Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Speed Cameras Cost-Effective Road Accident Reduction
or Expensive and Dangerous Confidence Trick?
A review based on many thousands of hours' study since 2000 of policies and benefits – real or imaginary.
Idris Francis [email protected]
01730 829 416 07717 222 459 May 2013
Safer Roads Humber Annual Safety Camera Progress Report
April 2010 – March 2011
59% reduction in the number of people killed or seriously injured at core safety camera sites in the Humberside Partnership area
42% reduction in the number of injury collisions at core safety camera sites in the Humberside Partnership area
£73,223,760 saving in terms of killed or seriously injured
9% reduction in the average speed and a 11% reduction in the 85th percentile speed
32% reduction in the number of vehicles exceeding the speed limit at camera sites.
Safer Roads Humber annual report 2010- 2011
Published March 2012
The partnership has now been operating safety cameras for eight years and the annual report gives details of the partnerships performance at core safety camera sites……..
Figures from the report show that, in the eight years since safety camera enforcement began, there has been a 59 per cent reduction in the number of people killed or seriously injured at the core safety camera sites. In real terms there are 411 people alive and well today that would have been killed or seriously injured if safety cameras had not been introduced.
Hull City Council, like many other Councils across the country, recently decided to stop funding speed cameras, North Lincolnshire considered doing so but then decided to continue funding in view of the casualty reductions supposedly achieved.
Who was right – are Safer Roads Humber’s claims justified, wishful thinking or indeed deliberate misrepresentation?
And even if the claims were justifed, would they represent good value for money compared to spending the same money in other ways?
Let's take a closer look at the numbers – starting with basic information about road and other deaths;-
Deaths Each Day in Britain (approximate)
All Causes...........................................................1,800Avoidable Hospital Deaths (infection, medicalerrors, neglect etc. ...............................................200Suicides....................................................................10Falls at home.............................................................7Road Deaths, all kinds ..............................................6As above, involving speeding ...................................1Primarily caused by speeding...................................0.5As above, on the 2% of roads with cameras ...........0.05 (0.003%)
Might a visitor from another planet wonder why we are spending £100m a year trying to reduce 0.003% of deaths in this country, when the same money could save vastly more lives spent in other more cost-effective ways? Like mops, buckets and disinfectant? When being in a hospital bed is several hundred times per hour, more likely to result in accidental death than being in a car at 70mph on a motorway ?
Years
Casualties
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 20100
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
GB FALLING FATALITY and SI TRENDS
GB FatalitiesSpeed Cameras
Hypothecation Scheme
World BustBrown Boom
ERM Bust
GB Serious Injuries (multiply by 12)
Years
Casualties
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20110
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
GB FALLING KSI TREND
GB KSI
Average 43116
42% GB Fall
Even from 2000 to date, less than 2% of road length is covered by speed cameras, so they could not have contributed significantly to this falling trend.
2
Years
Casualties
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20110
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
GB v Humberside Falling KSI Trends
GB KSI
Both scaled to 100% average in 2001
42% GB Fall
Humberside
33% HumberFall
For obvious reasons, casualty trends in each police area tend to be similar to national trends as shown here..However local data being smaller is more volatile,again as shown here..
For that reason what is significant in this sort of comparison is not whether one graph is above or below the other - that depends very much on the arbitrary choice of when the figures were scaled to match but how they change over time.
For the same reason of volatility percentage falls vary considerably depending on quite when the comparisons start and end
3
Main Causes of Long Term Downward Trends in Fatal and Serious Injuries
* Improvements of all kinds in vehicle design - better brakes, tyres, steering, road-holding, seat belts, air bags, ABS, crumple zones, stability systems
* Better roads and road surfaces, more motorways
* Slowing traffic growth, now falling for the first time since WW2
* Better and quicker medical and other help at accidents and later
* Fewer pedestrians casualties as car ownership widens
* Falling reporting levels of non-fatal injuries (down 25% in recent years)
* and others.
KSI %
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
63 Humber Camera Sites, KSI
Scaled to 100% average in 1999/00/01
55% Fall at 63 camera sites
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
SRH Core camera sites
100%
Impressive at first glance?
Graph is for financial year Aprl to March
3 Year Selection Period
A
KSI %
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
Humber Camera Sites, KSI
Scaled to 100% average in 1999/00/01
55% Fall at 63 camera sites
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
63 Core camera sites
100%
Impressive at first glance?Take a closer look.....
3 YearSelection Period
B
But these cameras did not go live until April to Aug 2003 so the large fall in 2002 was nothing to do with them. Nor did KSI fall in 2003 or 2004.after switch-on.
