SPECPRO_2SPECPRO_2nd set cases

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G.R. No. 192908 August 22, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS ANDHIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner,vs.ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where petitioner

Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways through

the Office of the Solicitor General, questions the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.

108499, to wit:

1. Resolution dated October 30, 20092dismissing petitioners petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 for being

filed out of time; and

2. Resolution dated July 15, 20103denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

The instant case arose from two cases filed by the Republic seeking expropriation of certain properties in the

name of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. (St. Vincent). In Civil Case No. 0062-04, the Republic sought to

expropriate 1,992 square meters out of a total area of 6,068 square meters of land for the construction of the

Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project (MCTEP). Said property belongs to St. Vincent covered by TCT No. T-

821169 and located in Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite. In Civil Case No. 0100-04, on the other hand, the Republic

sought to expropriate 2,450 square meters out of a total area of 9,039 square meters, also belonging to St.

Vincent and covered by TCT No. T-821170. Said property adjoins the property subject of Civil Case No. 0062-04.

Subsequently, the Republic filed in both cases an amended complaint alleging that the subject land originated

from a free patent title and should be adjudicated to it without payment of just compensation pursuant to Section

112 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

On August 9, 2005, the Republic filed in Civil Case No. 0062-04 a motion for the issuance of an order of

expropriation.4It was granted by the trial court per Order

5dated August 16, 2005, ruling that the Republic has a

lawful right to take the 1,992 square meters portion of the subject property, with "no pronouncement as to just

compensation" since the subject property originated from a free patent.6A motion for the issuance of an order

of expropriation was likewise filed by the Republic in Civil Case No. 0100-04 but before this could be resolved,

the Republic moved to consolidate the two cases, which was granted by the trial court.7

On November 16, 2006, the trial court denied St. Vincents motion for reconsideration of its Order dated

August 16, 2005 granting expropriation.8As alleged in the petition, no appeal was taken by St. Vincent from

said orders.9

After almost 2 years, or on July 28, 2008, St. Vincent filed a Manifestation with Motion for Clarification of the

Order dated August 16, 2005,10

contending that although it does not oppose the ruling regarding the


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determination of public purpose and the Republics right to expropriate the subject land, it, however, claims that

it is entitled to just compensation.

Meanwhile, the Republic attempted to implement the Order dated August 16, 2005 by entering the subject

portion of St. Vincents property. Aggrieved, the latter demanded upon the Republic and its agents to

immediately vacate, and remove any and all equipment or structures they introduced on its property in a

demand-letter11

dated October 3, 2008.

Due to St. Vincents refusal to honor the order of expropriation, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the

issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied by the lower court in its Order12

dated November 25, 20062008

. The lower court, however, modified its Order dated August 16, 2005 and required the Republic to

immediately pay St. Vincent in an amount equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the

property sought to be expropriated. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the lower

court per Order13

dated January 29, 2009 for lack of factual and legal basis.

Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic filed

with the CA a motion for additional time of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition. The CA granted

the motion in its Resolution14

dated April 30, 2009 and the Republic was given a non-extensible period of

fifteen (15) days or until May 4, 2009 within which to file its petition for certiorari.

On April 30, 2009, the Republic filed its petition for certiorariassailing the lower courts orders dated

November 25, 2008 and January 29, 2009 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

On June 19, 2009, the CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution15

ordering the Republic to show cause why its

petition for certiorarishould not be dismissed for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.

The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation16

dated July 1, 2009 pleading for the relaxation of the rules

by reason of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in the case and in consideration of substantialjustice. St. Vincent filed its Comment/Opposition17

dated July 15, 2009 alleging among others that the said

explanation is merelypro formadue to the Republics failure to justify its explanation.

On October 30, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed resolution dismissing the Republics petition for certiorari

on the ground that the petition was filed out of time inasmuch as extensions of time are now disallowed by A.M.

No. 07-7-12-SC18

and as applied inLaguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals.19

On November 26, 2009, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration alleging that it merely relied in good

faith on the appellate courts resolution granting the former an additional period of fifteen (15) days within

which to file the subject petition.

On July 15, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed resolution denying the Republics motion for reconsideration,

stating that it cannot disobey the ruling inLaguna Metts Corporation.20

Hence, this petition.

The Republic relies on the CA resolution granting its motion for extension of time and upon the strength of the

substantial merits of its petition. The Republic also invokesDomdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the

Sandiganbayan,21

where the Court ruled that absent a prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed, subject to

the Courts sound discretion.


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St. Vincent, however, contends that the present petition fails to neither allege any circumstance nor state any

justification for the deliberate disregard of a very elementary rule of procedure like Section 4 of Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court. And in the absence of any such circumstance or justification, the general rule on pro forma

motions/pleadings must apply.

The Issue

The Republic discussed the substantial merits of its case; however, the CA did no more than include such

matters in its narration of facts, and neither did St. Vincent dwell on said issues. Hence, the only issue to be

resolved in this petition is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it dismissed the Republics

petition for certiorarifor being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.

The Courts Ruling

We GRANT the petition.

The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30, 2009, which initially granted the Republics motion for

extension, was premised on the mistaken notion that the petition filed by the latter was one for petition for

review as a mode of appeal. The CA resolution stated, among others: "Provided that this Motion for Extensionof Time to File Petition for Review is seasonably filed, as prayed for, x x x."22

Thus, the CA granted extension

inasmuch as motions for this purpose are allowed by the rules.23

On this score alone, the CA should have

admitted the petition filed by the Republic since the latter merely relied on its Resolution dated April 30, 2009

granting the extension prayed for.

Nevertheless, the CA subsequently dismissed the petition filed by the Republic on the ground that the same was

filed out of time, following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In its Resolution dated July 15, 2010, which dismissed the

Republics motion for reconsideration, the CA also relied on the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation that the

sixty (60)-day period within which to file a petition for certiorariis non-extendible. The petitioner, however,

insists that Domdom allows extensions of time to file a petition.

In order to resolve the instant controversy, the Court deems it necessary to discuss the relationship between its

respective rulings in Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom with respect to the application of the amendment

introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Before said amendment, Section 4 of Rule 65 originally provides:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of

the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such

motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a

corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area

as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid

of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the

acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall

be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding

fifteen (15) days.


