SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (REGALADO TEXT; CHUA) 1 · PDF fileConcurrent jurisdiction over guardianship and adoption cases is now eliminated ... SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (REGALADO TEXT; CHUA)

SPECIALPROCEEDINGS(REGALADOTEXT;CHUA) 1

MA.ANGELAAGUINALDO ATENEOLAW2010

PRELIMINARIES

ACTION SPECIALPROCEEDING

Anactionbywhichapartysuesanotherfor the enforcement or protection of aright,or thepreventionor redressofawrong

It is a formal demand of one’s legalrightsinacourtofjusticeinthemannerprescribedbythecourtofbythelawIt is absolute rule that there is anadversarialpartyGeneraljurisdictionUsuallyconstituteactions inpersonam,whereinthedecisionofthecourtwouldonlybindthepartiesinthecaseIssuesdeterminedbythepleadingsThereisaprescriptiveperiodinvolvedTherecanbeanawardfordamages

Anapplicationtoestablishthestatusorright of a party or a particular fact, oranyremedyotherthananordinarysuitinacourtofjusticeGenerally commenced throughapplication, petition, or special formofpleadingPublicationusuallynecessarytoacquirejurisdictionIt is a general rule that there is noadverse party (exception: in cases ofhabeascorpusproceedings)Constitute actions in rem—whereintheseproceedingsbindthewholeworldoncetheyareconcludedIssuesdeterminedbylawThereisnoprescriptiveperiodinvolvedNoawardofdamagesGenerally, no default in specialproceedings

1 HAGANSV.WISLEZENUS 42PHIL880FACTS:Apetitionforcertiorariwasfiledagainstajudgewhoorderedtheappointmentofassessors in a special proceeding. Of all the laws existing during the period, the

only lawwhich could possibly sanction the appointment of assessors is Act 190,whichprovidedthatwhenthepartiesrequestfortheappointmentofanassessor,thejudgewouldconsequentlyprovidethesame.The trial court judge would be sustained if it is found that the provision alsocontemplated“specialproceedings”whenitmentioned“action”.HELD:There isamarkeddistinctionbetweenan"action"anda"specialproceeding."Anaction isaformaldemandofone's legalrights inacourtof justice inthemannerprescribedbythecourtorbythelaw.It isthemethodofapplyinglegalremediesaccording to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may bedefinedasanapplicationorproceedingtoestablishthestatusorrightofaparty,oraparticularfact.Usually,inspecialproceedings,noformalpleadingsarerequired,unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings isgenerally granted upon an application or motion. Illustrations of specialproceedings, in contradistinction to actions, may be given: Proceedings for theappointmentofanadministrator,guardians,tutors;contestofwills;toperpetuatetestimony; to change the nameof persons; application for admission to the bar,etc.Fromalloftheforegoing,inthepresentproceeding,thejudgeoftheCourtofFirstInstance is without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer isherebyoverruledandtheprayerofthepetitionisherebygranted,anditisherebyordered and decreed that the order of the respondent judge appointing theassessors described in the petition be and the same is hereby annulled and setaside;and,withoutanyfindingastocosts,itissoordered.2 NATCHERV.COURTOFAPPEALS 366SCRA380FACTS:SpousesdelRosarioweretheownersofaparcelofland.Whenthewifedied,thehusband and the children extrajudicially partitioned the property. Gracianolikewise donated part of his share in the land to his children and consequentlydividedhisshare intotwo—sellingone lottoathirdpersonandtheother lot,heretainedashisown.Helatercontractedasecondmarriagetopetitioner. Beforehisdeath,hesoldthesecondlottopetitioner. Uponhisdeath,thechildrenfiledanactionforannulmentoftitle,allegingthatbeforetheirfather’sdeath,through



