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Philippine Information Operations During

The Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign

By L. Grant Bridgewater, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Introduction

The Philippine counterinsurgency operation from 1946-1956 is

a fascinating small war worthy of examination today. This experience pitted the newly-minted Philippine government against the Hukbalahap—a well-organized and well-entrenched insurgent group that boasted years of success fighting other guerrilla forces, as well as Japanese invaders during World War II.

From 1946 to 1950 the Philippine government was in a desperate predicament, rapidly losing control of its country to the Hukbalahap. In fact, after the first years of the rebellion, the campaign was going so well for the insurgents that they publicly boasted they would replace the Philippine government with their own regime by 1952. Instead, by 1953, the insurgent movement was virtually crushed—a monumental turn of events. This dramatic swing from near defeat to total victory provides compelling lessons for future counterinsurgency operations.

This approach examines the Philippine government’s actions through the “lens” of today’s information operations (IO) doctrine. Analyzing specific aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign from the perspective of IO provides lessons that directly relate to current military theory and can be applied to current and future counterinsurgency operations.

In this paper, the researcher included only those activities he understood to “fit neatly” into the definition of IO. This enables the IO professional to determine if he can apply those capabilities in future warfare.

The HukbalahapThe initial movement known as

the Hukbalahap, later referred to as “Huk,” began in the 1930s as a political movement in Central Luzon. It gained support from people searching to improve their existence after years of injustice and poverty dating back to the time Spain governed the Philippine archipelago. Few Filipinos had resources to purchase public land, and land tenure problems grew among the population. Plots that plantation owners allowed tenants to cultivate for subsistence had been repeatedly divided among family members through the centuries into small sections. By the mid-20th century these plots could not produce enough food to sustain families, forcing tenants to borrow funds from their landlords. As debts mounted, the population became poorer with few opportunities to improve their situation and began to see landowners as the powerful upper-class.

In 1930 , the Soc ia l i s t and Communist parties promised to alleviate these social conditions. Their plan called for a rebellion to overthrow the government, which resulted in the

Philippine Communist Party (PKP) being outlawed in 1932. However, the militant arm of the PKP continued to conduct raids that killed landowners and destroyed plantations. Thus, by the time it was named the Hukbalahap (commonly called “Huk”) on March 29, 1942, this militant organization arose from a political/economical movement seeking to overthrow the government.

Huk LegitimacyThe Huk movement ga ined

legitimacy among the populace in Central Luzon during World War II when the Japanese invaded the Philippines. While many guerilla groups organized in response to the invasion, the Huks benefited from political sophistication and organization other groups did not have—enabling it to easily recruit, indoctrinate, and equip scores of volunteers.

Huk leaders knew they would attract more support by professing to be against the Japanese. The word Hukbalahap is an abbreviation of “Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon,” which means the People’s Anti-Japanese Army. Despite its revolutionary goals, the movement’s very name belied its emphasis on ousting the Japanese rather than instituting a Communist government. Many Huk members never realized the Huk’s Communistic goals. In fact, “great care was taken...not to inject ideology into the anti-Japanese struggle so as not to

Editorial Abstract: Lt Col Bridgewater examines Philippine counterinsurgency operations in light of contemporary IO doctrine. He discussing how the Philippine government employed IO core capabilities to defeat the Hukbalahap insurgents, and how this experience might benefit current Coalition counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq.

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antagonize the non-communist elements in the Huk ranks.”

Huk RebellionWhen the Philippines gained

national independence on July 4, 1946, the issue of agrarian unrest was still a primary concern. The Huks capitalized on this popular grievance for their own advantage. They established a three-phase plan to overthrow and replace the government. The first phase, scheduled to take place from 1946-1949, was to expand its popular support. The second phase, from 1949-1951, was an offensive whereby the masses gained would join the Huk military organization in revolutionary revolt. The final stage was the government takeover.

According to Philippine intelligence in 1946, the Huk force numbered about 15,000 fighters armed with a variety of weaponry, including rifles (mostly Enfield and Springfield), pistols, machineguns (primarily 30 caliber), and mortars. Procuring weapons would plague the Huks, who were never able to match the firepower of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

The Huk’s most important asset was support of the population. Peasants were desperate for social relief, and there were about 250,000 active Huk sympathizers. In areas where the Huk governed, peasants believed that there was actually a shift in power where they were in control—not the fleeing landlords. Villagers not only gave food and supplies to the Huks, but also provided information regarding the location, strength, and movement of government troops. Intelligence was vital to Huk success, and spies were eager to provide information. As Luis Taruc stated, “Without the support of the people...a guerrilla movement cannot survive.”

Counterinsurgency Operations, 19�6-1950I n 1 9 4 6 t h e n e w l y - m i n t e d

government inher i ted daunt ing challenges and was not prepared to deal with the Huk rebellion. Unavailability of agricultural land was the primary

problem. While economic trade with the world improved, the fledgling government was unable to leverage this wealth and alleviate problems facing its population. Furthermore, there was catastrophic devastation throughout the islands as a result of World War II.

Considering these issues, the Philippine government underestimated the Huk threat. The government first minimized the Huk issue. In his 1947 State of the Nation Address, President Roxas declared there was “complete peace and order throughout the Philippines, except in a few limited areas in Central Luzon.” However, in his speech the following year he stated that “lawlessness...prevailed in practically every province.” Many government officials commuted daily from Manila

to their Central Luzon offices for fear the Huks would kill them at night, while some simply abandoned their posts. While the U.S. did not provide military forces or fulfill Philippine requests for napalm and helicopters, it did provide military advisors who greatly influenced operations. Therefore, the campaign was almost entirely a Philippine-only struggle.

Constabulary and the Population

Relations between the population and government forces were dismal. When the Japanese were expelled

in 1945, the government hurriedly reorganized the Constabulary to ensure security throughout the archipelagos, often admitting people to its ranks such as Japanese collaborators and bandits. These troops often took food and supplies from people without compensation.

In addition, the Constabulary employed tactics that alienated the population. For example, in attempts to gather intelligence, troops adopted a tactic known as zona. This practice involved sealing-off a village to interrogate villagers and prevent them from supporting the Huk. This practice enraged villagers since the Japanese used this tactic to conduct interrogations, torture, and executions. This served to strengthen the villagers’ loyalties to the Huk. As a U.S. military advisor stated, the Constabulary “treated the people worse than the Huks did.”

Philippine Operations, 1950-1953

On August 28, 1949, Huk forces attacked a convoy, killing Mrs. Aurora Quezon, wife of the late President Manuel Quezon. The Huks seriously miscalculated the effects of their attack—Mrs. Quezon was one of the best-loved ladies in the Philippines, and popular support for the Huks began to erode. This catastrophic event jolted the government to take stronger action, and President Quirino appointed Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense in late 1949. Within 15 months of his appointment, Magsaysay stopped the Huk offensive and removed the Huks’ popular support.

Magsaysay’s New StrategyAssisted by U.S. military advisors,

Magsaysay developed a new strategy for the armed forces. Initially favoring large-scale, conventional sweeps, he quickly reconsidered after reviewing the results of previous operations. Since the Huk had sent assassins to kill the new Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay lived with (then) Lt Col Edward Lansdale, a U.S. Air Force officer and military advisor in the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). While

(U.S. Army Military History Institute)

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they were roommates, Lansdale listened to Magsaysay’s problems and helped identify key issues that needed to be addressed. He helped prioritize issues, suggest solutions, and let Magsaysay select the course of action he wanted to take. While other JUSMAG staff only ventured between the JUSMAG compound and AFP Headquarters, Lansdale accompanied Magsaysay on early morning field visits—pointing out operational shortcomings to Magsaysay’s untrained eye.

Lansdale’s discussions led to practices such as the government’s Economic Development Corps—a highly successful civil affairs program—as well as military deception tactics. In addition, JUSMAG codified basic counter-guerilla military operations in a manual for the Philippine government. In this way, U.S. advisors helped craft the unconventional tactics central to Magsaysay’s strategy—one that can be considered today as a counterinsurgency IO campaign.

The tactics Magsaysay proposed were unconventional, designed specifically to gain popular support and eliminate the Huks. In 1962, Colonel Valeriano noted, “Probably no campaign in Philippine history has seen such extensive use of unconventional operations as that against the Huks, especially after 1950.”

Philippine Counterinsurgency and Information Operations

The AFP changed its motto to reflect Magsaysay’s new counterinsurgency strategy. The old motto “Find ‘Em, Fight ‘Em, Finish ‘Em” was modified to begin with the phrase “Fool ‘Em” to reflect the importance of affecting the enemy’s information system. In his book on counterguerrilla operations based on lessons learned from the Huk campaign, Colonel Valeriano stressed this point by stating, “first in importance, and first in difficulty, is fooling the guerrilla enemy, misleading, eluding, or blinding his information and observation screens. Undoubtedly, one can see the emphasis on performing what is known today as “Information Operations.”

There are several IO capabilities at work throughout Magsaysay’s counterinsurgency plans. Military profess iona ls today can eas i ly charac te r ize Magsaysay’s p lan as including a comprehensive and successful IO campaign to defeat the Huk insurgency. In 1984 the U.S. Senate noted that the strategy devised by Magsaysay in 1950 “laid the foundation for U.S. counterinsurgency strategy to this day.” Therefore, it is useful to examine the specific elements of this “IO campaign” to see how it helped defeat the insurgents.

Military Deception (MILDEC)

Military deception focuses on presenting information to the enemy that causes him to behave as you desire. The AFP incorporated military deception in their operations to defeat Huk insurgents. Using deception techniques, government forces achieved greater success than had previously been achieved in operations that did not employ military deception. As emphasized in doctrine today, deceptive techniques were designed to affect the information available to the Huks, leading them to act in a manner benefiting the AFP.

Posing as Enemy Forces

The AFP became adept at posing as Huk insurgents. Highly-risky infiltration operations were conducted to penetrate enemy strongholds, learn more about the adversary’s behavior, attack specific units, and confuse the Huks. The strict restrictions placed on joining an infiltration team posing as Huk soldiers was so rigorous that it is better defined as a “Special Information Operations,” and an example is provided in the SIO section of this paper.

Some of these deceptive operations were wildly successful while others were not, since there was no formalized process between AFP units for establishing and training these infiltration teams. However, taken in aggregate, posing as the enemy certainly served to confuse the Huks. What was the affect on Huk

behavior? Certainly, the Huks began to distrust other Huk units for fear that they were actually AFP troops. For example, after the use of AFP forces disguised as Huk soldiers became so prevalent, two Huk units fought against each other—each one being convinced that the other unit was actually AFP forces in disguise.

Confusing and Luring the Enemy

Perhaps the most creative IO tactic used simply involved “luring” or “confusing” the Huks. Methods ranged from highly-coordinated to very simple deception techniques. In each case, AFP action was taken purposely to cause the enemy to respond in a specific manner.

During the daytime AFP units would depart an area, which caused the Huks to believe they had ended their operations there. Observing this, the Huks would believe the area was safe and return to it. In reality, though, AFP operations had not ended and government forces returned to the same area under the cover of darkness to surprise their Huk adversaries. The results of the AFP’s military deception strategy were excellent. After years of successful operations, Huk foraging tactics were severely curtailed and they were forced to demand more support from already poor Central Luzon peasants, often offended their sympathizers by using harsh tactics. Intra-unit suspicions were aroused, and they were under constant lookout for government forces—increasing their operational tempo and degrading their readiness posture. The AFP learned that deceit, in any form, proved to be a particularly effective method of combat for Philippine forces.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

For the first three years of the Huk campaign there was virtually a one-way PSYOP war—that of the Huk extolling their virtues and deriding the government. However, in 1950, the AFP’s use of PSYOP gave it a considerable advantage over their guerrilla adversary. While

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the Huks waged PSYOP toward the population, the AFP waged a PSYOP campaign, referred to as the “psy-war,” toward both the people and their adversaries.

