Spitz - The Significance of Leibniz for Historiography.pdf

7/28/2019 Spitz - The Significance of Leibniz for Historiography.pdf

1/17

The Significance of Leibniz for HistoriographyAuthor(s): Lewis W. SpitzReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Jun., 1952), pp. 333-348Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707600 .

Accessed: 23/10/2012 05:25

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Journal of the History of Ideas.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=upennhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2707600?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2707600?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=upenn


2/17

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEIBNIZ FORHISTORIOGRAPHYBY LEWIS W. SPITZ

The evaluation of the significance of Leibniz for historiographyrequires an examination of his understanding of the theory of historyand his own achievement in practice, his contribution to the historicalwriting of the Enlightenment, and finally, his impact on subsequenthistorical thought. Two dominant attitudes toward history prevailedin early modern philosophy as Leibniz knew it. On the one hand,Cartesianism made no serious evaluation of history at all and aban-doned it to revelation or to literature. On the other hand, Spinozaand Hobbes reduced the facts of history to a philosophically general-ized naturalistic concept of causation. In neither case could an ade-quate theory of history be achieved. There is a dichotomy also in thethought of Leibniz between his philosophic system and his expressedinterpretation of historical method and meaning. The essential con-nection between his philosophy and history was there, but he did notconsciously elaborate its terms in any coherent fashion. Both phi-losophy and history were important. " Philosophers despise historiansof antiquity and antiquarians mock what they call the dreams of phi-losophers. But he is right who does justice to the merits of both." 1He did not assign to history the lofty rank of the realm of freedom, asKant was to do, but considered the world of factual truth secondaryto that of eternal truth. His views of history, never comprehensivelyformalized, must be drawn from scattered references in his letters,prefaces, dissertations, and philosophical writings wherever they areto be found.Leibniz has long been recognized as a polyhistorian of greatachievement.2 His learning was not just a cumulative activity, aswith many scholars of the age of erudition, or a negative instrumentfor criticism as with Pierre Bayle, but was creative and capable ofconstructive synthesis.3 His thinking on historical method, however,represents one of the least original and productive aspects of his intel-lectual perpetuum mobile.1 Leibnizto Th. Burnett (1700), C. J. Gerhardt,Die philosophischen chriftenvon Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Berlin, 1887), III, 270, hereafterreferred to asGerhardt'sPhil. Schriften.2 LudwigGrote,Leibnizund seine Zeit (Hanover,1869), 383.3 LudwigFeuerbach,Darstellung,Entwicklungund Kritik der Leibnitz'schenPhilosophie (Ansbach,1837), 12. Leibnizwrote in "Zwei Plane zu Societaten":"Die wahreHoffnung st nicht nur reden,ja nicht nur dencken,sondernpracticedencken .... ." Die Werke von Leibniz (Hanover, 1864), Onno Klopp ed., I, 112.

333


3/17

334 LEWIS W. SPITZWhen Leibnizturnedhis attention to historicalwriting,his logic,epistemology,and metaphysicsmoved into the backgroundand hebecame mmediatelyconcernedwith the descriptionof fact and inter-

connectionsof the materialpresentedexperientially. This necessarilydirectedhim to the problemof sourcecriticism. " I have learned,"hewrote," that in mathematicsone must dependon reason, n natureonexperiments, n laws divine and human on authority,and in historyon witnesses." Historicalcritics,however,shouldbe aware hat evena contemporarywitness can be trusted chiefly with respect to publicevents, but when he speaks of motives, secrets, hidden forces, andthingswhichare disputable,e.g., poisonings,assassinations, he testi-mony of many witnessesis necessary.5 For witnesses are subject toprejudice,venality, the ambitionto makesensationalstatements,andare thereforeto be tested in respectto sincerityand accuracy.6 Thenumberand clarityof the documentsare significant.But not only the direct testimony of witnesses is useful. Bern-heim believes that the importanceof sourcesand acts for historicalresearchhas seldombeen so strongly emphasizedas in the prefacetothe Codex juris gentium diplomaticus, 1693, with the appendix Man-tissa codicisjuris, etc., 1700.7 In reconstructingan historicevent, astudy of natural conditions is helpful. Chronologymay be estab-lished by documents. Bronze tablets, old monuments, documents,seals, and numismatics,all are useful in historicalinvestigation andmay enable the historian to explode fictions, as that of the PapessJoan.8 In spite of this appreciation or the contributionof the auxili-4 Letter to von Blume (1688), Werke, Onno Klopp ed., V, 368.5Nouveaux Essais, Bk. IV, chap. XVI, ? 10, Gerhardt, Phil. Schriften, V, 448f.6 Letter to Eisenhardt (1679), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Samtliche Schriftenund Briefe (Darmstadt, 1927), series I, vol. II, 426ff.7 Ernst Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode und der Geschichts-

philosophie (Leipzig, 1908), 225. Cf. Werke von Leibniz, Onno Klopp ed., VI, 457,Codicis Juris gentium diplomatici praefatio.8" Notitia De Historia Brunsuicensi, quam edere paraverat G. G. Leibnitius,"Acta Eruditorum (Leipzig, 1717), 361: "Through documents, moreover, a chronol-ogy will be exactly arranged of the ninth and tenth centuries with part of theeighth and eleventh which up to now have been obscured with deep darkness.Furthermore, a little treatise will be added which will be inscribed: Flowers scat-tered on the grave of a Papess, wherein by bringing new insights into history thatfable will be exploded, which so far was maintained only because of the great ob-scurity of the chronology. Finally, I may venture to assert that nothing like thishas been produced for medieval history to date in which so many errors on theaffairs of the Empire throughout Germany and Italy have been put under andmatters placed in a clearer light. Each volume will be in folio form, as they callthem, decorated with bronze tablets of old monuments, of documents, seals, andcoins."