fraudandforgery,petitionerunlawfullytransferredthelandtoher.Thetrialcourtruled that the deed of sale was void and against the law. nonetheless, theconveyancecanbeconsideredasanadvanceinheritance.ThiswasreversedbytheCourtofAppealshoweveronappeal—rulingthatthetrialcourtshouldn't ruleonmatterswhichtheprobatecourthasproperjurisdictionover.HELD:Ascouldbegleanedfromtheforegoing,thereliesamarkeddistinctionbetweenanactionanda specialproceeding.Anaction isa formaldemandofone's right inacourt of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is themethodofapplyinglegalremediesaccordingtodefiniteestablishedrules.Theterm"specialproceeding"maybedefinedasanapplicationorproceeding toestablishthestatusorrightofaparty,oraparticularfact.Usually,inspecialproceedings,noformal pleadings are requiredunless the statuteexpressly soprovides. In specialproceedings,theremedyisgrantedgenerallyuponanapplicationormotion."Applyingtheseprinciples,anactionforreconveyanceandannulmentoftitlewithdamagesisacivilaction,whereasmattersrelatingtosettlementoftheestateofadeceasedpersonsuchasadvancementofpropertymadebythedecedent,partakeofthenatureofaspecialproceeding,whichconcomitantlyrequirestheapplicationofspecificrulesasprovidedforintheRulesofCourt.Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of thedecedentfallwithintheexclusiveprovinceoftheprobatecourt intheexerciseofitslimitedjurisdiction.Thus,underSection2,Rule90oftheRulesofCourt,questionsastoadvancementmadeorallegedtohavebeenmadebythedeceasedtoanyheirmaybeheardanddeterminedbythecourthavingjurisdictionoftheestateproceedings;andthefinalorderofthecourtthereonshallbebindingonthepersonraisingthequestionsandontheheir.Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its generaljurisdiction, isdevoidofauthoritytorenderanadjudicationandresolvethe issueof advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher,inasmuchasCivil CaseNo. 471075 for reconveyanceandannulmentof titlewithdamages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question.Moreover,underthepresentcircumstances,theRTCofManila,Branch55wasnotproperlyconstitutedasaprobatecourtsoastovalidlypassuponthequestionof

advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, hereinpetitionerNatcher.3 VDA.DEMANALOV.COURTOFAPPEALS 349SCRA135FACTS:TroadioManalodied intestate, leavinghis spouseand childrenasheirs. Eightofthesechildrenfiledforthesettlementoftheestateoftheirfather.Thetrialcourtissued an order setting a date for hearing as well as publication of the same innewspapers. Petitioners opposed and sought that they be heard on theiraffirmativedefensesregardingthecase’sdismissalaswellasthatthecourthasn'tacquired jurisdiction over them. The trial court issued an order overruling thepetitioner’scontention.Itwassustainedbytheappellatecourtdespiteallegationsof the petitioners that the special proceedings applied for by respondents wasactuallyinthenatureofanordinarycivilactionfiledagainstthem.HELD:It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action orproceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought 16 in thecomplaint,orpetition,asinthecaseatbar,shallbecontrolling.AcarefulsrutinyofthePetitionfor IssuanceofLettersofAdministration,SettlementandDistributionofEstateinSP.PROC.No.92‐63626belieshereinpetitioners'claimthatthesameisin the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficientjurisdictionalfactsrequiredinapetitionforthesettlementofestateofadeceasedpersonsuchasthefactofdeathofthelateTroadioManaloonFebruary14,1992,aswellashisresidenceintheCityofManilaatthetimeofhissaiddeath.Thefactof death of the decedent and of his residencewithin he country are foundationfactsuponwhichallthesubsequentproceedingsintheadministrationoftheestaterest. The petition is SP.PROC No. 92‐63626 also contains an enumeration of thenames of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by thedeceasedwhichare sought tobesettled in theprobateproceedings. Inaddition,the relief'sprayed for in the saidpetition leaveno room fordoubtas regard theintention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicialsettlementoftheestateoftheirdeceasedfather,TroadioManalo.

