SPS BENITEZ vs CA_Ejectment of Portion Encroached Upon

7/27/2019 SPS BENITEZ vs CA_Ejectment of Portion Encroached Upon

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 104828 January 16, 1997

SPOUSES RAFAEL BENITEZ AND AVELINA BENITEZ, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RENATO MACAPAGAL and ELIZABETHMACAPAGAL, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

May possession of a lot encroached upon by a part of another's house be recovered inan action for ejectment?

This is the main question raised by the petition for review on certiorariassailing theResolution 1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division, 2 dated March 24, 1992, in CA-G.R.SP No. 26853 denying due course to petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision ofthe Regional Trial Court of Pasig in Civil Case No. 61004, which in turn affirmed thedecision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, Branch 58.

The Facts

On January 22, 1986, petitioners Rafael and Avelina Benitez purchased a 303-square-meter parcel of land with improvement from the Cavite Development Bank, covered byTransfer Certificate of Title No. 41961 (now, TCT No. 55864).

Subsequently, private respondents Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal bought a 361-square-meter lot covered by TCT No. 40155. On September 18, 1986, they filed CivilCase No. 53835 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 157 against petitionersfor the recovery of possession of an encroached portion of the lot they purchased. Theparties were able to reach a compromise in which private respondents sold the

encroached portion to petitioners at the acquisition cost of One Thousand Pesos(P1,000.00) per square meter.

On July 17, 1989, private respondents purchased still another property, a 285.70square-meter-lot covered by TCT No. 3249-R, adjacent to that of petitioners. After arelocation survey was conducted, private respondents discovered that some 46.50square meters of their property was occupied by petitioners' house. Despite verbal and


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written demands, petitioners refused to vacate. A last notice to vacate was sent topetitioners on October 26, 1989.

On January 18, 1990, private respondents filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of SanJuan, Branch 58, Civil Case No. 61004 for ejectment against petitioners. The MeTC of

San Juan decided in favor of the former, with the following disposition:3

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs andagainst the defendants ordering them and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate andsurrender possession of the subject premises to the plaintiffs as well as to pay the following:

1. The amount of P930.00 a month starting July 17, 1989 until they finally vacatethe subject premises;

2. The amount of P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees; and

3. Cost of suit.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 167, affirmed said decision. 4 TheRTC said: 5

The controversy in this case is not an encroachment or overlapping of two (2) adjacent propertiesowned by the parties. It is a case where a part of the house of the defendants is constructed on aportion of the property of the plaintiffs. So that as new owner of the real property, who has a rightto the full enjoyment and possession of the entire parcel covered by Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. 41961, plaintiffs have the right to demand that defendants remove the portion of the housestanding on plaintiff's realty. . .

The dispositive portion thereof reads: 6

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, it being more consistentwith the facts and the law applicable, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against thedefendant-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

On further appeal, the respondent Court found no merit in petitioners' plea. In aResolution dated March 24, 1992, the Sixth Division of said Court found the petition tobe a mere rehash of the issues and arguments presented before the lower courts. Itruled in part that: 7

3) Petitioners were fully aware that part of their house encroached on their neighbor's property,while respondents became aware of it only after purchasing said property. Petitioners cannotclaim good faith as against the respondents.

4) Since petitioners are not builders in good faith, they cannot demand that respondents sell thedisputed portion; what the law provides is that the builders in bad faith can be ordered todismantle said structure at their own expense. In the interim period that petitioners' structureremains, they should pay reasonable rent until they remove the structure.


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The dispositive portion thereof reads: 8

For reasons indicated, We find the appeal without merit and deny it due course, with costsagainst the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

The main issue is whether the possession of the portion of the private respondents' landencroached by petitioners' house can be recovered through an action of ejectment, notaccion publiciana. Corollarily, petitioners question (a) the validity of the imposition of"rental" for the occupancy of the encroached portion, (b) the denial of their claimed pre-emptive right to purchase the encroached portion of the private respondents' land, and(c) the propriety of a factual review of the CA's finding of bad faith on the part of

petitioners.

In a nutshell, petitioners insist that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case at barbecause its real nature is accion publiciana or recovery of possession, not unlawfuldetainer. It is not forcible entry because private respondents did not have priorpossession of the contested property as petitioners possessed it ahead of privaterespondents. It is not unlawful detainer because petitioners were not the privaterespondents' tenants nor vendee unlawfully withholding possession thereof. Said courtalso has no jurisdiction to impose payment of "rentals" as there is no lessor-lesseerelationship between the parties. They pray for a review of the factual finding of badfaith, insisting that the facts uphold their position. Due to their alleged good faith, they

claim the pre-emptive right to purchase the litigated portion as a matter of course.Finally, they insist that the award of attorney's fees is unwarranted as privaterespondents allegedly had knowledge of the encroachment prior to their acquisition ofsaid land.

Private respondents counter that petitioners are estopped from questioning thejurisdiction of the MeTC after they voluntarily participated in the trial on the merits andlost; that there is no law giving petitioners the option to buy the encroached property;and that petitioners acted in bad faith because they waived in their deed of sale theusual seller's warranty as to the absence of any and all liens and encumbrances on theproperty, thereby implying they had knowledge of the encroachment at the time of

purchase.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit and should be denied.

First Issue: MeTC Has Jurisdiction


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The jurisdictional requirements for ejectment, as borne out by the facts, are: afterconducting a relocation survey, private respondents discovered that a portion of theirland was encroached by petitioners' house; notices to vacate were sent to petitioners,the last one being dated October 26, 1989; and private respondents filed the ejectmentsuit against petitioners on January 18, 1990 or within one (1) year from the last demand.