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As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 4 of Rule 65 now reads:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of

the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such


If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or

a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined

by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not

the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-

judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be

cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be

filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

In interpreting said amendment, the Court, inLaguna Metts Corporation, held that:

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change itsmeaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a

change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction

different from that previous to its amendment.

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65,

the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under

the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any

extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari.

The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the

petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph

allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the

Rule now stands, petitions for certiorarimust be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from

the order denying a motion for reconsideration.24

(Citation omitted and emphasis ours)

Nevertheless,Domdomlater stated:

On the Peoples argument that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorariis no longer

allowed, the same rests on shaky grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the following provision in Section 4 of

Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC evinces an intention to absolutely prohibit motions for extension:

"No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case

exceeding fifteen (15) days."

The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads:

x x x x

That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in

the previous for formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the

intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that "no extension of time to file the


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x x x.

Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that the deletion of the clause in

Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to file

a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited. We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended, the

deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an extension of time to file such

petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be

allowed, subject to this Courts sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases.

Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve

substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x x x:

x x x x

The present Petition involves one of those exceptional cases in which relaxing the procedural rules would serve

substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x x x Consequently, in order to protect strong public

interest, this Court deems it appropriate and justifiable to relax the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 under

A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, concerning the reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition. Considering that

the imminent power crisis is an exceptional and meritorious circumstance, the parties herein should be allowedto litigate the issues on the merits. Furthermore, we find no significant prejudice to the substantive rights of the

litigants as respondent was able to file the Petition before the CA within the 15-day extension it asked for. We

therefore find no grave abuse of discretion attributable to the CA when it granted respondent Power Ones

Motion for Extension to file its Petition for Certiorari.30

(Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied inLaguna Metts Corporation, the

general rule is that a petition for certiorarimust be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,

order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the sound

discretion of the Court, said period may be extended pursuant to Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Powercases

Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republics petition: first, due to its own lapse when it granted

the extension sought by the Republic per Resolution dated April 30, 2009; second, because of the public interest

involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for public use (MCTEP); and finally, no undue prejudice or

delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated October 30, 2009 and

July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 are NULLIFIED. The Court of Appeals is

hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE and ADMIT the petition for certiorarifiled by the Republic of the

Philippines in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 and to proceed with the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

G.R. Nos. 182382-83 February 24, 2010


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JAIME S. DOMDOM, Petitioner,vs.HON. THIRD AND FIFTH DIVISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT andTHE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By Affidavit of February 15, 2002, Hilconeda P. Abril, State Auditor V of the Commission on Audit (COA)

assigned at the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), requested the Office of the Ombudsman to

conduct a preliminary investigation on the transactions-bases of the claims of Jaime S. Domdom (petitioner) for

miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses as a Director of PCIC, the receipts covering which were alleged to be

tampered.1

After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner with

nine counts of estafa through falsification of documents in view of irregularities in nine supporting receipts for

his claims for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses, after verification with the establishments he had

transacted with. It thus directed the filing of the appropriate Informations with the Sandiganbayan.2

The Informations were separately raffled and lodged among the five divisions of the Sandiganbayan. The First,

Second and Fifth Divisions granted petitioners Motions for Consolidation of the cases raffled to them with that

having the lowest docket number, SB-07-CRM-0052, which was raffled to the Third Division.3

The Sandiganbayan Third Division disallowed the consolidation, however, by Resolutions dated February 12

and May 8, 2008, it holding mainly that the evidence in the cases sought to be consolidated differed4from that

to be presented in the one which bore the lowest docket number. It is gathered from the records that the

Sandiganbayan Fourth Division also denied petitioners Motion for Consolidation.5

Petitioner thus seeks relief from this Court via the present Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for temporary

restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the different divisions of the

Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with the cases against him during the pendency of this petition.6

Petitioner argues that, among other things, all the cases against him arose from substantially identical series of

transactions involving alleged overstatements of miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses.

Respondent People of the Philippines (People), in its Comment,7counters that petitioner failed to file a motion

for reconsideration which is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari; that the petition was

filed out of time since a motion for extension to file such kind of a petition is no longer allowed; that

consolidation is a matter of judicial discretion; and that the proceedings in the different divisions of theSandiganbayan may proceed independently as the Informations charged separate crimes committed on separate

occasions.

In the meantime, the Court issued a TRO8enjoining all divisions of the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding

with the trial of the cases against petitioner until further orders.

Prefatorily, the People raises procedural questions which the Court shall first address.


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Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a

petition for certiorari, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any actual or

perceived error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.9

The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity

because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been

duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower

court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay wouldprejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable;

where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was

deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order

of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the

lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner

had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is

involved.10

1 a vv p h i l

The Court finds that the issue raised by petitioner had been duly raised and passed upon by the Sandiganbayan

Third Division, it having denied consolidation in two resolutions; that the issue calls for resolution and anyfurther delay would prejudice the interests of petitioner; and that the issue raised is one purely of law, the facts

not being contested. There is thus ample justification for relaxing the rule requiring the prior filing of a motion

for reconsideration.

On the Peoples argument that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer

allowed, the same rests on shaky grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the following provision in Section 4 of

Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC11

evinces an intention to absolutely prohibit motions for extension:

"No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case

exceeding fifteen (15) days."

The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads:

Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from

notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,

whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the

notice of the denial of the motion.



by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or notthe same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-



In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be

filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. (underscoring supplied)

That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in

the previous formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the


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intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that "no extension of time to file the

petition shall be granted." Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the Courts

sound discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension sought and,

at all events, given its merits.

In Teston v. Development Bank of the Philippines,12

the Court laid down the requisites for the consolidation of

cases, viz:

A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act,

event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence,

provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one

party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. (emphasis and underscoring

supplied.)

The rule allowing consolidation is designed to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression or abuse,

to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, and to simplify the work of the trial court in short, the

attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.

Thus, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Maalac, Jr.,13

the Court disregarded the technical difference between anaction and a proceeding, and upheld the consolidation of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with

an ordinary civil action in order to achieve a more expeditious resolution of the cases.

In the present case, it would be more in keeping with law and equity if all the cases filed against petitioner were

consolidated with that having the lowest docket number pending with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.

