optive and coercive politicaland psychological persuasion. Combatants tend tobe interspersed among ordinary people and have no


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permanent locations and no identity to differentiatethem clearly from the rest of a given population. There

is no secluded battleeld far away from populationcenters upon which armies can engagearmedengagements may take place anywhere. This type ofconict is not intended to destroy an enemy militaryforce, but to capture the imaginations of people andthe will of their leaders. Ultimately, the intent is toneutralize or control government and its traditionalsecurity forces so as to attain the level of freedom ofmovement and action that allows the achievement ofdesired enrichment.

Outcomes and Consequences illustrate where,in physical and value terms, contemporary criminal-military violence leadsand clearly answers the sowhat? question. In these terms, we take a close lookat socio-political life in the State of Sinaloa. We center

our attention on the reality of effective Mexican statesovereignty and the governing values being imposedin that Zone of Impunity. The drug cartel, theenforcer gangs, and the Zetas operating in Sinaloa havemarginalized Mexican state authority and replaced itwith a criminal anarchy. That anarchy is dened bybribes, patronage, cronyism, violence, and personalwhim. One is reminded of Thomas Hobbes descriptionof life in a State of Nature. That is, life is nasty,brutish, and short.

Finally, trends and challenges and threats areidentied that will have an impact on Mexico andits neighbors over the next several years. And,organizational and cognitive Recommendations areoffered as a point of departure for possible responses.


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A NEW DYNAMIC IN THE WESTERNHEMISPHERE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:

THE MEXICAN ZETAS AND OTHER PRIVATEARMIES

Leftist insurgent groups such as ComandanteZeros Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN)are not the only nonstate political actors in Mexicoor the Western Hemisphere that exercise violence toadvertise their cause, radicalize the population, andmove slowly but surely toward the achievement of theirideological and self-enrichment dreams.1 But a newand dangerous dynamic has been introduced into theMexican internal and the Western Hemisphere securityenvironments. In Mexico, that new dynamic involvesthe migration of traditional hard-power nationalsecurity and sovereignty threats from traditional state

and nonstate adversaries to hard- and soft-powerthreats from small, nontraditional, private nonstatemilitary organizations.2 This privatized violencetends to include a complex and enigmatic mix ofTransnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) (cartelsand maa); small private military organizations suchas the Zeta enforcer gangs (the Aztecas, Negros, andPolones); mercenary groups (the Central AmericanMaras, Guatemalan Kaibiles, and paramilitarytriggermen [gatilleros]); and other small paramilitary orvigilante organizations (hereafter cited as the gangs-TCO phenomenon).3

What makes these small private armies so effectiveis the absence of anyone to turn to for help. Weak and/or corrupt state security institutions, as in Mexico,

are notoriously unhelpful and tend to be a part of theproblemnot the solution. In such a vacuum, only afew relatively well-armed and disciplined individualsare capable of establishing their own rule of law. The


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dynamic of privatized violence (which has been onthe global scene for centuries and is not really new)

involves a powerful and ambiguous mix of terrorism,crime, and conventional war tactics and operations.This violence and its perpetrators tend to create andconsolidate semiautonomous enclaves (criminal-free states) that develop into quasi statesand whatthe Mexican government calls Zones of Impunity.4Leaders of these quasi-state (nonstate) political entitiespromulgate their own rule of law, negotiate allianceswith traditional state and nonstate actors, and conductan insurgency-type war against various state andnonstate adversaries. Additionally, criminal quasi-states may operate in juxtaposition with the institutionsof weak de jure states and force the populations toadapt to an ambivalent and precarious existence thatchallenges traditional values as well as local law.5

The dynamics of privatized military force in Mexicosignal two cogent trends. The rst addresses the threat.It illustrates a new and unconventional battleeldthat represents a nontraditional security threat toMexico and its northern and southern neighbors. Thesecond trend deals with response. These dynamicssignal a new stability-security reality that is changingrelations and roles among and between state securityand service institutions. The new threat is not just alaw enforcement problem, a national security issue, oreven a social issue. It is much more, requiring a whole-of-government approach to dealing with the causes aswell as the perpetrators of terrorism, criminality, andmilitary violence. Ultimately, depending on responseto threat, there is another signal that will dene an

underlying shift in state identity: a shift in state identitytoward, or away from, some manifestation of statefailure.


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The mention of a possible shift in state identity heredoes not imply that Mexico is now a failed state. That

country has a vibrant middle class that supports lawand order, and it has a relatively robust economy thatcan sustain a president willing to use the powers of thestate to confront the gangs-TCO phenomenon. UnderPresident Felipe Calderon, Mexico is respondingconstructively to the threat and can be seen as shiftingaway from the possibility of state failure.6 Nevertheless,the threat exists; it is exacerbating the newprivatized violence, and it cannot be wished away. Asa consequence, this cautionary tale is intended to helppolitical, military, policy, academic, and opinion leadersthink strategically about explanations and responsesthat might apply to many of the unconventional,irregular, and ambiguous threats that Mexico and othercountries face now and in the future. At the same time,

this monograph is intended to help generate a morerelevant response in the United States and the rest ofthe hemispheric community to the strategic reality ofthe Guerrillas Next Door. 7

In this connection, we examine the macro what,why, who, how, and so what? questionsconcerning the resultant type of conict that hasbeen and is being fought in Mexico. A useful way toorganize these questions is to adopt a matrix approach.The matrix may be viewed as having four sets ofelements: (1) The Contextual Setting, the what andthe beginning why questions; (2) The ProtagonistsBackground, Organization, Operations, Motives, andLinkages, the fundamental who, why, and howquestions; (3) The Strategic-Level Outcomes and

Consequences, the basic so what questions; and (4)Recommendations that address the so what issues.These various elements are mutually inuencing and


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constitute the political-strategic-level cause-and-effectdynamics of a given case. This approach is helpful and

important in policy, practical, and theoretical terms.8

THE CONTEXTUAL SETTING

Two contextual themes are relevant to the analysisof Mexicos past, present, and future criminal andmilitarized violence. First, armed insurgent groupshave arisen and prospered primarily as a responseto historical sociopolitical factors. Yet the Mexicanpolitical structure has not developed programs andpolicies to remedy the societal ills that have generatedand supported all these revolutionarymovements.9Second, the continuing existence of political insurgentsand armed criminal groups in Mexico since foreversays much for their ability to adapt to and use the

political system for their own purposes. This abilitysays much about both the motivational dedication of theinsurgent-criminal leadership and the basic corruptionwithin the postrevolutionary political system. Suchcorruption is likewise a result of long-standing political-historic factors, as well as new political-economic-social-military dynamics being introduced into theMexican internal security situation.10

Historical-Political Context of Mexican Politics.

Many scholars agree that the key to understandingthe contemporary Mexican political system lies in itsorigins in the social upheaval of the Revolution of 191020. The radical change precipitated by that event almost

completely destroyed Mexicos past and forged a newand somewhat different nation. Some important oldpolitical habits did survive the revolution, however.11


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Caudillismo (political control by strong men) neverhas been very far under the surface of Mexican politics,

and the constitution that emerged out of the Revolutiondid not promulgate the kind of democracy that liberalsmight champion. Thus, every president of Mexicosince the Revolution has been a great revolutionaryleader (caudillo), and the Mexican constitution ismostly an expression of hopes and wishes for futurepolitical, economic, and social justice. Accordingly,every president of the Republic represented historicalcontinuity with the Revolution and dened therevolutionary goals that would be pursued during his6-year term of ofce. And in true caudillistic fashion, thepresident provided justice. All actions of governmentexecutive, legislative, and judicialwere taken in hisname and were administered by his loyal politicalappointees.12

If the president was the leader (strong man) ofthe Revolution, the Institutional Revolutionary Party(PRI) was his functional representative. The PRIwas the single, all-powerful mechanism of electoralactivity, recruitment, and social control. Throughthe manipulation of the party mechanism and allits symbols during each 6-year term of presidentialofce, the political elites were able to maintain andenhance their power and wealthand to enshrineMexican personal freedom of political opinion, whilesystematically repressing political organizations thatoperated outside the limits allowed by the PRI.13

A New National Security Context.