4/17

LEIBNIZ' SIGNIFICANCE FOR HISTORIOGRAPHY 335ary sciences in establishing historical accuracy, it is undeniable thatLeibniz placed greater emphasis on lower criticism than on higher.Leibniz believed that historical method was becoming increasinglyscientific. Authors and documents more recent, while very faulty,were nevertheless more reliable than those of earlier centuries.9 Thebenefits of printing in making sources available and thus increasingaccuracy held great promise for historians.10 The same exactnesswhich was increasing in the other sciences was spreading also to his-tory.11 This tendency of Leibniz to conceive of historic truth in termsof scientific exactitude was certainly a reflection of contemporarynatural science. It was this trend of thought which led him to applythe analogy of the human body to history and its auxiliary sciences,a parallel to the then common Cartesian analogy of comparing thesciences with a tree, with metaphysics as the roots, physics as thetrunk, mechanics, medicine, morality, and the like as the branches.This analogy must not be taken too seriously as a definitive statementof Leibniz's conception of history. It is certainly unfair to brand thisletter as "incredibly naive " and "nothing but crude materialism,"to see in it the sum total of Leibniz's historical thinking and to seethis as the cause for his "small influence on history." 12 It was nodoubt this emphasis on method which prompted Droysen to call Leib-niz a trail blazer in giving a historical method to the a1uoSo~8oi9' ofhistory in the new natural law sense.13This concern for a critical method, laudable though it was, should

9GodefridiGvilielmiLeibnitii,AccessionesHistoricae(Leipzig,1698), praefatioad lectorum: "... truly excellent documents, especially those by which we maylearnto knowsomethingwhichreason tself would not have easily explained, findto be rare,even amonggood writers; much more so amongthose inept and barba-rousauthorswhich the centuriescondemned o ignoranceproduced."10G. W. Leibniz,ScriptoresRerum Brunsvicensivm(Hanover, 1707), Intro-dvctio: "When after the rebirth of letters erudite men gave thoughtto the writingof histories,they gave narrationsconfirmedby no documentson the model of theancients,as thoughthe authorityof the writer sufficedto make it reliable. How-ever, this could be allowed n contemporaneous vents, especially f the author wasengaged n the elucidationof things which he could know,which he handedon toposterity. But in remote times and places relianceon true recountings,uncertainbecauseof rumor, emotion,or unfaithfulwitness,has fallen into intolerableerrors,whichlittle by little have beenperceived, incethe ancientwriters, hanks to typog-raphy,beganto be in the hands of all."Memoir to Ernst Augustus (1692), Bodemann,Zeitschriftdes historischenVereins iir Niedersachsen 1885), 19ff. in LouisDaville, "Le Developpementde laMethodehistoriquede Leibniz,"Revue de SyntheseHistorique Paris,1911),XXIII,no. 3, 262ff.: "Cette exactitudeque les vrais sqavansdemandentaujourd'huy 'estrepandue jusque dans l'histoire ...."

12 J. W. Thompson,History of HistoricalWriting (New York, 1942), II, 100.13JohannGustavDroysen,Historik (Munich,1937), 417.


5/17

336 LEWIS W. SPITZnot be exaggerated.l4 The Maurists and Bollandists, whose workLeibnizknew, had stressed critical history, and Leibniz himself waslittle if any aheadof Mabillon and Muratori. He did not, for exam-ple, use modern critical apparatusand supplied only a half dozenmarginalannotationsin the whole Annales.l He refusedto devotehis life exclusively to editing sources and works of a purely criticalnature. "I have no mind to turn transcriber . . . ," he wrote toBasnage,"Does it not occurto you that the advice you give me re-sembles that of a man who should wish to marry his friend to ashrew? For to engagea man in a lifelong workis much the same asto find him a wife." 6 Moreover,there was little development inLeibniz'sbasic criticalconceptionsduringhis own careeras a profes-sionalhistorian,an indicationthat the problemnever really receivedhis seriousattention,forhe left few areasof knowledgewhichactuallyinterestedhim unchanged.17In tune with the generaltendencyof the time towardthe seculari-zation of the areas of historicalinvestigation,Leibniz expandedthescope of his interestsbeyond a concernfor ecclesiasticalhistory andalso embracedmuch more than political history. To him history in-cludedthe "universal history of the times, the geographyof places,the searchingof antiquities and of ancient monuments,as medals,inscriptions,manuscripts,and the like, the knowledgeof languagesand that whichone callsphilology,whichincludesalso the etymologi-cal origins, literary history . . ., customs, positive laws, and the his-tory of religions." 8 He was almost monadicin his interests,reflect-ing a universeof subjectsworthyof historical nvestigation,biographyof authorsand inventors,historyof medicine,historyof law, and the

14 LouisDaville,LeibnizHistorien (Paris, 1909), muchoverrates Leibniz'shis-toricalmethod,comparingLeibnizwith the historiansof the Renaissance. Believingthat humanisthistory persisted nto the 17th century,he ascribesall improvementto Leibniz, 355. Cf. Eduard Fueter, "Literaturbericht iber Leibniz Historien,"HistorischeZeitschriftCVIII (Munich,1912),341ff. Also MarcelDrouin,"LeibnizHistorien,"Revue de Synthese Historique XXIII (Paris, 1911), 154, held thatDavill6did not knowany otherhistoriansof the 17th centuryexcept MabillonandDom Calmet.15 HeinrichPertz, Vorrede,G. W. Leibnitii,AnnalesImperii (Hanover,1843),xxvi.16Letter to Basnage,in Franz von Wegele,Geschichteder deutschenHistori-ographie eit demAuftretendesHumanismusMunich,1885),653. CharlesLangloisand CharlesSeignobos, ntroductionaux EtudesHistoriques(Paris, 1897),98, praiseLeibnizfor not sacrificinghis higherfaculties to purelycritical earning.17Louis Daville, "Le Developpementde la Methode historiquede Leibniz,"Revue de SyntheseHistoriqueXXIII (1911), 257: "Nous croyons toujoursque lesideesessentiellesde Leibnizne se sont pas modifieesdurantsa carriere."18Memoirepour des Personneseclaireeset de bonne intention, Werke,OnnoKlopp ed.,X, 7ff.,especially?? 16-19.