Private respondents' cause of action springs from Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rulesof Court, which provides:

Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when Subject to the provisions of the nextsucceeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person againstwhom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration ortermination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or thelegal representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, atany time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring anaction in the proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding ordepriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such

possession, together with damages and costs. . .

That petitioners occupied the land prior to private respondents' purchase thereof doesnot negate the latter's case for ejectment. Prior possession is not always a conditionsine qua non in ejectment. 9 This is one of the distinctions between forcible entry andunlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of hisland or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; thus, he mustallege and prove prior possession. But in unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfullywithholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under anycontract, express or implied. In such a case, priorphysicalpossession is not required. 10

Possession can also be acquired, not only by material occupation, but also by the factthat a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legalformalities established for acquiring such right. 11 Possession of land can be acquiredupon the execution of the deed of sale thereof by its vendor. Actual or physicaloccupation is not always necessary.

In the case before us, considering that private respondents are unlawfully deprived ofpossession of the encroached land and that the action for the recovery of possessionthereof was made within the one-year reglementary period, ejectment is the properremedy. 12 The MeTC of San Juan had jurisdiction.

In addition, after voluntarily submitting themselves to its proceedings, petitioners areestopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MeTC. 13 This Court will not allowpetitioners to attack the jurisdiction of the trial court after receiving a decision adverse totheir position.

Second Issue: Compensation For Occupancy


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Petitioners erroneously construed the order of the MeTC to pay private respondentsNine Hundred Pesos (P930.00) a month starting July 17, 1989 until they (petitioners)finally vacate the subject premises as "rentals". Technically, such award is not rental,but damages. Damages are recoverable in ejectment cases under Section 8, Rule 70 ofthe Revised Rules of Court. 14These damages arise from the loss of the use and

occupation of the property, and not the damages which private respondents may havesuffered but which have no direct relation to their loss of material possession. 15Damages in the context of Section 8, Rule 70 is limited to "rent" or "fair rental value" forthe use and occupation of the property. 16

There is no question that petitioners benefited from their occupation of a portion ofprivate respondents' property. Such benefit justifies the award of the damages of thiskind. Nemo cum alterius, detrimenti locupletari potest. No one shall enrich himself at theexpense of another.

Third Issue: Option To Sell Belongs To Owner

Article 448 of the Civil Code 17 is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on whichanother in good faith builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner.

The option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the landowner's choice. Not even a declarationof the builder, planter, or sower's bad faith shifts this option to him per Article 450 of theCivil Code. 18 This advantage in Article 448 is accorded the landowner because "his rightis older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership ofthe accessory thing." 19There can be no pre-emptive right to buy even as a compromise,as this prerogative belongs solely to the landowner. No compulsion can be legallyforced on him, contrary to what petitioners asks from this Court. Such an order would

certainly be invalid and illegal. Thus, the lower courts were correct in rejecting thepetitioners' offer to buy the encroached land.

Fourth Issue:A Review of Factual Findings Is Unwarranted

Petitioners ask this Court to review the alleged error of the respondent Court inappreciating bad faith on their part. According to them, this is contradictory to the factthat private respondents acquired their lot and discovered the encroachment afterpetitioners bought their house. After careful deliberation on this issue, this Court findsthis petition for review inadequate as it failed to show convincingly a reversible error onthe part of the respondent Court in this regard. Thus, for very good reasons, this Court

has consistently and emphatically declared that review of the factual findings of theCourt of Appeals is not a function that is normally undertaken in petitions for reviewunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such findings, as a general rule, are binding andconclusive. 20 The jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law unlessthere is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in therecords or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute reversible error. 21


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Even respondent Court has taken note of the inadequacy of the petition before it, as itwryly said: 22

The Petition for Review is not certainly a manifestation of clarity nor an example of a well-organized summation of petitioners' cause of action. . .

xxx xxx xxx

A careful scrutiny of the above issues discloses that they are mere repetitions in a rehashed formof the same issues with the same supporting arguments raised by petitioners when they appealedfrom the decision of the (MeTC) to the RTC. . .

This petition is no different. We share the foregoing sentiments of the respondent Court.In essence, respondent Court merely affirmed the decision of the MeTC. The Court of

Appeal's finding of petitioners' bad faith did not alter nor affect the MeTC's disposition.Petitioners want this Court to declare them in good faith and to determine their rightsunder Article 448, Civil Code. However, the mere fact that they bought their property

ahead of the private respondents does not establish this point. Nor does it prove thatpetitioners had no knowledge of the encroachment when they purchased their property.Reliance on the presumption in Article 526 of the Code is misplaced in view of thedeclaration of the respondent Court that petitioners are not builders in good faith.

What petitioners presented are mere allegations and arguments, without sufficientevidence to support them. As such, we have no ground to depart from the general ruleagainst factual review.

In sum, the petition has not shown cogent reasons and sufficient grounds to reverse theunanimous ruling of the three lower courts. The MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals

were all in agreement in sustaining private respondents' rights. And we uphold them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolution is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 25-27.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr. and concurred in by AssociateJustices Alfredo M. Marigomen and Fortunato A. Vailoces.

3 Rollo, pp. 25-26.

4 Penned by Judge Alfredo C. Flores, C.A. Rollo, pp. 10-13.

5 CA Rollo, pp. 11-12.


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6 CA Rollo, p. 13.

7 Rollo, p. 27.

8 Ibid.

9 Pharma Industries Inc., vs. Pajarillaga, 100 SCRA 339, 345, October 17, 1980.

10 Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372, 382-383, May 10, 1994 and Javelosavs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124292, promulgated on December 10, 1996, p. 10.

11 Pharma Industries Inc., vs. Pajarillaga, op cit.

12 Del Castillo vs. Aguinaldo, 212 SCRA 169, 173-174, August 5, 1992.

13 Tejones vs. Gironello, 159 SCRA 100, 104, March 21, 1988 and Romualdez vs.Regional Trial Court, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 414, September 14, 1993.