With the malaise of corrupt caudillistic self-aggrandizement rooted at all levels of the Mexicanpolitical-economic-social system, forces for new andfundamental change began to emerge in the 1980s.


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At that time, a set of economic measures designed toreduce ination, control currency devaluation, and cut

back on government spending led to bankruptcy in thebusiness sector, increased unemployment, growingincome inequality, and a much larger role for theprivate business sector in the government-controlledeconomy. Politically, the middle class, disaffected bypublic-sector inefciencies generated by PRI corruptionand resistance to serious reformand declining livingstandardsbegan to abandon the PRI and vote for otherparty candidates for public ofce. As a consequence,Mexico began to devolve from a strong, centralized,de facto unitary state to what Professor (Ambassador)David C. Jordan calls an anocratic democracy. Thatis, Mexico is a state that has the procedural featuresof democracy but retains the characteristics of anautocracy, in which the ruling elites face no scrutiny or

accountability.14

At the same time, Mexico has becomea market state that is moving toward criminal freestate status. That is, Mexico is a state in which politicalpower is migrating from the state to small, nonstateactors who organize into sprawling networks thatmaintain private armies, treasury and revenue sources,welfare services, and the ability both to make allianceswith state and nonstate actors and to conduct war (thegang-TCO phenomenon).15 This correlation of political,economic, and military forces, in turn, has generatedan extremely volatile and dangerous internal securitysituation in Mexico that has been all but ignored in theUnited States. The Anocratic Democracy. The policy-orienteddenition of democracy that has been generally

accepted and used in U.S. foreign policy over thepast several years is best described as proceduraldemocracy. This denition tends to focus on the


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election of civilian political leadership and, perhaps,on a relatively high level of participation on the part of

the electorate. Thus, as long as a country is able to holdelections, it is considered a democracyregardless ofthe level of accountability, transparency, resistanceto corruption, and ability to extract and distributeresources for national development and the protectionof human rights, liberties, and security.16

In contemporary Mexico, we observe importantparadoxes in this concept of democracy. Electionsare held on a regular basis, but leaders, candidates,and elected politicians are regularly assassinated;hundreds of government ofcials consideredunacceptable to the armed nonstate actors have beenassassinated following their elections. Additionally,intimidation, direct threats, kidnapping, and the useof relatively minor violence on a person and/or his

family play an important role prior to elections. As acorollary, although the media institutions are free fromstate censorship, journalists, academicians, and folkmusicians who make their anti-narco-gang opinionknown too publicly are systematically assassinated.17

Consequently, it is hard to credit most Mexicanelections as genuinely democratic or free. Neitherpolitical party competition nor public participation inelections can be complete in an environment whereviolent and unscrupulous nonstate actors compete withlegitimate political entities to control the governmentboth before and after elections. Moreover, creditingMexico as a democratic state is difcult as long aselected leaders are subject to corrupting control andintimidation or to informal vetoes imposed by criminal

nonstate actors. Regardless of denitions, however, thepersuasive and intimidating actions of the gang-TCOphenomenon in the Mexican electoral processes have


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pernicious effects on democracy and tend to erode thewill and ability of the state to carry out its legitimizing

functions.18

The Market State and the Gang-TCO Phenomenon.John Sullivan has identied an important shift in stateform: from nation-state to market state and thereuponfrom market state to criminal-free state status. Asthe ability to wage war (conict) devolves fromtraditional hierarchical state organizations to Internet-worked transnational nonstate actors, we can see theevolution of new warmaking entities (small privatearmies) capable of challenging the stability, security,and sovereignty of traditional nation-states. Theseprivate entities (terrorists, warlords, drug cartels,enforcer gangs, criminal gangs, and ethno-nationalisticextremists) respond to illicit market forces (such asillegal drugs, arms, and human trafcking) rather than

the rule of law and are much more than statelessor nonstate groups. They are powerful organizationsthat not only can challenge the rule of law and thesovereignty of the nation-state but also are known topromulgate their own policy and lawsand imposetheir criminal values on societies or parts of societies(creating criminal-free zones and badlands and badneighborhoods all around the world).19

In Mexico, as an unintended consequence ofdevolving political power from the state to privatenonstate entities, we see not only the erosion ofdemocracy but also the erosion of the state. Jordanargues that corruption at all levels is key to this problemand is a prime mover toward narco-socialism.20Narco-politics has penetrated not only the executive,

legislative, and judicial branches of the Mexicanfederal government but also state governments andmunicipalities.21 The reality of corruption at any level


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of government favoring the gang-TCO phenomenonmitigates against responsible governance and the

public well-being. In these terms, the states presenceand authority is at best questionable in over morethan 233 Zones of Impunity that exist throughoutlarge geographical portions of Mexico. At the sametime, the corruption reality brings into question theissue of effective state sovereignty. This is a feudalenvironment dened by extreme violence, patronage,bribes, kickbacks, cronyism, ethnic exclusion, andpersonal whim.22

Given the rise of the market state and violentprivatized market-state actors, long-standingassumptions about national security and lawenforcement are being challenged. Most notably, theability (and power) to conduct conict is moving fromthe traditional hierarchical nation-state to the privatized,

horizontally-networked market state. Again, as notedabove, that transition of power blurs the distinctionsbetween and among crime, terrorism, and warfare.23 Atthe same time, privatized violence is becoming (and inmany regions has become) a feature of the transition tothe market state and beyond. In this milieu, terroristsand organized crime come into conict with warlords,insurgents, governments, private corporations, andnongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Any and allof these types of state and nonstate entities can hireand operate a small private army. In addition, allthese entities can interact and blend or share attributesat given points in time. This is particularly relevantin the case of al-Qaeda jihadi terrorists operating inSpain, state-supported popular militias operating out

of Venezuela, and nonstate criminal-political gangsoperating in Colombia that seek to foment global,regional, and/or national or subnational instability,


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conict, and political change. The linkage among war,terrorism, and crime is especially relevant in cases in

which we see these types of actors making allianceswith or declaring war against other similar privatizedorganizations, transnational criminal organizations,NGOs, and governments.

Typically, private armies and warlordism are theprovidence of failed or failing states. The commonwisdom predicts that such states will eventuallydissolve into nothing and provide no problems.Yet reality warns us that failed states do not simplygo away. They normally devolve into internationaldependencies, peoples democracies, narco-socialiststates, criminal states, military dictatorships, orworse.24

The Resultant Internal Security Situation in Mexico. Inthe mid-1980s and later, a new political-economic force

inserted itself into the changing internal security milieu.At a time when the political system was weakening andthe economy privatizing, illicit drug trafcking startedto become very big business. This is not to say that theillegal drug trafcking industry had theretofore notbeen operating in Mexico. It was. But in the 1990s, airand sea routes to the U.S. market from South AmericasWhite Triangle (main cocaine-producing regions inColombia, Bolivia, and Peru) were being shut down.The narcotics-producing cartels, along with theirTCO allies, began to use land routes through CentralAmerica and Mexico to transport their products tothe U.S. market. As a consequence, between 60 and 90percent of the illegal cocaine entering the United Statesis estimated to transit Central America and Mexico.