6/17

LEIBNIZ' SIGNIFICANCE FOR HISTORIOGRAPHY 337like.19 In his criticism of content, however, he frequently fell backupon a narrow conception of the canons of criticism.Nor was Leibniz's chronological division an innovation. He droppedthe idea of the four kingdoms, as had others before him. He knew thedivision of history into Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, dating thelast of these from the Reformation, covering specifically the sixteenthand seventeenth centuries. But this periodization also had been invogue for some time.20 In organizing his material he himself used theannalistic method as Baronius did before him and as Muratori didafter him. This method, after all, was best adapted to the presenta-tion of individual facts and would have been all but impossible ifhe had attempted more generalizations and broader groupings ofmaterial.The conventional nature of his historical theory was evidencedfurther in his conception of the pragmatic purpose of history. " I wishthere might be some persons who would devote themselves preferablyto drawing from history that which is more useful [italics mine], aswould be extraordinary examples of virtue, remarks upon the con-veniences of life, stratagems of politics and of war. And I wish thata kind of universal history were expressly written which should indi-cate only such things, and some few others of most consequence; forsometimes one reads an extensive historical work, learned, well-written, suited also to the aim of the author, and excellent of its kind,but which contains little useful instruction, by which I do not meanhere simple morality, with which the Theatrum vitae humanae andother such florileges are replete, but skill and knowledge of which notevery one would think himself in need." 21 It is easy to recognize inthis the utility-motif found in the general Enlightenment thought onhistory as expressed in Bolingbroke's famous dictum " History is phi-losophy teaching by example " (1735), and Voltaire's article "His-toire " in the Encyclopedie. It was a recurrent theme in Leibniz. Inthe Theodicee he wrote that the main goal of history, like that ofpoetry, was " to teach wisdom and virtue by example," and converselyby setting forth the proper examples to inspire an abhorrence ofwickedness.2

In the preface to the Accessiones Historicae (1698), he did notspeak of specifically religious and moral utility, but found three par-ticular uses of history: history satisfies our curiosity, our desire toknow the res singulares; it provides rules for life, demonstrating the19LouisDaville,LeibnizHistorien,348 et passim. 20 Ibid., 344.21 NouveauxEssais,Bk. IV, chap.XVI, ? 11,Gerhardt,Phil.Schriften,V, 452ff.22 Theodicee,Bk. II, ? 148, Gerhardt,Phil. Schriften,VI, 198.


7/17

338 LEWIS W. SPITZtruth of Christianity;and finally, it leads us to recognizethe originsof the present by tracing the past to the present time through thecausesof events.23 In a more extendeddiscussionof the use of his-tory he repeatedthe idea that history provides pleasurethroughtheknowledgeof origins. It is useful in rendering usticeto the men whohave deservedwell of other men and in establishinghistoricalcriti-cism, especiallyof sacredhistory, which supportsthe foundationsofrevelation by the useful teachings which the examples furnish us.24Even the smallesttriflesof antiquityareworthysubjectsof examina-tion, for they may contributeto a knowledgeof important matters.Leibniz, then, was not an antiquarianor polyhistorianof the typecommonto the age of erudition.25Rather he was representativeofthose historianswho were concernedwith rescuinghistory from Des-cartes'witheringattackby tryingto establishhistorical acts criticallyand thereby to elevate them to the status of facts of science, andfurtherby stressingthe useful functions of history. This apologeticmotive, therefore,wasone determinant n the formulationof Leibniz'sideas of history.This moral-utilitarianconceptionof history rested, of course,onthe premise that history is rationally explicable in causal terms, isaffectedby human action, and is not controlledby blind chance. Inhis own writingLeibnizconstantlyrefers to personalmotivations ascausal factors.26 To what extent this is compatiblewith his formalsystem of thought will become apparentfrom the discussion of hisa prioriphilosophyof history. GerhardStammler,baffled n his at-tempts to find a real inner connectionbetween Leibniz'stheory ofhistory, especiallyas approachedn his actualhistoricalwork,and hisphilosophy,has advanceda uniquehypothesis. The meaningof Leib-niz's task as a historian cameto him, Stammlerholds, from a patternof proceduredevelopedin his intellectual pursuitsand not from for-mal philosophy. He developed a kind of artistically constructedmethodologyin his techniquefor approaching ntellectual problemsof any nature,best illustratedin the Notitia describinghis plan forthe Guelphhistory. This architecturehe appliedto all his writings,

23Praefatioad lectorum.24NouveauxEssais,Bk. IV, chap. XVI, ? 10, Gerhardt,Phil.Schriften,V, 448ff.25 Daniel GeorgMorhof in the prolegomenao his chief work supplieda com-plete, if totally naive, discussionof the leading Polyhistoriansof the day, Polyhistorin Tres Tomas(Liibeck,1708).26Expressions uch as "I think that by a certainsingularcounsel of the fatesit happened hat . . .," Novissima SinicaHistoriamNostri TemporisIllustratura(Hanover,1697), ii, are not to be taken literally,for they are counterbalanced ycontraryexpressions uch as "SupremeProvidence, n orderthat . .," ibid.


