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8/6/2019 Speech; Def Strat & Int Def Coop IDS
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INDIAS DEFENCE STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE COOPERATION
INTRODUCTION
1. The 20
th
Century has perhaps been one of the bloodiestcenturies in the history of mankind, wherein, the world has
witnessed conflicts across the entire spectrum of warfare from
low intensity to world wars including the use of nuclear weapons.
However, on the contrary, the latter half of the century also saw
a number of landmark events such as the end in a continent that
suffered two world wars in the space of three decades.
Increasingly states are getting into multi-lateral alliances for
security and economic reasons. The NATO continues to expand
and so does the EU.
2. It has been clear from the past two decades that a global power
shift from the Euro-Atlantic West to an Asia centered East has
been in progress. This has far reaching implications not only for
the nature of international order as it emerges in the coming
decades and great power relations, but also inevitably for the
security environment. It is reasonable to assume that there will
be a strong tendency towards polarization of the polycentric
international system over time leading to multipolarity. However,
any form of polarity in the international system intrinsically
contains an implicit phenomenon of areas of control and
influence and hegemonic framework of inter state relations.
Indias interest would be served well by perpetuation of non-
hegemonic polycentrism rather than any form of polarization inthe international order.
3. With this background, I would give an overview of Indias
Defence Strategy and International Defence Cooperation. I
would cover the topic under the following heads:-
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(a) Strategic Overview and defence Strategy
(i) Global Situation
(ii) Indias Core Values and National Aims
(iii) Favourable elements that can be identified for India
(iv) Some negative elements
(v) Our Security Challenges
(b) Defence Cooperation
(i) Means of engagement between nations
(ii) History of International Defence Cooperation in India
(iii) Definitions
(iv) Benefits of International Defence Cooperation
(v) Defence Diplomacy and Cooperation: MoD Point of view
(vi) Hurdles to Defence Cooperation
(vii) Avenues for Defence Cooperation
(viii) Framework for Defence Cooperation
(ix) Planning Considerations
(x) Mechanism for Defence Cooperation
(xi) Policy Guidelines
(c) Conclusion
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW
Global Situation
2. For much of the millennium gone by, Europe has been the
strategic heartland of the world. It gave birth to the concept of
the nation-state, it ruled the world, it was the arena for much of
the bloodshed and conflict of the 20th Century, and now, in a bold
experiment, it is evolving into the European Union, finally
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seeking peace within itself and with the world. The last decade
of the millennium and the first half of the first decade of this
millennium have witnessed significant events that have catalysed
a transformation of the existing world order and portend a new
distribution of power. These events included the rise of the East
Asian tigers, the rapid growth of the economies of China and
India, the end of the Cold War following the demise of the Soviet
Union, and, the continuing stagnation of Japan. The euphoria
that was generated at the dawn of the new Century was rudely
shattered by the catastrophic events that have become known as
9/11 and the reaction that followed, notably, the American
invasion of Iraq, the intervention in Afghanistan, and, the
polarisation of ideologies between Western (Christian) states
and radical Islamic ones, termed the Clash of Civilisations by
Samuel Huntington. All these events, when taken together, have
radically transformed the international geo-political balance of
the new millennium. The beginning of the 21st Century has fixed
the worlds spotlight onto South Asia and adjoining West Asia.
3. In this rapidly changing geo-political scenario, Europe appears to
have relinquished its centuries old eminence as the strategicheartland of the world. One suspects that it has no further
desire for maintaining such a position. We are witnessing a
fundamental geo-strategic alteration. South Asia (and adjoining
West Asia) is emerging as the arena for the big dogs of the 21 st
Century. In essence, the strategic heartland of the 21st
Century will be a triangle with its apex at the Caspian Sea,
and its base running across the Indian Ocean. India occupies
the central position in this triangle. Therefore, we may expect to
be drawn into or affected by the power struggles and the
conflicts of the 21st Century. Indias growing geo-political
eminence engendered by a robust economic growth and
democratic principles of governance urges us to espouse a
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foreign policy that is pro-active, rather than remaining chained to
the traditionally benign and reactive policy of yester-years.
Indias Core Values and National Aims
4. A countrys defence strategy cannot be evolved from the
vacuum. It has to be based on the national core values and aims
and the geo-political situation that prevails.
5. Our Core Values. Indias development as a nation has evolved
against the backdrop of Indias core values namely, democracy,
secularism and peaceful co-existence and the national goal of
social and economic development.
6. Our National Aim. The overall national aim can be deductedfrom the introductory paragraphs of the Annual Report of the
Ministry of External Affairs, To promote an environment of
peace and stability in the region and in the world, to enable
Indias accelerated Socio-economic development and to
safeguard its national security, maintaining autonomy of decision
making and equity in the conduct of international relations.
Favourable Elements that can be Identified for India
7. During the Cold War, the world order was characterised by a well
defined bipolarity separated by the symbolic Iron Curtain. This
has given way to a complicated and unpredictable, globalised
world, where many countries are seeking to leverage available
strengths, opportunities and advantages to gain desired
standings in the international pecking order. From Indias
viewpoint, many favourable elements can be identified. These
include:-
(a) Growing acknowledgement and expectation of India as a major player in Asia,
with a pronounced impact on global affairs.
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(b) Globalisation of the world economy, which is manifested by intense economic
engagement between major powers and is creating greater inter-dependency
and intricate linkages between nations.
(c) Due to the growing economic interdependencies and inter-linkages, the
spectre of conventional armed conflict between major nations is diminishing.
(d) The growing strategic ties with all the major countries, especially the US and
Japan, coupled with the rejuvenation of traditional ties with Russia and the increasing
engagement with China.
(e) The growing international support and belief in the rapid and sustained growth
of the Indian economy.
(f) The growing number of countries that want to do business with India.
(g) The growing and, at times grudging, acceptance of Indias presence as a
front-runner in international fora.
(h) A strong belief in the principles of democracy, a secular and pluralistic
societal fabric and a political outlook that is non-aligned and willing to engage all
nations in a constructive and mutually beneficial manner.
Some Negative Elements
8. There are also some negative elements that confront India.
These are :-
(a) The persisting adversarial attitude adopted by Pakistan against India, fuelled
by the ISI and the Pakistan Army.