Camerasswitched onfrom April
KSI
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Humbers ide KSI with and without cameras
* Operational from Apr to Aug 2003 on
71 actualsites
100%
3 year Selection Period1999/00/01
254 sites had 3 or more KSIin 199/00/01, 63 with cameras, 189 without
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
SRH's 63 camera sites averaged 3 KSI in 3 years in the selection period but there were another 189 sites that would have qualified at the same timeon that basis but did not have cameras installed. The graph shows how little difference there wasbetween their results with and without cameras.
C
Higher in 2011 than in 2005
KSI
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
Humber Camera Sites, KSI v GB
Both scaled to 100% average in 1999/00/01
42% GB Fall
54% Fall at 63 camera sites
Showing how falls similar to those claimed as camera benefit also happened across the country where 98% of roads had no cameras.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
SRH Core camera sites
100%
Start of Enforcement
D
Casualties
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Why Camera Effectiveness Assessment is Nonsense
Camera effectiveness is claimed by many Reports, and indeed stated explicitly in the 2005 Handbook for Partnerships, to be the fall in casualties from the average in the 3 year site selection period before camera installation up to date.
Claimed as Camera Effect
However this makes the assumptions, invalid as we have seen, that:
(a) casualties would continue indefinitely at the same level were cameras not installed,
(b) the 3 year average accurately represents that long term level. rather than being an unusally high level which led to the site being selected in the first place.
(c) having reduced casualties almost immediately by far more than are ever caused by speeding in the first place, cameras then continue to reduce them further over time.
E
Casualties
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Why Camera Effectiveness Assessment is Nonsense
However, given that sites are chosen for unusually high casualty numbers,and given long term trends,observed falls are clearly primarily or indeed entirely to the two effects shown below:
Long term trend
Regression to the Mean(Return to Normal)
A new analysis of when and where some 7 million injury accidents happened from 1985 to 2011 confirms beyond rational doubt that this is indeed what happens,on average, across the country, and that results at camera sites are, again on average,indistinguishable from similar sites that have no cameras.
That claims for camera effecftiveness have been based on incompetent- or, worse,deliberately misleading - analysis has long been clear to critics. The new analysis however confirms that they provide no identifiable benefit and certainly none that remotely justify either the expense or the "war on motorists".
F
There is no data in the Report prior to the 1999/00/01 numbers, the “baseline” level from which they assess reductions, to establish whether that period’s numbers were normal or abnormal. When asked for that data SRH replied:
"The casualty data for 1987 to 1998 you have requested is pre Safer Roads Humber and not held by ourselves. I have transferred your request to Humberside Police as they may hold the information“
I replied
"That Safer Roads Humber, whose task is to reduce accidents over time, has not even bothered to obtain, let alone study, data prior to the 1999/00/01 site selection period the better to understand such trends, is not only significant but also utterly damning both of its competence and its integrity.”
Was it ever possible that the speed reductions claimed for the sites could ever have brought about the observed reductions in casualties in any case?
In other words, how significant a contributory factor in accidents is speeding? Fortunately, since 2005 police Stats 19 data includes whether speeding was a "very likely" or "possible" factor, and the results have been quite consistent since then.
And equally significant, by how much has speeding actually been reduced?
The answer in both cases is “Not a lot”
DfT Table RAS50007 2011 Killed Seriously injuredContributory factor No % No %
Road environment contributed 158 9 2,409 12Vehicle defects 55 3 450 2
Injudicious action 498 28 4,604 23Exceeding speed limit 242 14 1,378 7Travelling too fast for conditions 226 13 1,759 9Driver/rider error or reaction 1,185 68 13,395 66Poor turn or manoeuvre 202 12 2,842 14Failed to look properly 433 25 6,882 34Failed to judge path or speed 200 11 3,186 16Swerved 116 34 4,190 21Impairment or distraction 426 24 3,152 15Impaired by alcohol 166 9 1,386 7Behaviour or inexperience 467 27 5,247 26Careless, reckless or in 285 16 3,533 17Pedestrian only 302 17 3,779 19Total number 1,752 100 20,396 100
Table 4h: Most frequently recorded contributory factors for car driversGB 2007
Contributory factor recorded %Failed to look properly 20Failed to judge other person’s path or 11Careless, reckless or in a hurry 9Loss of control 8Poor turn or manoeuvre 8Slippery road (due to weather) 6Travelling too fast for conditions 6Sudden braking 4Following too close 4Exceeding speed limit 3 (compared to 6% overall)Impaired by alcohol 3Learner or inexperienced driver/rider 3Disobeyed 'Give Way' or 'Stop' sign 2Dazzling sun 1Nervous, uncertain or panic 1Illness or disability, mental or physic 1
Source – 2007b DfT Report based on police Stats 19 data
Now let's have a look at the speed reductions actually achieved by Safer Roads Humber’ cameras:
Throughout the list of some 80 sites, speed reductions are in fact relatively trivial, amounting to only the odd 1 to 3 mph. That, incidentally, is why SRH choose to quote percentages, hoping that we will not notice that 9% of 35mph is only 3.2mph. Not not remotely enough to bring about even the modest casualty reductions that might theoretically be possible, let alone the wildly exaggerated claims of the Report.