8/17

LEIBNIZ' SIGNIFICANCE FOR HISTORIOGRAPHY 339according to Stammler-to the works on jurisprudence, on formallogic, on natural law, on philology, and hence also to those on history,which led him to betray his philosophic premises to a history actuallylacking even probability.27 This ingenious explanation, coupled withthe fact that philosophy and not history was Leibniz's first love, aswell as the general low prestige of history at that time, help explainhis curious conception of the nature and task of historical writing.28Leibniz produced a phenomenal number of widely varied historicalwritings.29 In 1674 at the age of twenty-eight he became the libra-rian of Hanover. After extended travels, he wrote the Codex jurisgentium diplomaticus in 1693 followed by the lesser De origine Ger-manorum in 1696. He was commissioned to write a history of theHouse of Brunswick, for the very utilitarian purpose of establishingcertain seniority rights and claims of the House, not unlike the dutyof the Chambers of Reunion under Louis XIV. He was drawn toextend his inquiries further and further afield until his history coveredthe western empire from the time of Charlemagne to 1025 A.D., theend of the Saxon imperial line. This exhaustive and detailed studyconsumed a tremendous amount of time, but by his death in 1716Leibniz had all but completed it, lacking only about three years.Through an unfortunate concatenation of circumstances the fifteenmanuscript volumes were not published until 1843, when HeinrichPertz edited the work for King William IV and published it as theAnnales Imperii in three volumes of over two thousand pages. Mean-while a strictly genealogical history of the House drawn from theresearch of Leibniz was published for George II in 1748, the OriginesGuelficae. While working on his major history, Leibniz had publishedtwo valuable collections of sources, the Accessiones Historicae (1697),a series of chronicles of the Empire in the Middle Ages, and the Scrip-tores Brunsvicensia illustrantes, volume I in 1707 and volume III, thelast, in 1711. In addition to these he wrote a host of smaller disser-tations, like the De migrationibus gentium and the Protogaea.30

27 GerhardStammler,Leibniz (Munich, 1930), 113ff.28 Letter to Bayle (1702), Opera,Erdmanned., 193, last sentence: "If I hadthe choice,I should prefernaturalhistory to civil, and [the study of] the habitsand laws that God has established n natureto what is observedamongmen." Cf.H. A. Erhard,"Leibnitz, als Geschichtsforschernd als BefSrdererwissenschaft-licherVereine,"ZeitschriftfiurvaterldndischeGeschichteund AlterthumskundeX(Miinster,1846), 247.29LouisDaville,LeibnizHistorien,1-333, gives a completetreatmentof his lifeand works. A moreconcise istingof his works,includingposthumouspublications,is givenin HeinrichPertz'sprefaceto the AnnalesImperii (1843).30The Protogaeacontainedsome novel ideas " de la formation et des revolu-tions du globe."


9/17

340 LEWIS W. SPITZA candid evaluation of his historical theory and actual achieve-ment in historicalwritingmakesimpossiblethe claim that "Leibnizest un des plus grandshistoriensde l'6poquemoderne et de tous les

temps." 1 It is true that he was a professionalhistorianmost of hislife and was occupiedwith history especially duringhis last years.Nevertheless certainseriousshortcomings n his workmake it some-thing less than great. The lack of an inner relationshipbetween histheory of history and his philosophy, particularlythe original andcreativeside of his formalthought, deprivesit of real dignity, coher-ence, and meaning.32 His method, while enabling him to produceworkcomparablewith the best of his day, offeredno strikinginnova-tion, whilehis conceptionof the task of historicalwritingwas typicaland conventional.His historical writings, moreover,had only a limited influence.EdwardGibbon used the OriginesGuelficaeas a guide to his ownAntiquities of the House of Brunswick. He found Leibniz a "boldand originalspirit" who "couldturn fromthe solution of a problemto the dusty parchmentsand barbarousstyle of the recordsof theMiddleAge." He declared hat with sucha guideand with the mate-rials provided by him and others, and with some experienceof theway, he would "boldly descend into the darkness of the MiddleAges." 3 Moreover, he huge source books of medieval manuscriptswhich Leibniz edited as well as the factual material of the Annalesarestill usedby medievalists oday.34 But the influenceof his histori-cal writing upon historiographywas almost entirely negated by thefact that the Annaleswerenot publisheduntil the middle of the nine-teenth centurywhen scholarshiphad already surpassed heir level ofmerit.35 Moreover,his workwas soon overshadowedby two tremen-dous workson the earlymiddleagesby Moscov and by Biinau.36

31LouisDaville,LeibnizHistorien,743.32 Cf. WilhelmDilthey,"Leibnizund sein Zeitalter,"n "Studienzur Geschichtedes Deutschen Geistes," GesammelteSchriften (Leipzig, 1927), III, 36: "DiegeschichtlicheWelt in sein philosophisches ystem aufzunehmen,hat Leibniz nichtmehrversucht."33EdwardGibbon,"Antiquities of the House of Brunswick,"MiscellaneousWorks (Dublin, 1796), John Lord Sheffield,ed., III, 401ff. He added the inter-esting observation hat Leibniz's"powerswere dissipatedby the multiplicityof hispursuits . . ." and that he "may be compared to those heroes, whose empire hasbeenlost in the ambitionof universalconquest." 34 MarcelDrouin, op. cit., 152.35 This misfortune ed E. H. Holthouse,"Leibnizas a Historian,"The LondonTimesLiterarySupplement(Nov. 16, 1935), 746, to speak of the "tragedy of thelife of Leibniz."36Franzvon Wegele,op. cit., 636ff. On the greatsignificance f thesetwo menfor Germanhistoriography,cf. FriedrichGundolf,Anfange Deutscher Geschicht-schreibung Elsevier,1938), 130ff.