Estimates of the money involvedin the billions ofdollarsare mind-boggling.25


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In this context, gangs and their TCO allies in Mexico,as in other countries, share many of the characteristics

of a multinational Fortune 500 company. Thus, thephenomenon is reied in the form of an organizationstriving to make money, expand its markets, and moveand act as freely as possible in the political jurisdictionswithin and between which it works. By performing itsbusiness tasks with super-efciency and for maximumprot, the general organization employs its chiefexecutive ofcers and boards of directors, councils,system of internal justice, lawyers, accountants, publicaffairs ofcers, negotiators, and franchised projectmanagers. And, of course, this company has a securitydivision, though somewhat more ruthless than one ofa bona de Fortune 500 corporation.26

Authorities have no consistent or reliable data onthe gang-TCO phenomenon in Mexico. Nevertheless,

the gang phenomenon in that country is acknowledgedto be large and complex. In addition, the gang situationis known to be different in the north (along the U.S.border) than it is in the south (along the Guatemala-Belize borders). Second, the phenomenon is different inthe areas between the northern and southern bordersof Mexico. Third, a formidable gang presence is knownto exist throughout the entire country (regardless ofthe accuracy of the data estimating the size and extentof this gang presence), andgiven the weakness ofnational political-economic institutionscriminalityhas considerable opportunity to prosper.27 As a result,the rate of homicides along the northern and southernborders is considered epidemic, and Mexico has thehighest incidence of kidnapping in the world. Finally,

violent gang and TCO activity in Mexico clearlythreaten the socioeconomic and political developmentof the country.28


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More specically, the Central American MaraSalvatrucha 13 and Mara Salvatrucha 18 gangs

(referred to collectively as the Maras) have madesignicant inroads into Mexican territory and appearto be competing effectively with Mexican gangs. Inthe southalong the Belize-Guatemalan borderstheMaras have gained control of illegal immigrant anddrug trafcking moving north through Mexico to theUnited States. The Central American Maras are alsoused as mercenaries by the northern drug cartels.Between the northern and southern borders, an ad hocmix of up to 15,000 members of the Mexican gangs andCentral American Maras are reported to be operatingin more than 20 of Mexicos 30 states. Additionally,members and former members of the elite GuatemalanSpecial Forces (Kaibiles) are being recruited by the GulfCartel and the Zetas as mercenaries.29

The gangs operating on the northern border ofMexico are long-time, well-established, generational(that is, consisting of Mexican grandfathers, sons, andgrandsons) organizations with 40-to-50-year histories.There are, reportedly, at least 24 different gangsoperating in the city of Nuevo Laredo and 320 activegangs operating within the city of Juarezwith anestimated 17,000 members. The best-known gangs in thenorth are the Azteca, Mexicles, and Zetaorganizations,whose members generally work as hired guns anddrug runners for the major cartels operating the area.The major cartels include the big fourJuarez, Gulf,Sinaloa, and Tijuana cartels, which operate generallyin the north. Despite the fact that most of the reportedviolence is concentrated in three northern states

Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Baja Californiathe JuarezCartel maintains a presence in 21 Mexican states; theGulf Cartel is found in 13 states; the Sinaloa Cartel (seethe later discussion of El Chapo) has located itself in 17


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states; and remnants of the reportedly disintegratingTijuana Cartel (Areliano Felix) are present in 15 states.

There are also the Colima, Oaxaca, and Valenciacartels, which generally operate in the southern parts ofMexico. The Mexican Maa (EME) further complicatesthe Mexican gang-TCO picture. At one time, all gangsoperating south of Bakerseld, California, and intonorthern Mexico had to pay homage to and take ordersfrom EME. That is no longer a rigid requirement,however; the Central American Maras are known tohave broken that agreement as early as 2005.30

This convoluted array of gangs and TCOsCentralAmerican Maras, Mexican Zetas, Guatemalan Kaibiles,Mexican drug cartels, and the Mexican Maaleavesan almost anarchical situation throughout Mexico. Aseach gang and TCO violently competes with othersand within itself and works against the Mexican

government to maximize market share and freedom ofmovement and action, we see a strategic internal secur-ity environment characterized by ambiguity, com-plexity, and unconventional (irregular) war. In ad-dition, we see the slow erosion of the Mexican stateand the establishment of small and large criminal-freeenclaves in some of the cities and states of Mexico.Moreover, the spillover transcends the supposedlysovereign borders of Mexico and its neighbors(both south and north). This situation reminds oneof the feudal medieval era. Violence and the fruitsof violencearbitrary and unprincipled politicalcontrolseem to be devolving to small, private,criminal nonstate actors. This is a serious challengeto democracy, stability, security, and sovereignty in

Mexico and its neighbors.31


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Conclusions.

The internal security environment that we see inMexico today is dangerous and volatile. And it goeswell beyond a simple law enforcement problem.Thus, the internal security situation is characterizedby an unconventional battleeld which no one fromthe traditional-legal Westphalian school of conictwould recognize or be comfortable with. Insteadof conventional, direct interstate war conductedby uniformed military forces of another country,we see something considerably more complex andambiguous.

First, thanks to Steven Metz and Raymond Millenand their theory-building efforts, we see unconventionalnonstate war, which tends to involve gangs, insurgents,

drug trafckers, other TCOs, terrorists, and warlordswho thrive in ungoverned or weakly governedspace between and within various host countries. Atthe same time, we also see unconventional intrastatewar, which tends to involve direct and indirect conictbetween state and nonstate actors.32 Regardless ofany given politically correct term for unconventionalintrastate war, all state and nonstate actors involvedin unconventional intrastate conict are engaged inone common political actwar. That is, the goal is tocontrol and/or radically change a government and toinstitutionalize the acceptance of the victors will.33Additional strategic-level analytical commonalties inthe contemporary battle space include the following:

No formal declarations or terminations of war;

No easily identied human foe to attack anddefeat;

No specic geographical territory to attack and


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moral, informational, economic, social, police, andmilitary activity that can be brought to bear holistically

on the causes and consequencesas well as theperpetratorsof violence.35

ZETAS: THE WHO, WHAT, AND WHYARCHITECTURE

The Who, What, and Why case studymethodological architecture focuses on protagonistleadership and organization, operations, motives, andlinkages. Long-standing common wisdom has it thatvirtually any nonstate political actor with any kind ofresolve can take advantage of the instability inherentin anything like the current Mexican internal securitysituation. The tendency is that the best-motivated andbest-armed organization on the scene, or an alliance of

these entities, will eventually control that instabilityfor its own purposes. Carlos Marighella, in his well-knownManual of the Urban Guerrilla, elaborates on thatwisdom: A terrorist act is no different than any otherurban guerrilla tactic, apart from the apparent facilitywith which it can be carried out. That will depend onplanning and organization [and its resultant shockvalue].36 Thus, even though other privatized militaryorganizations (including enforcer gangs) are operatingin Mexico today, the Zetas appear to be the groupmost likely to be able to achieve their objectives. Zetaorganization and planning has been outstanding, andthe shock value of Zetaoperations has been unequaled.Thus, as Marighella teaches, terrorism is a major forcemultipliera weapon the revolution cannot do

without.37


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Background.