PSYOP StrategyMagsaysay’s overall message was

a simple one: the government would provide “All-out Force or All-out Friendship.” Magsaysay developed a strategic PSYOP plan that addressed several target groups that included the dissidents (both “die-hard” communists, Huk soldiers, and misguided peasants), the neutral population, and even the AFP itself. Note that, while the researcher can delineate between messages specifically for the Huk soldier, the AFP needed to communicate these messages to the Huk, his sympathizers, his civilian opponents, and the neutral population, since he was unable to distinguish between Huks and the population at large.

Institutionalizing “Psy-War”

M a g s a y s a y w a s convinced that the AFP itself was the best method to prosecute what he called the “psy-war”—not only toward Huk soldiers, but to the populace as well. To that end, he took dramatic steps to ensure the PSYOP campaign was strongly ingrained throughout the AFP’s combat units. To institutionalize his vision, Magsaysay reorganized the AFP. He provided the strategic leadership for the psy-war. At the operational level, he established a Public Affairs Office (PAO) to oversee 8-10 man tactical-level psy-war teams. These teams were integrated into each combat company and included equipment for typing, public address, video, and copy making. Personnel with valuable skills were included, such as typists, artists, draftsman, and technicians. In this manner, the AFP was organized in a manner that enabled

commanders at the tactical level to prosecute the psy-war using local discretion and creativity.

Special Information Operations (SIO)

In 1948 the Huk movement in Southern Luzon gained momentum and attempted to connect with Huk forces in the north—presenting an opportunity for AFP forces. The AFP developed a highly-secretive team, referred to as “Force X,” to infiltrate the Huk organization in south Luzon. Information was vital to the team’s success. Thus, after being selectively screened for entry into Force X, members underwent a four-week training program designed to enable them

to infiltrate the Huk. Ex-Huk soldiers taught team members Huk speech, songs, customs and mannerisms. Force X also recruited and incorporated AFP soldiers who were recently wounded in action and still recovering from their injuries. Members carried items found on dead Huk soldiers, to include communist propaganda, weapons, pictures of loved ones, and indoctrination materials.

PSYOP lent credibility to Force X and provided an introduction into Huk forces. On April 14, 1948, fake battle took place between Force X and two Philippine Constabulary companies in

a southern province—the battle was widely reported. Huk units wanted to know more about their “brethren Huk force,” and Force X infiltrated two Huk squadrons who accepted their cover stories. More Huk units joined this group, including Huk from Central Luzon. After six days, when the members of Force X noticed that the real Huks acted coolly toward them, they coordinated an attack that dismantled the Huk squadrons in an instant.

This example not only indicates the massive effects of SIO, but it also displays how various aspects of IO must be integrated to ensure success. Certainly intelligence played a central role in Force X’s success, as did MILDEC, PSYOP, and OPSEC. A failure in any of these

IO capabilities could have sabotaged the impact of this particular SIO.

Assessing Philippine IO

StrategyT h e P h i l i p p i n e

g o v e r n m e n t m a d e excellent use of IO to help defeat the Huks. With the assistance of U.S. advisors, the government employed deception to interdict and disrupt Huk logistics and degrade enemy readiness. Well-orchestrated PSYOP achieved what military conflict failed to do—

appealing for Huk fighters to surrender while wooing the general population. The PSYOP campaign was supported by the civil affairs activities that leveraged AFP and government resources to assist the public. This reversed destructive practices of government troops and employed them as an essential resource to befriend disenfranchised peasants. Information gleaned from former Huk rebels proved vital to infiltration teams who not only destroyed Huk units but also learned their practices and hiding places. Across the board, IO tactics significantly influenced enemy information systems to facilitate the government’s success. The Huk

WWII counterinsurgency team (U.S. Army Military History Institute)

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rebellion shows that IO provides forces with the unconventional tactics necessary to defeat insurgents.

Lessons For TodayA striking similarity between the

Philippine situation in 1946-1950 and Iraq today is the introduction of a fledgling government and an entrenched opposition. An important lesson from the Huk rebellion is that success centers around attracting and sustaining public support. Attacking insurgents simply as a “military problem” alone only served to expand the insurgent’s influence in the Philippines. Leaders understood that the best way to gain popular support was through an effective IO campaign—not through military firepower alone.

Today, U.S. forces find themselves in a similar environment that the AFP did years ago—fighting insurgents without being able to easily distinguish them from the population at large. Attracting public support while influencing the enemy is crucial in this environment. Like the AFP, U.S. forces must employ PSYOP techniques to convey “ethical and religious messages” that may cause insurgents to abandon safehouses or avoid locations. PSYOP offering amnesty or fair treatment in exchange for surrender or information must also be liberally employed.

Indigenous IO StrategyThe IO campaign during the Huk

rebellion was an indigenous campaign. The U.S., although crucial to the campaign’s success, served only in an advisory role. The Huks were skilled at vilifying the Americans as occupiers and evil capitalists. The fact that the local populace in Luzon could identify positively with their own officials was vital to the use of IO and removed the Huk’s ability to incite anger toward “American colonialists,” as it had done in the 1930s.

U.S. military forces are currently employing IO tactics in Iraq—not an indigenous Iraqi force. Therefore, the U.S. must work just as hard with the new Iraqi government to devise an IO strategy that will win popular support and defeat insurgents. Today, U.S. forces

must prepare the future battlespace by establishing a military advisory group that can help develop an Iraqi IO strategy against the insurgents. The U.S. must identify the insurgent’s key centers of gravity and prepare IO tactics to attack these centers of gravity. It must also determine what issues are important to the public and develop IO tactics to address these issues as well. Therefore, once an Iraqi government is in place, it can center its counterinsurgency campaign around unconventional IO methods. In addition, when Iraqi forces begin employing IO tactics themselves, this will remove the insurgent’s ability to attribute these tactics to the U.S. IO tactics performed by a credible Iraqi force will likely have greater public appeal than similar tactics employed by U.S. troops. In addition, using Iraqi forces also allows more IO options such as using indigenous personnel to infiltrate insurgent groups, much like the AFP’s “Force X” teams. Therefore, it is prudent to prepare now to help the new Iraqi government execute a coherent IO strategy.

Military’s Expanded RoleIn Iraq today, the military must

continue to foster the perception that it is able to assist the population. However, in addition to civil affairs performed by U.S. troops, the coalition must leverage the newly-organized Iraqi Army to fill civil affairs roles as well. Iraqi forces, guided by U.S. advisors, must also build schools, establish hospitals, and assist the local populace. This practice will not only engender greater popular support for Iraqi forces, but it will also set an important precedent of civic support and assistance within the fledgling Iraqi Army.

One “high-return” civil duty the military can perform is to enforce free and fair national elections. The Philippine elections of 1951 presented an excellent opportunity that greatly improved the AFP’s image and instilled trust in the electoral process. Since the 1949 Philippine elections were violent and dishonest, somewhat

like the sham Iraqi election in 2002, and insurgents boasted that the 1951 elections would only further prove the government’s dishonesty. To reassure the public, AFP protected voting booths and quelled dishonest activity—in one case imprisoning a town’s entire police force for allowing the assassination of a candidate whom it disapproved. The peaceful and honest election of 1951 convinced many peasants that open elections were a sound alternative to organized revolt.

ConclusionAny assertion that one aspect of a

counterinsurgency campaign is solely responsible for defeating insurgents neglects the impact other activities contributed to the final outcome. Thus, asserting that the IO strategy was the “key to success” would be fallacious. What can be stated with certainty, however, is that the Philippine IO campaign was overwhelmingly successful in achieving its goal to help defeat the insurgents. Considering that, prior to introducing a comprehensive IO strategy, the Philippine government was losing the campaign against the Huks in 1949 and the dramatic way the AFP defeated the insurgents after incorporating capabilities of IO, there is a clear indication that the IO campaign was central to the government’s victory. In the end, the Huk rebellion was crushed largely due to an effective IO campaign. Certainly, current and future counterinsurgency operations must take into account the asymmetric effect an IO campaign can have to influence enemy behavior, gain popular support, and defeat insurgents.

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Cultural intelligence can be defined as analyzed social, political, economic, and other demographic information that provides understanding of a people or nation’s history, institutions, psychology, beliefs (such as religion), and behaviors.1 It helps provide understanding as to why a people act as they do and what they think. Cultural intelligence provides a baseline for education and designing successful strategies to interact with foreign peoples whether they are allies, neutrals, people of an occupied territory, or enemies.

Cultural intelligence is more than demographics. It provides understanding of not only how other groups act but why. It gives the commander as well as the soldier the knowledge to anticipate reactions to selected courses of action. It is especially relevant for the JFC because he must work with coalitions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), host nations, and other regional power brokers. If used properly it will enable U.S. forces to more successfully interact with foreigners, both in their countries or within coalitions, and more successfully achieve mission objectives.

THE NEED FOR CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE

The need for cultural understanding to conduct successful operations has been stated and written many times. For almost one hundred years the U.S. Marine Corps has considered cultural issues in its MOOTW. It most recently captured these issues and other small contingency best practices in its Small

Wars Manual last formally published in 1940. This manual emphasizes the need for true cultural understanding for the Marines operating in foreign countries. However, the lesson of including cultural intelligence in our joint intelligence effort and doctrine has not been learned. Historical feedback and recent lessons-learned confirm this. In a perceptive article on transforming doctrine with cultural intelligence, George Smith draws fascinating parallels between Napoleon’s campaign in Spain and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In each conflict, conventional military operations were quickly won, but stabilization operations encountered long and difficult problems due to a lack of proper planning for and understanding of the local populations in each country.2 Regarding OIF, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, V Corps Commander in OIF, stated that the value of “cultural intelligence” was a lesson learned. He noted, “If we are going to insert Army formations in a culture that is different than our own, we’ve got to have a much better appreciation for what the impact of insertion of U.S. formations into that culture might have...we need to be a lot more sensitive to that . . .”3 Analysis of other recent operations and wars also highlights the need for good cultural intelligence. Vietnam provided many examples, but operations in Somalia give even more applicable lessons to the varied MOOTW missions we continue to conduct. When carrying out stability, humanitarian relief and other MOOTW operations in Somalia, Marine General Anthony Zinni, former commander of

INTRODUCTION

Joint intelligence doctrine is flawed. It focuses too much on traditional

adversaries in combat situations and does not adequately address issues of foreign culture. Additionally, intelligence doctrine for process and planning does not adequately direct the joint force commander’s (JFC) intelligence establishment to prepare estimates on the characteristic features of foreign peoples that includes items such as their civilizations, beliefs, and social institutions. These flaws leave the commander and his forces vulnerable and reactionary when they must operate closely with foreign peoples and in foreign societies.

Joint operations are continuing to place U.S. forces in other countries for extended periods. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is just the latest example of how large numbers of troops can quickly shift from traditional, high intensity combat operations to MOOTW such as nation assistance and counterinsurgency support. They can then find themselves in the midst of a society, rather than a battlefield, performing a wide range of tasks required to rebuild an entire nation. In Iraq, U.S. leaders and forces must interact every day with all segments of the local population. Iraq is an obvious example, but operations in Afghanistan, Djibouti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, the Philippines, Lebanon, and Somalia highlight only a few of the many places where U.S. and U.S. led coalition forces have had troops, airmen, and sailors on the ground conducting operations and interacting with local populations.