14 Rule 70, Section 8 provides:

Sec. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same. If judgment is renderedagainst the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has beenperfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the

justice of the peace or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action inthe Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down tothe time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal,he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under thecontract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court toexist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value ofthe use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the ratedetermined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or

period. . .

15 Hualam Construction and Dev't. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612, 624 -625,October 16, 1992 and Araos vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 770, 776, June 2, 1994.

16 Ibid. and De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 715, 721, April 8, 1991.

17 Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted ingood faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the onewho built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value isconsiderably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay

reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building ortrees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and incase of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

18 Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown inbad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing beremoved, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the personwho built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price ofthe land, and the sower the proper rent.


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19 Depra vs. Dumlao, supra, p. 483.

20 De la Serna vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 325, 329, June 21, 1994; Tay Chun Suyvs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 151, 156, January 7, 1994; First Philippine InternationalBank vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259, 307-308, January 24, 1996; and LibertyConstruction & Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106601, promulgated

on June 28, 1996, p. 7.

21 Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162, 171, July 14, 1995; The Municipality ofCandijay, Bohol vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 530, 534, December 28, 1995; andTanedo vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 80, 91, January 22, 1996.

22 Rollo, p. 26.


SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166802 July 4, 2008

SPS. ALBERTO GUTIERREZ and EPIFANIA GUTIERREZ, petitioners,

vs.

SPS. ROGELIO and JOSEPHINE VALIENTE, HON. ALEXANDER TAMAYO,Presiding Judge, Branch 15, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and SHERIFF IV

PABLO R. GLORIOSO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

assailing the Resolution1dated October 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP

No. 86957 which dismissed outright the Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition of petitioners

Spouses Alberto and Epifania Gutierrez (Spouses Gutierrez) for being deficient in form, and theCA Resolution2dated January 20, 2005 denying their Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to

Admit Annexes and to Allow Payment of Additional Docket Fees.

The present controversy involves a boundary dispute between owners of adjoining Lot 6098-Dand Lot 6098-E situated in Banga, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Lot 6098-D is a 250-square meter

parcel of land owned by Spouses Gutierrez under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5728
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(M). Lot 6098-E is a 425-square meter parcel of land owned by respondents Rogelio and

Josephine Valiente (Spouses Valiente) under TCT No. T-26901 (M).

Lot 6098-E was previously owned by Crispin Gutierrez, the brother of petitioner AlbertoGutierrez, under TCT No. 5729 (M). On January 28, 1997, Spouses Valiente bought said Lot

6098-E thru a Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale from the surviving heirs ofCrispin Gutierrez, namely, his widow Milagros, and daughters Maricris and Marissa. The

vendors told the vendees that a portion of the lot was occupied by Spouses Gutierrez at the meretolerance of the vendees. Sometime in April 1997, Spouses Valiente conducted a relocation

survey to verify the boundaries of their lot. The relocation survey revealed that Spouses

Gutierrez occupied a 99-square meter portion of the lot of Spouses Valiente. When SpousesValiente demanded the return of the encroached area, Spouses Gutierrez refused, claiming

ownership of the occupied portion under their title.

Thus, on May 23, 1997, Spouses Valiente filed a complaint3 against Spouses Gutierrez for

Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages before the Regional Trial Court

(RTC), Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 355-M-97.

On August 8, 1997, Spouses Gutierrez filed a Motion to Dismiss.4On October 30, 1997, the

RTC issued an Order5denying the Motion to Dismiss and required Spouses Gutierrez to submit

their Answer.

Instead of filing an Answer, Spouses Gutierrez filed on November 7, 1997 a Motion for

Reconsideration.6 On November 19, 1997, Spouses Valiente filed an Opposition to the Motion

for Reconsideration with Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and Render Judgment.7 OnNovember 21, 1997, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of

Spouses Gutierrez and reset the hearing to December 11, 1997.

At the scheduled hearing of December 11, 1997, Spouses Gutierrez and their counsel failed to

appear.9 Thereupon, Spouses Valiente moved that their Motion to Declare Defendants in Defaultand to Render Judgment be granted considering that Spouses Gutierrez have not filed their

answer within the allowable period given them.10Finding merit in the motion, the RTC issued an

Order11 declaring Spouses Gutierrez in default and allowed Spouses Valiente to present their

evidence ex-parte.

On December 17 and 18, 1997, Spouses Valiente presented their evidence ex-parte. Upon the

submission of their evidence, Spouses Valiente rested their case and submitted it for decision. On

February 12, 1998, Spouses Gutierrez filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default.12However,

the records do not show that the RTC acted on the motion.

On August 17, 1999, Spouses Valiente filed a Manifestation with Motion to Render Judgment13

since no decision had been rendered 18 months from submission of the case for decision. On

March 13, 2000, Spouses Valiente filed anEx-Parte Manifestation14 reiterating their motion torender judgment.
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On May 15, 2000, the RTC, now acting through a different judge, issued an Order15 directing the

verification and relocation survey of Lots 6098-D and 6098-E by the government Geodetic

Engineer to determine the exact description, monuments and areas, as appearing on both titles ofthe lots, for the reconveyance of the encroached portion to the party entitled thereto. The

relocation survey, however, was delayed several times due to the interference of Spouses

Gutierrez.16

Two years later, or on May 17, 2002, Geodetic Engineer Joel Atienzo (Engr. Atienzo) submittedhis Surveyor's Report17 with a Sketch Plan.18 He stated in his report that an existing alley with an

area of 45 square meters was within the boundary of Lot 6098-E.