10/17

LEIBNIZ' SIGNIFICANCE FOR HISTORIOGRAPHY 341An avenue of influence more direct and possibly more effectivewas Leibniz's personal influence exerted through a tremendous corre-spondence, including over fifteen thousand letters of academic import

still extant, through his personal travels and conversations, andfinally through his share in promoting learned academies. Leibniz,whom Frederick the Great called a "whole academy in himself,"provided the inspiration for and led in the founding of the BerlinAcademy.37 Bernheim believed this type of personal contact had animportant influence on historical method.38 However, its extentand nature is necessarily difficult to determine.Leibniz's a priori philosophy of history involved three elements ofbasic importance, his solution to the problem of freedom and neces-sity, his concept of optimism, and his idea of progress. Leibnizrealized only too well that his system of preestablished harmonymight spell determinism, and he struggled heroically against this con-clusion. " The real existence of beings which are not at all necessaryis a matter of fact or of history; for the knowledge of possibilities andnecessities (for necessary is that the opposite of which is not at allpossible) constitutes the demonstrative sciences," he argued.39 Freewill, for him, consisted in the fullness of knowledge and insight intothe purposes and moral connotation of an action, as in the Stoicphrase, "the wise alone are free." 40 Truths of historic fact he con-sidered contingent, since they are not exhaustive of all possibilities.Nevertheless, his concept of the internal development of the monadwithin predetermined limits, derived from the assumption of his logic,that the nature of the predicate is contained in the subject, involvedhim in a logical determinism. In so far as the individual is con-strained only from within, it is a psychological determinism. Butthe preestablished harmony between the monads and the materialcontinuum suggests inevitable necessity.41 This necessity is thusinvolved in the very structure of his monadology.42

37MarthaOrnstein,The Role of ScientificSocieties n the SeventeenthCentury(Chicago,1929), 177ff. So alsoAdolfHarnack,GeschichtederKiniglichenPreussi-schenAkademiederWissenschaftenuBerlin(Berlin,1900),I, Iff. 38 Op.cit.,225.39NouveauxEssais,Bk. III, chap. V, ? 3, in Gerhardt,Phil. Schriften,V, 279f.40 NouveauxEssais,Bk. II, chap. XXI, ? 8, Gerhardt,Phil. Schriften,V, 160f.41Cf. GeorgM. Burgarski,Die Natur und der Determinismusdes WillensbeiLeibniz (Leipzig,1897), 77. Dr. Gustav Class at the end of his carefulstudy ofthis problemconcluded:"We may now at the end of our investigationconcludethat this wholemonadologys a mechanism,not indeed that of efficientcauses,butthat of the a prioribasis in the peculiarsense alreadydescribed,"Die metaphysi-schenVoraussetzungenes LeibnitzischenDeterminismus Tiibingen,1874), 125.42 ClodiusPiat, Leibniz(Paris, 1915), 354, found in certainminor treatisesmoreovert affirmationsof Spinozisticprinciples. He is wrong,however,in findingthisto be in completecontrast to the NouveauxEssais, Theodicee,and Monadology.


11/17

342 LEWIS W. SPITZEssentially, both nature in its origin and developmentas well ashistory in its unfoldinghad their originsin God,the entelechyof thegreatest wisdom. The Theodiceein particulardescribesGod as the

most perfect,the best monarch,the great architect. If this were notthe best of all possibleworlds,then Godwould not be true God eitherin essenceor in morality. Omnepossibileexigit existere. This "op-timism" does not mean that everythingin the worldis good,as menreckongood. Indeed,Leibniz believedin or at least wroteof eternalpunishmentfor the wicked. It means rather that the worldcontainsthe greatest amount of good actually possible.43 The Theodicee,writtenin oppositionto PierreBayle's skepticism,arguesthroughoutfor the necessity of contrastsand the superiorityof the imperfecttonothing at all, whichmay constitute Leibnizmore of a melioristthanan optimist.Spiritual development and material progress everywhere movetowardcompleteness,beauty, and an ever higher culture. Mankindis advancingto a greater completeness. Thus Leibniz has already"temporalizedthe great chain of being." It is this emphasiswhichpromptedReinholdNiebuhr'spenetratingcriticism: "The dominantnote in modern culture is not so much confidence n reason as faithin history. The conceptionof a redemptivehistory informs the mostdiverseforms of modern culture. The rationalist, Leibniz,shareditwith the romanticistHerder." 4 What seemsto us to be sorrowandneed is the means by which progressis made, "as the seed mustsufferbefore it can producefruit." Nevertheless,this progress s anendlessprocessand does not promise mmediate achievement. Man-kind will neverreachthe beatific vision.45 Progress oward evil mustbe finite, but towardgood,infinite.46