Incorporating Cultural Intelligence Into Joint Doctrine

by John P. (Jay) Coles, Commander, USN

Editorial Abstract: The author examines perceived flaws in joint intelligence doctrine, especially lack of emphasis on cultural intelligence, using case studies from the current campaign in Southwest Asia. He suggests joint commanders and joint intelligence professionals will have difficulty asking and answering the right questions until both embrace doctrine-driven changes to intelligence guidance and training.

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the need for cultural intelligence. Unfortunately, as Figure 1 shows, it is clear that the requirements listed pertain to developing the physical, threat and target-oriented aspects of the situation, not developing a true understanding of local peoples and their culture in the way that General Zinni espouses.

What we get from joint intelligence doctrine are general requirements like “Intelligence develops knowledge of the environment in relation to the JFC’s questions concerning actual and potential threats...cultural characteristics, medical conditions, population, leadership, and many other issues concerning the operational area.” 9 Intelligence doctrine

is geared to support the more physical aspects of the operation. Providing cultural intelligence and insight on the local populations is not the focus. The direction to provide “cultural characteristics” will get the commander some demographic overlays showing data like tribal locations and a geographic chart showing a region’s religious breakdown by percentage. A doctrinal example in JP 2-0 states, “Intelligence helps the JFC determine which forces to employ and assists in estimating the duration of the operation. During disaster relief operations, intelligence can play an important role in surveying

Operations Restore Hope, Continue Hope, and United Shield stated:

What we need is cultural intelligence. What makes them [the faction leaders and people] tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that’s so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think, compared to my values and the way I think in my western, white-man mentality?...What you need to know isn’t what our intel apparatus is geared to collect for you, and to analyze, and to present to you. 4

General Zinni’s assessments and views on the need for cultural intelligence are well documented. Why do we keep making the same mistakes and relearning the same lessons? Undoubtedly part of the answer lies within our own military culture, which is more geared to preparing for and fighting conventional military operations. That culture is clearly expressed in our doctrine.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE

Joint doctrine defines intelligence as a “product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas,” and the “information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.”5 More detailed examination of shows that it centers on combat adversaries and the physical environment. Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, states:

Intell igence provides knowledge of the enemy to JFCs. Intelligence tells JFCs what their adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. Intelligence assists JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the battlespace

and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern the adversary’s probable intent and future course of action. 6 Joint intelligence doctrine is almost

exclusively focused on combat operations and getting the JFC information on combat adversaries and the battlespace. It is interesting to note that the doctrine already includes language that reflects the growing trend of the military operations and fighting construct to support information superiority and network centric warfare. Yet, the age-old need to

understand foreign cultures is not given doctrinal emphasis. It is no wonder that we have to relearn hard lessons on the need for cultural intelligence.

Figure 1 shows how JP 2-0 breaks out the key intelligence requirements.7 In a dangerous assumption, doctrine states that the intelligence requirements for supporting MOOTW and the use of force “are similar to those required during war.” 8 This downplays the role the local populations play in achieving mission success. In the JP 2-0 construct then, it is intelligence during MOOTW not involving force, where one would then expect to find doctrine supporting

INTELLIGENCE DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WARMOOTW INVOLVING THE USE OF OR THREAT OF FORCE

STRIKES AND RAIDS, PEACE ENFORCEMENTCOUNTERTERRORISM

• Helps joint force commanders (JFC) with force deployment & employment decisions• Supports force protection mission• Prepares for possible escalation to war

MOOTW NOT INVOLVING THE USE OF OR THREAT OF FORCEDISASTER RELIEF, FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE,

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE

• Provides JFC with information about the operational area• Helps JFC determine which forces to employ• Assists JFC in estimating the duration of the operation

Figure 1

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the extent of damage and the level of suffering and can assist in planning for the deployment of relief forces.” 10 Unfortunately, doctrine does not imply an intelligence officer (J-2) needs to provide intelligence on the people and leaders in the context, understanding and meaning that commanders like Zinni and Wallace are saying they need.

JP 2-0 also addresses intelligence doctrine during peacetime. In a short section, it states:

D u r i n g p e a c e t i m e , intelligence helps commanders project future adversary capabilities; make acquisition decisions; protect technological advances; define weapons systems, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems requirements; shape organizations; and design training to ready the joint force. Intelligence assets monitor foreign states and volatile regions to identify threats to U.S. interests in time for the National Command Authorities (NCA) to respond effectively.11

Thus, in peacetime preparations, intelligence is focused on strategic acquisitions, indications and warning, and training.

JP 2-01, Joint and National Support to Military Operations, focuses on the need for intelligence to quickly support the speed of command functions and the planning process. Obtaining efficiency in the process and effectiveness in support to the JFC are important. Intelligence products are placed in five categories: Indications and Warning (I&W), current intelligence, general military intelligence, targeting, and scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence. While “political, economic and social aspects of countries in a Joint Operations Area” are listed as a part of “General Military Intelligence,” as the title suggests, adversaries and militaries are stressed, and the key products are

military capabilities assessments and course of action estimates.12

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) doctrine in JP 2-01.3 is also primarily focused on traditional combat operations. However, the discussion focuses too much on how to modify normal JIPB products for the MOOTW situation instead of putting real guidance into items that may help in non-combat, transition or MOOTW missions. Even the chapter wording states, “the primary purpose of JIPB support to MOOTW is to heighten the JFC’s awareness of the battlespace and threat the joint force is most likely to encounter.”13 There is no provision to truly include the needed, in-depth cultural intelligence into JIPB.

OPERATIONS DOCTRINE - MOOTW

The best joint doctrinal requirements for cultural intelligence are found in joint operations doctrine for MOOTW (JP 3-07). The MOOTW focus is on operations deterring war and promoting peace, not large scale combat operations. However, it is recognized that noncombat MOOTW can be simultaneous with combat MOOTW.14 Intelligence requirements in this publication include understanding culture in order to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government. The doctrine mentions cultural issues important in the planning considerations for the sixteen types of MOOTW missions listed in JP 3-07.15 Some of the planning considerations include: multinational operations, public affairs, civil affairs, psychological operations, intelligence and coordination with NGOs and IGOs. Each of these planning considerations requires some degree of cultural understanding in order to enable the mission to be planned and carried out effectively. JP 3-07 states:

Intelligence collection in MOOTW…might require a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation. Information collection and analysis in MOOTW must

often address unique and subtle problems not always encountered in war. It will require a depth of expertise in (and a mental and psychological integration with) all aspects of the operational environment’s peoples and their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups of people. It is only through an understanding of the values by which people define themselves, that an intervener can establish for himself a perception of legitimacy ....16

The operational MOOTW doctrine almost assumes that the JFC will not have this understanding at the beginning of the operation. It asserts that human intelligence will probably be the best intelligence source to help the commander gain the understanding he needs. The problem though, is that the JFC may be at a huge disadvantage if he has to wait until he is assigned the mission and is located in the joint operations area in order to start building the cultural understanding he needs. In a similar fashion, it takes time to develop human intelligence sources. The national intelligence structure supporting the Department of Defense (DOD) may be able to provide some baseline intelligence assessments from a strategic level, but neither it nor the Combatant Commander’s Joint Intelligence Center are geared to provide in-depth operational intelligence support to many of the potential areas - areas for MOOTW for example - where we are likely to find our joint forces operating. The military theater augmentation teams and Joint Intelligence Support Elements (JISE) do not include, per doctrine, cultural experts. If the JFC is lucky, regional embassy teams, national intelligence support teams or allies can provide some insight. Essentially, operations doctrine in JP 3-07 levies significant cultural intelligence requirements on joint intelligence that joint intelligence doctrine does not adequately mirror or fulfill.

10 Spring 2006

ISSUES WITH JOINT DOCTRINE

Jo in t i n t e l l i gence doc t r ine inadequately accounts for cultural intelligence. Although joint, operational MOOTW doctrine addresses cultural items slightly better, it is still inadequate, and it is not intelligence doctrine. Specific problems that need attention are:

• Joint intell igence doctrine, especially the capstone intelligence document, JP 2-0, is overwhelmingly written for combat operations using combat terms.

• Cultural intelligence is not considered as an important intelligence area for product production, and the JP 2 and JP 3 series are not clearly aligned on cultural requirements.

• Current JIPB and other intelligence products lack the proper level of detail, thought and planning needed to guide J-2’s to successfully plan for and incorporate cultural intelligence into their intelligence estimates.

• Joint doctrine does not provide for augmenting combatant commanders or Joint Task Forces with cultural intelligence experts.

Inadequate joint intelligence doctrine surely factored into problems with the OIF transition phase. The U.S. forces on the ground were not ready to culturally engage the citizens for the range of operations related to stability and security. What emerged from the field is that presentations providing follow-on forces the lessons learned came long after operations commenced. Local commanders created these briefings to overcome pre-operational intelligence shortfalls. Doctrine should have guided the operational commander’s J-2 to develop more detailed cultural intelligence prior to operations in Iraq. Without cultural considerations adequately addressed in doctrine, the military mindset remains on combat operations and not on conducting the less glamorous but equally important MOOTW.

RECOMMENDATIONSFirst, doctrinal language needs to

reflect wording that recognizes that joint forces interact with more than just adversaries. Below is a recommendation for JP 2-0 to slightly reorganize and add improved wording for what intelligence provides to JFCs. This is an example, the spirit of which should be incorporated throughout the JP 2 series. This example provides a contrast with the description shown above from JP 2-0 [bold font indicates additions]:

Intell igence provides knowledge of the enemy, potential enemy and local foreign populations to JFCs. In combat situations intelligence tells JFCs what their adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. In combat, intelligence assists JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the battlespace and in achieving informat ion super ior i ty. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern the adversary’s probable intent and future course of action. In peacetime operations, transition operations or other MOOTW, intelligence provides the JFC true cultural knowledge of local populations, their leaders and coalition partners. This knowledge will help the JFC and his staff design the best courses of action for the given mission. Intelligence doctrine must stress

that knowledge of all foreign peoples in a joint operations area is a fundamental of joint warfare; it is not limited to the “knowledge of the enemy.”

Second, JP 2-0 and the other joint intelligence doctrine series publications should be updated to include cultural intelligence, as defined in this paper. Cultural intelligence should fall under the category of an intelligence product and

requirement in JP 2-0 and be described as such in all joint intelligence doctrine. The joint publication series, especially Operations and Intelligence, should align all cultural requirements. This will allow the JFC and his staff to easily visualize, plan and synchronize cultural intelligence needs within intelligence operations.

Third, joint intelligence doctrine and JIPB products need to incorporate more cultural intelligence guidance.17 Due to lack of doctrine, JFCs and their J-2s begin many missions culturally “behind,” negatively impacting the operational factor of time. Tactical forces are then forced to build cultural awareness, on the ground, after operations have started. The individual services should be consulted for recommendations in order to find the best practices they have developed, and these should be considered as doctrinal analysis is conducted on the best cultural items to incorporate into JIPB doctrine.

Cultural intelligence must be factored into the JIPB process. Also, a base reference should be kept as a living document for any area where there may be a good chance of operations. The combatant commander’s Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) may possess elements of the cultural intelligence needed, but it needs to be robust and ready. When a warning order is issued, the culturally infused JIPB could then be quickly adjusted to the operational level and flowed to the JTF. Figure 2 shows an example of factors to consider when preparing cultural estimates for the JIPB.18 The figure shows what might be looked at for the insurgency in Iraq. It serves as an example of the type of guidance and level of detail that is needed in doctrine. Factors analyzed will vary from culture to culture and operation to operation. Using cultural intelligence will improve the JFC’s operational analysis of space, and it will allow him to make better force decisions.