JURISDICTION

EXTENTOFJURISDICTION



1. Concurrent jurisdiction over guardianship and adoption cases is noweliminatedandexclusivejurisdictionisnowvestedwiththeRTC

2. Municipal trial courts can likewiseappoint guardiansad litem inpropercasesandwhere said incompetent isnot representedbyhisparentsorjudicialguardian

3. Municipal trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction over probate casesinvolving a gross value of the estate not exceeding P20,000—lateramendedbyincreasingittoP300,000andP400,000inMetroManila

4. ThewritofhabeascorpusmaybeissuedbytheSupremeCourt,CourtofAppeals,andRTC

5. SpecialjurisdictionisconferredtomunicipalcourtjudgesintheabsenceofanyRTCjudge

6. Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions forguardianship, custody, habeas corpus in relation to the latter, andadoptionofchildrenandrevocationthereof

7. Publication of judicial orders and notices is often required in specialproceedingsforjurisdictionalpurposes

4 MANGALIMANV.GONZALES 36SCRA462FACTS:Petitionerwastheillegitimatedaughterofthedecedentandwasgivenalegacyof1/8undividedportion inHaciendaEvangelista. Sinceshewasstillaminorduringthistime,shewasplacedunderguardianship. Oneofthelegitimatechildrenwastheadministratorof theestate. Onallegations thathis feesweren’tpaidyet,hefiled for awrit of execution. ThewholeHacienda Evangelistawas sold in publicauctiontorespondent‐administrator,includingthatshareofpetitioner.Whenshecameofage,shetriedtoannulthesaletoherhalf‐brotherbutshewasoverruledonthegroundthattheguardianknewofthesaleandshouldhavefiledtheactionto annul long before. She then discovered that the feeswere actually paid andthrough fraud and machinations, brother‐administrator was able to sell theHacienda to himself. She sought then the annulment of the sale again, in theprobate court, alleging anew the fraud employed. Her complaint was againdismissed.HELD:The probate court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition forreconveyance,inquestion.Theremedysoughtbypetitionerforthereconveyance

toherofhershareintheHaciendaEvangelistauponthegroundthatthesamewasacquiredbyrespondentthroughfraudormisrepresentationcannotbeobtainedbyamerepetitionintheprobateproceedings.Thecourtoffirstinstance,actingasaprobatecourt,haslimitedjurisdictionandcantakecognizanceonlyof"mattersofprobate, both testate and intestate estates, ... and all such special cases andproceedingsasarenototherwiseprovidedfor"Thejurisdictionofaprobatecourtis limited and special, and this should be understood to comprehend only casesrelatedtothosepowersspecifiedinthelaw,andcannotextendtotheadjucationofcollateralmatters.The petition filed by petitioner before the probate court which seemingly seeksmerely the reconveyance toherofherundivided share inaparcelof landwhichoriginallyformedpartoftheestateofherfatherinfactcallsforthenullification,oftheorderofexecutionissuedbytheprobatecourtwhichisalreadyfinal,andofthesubsequent sale of a property to respondent, upon the alleged ground of fraud.The defense interposed by respondent is that petitioner's action to recover thepropertyisalreadybarredbyprescription,laches,andresjudicata.Thepetitionforreconveyancehasgivenrisetoacontroversy involvingrightsoverarealpropertywhichwouldrequire thepresentationofevidenceandthedeterminationof legalquestionsthatshouldbeventilatedinacourtofgeneraljurisdiction.5 BAYBAYANV.AQUINO 149SCRA185FACTS:Private respondents, alleging themselves to be the nephews and nieces of adecedent,soughtthesummarysettlementofthesame’sestate.Theprobatecourtorderedthesubmissionofaprojectofpartitiontogetherwiththeaccountingandinventory of the properties. The property was then distributed and writs ofpossessionwereissuedtotheprivaterespondents.Consequently,motionstocitepetitioners in contempt of court were filed, who allegedly interrupted privaterespondents in takingpossessionof the land. Thepetitionersontheotherhand,filedforquietingoftitleagainstthesheriffandotherprivaterespondents. Later,the probate court found out that the land specified in the application wasregisteredinthenamesofpetitioners.Itthenissuedanorderdenyingthemotionfor contempt of court and likewise ordered the petitioners to amend theircomplaintagainstprivaterespondents.HELD:



The contention, inouropinion, is notmeritorious.While itmaybe true that theordertoamendthecomplaintfiledinCivilCaseNo.231‐RwasissuedinSpec.Proc.No. 24‐R, so that it cannot ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who are notparties in said special proceedings, it appears, however, that the petitionersvoluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, whenthey filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231‐R, wherein they prayed forleavetoamendtheircomplaintinaccordancewiththeorderoftheprobatecourtof 30 October 1975. They cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt aninconsistentposturebyattacking the jurisdictionof the respondent trial Judge towhomtheysubmittedtheircausevoluntarily.We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse ofdiscretion,amountingtolackofjurisdiction,indismissingthecomplaintfiledbythepetitioners,fortheirallegedfailuretoamendtheircomplainttoexcludetherefromLotEwhichtherespondentJudgefound,inhisorderof30October1975,issuedinthe probate court, to be owned by the petitioners Cipriano Evangelista andConsueloBaybayan.The findingsof the respondent Judgeas to theownershipofLotEafterthehearingconductedinSpec.Proc.No.24‐Rdonotjustifytheordertoamendthecomplaintsincethedeterminationoftheownershipofthesaid lotbytherespondent Judgepresidingoveracourtexercisingprobate jurisdiction isnotfinal or ultimate in nature and iswithout prejudice to the right of an interestedpartytoraisethequestionofownershipinaproperaction.Itisawell‐settledruleinthisjurisdiction,sanctionedandreiteratedinalongfineofdecisions,that"whenquestionsariseastoownershipofpropertyallegedtobeapartoftheestateofadeceasedperson,butclaimedbysomeotherpersontobehis property, not by virtueof any right of inheritance from thedeceased, but bytitle adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot bedeterminedinthecourtsofadministrativeproceedings.TheCourtofFirstInstance,acting,asaprobatecourt,hasnojurisdictiontoadjudicatesuchcontentions,whichmust be submitted to the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its generaljurisdictionasacourtoffirstinstance."6 FERNANDEZV.MARAVILLA 10SCRA589FACTS:Maravilla sought theprobateofhis latewife’swill. The siblings soughtdenialofprobate on the ground that it wasn't signed on each and every page by the

decedent. They likewise prayed for the appointment of their brother as specialadministrator in lieuof thehusband toprotect their interestandalsodue to thefailure to file an inventory. Theprobateof thewill in themeantimewasdeniedand to this, thehusbandappealed. Consequently, thebrotherwasappointedasadministrator. The husband filed a petition for certiorari and for preliminaryinjunction,praying therein theannulmentof thebrotheras co‐administratorandthe prohibition of the probate court from proceeding in his removal asadministrator.ThepetitionersmovedforthecertificationofthesametotheSCasthe amount involved exceeds the jurisdiction of the CA. Nevertheless, the CAdecidedinfavorofthehusband.HELD:UnderSection2,Rule75,of theRulesofCourt, theproperty tobeadministeredand liquidated in testateor intestateproceedingsof thedeceased spouse is, notonly that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but theentire conjugalestate.ThisCourthasalreadyheld thateven if the deceasedhadleftnodebts,uponthedissolutionofthemarriagebythedeathofthehusbandorwife,thecommunitypropertyshallbeinventoried,administered,andliquidatedinthetestateorintestateproceedingsofthedeceasedspouse.Inanumberofcaseswhereappealwas taken fromanorderofaprobatecourtdisallowingawill, thisCourt, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved or in controversytherein is that of the entire estate. Not having appellate jurisdiction over theproceedings in probate (CA‐G.R. No. 27478‐R), considering that the amountinvolvedthereinismorethanP200,000.00,theCourtofAppealscannotalsohaveoriginal jurisdiction to grant thewrits of certiorari and prohibition prayed for byrespondentintheinstantcase,whicharemerelyincidentalthereto.Note also that thepresent proceedings under reviewwere for the annulment ofthe appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co‐administrator and to restrain theprobatecourtfromremovingrespondentasspecialadministrator.Itistherefore,acontest for the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount orvalueoftheassetsofthewholeestateisthevalueincontroversy(4C.J.S.204).ItappearingthatthevalueoftheestateindisputeismuchmorethanP200,000.00,the Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs inquestion.7 MANALOV.PAREDES 47PHIL938