The only notable differences in these cases lie in the date of the transaction, the entity transacted with and

amount involved. The charge and core element are the same estafa through falsification of documents based

on alleged overstatements of claims for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses. Notably, the main witness is

also the same Hilconeda P. Abril.

It need not be underscored that consolidation of cases, when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings

which saves time, the resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It

contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just,

speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Above all, consolidation avoids the

possibility of rendering conflicting decisions in two or more cases which would otherwise require a single

judgment.14

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Third Division of the Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to allow

the consolidation of the cases against petitioner for estafa through falsification of documents with SB-07-CRM-

0052, which has the lowest docket number pending with it. All other Divisions of the Sandiganbayan areaccordingly ORDERED to forward the subject cases to the Third Division.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice


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G.R. No. 187984 November 15, 2010

FRANCISCO A. LABAO, Petitioner,vs.LOLITO N. FLORES, AMADO A. DAGUISONAN, PEPE M. CANTAR, JULIO G. PAGENTE, JESUSE. ARENA, CRISPIN A. NAVALES, OSCAR M. VENTE, ARTEMIO B. ARAGON, ARNOLD M.CANTAR, ALBERTO T. CUADERO, RASMI E. RONQUILLO, PEDRO R. GABUTAN, ELPEDIO E.

MENTANG,

*

WILFREDO R. MIOSA,

**

RODERICK P. NAMBATAC, MARCIAL D. RIVERA,SANDE E. CASTIL,***CRISOSTOMO B. ESIC, and AMBROSIO M. CANTAR,****Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1filed by petitioner Francisco A. Labao (petitioner) to challenge

the decision2and resolution

3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01472-MIN.

4

The Factual Antecedents

The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.

The petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of the San Miguel Protective Security Agency (SMPSA), a

licensed security-service contractor. Respondents Lolito N. Flores, Amado A. Daguisonan, Pepe M. Cantar,

Julio G. Pagente, Jesus E. Arena, Crispin A. Navales, Oscar M. Vente, Artemio B. Aragon, Arnold M. Cantar,

Alberto T. Cuadero, Rasmi E. Ronquillo, Pedro R. Gabutan, Elpedio E. Mentang, Wilfredo R. Miosa,

Roderick P. Nambatac, Marcial D. Rivera, Sande E. Castil, Crisostomo B. Esic, Ambrosio M. Cantar

(respondents) and Jimmy O. Bicoy, were SMPSA security guards assigned to the National Power Corporation,

Mindanao Regional Center (NPC-MRC), Ditucalan, Iligan City. Each of the respondents had a monthly salary

of P7,020.00.

On July 27, 2004, the petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit their updated

personal data files, security guard professional license, and other pertinent documents by July 30, 2004 for

reevaluation in connection with the SMPSAs new service contract with the NPC-MRC.5

When respondents failed to comply with the petitioners directive, despite several notices to do so, the petitioner

relieved them from NPC-MRC duty starting September and October 2004, and ordered them to report to the

Senior Operations Officer, Nemesio Sombilon, for new assignments.

Sometime in March and April 2005, the respondents filed individual complaints with the Iligan City Sub-

Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal and

money claims, claiming they were constructively dismissed when they were not given new assignments for a

period of over 6 months, despite repeated requests for NPC-MRC redeployment and for new assignments. The

complaints were consolidated.

The petitioner and SMPSA denied the charge of constructive dismissal. They countered that the respondents

relief from NPC-MRC duty was a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Furthermore, they issued a

notice (dated January 17, 2005)6directing the respondents to report to SMPSAs main office for new

assignments, but the latter failed or refused to comply without any valid reasons.


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The Labor Arbiter Ruling

In a December 27, 2005 decision, Labor Arbiter (LA) Noel Augusto S. Magbanua dismissed the consolidated

complaints for lack of merit. He held that the respondents relief from NPC-MRC duty was due to their failure

to comply with SMSPAs requirement for its employees to submit updated documents to meet NPC-MRC

contract renewal requirements. According to the LA, this was a legitimate exercise of NPC-MRCs

management prerogative, in light of the information it received that some security guards carried falsified

documents.

7

The respondents appealed the dismissal of their complaints to the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In a July 31, 2006 resolution, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision. It noted that the respondents relief was in

good faith, without grave abuse of discretion, and in the best interest of the business enterprise since SMPSA

merely exercised its management prerogative and discretion to protect its business interest.8

It also noted that the respondents temporary off-detail did not exceed the 6-month period permitted by law,

since the respondents were directed, through the January 17, 2005 notice, to report for a new assignment onJanuary 25, 2005, but they failed or refused to do so.

In a September 29, 2006 resolution, the NLRC denied the respondents subsequent motion for reconsideration.9

The respondents counsel, Atty. Demosthenes R. Plando, received the September 29, 2006 resolution on

October 13, 2006.

Eighty-eight (88) days later, or on January 9, 2007, the respondents, through their new counsel, filed with the

CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging that they were informed of the

September 29, 2006 resolution on December 6, 2006, while Bicoy received a copy of the resolution on

November 6, 2006.

The CA Ruling

In its September 5, 2008 decision, the CA set aside the NLRC resolution, finding that the respondents were

constructively dismissed when they were not given new assignments for more than 6 months, from September

and October 2004, when the respondents were "off-detailed," until March and April 2005, when they filed their

individual complaints for illegal dismissal. The appellate court noted that the January 17, 2005 notice to report

for new assignments did not toll the 6-month "floating status" period since the respondents failed to receive the

notice before the appointed date, as SMPSA sent the notice by registered mail, which normally takes at least 5

working days to reach the intended recipients.10

Finding that reinstatement was no longer viable under the circumstances, the CA awarded the respondents

separation pay at one (1) months salary for every year of service, plus full backwages, allowances and other

statutory benefits under the law.