Fourth, perhaps the quickest way to help a JFC would be to alter the doctrine in JP 2-01 and thus the composition of deployable intelligence support teams. The JISE, for example, should be amended to include theater augmenters

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for cultural intelligence. There should be an organizational spot or box showing this dedicated support. In the same vein, continuing to push for support from broader groups such as National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST) or the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) may be a way to tap the expertise currently in DOD and the intelligence community.

Combatant Commanders should support the recommended change in intelligence doctrine and levy requirements for increased and highly trained cultural experts to support the doctrine. They should link these requirements to dedicated staff and JIC billets for both civilian and uniformed service personnel. Some billets need to be deployable to a JTF. Essentially the commanders need an operational and strategic foreign area officer cadre created expressly to support the Combatant Commander, the JIC and a JTF. In writing about the need for more cultural awareness, better education and a shift in resource allocation for the U.S. military, Major General Robert Scales (Ret.) stated that the military would be much better off if it spent some of the billions of dollars allocated to marginal technological gains

to create a transformation in our peoples’ cultural awareness and ability to think in foreign environments. His research and interviews with commanders that served on the ground in OIF reinforce this need, “Reflective senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan...are telling us that wars are won as much by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions—all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation.”19 Scales proposes large training and educational changes to support making select military people more savvy on how to deal with foreign cultures, and be able to quickly think and better interact with them. Then these specialists would be integrated into key planning, analysis, and operational jobs.

To be fair, there are institutional barriers within the military to creating and training these specialists. The barriers arise between the military services whose role is to man, train and equip the forces and the JFCs who must fight with the forces provided. A process must be created whereby the requirement for uniformed cultural experts can be

levied and then met, or the case must be made showing that it is in the best interests of the service and the JFC to possess and effectively manage the specialists.

Finally, military intelligence and particularly joint intelligence need to institute a culture shift. While traditional, adversary and combat based JIPB and intelligence production may be the most “sexy” form, intelligence professionals need to readjust their cultures and doctrine to also think in terms gaining and providing cultural intelligence to commanders and forces. This intelligence will give them true cultural understanding of foreign peoples that they will interact with to accomplish whatever mission called to perform. Intelligence professionals should not believe their jobs are complete until they provide their commanders and customers this type of intelligence.

ALTERNATE ARGUMENTSCritics of this approach to change

joint intelligence doctrine may say that it does not need to be changed. Indeed, as doctrine stands, it adequately addresses non-combat or MOOTW situations. The U.S. military is a combat organization and that must be the emphasis of doctrine. Furthermore, there is nothing in doctrine prohibiting JFCs and their J-2s from acquiring and developing cultural intelligence. A commander will state his priority intelligence requirements and say if he wants cultural intelligence products. Cultural intelligence does not need to be formally incorporated into joint intelligence doctrine.

Joint intelligence doctrine must include cultural intelligence into its lexicon so it will be trained, planned in advance and factored into priority intelligence requirements. Joint intelligence also needs to be prepared to help the JFC understand his ally - a member of his own coalition. As operations in Somalia demonstrated, the JFC’s role can become very political and his forces may operate in very different social environments with a diverse coalition. Furthermore, JFCs are military commanders trained in

Figure 2. Example of Cultural Intelligence Factors to Consider in Intelligence Analysis - Iraq

12 Spring 2006

military arts. Many will not possess true understanding of what is required prior to entering an operation where they must closely work with foreign leaders, forces or populations. This is where the J-2 can provide guidance and expertise in shaping culturally-oriented, priority intelligence requirements for the social and political situations. The J-2 and JFC should not think of foreign peoples simply as adversaries, and attempt to analyze them in combat support terms with intelligence products designed for combat. They should think of the foreign peoples in terms of being from distinct cultures that must be understood in order to design successful courses of action to achieve mission success. An operation will be better poised for early success if the cultural intelligence requirements are included in doctrine and planned early.

The use of cultural intelligence to adapt operational strategies and interactions with foreign populations and leaders or even coalition forces is the smart way to develop courses of action. It does not mean that the JFC should shape a course of action based solely on cultural intelligence considerations. It simply means the commander would possess the best all around knowledge of the foreign peoples to tailor his actions to achieve his objectives.

OIF provides a classic example. Bruce Hoffman from RAND presents a compelling case, echoed elsewhere, about how a complete lack of planning for transition to stability operations cost U.S. forces dearly, as many local Iraqis decided to fight the American forces that had just liberated them from Saddam Hussein. While intelligence did predict some insurgent activity, it did not inform operational commanders or policy makers about the scope of the insurgency or educate them as to what the Iraqi public would desire--security. Intelligence did not give the commanders insight on how to act in order to be perceived as liberators and not occupiers. Thus, commanders misread the transition situation in Iraq, and did not develop courses of action to guarantee security and manage local perceptions. When small-scale looting

the needed foreign cultural knowledge. Mission success could depend upon how well U.S. forces work with foreign peoples in their countries and/or coalitions. The tactical commanders in the field should not have to develop baseline cultural knowledge after they are well into an operation in a foreign area. Without cultural intelligence defined and better factored into doctrine, U.S. forces will be at higher risk to keep repeating the same mistakes in working with foreign peoples.

U l t ima te ly, chang ing j o in t intelligence doctrine to include cultural intelligence will require a cultural change within the military intelligence community. The military is primarily a combat organization, and the forte of military intelligence is combat and adversary related intelligence. Changing joint intelligence doctrine does not mean general military intelligence is pushed aside. It does mean that the doctrinal intelligence requirements will grow, but only to the point where they should already be. Doctrine must be changed, and the accompanying support and training must follow for the change to take root. Not changing and continuing to fail to provide intelligence to support all facets of military operations would amount to dereliction of duty. The commanders and forces deserve excellent, full spectrum, intelligence support. Changing doctrine is the correct place to start the cultural change required.

Endnotes1 This is my definition of cultural intelligence. In my research I found that various authors espoused a need for better cultural awareness, understanding and training. One group, the Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps Cultural Awareness Working Group, defined cultural intelligence in terms of incorporating cultural factors into the Marine Corps intelligence cycle. My goal was to create a “stand alone” definition of cultural intelligence. The cultural aspect hinges upon the definition of the word culture. According to Webster’s New Ideal Dictionary, G.& C. Merriam Co., 1978, it can be defined as, “the characteristic

started in Iraq immediately following combat operations, it usually involved regime offices; however, many local institutions with no connection to the regime remained unguarded and were subsequently looted. U.S. and coalition forces did nothing to stop the crime and could not stop the indiscriminate terrorizing of the local population.20 To many Iraqis it appeared that the U.S. forces were occupiers who could not guarantee security, the key factor of governance Iraqis wanted most--ahead of democracy.21 By the time U.S. commanders figured it out, it was too late. The insurgency was out of control and many locals joined the efforts. Hoffman notes that this “lesson learned” has had to be relearned many times.22 If cultural intelligence is included, emphasized and used in intelligence doctrine, U.S. commanders might avoid making similar mistakes in the future.

CONCLUSIONSJoint intelligence doctrine must be

changed to include cultural intelligence if the JFC is going to possess the best knowledge to make decisions and determine courses of action in his joint operations area. The JFC needs to understand the peoples and leaders in the area where he and his forces will operate especially if the operation involves MOOTW or the possibility of transition from combat to MOOTW. Without cultural intelligence factored into the JIPB and other all-source intelligence products, the JFC and his forces will start the operation at a disadvantage. They may further choose courses of action that hinder achieving mission success. Good cultural intelligence will help the JFC and his forces avoid being ignorant about how to act with a local population. This will also help them avoid mirror-imaging (thinking foreign people will act or react the same as U.S. people).

Feedback from commanders in recent operations corroborates many historical lessons learned. The U.S. military should begin operations with better cultural understanding of the foreign peoples where it operates. The intelligence organization should provide

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features of a civilization including its beliefs, its artistic and material products, and its social institutions.” The intelligence aspect relates not an intelligence discipline or source (such as human intelligence), but it is a product of analysis and evaluation of various information sources including single source intelligence.2 George W. Smith, Jr., “Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (Or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation?),” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition: Essays 2004 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004), 21-22.3 Joy Pariante, “Wallace Outlines Lessons-Learned, Role of Intelligence in Iraq War,” The Scout, www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/TNSarchives/February04/020204.htm. [7 Jan 2005].4 Anthony C. Zinni, “Non-Traditional Military Missions: Their Nature, and the Need for Cultural Awareness and Flexible Thinking,” in Capital “W” War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War, ed. Joseph L. Strange (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps War College, 1998), 267.5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02 DOD Dictionary Of Military And Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 12 April 2001). 6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2–0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations(Washington, DC: 9 March 2000), I-1.7 Ibid, 1-7.8 Ibid, I-6. 9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2–0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations(Washington, DC: 9 March 2000), I-7.12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2–01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Mil i tary Operat ions (Washington, DC: 7 October 2004), III-40.13 Ibid, V-3.14 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington,

DC: 16 June 1995), vii-viii.15 Joint Publication 3-07 lists sixteen types of MOOTW operations: Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations, Enforcement of Sanctions/Marit ime Intercept Operations, Enforcing Exclusion Zones, Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Peace Operations (PO), Protection of Shipping, Recovery Operations, Show of Force Operations, Strikes and Raids, and Support to Insurgency.16 Joint Publication 3-07, IV-2.17 Smith, 29-30. Smith makes great recommendations on how the JIPB process needs to be expanded to include people particularly for the transition phase from combat to stability and security. These recommendations and the additional ones I list should be applied to all types of joint operations and conflict.18 Ben Connable, “Groups vs. Motivations 31,” (Unpublished PowerPoint Briefing,

Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps Cultural Awareness Working Group: January 2005). Figure 3 is from this brief. The working group provided several thought provoking briefings and papers that discuss the need for better cultural awareness within DOD.19 Robert H. Scales, “Culture Centric Warfare ,” U.S. Naval Ins t i tu te Proceedings (October 2004): 33.20 Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, OP-127-IPC/CMEPP (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, June 2004), 2-3, 11-12. Hoffman’s work draws on other recent OIF analysis from many authors including Anthony Cordesman and a long history of RAND publications on insurgency, terrorism, and nation-building. Its assertions on the poor stability operations in Iraq includes corroboration from many military officers serving there.21 International Republican Institute, Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, December 26, 2004 – January 7, 2005, (Washington D.C.: 20 January 2005), http://www.iri.org/pdfs/1-20-05Iraqpollpresentation. ppt. [11 February 2005].22 Hoffman, 6.

� Spring 2006

Countering Al Qaeda: An Interview with

Dr. Rohan GunaratnaInterviewed by John Whisenhunt, Editor

IO Sphere sat down with Dr. Gunaratna during his February 2006 seminar in San Antonio. He is a widely-recognized expert on Al Qaeda, and its evolution from a radical group to an Islamic extremist movement. His seminar drew attendees from across the U.S. Combatant Commands, state and local governments, and local universities..

IO Sphere: Thank you very much for your time today.

Dr. Gunaratna: You are very welcome. It is a pleasure to be here.

IO Sphere: We are all trying to find a way to create and distribute a unified policy message. What groups or governments, or groups within government, do you find are most successful in spreading a unified theme or message? Who would be a good model?

Dr. Gunaratna: No one country can create a message that can find universal resonance. From their own experience, governmental and non-governmental organizations can share best practices in the fight against terrorism and extremism. Because the threat is multidimensional, our response must be multi-pronged, multi-agency, multijurisdictional and multinational. Although government has primary responsibility to spread the message, religious institutions, schools, community organizations, private security industry, academia... they all have a responsibility. So I don’t think there will be any one particular individual or agency.