On July 3, 2002, Spouses Valiente filed their Comments on the Surveyor's Report19 seekingclarification of the Surveyor's Report since the Sketch Plan delineated two other portions

apparently encroached in Lot 6098-E, with areas of 17.95 square meters and 44 square meters,

but Engr. Atienzo did not state them as encroached upon in his Surveyor's Report.

At the hearing on September 20, 2002, the parties manifested in open court their agreement tothe Surveyor's Report and intimated that Spouses Gutierrez were willing to negotiate with

respect to the payment of the property encroached upon per Surveyor's Report.20

During the November 20, 2002 hearing attended by both parties, Engr. Atienzo clarified in open

court that the 17.95-square meter, 45-square meter and 44-square meter portions delineated inthe Sketch Plan were also encroachments on Lot 6098-E.21On the same day, the RTC issued an

Order22 directing the parties to submit their joint commitments on the issues of encroachment

and/or payment, considering that there are three encroached portions of the subject lot but onlyone was reported to be within the boundary of Lot 6098-E.

On March 7, 2003, Spouses Valiente filed a Manifestation

23

stating that the parties could nolonger submit any commitment on the issues on encroachment and/or payment thereof because

no agreement was arrived at between the parties regarding said issues. They also manifested thatwith the declaration in open court of Engr. Atienzo that the 17.95-square meter, 45-square meter

and 44-square meter portions delineated in his Sketch Plan are the encroached areas in Lot 6098-

E, then the RTC may finally dispose of the casesans the parties' joint commitments. No other

pleading was filed by the parties.

Thus, on June 23, 2003, the RTC issued an Order24approving the Surveyor's Report and

directing Spouses Gutierrez to reconvey to Spouses Valiente the 17.95-square meter, 45-square

meter and 44-square meter encroached portions of Lot 6098-E. No motion for reconsideration or

appeal from said Order was filed by Spouses Gutierrez.

On August 11, 2003, Spouses Valiente filed a Motion for Execution,25 which was granted by the

RTC in an Order26 dated February 5, 2004. On May 25, 2004, respondent Sheriff gave Notice to

Spouses Gutierrez of the Writ of Execution.

On May 28, 2004, Spouses Gutierrez filed their Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Execution andto Stay Notice of May 25, 200427 on the ground that the Orders dated May 15, 2000 and June 23,
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2003 directing reconveyance of the encroached portions exceeded the nature of the reliefs prayed

for in the complaint.

On June 9, 2004, the RTC issued an Order28 denying the motion to quash of Spouses Gutierrez. Itheld that the May 15, 2000 Order had long attained finality and that the order for reconveyance

in the June 23, 2003 Order is related to the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. Spouses Gutierrezfiled a Motion for Reconsideration29 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order30 dated September

9, 2004.

On October 14, 2004, Spouses Gutierrez filed a Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition31in the

CA assailing the RTC Orders dated May 15, 2000, June 23, 2003, June 9, 2004 and September 9,

2004.

On October 22, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution 32 dismissing outright the petition for: (a)defective verification because it did not give the assurance that the allegations of the petition are

true and correct based on authentic records; (b) failure to attach material portions of the record,

to wit:

Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Order dated October 30, 1997 and the Motion forReconsideration thereto, Order dated November 21, 1997, Motion to Declare Defendants

in Default, Order dated December 11,1997, Motion to Set Aside Order of Default,

Motion to Require the Acting Chief, Survey Party of CENRO, Tabang Guiguinto,Bulacan to Submit Verification/Relocation, Orders dated April 26, 2001 and November

20, 2002, Motion for Writ of Execution dated August 11, 2003, Motion for

Reconsideration dated July 1, 2004 and the Opposition thereto and Reply.33

and (c) insufficient payment of docket fees.

On November 22, 2004, Spouses Gutierrez filed their Motion for Reconsideration with Motionto Admit Annexes and to Allow Payment of Additional Docket Fees,34 attaching thereto (a) an

amended verification, (b) copies of the required documents and portions of the record, and (c) a

postal money order for P680.00.

In a Resolution35dated January 20, 2005, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration of

Spouses Gutierrez, holding that strict compliance with the rules of Court is indispensable for the

prevention of needless delays or for the orderly expeditious dispatch of judicial business. It also

found no merit to the claim of Spouses Gutierrez that the RTC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in issuing the assailed orders.

Hence, the present petition with the following assigned errors:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE

SUBMISSION AND/OR AMENDMENT OF THE VERIFICATION ANDCERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM AND THE SUBMISSION OF THE ALLEGED

MATERIAL PORTIONS OF THE RECORD; AND THE FULL PAYMENT OF THE

BALANCE OF THE APPELLATE DOCKET FEE OF P680.00;36
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B. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DEPARTURE FROM THE

USUALLY ACCEPTED JUDICIAL PROCEDURE WHEN THE LATTER AWARDEDRELIEFS IN THE JUDGMENT OF DEFAULT NOT PRAYED FOR IN THE

COMPLAINT; AND IN ISSUING A WRIT OF EXECUTION OF A

JUDGMENT/ORDER THAT WAS CONDITIONAL AND WHICH COULD NOTBECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.37

Spouses Gutierrez invoke liberality and the primordial interest of substantial justice over the

strict enforcement of the rules of technicality. They submit that the CA should have resolved the

petition on the merits, instead of indulging on strict technicalities. They contend that the RTCgravely abused its discretion when it did not quash the Writ of Execution because the Orders

dated May 15, 2000 and June 23, 2003 cannot be the basis of the Writ of Execution: the May 15,

2000 Order being an interlocutory order and the June 23, 2003 Order exceeded the reliefs prayedfor in the complaint.

On the other hand, Spouses Valiente submit that the CA correctly dismissed the petition forprocedural and substantive infirmities since Spouses Gutierrez not only failed to comply with the

procedural requirements of the rules but also failed to show that the RTC committed grave abuseof discretion in issuing the assailed orders.

