Specpro Reviewer Cha

8/3/2019 Specpro Reviewer Cha

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1 | S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n B a l b a s t r o _ b y C h a M e n d o z a

INTRODUCTION

BASIS AND COMPONENTS OF REMEDIAL LAW

Article VIII, Section 13, Constitution

The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall

be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the

Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached

to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, orabstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be

observed by all lower collegiate courts.

Civil Procedure (Section 3a, ROC)

Ordinary Civil Action: one by which a party sues another for

...the enforcement or protection of a right,

...or the prevention or redress of a wrong

Special Civil Action: similar to an ordinary civil action but subject to specific rules prescribed for it

Special Proceedings

-a remedy by which a party seeks to establish

...a status

a right

or a particular fact

Criminal procedure

-criminal Action: one by which the State

prosecutes a person

for an act or omission punishable by law

Evidence

R128.1 Evidence is the means

Sanctioned by these rules

Of ascertaining in a judicial proceedings

The truth

In relation to a matter of fact

Importance of Procedural RulesREPUBLIC V. KENRICH DEV'T CORPORATION 498 SCRA 220

Facts:

-Kenrick Development Corp built a perimeter wall which encroached upon some parcels of land occupied

by ATO based on TCTs derived from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.

When ATO verified the TCTs with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), it was found that there were no

record of TCT no. 17508 and its ascendant title. Land was also covered by Villamor Air Base.

-so OSG, on behalf of LRA, filed a COMPLAINT FOR REVOCATION, ANNULMENT AND CANCELLATION OF

CERTIFICATES OF TITLE in behalf of RP vs. Kenrick and Alfonso Concepcion

-Alfonso Concepcion cannot be found so alias summon by publication done

-Kenrick allegedly filed an answer signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr as their counsel (but later on, during

a Senate hearing, it was found that somebody else signed for Atty. Garlitos but he did not authorize such

signing)

-case punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or

continuances, MTDs, Motion to declare defendant in default, et al.

-Pending hearing, Senate conducted hearing in aid of legislation on the issuances of fake titles and

focused on how Kenrick was able to obtain title to lands wherein it built perimeter fence. Here is where

atty. Garlitos denied that he signed the answer before the RTC

-with that admission before the senate, OSG filed Urgent motion to declare Kenrick in default. - answer

no signature of counsel so mere scrap of paper

-RTC: granted, declared defendant in default, allowed RP to present evidence ex parte

-MR: Denied, so petition for certiorari-CA: reversed RTC

statements of Atty. Garlitos in the Senate hearing unreliable, not subject to cross examination

Acts of Atty Garlitos after the filing of the answer: although he did not sign it, he prepared the draft of

the answer and even if it was signed by another person, he did not contest it and even represented

Kenrick in another case - these acts s upposedly cured whatever defect the answer had

ISSUE:WON CA erred ? YES. Kenrick is really in default, for their answer was not signed therefore the

said pleading is deemed as a mere scrap of paper and thus they are not considered to have submitted

any answer at all.

On the alleged blanket authority given by Atty. Garlitos for anyone to sign the draft answer he

prepared

-acts of Kenrick was deemed to have adopted the statements of Atty. Garlitos (that the answer

submitted was not signed by him therefore, they have submitted a defective answer)- adoptiveadmission

-SIGNED PLEADING: signed by the counsel or the party himself; counsel's signature cannot be delegated

and means that he certifies that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information

and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of

Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.

On liberal interpretation of rules (rules are mer e technicalities.)

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their

own valid raison d etrein the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may

result in arbitrariness and injustice.19

The Courts pronouncement inGarbo v. Court of Appeals20is relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike

are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a

relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion forerring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of

the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true

that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in

accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of

reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of

his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. 21In this case, respondent failed

to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of

the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.

SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION V. CIR 492 SCRA 192
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San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation was assessed by the BIR for DEFICIENCY miller's tax and

manufacturer's sales tax. It was imposed on the sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products.

SPMC opposed the assessment but their protest was denied. SPMC appealed to CTA.

-CTA:cancelled deficiency manufacturer's tax on sales of corn and edible oils but not deficiency miller's

tax. MR denied

-SPMC appealed to CA BUT the attached VERIFICATION and CNFS to the appeal was WITHOUT THE

CORPORATE SECRETARY'S CERTIFICATE, BOARD RESOLUTION OR POWER OF ATTORNEY but only with the

SPMC's chief financial officer who did not appear to have authority to sign the verification and CNFS. MR

DENIED

ISSUE: WON CA should have given cognizance to the appeal? NO

On SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE (as the merits would allegedly show that SPMC was not liable for the

miller's tax as the crude oil was sold to UNICHEM and UNICHEM exported it as an ingredient of fatty

acid and glycerine)

-R43.5 (appeals to CA from CTA): Needs pleading to be verified + CNFS. If w/o proper verification, treated

as an unsigned pleading. If w/o CNFS, ground for dismissal.

WHO MAY BE SIGNATORIES TO CORPORATION'S DOCUMENTS: only by natural persons duly authorized

for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific acts of the board of directors. In the absence of

authority from the BoD, no person, n ot even the officers of the corporation, can bind the corporation.

Here:AS SPMC'S PETITION DID NOT INDICATE THAT THE PERSON WHO SIGNED THE VERIFICATION/CNFS

WAS AUTHORIZED BY BOD.

WHY: IT ONLY RELIED ON THE ALLEGED POWER OF THE CHIEF FINANCING OFFICER TO REPRESENT SPMCIN ALL MATTERS REGARDING FINANCES OF CORPORATION - INCLUDING FILING OF SUITS

BUT: no power of attorney, no authorization from the BoD

= unsigned pleading

strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.

Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance such as the requirement

on non-forum shopping, as well as verification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be

rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.

Even if grant substantial compliance, SPMC still is liable for miller's tax

-The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and

dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured

article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller himself.

-The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere

did it provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in the exemptingclause or the manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials was covered by the exemption. Since

SPMCs situation was not within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% millers tax

imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.

TRINIDAD V. ACAPULCO 493 SCRA 179

Facts

Backstory:Acapulco owed Trinidad around P566k.

Trinidad's version:as payment for the P566k, Acapulco gave him the Mercedez Benz she bought from

Canete for P500k by way of dacion en pago. A deed of sale was executed to that effect. He did not give

instructions to Acapulco to buy it from Canete, he did not borrow it from Acapulco and Acapulco did not

demand for its return

Acapulco's version:Acapulco was asked by Canete to sell the Mercedes Benz for P580k (but she could

buy it herself for P500k). While she was finding a buyer, Trinidad borrowed the car from her and

instructed her to buy the car from Canete herself then Trinidad would then pay her (so bayaran muna

nya para mura bili then saka bibilhin ni Trinidad). However, after buying the Benz from Canete, Trinidad

did not return the car and did not pay Acapulco, saying that he would just offset whatever Acapulco

owes to him. As a result, the checks issued by Acapulco in favor of Canete (to pay the P500k) were not

funded and bounced. Criminal charges were filed against her by Canete.

-Acapulco filed Complaint for nullification of sale she made in favor of Trinidad, prayed that the car be

returned to her and that Trinidad pay damages.

-Trinidad alleged that there was dacion en pago between them (and alleged those above)

-Pre-trial order focused on WON there was dacion en pago between themRTC:NO DACION EN PAGO because no common consent (for Acapulco);

-MR :he alleged that there was implied consent on the part of Acapulco because she delivered the car

herself after he threatened that he'll file an estafa case against her

-Supplemental Motion: assuming no consent from Acapulco, there was legal compensation (since

Acapulco owed him P566k and the cost of the car was P500k)

-appealed to CA

CA:affirm

(1) legal compensation allegation filed too late

(2) parties already agreed that the issue would only be WON there was dacion en pago

(3) dacion en pago was not present - Acapulco did not give consent

(4) no legal compensation (obligation in money not equivalent to delivery of car)

(5) admission that the sale price of the car was not paid by him (as he wanted that the car be

given as payment for Acapulco's debts) entitled Acapulco to file action for rescission of sale

ISSUE:WON legal compensation argument of Trinidad should still be appreciated, though not expressly

stated in his Answer to the Complaint before RTC, as his allegations in the answer and the facts proven in

TC shows the presence of legal compensation

HELD:For TRINIDAD. There's legal compensation

On technical rules (late raising of issue of legal compensation):

-Our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper

assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. The interest of justice dictates that the Court

consider and resolve issues even though not particularly raised if it is necessary for the complete

adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and it falls within the issues already found by

them. While it is true that petitioner failed to raise the issue of legal compensation at the earliest

opportunity, this should not preclude the courts from appreciating the same especially in this case,

where ignoring the same would only result to unnecessary and circuitous filing of cases .

Indeed, the doctrine that higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the

pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for

reconsideration or on appeal, is subject to exceptions, such as when:

a. grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;

b. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within

contemplation of law;

c. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is n ecessary in arriving at

a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to

avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;

d. matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are

matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the p arties failed to

raise or which the lower court ignored;


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e. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and

f. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question

properly assigned, is dependent.

ON WON there was LEGAL COMPENSATION

-Compensation takes effect by operation of law even without the consent or knowledge of the parties

concerned when all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 of the Civil Code are present. This is in

consonance with Article 1290 of the Civil Code which provides that:

Article 1290. When all the requisites mentioned in article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect byoperation of law, and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the creditors and

debtors are not aware of the compensation.

Since it takes place ipso jure, when used as a defense, it retroacts to the date when all its requisites are

fulfilled.

Article 1279 provides that in order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:

that each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of

the other;

that both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind,

and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;

that the two debts be due;

that they be liquidated and demandable;

that over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons andcommunicated in due time to the debtor.

Here, petitioners stance is that legal compensation has taken place and operates even against the will of

the parties because:

respondent and petitioner were personally both creditor and debtor of each other;

the monetary obligation of respondent was P566,000.00 and that of the petitioner was P500,000.00

showing that both indebtedness were monetary obligations the amount of which were also both known

and liquidated; - of no moment if the other obligation was the delivery of the car

both monetary obligations had become due and demandablepetitioners obligation as shown in the

deed of sale and respondents indebtedness as shown in the dishonored checks; and

neither of the debts or obligations are subject of a controversy commenced by a third person.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS 458 SCRA 200 (2005)

Facts:

-Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc wanted a declaration of the presumptive death of her husband Clemente

Jomoc, who has been absent for 9 years, to be able to marry again.

-RTC:granted it, declared her husband presumptively dead

basis: Article 41,par2, FC: fourconsecutive years only required; must institute a summary proceeding

for the declaration of presumptive death of absentee spouse

-Republic, through OSG, sought to appeal by filing ONLY A NOTICE OF APPEAL

-TC disapporved the Notice of appeal: based on Rule 41, Section 2(a), there should also be a RECORD OF

APPEAL filed and served as the present case was a special proceeding

-OSG filed MR: denied

-OSG filed Petition for certiorari before CA: declaration of presumptive death is NOT A SPECIAL

PROCEEDING or a case of multiple or separate appeals which would require a record on appeal

-CA: denied Petition for certiorari:

(1) OSG failed to attach CTC of assailed order (TC's denial of MR)

(2) OSG failed to attach a copy of the order declaring Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead

---based on (1) and (2) alone + Rule 46.3: the case should have been dismissed!

(3) Declaration of presumptive death is a SPECIAL PROCEEDING as it merely seeks for a declaration of the

trial court of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse. It does not seek enforcement or protection

of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of a right or a COA

that can be enforced

ISSUE:WON THE DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH OF AN ABSENTEE SPOUSE IS A SPECIAL

PROCEEDIGN OR A SUMMARY PROCEEDING (IF NOT A SPECIAL PROCEEDING, DOES NOT NEED A RECORD

ON APPEAL)

HELD:it is NOTA SPECIAL RPOCEEDING!

RULE 72: SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY

OF GENERAL RULES

Section 1. Subject matter of specialproceedings. Rules of specialproceedings are provided for in the

following:

a. Settlement of estate of deceased persons;

b. Escheat;

c. Guardianship and custody of children;

d.

Trustees;e. Adoption;

f. Rescission and revocation of adoption;

g. Hospitalization of insane persons;

h. Habeas corpus;

i. Change of name;

j. Voluntary dissolution of corporations;

k. Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;

l. Constitution of family home;

m. Declaration of absence and death;

n. Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

Sec. 2.Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of specialprovisions, the rules provided for

in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in specialproceedings. (Underscoring

supplied)

CIVIL CODE

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he

shall be presumed dead for all purposes,except for those of succession.

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

FAMILY CODE

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null

and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent

for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was

already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth

in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.


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For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses

present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Codefor the declaration of

presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent

spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

RULES OF COURT ON WHEN RECORD ON APPEAL REQUIRED

Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial courtin

disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal.-Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Courtof Appealsin cases decided by the Regional Trial Courtin the

exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the courtwhich

rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedingsand other cases of multiple or

separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be

filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By the trial courts citat ion of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria

Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract

a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following

above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW,

contains the following provision, inter alia:x x x

Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases

provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an

expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

x x x,

there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary

proceedingunder the Family Code, not a specialproceedingunder the Revised Rules of Courtappeal for

which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a

Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.

That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of RepublicAct No. 386, otherwise known as

the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended,

and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rulesand regulations, or parts thereof,

inconsistent therewithare hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

seals the case in petitioners favor.

*IN SHORT, SINCE THE TRIAL COURT USED THE FAMILY CODE, AND THE FAMILY CODE DESIGNATES

SUCH CASES AS A SUMMARY PROCEEDING AND NOT A SPECIAL PROCEEDING, IT IS NOT A SPECIAL

PROCEEDING

Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the appellate court. Petitioners

failure to attach to his petition before the appellate courta copy of the trial courts order denying its

motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules

of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner,

what the appellate courtshould have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.

As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order granting the petition for declaration of

presumptive death, contrary to the appellate courts observation that petitioner was also assailing it,

petitioners 8-page petition filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed the order

disapproving the Notice of Appeal.

DEFINITION: R2.2, ROC

Cause of action defined: a COA

-is the act or omission

By which a party violates the right of another

DISTINGUISHED FROM CIVIL ACTION R2.1 AND 2.2

R2.1: Ordinary Civil Actions, basis of -

every civil action

Must be based on a cause of action

R2.2 COA

SUBJECT MATTER

RULE 72.1, ROC

Rules of Special proceedings are provided for in the following cases:a. Settlement of estate of deceased persons

b. Escheat

c. Guardianship and custody of children

d. Trustees

e. Adoption

f. Rescission and revocation of adoption

g. Hospitalization of insane persons

h. Habeas corpus

i. Change of name

j. Voluntary dissolution of corporations

k. Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children

l. Constitution of family home

m. Declaration of absence and death

n.

Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry

APPLICABILITY OF RULES OF CIVIL ACTIONS

RULE 12.2, ROC

In the absence of special provisions

The rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be

As far as practicable

Be applicable in special proceedings

II. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS

VENUE AND PROCESS RULE 73, SECTIONS 1-4


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Section 1 Where estate of deceased persons settled.

If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,

Whether a citizen or an alien

His will shall be proved,

Or letters of administration granted

And his estate settled,

In the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death

And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,

The Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent

Shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The jurisdiction assumed by a court

So far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent

Or of the location of his estate

Shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding

Except in an appeal from that court

In the original sense

Or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

Section 2 Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage

When the marriage is dissolved

By death of the husband or wife

The community property shall beInventoried

Administered

And liquidated

And the debts thereof paid

In the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse

If both spouses have died,

the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated

in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.

Section 3 Process

In the exercise of probate jurisdiction,

Courts of First Instance may issue warrants and process

Necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses

Or to carry into effect their orders and judgmentsAnd all other powers granted to them by law.

If a person does not perform an

order

or judgment

rendered by a court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction

it may issue a warrant for the apprehension

and imprisonment of such person

until he performs such order or judgment

or is released.

Section 4. Presumption of death

For purposes of settlement of h is estate,

A person shall be presumed dead

If absent and unheard from for the periods fixed in the Civil CodeBut if such person proves to be alive,

He shall be entitled to the balance o his estate

After payment of all his debts.

The balance may be recovered by motion in the same proceeding.

Civil Code Provisions relevant:

Ar tic le 390 :10yr-absence for purposes of opening succession

If 75 years: absence of 5 years

Ar tic le 391 :danger of death: 4 years

a. On board a vessel lost during a sea voyage

b. On board a plane which is missing

c. Was in the armed forces and has taken part in war

d. Has been in danger of death under other circumstances

Ar tic le 392 :recovery of property upon reappearance

If the absentee appears

Or without appearing his existence is proved

He shall recover his property in the condition in which it may be found

And the price of any property that may have been alienated

Or the property acquired therewith;

But he cannot claim either fruits or rents

Regalado: Article 392 + Rule 73.4: conditions of recovery of absentee

(a) All debts must have been paid

(b) He shall recover his property in the condition in which it may have been found, together with the

price of any property that may have been alienated or the property acquired therewith

(c) He is not entitled to fruits or rents

SAN JUAN V. CRUZ, 479 SCRA 410

SHORT SUMMARY: THIS IS THE CASE WHEREIN A DEVISEE OF A DECEASED PENDING PETITION FOR

PROBATE DIED, AND HIS HEIRS WERE PRESENTED TO SUBSTITUTE HIM, BUT ONE OF THE HEIRS OF THE

DECEDENT OPPOSED SAID SUBSTITUTION, INSISTING THAT A COURT-APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OR

EXECUTOR SHOULD INSTEAD BE THE PROPER SUBSTITUTE

Decedent: Loreto Samia San Juan

Last will and testament: Oscar Casa as one of the devisees

Death: October 25, 1988

-Atty. Teodorico Aquino filed PETITION FOR PROBATE with QC RTC

-pending petition, Oscar died intestate on May 24, 1999: so Firs of Aquino et al. entered their

appearances as counsel for Federico Casa, Jr. (one of Oscar's heirs) - entry of appearance DENIED:

Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee

-RTC ordered Aquino to secure appointment of administrator or executor of estate of Oscar Casa

-Aquino filed pleading "Appointment of Administrator" signed by alleged heirs of Oscar Casa, praying

that Federico Casa Jr. be designated as administrator of Oscar Casa's estate and that he may be

substituted (Federico is the nearest accessible heir to attend the hearing of the probate of the will +

most competent to assume the responsibilities and duties of the ADMINISTRATOR)

-Epifanio San Juan filed MOTION TO DECLARE APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR AS INADEQUATE OR

INSUFFICIENT: heirs should present an administrator of Oscar Casa's estate as representative


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>reply: (1) R3.16: heirs of Oscar may be substituted for the deceased without need for appointment of an

administrator or executor of the estate

(2) Court enjoined to require the representative to appear before the court

-RTC: San Juan's motion DENIED: no need for appointment of administrator or executor, enough that a

representative be appointed (R3.16)

-San Juan filed MR, citing LAWAS V. CA: R3.16: priority still given to the legal representative of deceased

(executor/administrator of estate)

-in case the heirs of the deceased will be substituted, there must be a prior determination by the

probate court of who the rightful heirs are, in line with A1058 NCC and R78.6 and R79.2. (so insist thatthere should be petition for appointment of an administrator of Oscar Casa's estate)

-MR DENIED

-2nd MR, append TORRES V. CA: purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of

the right of every party to due process, to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly

represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate

ONLY in the absence of an executor or administrator that the heirs may be allowed to substitute for

the deceased party

2nd MR DENIED: (1) same arguments; (2) MONTANONO V. SUESA & RIERA V. PALMANORI: no need for

the appointment of an administrator since a legatee is not considered either an indispensable or

necessary party

-MR AGAIN of San Juan:

(1) cases cited did not rule on issue of WON a substitution of a legatee under the will who died during

probate may be done by simply submitting an "appointment of administrator"cases involved WON the

probate court can rule on the validity of the provisions of the will>Opposition: 3rd MR prohibited by R37.3

>DENIED 3rd MR

CA: dismissed

(1) filed beyond the 60-day period counted from notice of denial of first MR

(2) Subsequent MRs pro forma because it sought the same relief - so did n ot toll the running of the 60-

day period.

-MR (only interlocutory, not final judgment so should not run 60-d period from denial of 1st MR) -

DENIED

WON 60-day period for filing of petition for certiorari is reckoned from notice of denial of 1st MR even

though a 2nd and 3rd MR of same interlocutory order had been filed and later denied

YES, but different rule:

-the proscription against apro formamotion applies only to a final resolution or order and not to an

interlocutory one.-2nd MR, though based on same grounds, is not pro forma BUT may still be denied on the ground that it

is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration of the grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved

by the court

-cannot reject 2nd MR on the ground that 2nd MR of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law

Thus, there are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certioraribrought under Rule

65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of a judgment, resolution or order:

(1) the date when notice of the judgment, resolution or order was received;

(2) when a motion for a new trial or reconsideration of the judgment, order or resolution was submitted;

and

(3) when notice of the denial thereof was received by petitioner.

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court is for the purpose of determining its timeliness, considering that a petition is required to be filed

not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be nullified

BUT Agree with CA that Petition for certiorari should have been filed 60 days after notice of denial of 1st

MR, otherwise indefinite delays will enuse

WON a person nominated as "administrator" by purported heirs of a devisee or legatee may validly

substitute for that devisee or legatee despite the fact that such "administrator" is not court-appointedYES. The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an

administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and

acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto SanJuan. Thus, a prior appointment of an

administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal

capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate.42Said heirs may designate one or some of

them as their representative before the trial court.

The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for

the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within

the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel,

within a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall

immediately appear for the estate of the deceased. The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court

of Appeals(relied upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased

(the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of anexecutor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate

that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the

deceased, is nolonger true.In Gochan v. Young,a case of fairly recent vintage, the Court ruled as

follows:

The above-quoted rules, whilepermittingan executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on

behalf of the deceased, do notprohibitthe heirs from representing the deceased.These rules are easily

applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But norule categorically

addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been

instituted, yet noadministrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to

wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed

would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the

meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.

The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy

and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way asto unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of the decedent,

this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent,

even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court.When noadministrator has been

appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper

representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from representing the

deceased, and since noadministrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution of the

Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young, Sr.

who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC. (Emphasis supplied)

VDA. DE REYES V. CA, 169 SCRA 524 (1989)

Short Facts: Beatriz, (not sure if illegit or legit child) opposes the correction of judgment and the re-

opening of the probate proceedings to correct a alleged typographical error in the sqm of the Antipolo
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land in question, claiming that there was no typographical error and the parties intended to share only

that area of land.

Decedent: Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.

Pilar Ibanez de Susuarregui: surviving spouse of decedent

-administratix of the estate

Illegit children:

Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.

Enrique de ZuzuarreguiJose de Zuzuarregui

*Beatriz de Zuzuarregui vda. Re reyes: daughter of Antonio Sr. by another mother

Pacita Javier: niece of administratix

-mother of the three illegit children

Project of partition:

Pilar: 12/16, inclusive of 1/2 of the assets (share of conjugal partnership)

Beatriz: 1/16

Antonio, Jr.: 1/16

Enrique: 1/16

Jose: 1/16

Antipolo, Rizal property: mentioned 4x in document

-adjudicated to Pilar (12/15), Antonio Jr. (1/15), Enrique (1/15) and Jose (1/15)-Pacita relinquished her right "in lieu of her bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property"

-administratix and other three distributees filed a MOTION TO REOPEN SPECIAL PROCEEDIGNS for the

purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the parcel of land (correct land

area: 803,781.51, not 83,781sqm)

-opposition to motion

TC:

(1) opened for purpose of correcting clerical error in description of land

(2) correct land area to conform with description of land area in TCT

(3) correction be made in the project of partition

-CA: Affirm

Pacita's allegation: no clerical area. The area in the project of partition is correct. She would not have

relinquished her share in the Antipolo land if sh e new nothing would remain from the land. It was evenrepeated 4x in the project of partition

WON there was a clerical error, which is an exemption to correcting or supplying a final judgment

already entered?

NONE.

On correction of clerical errors:

It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission plainly

due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has been

entered. The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or

correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had become final. The court may

make this amendment ex parteand, for this purpose, it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties,

the court's findings of facts and its conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision.

-TC already found that a typographical or clerical error was clearly committed by inadvertence in the

project of partition

-probate proceeding, nature:

That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the ENTIRE estate

of the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or

leave a parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is

precisely designed to end the community of interests in properties held b y co-partners pro indivisowithout designation or segregation of shares.

-It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in fact it is, a full and

complete adjudication and partition of all properties of the estate, necessarily including the entire area

of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643. Thus as perceptively posed by the queries

of the respondents, if the intention of the heirs was to make only a partial adjudication and distribution

of the subject parcel of land, why is it that they did not make any further disposition of the remaining

balance of 720,000 square meters?What sound reason would the heirs have in holding in suspense the

distribution of the difference of 720,000 square meters?

-if they cannot see eye to eye, why share properties as co-owners?

-weird that the parties came up with 83,781, just omitting the zeroes. So only logical reason is that they

just forgot to put zero.

-according to her own computation, she already received her 1/16 share in the estate. There would not

be a substantial difference in value in their shares...

REYNOSO V. SANTIAGO, 85 PHIL 268

Short summary:husband and eldest son wanted to reopen the probate proceedings of the deceased

wife/mom and wanted the reappointment of the surviving husband as the executor

Facts:

Decedent: Salvadora Obispo

S.Spouse: Victorio Reynoso

Eldest son: Juan Reynoso

-Leoncio Cadiz and other heirs of decedent Salvadora Obispo presented an application in CFI for

administration of Salvadora's property (No. 2914)

-Father and son opposed application and filed a document, allegedly the last will and testament of

Salvadora, w/ a counter petition for probate

TC: alleged last will and testament is a forgery

CA: reversed

-Father and son filed 2 p etitions, one special proceedign (No. 2914) an another under a separate and

new docket number (3107) and with different title (Testate Estate of the deceased Salvadora Obispo)

1st petition:(1) special administrator, Meliton Palabrica (2914), be ordered to turn over the properties

of the deceased and proceeds of copra, nuts and other agricultural products to Victorio Reynoso, and

render accounting within reasonable time;

(2) render an accounting w/n a reasonable time

(3) closing of intestate proceeding

2nd petition: estate be administered and settled in special proceeding, Victorio Reynoso be appointed as

executor

-prayer for accounting

-delivery by him to the new executor of the properties

-2 petitions decided separately by Judge Santiago


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1st petition: substitution unnecessary, inconvenient and expensive + intestate proceeding should not be

converted into a testate proceeding in the same original expediente w/o the necessity of changing its

number, name or title

-withheld: because of the pendency on appeal of a case in which special administrator is plaintiff and

appellee and Victorio Reynoso defendant and appellant (re: parcel of coconut land)

WON the intestate proceeding should be discontinued and a new proceeding should be instituted

instead?

-this is in the sound discretion of the court. In no manner does it prejudice the substantial rights of anyheirs or creditors. Amor propio is perhaps the only thing is at stake on this phase of the controversy.

WON a regular executor should be appointed?

-appointment of the deceased's husband as executor or administrator: If one other than the surviving

spouse is appointed, which is possible, the feared conflict will not materialize. If Victorio Reynoso is

chosen, a special administrator may be named to represent the estate in the suit against him. Section 8

of Rule 87 provides that "If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he

shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator who

shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the

general administrator or executor in the settlement of the claims." The situation in which Victorio

Reynoso is found with reference to the land within the spirit if not exactly within the letter of this

provision.

-Subject to this observation, an administrator should be appointed without delay in accordance with the

final decision of the Court of Appeals. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only whenthere is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the

allowance or disallowance of a will or some other cause. The Court of Appeals having decreed the

probate of the will and the appointment of an albacea, there is no valid reason for the further retention

of a special administrator.The appointment of a regular administrator is necessary for the prompt

settlement and distribution of the estate. There are important duties devolving on a r egular

administrator which a special administrator can not perform, and there are many actions to be taken

by the court which could not be accomplished before a regular administrator is appointed.

B. EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN HEIRS SUMMARY

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs

If the decedent left no will

And no debts

And the heirs are all of age

Or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose

The parties may,

Without securing letters of administration

Divide the estate among themselves as they see fit

By means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds

And should they disagree

They may do so in an ordinary action of partition.

If there is only one heir

He may adjudicate to himself the entire estate

by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds

The parties to an extrajudicial settlement,

Whether by public instrument

or by stipulation in a pending action for partitionor the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself

by means of an affidavit

shall file,

simultaneously with

and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument

or stipulation in the action for partition

or the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds

a bond with the said register of deeds,in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved

as certified to under oath by the parties concerned

and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this rule.

It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts

If no creditor files a petition for letters of administration

Within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement

Or administration

Shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation

In the manner provided in the next succeeding section;

But no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person

Who has not participated therein

Or had no notice thereof.

Section 2 Summary settlement of estates of small value

Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person

Whether he died testate or intestate,

Does not exceed Php10,000.00

And that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate

By the petition of an interested persn

And upon hearing,

Which shall be held not less than 1 month

Nor more than 3 months

From the date of the last pub lication of a notice

which shall be published once a week

for 3 consecutive weeks

in a newspaper of general circulation

in the province,and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct,

the court may proceed summarily,

without the appointment of an executor

or administrator,

and without delay,

to grant, if proper,

allowance of the will, if there be,

to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate,

and to apportion and divide it among them

after the payment of such debts of the estate

as the court shall then find to be due;

and such persons,

in their own right,


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if they are of lawful age

and legal capacity,

or by their guardians or trustees

legally appointed and qualified,

if otherwise,

shall thereupon be entitled to receive

and enter into the possession of

the portions of the estate to be awarded to them respectively.

The court shall make such orders as may be justRespecting the costs of the proceedings,

And all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof

Shall be recorded in the office of the clerk

And the order of partition or award,

If it involves real estate,

Shall be recorded in the proper registers office.

Section 3 Bond to be filed by distributees

The court,

Before allowing a partition

in accordance with the provisions of the proceeding section,

may require the distributes,

if property other than real is to be distributed,

to file a bond in an amount to be fixed by the court,conditioned for the payment of any just claim

which may be filed under the next succeeding section.

Section 4 Liability of distributees and estate

If it shall appear at any time within 2 years after the settlement and distribution of an estate

In accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule,

That an heir

Or other person

Has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate,

Such heir or such other person

May compel the settlement of the estate In the courts

in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation.

And if within the same time of 2 years,

It shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid,Or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money,

The court having jurisdiction of the estate may,

by order for that purpose,

After hearing,

Settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation

And order how much and in what manner

Each distribute shall contribute in the payment thereof,

And may issue execution,

If circumstances require,

Against the bond provided in the next preceding section

Or against the real estate belonging to the deceased,

Or both.

Such bond and such real estate

Shall remain charged with a liability toCreditors,

Heirs,

Or other persons

For the full period of 2 years after such distribution,

Notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made.

Section 5 Period for claim of minor or incapacitated person

If on the date of the expiration of the period of 2 years prescribed in the preceding sectionThe person authorized to file a claim is

a minor

or mentally incapacitated,

Or is in prison

Or outside of the Philippines,

He may present his claim within 1 year after such disability is removed.

Cases

CRUZ VS. CRISTOBAL, 498 SCRA 37

Short Summary: Children of first marriage of dad found out after 60 years that the children of 2nd

marriage had an EJ Partition of the only property left by their dad, excluding them, so they filed for

annulment of said partition but both TC and CA ruled that their right is already barred by laches.

1st marriage children:Buenaventura Cristobal and Ignacia Cristobal

>Elisa-bunso

>Mercedes - eldest sister

>Anselmo

>Socorro

(SAME)

2nd marriage children:

Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez

>Norberto

>Florencio

>Eufrosina

>Jose

(JENF)

Dad bought land in San Juan in 1926. He died in 1930. So children squabble over property.

-Children of 2nd marriage executed an EJ partition of San Juan property w/o knowledge of 1st marriage

children (1st marriage children only found out about it after 6 decades)

-they attempted to settle at the barangay level but failed to do so.

-1st marriage children filed COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE AND DAMAGES:

(1) Annulment of deed of partition

(2) cancellation of TCTs in favor of 2nd marriage children

(3) re-partitioning of the subject property

(4) damages

-evidence presented to prove filiation (by 1st marriage children)

*baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo and Socorro


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*Certification from Local Civil Registrar for Socorro that the records in 1909 (when she was born) were all

destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear

*Testimonies:

>Elisa: mom (Ignacia) died when she was only 1y7m

lived with aunt Martina Cristobal because dad married again

brother Anselmo and sister Socorro lived with 2nd family in San Juan

when dad died, Anselmo lived with her and their aunt then Socorro lived with Mercedes

when Stepmom Donata died, 2nd family children lived with Elisa, Anselmo and their aunt

she is now living in the disputed San Juan property since 1948. Other houses in the areabelonged to half brothers and sisters

-out of the 535sqm, she only occupies 36sqm of the San Juan lot

-2nd marriage children divided the property among themselves w/o giving 1st marriage children

their share

-she was offered by Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the land or money but said she'll

have to consult the other 1st marriage children. When she inquired, she found out that the 2nd

marriage children already divided amongst themselves the said property to the exclusion of the

1st marriage children

CROSS: knew that the 2nd marriage children were the ones paying real estate tax due to the

land

>Ester Santos: corroborated what Elisa already said

said that the children had harmonious relationship, until when the 1st marriage children and

their grandchildren were called squatters by the 2nd marriage children and their grandchildren

CROSS: did not know the name of the 1st wife though she knew Buenaventura was married priorto marriage with Donata

>Jose (presented by the 1st FC though belonging to the 2nd FC): only found out about the 1st FC when

they lived with aunt Martina, and did not admit that Elisa was their sister but only offered land so that

she could have a piece of property of her own

Evidence of 2nd FC (respondents):

*Testimonies:

>Eufrosina: parents (Donata and Buenaventura) were married in 1919. They bought the San Juan

property in 1926.

they lived with Aunt Martina since their parents died and knew since theywere kids about the 1st FC

(that they were their brothers and sisters)

admitted that they did execute an EJ Partition of the San Juan property but asserted that the 1st FC

never asserted their alleged right over the property

that they were the ones paying for the real estate tax of said property

TC: dismissed case: petitioners failed to prove their filiation with Buenaventura Cristobal

baptismal and birth certificates have scant evidentiary value

inaction for a long period of time amounted to laches

CA: were able to prove their filiation thru "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws"

BUT they are barred by lachees

WON LACHES APPLY WHEN IT RESULTS TO GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED

BY SUCH PRINCIPLE

NO.

-PRELIMINARY MATTER: although the title of the pleading filed by the petitioners is for annulment of

title and damages, they prayed for the re-partitioning of the subject land so the court would not limit

their decision on the title

-WON Filiation proved:

A172. Filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws: may consist of the childs

baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the childs name has been

entered, common reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission by silence, the

testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of

Court

-in this case, the petitioners were able to present many evidences which would show that they were

indeed children of Buenaventura. The respondents on the other hand failed to refute the claim of the

petitioners that they were Buenaventura's children (some even admitted that they were their half bro

and sis)

-WON DEED OF PARTITION VALID: R74.1

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be pub lished in a newspaper of generalcirculation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall

be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring

supplied)

-here: the sole property of Buenaventura's estate is the San Juan property, thus, it is equivalent to the EJ

settlement of t his estate. As the 1st MC were excluded from said partition (and did not have notice

thereof), the said partition would not bind them.

-WON Action has already prescribed

No.

*Article 494, NCC: "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may

demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned."

... "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly

recognizes the co-ownership."

*Budlong vs. Bondoc: action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription

-how divided:

Old civil code applies (as Donata and Buenaventura both died in the 1930s when the NCC was only

effective 1950).

Art 921 and 931: intestate succession = all children would divide the estate equally

Art834: widow was only entitled to usufruct over property, which would terminate upon her death

WON Laches would apply.

NO.

-Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a

presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not

involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement

of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit.


11/102


-There is no evidence showing failure or neglect on their part, for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The

doctrine of stale demands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be

inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.

Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply the doctrine of

laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner. Laches is a creation of equity and its application is

controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate an

injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from

recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.

*Nominal damages awarded

CUA V. VARGAS, 506 SCRA 374

SHORT SUMMARY: Chua bought Catanduanes property from some of the co-heirs but when the non-

signatory co-heirs found out about it and he refused to resell the land to the latter, the latter

instituted case against him, which was won in the CA (holding that the partition and sale were void

and not binding on the part of the non-signatory co-heirs who were not informed of the said

transactions)

Mom/Decedent: Paulina Vargas

Heirs:

Ester

VisitacionJuan

Zenaida

Rosario

Andres

Gloria

Antonina

Florentino

Those who signed the notarized EJ Settlement:

Ester

Visitacion

Juan

ZenaidaRosario

-the said EJ Settlement was published in Catanduanes Tribune for 3 consecutive weeks

-they were also the ones who executed an EJ Settlement Among Heirs with Sale with Cua

*the latter 4 never signed any document

*all documents executed and published in 1994

-one of the heirs (Gloria Vargas, widow of Santiago Vargas) claimed that she only knew of the EJ

Settlement + Sale when the original house was demolished sometime in 1995; claimed she was unaware

of said settlement

-tried to redeem the property from Cua but Cua refused their offer

-amicable settlement not reached in barangay level

-ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF EJ SETTLEMENT AND LEGAL REDEMPTION OF LOT, MTC: 30-d period ff a

written notice by vendors to co-owners not sent to them so the EJ Settlement and Sale were null and

void and had no legal effect on them

MTC: DISMISS

-transaction occurred after partition so the co-owners could validly dispose of their shares

-written notice of sale under A1088, though not sent, was cured by the ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF SALE

(which was more than 30d before filing of complaint)

-no bad faith on part of Cua

RTC, appeal: affirm MTC

CA: Reversed RTC and MTC

-pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-

heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever

signify their consent to the same.

-MR Denied

WON PUBLICATION of the EJ Partition was binding on the non-signatory heirs because it constitutes due

notice and therefore, the non-signatory co-heirs were already estopped from assailing the partition and

sale

NO. Publication was made AFTER THE PARTITION WAS MADE, NOT BEFORE WHICH WAS REQUIRED IN

R74.1

-The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be

bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement

and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed

of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed

as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement

among heirs.

-The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no

knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution.The

requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive

heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present

case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their

existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial

settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is

invalid insofar as they are concerned.

WON THE RESPONDENTS NON-SIGNATORY CO-HEIRS HAD RIGHT TO REDEEM?

YES.

-sale ofpro indiviso shares allowed, subject to right of redemption of other co-heirs. This right was never

lost because the non-signatory co-heirs were never notified in writing of the actual sale. NOTIFICATION

IN WRITING OF THE SALE BY THE VENDOR is required to start the p eriod of redemption (w/n 1 month

from the time they were notified in writing of the sale); even if the co-heirs have actual knowledge of

sale, the notification in writing is still required. As there was no such notice here, the right to redeem the

shares is still with the non-signatory co-heirs.

-method of notification remains exclusive, no alternative provided by law

-purpose of A1088: keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership

WON Cua was a builder in GF


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-not in GF because he was very much aware that NOT ALL THE HEIRS PARTICIPATED IN THE EJ

SETTLEMENT + SALE, as evident from the face of the document itself

-since no valid partition yet, no sale could occur. Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests of the

respondents, he still constructed improvements on the property

WON MTC does not have jurisdiction, this being incapable of pecuniary estimation

Cua estopped thru active participation in the MTC

WON it should still be dismissed for non-joinder of indispensable partiesNO.

-indispensable party: party-in-interest, without whom there can be no final determination of an action

and who is required to be joined as either plaintiff or defendant.

-here: prayer of complaint was that they be allowed to redeem shares in property sold. The other co-

heirs already relinquished their right over their shares to Cua with the alleged sale. As a result, the other

co-heirs who sold him the property are not anymore needed.

On improper verification and CNFS

Rule may be relaxed. And since the respondent share a common interest with the other respondent, her

sole signature complies with the rules.

C. PRODUCTION OF WILL; ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY RULE 75, SECTIONS 1-5

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution.

No will shall pass

Either real or personal estate

Unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court.

Subject to the right of appeal,

Such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Section 2. Custodian of will to deliver.

The person who has custody of a will

shall,

within 20 days after he knows of the death of the testator,

deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction,

or to the executor named in the will.

Section 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.

A person named as executor in a will

Shall,

Within 20 days after he knows of the death of the testator,

Or

Within 20 days after he knows that he is named executor

If he obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator,

Present such will to the court having jurisdiction,

Unless the will has reached the court in any other manner,

And shall,

Within such period,

Signify to the court

In writing

His acceptance of the trust

Or his refusal to accept it.

Section 4. Custodian and Executor subject to fine for neglect

A person

Who neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections

Without excuse satisfactory to the court

Shall be fined not exceeding P2k.

Section 5. Person retaining will may be committed.

A personHaving custody of a will after the death of the testator

Who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same,

When ordered so to do,

To the court having jurisdiction,

May be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will.

VITUG V. COURT OF APPEALS

Short Summary:Romarico and Dolores had a joint account with Bank of American National Trust and

Savings Assn. and a SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT wherein it was agreed that upon death of one of

them, the surviving spouse would own the proceeds of the account. Romarico withdrew the said funds

and used it to pay for estate tax, and now wants to acquire authority to dispose of other properties of

his wifes estate for reim bursement of the advance he made. The oppositor alleged that he is not

entitled to the said reimbursement as the funds used, i.e. the funds of the Joint account, was part of

the conjugal property. The Court upheld the SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT.Digest:

-Romarico Vitug and Dolores Luchangco-Vitug had a joint account in the Bank of American National Trust

and Savings Associations. They also have a survivorship agreement wherein it was agreed that upon

death of 1 spouse, the surviving spouse would own all the collectibles from the said account.

-Dolores died. Romarico paid for the estate tax and other dues using the money in the joint savings

account. Pending probate proceedings, Romarico and Rowena Faustino-Corona were appointed as

cospecial administrator, the appointed executrix being in the states.

-Romarico filed a motion for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real

properties belonging to the estate.

-Rowena opposed, arguing that the money spent was part of the estate, it being part of the conjugal

property of the spouses.

TC: upheld survivorship agreement, granted Romarico's motion

CA: survivorship agreement is a conveyance mortis cause, should comply with the formalities of a valid

will. If it's a donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation.

HELD: Survivorship agreement valid. Grant motion of Romarico.

1. NOT A CONVEYANCE MORTIS CAUSA = WILL

-because the property conveyed is not exclusively owned by DOLORES (decedent)

A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person

disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his

death." 14 In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. 15 In this case, the monies

subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds

RIVERA V. PBTC (CASE WHERE THE MAID WAS GIVEN THE PROCEEDS OF THE JOINT ACCOUNT): not a

conveyance mortis causa if the property sought to be conveyed is not the exclusive property of the

conveyor


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MACAM V. GATMAITAN (LEONARDA OWNED THE HOUSE, JUANA OWNED THE BUICK AUTOMOBILE. ONE

WOULD GET THE OTHER'S PROPERTY UPON THE OTHER'S DEATH): It's an ALEOTORY CONTRACT (article

1790) wherein 1 of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or do something as an

equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case of the occurrence of an event which is

uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate time.

2. NOT A DONATION INTER VIVOS

a. It would take effect after death of one

b.

No conveyance of exclusive property of one spouse to the other

3. IT'S AN ALEOTORY CONTRACT

Article 2010: By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or to

do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is

uncertain, or which is to occur at an indeterminate time.

Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the

happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A

survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of

currency, and insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life annuity

or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under the second. In either case, the

element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and survivorship of the

other.

4. Caution: survivorship agreement may operate against the law:

>mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation

>to transfer property in fraud of creditors

>defeat the legitime of a forced heir

-but here, no such vice occurs

ACAIN V. IAC

Short Summary: Siblings of the deceased wanted the probate of his alleged will but the wife and

adopted daughter filed MTD on the ground that they were preterited. Court held that there was

preterition on the part of the adopted daughter, it being that an adopted child acquires the status of a

legitimate child and thus is considered a compulsory heir in the direct line. As a result, the intestacy

would ensue and the probate of the will should not have been granted, the defect in the will apparent

from the start. (Exception to rules on Probate proceedings)

Facts:

-Allegedly, Nemesio Acain died leaving a will whereing only his brothers Antonio, Flores, and Jose and

sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. His wife and adopted daughter

were not mentioned in the will.

-the sibling sought the probate of the will, the widow Rosa and adopted daughter Virginia opposed on

the ff grounds:

(1) no legal capacity to institute the proceedings

(2) merely a universal heir

(3) widow and adopted daughter were preterited

TC: Deny motion to dismiss by oppositors

-MR denied, went directly before SC on a petition for certiorari and prohibition. SC referred to IAC

IAC: granted petition of widow and adopted daughter, dismiss petition for probate.

WON Dismissal of the Probate Petition valid? YES

1. Though widow not preterited (not compulsory heir in the direct line), the adopted daughter was

preterited

A854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether

living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the

institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he effectual, without

prejudice to the right of representation.

Requisites:

1. The heir omitted is a forced heir (in the direct line);2. The ommission is by mistake or thru an oversight.

3. The omission is complete so that the forced heir received nothing in the will. (111 Padilla, Civil Code

Annotated, 1973 Edition, pp. 224-225) (Parenthetical addendum supplied).

-on widow:even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is

omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.

-on adopted daughter:PD 603, Article 39: adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and

duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of

the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the

testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither

can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of

the legally adopted child.

2. When there's preterition, the will is annulled and there would be intestate succession. No legacies or

devisees here so intestacy would ensue.

3. There being intestacy, the sibling cannot intervene in the probate of the will, he having no interest,

thus no legal standing.

-Who could intervene:

*have interest in the estate

*have interest in the will

*have interest in the property to be affected by the will (executor or claimant)

*one who would be benefited by the estate

4. Certiorari is proper, when the TC committed GAD in not dismissing the probate proceedings when it

appears that the will was invalid.

GR: Probate Court's authority:

(1) extrinsic validity of the will

(2) due execution of the will

(3) testator's testamentary capcity

(4) compliance w/ requisites or solemnities prescribed by law

X: when the invalidity of the provisions of the will are raised.

If not resolved from the start, there would be waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.

D. ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS RULE 76

SECTION 1. WHO MAY PETITION FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF WILL

Any executor,

Devisee,

Or legatee

Named in a will,

Or any other person interested in the estate,

May,


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At any time after the death of the testator,

Petition the court having jurisdiction

to have the will allowed,

Whether the same be in his possession or not,

Or is lost or destroyed.

The testator himself may,

During his lifetime,

Petition the court for the allowance of his will.

SECTION 2. CONTENTS OF PETITION

A petition for the allowance of a will must show,

So far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) the names,

Ages,

And residences of the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator or decedent;

(c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate

(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed;

(e) if the will has not been delivered to the court,

The name of the person having custody of it.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the allowance of the wil,

Or the issuance of letters testamentaryOr of administration with the will annexed.

SECTION 3. COURT TO APPOINT TIME FOR PROVING WILL. NOTICE THEREOF TO BE PUBLISHED.

When a will is delivered to,

Or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in,

The court having jurisdiction,

Such court shall fix a time and place for proving the will

when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof,

and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published 3 weeks successively,

previous to the time appointed,

in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

But no newspaper publication shall be made

Where the petition for probate has been filed by the testator himself.

SECTION 4. HEIRS, DEVISEES, LEGATEES, AND EXECUTORS TO BE NOTIFIED BY MAIL OR PERSONALLY.

The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will

To be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator

Resident in the Philippines at their places of residence,

And deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid

At least 20 days before the hearing,

If such places of residence be known.

A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor,

if he be not the petitioner;

also, to any person named as coexecutor not petitioning,

if their places of residence be known.

Personal service of copies of the notice at least 10 days before the da y of hearing shall be equivalent to

mailing.

If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will,

Notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs.

SECTION 5. PROOF AT HEARING. WHAT SUFFICIENT IN ABSENCE OF CONTEST

At the hearing

compliance with the provisions of the last 2 preceding sections must be shown before the introductionof testimony in support of the will.

All such testimony shall be taken under oath

And reduced to writing.

If no person appears to contest the allowance of the will,

The court may grant allowance thereof on the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses only,

If such witness testify that the will was executed as is required by law.

In the case of a holographic will,

It shall be necessary that at least one witness

who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator

Explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator.

In the absence of any such competent witness,

And if the court deem it necessary,

Expert testimony may be resorted to.

SECTION 6. PROOF OF LOST OR DESTROYED WILL. CERTIFICATE THEREUPON.

No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will

Unless

*the execution

And validity of the same be established,

*And the will is proved to have been

>in existence at the time of the death of the testator,

>Or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without

his knowledge,

*Nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least 2 credible witnesses.

When a lost will is proved,

The provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge,

Under the seal of the court,

And the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and recorded.

SECTION 7. PROOF WHEN WITNESSES DO NOT RESIDE IN PROVINCE.

If it appears at the time fixed for the hearing

That none of the subscribing witnesses resides in the province,

But that the deposition of one or more of them can be taken elsewhere,

The court may,

On motion,

Direct it to be taken,

And may authorize a photographic copy of the will to be made

And to be presented to the witnesses on his examination,

Who may be asked the same questions with respect to it,

And to the handwriting of the testator and others,


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As would be pertinent and competent if the original will was present.

SECTION 8. PROOF WHEN WITNESSES DEAD OR INSANDE OR DO NOT RESIDE IN THE PHILIPPINES.

If it appears at the time fixed for the hearing

That the subscribing witnesses

are dead or insane,

or that none of them resides in the Philippines,

the court may admit the testimony of other witnesses to prove

the sanity of the testator,and the due execution of the will;

and as evidence of the execution of the will,

it may admit proof of the handwriting of the testator

and of the subscribing witnesses,

or of any of them.

SECTION 9. GROUDNS FOR DISALLOWING WILL

The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

a. If not executed and attested as required by law;

b. if the testator was insane,

or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will,

at the time of execution;

c. If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

d. if it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or ofsome other per

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