SREE Inaugural Conference

Low Performing Schools and

The Market for Teachers

Eric A. HanushekStanford UniversityDecember 2006

What We “Know” and Some Policies

Teachers are most important aspect of schools

Schools for disadvantaged students particularly bad

Improving performance and closing achievement gaps require improved teacher policies

Common Policy Discussion We need to increase teacher salaries

Best teachers leave to other occupations We face large shortages in math, special

education, and foreign languages Best teachers leave most disadvantaged

schools We need to tightened teacher entry

Unqualified teachers in the classrooms Disadvantaged schools get new,

unqualified teachers

Quality Measurement

Salary and cognitive tests have fallen

Percent college educated earning less than average teacher, 1940-2000

0

20

40

60

80

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Pe

rce

nt

All men All women Men, age 20-29 Women, age 20-29

Quality Measurement

Salary and cognitive tests have fallen But implications for quality uncertain

Measured characteristics unrelated to achievement Teacher education Teacher experience* Certification Teacher test scores*

Value of Longitudinal Data

Important to follow students and teachers Understanding influences of

contemporaneous influences Dealing with unobserved heterogeneity Diagnosing potential biases

Examples from Texas Schools Project of University of Texas at Dallas

Teacher mobility Teacher quality

Policy implications

Considerable Movement of Teachers

Lots of school changing

Teacher Experience

StayChange school

Change district

Quit

0-2 yr 73.6 7.5 9.3 9.5

3-5 yr 77.7 7.2 6.6 8.5

Annual Percentage MovementsTexas Teachers

Considerable Movement of Teachers

Lots of school changing Movement is systematic

Student achievement Race/ethnicity salary

Change in Salary and Student Characteristics: District Switchers

Men

0-2 yr

Women

0-2 yr

Salary (log) 0.012 0.007

Test score 0.05 0.08

% Hispanic -4.8 -4.8

% Black -0.07 -2.6

% subsidized lunch -4.7 -7.0

Salary Premia to Neutralize Turnover Effect Between Large Urban and Suburban

Districts

12.3%8.8%

25.2%

42.6%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

experience 0-2 years experience 3-5 years

males females

Panel Estimators of Teacher Quality

G iGiG iG i jG iGs iGs iGA F P S e

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

( )ig ig

G G G GG g G g G g G g

iG ig igs igs i ig g g g

F P S

Average Quality Differences(compared to stayers)

Compared to district

Compared to school

Change campus -0.089 -0.054

Change district -0.011 -0.023

Quit -0.044 -0.072

Figure 3. Kernal Density Estimates of Teacher Quality Distribution: Standardized Average Gains Compared to Other Teachers at the Same Campus by Teacher Move Status

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

-2 -1.8 -1.6 -1.4 -1.2 -1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8

Stays at Campus Campus Change District Change Out of Public Education

Policy Implications

Cannot regulate good quality Across the board salary increases

unlikely to work Single salary schedule precludes

quality improvement Need to think of working conditions

Some Research Issues

Measurement/estimation error Stability over time Policy alternatives and

experimentation

Opportunities and Problems

NCLB and state data Availability of student performance data IES grants for longitudinal data

FERPA Lack of access