On the procedural aspect of the case, the Court finds in favor of Spouses Gutierrez.

On the matter of defective verification, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court states that a

pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegationstherein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. This Court

has consistently held that this requirement is formal, not jurisdictional.38 It is a condition

affecting the form of the pleading; non-compliance with this requirement does not necessarilyrender the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance thatthe allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a

matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.39 Thus, the appellate court

could have simply ordered the correction of the pleading or act on the unverified pleading, if theattending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in

order to serve the ends of justice.40 Besides, there appears to be no intention to circumvent the

need for proper verification since Spouses Gutierrez submitted an amended verification in theirMotion for Reconsideration.

With regard to the failure to attach material portions of the record in support of the petition,

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires that petition forcertiorari shall be

accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order,resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the records as are referred to

therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto; and failure of compliance shall be

sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

In the present case, the CA dismissed the petition for failure to attach the following documents:
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Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Order dated October 30, 1997 and the Motion for

Reconsideration thereto, Order dated November 21, 1997, Motion to Declare Defendants

in Default, Order dated December 11,1997, Motion to Set Aside Order of Default,Motion to Require the Acting Chief, Survey Party of CENRO, Tabang Guiguinto,

Bulacan to Submit Verification/Relocation, Orders dated April 26, 2001 and November

20, 2002, Motion for Writ of Execution dated August 11, 2003, Motion forReconsideration dated July 1, 2004 and the Opposition thereto and Reply,41

These documents, however, are not at all relevant to the petition forcertiorari. Since the issue of

whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion pertain only to the Orders dated May 15,

2000, June 23, 2003, June 9, 2004 and September 9, 2004, copies of said Orders would havesufficed as basis for the CA to resolve the issue. It is in these Orders that the RTC supposedly

made questionable rulings. Thus, the attachment of these Orders in the petition was already

sufficient even without the other pleadings and portions of the case record. Moreover, SpousesGutierrez corrected the purported deficiency by submitting the required documents in their

Motion for Reconsideration.

InAir Philippines Corporation v. Zamora,42the Court clarified that not all pleadings and parts of

case records are required to be attached to the petition; only those pleadings, parts of caserecords and documents which are material and pertinent, in that they may provide the basis for a

determination of aprima facie case of abuse of discretion, are required to be attached to a

petition forcertiorari, and omission to attach such documents may be rectified by the subsequentsubmission of the documents required.43

As to the shortage of payment of the docketing fee, the same cannot be used as a ground for

dismissing the petition. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,44 the Court held that the strict

regulations set in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals45that a court

acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees does notapply where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees,

and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees whenrequired by the court. The liberal doctrine in Sun Insurance has been repeatedly reiterated in

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,46Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Banque Nationale de

Paris47andIntercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Alonzo-Legasto,48 and continues to be

the controlling doctrine. Since the deficiency in payment was not at all intentional, as there was awillingness to comply with the rules when Spouses Gutierrez remitted the deficiency by postal

money order in their Motion for Reconsideration, the Sun Insurance doctrine applies.

It cannot be gainsaid that the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party

litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from theconstraints of technicalities.49Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as

basis of decisions.50 As has often been stated, it is far better to dispose of a case on the merits

which is a primordial end rather than on a technicality, if it be the case, that may result ininjustice.51

In any event, the contentions of Spouses Gutierrez on the substantive aspect of the case fail to

invite judgment in their favor.
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On the matter of whether the May 15, 2000 Order is final or interlocutory, it must be clarified

that since the May 15, 2000 Order merely directed the conduct of a verification and relocation

survey to determine the metes and bounds of the parties' respective lots to find out which lot wasencroached upon, such May 15, 2000 Order did not finally dispose of the case. It awaited the

results and submission of the Surveyor's Report for the final adjudication on the boundary

dispute; thus the May 15, 2000 Order was merely interlocutory in nature. The word interlocutoryrefers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit which

decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.52 In that sense,

it does not attain finality since there leaves something else to be done by the RTC with respect tothe merits of the case.

It is the June 23, 2003 Order which finally disposed of the case, having settled the parties

respective rights and liabilities, by ordering the reconveyance of the encroached portions of Lot

6098-E.

There is no merit to petitioners argument that the RTC, by ordering reconveyance, exceeded the

reliefs prayed for in the complaint. Spouses Valiente prayed for the following reliefs in theircomplaint:

a) The verification and relocation survey of the spouses-plaintiffs' subject parcel of land

(Lot 6098-E) and that of the spouses-defendants (Lot 6098-D) (at the expense of thelosing party or if to be advanced by either party, to be reimbursed later on by the parties

concerned by order of the Honorable Court) to settle once and for all who is correct in

the parties respective claims;

b) The spouses-defendants to pay to the spouses-plaintiffs the following sum: P25,000.00

as actual damages; P25,000.00 as attorney's fees plus the sum of P1,000.00 as court

appearance fee for the latter's counsel every appearance and attendance in court;

c) The Cost of Suit.

Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies as the Honorable Court maydeem just and equitable in the premises.53(Emphasis supplied).

While the complaint does not categorically state reconveyance as the specific relief desired, it

does contain a general prayer "for such other reliefs and remedies as the Honorable Court may

deem just and equitable in the premises." In BPI Family Bank v. Buenaventura,54 this Court ruledthat the general prayer is broad enough "to justify extension of a remedy different from or

together with the specific remedy sought."

55

Even without the prayer for a specific remedy,proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidenceintroduced so warrant.56 The court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof

even if no such relief is prayed for.57 The prayer in the complaint for other reliefs equitable and

just in the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for.