(b) The continued and increasing reliance on the sea for almost all our mercantile
trade, as also resource and energy demands, which constitutes a vulnerability whose
mitigation mandates a more pronounced maritime orientation as an adjunct to the
dominant continental focus of our national security policy.
(c) Chinas South Asia policy, which remains inimical to Indias regional security
interests. This includes the continuing defence equipment support to Pakistan,
including the clandestine transfer of missile and nuclear technology. The String-of-
Pearls strategy of establishing bases across the IOR is supplemented by the supply
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of arms to Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, in a strategy that reflects the
Covert Encirclement of India.
(d) The growing circles of instability, internal conflict and political turmoil
surrounding India. These include Iraq, Afghanistan, and now, parts of Pakistan in the
west, Nepal in the north, Myanmar and Bangladesh in the east and Sri Lanka in thesouth.
(e) The aggressive policies and perpetual presence of major powers in the Indian
Ocean and Persian Gulf regions to safeguard energy interests.
(f) The growth of religious fundamentalism.
(g) The emergence of the non-state actor as a credible security challenge to the
nation state.
Our Security Challenges
9. In the 21st Century, India faces peculiar security challenges. We
live in a dangerous neighbourhood and need to bring into
perspective, our security deficit. Few other countries in the world
face the full spectrum of threats to their security as India does,
from low intensity conflict to an unfriendly nuclear weaponised
neighbourhood. Our response to such an environment has beenanything but militaristic or belligerent. This has led to growing
international respect, especially among the weaker nations. Our
security concerns are enumerated below: -
(a) To begin with, India is located at the centre of an arc of fundamentalist
activism, terrorism and political instability between North and East Africa and South
East Asia. Over the last decade, this region has witnessed some of the most
dramatic acts of terrorism, from the US Embassy bombings of Nairobi andMombassa, to incidents in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Bali and Jakarta. In
India itself, the Mumbai blasts in 1993, the Parliament attack of 2001 and the most
recent 26/11 Mumbai carnage were, arguably, the original act of mass terrorism,
easily similar in modus operandi and targets to 9/11 in their synchronised, serial
character and targeting of state and economic symbols. India faces terror outrages
whose regularity of occurrence would have ripped the very fabric of any other nation
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on earth. That we continue to act with equanimity and do not allow these outrages to
deviate us from the path of economic growth and political stability, is proof of the
resilience of the Indian nation and the certitude of its eventual great power status.
(b) India has, since independence, faced aggression and conflict with its two
largest neighbours. At least one has been openly hostile and adventuristic throughthis entire period. The very survival of the political leadership of this neighbour is
predicated upon an avowed anti-India stand. There are unresolved territorial and
boundary issues with both neighbours. While one of them lays claim to an entire
state of India, both illegally occupy portions of our country. The maritime boundary
too is a contentious issue with one of the neighbours. Although we have well-
established dialogue mechanisms with both neighbours and talks, as also
Confidence Building Measures, we have made some progress, but we are still a long
way from being able to let our guard down.
(c) India faces an ongoing proxy war from across its borders through terrorism
and local insurgencies. There are also spill overs of internal conflicts in our
neighbouring countries and threats to internal security from extremist elements from
within.
(d) We have to contend with instability and failing states in our neighbourhood
providing the breeding ground for terrorists and other non state actors. The human
dimension of this problem is the huge and unaccounted ill-legal migration into our
border states, especially in the North East, and in Tamil Nadu.
(e) India is faced with an unfavourable nuclear and missile environment. Apart
from the two declared nuclear weapon states, both of whom have been
internationally implicated in illegal proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile
technology, we have to contend with the possibility of WMDs falling into the hands of
terrorists and non state actors in our vicinity.
(f) The surfeit of malignant vectors in the maritime domain poses a clear and
present danger to the safety of of our annual overseas trade currently valued at over
US$ 200 bn, our offshore installations worth over Rs.30,000 crores, and, could
potentially destabilise the entire region through illegitimate activities like WMD
proliferation, gun running, human trafficking, maritime terrorism, etc.
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(g) And last (though certainly not the least), we have to contend with our own
huge mass of poverty stricken people (230 million are estimated to live below the
Indian poverty line) high rate of illiteracy, inadequacies of infrastructure, and, gross
deficiencies in elements of basic human care, all of which, when combined together,
make for a fertile ground for sourcing human fodder for unrest and insurgency.
10.The primacy of economic growth in our political agenda, and the
increasing integration with the global economy that globalisation
demands, have set in motion an inexorable trend of integrating
foreign and defence policies to align with and support economic
policy. It is not possible to deal with any nation exclusively on a
diplomatic, or military, or even economic, front alone. Synergy
between economic, diplomatic and military cooperation is
required to achieve our objectives. The wide spectrum of
activities that fall under the rubric of defence diplomacy and
military cooperation lend themselves to effective and optimal
exploitation in furtherance of economic and foreign policy
objectives. It is, therefore, axiomatic that India with its second-
largest military in the world, an impressive naval capability, and,
a modest defence industry, would seek to leverage these
attributes to its advantage.
DEFENCE COOPERATION IN INDIA
Means of Engagement Between Nations
11.The four major means of engagement between nations are
diplomatic, economic, informational and military. As the chances
of direct military confrontation between nations reduces, military
diplomacy and defence cooperation gain increasing importance.
Apart from being merely an effective tool of foreign policy that
helps achieve strategic and economic objectives, calibrated
military engagement is, in many an instance, the only political
expedient available when every other form of diplomacy is held
hostage to international opinion and sanctions. Military
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engagement has always been regarded as the final frontier of
strategic partnership and its employment as a political overture
indicates a willingness to pursue broader cooperation, mutual
trust and commitment to overcome and manage differences. It
could also be used as a means of introducing transparency,
particularly with regard to a nations intention and capability and
for building or reinforcing perceptions of common interests.
Military engagement is also the only viable solution to dealing
with the myriad challenges that confront us in the vast expanse
of the IOR challenges that no nation can address with its
individual prowess. Thus, defence cooperation if properly
employed becomes an effective tool for the furtherance of
national interests and objectives.
History of International Defence Cooperation in India
12.General. Before moving on to the contours of an International
Defence and Military Cooperation Plan for India, a brief look at
history and some definitions relevant to International Defence
and Military Cooperation would be useful.