FACTS:Hidalgo filedwith thecourther lettersofadministrationof theestate leftbyherdeceased husband. In the same proceedings, the illegitimate children togetherwiththecommon‐lawwifeofthedecedent,askedfortheprobateofthesupposedwillofthedecedent.Publicationoftheapplicationwasproperlymadeaswellasaguardian for the minoir children was appointed. When asked by the court toproducethewill,thecommon‐lawwifeadmittedtohavecoercedthehusbandtosignthewilltosecurethatthechildrenwouldbeleftsomethingoutofhisestate.Thepartiesthensubsequentlyenteredintoanagreementwhereintheapplicationforprobatewaswithdrawnandconsequently,thecourtdeniedtheprobateofthewill. Thereafter, using the same will, a cousin of the decedent filed anotherapplicationforprobate.Andupondenialofthejudgetopublictheapplicationorgiveduecoursetothesame,hefiledformandamus.HELD:Theproceedingfortheprobateofawill isaproceedinginrem(40Cyc.,p.1265),and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested through thepublicationofthenoticeprescribedbysection630oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them. Through thepublicationorderedbytheCourtofFirst InstanceofLagunaoftheapplicationforthe probate of the supposedwill of Francisco Villegas, filed by JustinaMendietaandherminorchildrenLazaroandDariaMendietaandMelecioFule,testamentaryexecutor, through their attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, said court acquiredjurisdictionoverallsuchpersonsaswereinterestedinthesupposedwill,includingGelacioMalihan.Thecourthavingtriedsaidapplicationforprobate,hearingallthetestimonyoftheattestingwitnessesofthesaidsupposedwill,theapplicantJustinaMendieta forherselfandasguardianad litemofherminorchildren, representedbytheirattorneys,Messrs.MarcelinoLontokandMarcialAzada,ontheonehand,and LaureanaHidalgo,widowof Francisco Villegas, represented by her attorney,Jesus.E.Blanco,ontheother,havingsubmittedastipulationwhereinthe formerwithdrewherapplicationandthelatterreservedcertainrightsovertheestateleftbyFranciscoVillegasinfavorofJustinaMendietaandherminorchildren;andthecourt having approved said stipulation and declared that Francisco Villegas diedintestate according to said agreement, all the parties became bound by saidjudgment;and ifanyof themorotherpersons interestedwerenotsatisfiedwiththe court's decision, they had the remedyof appeal to correct any injustice thatmight have been committed, and cannot now through the special remedy ofmandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new application for theprobateofthesamewill inordertocompeltherespondentjudgetocomplywith

hisministerialdutyimposedbysection330oftheCodeofCivilProcedure;becausethisremedy,beingextraordinary,cannotbeusedinlieuofappeal,orwritoferror(26 Cyc., 177; 18 R.C.L., par. 443); especially when the parties interested haveagreed to disregard the testamentary provisions and divide the estate as theypleased,eachofthemtakingwhatpertainedtohim(25R.C.L.,359).

RULE72SUBJECTMATTERANDAPPLICABILITYOFGENERALRULES

Section1.Subjectmatterofspecialproceedings.Rulesofspecialproceedingsareprovidedforinthefollowingcases:(a)Settlementofestateofdeceasedpersons;(b)Escheat;(c)Guardianshipandcustodyofchildren;(d)Trustees;(e)Adoption;(f)Rescissionandrevocationofadoption;(g)Hospitalizationofinsanepersons;(h)Habeascorpus;(i)Changeofname;(j)Voluntarydissolutionofcorporations;(k)Judicialapprovalofvoluntaryrecognitionofminornaturalchildren;(l)Constitutionoffamilyhome;(m)Declarationofabsenceanddeath;



(n)Cancellationofcorrectionofentriesinthecivilregistry.Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of specialprovisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far aspracticable,applicableinspecialproceedings.RELATIONTOPROVISIONSINTHERULESOFCOURT