In the present case, this general prayer should be interpreted to include the prayer forreconveyance of the encroached portions since this is already evident from the allegations
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contained in the body of the Complaint and in the prayer of Spouses Valiente that the respective

claims of the parties should be settled once and for all.

At any rate, the issues raised by Spouses Gutierrez refer to the validity of the Orders dated May15, 2000 and June 23, 2003 which are not proper grounds in a motion to quash execution.

A motion to quash execution is only proper where: (a) the writ of execution varies the judgment;

(b) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;

(c) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (d) it appears thatthe controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court; (e) the terms of the

judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or (f) it appears

that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance or isissued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or

the writ was issued without authority.58 None of these instances apply here.

Spouses Gutierrez should have addressed the issues regarding the validity of the Order dated

June 23, 2003 in motion for reconsideration or appeal. Since no motion for reconsideration orappeal was filed by Spouses Gutierrez within the reglementary period, the order for

reconveyance had become final and executory. Having lost the right to appeal, they can no

longer assail the validity of June 23, 2003 in a motion to quash or a petition forcertiorari and

prohibition in the CA.

A motion to quash execution and a petition forcertiorari and prohibition, are not and should not

be substitutes for a lost appeal.59 They are not procedural devises to deprive the winning party of

the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. Courts should frown upon any scheme to prolonglitigations. A judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence,

may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Once

a judgment or order becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved andlaid to rest.60

The Court stresses once again that it is an important fundamental principle in the judicial system

that every litigation must come to an end. Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a

limit thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a

competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. Theprevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be

encouraged, then unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the detriment of the

administration of justice.61

Thus, litigation of this case must now cease.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Except for the procedural aspect, the dismissal of the

Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No. 86957 for lack of merit is

AFFIRMED. The Order dated June 9, 2004 denying petitioners Motion to Quash and Orderdated September 9, 2004 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, issued by the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan, stand.
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SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo and concurred in by AssociateJustices Romeo A. Brawner and Magdangal M. de Leon, CA rollo, p.41.

2 Id. at 94.

3 Id. at 30.

4 Id. at 50.

5 Id. at 55.

6 Id. at 56.

7 Id. at 60.

8 Id. at 59.

9 Rollo, p. 144.

10

Id.

11 Id.

12 CA rollo, p. 63.

13 Rollo, p. 145.

14 Id. at 147.

15 CA rollo, p. 23.

16 Rollo, pp. 148-157.

17 Id. at 159.

18 Id. at 161.

19 Id. at 163.
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20 Id. at 168.

21 Id. at 171.

22 Supra note 20.

23 Id. at 169.

24 Id. at 39.

25 CA rollo, p. 71.

26 Id. at 26.

27 Id. at 35.

28

Id. at 28.

29 Id. at 73.

30 Id. at 29.

31 Id. at 2.

32 Id. at 41.

33 Id at 41-42.

34 Id. at 43.

35 Id. at 94.

36 Rollo, p. 16.

37 Id. at 18.

38Gordoland Development Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163757,November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 425, 433; Benguet Corporation v. Cordillera Caraballo

Mission, Inc., G.R. No. 155343, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 381, 384.

39 Gordoland Development Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, supra note 38; Benguet

Corporation v. Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc., supra note 38; Shipside Inc. v. Courtof Appeals, 404 Phil. 981, 995 (2001).

40Ballao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162342, October 11, 2006, 504 SCRA 227, 233;

Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan, 410 Phil. 483, 492 (2001).
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41 Supra note 33.

42G.R. No. 148247,August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 59.

43 Id. at 69-70.

44G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 274, 285.

45G.R. No. L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562.

46G.R. No. 140954,April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 475.

47G.R. No. 151242,June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 260, 274-276.

48G.R. No. 169108,April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 339, 347.

49

Peoso v. Dona,G.R. No. 154018, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 232, 240; Ginete v. Courtof Appeals, 357 Phil. 36, 53 (1998).

50Composite Enterprises, Inc. v. Caparoso, G.R. No. 159919, August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA470, 480; Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, G.R. No. 154798, October 20, 2005, 473

SCRA 559, 566.

51Tan v. Dumarpa,G.R. No. 138777, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 659, 665; Serrano

v. Galant Maritime Services, Inc., 455 Phil. 992, 998 (2003).

52Pobre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141805, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 50, 60;

Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA166, 177.

53 CA rollo, p. 34.

54G.R. Nos. 148196 & 148259,September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 431.

55 Id. at 445. See also Morales v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 112140, June 23, 2005, 461

SCRA 34;First Metro Investment Corporation v. Este Del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc.,

420 Phil. 902 (2001).

56

Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990, 185 SCRA 425, 432-433.

57 Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, 466 Phil. 173, 180 (2004); Banco Filipino Savings andMortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 27, 41 (2000).

58 Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 294, 302 (1999); Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate

Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70987, January 30, 1987, 147 SCRA 516, 522-23.
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59Cf Conejos v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 849, 855 (2002); Del Mar v. Court of

Appeals, 429 Phil. 19, 30 (2002).

60CfSalva v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 281, 294 (1999).

61

Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No.157911, September 19, 2006, 502SCRA 354, 381;Ferinion v. Sta. Romana, 123 Phil. 191, 195 (1966).


SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 149118 February 16, 2006

FLAVIANA LIM CAJAYON and CARMELITA LIM CONSTANTINO, Petitioners,vs.

SPOUSES SANTIAGO and FORTUNATA BATUYONG, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari challenges the two rulings of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP. No. 50952. The first decision dated 27 November 20001 upheld the ruling of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirming the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) order for ejectment,

while the Resolution dated 5 July 20012 denied the motion for reconsideration.

First, the factual background of the case.