The petitioner and SMPSA moved for reconsideration, arguing that the CA should have dismissed the petition

outright for late filing, and that there was no compelling reason for the reversal of the LA and the NLRCs

factual findings.11


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In its April 22, 2009 resolution, the CA modified its September 5, 2008 decision by dismissing Bicoys petition

for having been filed out of time. However, it considered the respondents petition as timely filed. It also opined

that disregarding any procedural lapses best served substantial justice.12

The petitioner then filed the present petition. Bicoy, with respondents Castil, Esic, and Ambrocio M. Cantar

filed a separate appeal, docketed as G.R. No. 190848. The Court denied this appeal in its April 5, 2010

resolution for late filing and for non-compliance with Rules 45 and 46 of the Rules of Court.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that: (a) the respondents CA petition for certiorari was filed 28 days late; (b) the

respondents new counsel concealed Atty. Plandos October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 26, 2006

resolution and relied on the respondents December 6, 2006 notice of the resolution; and (c) the evidence on

record supports the LA and NLRC decisions.

The Case for the Respondents

In contrast, the respondents submit that: (a) December 6, 2006 is the reckoning date of the 60-day period; (b)

Atty. Plandos October 13, 2006 receipt did not bind them because his secretary, Sonia M. Barnachea,misplaced the September 29, 2006 resolution and they should not suffer for her negligence; and (c) the evidence

on record does not support the LA and NLRC rulings.

Issue

The core issues boil down to whether the CA erred in acting on the respondents petition despite its late filing,

and in reversing the LA and NLRC decisions.

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

Timeliness of the CA petition for certiorari

Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,13

certiorari should be instituted within a

period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed.14

The 60-day period is

inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy

disposition of their case.15

Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules

were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our judicial system.16

While

procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,

indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedydischarge of judicial business.

17The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court

cannot trifle with.18

Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance

may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed. 1avvphi1

However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty

reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the

prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time


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from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case;

(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;

(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be

unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10)

peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair

play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all

the attendant circumstances.19

Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to

advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.1avvphi1

Negligence of former counsel binds the respondents

In the present case, the respondents petition for certiorari was filed twenty-eight (28) days late from Atty.

Plandos October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 29, 2006 resolution. The respondents insist that they should

not suffer for Atty. Plandos negligence in failing to inform them of the September 29, 2006 resolution, and the

reckoning date for the 60-day period should be their December 6, 2006 notice.

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural

technique.20

The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable

that the client is deprived of his day in court.21The failure of a partys counsel to notify him on time of the

adverse judgment, to enable him to appeal therefrom, is negligence that is not excusable. We have repeatedly

held that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to

inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a

judgment valid and regular on its face.22

We cannot sustain the respondents argument that they cannot be bound by Atty. Plandos negligence since this

would set a dangerous precedent. It would enable every party-litigant to render inoperative any adverse order or

decision of the courts or tribunals, through the simple expedient of alleging his/her counsels gross negligence.

We thus find that the CA erred in acting on the respondents petition for certiorari despite its late filing. TheNLRC resolution was already final and executory, and the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition,

except to order its dismissal.

Immutability of NLRC resolution

The NLRCs resolution became final ten (10) days after counsels receipt, and the respondents failure to file

the petition within the required (60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition

for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the resolution.23

Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer

be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and

whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.24

All the issues between

the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the

decision proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are acquired by the winning party.25

Just as a losing party

has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the

finality of the decision on the case.26

After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a

decision on the merits.27

Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of

courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by

settling justiciable controversies with finality.28


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WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. SP No. 01472-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter is

REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 189191 February 29, 2012

Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation, Petitioner,vs.Court of Appeals, Power One Corporation, Islands Grid Network Philippines, Inc., David Tan, andManuel Lauron,*Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing

the 23 December 2008 and 23 June 2009 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA).1The core issue at bench is

whether the CA had the authority to grant a Motion for Extension to file a petition for certiorari, in the light of

our Resolution in A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which took effect on 27 December 2007.

Facts

The case stems from the Complaint for injunction with urgent prayer for temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 70957-SJ) filed by MindoroTech Services Inc. (MindoroTech) and

petitioner Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation (Mid-Islands Power) against respondents Power One

Corporation (Power One), Islands Grid Network Philippines, Inc. (Islands Grid), David Tan (Tan), and Manuel

Lauron (Lauron).

Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ORMECO), an electric distribution cooperative, entered into an

Electric Supply Agreement (ESA) with Power One as the formers new electric power provider. Pursuant to the

agreement, Power One was permitted to install, construct or acquire, and operate an electric generating facility

in Oriental Mindoro. It was also authorized to assign its rights, interests, and obligations under the ESA to anaffiliate or to a special purpose corporation that it may organize for the project (project company). Furthermore,

Power One was empowered to form other corporations for the purpose of undertaking various aspects of the

ESA. As part of the agreement, it was given the right to use the existing Calapan Diesel Power Plant in Oriental

Mindoro.

Power One invited several potential partners to join it in a business venture involving the management and

operations of its ESA with ORMECO and its existing ESA with Central Negros Electric Cooperative

(CENECO). Under the proposal, they would form a joint venture to be called "Mid-Islands Power Generation

Corporation." This proposed project company would assume all the interests, rights, and obligations of Power


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One under its ESA with CENECO (ESA-CENECO) and with ORMECO (ESA-ORMECO). Consequently, on 4

June 2004, Power One entered into a Memorandum of Agreement2(MOA) with Victor Pascual, Faustino Lim,

Philip Uy, and Viscal Development Corporation. The MOA stated that the new company, Mid-Islands Power,

would own and implement Phase 1 of ESA-CENECO, which involved existing and proposed power plants in

Alijis District, Bacolod City; and Phase 1 of ESA-ORMECO, which concerned the existing Calapan Diesel

Power Plant in Calapan City.

Under the agreement, the new partners would subscribe to 69.5%; Power One, through its affiliate companyIslands Grid, to 29.5%; and a certain Kenneth Uy, to the remaining 1% of the outstanding capital stock of Mid-

Islands Power. It was further stipulated that the management and operations of the newly organized project

company, Mid-Islands Power, would be the responsibility of the new co-partners of Power One. Thus, on 15

October 2004, by virtue of an Assignment Memorandum,3Power One assigned its two ESAs to Mid-Islands

Power and notified ORMECO accordingly. In turn, ORMECO acknowledged the assumption by Mid-Islands

Power of the rights, interests, and obligations of Power One under the ESA-ORMECO.