• Distinction between final and interlocutory orders in civil actions fordeterminingthe issueofappealability isnotstrictlyapplicabletoordersissuedinspecialproceedings

• Rule 33 on judgment on demurrer to evidence is applicable to specialproceedings

CONSTRUCTIONOFTHERULESONSPECIALPROCEEDINGS

• Liberalconstructionaslongasnosubstantiverightswillbeprejudicedorviolated

8 FERNANDEZV.MARAVILLA SupraHELD:ThecasescitedbyrespondentwherethisCourtruledthattheseparatetotalclaimof the parties and not the combined claims against each other determine theappellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the instant case, becauseSection2,Rule75oftheRulesofCourtisexplicitthattheamountorvalueinvolvedor in controversy in probate proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming,arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, itshouldbenotedthatrespondentclaimsthewholeestateofatleastmorethan3/4thereof.Saidclaim,reducedtoapecuniarystandard,onthebasisoftheinventory,wouldamount tomorethanP200,000.00and,consequently,within theexclusivejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt.Whileitistruethatquestionsoffacthavebeenraisedintheprobateproceedings(Spec.Proc.No.4977,CFIofNegrosOccidental)whichwasappealedbyrespondenttotheCourtofAppeals,itbecomesimmaterial,inviewofSections17and31oftheJudiciary Act of 1948, as amended, providing that the Supreme Court shall haveexclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the value in controversyexceeds twohundred thousandpesos, exclusiveof interests and costs", and that"allcaseswhichmaybeerroneouslybroughttotheSupremeCourt,ortotheCourt

ofAppealsshallbesenttothepropercourt,whichshallhearthesameasifithadoriginallybeenbroughtbeforeit".On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as specialadministrator,weagreewithrespondentthattherewasnoneedfor it.Notethatthe Rules of Court contain no provision on special co‐administrator, the reasonbeing,thattheappointmentofsuchspecialadministratorismerelytemporaryandsubsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, itwouldnotonlybeunnecessarybutalsoimpractical, ifforthetemporarydurationof theneed for a special administrator, anotherone is appointedaside from thehusband, in this case, uponwhom theduty to liquidate the communitypropertydevolvesmerelytoprotectthe interestsofpetitionerswho, intheeventthatthedisputedwillisallowedtoprobate,wouldevenhavenorighttoparticipateintheproceedingsatall.

SETTLEMENTOFESTATE

RULE73VENUEANDPROCESS

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is aninhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or analien,hiswillshallbeproved,orlettersofadministrationgranted,andhisestatesettled, in theCourtofFirst Instance in theprovince inwhichhe residesat thetimeofhisdeath,andifheisaninhabitantofaforeigncountry,theCourtofFirstInstanceofanyprovinceinwhichhehadestate.Thecourtfirsttakingcognizanceof the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as itdepends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of hisestate, shallnotbecontested ina suitorproceeding,except inanappeal fromthatcourt, intheoriginalcase,orwhenthewantof jurisdictionappearsontherecord.Section2.Whereestatesettledupondissolutionofmarriage.Whenthemarriageisdissolvedbythedeathofthehusbandorwife,thecommunitypropertyshallbeinventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in thetestate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have



died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestateproceedingsofeither.RESIDENCE,ACCORDINGTOFULECASE

• Meanshispersonal,actual,orphysicalhabitation,hisactualresidence,orplaceofabode

WHAT IS DETERMINED BY THE QUESTION OF RESIDENCE IN SETTLEMENT OFESTATES?

• Determinativeofvenueanddoesn’taffectthequestionofjurisdictionofthecourt

• As venuemay bewaived, the submission of all affected parties to saidproceedingisawaiverofobjectiontothiserror

• However,wheretheproceedingwascommencedintheimpropervenueand itwasquestionedseasonably, thepetitionshouldbedismissedandshouldbeinstitutedinthepropercourt

WHICH COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OFIMPROPERVENUE?

• The court in which the proceedings were first filed has the exclusivejurisdictiontosettlethequestionofimpropervenue

• It acquires exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all questions concerning thesettlementoftheestatetotheexclusionoftheothercourts

CANACOURTBEDIVESTEDOFJURISDICTIONUPONFILINGOFPETITION?