Flaviana Lim Cajayon and Carmelita Lim Constantino (petitioners) and Isagani P. Candelaria

(Candelaria) were co-owners of a 260-square meter lot, then covered by Transfer Certificate of

Title (TCT) No. C-10870. On 1 February 1995, a partition agreement3 was entered into by

petitioners and Candelaria, wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 100 square

meters, more or less, was adjudicated to Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294, containingan area of 160 square meters, more or less, was given to petitioners. TCT No. C-10870 was

cancelled and TCT No. 288500 was issued in the name of petitioners.

On 30 May 1995, Candelaria sold his property, including the improvements thereon, to SpousesSantiago and Fortunata Batuyong (respondents). TCT No. 294743 was issued in their names over

the said parcel of land.4
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On 21 May 1996, petitioners started the construction of a seven (7)-door bungalow-type building

that allegedly intruded into the lot of respondents. At the instance of respondents, petitioners

were summoned by barangay officials to a meeting on the matter. It was then agreed upon thatpetitioners would defer the construction work pending the result of a relocation survey to be

conducted by a government surveyor.

A verification survey was conducted by Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valencia. She

submitted a report dated 12 November 1996 which yielded the findings that Lot 6-A(Candelarias) and Lot 6-B (petitioners) were not correctly positioned geographically on the

ground with respect to TCT No. 294743. Thus, as per survey, sub-lot B with an area of 10.43

square meters serves as right of way of Lot 6-B (petitioners lot) while sub-lot C with an area of10.18 square meters was the portion of Lot 6-A (respondents lot) presently occupied by

petitioners.5

Despite the delineation of said boundaries, petitioners proceeded with the forestalled

construction, allegedly occupying at least 20.61 square meters of respondents lot, including the

portion being used as right of way for petitioners tenants.

After respondents secured a permit from the barangay and the Caloocan City Building Official to

fence their lot, they made demands to petitioners to vacate the encroached portion but to no avail.

Respondents brought the matter to the barangay but no amicable settlement was reached. ACertificate to File Action was issued to them by the Barangay Lupon Tagapayapa. A final

demand was made through a letter dated 20 May 1997 upon petitioners to vacate the encroached

premises. Petitioners, however, vehemently refused to vacate and surrender the premises.

On 14 April 1997, respondents filed an ejectment case against petitioners before the

Metropolitan Trial Court6 (MeTC) of Caloocan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 23359. In a

Decision

7

dated 2 July 1998, the MeTC ordered petitioners to vacate and surrender possession ofa portion of respondents lot and to pay P500.00 per month as fair rental value from May 1996until the premises is finally vacated, plus P5,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of the suit.8

On appeal, the RTC9 affirmed the judgment of the MeTC.10 In doing so, the RTC debunked the

three (3) arguments posed by petitioners. First, contrary to petitioners submission, the RTC

ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the instant complaint. The RTC noted that the issue ofjurisdiction was never raised in the court a quo while on the other hand, petitioners actively

participated in the proceedings therein by filing their Answer and Position Paper. Evidently,

petitioners raised the question of jurisdiction as a mere afterthought as he did so only after heobtained an adverse judgment. Second, the allegations of the complaint sufficiently averred a

case for ejectment which the RTC found to be within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Third,

the trial court ruled that petitioners categorically recognized the validity of the verificationsurvey done by Engineer Valencia, as shown by the presence of petitioner Flaviana Cajayon

during the verification survey and setting of monuments per survey report.11

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration but it was denied in an Order12

dated 12 January 1999 of the RTC. They elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way ofpetition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. On 27 November 2000, the appellate


21/28

court rendered a Decision13 dismissing the petition. Holding that the exclusive jurisdiction to try

unlawful detainer cases is vested with the MeTC, the appellate court ratiocinated, thus:

The complaint in the instant case establishes jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain the actionfor unlawful detainer and the remedy it seeks is merely to obtain possession of the controverted

lot from respondents. Specifically, it alleges that sometime on May 21, 1996, petitioners startedconstruction works in the area which intruded into a portion of respondents property; that the

parties eventually agreed to stop the construction subject to the result of a survey to be conductedthereon; that a survey was conducted in the presence of the parties and a report was submitted by

Engr. Valencia on November 12, 1996, showing an encroachment of about 20.61 square meters

of respondents lot including that portion being used as a right of way for petitioners tenants;that even after the boundaries had been verified, petitioners resumed the construction on the area;

that despite verbal and written demands, the last of which was made on March 20, 1999,

petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the encroached area. Surely, respondents resort tounlawful detainer when petitioners failed to leave the controverted premises upon demand is in

order.14

The appellate court also held that the fact that petitioners houses already stood on the

controverted lot long before the purchase of the land by respondents failed to negate the case forejectment.15 The appellate court emphasized that prior physical possession is not a condition sine

qua non in unlawful detainer cases. The court likewise sustained the RTC findings on the validity

of the verification survey conducted by Engineer Valencia that petitioners have encroached on a20.61 square meter portion of respondents lot.

On 5 July 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution16 denying petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration.

Petitioners now come to us via the present petition, submitting as issues the question ofjurisdiction and the weight to be accorded to the verification survey results.17

Petitioners anchor their petition on the court a quos lack of jurisdiction over the instant suit. The

averments in the complaint do not make out a case for ejectment, they claim, as their entry into

the disputed lot was not made by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Neither was their

possession of the disputed property by virtue of the tolerance of respondents or the latterspredecessor-in-interest.