In July 2005 Victor Pascual, Faustino Lim, Philip Uy, and Container Corporation of the Philippines4

(collectively, Pascual et al.) entered into a Revised Memorandum of Agreement5(Revised MOA) with Power

One, in which the parties agreed to shelve the CENECO project. Instead, they decided to focus on Phase 1 ofthe ORMECO project and to add Phase 2 of the ESA-ORMECO to their joint venture. Furthermore, the parties

stipulated that they would form "an O & M Company," which would operate and manage the Calapan Diesel

Power Plant on behalf of Mid-Islands Power. It was agreed that Pascual et al. would own and subscribe to 80%

and Power One, through Islands Grid, to 20% of the stocks of the "O & M Company" that would be formed.

The business relations between Power One and Pascual et al. eventually turned thorny. On various dates in May

2006, respondent Tan on behalf of Power One sent correspondences6to Mid-Islands Power. An issue raised

therein was the latters inability to fulfill its commitment to complete certain aspects of the ORMECO project

within their set deadlines. Power One reiterated that the timely completion of Phase 1 of the ESA would be

critical to the achievement of their profit goals. It insisted that Mid-Islands Power should decide and act fasterso that the delays in finishing the projects would be cut by half. For its part, Mid-Islands Power broached

several issues concerning its monetary advances, future financing arrangements, and proposed revision of the

provisions on shareholdings in their Revised MOA. A further exchange of correspondences ensued,7with both

parties raising various concerns, such as lack of the required financing for the ORMECO project; the inability of

Pascual et al., through Mid-Islands Power, to complete Phases 1 and 2 of the ORMECO project; and

inefficiency in the management of the Mid-Islands Power joint venture.

Consequently, in a demand letter8sent to Pascual et al. through Mid-Islands, Power One asked for the specific

performance of Pascual et al.s obligations under the Revised MOA. Power One asserted that the continued

delay in finishing the ORMECO project had already resulted in a reduction of the electricity generated to lessthan 50% of capacity. Power One then informed Mid-Islands that their right to supply power to ORMECO and

NPC, as well as to occupy and operate the leased facilities of NAPOCOR, had not taken effect.

Power One alleged that it had already informed ORMECO that the assignment of the ESA in favor of Mid-

Islands Power had not taken effect as of 30 April 2006 because of the latters inability to fulfill its obligations

under the Revised MOA. Furthermore, Power One informed Mid-Islands Power that ORMECO had supposedly

noticed that another company, MindoroTech, had been operating the Calapan Diesel Power Plant in violation of

the ESA. Power One thus sought an explanation of the role of MindoroTech and demanded that Mid-Islands

provide a clear plan on how the latter would complete Phase 1 of the ORMECO project. Subsequently, on 19


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August 2006, Power One and Islands Grid barred Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech from entering the

Calapan Diesel Power Plant.

On 11 September 2006, MindoroTech and petitioner Mid-Islands Power filed a Complaint (Civil Case No.

70957-SJ) against respondents Power One, Islands Grid, Tan, and Lauron. The complainants argued that, since

the interests, rights, and obligations of respondents had already been transferred, respondents must be restrained

from preventing them from performing their lawful and valid obligations under the ESA and the Revised MOA.

Respondents opposed the Complaint and argued that the assignment of the ESA-ORMECO did not becomeeffective, since certain conditions under the Revised MOA had not yet been fulfilled. According to respondents,

the Calapan Diesel Power Plant could not be commercially operated unless the conditions were satisfied; and

until due consultation with ORMECO was held, and the latters approval obtained.

The Pasig City Regional Trial Court (Pasig RTC) issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order (TRO) to Power

One, Islands Grid, Tan, and Lauron. At the continuation of the hearing on the issuance of a preliminary

injunction, the parties agreed to the policy of "no touch," in which none of the parties would enter the control

and the engine rooms of the power plant. They also agreed to an interim compromise operation of the power

plant. In the meantime, the branch sheriff of the Pasig RTC placed the operation of the power plant under the

responsibility of Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech.

However, on 20 October 2006 and during the pendency of the Complaint filed by MindoroTech and Mid-

Islands Power, ORMECO filed a separate Complaint (Civil Case No. CV-06-5689) against Power One for

specific performance of contract, with an application for preliminary mandatory injunction and damages before

the RTC in Calapan City (Calapan RTC).9On the same day, the trial court issued a 72-hour TRO commanding

Power One to perform and comply with the latters obligation to immediately operate the Calapan Diesel Power

Plant pursuant to the ESA-ORMECO. The Order also directed that, if Power One failed to perform its

obligation, ORMECO would be authorized to operate the power plant. The sheriff of Calapan RTC eventually

turned over to ORMECO the operations of the power plant and removed Mid-Islands and MindoroTech

therefrom. According to the Calapan RTC judge, the TRO was issued to safeguard public interest, because therewas an impending brownout in the whole province of Oriental Mindoro.

10

On 6 November 2006, the Pasig RTC issued an Order11

granting the prayer of MindoroTech and Mid-Islands

Power for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Power One, Islands Grid, Tan, Lauron, and

their representatives and agents. According to the RTC, actual and imminent danger was present. If the

employees of complainants were prevented from operating the Calapan Diesel Power Plant, there would be

undue interference with the performance of the ESA, which would in turn result in a power crisis in the area

serviced by the Calapan Diesel Power Plant. The Pasig RTC noted that public interest was involved in the full

and continuous supply of electricity in Oriental Mindoro. Thus, pursuant to the writ, Mid-Islands Power and

MindoroTech were allowed to reenter and operate the Calapan Diesel Power Plant.

Thus, on the afternoon of 10 November 2006, the branch sheriff implemented the writ of preliminary injunction

issued by the Pasig RTC, which allowed Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech to resume their operations at the

power plant. On that same day, however, the Calapan RTC issued a separate writ of preliminary mandatory

injunction against these two corporations. Counsel for Power One then went to the power plant and demanded

that Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech vacate the premises. As both parties tried to enforce the two separate

writs of preliminary injunction, which were issued by two different trial courts, trouble at the power plant

ensued. Eventually, the Calapan RTC sheriff forcibly broke open the doors of the power plant and demanded

that the personnel of both corporations leave the premises.