Because the terrorists are working together, we have no option but to cooperate and collaborate. We must learn from the enemy. For instance, Al Qaeda popularized the theme “war against the Jews and the Crusaders.” In February 1998, Usama Bin Laden issued a fatwah (a religious opinion) stating that it is the “duty of every good Muslim to wage Jihad.” Although church and state are separate in the US, I think it is important to counter this. Unfortunately, in the western world, there is no principal strategist to counter the message of Al Qaeda statements or ideologues. Among the Jihad groups Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri, the deputy leader of Al Qaeda, has emerged as a strategist of the jihad movement. But, on the Western side I haven’t come across a principle strategist opposing these Jihad groups. This is a weakness to highlight. We must create a

central authority, somebody iconic, to constantly spread the message!

IO Sphere: Based on your discussions here, do you think there is some aspect of what the West or the U.S. is doing that we can capitalize on… that we can build on?

Dr. Gunaratna: America’s biggest strength, and also its biggest weakness, has been technology. America has progressed so much because of technology. For instance, you have removed some of the key leaders of AQ using the Predator (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle). In January of 2006, you neutralized Abu Khabab Al Masri (aka Midhat Mursi), one of the key explosives leaders of AQ. In December of 2005, you killed the operations leader of AQ, Abu Hamza Rabia. In November of 2001, the Predator killed Muhammed Atef (aka Abu Hafs), the military commander of AQ. But again, you always think technology has the total answer. I think that on the operational counterterrorism side, you are so good, because technologically you are so good. But now you need to invest in strategic counterterrorism. Yesterday I mentioned six aspects of strategic counterterrorism (Figure 1). One is

Aspects of Strategic Counterterrorism

IdeologicalEducational

Media ResponseFinancial

LegislativeDevelopmental

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna (PBS.org)

Figure 1.

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ideological response, another is educational response, three is media response, four is financial response, five is legislative response, and six is developmental response. By using operational terrorism you can destroy terrorist groups; you can take out leaders – they will be replaced. But by investing in ideological response, you can change the environment and the minds of the people. America’s facination with technology to fight future wars is a mental trap. The weapons you have developed are of marginal use to fight the real wars of today and tommorrow.

IO Sphere: One of the things you mention in your testimony to the 9-11 Commission (in 2001) was AQ being in a period of transition. How have things changed since then? With this lack of strategic focus, are we still in a position to exploit some of AQ’s evolution?

Dr. Gunaratna: The threat posed by the global jihad movement has replaced the threat posed by Al Qaeda. As a result of US led coalition actions, the AQ group led by Bin Laden has become very weak. But AQ as a movement has become very strong: this idea that there must be attacks not only against local enemies - the “false” Muslim governments - but the “distant” enemy, the global enemy, the U.S. This idea has found acceptance among many local Jihad groups. So AQ has transformed very significantly, and I think it is important that the enemy is different from the one you had at 9-11. Today there are several AQs you must fight. And in that fight you need to have a much deeper understanding of the distinctions between these groups, in order for you to fight this campaign successfully. So you need to train specialists – not generalists – and the American way is to train generalists. I think the only way to fight this campaign is to train specialists.

IO Sphere: We currently have a limited number of international training opportunities in the U.S. military colleges. Is there potential to develop specialists there?

Dr. Gunaratna I think the U.S. must open their doors for more Muslim officers from Middle-Eastern and Asian Muslim countries, to come and train, and to study in the United States. It is true that a very small number of those who come and study in your country will become extremists, but the vast majority of them will support the U.S., and think positively of the U.S. I think that you must step up your recruitment and open your doors for more Muslims. Like, General Mushariff – an ideal case. And I think there are some countries that violate human rights, but just because they do that you should not sever your ties with those militaries. You cut your ties with the Indonesian military, now there’s a huge terrorist problem.

The Indonesian military is so poorly informed of the terrorist threat. But imagine you didn’t do that – you had continued to work with them, tried to reform them, and told them not to commit human rights violations. And you had trained them even better – then they would not do it (commit violations). Similarly, you have cut your ties with the Myanmar (former Burma) military. That’s a mistake. You must reestablish ties, and make them better people. Similarly, I think you must send more officers to study in the Muslim world. It’s a huge experience for them.

I will tell you my own experience. My first visit (to the U.S.) was in 1989-90. I came via the State Department International Visitor Program. The U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka asked me “What would you like to see?” And I said “I want to visit the biggest library in the world – the U.S. Library of Congress.” So I went there, to the South Asia section, and there was a librarian, who I asked “Do you have this book?” Then he showed me a computer and said “You can do a computer search.” So I said “I’m sorry, but I do not know how to use a computer.” So that was the first time for me to use a computer. When I went back to Sri Lanka I bought an inexpensive South Korean Kaypro computer, and I learned. And using that computer I wrote two books. So you can see how travel to the U.S. was so important. And during that visit I met Professor Steve

Cohen at the University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana – a brilliant guy – he’s the leading American South Asian specialist, even to this day. He wrote his thesis on the Indian and Pakistani armies, and later I came to

work with him in 1994. So you can have short visits - I only spent one month in the U.S.- but those are very important. I think they can influence and change people very significantly. And the group I traveled to the U.S. with, we created a group called SANOCR (South Asian Network On Conflict Research). It operated for about 10 years. But those people I came with, they were all South Asians, and we still keep in touch. So, I think it is very important to open those doors.

And you can do that, because you have a huge infrastructure... you can influence. Look at (Pakistani President Pervez) Musharraf, how he’s helping you. Over 25% of the detainees in Guantanamo, at Camps X-Ray and Delta, are from Pakistan. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 9-11 mastermind, was captured in Pakistan; Abu Zubaydah captured in Pakistan; Ramzi Binalshibh, 9-11 logistician captured in Pakistani; Mustafa Ahmed Al Hawsawi, the international accountant of AQ, captured in Pakistan. All of this because the Pakistanis are working closely with American agencies, and because of Musharaff. So, you will have so many benefits by inviting military officers, even from countries with which you have difficult relations.

“Unfortunately, in the western world, there is no principal strategist to counter the message

of Al Qaeda statements or ideologues.”

6 Spring 2006

STRATCOM (U.S. Strategic Command) are so important.

IO Sphere: Do you have any closing thoughts you’d like to share with our readers?

Dr. Gunaratna: Yes. President Bush formed a coalition willing to fight against AQ and its associated groups in October 2001. What is important to note is Al Qaeda formed their coalition, “The World Islamic Front For Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders,” in February 1998. So today, AQ is working with 30-40 different groups. But you must understand Al Qaeda formed its alliance two years before 9-11. At least belatedly, now there is a coalition among states, European allies, and friends in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East to fight against terrorism. The success of the U.S. against terrorism is to a large extent in the future, based on maintaining that coalition, and expanding that coalition. Terrorism cannot be fought by one single country. I see America’s biggest strength will be to build even deeper bridges to the Muslim world: not just to the Muslim states, but the Muslim communities, and the Muslim Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO). Without working closely with the Muslim world, and the Arab world, it would be very difficult to fight extremism in the future. So this is the challenge for American political and military leaders.

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna is Head, International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism

Research at the Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore. A fellow of the Royal Society of Arts (UK), he holds a master’s degree in International Peace Studies from Notre Dame, and a Doctorate in International Relations from the University of St Andrews, UK. He has over 20 years of academic, policy, and operational experience in counterterrorism, and is the author of 12 books.

IO Sphere: You mentioned that we need to work with the more moderate clerics. Can that be done by the U.S. Muslim community? Would it have to be an exclusively Muslim-to-Muslim approach?

Dr. Gunaratna: Firstly you’re fighting an idea: global Jihad is an ideology. You can use your operational tools to some extent, but to be effective you have to create an alternative ideology or counter the existing one. How do you do that? You don’t have the weapons – the clerics are the weapons! You have to reach out to them and work with them. If you can’t do that, you must reach out to organizations that have the linkages to the clerics. Certainly you can use some American clerics, and certainly some in the Middle East and Asia. You should use whoever you can to create that alternative ideology and counter the existing ideology.

IO Sphere: Do you think there are some groups who are waiting for an

invitation to help the U.S., but we simply have not asked them?

Dr. Gunaratna I think your focus has been on the short term capabilities to fight terrorism and extremism. Now you must develop the long term/long range capabilities that will have a strategic impact. That is why SOCOM (U.S. Special Operations Command) and

14 Spring 2006

Assigning a main effort as part of a concept of operations is commonly

understood. At the tactical level, the main effort is typically assigned to a unit, whereas at the operational level, the main effort is typically addressed in geographic or functional terms. In either case, the main effort is the commander’s bid for success - it is directed at the object which will have the most significant effect on the enemy, and which holds the best opportunity for success.1 This article explores some of the challenges a joint force commander and joint information operations (IO) cell chief might experience if IO becomes a joint force’s main effort.

Designation of the main effort can be addressed in geographical (area) or functional terms. In developing the operational concept, planners determine those tasks essential to the accomplishment of the military objectives and assign them to subordinate commanders either as area (geographic) responsibilities or as functional responsibilities. Area tasks and responsibilities focus on a specific area to control or conduct operations. Functional tasks and responsibilities focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve two or more Military Departments operating in the same dimension or medium, or where there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. In either case, designating the main effort will establish where or how a major part of one’s

own forces and assets are employed to attain the primary objective of a major operation or campaign.2

In most cases, a joint force commander’s assignment of the main effort is easily understood, planned, and executed. For example, assigning Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) during the seize-the-initiative phase of an operation makes sense if an essential task for that phase is achieving air superiority. Acting in a functional main effort role the JFACC is the commander responsible for, and held accountable for, accomplishing this assigned essential task. All other assigned components support the JFACC to this end. Similarly the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), Joint Force Marit ime Component Commander (JFMCC), or Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) might be assigned as a functional main effort. In all cases, a commander is responsible and accountable for carrying out assigned tasks as the joint force’s main effort. These commanders have the preponderance of organic assets to carry out their assigned functional tasks, or they are properly weighted with capabilities from other components. Notably, functional commanders operate in domains that are, for the most part, distinct from other domains (air, land, maritime).

The Challenges for IO as the Main Effort

A joint force commander who assigns IO the main effort faces challenges not normally associated with ascribing the same effort to functional components. My intent is not to argue that it is impossible or inconceivable to do so, but rather to point out some of these challenges and promote constructive dialogue within the joint IO community.

The Information Environment

Unlike the air, land, sea, and space domains which are relatively easy to quantify, the information environment presents less clear boundaries in the context of IO as the main effort. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The actors include leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations. Resources include materials and systems employed to collect, analyze, apply, or disseminate information. The information environment is where humans and automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and is therefore the principal decision-making environment. Even though the information environment is distinct, it resides within each of the four (air, land, sea, and space) domains.3

Designating Information Operations as the Joint Force’s Main Effort -

What Do We Really Mean?by Mark Horowicz, Major, USMC

Editorial Abstract: The author describes the challenges joint commanders face when assigning operational roles to their functional components, and the added complexities information operations introduce into the process. Major Horowicz further suggests potential organizational and doctrinal solutions, and invites continued debate on these proposals.

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Based on this description, assigning IO as the main effort does not help clarify the commander’s bid for success. Hypothetically, if a commander selects a functional component as the main effort - to be weighted with IO assets and capabilities in accomplishing the decisive IO tasks - he may likely find this simply isn’t feasible.