During the 80 years from 1920 through 2000 whenMexico was effectively a one-party unitary statecontrolled by the PRI, the drug cartels and the partymade an accommodation. The question was, Silveror lead? Silver was a bribe; lead was a bullet to thehead. The understanding that existed between thecartels and the party was that the political functionarywould be better off to choose silversimple as that!This does not mean that everyone was compromised,but it does mean that many party ofcials who werenot compromised directly nevertheless chose not tosee much that was going on. Vicente Foxs election tothe Mexican presidency in 2000 broke the PRIs gripon Mexico and changed the status that allowed the

cartels to go quietly about their business and sharesome of the wealth with their friends. President Foxand later President Calderon became progressivelymore aggressive in confronting both the cartels andthe police and the politicians whom the cartels hadcorrupted and co-opted. At about the same time, theow of illegal narcotics through Mexico increased tothe point such that drugs in Mexico are now estimatedto produce $25 billion (in U.S. dollars) per year.38

Everything changed. The party and governmentwere no longer as cooperative with the cartels as theyhad once been. The government was trying to exerciseits traditional sovereignty over the Mexican nationalterritory. The government, nding that to be moredifcult than expected, recognized the possibility that

the country might be moving toward failed statestatus.39 The various cartels were competing moreviolently than ever before. The cartels found themselvesghting with each otherand the governmentfor


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position in the new milieu. The prots to be had for thecartels, and the stakes for Mexico, were enormous. So,

what is a businessman to do? Somehow, he must protectand enhance his resources, including trafcking routesand political and physical space from which to operatemore freely, and he must simultaneously protect andexpand his share of the market.

As a result of carefully watching the indicatorsnoted above, the Gulf Cartel started to recruit membersof the Mexican Armys elite Airborne Special ForcesGroup (GAFES) in the late 1990s. The GAFES memberswho defected to the Gulf Cartel called themselves LosZetas. The intent of the cartel was to provide protectionfrom government forces and other cartels, and the GulfCartel paid the Zetas salaries well beyond those paidby the army to make the effort worth their while. Theidea proved to be a great success. Once the former

soldiers were in place and functioning, their superiortraining, organization, equipment, experience, anddiscipline led them from simple protection missionsto more challenging operations. The Zetas began tocollect Gulf Cartel debts, secure new drug trafckingroutes at the expense of other cartels, discouragedefections from other parts of the cartel organization,and track down and execute particularly worrysomerival cartel and other gang leaders all over Mexico andCentral America.40 Subsequently, the Zetas expandedtheir activities to kidnapping, arms trafcking, moneylaundering, and creating their own routes to and fromthe United States, as well as developing their ownaccess to cocaine sources in South America.41 All thishas been accomplished using the means delineated by

Carlos Marighella, often with grotesque savagery.42The Zetas is the rst private military organization

in the Western Hemisphere to be made up of former


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military personnel from a regular army. Because of itsconsiderable military expertise, previous experience

in counterinsurgency combat, and guerrilla and urbanwarfare against leftist Mexican insurgent groups, theZetas has made itself into a major private military-criminal organization in its own right. As a result, it hasbeen labeled by Mexican scholar and TCO authorityRaul Benetez as the biggest, most serious threat to thenations security.43

Organization and Operations.

Despite the lack of precise gures and specic andauthoritative organizational charts, the Zetasappearsto be much more than an ordinary enforcer gangorganization working within a larger business modelof a contemporary Mexican drug cartel. At rst glance,

there appears to be a hierarchical pyramid structurethat is common among military organizations andsome TCOs around the world.44 A closer examinationof the multilayered and networked structure, however,indicates a substantial corporate enterprise designedto conduct small and larger-scale business operations,along with terrorist, criminal, and military-typeactivities over large pieces of geographical territoryand over time. As a result, the Zeta private militaryorganization looks very much like any global businessorganization that can quickly, exibly, and effectivelyrespond to virtually any opportunity, challenge, orchanging situation. As a consequence, there is probablymore analytical utility in placing the traditional pyramidon its side and conceptualizing the Zeta organization

as constituted by horizontal concentric circles.45 Organizational Structure. At the top, or at the center ofthe organizational structure, depending on whether one


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is looking at a pyramid or at concentric circles, is a smallcommand structure. This group of senior individuals

provides strategic- and operational-level guidanceand support to its network of compartmentalized cellsand to allied groups or associations. This structureallows relatively rapid shifting of operational controlhorizontally rather than through a relatively slowvertical military chain of command. Then, a secondlayer (circle) of leadership exists. These individualsoversee or manage guidance received from above,particularly in the areas of intelligence, operationalplanning, nancial support, and recruitment andtraining. Additionally, this leadership group maymanage special geographically and functionallydistributed project teams.46

At a third level, cell members may be involvedin lower-level national and subnational, as well as

international, activities of all kinds. The fourth andlast level (circle) of the generalized and horizontalizedorganizational pyramid comprises a series of groups(clickas). These groups may be constituted by aspirants(that is, new recruits trying to prove themselves) and/or by specialists. The specic subgroups include thefollowing: (1) Los Halcones (The Hawks), who keepwatch over distribution zones; (2) Las Ventanas (TheWindows), who whistle or signal to warn of unexpecteddangers in an operational area; 3) Los Manosos (TheCunning Ones), who acquire arms, ammunition,communications, and other military equipment; (4)Las Lepardas (The Leopards), who are, as prostitutes,attached to the intelligence section of the functionalorganization and are trained to extract information

from their clients; and (5) Direccion(communicationsexperts), who intercept phone calls, and follow andidentify suspicious automobiles and persons, andhave been known to engage in kidnapping and


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executions.47

The Zetas organizational structure strongly

indicates that it is much more than an ordinaryenforcer gang that is subordinate to a cartels generalstructure. The Zetas has its own agenda and timetableand appears to be quite successful in achieving itsshort- and longer-term objectives. Militarily, and in theshort term, the Zetas has developed an organizationalstructure and mystique that allows a relatively smallforce to accomplish the following objectives:

Convince the people of a given area that theZetasnot local politicians or local police, notfederal authorities, and not other cartelsis thereal power in that specic geographical terrain;

Exert authority within its known area ofoperations, even if not physically present at agiven moment;

Fight both a larger force (such as police or themilitary or a rival gang) and another politicalactor at the same time.

Examples of terrorist means of convincingpopulations regarding prowess would include but notbe limited to the following:

November 2008March 2009several verysenior police ofcials, including the commanderof the federal police, were murdered in MexicoCity.

December 2008severed heads of eight Mexicansoldiers were found dumped in plastic bagsnear a shopping center in Chilpancingo, capitalof the southernstate of Guerrero.

February 2009another three severed headswere found in an icebox near Ciudad Juarez in


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the northern state of Chihuahua. February 20, 2009The chief of police for

Ciudad Juarez, Roberto Orduna, resigned underpressureafter his deputy was murderedand it was revealed that another police ofcerwould be killed every 48 hours until the chief(interestingly, a former army major) resigned.As the body count grew, Chief Orduna resignedand left the city.48

Over the longer term, the Zetas rst priority is tooperate a successful business enterprise, with morethan adequate self-protection and self-promotion.This private military organization encouragesdiversication of activities, diffusion of risk, andthe exibility to make quick adjustments, correctmistakes, and exploit developing opportunities. In

that connection, the organization can deliberatelyexpand or contract to adjust to specic requirements,and to new allies or enemies, while increasing prots.And, of course, this organization maintains a coherentmechanism for safeguarding operations at all levelsand enforcing discipline throughout the structure.Consequently, over the past 10 or more years, theZetashas slowly but surely moved from Gulf Cartelprotection to developing drug trafcking routes of itsown, to expanding from drug trafcking to arms andhuman trafcking and money laundering, and to anambitious expansion policy into new territories andmarkets. In short, the Zetas appears to have taken overthe main structure of the Gulf Cartel and launched anaggressive expansion strategy.49

Motives and Program of Action. The Mexican Zetasorganization is credited with being self-reliant andself-contained. In addition to its own personnel, it has