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Consequently, respondents assailed the Order of the Pasig RTC before the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 97243)

through a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.12

They argued that the trial court did not have territorial

jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ, because the acts sought to be enjoined had been committed in Calapan,

Oriental Mindoro. On 10 December 2007, the CA issued a Decision13

sustaining the Order of the Pasig RTC.

According to the appellate court, the lockout indeed happened in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro; but since those

who had barred the employees of Mid-Islands Power merely acted pursuant to the orders that officials of Power

One issued from its principal office in Pasig City, the acts sought to be restrained had actually been committed

within the territorial jurisdiction of the Pasig RTC. On 4 March 2008, the appellate court issued a Resolutiondenying the Motion for Reconsideration of Power One and Islands Grid. Afterwards, on 20 April 2009, the CA

issued another Resolution ordering the entry of judgment of its 10 December 2007 Decision and as the

judgment was no longer appealed to this Court subsequently ruled that the said CA Decision had become final

and executory on 2 April 2008.

Meanwhile, the Pasig RTC proceeded with the main action for injunction in Civil Case No. 70957-SJ. On 29

September 2008, it rendered summary judgment in favor of Mid-Islands Power and MindoroTech and made the

preliminary injunction it issued on 6 November 2006 permanent.14

Pursuant to the Order, Islands Grid and

Power One were permanently enjoined from committing acts that would tend to prevent Mid-Islands Power and

MindoroTech from exercising and performing the latter twos rights and obligations in operating the CalapanDiesel Power Plant.

On 9 December 2008, Power One filed a Motion for Extension of time to file its Petition for Certiorari with the

CA and prayed for a 15-day extension. According to Power One, the Petition would question the 29 September

2008 Order of the Pasig RTC granting a permanent injunction against the former.15

Power One claimed that on

10 October 2008, it received the Order that gave it until 9 December 2008 to file a petition for certiorari.

However, it posited that the lawyer handling the case had left the firm, and that the other lawyers were not able

to act upon the Petition due to "other equally important professional undertaking."16

Pending the CA resolution

on the Motion for Extension, Power One proceeded to file a Petition for Certiorari on 23 December 2008. The

Motion for Extension (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 106511) was eventually granted on 23 December 2008. 17Mid-Islands Power opposed the Resolution of the CA and argued that the Motion had been granted in violation

of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. On 23 June 2009, the CA denied the Motion of Mid-Islands Power,18

which

consequently filed the instant Petition.

Issue

The sole issue presented before this Court is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion,

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in granting respondent Power Ones Motion for Extension.

Discussion

According to petitioner, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in granting Power Ones Motion for

Extension to file a petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that the amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC had

already deleted the provision that allows an extension of time to file a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court.

Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, was previously worded thus:

SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice

of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether


18/27

such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said

motion.





acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shallbe filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.


fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a Resolution dated 4 December 2007, the Supreme Court En Banc issued A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which

amended the aforecited provision as follows:

Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from

notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,

whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from thenotice of the denial of the motion.



by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not

the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-



In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall befiled exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,19

we explained that the reason behind the amendments under

A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to prevent the use or abuse of the remedy of petition for certiorari in order to delay a

case or even defeat the ends of justice. We thus deleted the clause that allowed an extension of the period to file

a Rule 65 petition for compelling reasons. Instead, we deemed the 60-day period to file as reasonable and

sufficient time for a party to mull over the case and to prepare a petition that asserts grave abuse of discretion by

a lower court. The period was specifically set and limited in order to avoid any unreasonable delay in the

dispensation of justice, a delay that could violate the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of

their case. Consequently, we pronounced that when the CA granted the motion for extension, it in effectdisregarded and modified, if not outrightly reversed, the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 07-7-

12-SC. We then said that in so doing, the appellate court arrogated unto itself "a power it did not possess, a

power that only this Court may exercise."20

Consequently, we ruled that petitions for certiorari must now be

filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.21

Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,22

we ruled that the deletion of the clause

in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to

file a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited. We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended,

the deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an extension of time to file


19/27

such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be

allowed, subject to this Courts sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases.

Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve

substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. Thus, in Tan v. Ballena, we pronounced:

It is a well-settled principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of

justice.1wphi1Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate

rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. In deciding a case, the appellate court has the

discretion whether or not to dismiss the same, which discretion must be exercised soundly and in accordance

with the tenets of justice and fair play, taking into account the circumstances of the case. It is a far better and

more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case

to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the

parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a

miscarriage of justice.23

(Citations omitted.)

The present Petition involves one of those exceptional cases in which relaxing the procedural rules would serve

substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. It concerns the operations and management of the

Calapan Diesel Power Plant a power-generating facility that supplies electricity to Oriental Mindoro. It was

alleged that the dispute between the parties had already resulted in a reduced generation of power, which was

supposedly producing electricity at less than 50% of its capacity. A TRO had already been issued previously, as

there was an impending brownout in the entire province of Oriental Mindoro. Consequently, in order to protect

strong public interest, this Court deems it appropriate and justifiable to relax the amendment of Section 4, Rule

65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, concerning the reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition.

Considering that the imminent power crisis is an exceptional and meritorious circumstance, the parties herein

should be allowed to litigate the issues on the merits. Furthermore, we find no significant prejudice to the

substantive rights of the litigants as respondent was able to file the Petition before the CA within the 15-day

extension it asked for. We therefore find no grave abuse of discretion attributable to the CA when it grantedrespondent Power Ones Motion for Extension to file its Petition for Certiorari.

As a final note, we convey our strong disapproval over the failure of Power Ones lawyers to file the Petition

within the reglementary period. The amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC were meant to be implemented

strictly, with a view in mind that the 60-day period to file is a reasonable and sufficient time to prepare a Rule

65 petition. Workload and resignation of the lawyer handling the case are insufficient reasons to justify the

relaxation of the procedural rules. He should not have left his client with this very critical piece of work hanging

in midair. Were it not for the exceptional nature of the case and the strong public interest involved herein, we

would have overturned the approval by the CA of the Motion to extend the period to file a Rule 65 Petition.