43Leibnizwrote: "Le gouvernementde Dieu est le meilleur3tat qui soit possi-ble"; "Les lois queDieu a etabliesdansla nature,sont les plus excellentesqu'ilestpossible de concevoir,"n ArnaudBacharock,Shaftesbury'sOptimismusund seinVerhdltnis um Leibnizschen Thann,1912), 53.44Faith andHistory (New York, 1949), 3.45 "Nor, therefore,will progressat any time reach its limit," Gerhardt,Phil.Schriften(Berlin, 1890), VII, 308. Cf. LouisDaville,LeibnizHistorien,666ff.46Ella HarrisonStokes, The Conceptionof a Kingdomof Ends in Augustine,Aquinas,andLeibniz (Chicago,1912), 111. MauriceHalbwachs,however,contendsthat Leibnizdid not seem altogethersure that the world was in general progress,and cites his statement:" One can doubtif the worldalwaysadvances n perfection,or if it advances and recedesby periods,or if it does not rather maintainitself inthe sameperfectionwith regard o the whole, although t seems that the partsmakean exchangebetween themselvesand that sometimessome, sometimesothers, aremore or less perfect. One can then call in questionif all the creaturesadvancealwaysat least to the limit of theirperiods,or if there are someof them whichloseand recede always, or if there are some of them, finally, who always make the


12/17

LEIBNIZ' SIGNIFICANCE FOR HISTORIOGRAPHY 343These basic factors in Leibniz'sa prioriphilosophyof history ineffect completelynegate the value of history as history. If historyis predetermined,f its course unfolds always for the best within thelimits of possibility, and develops progressivelytoward the infinitegood, then its meaninglies well beyond the realmof a posteriori n-vestigationand interpretation, he criticalmethod,andthe pragmaticpurposeof history. Henri See has made an interesting observationregarding his type of a priorihistoricalthinkingwhich may containa valuable insight for the case of Leibniz. He believes that the phi-losophy of history of German thinkers of that century took on thecharacterof a metaphysicrather than an explanationof historyitself,

because, lacking a fatherland and unified nation, they did not, atleast up to 1815,have any "visee politique."47 A clearercase of thisnearer the end of the centuryis Kant who built his Idea for a Uni-versal History (1784) on a course of history determineda priori.However the case may be, it is obvious that the fundamentalstruc-ture of Leibniz'ssystem of rationalisticidealism requiredthis viewof history.Leibniz was the major sourceof the eighteenth-centuryGermanEnlightenment. In philosophyhis rationalism was the chief influ-ence,but it was affectedby the Leibniz-Wolffianchool,whichgave ita peculiar emphasis. ChristianWolff, the translatorand interpreterof Leibniz's works, applied rationalism to the whole domain ofknowledgeand tried to reduceall manifestationsof the human soulto the discipline of reason and mathematical demonstration,evendeducinga priorithe duties of servantsand the dangersof debauch-ery. Amongthe popular philosophersrationalismwas carried o theextremeof irrationality. Even the influenceof the psychologicalandmoralempiricismcomingfrom Englandwas limited by the rational-ist pattern.48 Thompson'sview that Wolff and the German Auf-klarung emphasized experience as opposed to the rationalism ofDescartes,Leibniz,and Bacon, so that while French historians wereanti-historicaland pragmatic,German thinkers like Kant, Herder,andHegel turnedto the past, not to "learnby example,"but to showthe continuity of the human spirit and social phenomena,holds inonly one respect.49It is true that Wolff'sepistemologydistinguishedperiodsat the end of whichthey find themselves to have neithergainednor lost:in the sameway as there are some lines whichadvancealwaysas the straightline,otherswhich turn withoutadvancingor recedingas the circle,others which turn andadvanceat the same time as the spiral, others, finally,which recedeafter havingadvanced,or advance afterhavingreceded,as the ovals,"Leibniz(Paris, n.d.), 150.47Scienceet Philosophiede l'Histoire(Paris, 1928), 17.48VictorBasch,Les DoctrinesPolitiquesdes PhilosophesClassiquesde L'Alle-magne (Paris, 1927), 6f. 49JamesWestfallThompson,op. cit., II, 103.


13/17

344 LEWIS W. SPITZa priori rational truths from a posteriori empirical truths, but he be-lieved that the two coincided. This recognition of the empiricalelement in knowledge was important for historical thinking, but itwas rather another element in the thought of Leibniz and not thisinnovation of Wolff's which helped to stimulate a resurgence ofgenuine historical thinking later in the century. The immediateeffect upon history of the philosophy of Leibniz as seen throughWolffian eyes was precisely the development of that anti-historicalpragmatism which Thompson saw as typical of the French historians.The historians of the early Aufkldrung, as historians, were notconcerned with resolving the logical difficulty between the a prioriand the utilitarian views of history. They studied history to see in itthe hand of God, and at the same time they drew lessons from pasthuman conduct, as though human will and decision were absolutelydeterminant in history. Later, of course, when the Voltairean influ-ence was more strongly felt, the latter motif prevailed. Leibniz knewthe term "pragmatic history," as applied to the kind typical of theGerman Enlightenment.50 History seen as the product of consciousindividual action was to serve pragmatic ends. While there were cer-tainly other factors at work in creating this development of historicalthought, the particular influence of Leibniz was important.51 He corre-sponded with Johann LorenzMosheim, the most important of the earlypragmatic historians, and influenced his thought.52 Leibniz's rational-ism in its Wolffian dress, especially in the importance given to humanreason, was basic in the thinking of the so-called "pragmatic his-torians " like Matthias Schroeckh, Gottlieb Planck, Heinrich Henke,and a large coterie of other writers. Schroeckh wrote: "Formerlyour history books were called impartial, reliable, complete. For sometime now (1768) they have felt honored to take the name prag-matic." 53 With Ludwig Spittler the Voltairean influence was addedand it becomes more difficult to trace the course of the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition. The basic assumptions, however, of rationalismand natural law, as contained in Leibniz's a priori philosophy of his-tory, remained essential for the conception of history of the repre-sentative historians of the Aufkldrung.