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its own arms, communications, vehicles, and aircraft.The general reputation is one of high efciency and

absolute ruthlessness in pursuit of its territorial andcommercial (self-enrichment) interests. As such, theZetas is credited with the capability to sooner or latertake over the Gulf Cartel and expand operations intothe territories and markets of the other cartels. And asit progresses toward the control or incapacitation ofrival organizations, it dominates territory, communitylife, and local and regional politics. Thus the explicitcommercial motive is also implicitly and explicitly apolitical motive. Yet unlike some other enforcer gangs,TCOs, other private military organizations, insurgentgroups, and neopopulists, the Zetasorganization doesnot appear to be intent on completely destroying thetraditional Mexican state political-economic-socialsystem and replacing it with its own. Rather, the Zetas

demonstrates a less radical option; it apparently seeksto incrementally capture the state.50

To accomplish this aim, the leaders of the Zetas havedetermined thatat a minimumthey need to be ableto freely travel, communicate, and transfer funds allaround the globe. For this, they need to be within easyreach of functioning population centers. Thus, the Zetasdoes not nd the completely failed state particularlyuseful. It would prefer to have Mexico as a weak butmoderately functional international entity. The shellof traditional state sovereignty protects the Zetasfrom outside (U.S.) intervention, but Mexican stateweakness provides freedom to operate with impunity.And, importantly, although continued U.S. pressurewill prevent Mexican authorities from abandoning the

ght against illegal drug trafcking, there are manyways a functional state could exhibit a kind of cosmeticconformity while doing little in practice to undermine


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the power of the drug trafcking organizations.51

John Sullivan and Robert Bunker tell us exactly how

the incremental capture of a state might conceivablytake place. This pragmatic model of military andnonmilitary methods demonstrates the ways andmeans by which a transnational nonstate actor suchas the Zetas can challenge and capture the de juresovereignty of a given nation-state. This model hasalready proved to be the case in parts of Mexico,Central America, South America, and elsewhere in theworld. This is how it works.

If an irregular attackercriminal gangs, terrorists,insurgents, drug cartels, private military organizations,militant environmentalists, or a combination of theaboveblends crime, terrorism, and war, he can extendhis already signicant inuence. After embracingadvanced technology, weaponry, including weapons

of mass destruction (WMD) (including chemical andbiological agents), radio frequency weapons, andadvanced intelligence gathering technology, alongwith more common weapons systems, the attacker cantranscend drug running, robbery, kidnapping, andmurder and pose a signicant challenge to the nation-state and its institutions.

Then, using complicity, intimidation, corruption,and indifference, the irregular attacker can quietly andsubtly co-opt individual politicians and bureaucratsand gain political control of a given geographical orpolitical enclave. Such corruption and distortion canpotentially lead to the emergence of a network ofgovernment protection of illicit activities, and theemergence of a virtual criminal state or political entity.

A series of networked enclaves could, then, become adominant political actor within a state or group of states.Thus, rather than violently competing directly with anation-state, an irregular attacker can criminally co-opt


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and begin to seize control of the state indirectly.52

This model represents a triple threat to the authority

and sovereignty of a government and those of itsneighbors. First, murder, kidnapping, intimidation,corruption, and impunity from punishment underminethe ability and the will of the state to perform itslegitimizing security and public service functions.Second, by violently imposing their power overbureaucrats and elected ofcials of the state, the TCOsand elements of the gang phenomenon compromise theexercise of state authority and replace it with their own.Third, by neutralizing (making irrelevant) governmentand taking control of portions of the national territoryand performing some of the tasks of government, thegang phenomenon can de facto transform itself intoquasi-states within a state. And the criminal leadersgovern these areas as they wish.53

Conclusions.

As one watches TV and reads newspapers, theasymmetric Zetachallenge might appear to be ad hoc,without reason, and inordinately violent (terroristic).Nevertheless, a closer examination of organization andactivities illustrates a slow but perceptible movementtoward the capability to increase its freedom ofmovement and actions in Mexico, Central America, andelsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. After reviewingthe basic facts of the brutal methods the Zetas use toinsinuate their power over people, one can see thatthese seemingly random and senseless criminal actshave specic political-psychological objectives. After

getting even closer to the situation, one can see thatthese objectives are not being lost on the intended


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audience.Commercial enrichment seems to be the primary

objective of gang-TCO phenomenon protagonistsplaying in the Mexican internal security arena. Thisis a serious challenge to existing law and order inMexico and to the effective sovereignty of Mexico andthe other nation-states within and between which theZetas and other TCOs move. It is that, but it is alsomore. Sullivan warns us that resultant para-statesor criminal-free states fuel a bazaar of violence where[warlords, drug lords] and martial entrepreneurs fuelthe convergence of crime and war.54 At the sametime, because political, military, and opinion leadersdo not appear to understand how to deal with thisambiguous mix ofintrastate violence, Peter Lupsha, awise and long-time observer, argues that those leadersare doing little more than watching, debating, and

wrangling about how to deal with these seeminglyunknown phenomena. As a consequence, territory,infrastructure, and stability are slowly destroyed, andthousands of innocents continue to die.55

OUTCOMES AND CONSEQUENCES: SOMECONTEMPORARY REALITY IN ONE DAYIN THE LIFE OF AN AMERICAN REPORTERSEEKING TO INTERVIEW A DRUG KINGPIN INSINALOA

This vignette, taken from a very interesting andinstructive article written by Guy Lawson,56 is anattempt to capture the essence of the article. The intenthere, however, is to briey examine contemporary

sociopolitical life in Sinaloa with a critical eye on thereality of effective state sovereignty.


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The Individual Being Interviewed: Juaquin Guzman

Loera, better known as El Chapo (Shorty).

El Chapo controls a Sinaloa Cartel that controlsthe Arizona border towns of Nogales and Mexicali.He has opposition, however. First, there are erstwhilefriends who have developed a personal feud with ElChapo that seems to go on and on and become moreand more violent. These antagonists are two brothers,Mochomo (Red Ant) and Barbas(the Beard), who areleaders of the Beltran Leyva cartel. Then there are theseemingly ever-present Zetas agents trying to expandtheir own and the Gulf Cartels illegal drug routes intothe United States. The Gulf Cartel and the Zetas appearto have teamed together with Mochomo and Barbas inan attempt to eliminate El Chapo from the market.

In the capital of the Mexican state of Sinaloa,Culiacan, El Chapo is known as a kind of folk heropart Robin Hood, part Billy the Kid. He has moremoney, more women, and more weapons than anyother TCO in the areaexcept the Zetas. Because ElChapo is relatively generous with some (actually, verylittle) of his money, people respect him. He grew uppoor, planting corn and marijuana. Over time, he builtmassive underground tunnels to smuggle cocaineinto Arizona, and he subsequently assembled a eetof boats, trucks, and aircraft that made him one of themost wanted drug dealers in the world. And, he nowamong other thingsnances new entrepreneurs asthey grow both marijuana and poppies for heroin. ElChapo, however, is most famous for his miraculous

escape from a federal prison in 2001 just before he wasto be extradited to the United States for trial on U.S. drugcharges. He had a plush suite in prison, complete with


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a personal chef, plenty of whisky, an endless supply ofViagra, and a girlfriend called Zulema. The common

wisdom is that El Chapo gave all that up to go back toSinaloa and help out his friends and neighbors.

Moreover, the people of Sinaloa are convinced thatthe federal government in Mexico City let El Chapoescape because he is the only drug lord who has theresources and intelligence to face up to the othercartels and to the Zetas.57 The argument, simply put,is that the federal government cannot do much. Thepolice are incompetent and corrupt; laws constraingovernment, while a TCO can do whatever it wants;and regular army troops are a poor match for the muchbetter armed, equipped, and trained Zetas. In short, itis better to let the TCOs destroy themselves rather thanght them directly.