13.Brief Historical Background. The post-Independence historyof Indian Defence Cooperation is as follows :-
(a) Till 1962. Indias approach till 1962 was based on the
Nehruvian Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Defence cooperation was restricted
largely to UK and Nepal. In Nepal, apart from joint check posts on the Nepal-Tibet
border, Indian training teams were functioning till 1970. An issue of considerable
significance, however, was the participation of the Navy in the Joint Exercises
Trincomalee (JET) series of combined exercises with other commonwealth nations.The advantages of combined exercises in terms of exposure to contemporary tactics
and the promotion of interoperability were evident even in those early times.
(b) 1962-1971. Following the 1962 Sino Indian, conflict
defence cooperation occurred initially in the form of material and training assistance
from USA. Cooperation also commenced with Bhutan and continues to date.
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Training assistance was provided to many African countries. The latter half of this
period gradually saw a cooling-off of defence relations with USA, mainly on account
of US assistance to Pakistan and Indias decision not to participate in US- led
regional military alliances.
(c) 1971-1991. The events leading to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and the Liberation of Bangladesh saw the Indo-Soviet Friendship
Treaty of 1971 and the availability of Soviet equipment at Rupee rates, making the
Indian Armed Forces major users of Soviet equipment. Cooperation with Nepal
reduced, with the withdrawal of Indian training teams and joint check posts. On the
other hand, military maritime cooperation, picked-up once again. After re-opening
the ports of Chittagong and those along the Pusur river in 1971, India effected the
transfer/sale (at friendship prices) of IN ships Akshay and Ajay in Apr 73 and Jul 74
respectively, as also of MVs Madhumati, Pasni and Anwar Baksh (Pakistani traders
captured in 1971) between Apr 73 and Nov 74. Maritime engagement was, obviously
not restricted to countries with whom India had common borders. Thus, in 1974,
India gifted an ex-IN Patrol Vessel (INS Amar) to Mauritius and set-up a professional
assistance programme involving the deputation of Indian Naval Officers to that
country a programme that is continuing to-date. Engagement with Sri Lanka too,
reached unprecedented heights as a consequence of the bilateral agreement of
1987, which saw the deployment of IPKF in Sri Lanka and training in India of largenumbers of Sri Lankan personnel. Overall, a large number of trainees from Africa and
Asia underwent training, especially pre-commission training and naval training at all
levels, in India. In 1988 India responded with military forces to prevent a coup in the
Maldives.
(d) 1991-1998. Subsequent to the disintegration of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the re-aligned focus of the United States
heralded the onset of greater collaboration between the two countries. Service toService military cooperation was initiated as a result of the proposals of Gen Wayne
Kicklighter, C-in-C Central Command in 1991. The Executive Steering Group
meetings commenced in 1992 as did the MALABAR Series of bilateral naval
exercises. India reoriented its defence cooperation endeavours with the newly
carved out republics from the erstwhile Soviet Union and Eastern European
countries, driven mainly by the need to acquire defence equipment. It was also the
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period when Indian Foreign Policy was reframed and expanded through Narasimha
Raos Look East policy in 1993 and the Gujral Doctrine in 1997 for relations with
neighbours, resulting in some increase in defence cooperation. Even prior to the
enunciation of the Look East policy, the navy, in realisation of the importance of
engaging emerging South East Asian states, had commenced combined bilateral
naval exercises with the Republic of Singapore Navy, an annual feature that has
grown manifold in scope and intensity. Nor was maritime defence cooperation limited
to SE Asia alone. IN ships Jamuna and Sutlej carried out asurvey off the South
East Coast of Oman from 11 Aug 93 to 05 Feb 94, earning Rs.18.19 crs in foreign
exchange. These surveys were undertaken off the southeast coast of Oman, from
Ras Abu Daud to Sur. The surveys were aimed at collecting hydrographic data for
the development of fishing harbours and also for developing facilities for laying
offshore pipelines etc. India also transferred a second naval vessel, SDB T-61, to
Mauritius in Apr 93. Defence equipment related cooperation began to drive Indias
strategic relationships with Israel, France, South Africa and Russia.
(e) 1998-2001. As a result of the imposition of sanctions following the
Pokhran II tests in 1998, defence cooperation with USA, Australia and many other
countries stopped. However, it grew with France and some Asian countries. Our
defence cooperation with Israel also grew rapidly during this period. After Indias
mature handling of the Kargil conflict in 1999, many countries lifted their sanctions.Defence cooperation recommenced, albeit hesitatingly with USA, Australia and
others. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on America, in 2001, radically changed the global
security scenario. Suddenly, India was a much sought after partner for defence
cooperation. In Nov 2000, the IN effected its first large-platform transfer-that of INS
Saryu to Sri Lanka.
(f) 2001 Onwards. Self confidence arising from a glut of exploratory offers
received for defence cooperation in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict and 9/11,combined with a period of sustained economic growth, has led to a rapid increase in
Defence Cooperation, both in the number of countries being engaged and the range
and quantum of defence cooperation activities. In the area of defence equipment,
there has been a major shift from procurement- relationships to joint production and
transfer-of-technology (TOT) by the Indian defence industry. Capacity-building of the
smaller littorals in the IOR has remained a focus throughout and it was in pursuance
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of this that INS Tillanchang was transferred to Maldives in Apr 06 and INS Tarmugli
was transferred to Seychelles in Feb 05.
14.It may be concluded that while India has practiced International
Defence Cooperation, this was not entirely as per a well
coordinated plan, but had an element of adhocism. OurInternational Defence Cooperation Programme needs to be a
sustained effort and rigorously executed.
Definitions
15.There is a wide range of defence-centric terminologies used in
international relations. Some of these are explained below: -
(a) Defence Diplomacy. Defence diplomacy covers all defence-related
actions that further national aims and objectives. These actions may be unilateral,
bilateral or multilateral, within or outside ones national territory, and with or even
without the consent of other party/parties concerned. If unilateral armed action is
considered as being at one end of the spectrum of defence diplomacy, then bilateral
or multilateral defence cooperation in aid of civil power (HADR) would be the other
end.
(b) Security Cooperation. This would comprise those actions that are
undertaken after mutual consent. Thus Security Cooperation would provide the
overarching umbrella for all security-related cooperation. This would include bilateral
or multilateral security initiatives undertaken by defence and civilian security agencies
after mutual consent. It would include politico military areas such as the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; civilian security areas, such as actions to
curb/counter drug and arms smuggling; civilian intelligence cooperation, and;
defence cooperation.