Measuring the Success of the IO Main Effort

When air, land, or sea functional components (JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC) are assigned as the main effort, it is relatively easy to measure their success in terms of achieving domain superiority. Standard enemy order of battle analysis allows us to match corresponding combat assessment against remaining enemy capabilities in order to give relative confidence we’ve achieved air, land, or maritime superiority. Our ability to maneuver within these domains without effective enemy opposition is proof of the corresponding superiority achieved within each domain. Taking a similar approach to IO, it is nearly impossible to ascertain the joint force’s achievement of information superiority within the joint operations area.4 By assigning IO as the main effort, the corresponding ability to achieve and measure information superiority across all domains (as the definition of the information environment discusses) might be a bridge too far. A retired three-star general recently stated, “Assigning our best thinkers to infuse content into vacuous slogans such as

“information superiority”…is fruitless and wastes valuable resources.”

Who’s In Charge?As I mentioned earlier, main

effort designation can be addressed in geographical (area) or functional terms. In developing the operational concept, planners determine those tasks essential

to the accomplishment o f t h e m i l i t a r y objectives and assign them to subordinate commanders ei ther as area or functional responsibilities.

When the main effort is addressed in geographic or functional terms, a commander i s r e spons ib le fo r that associated area or funct ion. When des igna t ing IO as the main effort, no

equivalent authority exists. All functional components possess varying degrees of IO capabilities.5 So when a commander states in his concept of operations that IO is the main effort for a particular phase of the operation, who is he really talking about? There is no Joint Force Information Component Commander (JFICC). IO is largely a staff function led by a J-39 IO cell chief on the joint force commander’s staff. Commander US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is responsible, per the Unified Command Plan for Fiscal Year 2004, for integrating and coordinating DOD IO that crosses area of responsibility (AOR) boundaries.6 Who is responsible for coordinating IO within a regional combatant command or joint task force: the IO cell chief - not a commander, but a staff officer. Therefore, if IO is the main effort within the joint operations area, are we really holding a staff officer accountable for executing operational tasks that are the commander’s bid for success? The IO cell chief lacks the authorities to execute such a role, plus the preponderance of IO capabilities reside within the functional components vice the joint force headquarters.

Joint Doctrine - Is IO Really Decisive or is it an

Enabler?While joint doctrine is relatively

consistent between JP 5-0 and JP 3-0 in addressing the concept of main effort, there are some distinguishing aspects (most notably in JP 3-0) that beg the question of whether IO is decisive, or if it is just an enabler for other decisive operations. JP 3-0 (revised final draft dated 23 Dec 2005) states:

The JFC may designate one component or line of operation to be the main effort, with others providing support, or the JFC may have a main effort with other components and functions performing operations in their own mission areas. When conditions or plans change, the main effort and focus of the operation might shift to another component or function. Some missions and operations (i.e., strategic attack, interdiction, and IO) continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of action or informational advantage. These missions and operations, when executed concurrently with other operations, degrade enemy morale and physical cohesion and bring the enemy closer to culmination.7

Potential SolutionDespite the challenges associated

with designating IO as the main effort, there are some potential ways to truly operationalize IO as the main effort. One would be to establish a Joint Force Information Component Commander (JFICC). Assuming he had the preponderance of IO assets and capabilities under his operational/tactical control, the JFICC could execute decisive and synchronized information operations as the joint force main effort. This would solve current challenges associated with joint IO capabilities being spread throughout the functional

Studying the information environment (DefenseLink)

16 Spring 2006

components. Additionally, this would place the responsibility and authority for execution of the decisive tasks under a commander vice under a staff officer (IO cell chief).

Another potential way to approach IO as the main effort would be to look at it from a traditional fires approach. Typically, a commander designating the main effort will also assign priority of fires as well. If we view IO as a joint force fires capability, a functional commander (JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC) can be assigned as the main effort, with priority of joint IO fires to the main effort.

Similarly, a functional component commander could be assigned as the joint force main effort with priority of IO effort given to particular essential tasks. By doing this, all functional components would be synchronized in time, space, and purpose throughout all domains (air, land, sea, space, and information). Like essential fire support tasks (EFST), essential IO tasks could be issued as part of the commander’s guidance and intent, which would then serve to create unity of effort throughout all domains.

Certainly IO could be assigned as the joint force’s main effort for a given phase of an operation. We must consider

Campaign Plan Design Paragraph: 4 Operational Concept3 Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations 13 Feb 2006 pp. I-14 JP 1-02 states Information Superiority is that degree of dominance in the information domain which permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition. JP 3-13 13 Feb 2006 - In Department of Defense (DOD) policy, information superiority is described as the operational advantage gained by the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.5 Per JP 3-13, IO capabilities are categorized as core, supporting, or related. The core capabilities consist of psychological operations,

electronic warfare, military deception, operations security, and computer network operations. The supporting IO capabilities consist of physical attack, physical security, counter-intelligence, combat camera, and information assurance. 6 Ibid.7 While JP 3-0 revision final draft is not authoritative until signed, it is telling of the views this joint publication might take concerning assignment of the main effort as it relates to IO.

some of the challenges this presents to the IO cell chief and the joint force commander. Ideally this article will serve to stimulate further discussion on the topic of IO as the main effort, encourage continued debate, and identify additional solutions.

Endnotes1 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) -1 Chapter-4.2 Publication: JP 5-00.1 Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning Chapter: II

The traditional fires approach (MarineLink)

32 Spring 2006

Author’s Note: As part of the overall Electronic Warfare (EW) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) effort, I present the following paper as an ongoing work in progress on a possible methodology to develop an EW JMEM for the EW JMEM Working Group. It is meant as a starting point, and not the final solution. Linus Torvald (developer of the Linux computer operating system) characterizes it this way: “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” I look forward to receiving any thoughts and comments you may have on this subject.

Defining Electronic Attack Effects Expectancy

We must first define the term EA, effects expectancy (EEEA), before starting to develop a mathematical model to predict effectiveness of an electronic attack. The proposed definition:

Electronic Attack effects expectancy defines the probability that a platform with the required system(s) and technique(s) can, within acceptable limits, reach the execute point and produce the desired effect on an EA target. Elements of this definition include several items of

interest:• For the purpose of EEEA, an EA target is the range of

sensors, networks, and receivers that can be affected for the required duration by a single weapon that produces the desired effect specified in the commander’s objectives. Since it is rare during a mission for a jamming platform to jam a single receiver, and EA effects generally are spread over a large geographic area, the problem is not limited to affecting a single receiver.

• The definition does not account for adversary self-defense mechanisms and techniques (e.g., IADs, harbor defenses, etc.) other than those built into the target system, such as electronic protect measures (EP).

• Acceptable limits can be a percentage of time of signal on target and/or jamming to signal ratio, or any number of criteria. Limits will vary depending on the type of system being affected.

Methodology for Determining EW JMEM

By Dave MacEslin

In addition, we need to consider the varying degrees to which we can achieve effects. The difficulty in determining nonkinetic effects expectancy lies in the definition of “effects.” We often see words such as “deny,” “degrade,” or “disrupt” within the commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent. By themselves, these words are insufficient; they must be defined against parameters in order to plan a mission. To simply deny communications between two stations is not enough: we need to know for what purpose, to what level, and for how long. Denial implies variables that must be clearly specified and laid out, so that we can employ correct jamming techniques and determine predictions of effectiveness.

Just as in kinetic warfare, we can characterize many EA effects using three primary variables:

• Scope – description of specific target or target set (Surface-to-Air Missile site or entire Integrated Air Defense System).

• Amount – the extent of the effect. Effects are either: partial, represented by a percentage of total capacity, or complete; i.e., total.

• Time – the duration of the effect. Effects are either temporary or long-term; i.e., permanent.

This simple construct leads to a more correct, hierarchical effects definition based on the overarching function of denial, in which to deny is to cause reduction, restriction, or refusal of target operations (regardless of time or amount). Significantly, this acknowledges that degrade, disrupt, and destroy are all

Editorial Abstract: Mr. MacEslin examines a detailed methodology to establish precise measures of effectiveness for electronic warfare operations. He compares EW planning and weapons selection with current kinetic examples, and proposes standard definitions, quantification methods, and measurement of desired effects.

Figure 1

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• Degrade throughput on all channels of a microwave communications tower at specified GPS address by 75%, beginning at 0630 for 3 hours.

• Disrupt Internet service at a named cybercafe from 2130 until 2145 for the next 3 days.

• Destroy the 80GB hard drive at given IP address tonight after 2300, but before 0430.

Note that each denial effect has a scope, amount, and time either specifically stated or unambiguously implied. Additionally, only one of these effects can be considered ‘damage.’ Degrade and disrupt may in some cases be synonymous terms, as a jamming signal is either on or off, and the degradation would be total disruption.

Damage Expectancy CriteriaThree major components which determine damage

expectancy within the kinetic world should also apply in any nonkinetic effects expectancy model:

• Target vulnerability – an assessment of a target’s loss of capability when impacted by a weapons damage mechanism

• Weapons characteristics – quantification of damage producing mechanisms and reliability of munitions

• Delivery accuracy – a measure of weapon system’s capability to place munitions on targets.

A target’s vulnerability is an exploitable weakness of the target receiver. A target’s vulnerability manifests itself in terms of the parameters of scope, amount, and time. Some of the questions which determine if an EW target has an exploitable weakness must include:

• Are the components of the target that must be affected hardened or shielded? Which of the receiver’s critical components must be defeated to satisfy objectives?

• Regarding countermeasures, is the receiver exploitable or do they have methods to determine jamming and TTP to decrease effectiveness? How well are they trained in using the equipment and in recognizing jamming?

• Do we have access? Can we reach the point at which we can produce effects? (This is simply a time and distance problem.) Can our weapon reach the point at which it can produce desired effects, or is it too far from where we must execute our mission?

This is only a starting point. We have to develop a target vulnerability manual listing all the vulnerabilities we must know, in order to best target a receiver. Some of the items listed above will not be in a vulnerability manual, but must still be part of our JMEM determination.

Weapon characteristics are the specific details of the chosen weapon, such as the AN/USQ-146 Rubicon or AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System. Weapon characteristics manifest themselves in terms of amount and time, and are independent of scope. Kinetic JMEMs do not attempt to dictate—or even recommend—tactics, nor should we. Some considerations in determining EA weapon characteristics include:

• Frequency, power, polarization, gain

different forms of denial. Disruption introduces the time aspect of denial (i.e., less than permanent), and degradation introduces the amount, or level of denial (i.e., less than total). Destruction is the special case that includes the maximum time and maximum amount of denial.

To illustrate by use of kinetic example, consider the tactical order to deny the use of a bridge to the enemy:

• This could be done temporarily, by disrupting traffic flow by attacking and disabling bridge traffic to block the bridge.

• This could be done partially, by degrading the bridge structure so that it will support only light vehicles and foot traffic.

• Destroying the bridge could also do this.Each of these can be an effective form of denial. These

definitions also allow useful combinations of effects, whereby a target can be both disrupted and degraded (e.g., “the flow of traffic on the bridge will be completely blocked for three hours, and thereafter limited to vehicles under 2 tons”). Since the goals of most EW actions are also effects-based, an EW mission requires us to describe effects in unambiguous terms.

Quantitatively, it should be possible to express denial (D) as a function of scope (s), amount (a), and time (t), as D(s,a,t). Defining effects in this manner clarifies to the planning staff that they must consider and specify, as needed, each of the parameters of the function, and derive each directly from the commander’s objective. As the amount (a) or level approaches 100% and time (t) approaches infinity, we can accomplish destruction. Time can be ASAP for a specified period of time, a start time with a specific duration, or a start and stop time. Since destruction is an effects-based concept that will vary by mission, Information Operations (IO) mission planners must decide both the amount and duration required to achieve destruction. Note this is no different from the kinetic example, since even destruction of a bridge is not permanent; it is only “effectively permanent,” based on the timeframe of the campaign, and the time and resources required to rebuild it.