Principal Locations Where the Search for ShortyTook Place, and Some of the Topics of ConversationThat Helped Pass the Time.

The State of Sinaloa, Mexico. Sinaloa is a smallstate on the Mexican Pacic coast across the Gulf ofCalifornia from the Baja California peninsula. It issituated between the sea and the almost impassableSierra Madre Occidental on the east. There are probablynot many more than a million inhabitants of the entirestate, but an average of three drug-related murdersare estimated to take place every day of the year inSinaloa. That statistic explains the front-page headlineof the local newspaper on the day that our Americanreporter arrived in Culiacan: Worse Than Iraq.

The Capital City of Culiacan, Sinaloa. That rst dayin Culiacan, everyone in the city was wondering whatEl Chapo might do to take revenge for the death ofhis 20-year-old son a few weeks earlier. The young


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man was shot and killed in broad daylight during adrive-by attack by 15 gunmen, one of whom red a

bazooka. The murder was attributed to the Beltran-Leyva cartel. Weeks later, four more decapitated bodieswere dumped in the center of Culiacan with a noteaddressed to El Chapo, saying, Youre next. Threedays later, three more bodiesthis time with legs aswell as heads severedwere found. Among them was aformer police comandante. Within hours, another policeofcer was shot and killed, along with a companionand a bystander. Within another few days, two moregrotesquely decapitated bodies were dumped outsidea farm owned by a capo (criminal chieftain) allied withEl Chapo.

That was just one series of events discussed onthat rst day in Culiacan. Something less importantthan the murder of El Chapos son was also a topic of

conversation. Only a few days before the arrival of ourreporter, a gang of gunmen pulled up in front of anauto shop in the center of the city. They opened rewith AK-47s and AR-15s. Within minutes, nine peoplewere dead. Then, as the assailants ed along ZapataBoulevard, they gunned down two police ofcers. OnInsurgentes Avenue, the killers opened re on federaltroops stationed outside a judicial building. There wasno pursuit and no arrests. All that anyone seemed toknow was that the gunmen were after a small timenarcotracante known as Alligator. A local ofcialsuccinctly explained, No one will talk.

As one might have guessed,

Culiacan is a drug-industry town the way Los Angeles

is an entertainment town. Every business is connected,directly or indirectly, with illegal drugs. There arenarco discos and narco restaurants. In the upscale mallsscattered around town, high-end jewelers sell gaudy


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and expensive necklaces favored by narco wives, andgirlfriends, and hookers. Narco chic is Valentino andMoschino pants, ostrich-skin boots, a black belt with anarco nickname (such as Alligator) engraved on it, anda Versace hand bag big enough to hold a stash of drugsand cash needed to pay off the police.

Thus, every day, Culiacan stages a sort of ongoing soapopera. But Culiacan is much smaller than Los Angeles.In Culiacan, one can see everyone and everything inone or two episodes. On the Road and into Tamazula de Victoria. TheAmerican reporter was hoping to meet El Chapo andinterview him. Through professional connections, hewas introduced to Julio, an opium (poppy) farmer,who considered himself a good friend of El Chapo. Hehas partied many times with El Chapo and his friends,and El Chapo supplies him with the seeds for the

poppies he grows. Julio told the reporter that he couldtake him to a town called Tamazula where El Chapolivesif he isnt in Guatemala or El Salvador.

The highway inland and toward the mountainsfrom Culiacan is dotted by large haciendas (ranches),sheltered behind 30-foot-high walls. Tamazula itselfboasts a new school and condo developmentssignsof the prosperity bought with narco dollars. In themiddle of the village, on a hill overlooking the valley,a mansion stands behind large black steel gates. Atthe bottom of the hill, just under the gaze of the narcomansion, there is a kind of contradiction common inthe Sierra Madres. It is an army outpost ironicallyillustrating that the fortunes of the law and outlawsare inextricably entwined. Julio explained that the

house belongs to one of El Chapos allies. But ElChapo is not there, he is up there, at a ranch of a caponamed Nachito. Julio pointed to a rough dirt trackthat could be seen leading up into the mountains from


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Tamazula.On the way out of town and toward the mountains,

Julio stopped and ducked into a tiny ofce to collectthe monthly subsidy he receives from the Mexicangovernment for not growing illegal drugsdespitethe fact that he does grow opium and marijuana. Thisis another closely related contradiction and irony inSinaloa, illustrating the you leave me alone and Illleave you alone armistice that exists between thenarcos and the government. A few minutes later, in thedistance they spotted what appeared to be a platoonof soldiers. Julio suddenly decided that they shouldturn around and go back. He insisted that it would beunsafe to go any further. He argued that the armedmen could be federal troops, El Chapos men,gatilleros(triggermen) for the Beltran-Leyva cartel, or Zetas. Inany case, they would recognize a gringo (American)

in the car and assume that he was from the U.S. DrugEnforcement Agency (DEA) or U.S. Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA). Julio was prickly and insistent: If youwant to ndEl Chapo, you should look near the villageof La Tuna. I know people who can take you there.

On the way back to Culiacan, conversation stayedcentered on the inordinately high level of violence andimpunity to prosecution for it in Sinaloa. In the capitalcity, the front page of the newspaper now featured astreet-by-street diagram of the most recent beheadingsand assassinations: El Mapa De La Muerte (the deathmap).

Our reporter never did nd out how the vendettabetween El Chapo and Mochomoand Barbas came out.It really did not matter. The back and forth violence

continues apace and seems to blur into a deep gray fog.In that fog, the violence between and within the rivalcartels, the enforcer gangs, and government forces


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does not appear likely to end anytime soon. There istoo much money to be made. In a lull in the almost

ever-present self-enrichment process, a bunch ofheadless bodiesor just the headswill be droppedsomewhere conspicuous. And there may or may not beanother note. Messages in Sinaloa no longer have to bewritten or explicit.

Conclusions.

The TCOs, their enforcer gangs, and the Zetasmembers operating in Sinaloa have marginalizedMexican state authority and replaced it with a criminalanarchy. That anarchy is dened by bribes, patronage,cronyism, violence, and personal whim. The presentvision of the human capacity to treat automaticweapons re and the terried screams of victims from

down the street as mere background noise to theSinaloa soap opera should create, at the least, a vagueunease. A future vision of larger and larger parts ofMexico and the global community adapting to criminalvalues and forms of behavior should be, at a minimum,unsettling.

This cautionary tale of a signicant criminalchallenge to effective state sovereignty and traditionalWestern values takes us to the problem of response.Even though commercial enrichment remains theprimary motive for TCO and Zeta challenges to statesecurity and sovereignty in Mexico, the strategicarchitecture of the Zetas (organization, motive,practices, and policies) resembles that of a political orideological insurgency. The primary objective of the

political insurgents, drug cartels, and private armiessuch as the Zetas is to attain the level of freedom ofmovement and action that allows the achievement of


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the desired enrichment. This denes insurgency: that is,coercing radical change of a given political, economic,

and social system in order to neutralize it, control it, ordepose it. Rephrased slightly, it also denes war: thatis, compelling an adversary to accede to an aggressorspolicy objectives.58

By responding to this kind of challenge to security,stability, and sovereignty with a piecemeal andincoherent law enforcement approach or with an adhoc and violent military approach, political leadersare playing into the hands of the cartels and TCO-gang phenomenon. Even worse, by condoning corruptpractices and hoping that the problem will go away,legitimate leaders are letting their adversaries play allthe proverbial cards. Contemporary political, military,and opinion leaders must change their fundamentalthought patterns (mindsets) and strengthen national

and multilateral organizational structures in order todeal more effectively with this overwhelming reality.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Again, as stated above, the power to deal effectivelywith the kinds of threats posed by the gang-TCOphenomenon is not hard combat repower or eventhe more benign police power. Power is multileveland multilateral and combines political, psychological,moral, informational, economic, and social effortsas well as police, military, and civil-bureaucraticactivitiesthat can be brought to bear holistically on thecauses and consequences, as well as the perpetrators,of violence. Ultimately, then, success in contemporary

irregular conict comes as a result of a unied effortto apply the full human and physical resources of anation-state and its international partners to achievethe individual and collective well-being that leads to


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sustained societal peace with justice.The actions, investments, and reforms needed to

generate the kind of power that can address the macro-level strategic socioeconomic and police-militaryproblems exacerbated by the gang-TCO phenomenonmust come from the Mexican government and society.In the meantime, there is still much to be done. TheUnited States, under the Merida Initiative, is providinga 3-year $1.4 billion aid package aimed at helping Mexicoght the drug cartels with increased law enforcementtraining, military equipment, and improved bilateralintelligence cooperation.59 Even though more microtactical-operational level aid will help, the fundamentalquestion is whether the Mexican, U.S., and otherinterested governments will focus on the problem longenough to change the drug war paradigm from a microto a macro approach.