(c) Defence Cooperation. Defence Cooperation would comprise actions
undertaken by the Defence Ministry and its agencies. This can be further sub
divided into strategic defence security cooperation, military to military cooperation
and defence industry and technology cooperation.
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(d) Military to Military Cooperation. Military to military cooperation would cover
cooperation involving uniformed armed forces, who share a unique bond universally.
It would be essentially focused on developing human or soft potential, related to the
man behind the weapon, through various facets of interaction such as weapon
platforms, tactical, strategic and doctrinal spheres, and a wide range of other
activities. It would also include exchange-visits, conduct of joint and/or combined
training exercises, assistance in defence training, participation in international and
regional security fora, arms and technology transfers, etc.
Benefits Of International Defence Cooperation
16.Defence Cooperation has been practiced since ancient times,
essentially in the form of alliances, both in pursuit of peace and
prosecution of hostilities. Even the two World Wars were fought
by two alliances the same is the case during the more recently
fought Gulf War, as well as in the ongoing operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
17.Militaries have strong organisational memories and, military
cooperation, more often than not, transcends the shifts in
political relationships. Some examples where defencecooperation is linked with international engagement are NATOs
Peace for Progress programme and its linkage with EU;
NATOs offer of membership to former Warsaw Pact and
erstwhile republic of the Soviet Union states; the revival of India-
US cooperation through the military-to- military cooperation
initiatives in 1991, post Pokhran in 1998, and, in 2001 post-9/11;
Indias engagement of Myanmar in the late 1990s, and the Indo-
Tajik cooperation in 2001. On the other hand, the poor bilateral
relations and the near-zero defence cooperation with
Bangladesh is a contra-indicator even though a nascent
relationship appears to be in the making.
18.Defence Cooperation can assist in creating an environment of
peace and stability in the region. This can lead to the right-sizing
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(iv) Military human-resource development (training teams and such like).
(b) Enhancing our International Stature. This is a natural outcome of
participation in UNPKO and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)
ops. This however entails concomitant responsibilities and initiatives such as: -
(i) Creating UN training facilities and inviting participation by friendly
countries.
(ii) Creating and sustaining regional structures and/or constructs, such as
the IONS initiative, for cooperative HADR actions.
(c) Access to Defence Equipment This can be through : -
(i) Acquisitions. Acquisitions, however, should not create dependency
that in turn permit foreign powers to dictate terms to India.
(ii) Technology-transfers.
(iii) Joint R&D.
(iv) Joint production.
(d) Sustaining the Domestic Defence Industry. This would include: -
(i) Promoting defence exports through sales, grants, gifts, and aid.
(ii) Technology transfers.
(iii) Joint R&D.
(iv) Joint production.
(e) Enhancing Regional Security. This is achieved by rendering assistance to
friendly countries in developing/enhancing their defence capability. This may be
achieved by:-
(i) Providing exposure to own systems.
(ii) Providing assistance in the development of doctrine, concepts, material
resources and human resources.
(iii) Transfer of technology and hardware.
(iv) Repair assistance and technical advice
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(f) Enhancement of Military Capability . Our military capability would be
enhanced through cooperative activities such as: -
(i) Personnel contacts through professional military exchanges.
(ii) Human-resource development by enhancing basic and advanced
military skills and war fighting skills at tactical, strategic, conceptual and
doctrinal levels.
(iii) Defence management specialiszations in areas such as resources,
techniques and training.
(iv) Incorporating best practices.
(g) Promote Defence And Military Interoperability. This can be achieved by
having: -
(i) Commonality of equipment and exploitation practices.
(ii) Commonality in military procedures.
(iii) Military human resource development.
Defence Diplomacy and Cooperation : MoD Point of View
18.As stated in the MoD Annual Report, closer security dialogue and strengthening
of defence cooperation with friendly countries are important objectives andcomponents of the overall defence and foreign policies. The Report also states
that defence cooperation engagement has increased and diversified very
significantly since 2003-04. The MoD differentiates between defence diplomacy
and defence cooperation. It refers to defence diplomacy as those actions
undertaken through the exchange of high level-defence related visits, dialogue on
security challenges and port calls, while defence cooperation covers areas such
as training-exchanges, combined exercises, sourcing, development, production
and marketing of defence equipment, and, other forms of cooperation. The range
of the MoDs defence diplomacy and defence cooperation activities include: -
(a) Visits by Heads of Government/State where defence relations and
cooperation form a part of the agenda.
(b) Visits by Defence Ministers.
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(c) Visits by Foreign Ministers and other Ministers where defence relations
and cooperation form a part of the agenda.
(d) Defence Agreements or MoUs.
(e) Security Dialogue and Consultative Mechanisms.
(f) Visits by Heads of Defence Staff and the Services.
(g) Visits by Defence Secretaries.
(h) Training cooperation and assistance including Indian teams abroad.
(j) Exchanges of defence and military delegations.
(k) Joint and combined exercises
(l) Overseas deployments of naval units.
(m) Naval assistance.
(n) Military level exchanges.
(p) Defence equipment transfers and sourcing.
(q) Defence Industry Cooperation (JVs, Licensed Production, ToT, etc).
Hurdles to Defence Cooperation
19.Policy Formulation and Decision Making Process. Defence Cooperation is
dealt with on a case-to-case basis and it varies from country to country. HQ IDS
and Service HQs prepare country-wise Defence Cooperation plans, as and when
required by the MoD, or as separate initiatives. These plans/initiatives are
generally prepared, incorporating the inputs of concerned branches / directorates
at Service HQ, as well as inputs from our Defence Attaches. These are approved
at the level of the appropriate PSOs, and then forwarded to MoD. Within the MoD,
all decision-making is centralised as the current rules of transaction of businessmandate that all incoming and outgoing visits and cooperation activities have to
be approved by the Defence Minister personally after Political clearance has been
accorded by the MEA. The MEA carries out an in-house analysis. It consults the
Head of Mission (who, in most cases would have cleared the proposal during
consultations with the Defence Attach prior to initiation of the proposal by
Service Headquarters) and then accords clearance or negates the proposal. The
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processing of requests for military course vacancies by foreign countries is
worked out annually. The allocation is finalised by MEA on receipt of
recommendations from the Service HQs. Till recently, MEA finalised the military
course allocations on their own, which often resulted in inappropriate military
engagement with the foreign country. In 2005, a move was initiated by Service
HQs through MoD to streamline the process wherein MEA intimates budgetary
limits and Service HQ, in consultation with Defence Attaches/ Missions abroad,
propose appropriate courses for final allotment by MEA.