• No, the court acquires jurisdictionupon the filingof thepetition and itcannotbedivestedofthesamethroughsubsequentactsofthepartiesorthroughfilinganotherpetitionforsettlementinanothercourt

HOW SHOULD THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BE LIQUIDATED UPON DEATH OFEITHERORBOTHSPOUSES?

• It shall be liquidated in the proceedings for the estate of the deceasedspouseandifbothdied,intheproceedingsofeitherestate

• If separate proceedings have been instituted for each estate, bothproceedingsmaybeconsolidatediftheywerefiledinthesamecourt

WHEN MAY A PROBATE COURT PASS UPON QUESTIONS OF OWNERSHIP OFPROPERTY?

1. Theinterestedpartieswhoareallheirsofthedeceasedconsenttheretoandtheinterestsofthirdpartiesaren’tprejudiced

2. ProvisionalmanneronlyAT WHAT INSTANCES MAY THE PROBATE COURT ONLY ISSUE WRITS OFEXECUTION?

1. To satisfy the contributive shares of thedevisees, legatees andheirs inpossessionofthedecedent’sassets

2. Toenforcepaymentofpartitionexpenses3. To satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate

proceedings4. Toexecuteagainstthebondexecutedbytheadministrator/executor5. To satisfy administration fees pursuant to agreement (if we follow the

caseofMangaliman)Section3.Process.Intheexerciseofprobatejurisdiction,CourtsofFirstInstancemayissuewarrantsandprocessnecessarytocompeltheattendanceofwitnessesortocarryintoeffecttheirsordersandjudgments,andallotherpowersgrantedthemby law. Ifapersondoesnotperformanorderor judgmentrenderedbyacourt in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, itmay issue awarrant for theapprehensionandimprisonmentofsuchpersonuntilheperformssuchorderorjudgment,orisreleased.Section 4. Presumption of death. For purposes of settlement of his estate, apersonshallbepresumeddeadifabsentandunheardfromfortheperiodsfixedintheCivilCode.Butifsuchpersonprovestobealive,heshallbeentitledtothebalance of his estate after payment of all his debts. The balance may berecoveredbymotioninthesameproceeding.9 SALAZARV.CFI 64PHIL78FACTS:Salazarfiledapetitionfortheprobateoftheallegedwillofhisdeceasedmother.In opposition thereto, the respondent Rivera filed her counter‐petition, whereinsheallegedthatthewillshehasinpossessionisthetruewillofthedeceased.Sheprayedthatthesecondwillbeadmittedtoprobateinstead.Atfirstorder,shewasdeniedbythecourtbutonamotionforreconsideration,shewasallowedtodoso,with the proper publications, etc. accordingly made. This was opposed to by



Salazaron theground thatRiverawasnotable topayaccordingly the court feesandthus,thecourthasnotacquiredjurisdictionoverthecase.HELD:Under the foregoing provisions, a Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction toprobateawillwhen it is shownbyevidencebefore it: (1)Thatapersonhasdiedleaving a will; (2) in the case of a resident of this country, that he died in theprovince where the court exercises territorial jurisdiction; (3) in the case of anonresident, thathehas leftaestate intheprovincewherethecourt issituated,and (4) that the testamentor lastwillof thedeceasedhasbeendelivered to thecourtandisinthepossessionthereof.Thelawissilentastothespecificmannerofbringingthejurisdictionalallegationsbeforethecourtbutpracticeandjurisprudencehaveestablishedthattheyshouldbe made in the form of an application and filed with the original of the willattachedthereto.Ithasbeenthepracticeinsomecourtstopermitattachmentofamerecopyofthewilltotheapplication,withoutprejudicetoproducingtheoriginalthereof at the hearing or when the court so requires. This precaution has beenadaptedbysomeattorneystoforestallitsdisappearance,whichhastakenplaceincertaincases.According to the facts alleged and admitted by the parties, it is evident that thecourthasacquiredjurisdictiontoprobatethesecondwill, inviewofthepresenceof all the jurisdictional facts above‐stated. The respondent's counter‐petitionshould,inthiscase,beconsideredasapetitionfortheprobateofthesecondwill,theoriginalofwhichwasfiledbyheronJuly20,1937.Thepaymentofthefeesoftheclerkofcourtforallservicestoberenderedbyhimin connection with the probate of the second will and for the successiveproceedings tobeconductedandothers tobe issued, inaccordancewithsection788,asamended,isnotjurisdictioninthesensethatitsomissiondoesnotdeprivethe court of its authority to proceed with the probate of a will, as expresslyprovided for by section 630. It is the inevitable duty of the court,when awill ispresentedtoit,toappointhearingforitsallowanceandtocausenoticethereoftobegivenbypublication.10 CAYETANOV.LEONIDAS 129SCRA522