Some examples of IO mission tasking using this construct:

Figure 2

�4 Spring 2006

air speed, compromised stealth, or reduced agility) falls in the missile reliability (MR) phase - where missile performance is considered - but could affect penetration where performance is assumed to be nominal in estimating probability to penetrate (PTP). Similarly, a near miss during a prelaunch attack could affect carrier reliability (CR). These recognized inconsistencies are considered minor compared to major considerations of the process, and other known inaccuracies in their estimates (e.g., simulation assumptions).

In many cases, these factors are further subdivided into sub-phases. This allows different organizations with cognizance over different sub-phases, data from different sources, and different models to operate with a degree of independence and contribute to the overall evaluation. Separate terms allow planners to identify component strengths and weaknesses of weapons systems.

We generally report factors to the warfighter, store them in a database for use in course of action (COA) selection, and later in specific mission planning. The independent component nature of the framework allows some mixing and matching of factors from different systems and scenarios. For example, the prelaunch survivability (PLS) and CR for a given aircraft may be the same, whether the aircraft is delivering cruise missiles, gravity bombs, or an electronic attack. Likewise, the warhead reliability (WR) for a bomb that can be delivered by different aircraft types may still have the same WR. On the other hand, there may be substantial differences even within the same weapon subsystem that may require different factor values. For example, the same airframe at different bases will have different PLSs. Some warheads may have different modifications and alterations in place, and require different WRs. In these cases, as with sortie PTPs, the initial plan would include a generic

• The percentage of time the jammer can maintain a desired signal on the target receiver during the mission

• The failure rate of the chosen weapon system

Delivery accuracy is a consideration in terms of scope, amount, and time.

• C a n t h e j a m m i n g signal be maintained on target receiver for the duration of mission?

• During the time when jamming is executed, how much of the time is the desired signal on target receiver?

• Nulls created by the delivery platform

• E n v i r o n m e n t a l conditions

• H o w m a n y t a rg e t r e c e i v e r s a r e w e t r y i n g to affect during the mission (commutation)?

Effects Expectancy Construct

Based on the above discussion, our model must be stated in terms of scope, amount, and time. We must consider target vulnerability, weapon characteristics, and delivery accuracy in our considerations.

In Mr. Bud Whiteman’s paper, “A Framework for CNA Planning,” dated 25 May 2005, the author develops a CNA planning paradigm based on the kinetic planning paradigm, which we will also use as a basis for developing EEEA.

Figure 3 shows an air-launched cruise missile mission, decomposed into phases, with each phase being evaluated for probability of succeeding.

Multiplying each factor of the decomposition shown determines the overall damage expectancy (DE). Because inherent dependencies exist between phases, each factor in the sequence depends on the prior phases being successfully completed. We can then multiply to determine composite probabilities, in accordance with the multiplicative law of probability. Although some dependencies may remain, even with this conditioning, the approach has proved useful in planning kinetic weapon employments.

Note even the definition of each factor depends on the successful completion of the previous phase. This allows multiplication of each factor to produce an overall probability of success (see standard statistical methods of multiplicative law of probability and the method of event-composition). Even with this technique, interdependencies between factors remain. For example, a missile performance degradation (e.g., reduced

Figure 3. Kinetic Planning Factors

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though it should be a known factor from the kinetic world for many aviation platforms.

Transport reliability (TR) is a measurement of the reliability of the platform that transports jamming equipment from a base of operations to the point where jamming is required (aircraft leaves deck, tank leaves staging area, etc.), and applies to all platforms from the time of mission execution. This may be a percentage of the time remaining before the expected failure of equipment based on historical mean time between failure data. This factor should also already be known from the kinetic world for many aviation platforms.

PTP is the probability that a reliable transport can successfully penetrate enemy defenses and get to the desired execute point. It is primarily a function of the enemy’s ability to detect, engage, and successfully target the transport vehicle. This value should not be specific to a particular mission. It consists of generalizations—for example, Country X has previously shot at aircraft 56% of the time. This factor should already be known form the kinetic world for many aviation platforms.

Equipment reliability (ER) is a measurement of the reliability of the jamming equipment (transmitter, transmission line (cable or waveguide) and antennae). The transmitter portion of this should include power generation reliability. This data should be available from the owning systems command, program office, or resource sponsor.

Signal reliability is a function of the enemy ability to detect and counter jamming, and the jammer’s capability to maintain the desired signal on target for the required timeframe. This section should consider the physics of the radar equation.

The product of terms PLS, TR, PTP, and ER is referred to as probability of arrival (PA), the cumulative probability that the jammer will be delivered to a position near the aim point and be able to energize the jamming system.

The IO and special effects (FX) working groups have defined probability of effect as the probability (chance) of a specific functional or behavioral impact on a target, given an

factor value, then when assignments are made, the plan would be evaluated with actual factors.

Empirical and theoretical data to support modern kinetic planning has been collected and analyzed for decades. Even so, kinetic effectiveness estimates still require engineering estimates, and contain other sources of significant uncertainty. We can expect uncertainties of 25% in the probabilities described above. Through the decades, planners and decisionmakers have become comfortable with kinetic models and supporting data, so estimated uncertainty is almost always omitted in kinetic planning briefings. EEEA does not have the luxury of decades of models, support data, and comfort; therefore we include uncertainty in our calculations.

EA Planning Factors Table 1 compares and contrasts the kinetic paradigm with

one that might be useable for EEEA

Table 1Kinetic Phase EA Phase

Prelaunch survivability SameCarrier reliability Transport reliabilityMissile reliability Equipment reliability

Probablity to penetrate SameWarhead reliability Signal reliability

Probability of arrival SameProbability of Damage Probability of effects

PLS is the probability that the transport vehicle survives enemy action to be available for mission execution. This factor does not include any reliability of the vehicle or support system. Our evaluation of the enemy’s intent, capabilities, and effectiveness (enemy’s DE against the transport) determines the value of PLS. It applies to all platforms, although the data may be currently available only for some aircraft. We will account for this as we develop effects expectancy for electronic protect,

Figure 4

36 Spring 2006

The most important terms to quantify are the dreaded “D” words—deny, degrade, destroy, disrupt, deceive, and delay. The earlier discussion of deny in terms of scope, amount, and time answer this question, as long as we can convince our commanders to give very specific objectives, guidance, and intent.

The Way AheadAssuming that the discussions above are acceptable, we

must now determine the way ahead. Recommended actions include:

1. Determine weaponeering methodology(a) Break the damage expectancy criteria into very specific

pieces, in order to determine what items support what portions of the EA planning factors.

(b) Determine interdependencies between damage expectancy criteria.

(c) Determine uncertainties in the EA planning factors.2. Develop target vulnerability and weapons characteristics

manuals.3. Develop collateral damage methodology.4. Develop weapons-target pairings manual/matrix.

References:1. Schuh, Paul, USSTRATCOM, “A CNA Testing,

Planning and Weaponeering Lexicon” version 0.9, dated 8 Jul 2005

2. Whiteman, Bud, USSTRATCOM J883, “A Framework for CNA Planning,” dated 25 May 2005

3. Whitehouse, Stephen R. et al, Information Operations (IO) JMEM Concept Definition and Exploration Final Report, dated Oct 2003

action. Probability of effect (PE) must include the functionality of signal reliability (SR).

The product of PA and PE is equal to EEEA. In mathematical terms:

EEEA= PLS*TR*PTP*ER*SR

Figure 4 illustrates that the term egress is listed to complete the mission profile or time line, but per the proposed definition, once jamming has ceased the mission is considered accomplished; thus, egress is not an issue.

Mr.Whiteman’s paper goes on to discuss the primary military objective (PMO), which I believe is still relevant to meeting a commanders objective, but not to an individual task. For example, if the commander’s guidance was to disrupt all communications between PT A and PT B for 3 hours starting at 0600, 25 August [notice relationship to scope (PT A and PT B), amount (all), and time (3 hours with a start and stop time)], IO planners would have very specific guidance on what effect to achieve. Intelligence indicates that communications between PT A and PT B include HF radio, Internet chat, both cell and land line telephone. The IO planner must determine the product of effects expectancy against each individual communications method to determine the expected effectiveness against the primary military object (disrupt communications).

EEPMO = EEEA1 * EEEA2* EEEA3* EECNA

Notice the term EECNA inserted to take into account the use of the Internet chat to communicate between the two points. EEPMO is how we determine effects of multiple receivers on a single mission. We determine the product for each individual receiver and the product of all receivers combined. This term could just as easily be EEIO to account for all possible methods in which we may be using IO to achieve the commander’s objectives.

To ensure we have met all the criteria of damage expectancy, and that each damage expectancy criteria is placed within the EEEA construct, we should relate the above terms back to the previously mentioned damage expectancy criteria.

Terms of Reference or LexiconThis list will grow over time. The intent is to have as

few EW specific terms as possible. The desire is to have the lexicon be standard across IO and, hopefully, adaptable to the kinetic world as we increasingly move towards effects based operations.

Table 2

PLS TR PTP ER SRDelivery accuracy Delivery accuracy Target vulnerability Weapon

characteristics and target vulnerability

Weapon characteristics and target vulnerability and delivery accuracy

26 Spring 2006

Enabling Strategic Communication at the Combatant Commands

by Stephen P. Perkins, Colonel, USA, and Gary T. Scott, Colonel (Select), USAF

As the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and its

Interagency partners continue to examine and codify the Strategic Communication process, the Combatant Commanders (COCOM) are certainly interested in this evolving process. Specifically, they are concerned with how Interagency policies and guidance on Strategic Communication (SC) will be vetted and synchronized with Combatant Commands’ planning activities, and how best to effectively analyze and tailor theater-specific SC efforts. A key question to address is what operating principles might help facilitate the smooth and effective execution of SC at the operational- and tactical-levels of the Combatant Commands? During the course of this article, we will examine seven principles for enabling Strategic Communication activities within the joint operational community. These principles are grouped into three areas: Interagency requirements; synchronizing methods; and analytical processing. The combined effect of the seven principles is synchronized Strategic Communication activities between the Combatant Commands to the national level, which not only allows the US Government to stay on message, but perhaps anticipate

crises requiring a coherent Strategic Communication response.

INTERAGENCY REQUIREMENTS

The very definition of Strategic Communication shows the importance of the combined capabilities of the Interagency. The current draft of Enclosure B, Strategic Communication, in JOPES Volume 1, defines Strategic Communication as “transmission of integrated and coordinated US Government themes, messages, and actions that advance US interests and policies through a synchronized Interagency effort.” It consists of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, military Information Operations components, and special activities. Supportive US government policies and active, forward-leaning Interagency involvements is fundamental to the Combatant Commander’s ability to develop coherent and comprehensive plans and programs, including Strategic Communication execution.

US Government PolicyFor Combatant Commanders

to successfully implement Strategic

Editorial Abstract: Colonels Perkins and Scott examine the complexities of building effective Strategic Communications organizations and messages, methodologies for synchronization and effective employment, and recent case studies in the Central Command and European Command areas of operation.

“Strategic Communication is vital to US national security and foreign policy. We are engaged in a global struggle of ideas similar in magnitude to what we faced throughout half

the twentieth century. Succeeding in this struggle requires leadership from the President down.’’ -- Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication

Communication, they must have an unequivocal definition of the overall US Government policy in dealing with a particular issue or regional objective. This does not require a “mechanistic, military-intensive, and Washington-centric” solution, but there is a requirement for overarching top-down direction. This point is also applicable to organizations providing direct support to Combatant Commands. For example, the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) recently led an Information Operations seminar in conjunction with key governmental representatives including US Southern Command and the Joint Special Operations University. Their task was to develop long-term Information Operations themes in concert with the US Government position on Cuba. During the two-day seminar, they clearly demonstrated the value of the Interagency process when the State Department representatives ensured the working group’s courses of action remained aligned with overall US Government policy on Cuba. The US Southern Command is now assured of a thoroughly vetted and unified Department of State and Department of Defense Strategic Communication approach to advance long-term US interests in Central America.