Respondents counter that the jurisdictional elements necessary to maintain an action for unlawful

detainer clearly obtain in the case at bar, namely: (a) after the parties agreed to the conduct of a

survey by a government surveyor and after the survey, it was determined that the structuresintroduced by herein petitioners have encroached a portion of herein respondents lot; (b) notices

to vacate and surrender of possession of the encroached portion were made to petitioners, the last

being on March 20, 1997; and (c) the suit was instituted on April 11, 1997 or within one (1) yearfrom date of last demand.18

Respondents also stress that possession of the premises by petitioners took place more than one

year before the filing of the complaint and the absence of an allegation in the complaint that such


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possession of the disputed portion was merely by virtue of respondents tolerance does not

deprive the lower court of its original and exclusive jurisdiction nor will it negate respondents

action for unlawful detainer.19

It is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the

complaint and the character of the relief sought.20

The Complaint21 filed by respondents (plaintiffs therein) alleged these material facts:1avvphil.net

2. That defendants and Isagani P. Candelaria were the former co-owners of a certain

piece of land located in Maypajo, Caloocan City containing an area of 260 square meters,more or less, under TCT No. C-10870 issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City;

3. That on February 1, 1995, said co-owners subdivided this parcel of land by virtue of a

Partition Agreement wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 100 square

meters, more or less, was given to Isagani P. Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294,

containing an area of 160 square meters, more or less, was given to defendants. A copy ofsaid Partition Agreement is hereto attached as Annex "A";

xxx xxx xxx

5. That on May 30, 1995, Isagani P. Candelaria sold his share to the herein plaintiffs,including the improvements thereon, in the sum of P100,000.00, under a Deed of

Absolute Sale x x x;

xxx xxx xxx

7. That sometime in May 21, 1996, defendants started construction works in the area andintruded into the lot owned by the plaintiffs causing the latter to protest and report the

matter to the barangay authorities;

8. That on the same day, the parties were summoned to appear before the Barangay

Chairman wherein defendants agreed to stop the construction works, and in a subsequentconference on June 7, 1996, they agreed to defer the matter pending the result of a survey

to be conducted by a government surveyor;

xxx xxx xxx

11. That the following day, September 5, 1996, Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valenciaconducted a survey of the aforesaid property and placed the concrete monuments thereonin the presence of plaintiffs and defendants;

12. That on November 12, 1996, a verification survey report was submitted by Geodetic

Engineer Florentina C. Valencia together with the survey verification plan xxx;


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13. That despite defendants knowledge of the property boundary, and despite repeated

serious objections from plaintiffs, defendants proceeded to construct a seven-door

bungalow-type semi-concrete building, occupying at least 10.18 square meters andanother 10.43 square meters for the right of way, thus encroaching upon at least 20.61

square meters of plaintiffs lot, and further demolishing plaintiffs wall.

xxx xxx xxx

20. That despite repeated and continuous demands made by plaintiffs upon defendants,both oral and written, the last being on March 20, 1997, defendants in manifest bad faith,

wanton attitude, and in a malevolent and oppressive manner and in utter disregard of the

property rights of plaintiffs, have failed and refused, and still fail and refuse to vacate thesame up to the present time x x x.22

From the above-quoted allegations taken in tandem with the textbook distinctions between

forcible entry and unlawful detainer, it is clear that the complaint makes out a case for forcible

entry, as opposed to unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two forms of ejectmentsuits, are: first, in forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession

of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant, whereas, in unlawful detainer, the

plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; second, in forcible entry, the possession

of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof byforce, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the

defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to

the possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff; third, in forcible entry, thelaw does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises, but in unlawful

detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature.23

Respondents had been in prior physical possession of the property in the concept of owner priorto petitioners intrusion on 21 May 1996. When petitioners encroached upon respondents lot andstarted construction works thereon the latter was dispossessed of the area involved. Despite

various demands by respondents to vacate, petitioners obstinately refused to do so. Clearly,

petitioners entry into the said property was illegal from the beginning, precluding an action forunlawful detainer.

On the other hand, to establish a case of forcible entry, the complaint must allege that one in

physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through

force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.24 It is not essential, however, that the complaintshould expressly employ the language of the law. It would be sufficient that facts are set up

showing that dispossession took place under said conditions.25

The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition

under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who hashad prior possession thereof. To constitute the use of "force" as contemplated in the above-

mentioned provision, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even

necessary that he use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going onthe property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of


24/28

force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.26 In the case at bar, petitioners

encroachment into respondents property in an oppressive and malevolent manner, coupled with

their refusal to vacate the premises despite knowledge of the proper boundaries and heedless ofrespondents serious objections, indelibly connotes "force" within the meaning of the law.

Petitioners contend that while they concede they might have intruded on respondents property,the action is barred by prescription because it was filed more than one (1) year after the

occurrence of the alleged intrusion. The contention is baseless. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules ofCourt allows a plaintiff to bring an action in the proper inferior court for forcible entry or

unlawful detainer within one (1) year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or

withholding of possession. In forcible entry, the one-year period is counted from the date ofactual entry on the land.27

Records show that the ejectment suit was instituted on 11 April 1997. Petitioners actual entry

into the property, according to the complaint, took place on 21 May 1996. Thus, the suit was

filed well within the one (1)-year period mandated by law.

As a collateral issue, petitioners claim that they are at least entitled to the rights of a builder in

good faith on the premise that they are not the owners of the property encroached upon.

This contention is not tenable. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is

building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.28 In the instant case, whenthe verification survey report came to petitioners knowledge their good faith ceased. The survey

report is a professionals field confirmation of petitioners encroachment of respondents titled

property. It is doctrinal in land registration law that possession of titled property adverse to theregistered owner is necessarily tainted with bad faith. Thus, proceeding with the construction

works on the disputed lot despite knowledge of respondents ownership put petitioners in bad

faith.

Now, the second issue. Petitioners question the evidentiary weight of the verification surveyreport. They point out that since the survey was a unilateral act of respondents, done as it was

without their consent, they should not be bound by its findings.29

In raising the issue, petitioners are in e

Documents

SPS BENITEZ vs CA_Ejectment of Portion Encroached Upon