Look for example at line 5 (in red) where a (strangely precise) 53.11% reduction in KSI was apparently achieved by an increase in average speed from 44mph to 48mph, an increase in 85th percentile speed from 47mph to 56mph and a fall in the percentage of drivers exceeding the speed limit only from 83% to 81%! . Welcome to Fantasy Land!
Summary
Most or all of the observed reduction at those sites would have happened anyway, without cameras, as it did across the 98% of roads across the country which have no cameras
A major part of the reduction happened in 2002 before the cameras were in operation and could not, therefore have been due to them.
After switch-on KSI hardly changed in 2003 or 2004.
It is not credible that cameras, having achieved nothing for 16 to 21 months could then cause the steep fall of 2005 .
Since 2005 the trend has been up, not down.
It is impossible even if speeding were eliminated to bring about more than 5% or so in KSI, and that only on 2% of road length.
Reductions in speed and speeding have been minimal and trivial
And also - DfT values for accidents prevented are nonsense. see http://www.fightbackwithfacts.com/bogus-dft-values/
“Regression to the Mean” aka “Return to Normal”
At camera sites selected for higher than normal KSI it is likely that (on average) casualty numbers will fall back to lower levels without intervention.
We have seen that this happened across Humberside’s 63 core sites, but also Dave Finney of Slough has established that it happened across the whole of the Thames Valley police area, in both cases before their cameras were switched on.
Given the importance of this effect a new analysis of regression to the mean has been done using police Stats19 data for 6 million injury accidents from 1985 to 2011 to see what did actually happen, 300,000 times, at 1km square locations (corresponding to camera sites) that had suffered at least 3 KSI in 3 years.
The results are consistent across the country and very significant:
These graphs – there are hundreds of them for different police areas and qualifying periods – all confirm that the normal pattern of casualties at sites selected for higher than normal levels, in the great majority of cases without cameras, is that:
Numbers follow national trends except in the 3 year selection period
No group of sites that qualifies in any one selection period sees another such episode – because next time around, accidents being accidents they hppen somewhere else.
Casualties revert to the normal trend in the first year after the selection period, and therefore normally before cameras would have been installed
The size of the fall in the first year afterwards is determined by the rise at the start of the selection period, and clearly not by anything to do with cameras.
Subsequent falls are due to long term trend
The fall from the average of the selection period to the average of years 2, 3 and 4 afterwards is due largely to return to normal but also slightly to trend.
Close to £2bn has been wasted over more than 12 years, pretending to bring about casualty reductions that would have happened anyway, without cameras.
For more than a decade a toxic combination of gross incompetence in planning, analysis and claims by the DfT, its Consultants, other advisers, vested interests and academics who really should have known better has wasted close to £2bn, penalised millions of safe drivers, cost tens of thousands their licenses and thousands their jobs, businesses and even marriages and not a few their lives.
Now at last this new analysis confirms beyond rational argument what many critics have said from the very beginning, that it never was possible to reduce accidents to any statistically significant extent at sites, let alone across the country, by using speed cameras, and that accident reductions at camera sites are little different from what happens without cameras.
Now at last this nonsense has to stop, now at last those who have perpetrated this fraud upon drivers and taxpayers, and who have consistently brushed off reasoned objections, must be called to account for what they have done.
And when they close down this insane and dangerous system, Parliament should take the opportunity to repeal Section 172 1998 Road Traffic Act that removes from drivers alone the right of silence that has been ours for centuries - and still is, for anyone suspected of any other offence including murder, terrorism, rape, arson, fraud and thousands more.
The Privy Council decision in 2000 and the ECHR decision in 2007 that authorised the breach of this fundamental principle of our justice system did so primarily because of a perceived road safety interest in penalising drivers of speeding vehicles.
Now that there clearly is no such public interest it is time to end this serious breach of our legal rights so that it becomes once again the responsibility of the authorities to prove their case, not the responsibility of the defendant to convict himself out of his own mouth.
With thanks for advice and assistance to many fellow realists about and campaigners against speed cameras, including particularly:
Eric Bridgstock
Ian Belchamber
Dave Finney
Brian Gregory
Al Gullon
Malcolm Heymer
John Lambert
All this information and a great deal more is available at on the fight back with facts web site. It and may be freely used and circulated to help bring to an end a scam which has already cost this country close to £2bn and made our roads more dangerous.
END