50LouisDaville,LeibnizHistorien,373.51Bernheimhas suggested hat pragmatichistoryhas appearedregularlywhen-ever a peopleof culturebecomesself-conscious ndsubjective,op. cit., 7ff. Polybiushad originallyusedthe phrase.52 J. Wagenmann, Mosheim,"AllgemeineDeutscheBiographie Leipzig,1885),XXII, 395.53J -MatthiasSchroeckh,ChristlicheKirchengeschichteFrankfort,1768),I, 264.


14/17

LEIBNIZ' SIGNIFICANCE FOR HISTORIOGRAPHY 345But the influence of the man whomHuxley has called "the mostcomprehensivehinker sinceAristotle" could not be containedwithinthe narrow imits set by the Aufkldrung. The creativeand dynamic

element of his thought in time received due recognition. The Nou-veaux Essais sur L'Entendement Humain, finally published in 1765,placed a greater emphasis upon individuality, spontaneity, and thedynamic aspects of Leibniz'sthought. Lessingtranslatedthem andwasprofoundly mpressedby the idea of the struggleof the individualsoul out of the darkdepthsof the unconscious oward the clearlightof consciousness. The story of Lessing,much influencedby Leibniz,and of the initial impetus he gave to Romanticism has often beentold. The relation of Leibniz to the new "historicism" is less wellknown.Wilhelm Dilthey has stated the essence of the contribution ofLeibniz with almostepigrammatical orce: "The aridnaturalsystemchanges so that Leibniz preparesthe way for the historical worldview."54 The nonconformist ideas he advanced eventually sub-verted the structureof rationalismhe himself had built. These ideashad deeproots in the past. Leibnizthoughtnot only in termsof theworld view of naturallaw, but also in terms derivedfrom the Refor-mation, the Renaissance,and earliertimes.55 Many of his conceptsbore a distinctresemblance o those of Nicolas Cusanus, or example.His mind assimilatedmany Platonic and Neoplatonicideas, illustrat-ing once more the truth of Whitehead'ssuggestionthat the "safestgeneral characterizationof the European philosophicaltradition isthat it consists in a series of footnotes to Plato." The Neoplatonicelement in Leibniz'sthought in particular ntroducedan anti-ration-alist currentwhich,whilehe controlled t rigidlyin his system,never-theless, provideda potential sourcefor a new philosophicaldevelop-ment.56 Specifically,three factors were of special import for a newhistorical point of view, namely, the concept of individualism,dy-namic development,and relativism.The originsof a conceptof individualismsignificant or historicalthought are to be found earlier than Herderor even Winckelmann.57

54 " Weltanschauung nd Analysedes Menschenseit Renaissanceund Reforma-tion,"Gesammelte chriften, I (Leipzig,1923),469. 55AdolfHarnack,op.cit., I, 10.56 JosephPolitella,Platonism,Aristotelianism, nd Cabalism n the Philosophyof Leibniz(Philadelphia,1938), 11ff.,discussespointsof similaritywith the Enneadsand thoroughlyexplores his type of correspondencend derivation.57Cf. FriedrichEngel-Janosi,"The Growth of German Historicism,"JohnsHopkins UniversityStudies (Baltimore,1944), series LXII, no. 2, 18: "Winckel-mann'sHistoryof AncientArt conceived he conceptof individuality. Two decadeslater Herder made it a principle to grasp historical individualities .... Bothwritersopenedup a new world for the historian."


15/17

346 LEWIS W. SPITZThis concept was alreadydevelopedin the thought of Leibniz. Hisdissertation,presentedat the age of sixteen to the faculty of LeipzigUniversity, arguedthe importanceof the individual entity; the in-dividual is individuatedby his whole nature.58 John Dewey believesthat the questionof the relation of the individual to the universe isfor Leibniz the nerve of the philosophicproblem.59The NouveauxEssais stress the significanceof the "spirit which loves unity in di-versity," a phrase employed since by Karl Lamprechtand others."Individuality includesinfinity and only he who is capableof com-prehending t can have the knowledgeof the principleof individua-tion of this or that thing. This arisesfrom the influenceof all thingsin the universe upon each other."60 Thus a qualitative differencemust exist between all individuals. This view of the free-actingpowerof a personwas in sharpcontrast to the ideal abstract naturallaw conceptionof human nature."'A corollary o the conceptof the varietasrerumwas the dynamicdevelopmentof the individual. The monadis not a static entity, butrather a dynamic principle, a force, which constantly unfolds itslatent potentialities from an inner source. In the worldthe monadprogressivelydevelopsself-consciousness nd at the sametime revealsitself. Aristotleconceivedof freedomas intelligenceandspontaneity.Leibniz conceived of it as the degreeof perceptionand spontaneityachieved, nevertheless, always within the bounds imposed by themonad's own nature. Nor can the soul unroll at once everythingthat is enfoldedin it, for its complexityis infinite.62 Moreover,theidea of many small perceptionsfrom the realm of the unperceiveduniting to achieve a perception,as many small waves make the roar

58DisputatioMetaphysicade PrincipioIndividui,Gerhardt,Phil. Schriften,IV,18ff.: " Pono igitur: omne individuum sua tota Entitate individuatur .... Tertiasententia est, Existentiamesse principiumIndividuationis." Sigmund Auerbach,however,believedthat this dissertationwas muchoverratedas a clue to the monad-ology, and should be understood n an Aristotelianor scholastic sense. Zur Ent-wicklungsgeschichteer LeibnitzchenMonadenlehreDessau, 1884), 11f.59Leibniz'sNew Essays Concerninghe HumanUnderstandingChicago,1886;new ed., 1902), 45.60NouveauxEssais, Bk. III, chap. III, ? 6, Gerhardt,Phil. Schriften,V, 268.Leibniz was fond of Hippocrates' phrase oil/7rvota 7rarira,all things breathe together.Cf. especiallyNouveaux Essais, Bk. II, chap. XXVIII, Gerhardt,Phil. Schriften,V, 213ff.61 Karl Biedermann,Deutschland m AchtzehntenJahrhundert Leipzig,1858),II-1, 249, suggests hat Leibnizwas inspired o this ideaof a self-activehumansoulby the new discoveriesof minuteorganic ife in nature.62 Monadology,? 61, Gerhardt,Phil. Schriften,VI, 617.