WHEREFORE the Petition is DISMISSED. The 23 December 2008 and 23 June 2009 Resolutions of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106511 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice


20/27

G.R. No. 185220 July 27, 2009

LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM and GERALDINE ESGUERRA, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J.:

This petition arose from a labor case filed by private respondents Aries C. Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra

against petitioner Laguna Metts Corporation (LMC).1The labor arbiter decided in favor of private respondents

and found that they were illegally dismissed by LMC. On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the labor arbiter in a decision dated February 21, 2008. Private

respondents motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated April 30, 2008.

Counsel for private respondents received the April 30, 2008 resolution of the NLRC on May 26, 2008. On July

25, 2008, he filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court.2The motion alleged that, for reasons

3stated therein, the petition could not be filed in the Court of

Appeals within the prescribed 60-day period.4Thus, a 15-day extension period was prayed for.

5

In a resolution dated August 7, 2008,6the Court of Appeals granted the motion and gave private respondents a

non-extendible period of 15 days within which to file their petition for certiorari. LMC moved for the

reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no

longer allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated

December 4, 2007.7This was denied in a resolution dated October 22, 2008. According to the appellate court,

while the amendment of the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 admittedly calls for stricter application to

discourage the filing of unwarranted motions for extension of time, it did not strip the Court of Appeals of the

discretionary power to grant a motion for extension in exceptional cases to serve the ends of justice.

Aggrieved, LMC now assails the resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 of the Court of

Appeals in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It contends that the Court of Appeals

committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted private respondents motion for extension of time to file

petition for certiorari as the Court of Appeals had no power to grant something that had already been expressly

deleted from the rules.

We agree.

Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of

claiming substantial merit.8As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain

proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly

discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.9

InDe Los Santos v. Court of Appeals,10

we ruled:

Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a petition for certiorari. The 60-day

period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave


21/27

abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would

violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case. (emphasis supplied)

While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for filing a petition for certiorari beyond

the 60-day period,11

the amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to

file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that previously permitted such extensions.

Section 4, Rule 65 previously read:

SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of

the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such






acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition

shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.


15 days.12

(emphasis supplied)

With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads:

SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice

of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such

motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer ora person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined

by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not

the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. lavvphilIf the petition involves an act or an omission of a

quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be


In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed

exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its

meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a

change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction

different from that previous to its amendment.13

lavvph!l

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65,

the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under

the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any

extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari.


22/27

The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph

allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the

Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from

the order denying a motion for reconsideration.

In granting the private respondents motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari, the Court of

Appeals disregarded A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. The action amounted to a modification, if not outright reversal, bythe Court of Appeals of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In so doing, the Court of Appeals arrogated to itself a power it

did not possess, a power that only this Court may exercise.14

For this reason, the challenged resolutions dated

August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 were invalid as they were rendered by the Court of Appeals in excess of

its jurisdiction.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals retained the discretion to grant extensions of time to file a petition for

certiorari for compelling reasons, the reasons proffered by private respondents counsel did not qualify as

compelling. Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving.15

Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to

deviate from the 60-day rule.16

As to the other ground cited by private respondents counsel, suffice it to say that it was a bare allegation

unsubstantiated by any proof or affidavit of merit. Besides, they could have filed the petition on time with a

motion to be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis. While social justice requires that the law look tenderly on the

disadvantaged sectors of society, neither the rich nor the poor has a license to disregard rules of procedure. The

fundamental rule of human relations enjoins everyone, regardless of standing in life, to duly observe procedural

rules as an aspect of acting with justice, giving everyone his due and observing honesty and good faith.17

For

indeed, while technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the

success of that quest to which all courts are devoted.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104510 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the

said case is ordered DISMISSED for having been filed out of time.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 70203 December 18, 1987

SALVIO B. FORTUNO and CAMARINES SUR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE (CASURECO II),petitioners,vs.HONORABLE MERICIA B. PALMA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch XXI, Regional TrialCourt, Fifth Judicial Region, and JOEL DAVID S. ABANTE, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:


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The issue posed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and

temporary restraining order is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction over quo warranto

proceedings involving the qualification for membership of the Board of Directors of an electric cooperative.

Petitioner Salvio B. Fortuno and respondent Joel David S. Abante were candidates for the position of director to

represent District V of the Camarines Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO II) at the elections of

February 9, 1985. On January 30, 1985, Abante filed with the National Electrification Administration (NEA) a

petition to disqualify Fortuno as candidate alleging that he is not a resident of the area coverage of District V asrequired by the By-laws of the corporation. The NEA directed the CASURECO Board of Directors to take

appropriate action on the petition in accordance with the By-laws and Election Code. The Board indorsed the

petition to the District Election Committee (DEC) which is the body charged with the duty of deciding all

election matters, including protests, quarries, referrals, postponements and nullification. 1 In another letter of

February 4, 1985 addressed to DEC, Abante likewise sought the disqualification of Fortuno on the same ground

of non-residence.

The DEC directed Fortuno to submit his comment thereto within 48 hours which was duly complied with. After

a hearing on February 9, 1985, the DEC denied Abante's petition to disqualify Fortuno finding that he is a

resident of the area coverage of District V.

On February 9, 1985, the election was held as a result of which Fortuno obtained 1,429 votes while Abante

received 637 votes. Accordingly, the DEC proclaimed Fortuno as the duly elected director for District V.

On February 10, 1985, a quo warranto petition with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining

order was filed by Abante in the Regional Trial Court of Naga City docketed as No. RTC-05-607 entitled "Joel

David S. Abante vs. Salvio B. Fortuno, and CASURECO II." On the day of the hearing of the preliminary

injunction the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court over the case was raised by said defendants. On March 13,

1985, an order was issued by the trial court upholding its jurisdiction over the subject matter. A motion for

reconsideration of said order was filed by defendants but this was denied in an order of March 16, 1985.

On March 18, 1985, the trial court issued an order resetting the hearing for preliminary injunction on March 25,

1985 to enable defendants to elevate the matter to the appellate court and issued the restraining order enjoining

Fortuno from assuming or otherwise performing the functions of a member of the Board of Directors of

CASURECO II until further orders of the Court and the respondent CASURECO II to observe and implement

the said restraining order.

Hence, the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary

restraining order filed on March 18, 1985 with this Court wherein petitioners seek to set aside said orders of

March 16 and 18, both of 1985 of the trial court and that a restraining order be issued against the trial court

taking further action on the case until further orders.

On March 19, 1985, a supplemental petition was filed by petitioners informing the Court of the restraining order

the respondent court issued on March 18, 1985 which in effect restrains the continuance in the performance of

the duties of Fortuno as an incumbent member of the Board of Directors who was elected in 1981 whose term

of office will end on March 30, 1985 and that assuming that he was not a resident of the area of coverage he

represents he cannot be arbitrarily suspended or removed from office so that petitioners pray for a restraining

order against the enforcement of said order and for the respondent Judge from taking further proceedings in the

case.


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On March 25, 1985, without giving due course to the petition the respondents were required to comment

thereon.

The comment thereon having been filed by the respondents, on October 9, 1985 the Court gave due course to

the petition and required the parties to submit their simultaneous memoranda. Only petitioners submitted their

memoranda. The case is now submitted for deliberation.

The main thrust of the petition is that the respondent court has no jurisdiction over the case citing Section 24 of

P.D. 269 as amended, which vests in the National Electrification Administration (NEA) the power of

supervision and control over all electric cooperatives as follows:

Section 24.Board of Directors. (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in its Board, subject to

the supervision and controlof NEA which shall have the right to be represented and to participate in all Board

meetings and deliberations and to approve all policies and resolutions.

The composition, qualifications, the manner of elections and filling of vacancies, the procedures for holding

meetings and other similar provisions shall be defined in the By-laws of the Cooperative subjectto NEA

policies, rules and regulations...2

Thus petitioners argue that:

Pursuant to the authority granted it by law, the NEA promulgated a standard Electric Cooperative Election Code

which the CASURECO II Board of Directors adopted under its Board Resolution No. 108, s. 1982, as amended

by Board Resolution No. 84-141 (Exh. 2). This Election Cooperative Election Code provides for the creation of

a District Election Committee (DEC) which shall, among other things, 'decide on all election matters including

protests, queries, referrals, postponement and nullification' (par. f, Sec. 26, Electric Cooperative Election Code),

'act as Board of Canvassers' (Sec. 26-g, Ibid), and 'proclaim the winning candidate' (Sec. 50, Ibid). lt is likewise

vested with the 'sole jurisdiction' over all protests relating to the election of the members of the Board of

Directors, although its decision is appealable to the NEA (Secs. 51, 52, Ibid).

As already adverted to above, respondent Abante filed two formal complaints questioning the residence

qualification of petitioner Fortuno. These two complaints were duly heard and resolved by the DEC in its

Resolution No. 04 dated 8 February 1985 (Exh. 4).Abante did not appeal from this Resolution which upheld the

residence qualification of Fortuno.

In other words, the District Election Committee which is vested with authority to decide questions of this nature

has already ruled that petitioner Fortuno possesses the necessary residence qualification, a decision which has

long become final, no appeal having been taken therefrom. The question, therefore, of Fortuno's alleged non-

residence within the area coverage of District V had finally been resolved by the duly constituted and

authorized administrative body in accordance with the internal rules and regulations of both CASURECO II and

the National Electric Administration.

Moreover, we earnestly underline the fact that immediately after the elections on the afternoon of February 9,

1985, the DEC proclaimed Fortuno as the duly elected Director for District V. No protest against petitioner's

proclamation was filed with the DEC, which has the sole jurisdictionto entertain the same, within the

reglementary 72-hour period provided for in Section 51 of the Electric Cooperative Election Code. Therefore,

said proclamation may no longer be questioned.


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These facts assume greater significance when it is remembered that private respondent Abante himself, in his

Certificate of Candidacy (Exh. 3), expressly agreed to abide by the Electric Cooperative Election Code, thereby

placing himself squarely within the jurisdiction of the provisions thereof.

We respectfully submit, therefore, that inasmuch as the power to determine and decide the residence

qualification of petitioner Fortuno is vested in, and falls within the peculiar function and competence of the

NEA, acting through its duly created District Election Committee, that the decision rendered by the latter had

already become final, said resolution may no longer be questioned elsewhere. The respondent Court thus iswithout jurisdiction and authority to review and reverse the aforesaid decision of the District Election

Committee.3

In support of petitioners' theory the cases ofLions Clubs International vs. Judge Amores4and ofBataan

Electric Cooperative vs. Judge Pedro T. Santiagoare cited.5

In the questioned order of March 13, 1985 of the respondent court it made the following disquisition:

The pleadings and motions filed by counsels disclose the following: 1) Petitioner Joel David S. Abante and

respondent Salvio S. Fortuno were the only candidates in the election for District Director, District V,

CASURECO II, Inc. for the towns of Canaman, Magarao and Bombon held on February 9, 1985. 2) Few daysbefore the election, or on January 30, 1985 Abante in a petition to the National Electrification Administration

(NEA) sought the disqualification of respondent Salvio Fortuno on the ground that the latter was not a resident

within the area coverage of District V, CASURECO II. The NEA endorsed the petition to the District Election

Committee which in resolution No. 04 dated February 8, 1985 denied Abante's petition. 3) A petition for

mandamus with preliminary injunction to disqualify Fortuno on grounds of non-residence and to enjoin the

CASURECO II from proceedings with the election scheduled on February 9, 1985 was filed before the RTC,

which was docketed as Civil Case No. RTC'85-599. After due hearing the Court denied the prayer for

postponement of the election and dismissed the petition. 4) The DEC proclaimed Fortuno elected having

garnered 1,429 votes as against Abante's votes of 637. No protest was filed by Abante within the 72-hour

reglementary period as allegedly provided for in Section 51 of the Electric Cooperative Election Code.

The elected board of CASURECO II will assume their position for a term of 3 years on March 30, 1985.

Abante, convinced that Fortuno is disqualified because of non-residence in the area, filed this present Special

Civil Action for Quo Warranto Respondent Fortuno in raising the issue of jurisdiction contends that judicial

intervention is not proper; that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies; that this Court has no

jurisdiction over the nature of subject matter of the action; that it is the DEC who is vested with the "sole

jurisdiction over all protests of directors, although its decision is appealable to the NEA." It is claimed that

Courts may not intervene in the purely internal affairs of the cooperative and in this regard, respondent

Documents

SPECPRO_2SPECPRO_2nd set cases