A macro strategic and practical approach to thegang-TCO phenomenon must begin with a mindsetchange and the promulgation of a cognitive basisfor effective change. That is, while a combination oflaw enforcement and military power is necessary todeal with the problem, it is insufcient. The key togreater success in this kind of irregular conict is ashift in emphasis toward thinking better and ghtingsmarter.60 Accordingly, the author of this statementfrom a RAND Occasional Paper argues that there aretwo requirements to ghting smarter. They are to(1) create institutional conditions conducive to usingbrains more than bullets; and (2) implement measuresdesigned to develop brain power and put it to gooduse.61

The rst recommendation, then, requires thefollowing:

A at (rather than traditional hierarchical)


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organizational structure, with leadershipcognitively prepared to coordinate and

implement macro whole-of-government effortsto address the multifaceted and dynamic threatin a timely manner.

That, in turn, requires professionalizationand modernization of civilian-police-militaryleadership capable of identifying and meetingcritical analytical, planning, operational, andstrategic decisionmaking needs (for example,institutional reform and personnel investment)for a prioritized and balanced approach tothe larger issues of Mexican and hemisphericsecurity.

The second recommendation involves a seriousinvestment in people and brain power. That would

entail: Revising current personnel policies to recruit

and promote individuals who demonstrate greatintellectual aptitude for solving unfamiliar andambiguous problems;

Providing continuing professional educationand training and bilateral personnel exchangesat all levels;

Exploiting networks and networked informationquickly and fully; and,

Decentralizing authority to make decisions.62

These recommendations call for some organizationalreform and serious investment in improving civil-police-military cognitive capacity. It is time to take the

wisdom of Sun Tzu seriously. He left for posterity thisexhortation from the opening of his famousArt of War:War is a matter of vital importance to the State. Theprovince of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It


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is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.63

ENDNOTES

1. Lincoln B. Krause, The Guerrillas Next Door, Low IntensityConict & Law Enforcement, Spring 1999, pp. 3456. Also see JoseLuis Velasco, Insurgency, Authoritarianism, and Drug Trafcking inMexicos Democratization, New York: Routledge, 2005; and Max G.Manwaring, Sovereignty under Siege: Gangs and Other CriminalOrganizations in Central America and Mexico, in Insurgency,Terrorism & Crime, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008,

pp. 104128.

2. See note 1. Also see Mark Stevenson, Commission saysCentral American Mara gangs have taken root in Mexico, www.signonsandiago.com, 4/4/2008; Alfredo Corchado and LaurenceIliff, Ex-rivals merge to megacartel intensies brutality inMexico, www.dallasnews.com, 7/9/2008; Ioan Grillo, BehindMexicos Wave of Beheadings, www.time.com, 1/22/2009; IoanGrillo, Confessions of a Mexican Narco Foot-Soldier, www.time.

com, 1/22/2009; Robin Emmott, Mexicos Gulf Cartel undauntedby military assault, www.reuters.com, 1/22/2009; and TimPadgett, The Killers Next Door, www.time.com, 1/22/2009.

3. Private armies are not new. They have been operating atone level or another for centuries, and John Sullivan cites data tothe effect that [s]everal hundred currently operate in over 100nations, on six continents, generating over $100 billion in annualrevenues. See John P. Sullivan, Terrorism, Crime, and Private

Armies, Low Intensity Conict & Law Enforcement, Winter 2002,pp. 239253.

4. James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1990. Also note that Mexico admits to233 Zones of Impunity; see Marc Lacey, In Drug War, MexicoFights Cartels and Itself, New York Times, March 30, 2009, at www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/world/americas/30mexico.html. Also seePeter W. Singer, Peacekeepers, Inc., Policy Review, June 2003.

5. See note 1. Also see author interview with the personalrepresentative of the attorney general of Mexico in the UnitedStates, Dr. Manuel Suarez-Meir, in Washington, DC, January 29,


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2009.

6. Sullivan, 2002, pp. 244249.

7. This term comes from the title of Krauses article cited innote 1.

8. The methodology is taken from Robert K. Yin, CaseStudy Research: Design and Methods, Thousand Oaks, CA: SagePublications, 1994, pp. 110, 15, 3132, 140, and 147.

9. Charles Gibson, Spain in America, New York: Harper andRow, 1966; Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America from theBeginnings to the Present, New York: Knopf, 1968; Thomas E.Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America, New York:Oxford University Press, 1984; and Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keysto Latin America, New York: Knopf, 1962. Also see George W.Grayson, Los Zetas: The Ruthless Army Spawned by a MexicanDrug Cartel, Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Research Institute,April 30, 2008; George W. Grayson,Mexicos Struggle with Drugsand Thugs, Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Association HeadlineSeries, Winter 2009; Colleen W. Cook, Mexicos Drug Cartels,Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, February 25,2008, Order Code RL34215, hereafter cited as CRS Report; MachaelPatrou, Mexicos Civil War, Macleans, December 8, 2008; andSullivan, 2002, 239253.

10. Robert E. Scott,Mexican Government in Transition, Urbana:University of Illinois Press, 1964; Roger D. Hanson, The Politics of Mexican Development, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1971; Martin C. Needler, Mexican Politics: The Containmentof Conict, New York: Dragon, 1982; and Daniel Levy and GabrielSzekelup, Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change, Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1983.

11. See notes 8 and 9.

12. Tannenbaum, 1962.

13. Ibid.; and note 9.

14. David C. Jordan, Drug Politics, Norman: University of


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Oklahoma Press, 1999, pp. 19, 142157.

15. Sullivan, 2002.

16. Jordan, 1999, p. 19.

17. Ibid. Also see Mark Stevenson, Mexican Singer Slainin Hospital while Recovering from Gunshot Wounds, www.signonsandiego.com, 12/4/2007; Ana Arana, How the Street GangsTook Control of Central America, Foreign Affairs, MayJune 2005,pp. 98110; and John P. Sullivan, Maras Morphing: RevisitingThird Generation Gangs, Global Crime, AugustNovember 2006,pp. 488490.

18. Jordan, 1999, pp. 142157.

19. Sullivan, 2002, pp. 239253. Also see Brian Jenkins,Redening the Enemy: The World Has Changed, But OurMindset Has Not, Rand Review, Spring 2004.

20. Jordan, 1999, pp. 193194.

21. Ibid., p. 152. Also see Grayson, 2009; Sinaloa Drug CartelSaid to Inltrate Executive Branch, Economic News & Analysison Mexico, www.thefreelibrary.com, 1/23/2009; Jane Bussey,Organized Crime Takes Control in Parts of Mexico, McClatchyWashington Bureau, www.mcclatchydc.com, 9/20/2008; andReports: Cancun Police Chief Questioned in generals Killing,www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas , 3/17/2009.