20.Funding and Expenditure on Defence Cooperation. MoD has no dedicated
funds for defence cooperation except for hosting incoming foreign delegations
and the foreign travel of its personnel, needed to meet its own organisational
requirements. Clear figures are hard to come by, as there is no separate budget
head for defence cooperation. However guess-estimation would put the total
annual expenditure by MEA and MoD on International Defence cooperation, both
material assistance and foreign travel, at approximately Rs 200 Crores (US $ 40
Million).
21. Lack of Focussed Approach. Despite some instances of the successful use of
defence cooperation, in furtherance of political objective, the majority of our international
relations initiatives evidence the relatively modest use of Defence Cooperation as a foreign
policy tool. The general state of inimical relations with countries in the region and the
consequent impact on the internal stability of the country suggest deficiencies in the Indian
approach. Further, an analysis of Indias International Defence Cooperation engagement
within the strategic footprint as defined in the PMs statement Indias strategic footprint as
the region bounded by the Horn of Africa, West Asia, Central Asia, South East and Far East
Asia and beyond to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean, indicates that the Indian approach
is not fully tailored to achieve this end. It is not sufficiently proactive either, to be able to
exploit opportunities that present themselves. Bilateral agreements and MoUs are often atthe behest of the other country. Although the drivers for defence cooperation have been
precisely identified, our actions in pursuance of perceived objectives are discernibly
inadequate and disjointed. The restricted, reactive and isolated approach that characterises
our defence cooperation initiatives stems from the over-centralisation of decision making
with the MEA and the absence of a coordinated strategy for the employment of defence
diplomacy and cooperation in consonance with both foreign policy and national security
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objectives. Our bias towards relations based purely on defence trade stems from an
inability to recognise the intangible benefits that accrue from institutionalised collaboration
and other forms of cooperative interaction. It would be nave of us to remain oblivious to the
compelling need for the present directionless approach to metamorphose into a focussed
one that emulates the increasing global trend towards active bilateral and multilateral
collaboration to enhance influence, contain the influence of inimical actions in our strategic
space, address the wide spectrum of challenges that confront us, and, protection of our
sovereign interests.
22.Absence of a Mechanism for Quick Funding. An all too obvious systemic
flaw, is the absence of specifically allocated funds with the Services to provide
material assistance and military training to build capacity and enhance capability
of nations that either seek our help or merit our attention, given their importance
to our strategic interests. Although the Special Diplomatic Expenditure controlled
by the MEA could be enhanced to cater for greater military equipment assistance,
the prime concern is that big-ticket grants would always be viewed through the
prism of political propriety and international approval rather than national security
concerns. In many an instance, equipment and assets to be gifted have been re-
appropriated from Services holdings as a measure of last resort, to mitigate the
effect of aggressive efforts by China to woo the innermost cordon of our
neighbouring countries as part of its perceived design of strategic encirclement ofIndia. In cases where the Services are unable to spare equipment, the MoD
approves the material assistance request from the defence budget. The Defence
Procurement Procedure (DPP) is still cumbersome and often results in
procurement being realised only after 12 to 18 months. This defeats the very
purpose of time-sensitive assistance, and, the delay is perceived by the
requesting nation as a reluctance to help in the process, allowing countries
such as Pakistan and China to fill the void.
23.Processing Delays. The rapidly changing world order requires expeditious
responses and, more often than not, proactive action. Our decision-making is
painstakingly slow and laborious.
24.Capacity and Resource Constraints. Our intention to gift hardware and/or
provide assistance to needy nations is often hamstrung by capacity-and-resource
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constraints. Resources are often limited, (as may be expected in a emerging
economy such as ours), but even when these are made available, capacity
constraints within our manufacturing facilities limit our ability to physically provide
the aid. The long lead time of our construction/production industries and their
inability to bid competitively have further blighted our desire to foster dependence
on us through aggressive defence trade.
25.Politico-Military Synergy. Better integration between the military and political
decision-making processes will enhance the scope of interaction, especially with
countries with which military diplomacy plays a crucial and catalytic role.
26.Limited Industrial Capability/Capacity. The product range offered by the Indian
military-industrial complex lags behind the competition in terms of costs, quality,
and, variety. Even the recent policy-initiative permitting 26% FDI in defence
industry does not seem to have alleviated this situation. The direct offset policy
that mandates a 30% investment back into the Indian Defence Industry for
contracts of value of more than 300 crores is skewed in that it does not enable
costing of technology transfer and joint R&D, whose infusion would breathe fresh
life into the defence industry. And finally, we are woefully short of marketing
expertise as well.
27.Absence of Enabling Agreements. While MOUs have been signed with a
number of countries, there are still cases in which delays are of the order of a
decade or more. The absence of MOUs/ agreements significantly hinders the
growth of co-operative activities. By corollary MOUs are, more often than not,
prerequisites to meaningful defence cooperation.
28. Inadequate Defence Representation in Missions Abroad. Services
representation abroad needs enhancement to cater to new roles assigned.
29. Inadequate Funding for Training . The corpus of approximately Rs 600 millionadministered by the Technical Cooperation Division of MEA for ITEC (Indian
Technical and Economic Cooperation), SCAAP (Special Commonwealth
Assistance for Africa Programme) and Aid for Disaster Relief is meant to support
the political objectives of diplomacy and provide scientific and technical expertise
in various fields to target countries. More often than not, the quantum of funds is
inadequate to meet the recommendations of the Services (in the form of
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vacancies at NDC/DSSC and deputation of incoming teams), due to competing
interests.
Avenues for Defence Cooperation
30.Defence Cooperation is the embodiment of a strategic partnership and reflects
the intent of the stake holders to take bilateral/multilateral relations to higher
levels. The decision to embark on defence cooperation is a political one and
normally emanates from strategic dialogue. The avenues of defence
cooperation that are available to the Services are enumerated below. The
cooperative engagement initiatives would be in support of political and strategic
objectives and would largely conform to the tenets of our foreign policy.
(a) Formal/Institutional Interaction.
(i) Joint Defence Committees, Bilateral Talks, Joint Working Groups, Staff
Talks, Steering Groups, etc.
(ii) Joint Exercises (Bilateral / Trilateral / Multilateral).
(iii) Exchange visits of subject-matter experts, study teams, and, scoping
delegations.
(iv) Participation in Seminars/Symposia, and Conferences and workshops.
(b) Military Training/Extra Curricular Exchanges.
(i) The provision of courses to foreign students under ITEC-I/II, Special Aid
Packages and Self Financing Schemes, and, the availing of courses by our
own officers in foreign training establishments.
(ii) The conduct of specially structured training packages for selected countries
on an as required basis.
(iii) The deputing of Training and Advisory Teams (both long and short term)to countries in our immediate neighborhood and countries of strategic importance
to us.
(iv) The undertaking of trainer and trainee exchange programmes.
(v) Participation in sports, adventure and cultural activities with foreign Armed
Forces.
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(vi) Visits and exchange-visits of military bands.
(vii) Cross-exchanges of officers for limited duration afloat attachments in
units/establishments/ships/aircraft/submarines.
(c) Military Equipment Transfer.
(i) Gifting of military hardware (and /or sale of hardware at friendship rates).
(ii) Loan /lease of military equipment for specified periods and for specified
terms of utilisation.
(iii) The provision of follow-on and subsequent support to create dependence on
India. This would include the, provision of ordnance and ordnance stores; the,
service, /over-haul, rotation and/or upgradation of equipment and supply of
spares, etc.
(iv) Procurement, Joint R&D, and, Production ventures.
(v) The provision of technical advice and human resources for technical
assistance.
(d) UN Peace Keeping Operations.
(i) Peace Keeping Contingents (both for peace support and for peace
enforcement) and MILOBS.
(ii) Training at our Centre for UN Peace Keeping.(CUNPK)
(iii) Participation in UN Missions.
(e) Professional Exchanges. In addition to the facts already covered at Para
30(b) above in respect of training this would include exposure/interaction to the
facilities and assets of friendly foreign countries and could involve the joint
formulation/development of concepts and/or doctrines.
Framework for Defence Cooperation
31. International Defence Cooperation will be conducted (but not limited to) through a
framework of following activities:-
(a) Strategic dialogue at the political and higher defence levels.
(b) Military to military cooperation.
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(c) Professional exchanges also referred to as Subject Matter Expert Exchanges
(SMEE).
(d) Technical (defence industry and R&D) cooperation.
32. The activities undertaken for defence cooperation must be supported by a framework
of defence cooperation agencies, appropriate funding, fora/structures for interaction, both
internally and with foreign agencies and decision-making processes.
Planning Considerations
31.While formulating the overall plan for defence cooperation with a particular
country/or countries in a regional grouping the following aspects would be
addressed: -
(a) Aims
(b) Objectives
(c) Framework for the conduct of Defence Cooperation, namely,
agreements/MoUs/cCharters, multilateral/bilateral forums, long term and annual
cooperation plans.
(d) The List of Negative export countries, promulgated by MEA.
(e) Budgetary allocation.
(f) The availability of funds, the appropriate funding agency, mode of funding(hire
of Credit/Grant), procurement methodology to be followed and other finance related
issues. Some of the specific areas of defence cooperation that merit a careful
examination of budgetary support are:-
(i) Provision of training courses and deputation of training/support teams
under ITEC.
(ii) Conduct of seminars, conferences, symposia, etc (organised by the
MoD, Services, and, autonomous and quasi-autonomous think tanks such as
IDSA, USI, CAPS, CLAWS, NMF etc).
(iii) Publication of Journals.
(iv) Hosting of foreign delegations (from within Service HQ funds under
local powers).
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(v) Planning and execution of professional exchanges.
(vi) Planning and conduct of training programmes at Service-specific
training centre with friendly foreign countries/Service (e.g at CIJW, HAWS,
PTS, etc).
(vii) Planning and conduct of bilateral and multilateral exercises involving
one or more Service.
(viii) Technical and repair-assistance to foreign militaries.
(ix) Lease of territory and upgradation of facilities on foreign soil in pursuit of
forward-basing capability.
(x) Prolonged deployment of warships in foreign waters for assistance in
EEZ surveillance, hydrographic survey, protection of offshore assets, etc.
(xi) Deployments of warships in support of scientific experiments/space
launches.
(xii) Deployment of forces for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
missions.
(xiii) Deployments in support of Indian diaspora in exceptional
circumstances.
Mechanisms for Defence Cooperation
32.Prioritisation of Countries. Based on the general policy guidelines for defence
cooperation, friendly foreign countries will be classified into Priority I, Priority II,
Priority III and Priority IV categories of engagement. The prioritisation will be as
per the overarching driver of political considerations and will flow from Indian
regional security and economic interests. Given the dissimilar imperatives of
military engagement of different countries and the degree of politico-military
benefits that would accrue from this defence engagement, prudence demands the
prioritisation of countries to define the scope and intensity of cooperative activities
with them. It would, of course, be an obvious conclusion that this prioritisation is
dynamic due to its close inter-linkage with domestic political sentiment, the
changing geo-strategic environment, economic interests, national security
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considerations and international opinion. Countries would be prioritised into four
categories as follows:-
(a) Priority I. This grouping would comprise countries with which, defence
cooperation would need to be pursued across a wide spectrum of activities and the
engagement provided substance through formalised mechanisms at the politico-military and military to military levels. The countries in this grouping are those that
directly impinge on our immediate strategic environment and whose engagement
would quantum benefits.
(b) Priority II. This would encompass those countries of relatively lesser
importance than Priority I countries. Nevertheless, they would also merit wide
ranging engagement in recognition of the possibility of them having to be accorded
higher priority due to a changed strategic environment and a consequent
reassessment of their importance to us.
(c) Priority III. This category seeks to include those countries that in terms of
geographical positioning, technological advancement, military prowess and strategic
importance do not qualify for extensive engagement. Nonetheless their engagement
is warranted at the politico-military level as a display of our intention for greater
bilateral cooperation, as also in support of our economic and political ties with them.
(d) Priority IV. This grouping includes countries of marginal, albeit noticeableimportance.
33.Tiered Mechanism for Institutionalised Interaction. It is a universally
acknowledged fact that institutionalised interaction constitutes the most important
facet of defence cooperation; a fact attributable to the overarching policy
guidance it provides and the engagement objectives it defines. Each of these
four categories of prioritised countries would consequently be engaged through a
tiered mechanism of institutionalised interaction reflective of the levels of politico-military and purely military dialogue desired. As a general rule, Priority I countries
will be engaged in a Four Tier / Three Tier Arrangement, Priority II countries in a
Three / Two Tier Arrangement and Priority II countries in a Two / One Tier
Arrangement.
(a) Four Tier Arrangement.
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(i) Ministry level Apex forum.
(ii) Working Group/Subgroups at Ministry/IDS level.
(iii) Integrated Staff Talks at IDS or Services level.
(i) Service to Service Staff Talks for each service.
(b) Three Tier Arrangement.
(i) Ministry level Apex forum.
(ii) Working Group/Subgroups at Ministry/IDS level.
(iii) Mil to Mil Staff Talks under HQ IDS/lead service.
(c) Two Tier Arrangement.
(i) Ministry level Apex forum.
(ii) Working Groups/Subgroups at either Ministry/IDS level OR Mil to Mil
staff talks under HQ IDS/lead service.
(d) Single Tier Arrangement. Ministry level forum with representatives of
services, on as required basis.
(e) No Institutional Forum. There will not be any institutionalised forum with
countries in this category but the countries can be engaged through exchange of
visits or occasional training activities on request/approval of the MoD.
34.Levels of Leadership. Levels at which each of the above mentioned interactions
are to be headed will be as follows: -
(a) Ministry Level Apex Forum. Will be led by Def Secy in case of Priority I/II
countries, by AS/JS in case of Priority II/ III and other countries by JS, unless
otherwise dictated by MoU / MOA or desired by MoD.
(b) Working Group/Sub Groups at Ministry level. Will be led by AS/JS
with 2/1 star representatives from HQ IDS and Service HQ.
(c) Mil to Mil Staff Talks at HQ IDS Level or Lead Service Level. Will be led
by 2/1 star officer from HQ IDS or lead service with representatives from HQ IDS and
all services.
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(d) Service to Service Staff Talks. Will be led by 2/1 star with Col/eqvt
representative from each service.
Policy Guidelines
37.General. The direction and intensity of Indian Defence Cooperation will be
governed by the following guidelines: -
(a) Political considerations constitute the first and, without doubt, the
overarching driver of defence cooperation. The political driver is often dynamic,
manifests itself as government-direction, and overrides all other considerations.
(b) Balanced cooperation with no visible/perceptible tilt towards any one
country/region, consistent with Indias posture of non-alignment and belief in multi-
polar world.
(c) Defence Cooperation will be driven by the need to ensure:-
(i) Stability in our immediate continental and maritime neighbourhood
and promote own security interests, thus enabling India to create a
unique footprint in the littoral and hinterland areas of theIndian Ocean
Region.
(ii) Energy Security, and the Security of Energy, leading to cooperation with
those countries whose geographical location influences the security of our
energy lines-of-communication.
(iii) The safety and security of our overseas trade, leading to cooperation with
countries with whom we have strong and growing economic ties, as also
those whose geographical location influences the security of our trade
Lines-of-Communication.
(iv) The eradication/elimination of terrorism, insurgency, piracy, maritime
crime, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), etc, leading to
cooperation with countries that share our views in this regard.
(v) Theadoption of proactive, calibrated measures to prevent and contestthe
strategic encirclement of India leading to cooperation with countries that
could provide Forward Operating Bases/Areas/facilities that would enable
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Enhanced monitoring of our strategic space, increase our reach, and, reduce
our reaction time in responding to a crises..
(vi) Our ability to effectively undertake perception-management, and shape
probable maritime battle-space in the IOR and its environs, including
countries that control the choke-points of the Indian Ocean and other areasthrough which our seaborne trade passes.
(vii) The promotion of our own R&D and Defence Industry, through the
constructive engagement of technologically advanced nations, including
countries as are advanced in Space and dual use technologies as also
countries from whom ourcivil nuclear programme would be advanced.
(viii) The promotion of our regional influence by strengthening defence
relationships, assisting friendly foreign Armed Forces in developing defencecapability without impinging on our own national security.
(ix) The strengthening ourLook East policy and other foreign policy
initiatives of the Government.
(x) The projection of our own national power for in support of our own
strategic interests.
(xi) The development of our military doctrine, tactics, techniques,
procedures, equipment, exploitation, philosophies/practices, training,
and enhancement of our overall operational efficiency.
(xii) Continued and active participation in UN Peace-Keeping Operations
(UNPKO).
(xiii) The promotion of understanding and cooperation with countries
having abundant natural resources.
(xiv) The provision of reassurance, succour and extrication options tothe Indian Diaspora under exceptional circumstances and Persons of Indian
Origin, leading to cooperation with countries that host significant numbers of
the Indian Diaspora. All on-going Defence Cooperation activities would be
regularly reviewed vis--vis tangible/non-tangible gains, so as to extract the
biggest Bang for the Buck and ensure that the cost-benefit ratio is always
favourable to us.
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conducted by any Service with a particular country in one calendar year.
(xii) The budgetary provisions for all bi/multilateral exercises are to be
catered for by the MoD and not impinge on Service-specific estimates.
Cooperative activities undertaken at the behest of the MEA such as EEZ
surveillance assistance, hydrographic surveys, etc, would be funded by theMEA.
(xiii) Due care is to be taken which fielding of equipment for various
exercises so as not to compromise its security and usage in actual operations.
(xiv) No contractual obligations/clauses are to be compromised while
displaying / participating with own eqpt.
(xv) Multilateral exercises with more than two countries will be carried out
under Joint patrolling in IOR, Disaster/relief operations, UNPKO, to enhance
own operational capability and to develop common standing operating
procedures for joint ops to cater for possible multinational forces operating
together in a common scenario under the aegis of UN.
Note : Under no circumstances such exercises should be perceived as possible
growth of an alliance/s and therefore should be evenly balanced out.
(xvi) A block proposal covering five-year period will be worked out by the
services and fwd to HQ IDS by 01 July of the preceding year for coordination
and onward approval by MoD Interim changes due to unforeseen
circumstances may be communicated mid-way to HQ IDS for amendments on
case-to-case basis.
(b) Military-to-Military Cooperation Visits. The mil to mil visits that may be
undertaken after due clearance from the MoD and the MEA would, inter alia, be to:-
(i) Finalise mutually agreed agendas for Defence Cooperation.
(ii) Share information. The exchange of information is to be
governed by existing MoU / MOA on sharing of classified information.
(ii) Gather and collate as much information of value (Military or otherwise)
from hosts/participants during visits / by study teams ./ delegations.
(iii) Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEE).
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(iv) The conduct of technical dialogues.
(v) Seminars and conferences for enhancement of knowledge.
(vi) Seminars and conferences proposed to be hosted by our own Services will
form a part of the Annual Visit Plan, to include, inter alia, details of topics,
participation, venue, administrative aspects and related costs for approval
of MEA / MoD.
(vii) Scoping visits, Institutionalised dialogue, Professional/Technical Assistance,
Exercise planning, Visits to defence/industry facilities, Witness trials,
Observers for exercises, Contractual visits etc.
Note :- Offers of visits to foreign strategic facilities will be declined, to
avoid any issues of reciprocity.
(c) Training/Courses.
(i) Courses to Foreign Military students under ITEC I/II, SFS and Special Aid
Packages to friendly foreign countries are to be coordinated by HQ, IDS.
The budgeting and allocation of vacancies for defence related courses are
to be controlled by MoD. These courses, including financial outlay will
henceforth be decentralised and vacancies proportionately distributed by
HQ IDS.
(ii) Specially structured training packages for selected countries will be
conducted as per MoU / MOA on the subject between the respective
governments at the level of the MoD. Funding will be the responsibility of
the requesting agency.
(iii) Deputation of Training / Advisory Teams to selected countries would be
governed by terms and conditions of MoU / MOA on the subject between
the respective governments at the level of the MoD. The MoU / MOA will
continue to be drafted by the respective Service as per existing practice.
This arrangement would also be applicable for trainee and/or Trainer
exchange programmes, sports, adventure, and, cultural activities.
(iv) The provisions at sub-para (c) above will also be applicable for countries
wishing to send their training teams to India. Terms of engagement for
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training teams being sent consequent to purchase of equipment will be
stipulated in the contract/purchase agreement.
(v) It must be endeavoured to avail courses abroad only in those disciplines in
which we possess neither the expertise nor the institutional
experience/wherewithal. This restriction is, however, not applicable toreciprocal courses, as also gratis offers.
(vi) Courses offered by friendly foreign countries, under their respective military
training and education programmes, may be subscribed-to provided that the
course offered does not carry monetary obligations other than for travel,
boarding and lodging or is gratis / reciprocal.
(vii) Courses conducted in languages other than English will be preceded by a
comprehensive language course either at the School of Foreign Languages(SFL) or by the host country, prior to commencement of the course. The
latter will be funded entirely by the host country unless otherwise mutually
decided by a specific MoU. In latter case, the duration of the course may
exceed one year and is to be treated as permanent posting.
(viii) A detailed After Course / Event Reports is to be submitted by participant/s
to their respective Service HQ This report is to include inter alia comments
on the usefulness, shortcomings, and, recommendations. For tri-Servicedetailment, such reports are to be rendered to HQ IDS with a copy to
respective Service HQ.
(ix) It will be ensured by respective service HQs that post course employment of
such candidates is ensured in organizational interest for a minimum period
of three continuous years. Adverse career certificates may be obtained to
ensure compliance.
(x) Foreign students attending military courses in India are not to be exposed
to classified equipment/ subjects.
(d) Reciprocal Programmes. Such programmes will henceforth not be
negotiated at service level. Service HQs will, however, forward their annual
requirement, specifying the disciplines concerned, to HQ IDS, which, in turn, will
finalise the itinerary along with allied details under the aegis of MCG meetings.
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operationalisation, and, equipment Training are also to be governed by the
MoU/MOA as is any requirement for the prolonged positioning of technical
support/maintenance staff.
(vii) Details of Strategic assets are not to be divulged at any level unless
otherwise specifically tasked/ cleared by MoD.
(viii) Utmost care is to be taken in guarding electronic signature of all emitters.
(ix) Teams deputed abroad in conjunction with Defence R&D/Industry will be
governed by the MOU defining the terms and conditions of the deputation.
(e) Space. Military applications of space are not to be discussed at any
level, unless tasked / cleared by MoD. However, dialogues/seminars/ visits may be
progressed/undertaken so as to keep abreast with associated technological
developments.
(f) UN Peace-Keeping Operations (UNPKO). UNPKO are to be governed
strictly according to the UN Charter. No deviations are permitted. Offers/Expressions
of Interest for availing training at the UN Centre for Peace Keeping are to be actively
encouraged and accommodated to the maximum possible extent.
(g) Professional Exchanges. These may include exposure/interaction to
concepts, doctrines, facilities, training and assets of technologically/militarily
advanced foreign countries but are to be effected without compromising our own
security. It is to be ensured that such interaction does not connotate any military
alignment.
(h) Other Fields of Cooperation. Cooperation between countries may also
involve exchange of information and experience in the following areas: -
(i) Strategic Situation and Current Defence Policy Matters.
(ii) Leadership Concepts.
(iii) Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).
(iv) General Defence Technology.
(v) General Defence Business Cooperation.
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ground or in the air. Contractual obligations with respect to IPR will be complied.
Avionics / weapons / other equipment and manoeuvres that would compromise the
performance and violate secure information of the aircraft are not to be used /
demonstrated. Procedure for pre-flight briefing, medical, emergency drills and debrief
are to be strictly followed. Photography would be permitted only on ground as per
existing rules. The IAF shall not be liable for any compensation or claims in the event
of injury or death of a foreign aircrew in connection with the familiarization sortie.
This aspect must be addressed in the Staff Talks and included in the Minutes.
CONCLUSION
39. The Defence Services are an instrument of state policy and reflect the aspirations,
strengths and vulnerabilities of the body politic that sustain it. If India has to take its
appropriate place in the global hierarchy as a truly independent, responsible, peace loving
nation with all the attributes of a liberal, secular democracy, military defence diplomacy and
defence cooperation would certainly have pivotal roles.
40. In keeping with the changing global order, international defence engagement with the
world community has grown rapidly over the last few years. It is, therefore, important that
our organisational structures as well as the processes are re-engineered continuously, in
order to remain effective and geared to meet the challenges and opportunities in the
international arena, in tune with our growing status as an emerging power.
36