16/17

LEIBNIZ' SIGNIFICANCE FOR HISTORIOGRAPHY 347of the sea, also subverted the Cartesian reliance on clear and distinctideas.63 All bodies are in flux, all is in development, change, andgrowth. This was an important preparation for modern genetic his-tory. "The present is big with the future and heavy with the past,"he wrote.64 Nevertheless, the breakthrough of individuality and dy-namic development was not complete in Leibniz. The spontaneousdevelopment according to the individual's own law was still a reflec-tion of the universal reign of law and norms.65Finally, since every monad reflects its own picture of the universeand there is consequently a countless number of different world pic-tures, a relativistic element is included in the monadology. However,Leibniz held that all these views are only perspectives on the one uni-verse and so escaped complete relativism.66Neither Lessing, Kant, nor Herder read the Annales, but these"progressivist" historians and many others influential in the de-velopment of historicism through the nineteenth century read andwere influenced particularly by the more original and creative aspectsof Leibniz's philosophy.67 Lessing's Erziehung des Menschenge-schlechts (1780), Kant's Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte inweltbiirgerlicher Absicht (1784), and Herder's Ideen zu einer Phi-losophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784) reveal in various waysthe impact of his thought. In 1770, in fact, Herder wrote an essayentitled " Truths from Leibniz." Herder understood that Wolff hadtaken the most conventional ideas of Leibniz, the "new Plato," anddropped some of his more valuable insights. Similarly the Leibniziancontinuity and development became for Kant the Werden or be-coming in outward form of inward forces, in other words, the creativenature of time, and for Herder the change of individuals and nationswithin the cosmic continuity. Rejecting a pre-conceived plan, Her-der yet saw continuity in the entire scheme of things. The first ideaof the first man's soul is connected with the last thought of the last

63 Prefacea NouveauxEssais,Gerhardt,Phil. Schriften,V, 49ff. 64 Ibid.,V, 48.65 A half-centuryagoPaul Janet couldsay: "It is metaphysicsand not physicswhich is risingabovemechanicalism,"ntroduction o Leibniz,Discourse on Meta-physics (Chicago,1927; 1st ed., 1902), x.66Ernst Troeltsch n his essay on "The Ideas of NaturalLaw and Humanity"concludedthat "it was not after all Romanticismand Hegel which first dividedGermanyfrom the West; it was the mysticismof Eckhart and the philosophyofLeibniz,with its relativismandits doctrineof immanence,"n Otto Gierke,NaturalLaw and the Theoryof Society, 1500-1800(Cambridge,1934), 212.67FriedrichMeinecke,Die Entstehung des Historismus (Munich, 1946), de-velops the relationshipof Leibniz to the early historicism n a brilliantand muchmorecomprehensiveway than is here possible.


17/17

348 LEWIS W. SPITZman. Moreover, since Nature has given the earth to her humanchildrenand has permittedthem to germinateuponit what by virtueof its place, time, and potency could germinate,the historian mustview all without partiality and judge without passion. One needonly ask for the criterionwhichmakes a judgment possibleat all onthese premises,and the specterof relativity arises.The contemporary chool of historicalthought which has grownout of this traditionderivedfrom LeibnizthroughHerdermaintainsmany viewpointsfoundin the thought of Leibniz. Thoughthis viewof history has developed a self-consciousgroup of adherents onlywithin the last half century or so-the term Historismus was firstused in Karl Werner'sbook on Vico in 1879-it was in developmentduring the whole span of the past century. Friedrich Meinecke,without doubt the most prominent adherent of historicism today,considers t more than a spiritual-intellectualmethod, rather a dif-ferent view of the world and life, revealing deeper insights thanotherwisepossible.68 The debt this historicalinterpretationowes tothe originaland creativethought of Leibnizis obviousfrom its basicinterest in the individual,in dynamicchangeand development,andin the resultingrelativism."Leibniz combinedtwo great qualities which are almost incom-patible with one another-the spirit of discovery and the spirit ofmethod,"wrote the admiringDiderot. The spirit of method tendedto yield conventionaland conformistpatternsof thought, and beingin tune with the times, it was embracedby the Enlightenment anddirectlyinfluenced ts historiography. The spiritof discoveryyieldednew and creative insights of great significancefor historical inter-pretation and influenced n turn the developinghistoricismof mod-ern scholarship. A few days before his death, Leibniz wrote at theend of the introductionto his AnnalesImperii: "I relinquishto thediligence of others those who must be brought from the shadows[of the past] into the light."69 This almostpropheticstatement wellillustrates his contribution to historiography. His own historicalwritingand specifichistoricaltheory were of relatively little import.But the impact of his thought on the Enlightenmentand on histori-cism led to a diligent recoveryof the past and to particularinter-pretations of that past. It is in this that his great significance orhistoriographyies.

HarvardUniversity.68 F. Meinecke,op. cit., 1.69 P. xxii, "... quos ex tenebris eruendosaliorumdiligentiaerelinquo."

Documents

Spitz - The Significance of Leibniz for Historiography.pdf