22. Phil Williams, From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age:The Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy, Carlisle, PA: StrategicStudies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008.

23. Sullivan, 2002, p. 239.

24. Chester A. Crocker, Engaging Failed States, ForeignAffairs, SeptemberOctober 2003, pp. 3244; Steven D. Krasnerand Carlos Pascual, Addressing State Failure, Foreign Affairs,JulyAugust 2005, pp. 153155.

25. CRS Report. Also see Central America and Mexico Gang


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Assessment, Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment, Bureau for Latin America and Caribbean Affairs,April 2006, hereafter cited asAID Paper, 2006.

26. W. Lee Rensselaer III, The White Labyrinth, New Brunswick,NJ: Transaction, 1990. Also see Max G. Manwaring, Street Gangs:The New Urban Insurgency, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,U.S. Army War College,2005, p. 24.

27. See note 26. Also see Mark Stevenson, Mexico: DrugGangs Using Terror Tactics, Miami Herald, May 17, 2007, www.miamiherald.com/915/story/110509.html .

28. Ibid. Also see Kevin G. Hall, Mexican Drug War GettingBloodier,Miami Herald, March 21, 2007; andAID Paper, 2006.

29. See note 28. Also see statement of Chris Swecker, AssistantDirector, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, before U.S. House of Representatives Committeeon Judiciary, November 17, 2005, www.fbi.gov/congress05/swecker111705.html, 1/22/2009; President Felipe CalderonLaunches Ambitious Campaign against Drug Cartels, EconomicNews & Analysis on Mexico, January 24, 2007, www.thefreelibrary.com,1/23/2009; and Oscar Becerra, A to Z of CrimeMexicos ZetasExpand Operations, Janes Intelligence Review, January 30, 2009,www.Z.janes.com/janesdata/maps/jir/history/jir2009...2/5/2009.

30. See note 29. Also see Grayson, Mexico and the DrugCartels, August 17, 2007, www.fpri.org; and notes 2, 8, 23, and24.

31. See note 30. Also see Williams, 2008.

32. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Future Wars/FutureBattlespace, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, 2003, pp. ix, 1517.

33. Paul E. Smith, On Political War, Washington, DC: NationalDefense University Press, 1989, p. 3. Also see Carl von Clausewitz,On War[1832], Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. and eds.,New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976, p. 75.
http://c/Users/Jennifer.Nevil/Desktop/zeta%20manwaring/www.miamiherald.com/915/story/110509.htmlhttp://c/Users/Jennifer.Nevil/Desktop/zeta%20manwaring/www.miamiherald.com/915/story/110509.htmlhttp://c/Users/Jennifer.Nevil/Desktop/zeta%20manwaring/www.miamiherald.com/915/story/110509.htmlhttp://c/Users/Jennifer.Nevil/Desktop/zeta%20manwaring/www.miamiherald.com/915/story/110509.html


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34. Ibid. Also see Jorge Verstrynge Rojas, La guerra asimetricay el Islam revolucionario (Asymmetric War and Revolutionary Islam),Madrid, Spain: El Viejo Topo, 2005.

35. General Sir Frank Kitson, Warfare as a Whole, London: Faberand Faber, 1987. Also see General Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility ofForce: The Art of War in the Modern World, New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 2007.

36. Carlos Marighella, Manual of the Urban Guerrilla, ChapelHill, NC: Documentary Publications, 1985, p. 84.

37. Ibid.

38. CRS Report, pp. 45. Also see Mexicos Civil War,Macleans, December 8, 2008, pp. 2425; and Grayson, 2008 and2009.

39. Subdued debate regarding whether Mexico was or ismoving toward failed state status was enlivened both in Mexicoand the United States by General (Retired) Barry R. McCaffreyspresentation to Roger Rufe, entitled A Strategic and OperationalAssessment of Drugs and Crime in Mexico, dated March 16,2009. See [email protected]. Also note that Velasco,2005, p. 2, states that Mexicos democracy is partial, weak,contradictory, and supercial.

40. Grayson, 2008.

41. CRS Report, p. 11. Also see Martin Morita, Desatencarteles guerra en el sureste (Separating Cartels and War in theSoutheast), Reforma, July 27, 2006.

42. Marighella, 1985. Also see Grayson, 2008. Also note thatin response to Gulf Cartel initiatives, the rival Sinaloa Cartel hascreated its own enforcer gangs. The Negros and the Polones areless sophisticated and effective than the Zetas, but they appearto have little problem confronting local police andof courseunprotected civilians. See Alfredo Corchado, Cartels EnforcersOutpower Their Boss, Dallas Morning News, June 11, 2007.

43. See note 43. Benetez is quoted in the Corchado article inthe preceding note.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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44.AID Paper, 2006.

45. Max G. Manwaring, La soberania bajo asedio: LasPandillas y otras organizaciones criminales en Centroamerica y enMexico (Sovereignty Under Seige: Gangs and Other CriminalOrganizations in Central America and Mexico), Air & SpacePower Journal, 2nd trimester 2008, pp. 2541.

46. Alejanddro Suverza, Los Zetas, una pasadilla para elcartel de Golfo (The Zetas, Two Faces for the Gulf Cartel),El Universal, January 12, 2008; Oscar Becerra, A to Z of Crime:Mexicos Zetas Expand Operations, Janes Intelligence Review,January 30, 2009; and Grayson, 2008 and 2009.

47. Ibid.

48. Economist, March 7, 2009, pp. 3033; and Marc Lacey,With Deadly Persistence, Mexican Drug Cartels Get Their Way,New York Times, March 1, 2009, pp. 1, 9.

49. Becerra, 2009, pp. 19; and Grayson, 2008, p. 2.

50. Williams, 2008; and Phil Williams, Mexican Futures,unpublished monograph, n.d.

51. See note 51.

52. John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, Drug Cartels,Street Gangs, and Warlords, in Robert J. Bunker, ed., NonstateThreats and Future Wars, London: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 4553.

53. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, Cartel Evolution:Potentials and Consequences, Transnational Organized Crime,Summer 1998, pp. 5574.

54. Sullivan, 2006, p. 501.

55. Peter Lupsha, Grey Area Phenomenon: New Threatsand Policy Dilemmas, unpublished paper presented at the HighIntensity Crime/Low Intensity Conict Conference, Chicago, IL,September 2730, 1992, pp. 2223.


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56. The following vignette is taken from Guy Lawson, TheWar Next Door, Rolling Stone, November 13, 2008.

57. Mark Stevenson, Top Mexico Cops Charged withFavoring Drug Cartel, Associated Press, January 24, 2009, www.news.yahoo.com, 1/26/2009.

58. See, as an example, Clausewitz, [1832] 1976, p. 75.

59. Elise Lebott, U.S. Puts Finishing Touches on Anti-DrugEffort with Mexico, CNN News, March 27, 2009, www.CNN.com.

60. David Gombert, Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side ofCounterinsurgency (COIN), Rand Occasional Paper, Santa Monica,CA: RAND National Defense Institute, 2007, pp. 3556.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Grifths, trans., London,United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 63.
http://c/Users/Jennifer.Nevil/Desktop/zeta%20manwaring/www.CNN.comhttp://c/Users/Jennifer.Nevil/Desktop/zeta%20manwaring/www.CNN.comhttp://c/Users/Jennifer.Nevil/Desktop/zeta%20manwaring/www.CNN.comhttp://c/Users/Jennifer.Nevil/Desktop/zeta%20manwaring/www.CNN.com

Documents

SSI Pub 940 "A New Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies"