Special Report: Tanzania Ongoing security vacuum leads to rise in criminal activities and potential

terror threats

April, 2013

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Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................. 3

Background .................................................................................................................. 3

Security Vacuum: Lack of security infrastructure creates environment in which criminal

enterprises can become established ............................................................................... 4

Gun Proliferation: Provides criminals with increased tactical strength, allows expanded

operations ................................................................................................................... 6

Assessments: Security vacuum and gun proliferation leads to gradual nationwide rise in

petty, large-scale crimes targeting foreigners ................................................................... 7

Assessments: Potential dangers to business interests, challenges to business continuity

posed by security weaknesses ........................................................................................ 8

Assessments: Socio-economic conditions, drug trade exacerbate security risks, increase

criminal activity ............................................................................................................ 9

Assessments: Religious fundamentalism and social discontent increase risk of terrorist

operations ................................................................................................................. 10

Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 11

Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 11

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Introduction

Throughout 2012-2013, there are indications across Tanzania of an overall gradual decline in

the security situation in numerous spheres as evidenced by the rise in petty and large scale

criminal incidents. Longstanding weaknesses within state and private security infrastructures

have helped to facilitate this notable rise in criminal activity including crimes targeting

foreigners and their perceived assets. In an effort to mitigate growing domestic security

threats, the government has renewed a program in 2013 to provide 50,000 private security

guards with partial police training. Meanwhile in response to regional security risks,

Tanzania has joined the South African Regional Police Chiefs Council Organization (SARPCCO)

and the Eastern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) joint security

operations to combat terrorism and cross-border crimes. Despite these recent government

initiatives, the country faces deep-rooted security issues and negative socio-economic

trends that will pose short and long term challenges to the stability of the country. This

report will discuss the weaknesses of the security structure and the factors that exacerbate

the resulting security vacuum and continue to contribute to criminal activity.

Background

In 2012, the American and Canadian Embassies in Tanzania issued travel alerts to their

citizens warning about the rising trend of criminal activity targeting tourists. The warning

was issued following a spate of physical assaults and robberies targeting tourists in Dar es

Salaam. These attacks occurred in affluent areas of the city such as Masaki and the City

Center, near Sea Cliff Hotel, and Serena Dar es Salaam Hotel. Furthermore, from January to

September 2012, Tanzanian police recorded 876 cases of armed robbery. These robberies

resulted in the loss of 138 lives, including six police officers, and an estimated loss of 2.8

billion USD in property. 304 firearms were seized from suspected perpetrators of these

crimes. Meanwhile, there are recent indications of threats posed to business interests in the

country due to deficiencies in the security apparatus. The 2012-2013 Global Competitiveness

Report of the World Economic Forum ranked Tanzania as performing below standards in

protecting companies operating in the country from crime. While the report highlighted

corruption as being the greatest impediment to business, infrastructure inadequacies,

inefficient government bureaucracy, and unreliability of police also ranked high.

Transparency International’s 2012 Global Corruption Barometer, which is based on polls of

the public’s perception of corruption, corroborated the issues with police corruption. It

ranked police as 4.1 out of 5, being “extremely corrupt” and was charged with receiving the

most bribes in the country. Also 50% of respondents felt that the government was not

effective at fighting corruption.

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Security Vacuum: Lack of security infrastructure creates environment in which

criminal enterprises can become established

In February 2013, the Deputy

Minister for Home Affairs

alleged that the Tanzanian

police force does not have a

sufficient number of police

to deal with security

concerns in the country.

While there are

approximately 38,850

policemen in the force, the

country would need to

employ at least 48,000 more

officers in order to meet

international standard ratios for the number of policemen in relation to the population.

Additionally, the Tanzanian police force faces numerous assertions of weaknesses in the

personnel. Members of the police force are reportedly hired based on personal connections

rather than professional training or experience. The allegations of rampant corruption

within the force are substantiated by various studies of outside impartial entities, such as

the World Economic Forum and Transparency International, which indicate the police’s

susceptibility to accepting bribes. In 2013, MP Lameck Airo accused police of condoning

major crime rings and gang operations in the country in return for bribes. The reported

prevalence of corruption and bribery is likely linked to the lack of incentive for policemen to

avoid breaking the law because they are legally exempt from criminal investigations.

Partially due to the insufficient numbers of police, the government and business operations

in the country rely heavily on private security guards and companies, as highlighted by the

state’s renewal of programs to provide private security personnel with police training in

2013. The Tanzania Security Industry Association (TSIA) reportedly contains the membership

of more than 1.2 million security guards and at least 400 security companies. The police

collaborate with private security personnel to guard various types of high-profile

installations, including: government ministry buildings, assets of the Bank of Tanzania,

currency exchanges, and various companies.

The state liberalized the security industry in the 1980s, as part of a loosening of restrictions

across most public sectors in response to deteriorating economic conditions caused by strict

government controls since the 1960s. Since the liberalization of the security sector, there

has been no legal framework to regulate the private security field in spite of many rejected

proposals. Due to the lack of legislation regarding private security, the police force has

Male Tanzanian police in uniform

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gradually become the assumed controller of the sector and sometimes, although not

consistently, applies police law to regulate private security.

There are two issues that arise

from this relationship, which

highlight fundamental

weaknesses in the structure of

security. Firstly, given the fact

that the laws governing police

actions in the country are very

lenient and contain many

exemptions for punishment,

the application of this

legislation to private security

officers does not serve to control the sector. Secondly, it is not uncommon for active police

officers to simultaneously own private security companies. This overlap between state and

private security apparatuses has the potential to create a serious conflict of interest because

lines are blurred between intelligence to which government security apparatuses are

privileged and that given to private security. Corrupt personnel, branching both security

worlds, could compromise the dual information to which they have access by accepting

bribes from criminal networks. Furthermore, police officers with business interests in

promoting their private security companies are more likely to use various illicit means to

promote their commercial interests. Lastly, the established links between the two security

spheres coupled with the power the police enjoys over private security companies, are

assessed to have contributed to the ongoing lack of specific legislation to control the private

sector because it is not in the commercial interests of policemen who own private security

companies to push for regulation.

Due to the absence of legislation for private security, there is no standardization for the

necessary qualifications of personnel and companies claiming to provide security. There is

also no regulatory body that verifies the quality of security services provided by private

entities. Lastly, the lack of regulations means that there is no comprehensive background

check on security personnel operating within the country. It is assessed that this

longstanding lack of regulation has created an environment in which corruption and scam

operations within security forces are able to flourish because there are no controls to

dissuade criminal activities. Furthermore, the preponderance of unregulated private security

highlights the potential for criminals to pose as security personnel in order to target high-

profile individuals and assets through inside job operations

Male Tanzanian police in uniform

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Gun Proliferation: Provides criminals with increased tactical strength, allows

expanded operations

Gun proliferation is a decades-long security issue resulting from the numerous conflicts in

neighboring countries like Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Many firearms from these countries have passed through Tanzania’s porous borders, and

security forces launch perpetual campaigns to collect these unregistered weapons. Despite

the February 2013 seizure of 3,000 illegal firearms, Tanzanian security forces estimate that

there are potentially 500,000 illegal guns in the country.

The ongoing increase in crimes committed by armed individuals throughout Tanzania is the

likely result of this rampant gun proliferation. Armed criminals are assessed to feel less

compunction committing criminal operations, including targeting high profile individuals and

businesses, because they can threaten their targets with guns and use the weapons to

defend themselves if they are apprehended by security personnel. Additionally, the

possibility that Tanzanian criminals could obtain more advanced weapons in the future from

border conflicts should not be ruled out. Such a development would decrease the relative

advantage of the state security forces’ weaponry vis-à-vis criminals operating in the country

and, thus, lessen their ability to secure targeted individuals and assets.

Borders vulnerable to trafficking and infiltration – (Map created using Google Earth)

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Assessments: Security vacuum and gun proliferation leads to gradual nationwide

rise in petty, large-scale crimes targeting foreigners

The petty crimes against tourists in affluent areas of Dar es Salaam in 2012 marked an

evolution in the scope of robbers in Tanzania who had previously confined their activities to

less central, poorer and outlying areas. The thefts, usually carried out by armed robbers,

included bag snatchings and forced withdrawals from Automated Teller Machines (ATM).

They occurred in the daytime as well as in evening hours. The fact that attacks were

reported during the daytime indicates a growing boldness by thieves, who previously largely

confined their activities to the evening. In 2013, criminal elements have undertaken a

tactical evolution by changing their modus operandi from cars to motorcycles, which can

maneuver to quickly flee the crime scene. Suspected thieves mainly target handbags, cell

phones, and laptops. Central Police claim an average of 50 cases of theft is registered daily in

Dar es Salaam alone. Such crimes have reportedly become most prominent in the city

center, Upanga, Oysterbay, Masaki, and Ilala. The fact that most of these assaults were

successfully carried out indicates the inability of the security forces patrolling those areas to

prevent the crimes. It should further be noted that muggings have not been confined to the

capital or to tourists openly exhibiting wealth. Security personnel killed five robbers in

March 2013 who had been targeting motorists in the Kagera northwestern region.

Meanwhile, backpackers in Dar es Salaam, near the Ubungo bus station, Coco Beach, and

the peninsula region, and in Zanzibar, near Stone Town, have been kidnapped and robbed

throughout the year 2012.

Areas of high criminal incidents and notable sites of muggings and robberies in Dar es Salaam in

2012-2013

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There is a growing incidence of con artist operations in Tanzania targeting foreigners for

documents, such as passports, and money. The most common sorts of cons include

individuals impersonating security personnel and taxi drivers. It can be difficult to identify

con practitioners, especially given the fact that they may resemble the personnel they are

impersonating by wearing the appropriate uniforms or presenting documentation.

However, if operators or security personnel present documentation in photocopy form and

are not able to produce original identification, this is often a sign that the verification has

likely been falsified.

While many of the robberies in Tanzania involve small sums of money, the orchestrated

grand theft of a prominent Asian businessman in Dar es Salaam in November 2012, in which

$42,000 was stolen, indicates the susceptibility of larger assets to targeted robberies. The

fact that the robbery was reportedly an inside job by his driver and security staff highlights a

possible future evolution in the targets of thieves in the country, who could likely realize the

increased monetary potential in such schemes and inside job operations. The details of the

robbery indicate a significant amount of planning by the businessman’s trusted employees

to target him for his known assets.

Assessments: Potential dangers to business interests, challenges to business

continuity posed by security weaknesses

On March 2, 2013 the North Mara gold mine, owned by the transnational Barrick Gold

Corporation was stormed by 4,000 local residents with the alleged intent to steal gold sand.

The incident underscores the vulnerability of major business operations, and particularly

mining operations, in the country given the fact the North Mara mine has been robbed

several times since 2002 and sustained millions of dollars of damage from these incidents.

The North Mara mine attacks are indicative of the rising costs and uncertainties of doing

business in Tanzania. In the event of further significant attacks on business interests, a

consequential future decline in foreign business operations and investments in the country

should not be ruled out.

Current security procedures at the mine have not been able to decrease its susceptibility to

attack. The North Mara mine employs a combination of internal and external security

personnel, which comes from private companies and is partially provided by the Tanzanian

government. Additionally, the Barrick Gold Company that owns the mine attempts to

incorporate local populations in its security apparatus. While such cooperation is aimed at

creating good relations with these communities, we assess that there are inherent risks in

attempting security cooperation projects with local communities. The risks stem from the

fact that if high profile information is leaked to local populations, the probability that the

sensitive information could be used to breach security around the mine or business is

heightened. Additionally, employing locals with existing community connections to serve as

security personnel is assessed to increase the likelihood that they will be more susceptible to

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pressure to disclose security information to local criminal enterprises in addition to being

more susceptible to bribes.

The North Mara Mine had already been in the process of upgrading security measures

around the mine before the recent robbery, including the construction of a multi-million

dollar protective barrier. Construction of the barrier comes in response to the reports of

daily security breaches on the mine’s property by locals from the surrounding villages who

come to collect the discarded rocks around the mine, which can be sold for a profit. The

North Mara mine, as is likely with other significant business interests in outlying areas in the

country, is viewed by local impoverished populations as the primary source of income in the

region due to this illegal rock and dust stealing business. Thus, the large-scale attacks and

fairly daily small robberies of mine property are related to the underlying socioeconomic

conditions that are driving criminal activity throughout Tanzania at large.

Assessments: Socio-economic conditions, drug trade exacerbate security risks,

increase criminal activity

In recent years, there has been a large population shift to urban areas as Tanzanian youths

leave rural communities to search for better opportunities in cities. However, the cities have

not been able to successfully absorb the migration boom and provide work for the new

residents. The resulting overcrowding, poor living conditions, unemployment, and

underemployment have an environment in which petty crime has been able to flourish.

Meanwhile, Tanzanians remaining in outlying areas also suffer from long standing socio-

economic issues. The majority of those living in rural areas live below the poverty line and

rural unemployed youths often turn to crime. The regular attacks at North Mara gold mine

despite evolving security strategies highlight the risks to prosperous businesses in outlying

areas by such unemployed groups.

Meanwhile, Tanzanian security forces are focusing their efforts on cracking down on drug

trafficking, which is a growing problem in the region as the global drug trade has turned its

attention to the largely unregulated waters off the east African coast and the porous borders

between countries. While the joint operations between southern and eastern African

countries are partially aimed at stemming drug trafficking, a recent joint Australia-Canada

operation in the waters near Zanzibar Island resulted in the major seizure of 100 million USD

worth of heroin. The involvement of states outside of the region in combating drug

trafficking highlights broad security concerns about the global drug trade, which serves to

fund major illicit criminal and terrorist networks worldwide.

As a likely concurrent effect of the major drug trafficking operations in the country, the Drug

Control Commission (DCC) has reported that drug use among Tanzanians is rapidly

increasing to estimates between 150,000 to 500,000 individuals. Common drugs found in

the country include cocaine, mandrax, and ecstasy. Tanzanian security personnel reported

a 100 percent increase in the number of kilograms of drugs seized during 2010-2011, which

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could be indicative of the alleged rise in drug use or the success of stricter policing efforts.

The possibility that the rise in drug use could carry the incidental effect of engendering more

petty crime should not be ruled out as addicts of hardcore drugs may engage in thefts and

muggings in order to acquire money to purchase drugs.

Assessments: Religious fundamentalism and social discontent increase risk of

terrorist operations

There are signs of growing religious fundamentalism, especially radical Islamism, and an

increase in religiously motivated crimes, which commenced with clashes between Muslims

and Christians in the fall of 2012. While much of the violence was focused in Zanzibar and

culminated in the February 2013 killing of a Catholic priest on the island, renewed violence

broke out in the southwestern Mbeye region April 3, 2013 when Christians attempted to

burn down a mosque. The delocalization of violence to another region highlights the

possibility for a future diffusion of religious tensions to other areas of the country and the

region at large. The decision of Zambia to close its border with the Mbeye region due to the

violence underscores concerns over a spread of instability. The underlying, weak security

infrastructure of Tanzania would likely be unable at this point in time to quell more

widespread religious tensions and ensuing clashes could severely affect stability and

business continuity.

It is assessed that the

simultaneous

phenomena of

declining socio-

economic conditions,

especially in the youth,

and growing religious

fundamentalism could

create conditions that

terrorist groups could

exploit to recruit

members for

operations within

Tanzania and regionally.

This threat is

underscored by the

British Embassy’s warning in February 2013 about the growing threat of terrorist activities in

Tanzania. Terrorist entities could try to promise relief from socio-economic troubles and

more employment for youth, which the government has thus far been unable to provide.

Meanwhile, Islamist terrorist networks may attempt to promise broad implementation of

Islamic Sharia law to fundamentalist segments of the population who are currently

discontent with what they perceive as the government’s lack of respect for their religious

Controversial Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, blamed for inciting religious

violence, addresses crowds in Dar es-Salaam

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observances. The already established cross border gun and drug trade in the country could

indicate the presence of insurgent elements within the country. The possibility that terrorist

networks could exploit pre-existing socio-economic trends and the overall deficiencies of the

security infrastructure in the country in medium to long term should not be ruled out in the

event that the current security situation remains unchanged.

Conclusion

The recently planned joint operations between South African and East African countries to

provide support combating cross border crimes comes partially in response to the growing

threat of transnational terrorism posed to regional stability. Yet, we assess that this initiative

will not be sufficiently broad or strong to prevent regional terrorist groups from establishing

cells within the country if they choose to do so. As terrorist groups, such as al-Shabaab in

Somalia, are routed from their traditional strongholds by counterinsurgency efforts, they will

likely look for new areas with underlying weak security where they can establish new bases

of operation. Tanzania’s largely unmonitored and unregulated borders place it at risk for

infiltration by such insurgent elements in the medium-long term.

In the near term, we assess that petty criminal activity and large-scale attacks on business

interests will continue to grow due to the failure of the government to implement any

significant changes to the current security infrastructure. Criminality could likely be

diminished somewhat if the government would be able to launch a successful campaign

against corruption within the police force in addition to upholding requirements for entering

the state police apparatus. Additionally, a major restructuring of the private security sphere,

including passing and implementing legislation to control the sector, would likely improve

the security environment nationwide.

Recommendations

1. Given the evolving tactics and targets of thieves, minimize foot travel as much as

possible throughout all urban areas. If walking is necessary, maintain a low profile and

avoid exhibiting wealth. This includes wearing high profile jewelry, carrying electronics

devices openly, and carrying large quantities of visible cash.

2. Regarding car travel, keep doors locked, windows closed, and valuables hidden. If hiring

a taxi or chauffeur, verify the driver’s identification and credentials. Furthermore, it is

recommended to only use taxi and chauffeur services recommended by hotels or

business associates.

3. Regarding the hiring of personal or business security, it is recommended to vet a variety

of security options and to only employ personnel who can be verified through several

reliable references. Verify the background, qualifications, references, and quality

reputation of potential personnel and companies. Be vigilant for illegitimate and

inexperienced companies and avoid hiring their services regardless of the short term

possibility of saving capital.

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4. Furthermore, it is advised to employ sufficient numbers of security personnel to monitor

facilities. If possible it is recommended to retain security personnel who are not from

the area of operations, who may be less likely to feel local affiliation to assailants, accept

bribes, or condone attacks.

5. In order to mitigate the risk of significant monetary losses from attacks on businesses,

including mining operations, contact Max Security Solutions for on-site planning and

security consulting, which includes security infrastructure and security personnel.

6. As a general security precaution, avoid unnecessary travel to outlying areas.

7. In general, if confronted by criminal activity, it is advised to cooperate with assailants

and not engage in any behavior that could raise tensions.

8. If traveling in Tanzania, it is advised to have an emergency contact on hand.

Furthermore, change itineraries and travel routes frequently so as to be less susceptible

to monitoring and targeting by criminal elements.

9. Before planning travel to Tanzania, refer to Max Security Solutions for further security

guidance before planning travel to Tanzania.

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