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Interagency InvolvementWhile having a clear US Government

policy directing Combatant Commands’ activities is paramount for successful accomplishment of military operations, it is also necessary for Combatant Commanders to receive mission-type orders from the Interagency Community. The Department of Defense, and specifically the Joint Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) are the primary conduits to the Interagency, and all must actively participate in these ongoing and important policy discussions. The US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) also has an active role in this integration process based upon its Unified Command Plan responsibilities. Once the US Government position is ascertained and coordinated with the myriad executive departments, the Secretary of Defense will issue mission-type execution orders to Combatant Commands. These orders must include requisite background information on the tie-in to national security strategy and national military strategy, along with theater-specific Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs themes for dissemination, to achieve applicable US policy objectives in the region. The guidance should cover “what” themes and possible messages to communicate, but not “how” to communicate them. Additionally, mission-type orders should include three critical items: specific targets sets (e.g., leaders, media outlets, general population, etc); the effect(s) desired (e.g., what do we want the target audience to do?); and required timelines for accomplishment of the effects. These guidance elements are essential to ensure the Combatant Commands understand the true intent of the US Government policy and objectives, enable the IO/SC planners to focus and prioritize their Strategic Communication efforts, and best employ scarce communications resources.

SYNCHRONIZING METHODS

Having a stated US Government policy and Interagency involvement

provides direction to the Information Operations/Strategic Communication planners, but a critical need exists to ensure the synchronization, planning and execution of the various components of the Strategic Communication process.

SynchronizationThe Interagency community must

ensure that coordinated, overarching communication themes are integrated across the entire US Government enterprise. The intent of Strategic Communication is to create a coherent US Government message by simultaneously coordinating the vertical organizations in the Department of Defense, with parallel coordination across the Interagency horizontal structure. If one executive department or key organization does not participate or fully support the synchronization process, it can lead to a disjointed Strategic Communication effort and failure to meet US Government policy goals.

A case in point, Mr. Jeff Jones, the former Senior Director for Strategic Communication and Information on the US National Security Council, was instrumental along with the Joint Staff in helping formulate the initial US Government communication policy for the Middle East. US Central Command (USCENTCOM) created a Strategic Communication entity within its Tampa-

Synchronizing every step (DefenseLink)

based command headquarters to leverage US Government guidance to focus Strategic Communication activities, primarily in Iraq and to a lesser degree in Afghanistan. These early efforts were useful in coordinating communication themes for implementation in Iraq. With the departure of Mr. Jones in 2004, no single Interagency entity is currently directing the overall US Government communication strategy on Iraq during the crucial effort to establish a viable, representative Iraqi government. In the absence of continuing communication guidance on Iraq from the US National Security Council, US Central Command directed Multi-National Force-Iraq to assume the Strategic Communication integration role with their respective counterparts in the newly established US Embassy in Baghdad. Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and the embassy coordinated their Strategic Communication actions to ensure Coalition forces, the US Embassy, and the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly presented a united front. These actions support US Government policy to help build Iraqi popular support for internal security measures to attain a secure environment, and foster robust economic reconstruction efforts. This should eventually lead to Iraqi self-reliance in the form of a permanent Iraqi national government, to support

2� Spring 2006

and defend its people, and become a valued member and contributor to the region and larger international community. Notably, the success of the MNF-I and US Embassy Baghdad collaborative effort resulted absent any continuing communication guidance from the National Security Council. This raises the question as to what “level” of involvement the Interagency must have to preclude disconnects in US Combatant Commands’ communication activities, and overarching Interagency communication goals.

The Planning ProcessS y n c h r o n i z i n g e f f o r t s i s

critical to Strategic Communication activities, but control of organizations and situations requires a repeatable planning process which provides a standardized but flexible template for dealing with SC issues. The planning process defines responsibilities for the various components—Public Affairs; Public Diplomacy through the Political Advisor; J39 Information Operations Division; J5 Plans Directorate; and the supporting J2 Intelligence Directorate—so each component understands their responsibilities and how each can best bring their unique experience and insights into the overall planning effort.

This process must include the capabilities and resources each component brings to the particular tasking, and mechanisms such as a Strategic Communication annex, plus a timeline matrix for action. The synchronization of the US Government guidance with IO and SC at the Combatant Commands will ensure the respective Information Operation/Strategic Communication planners understand the broader national-level policy guidance, and potential impacts and unintended consequences of their communications messages. The US Pacific Command’s PACOM Influence Working Group (PIWG) is a prime example of the aforementioned process. As a part of USPACOM’s response to the Asian Tsunami in December 2004, the PIWG and its pre-established planning process enabled much of the successes of OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. The US PACOM J39, under Colonel Rob Preissinger, USAF, brought together a group of regional and cultural experts from the J5 directorate, along with Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy representatives, and Joint Information Operations Center personnel to work PIWG issues. The PIWG developed themes and messages - including those to avoid - regarding the safe deliverance of humanitarian aid and disaster relief supplies to displaced

peoples throughout Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. These safety-related messages were disseminated primarily by leaflets, broadcasts and loudspeakers to the affected populaces. Such Strategic Communication activities helped convey US intent to assist the regional governments, and ensure the safety of the various international military personnel, numerous Non-Governmental Organizations representatives, and local populaces during the relief operations.

Control and ExecutionPerhaps the most critical of the seven

operating principles that enable Strategic Communication at the COCOMs will be the need for centralized control and decentralized execution. Based on a common understanding of the mission-type execution orders among the Interagency; decentralized execution is necessary due to several factors. First, forward-based Information Operations and Strategic Communication personnel must vet potential messages with local, regional and cultural experts to ensure the messages convey the desired themes to have the desired outcomes. Second, personnel in the field need the authority to rapidly adjust messages based on feedback from the target audience in an OODA-loop (Observe, Orient,

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Decide, Act) type responsive process. Furthermore, the need for decentralized execution is further necessitated by the fact that this feedback loop may often extend to the tactical level, and include non-US Government entities such as Non-Governmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations. Use of a centralized review and approval process loses timeliness, and hence effectiveness. Given the dynamic nature of Strategic Communication, the US Government cannot afford to have this occur during the early critical phases of an OPLAN execution or in Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)-related operations. Time is a critical factor in persuading and lead-turning target audiences in this era of global, continuous communications. Finally, the process of receiving mission-type execution orders is not always a one-way, top-down directed effort; in many cases the on-scene commander will forward target set recommendations based on real-time observations at the tactical level for adjudication at higher headquarters. Ultimately, the US Government must posture itself to leverage disparate organizations and people involved in the Strategic Communication effort - including execution authority - at any level, whenever required.

Enabling Mission-type Themes

In the end, the real Strategic Communication effort is all about executing the messages in the field, bound together by overall mission-type themes, to attain a specific policy or objective. There must be standing, pre-approved authorities prior to the execution phase to define for Information Operations/Strategic Communication planners the latitude to generate and disseminate applicable messages to support overall themes. One particular contingency plan for the GWOT provides us with an example of a significantly shortened approval process, because it leverages extensive prior Interagency coordination to facilitate senior decision-maker involvement

during the contingency plan’s execution phase. Information Operations/ Strategic Communication planners will use a matrix of situation-to-country/region with associated responsibilities and authorities for a number of anticipated situations and scenarios. This is how we could potentially stay ahead of an adversary, by providing IO/SC planners the ability to rapidly adjust to changing communication scenarios without the need to vet new courses of action through a lengthy, top-down directive coordination and adjudication process. This template could also enhance deliberate and crisis planning and execution activities for other Information Operations and Strategic Communication scenarios.

ANALYTICAL PROCESSINGT h e n e e d f o r I n t e r a g e n c y

involvement and synchronization of actions is vital to the success of the US Government’s Strategic Communication efforts. However, this process requires clearly quantified communication actions, and measures of effectiveness in articulating government policies and goals, to remain viable.

Strategic Communication Analysis

The real measure of Strategic Communication success is target audience response and advancement of US Government goals. To this end, Combatant Commanders require tailored and coordinated SC information analysis.

Staying “on message” (DefenseLink)

This should be obtained from the widest possible array of entities, including: intelligence operations commands and centers; media consultants; US Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) elements; the US Special Operations Command’s Joint PSYOP Support Element; and the Joint Information Operations Center. Other information centers, such as the Asia-Pacific Center in Honolulu, must be connected, and should work with national-level information agencies to do the holistic analysis required of this complex problem set. All of the activities must fully share their analysis up and down the chain. All Strategic Communication entities must understand whether we are achieving our objectives, and where we must adjust overarching themes and their associated messages. An excellent example of a thoroughly vetted Combatant Command analysis process resides in US European Command’s Strategic Effects and Communication Council (SECC). USEUCOM’s IO Chief (J39) uses the SECC to propose guidance and attain decisions on how to orchestrate and synchronize strategic objectives with theater Influence Activities and Operations. This process provides a detailed strategy-to-task linkage to help define and valid strategic effects and activities as it relates to the Command’s Theater Security Cooperation and Counterterrorism objectives, which are designed to support both the Combatant Commander ’s priorities, and the overarching national security strategy. The SECC meets on a bi-monthly basis to

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review theater guidance, intended effects, Priority Intelligence Requirements, and Measures of Effectiveness as part of its ongoing information analysis. Additionally, the council regularly coordinates Strategic Communication activities with the Interagency, primarily the Department of State. The SECC process leverages its superb regional and cultural expertise resident in their J8 and with other in-theater analysis sources, to accurately determine and measure the effectiveness of its Strategic Communication actions, and decide what adjustments are required to optimize the desired strategic effects.

To date, the two most notable Strategic Communication approaches taken by the Combatant Commands have either focused on a few specific target countries (e.g., US Central Command’s focus on Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM), or centered on a particular humanitarian aid/disaster relief event (e.g., US Pacific Command’s Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE). These efforts clearly show the versatility of

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the Strategic Communication process to adapt to a specific situation or country focus, but perhaps a more theater-wide effort like that currently used by US European Command is warranted. The SECC approach certainly merits further examination and consideration by the other Combatant Commands and the Interagency, as a possible template for building a theater-wide - possibly US Government-wide - Strategic Communication planning processes.

CONCLUSIONThe need for an effective, coherent,

and responsive approach to Strategic Communication cannot be overstated. Assistant Secretary of State John Hillen recently highlighted the compression of the political-military domains by noting, “We now operate in a very different kind of strategic environment, one which requires different organizations and different rules than those by which we now play.” The seven operating principles in this article suggest a viable framework for Combatant Commanders, a rough set of “rules” to enable them

to execute and succeed in effective Strategic Communication. While most of the geographic combatant commands are already addressing this complex and emergent process, they often comment that the national-level must generate more coordinated guidance, and the Interagency must speak with one synchronized voice. USSTRATCOM must be a strong advocate for the five geographic combatant commands and, when appropriate, to assist in the synchronization of themes and messages throughout the joint operational community. The Global War on Terrorism requires a concerted and synchronized effort from all of those involved in its execution, which necessitates coordinated Strategic Communication actions—from the President to the joint warriors on the Strategic Communication front-lines. Maximizing the US Government’s collective voice and the use of precious Strategic Communication resources will allow it to meet the challenges of a dynamic and often anti-American information environment.