FACTS:Whenhisdaughterdied,thefatherexecutedanaffidavitexecutinginhisfavortheestate. Lateron,oneof thedecedent’ssisterssubmitted forprobatetheallegedwillofthedecedent. ItwasshownthatthedecedentwasacitizenoftheUSandthatshediedwhiletemporarilyresidingwithhersister.Thefatheropposedthisatfirstbutlateronwithdrewtheoppositionwhichwasaffirmedbyhismanifestation.When theorderadmitting forprobatewasgivenby thecourt, the fatherallegedthathewithdrewtheoppositionerroneouslythroughfraudemployedagainsthim.This was however unsubstantiated. The father consequently died and leavingpetitionertosubstitutehim.HELD:Finally,wefindthecontentionofthepetitionastotheissueofjurisdictionutterlydevoidofmerit.UnderRule73,Section1,oftheRulesofCourt,itisprovidedthat:SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. � If the decedent is aninhabitantofthePhilippinesatthetimeofhisdeath,whetheracitizenoranalien,hiswillshallbeproved,orlettersofadministrationgranted,andhisestatesettled,intheCourtofFirstInstanceintheprovinceinwhichheresidedatthetimeofhisdeath,andifheisaninhabitantofaforeigncountry,theCourtofFirstInstanceofany province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of thesettlementoftheestateofadecedent,shallexercise jurisdictiontotheexclusionofallothercourts.Thejurisdictionassumedbyacourt,sofarasitdependsontheplace of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not becontested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in theoriginalcase,orwhenthewantofjurisdictionappearsontherecord.Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Camposwas correctly filedwith the Court of First Instance ofManila where she had an estate since it wasalleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen andpermanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usualresident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is nowestoppedfromquestioningthejurisdictionoftheprobatecourtinthepetitionforrelief. It is a settled rule that aparty cannot invoke the jurisdictionof a court tosecureaffirmativerelief,againsthisopponentandafterfailingtoobtainsuchrelief,repudiateorquestionthatsamejurisdiction.11 INREKAWSINGCO 74PHIL239



FACTS:A resolution was issued by the court certifying the case to the /CA for furtherproceedings,whereinaquestionoffactastowherethedecedentdiedwastobeinquiredinto.Thiswasquestionedbythepetitioner.HELD:The law which provides that the estate of the deceased shall be settled in theprovince where he last resided couldn't have been intended to have meant asjurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter. such provision iscontainedinalawofprocedureanddealsmainlywithproceduralmatters.12 GARCIAFULEV.COURTOFAPPEALS 74SCRA189FACTS:Garcia Fule filed letters for administrationof thedecedent. Shealleged that thedeceased last resided in Calamba. This was opposed by the respondent on thegroundthatthevenuewasimproperlylaidandthatjurisdictionoversubjectmatterwasn'tacquired. Shequestionedtheappointmentofpetitioneraswellasspecialadministratixsincethelatterhasallegedlyadverseinterestovertheestate.HELD:Section 1, Rule 73 of theRevisedRules of Court provides: "If the decedent is aninhabitantofthePhilippinesatthetimeofhisdeath,whetheracitizenoranalien,hiswillshallbeproved,orlettersofadministrationgranted,andhisestatesettled,intheCourtofFirstInstanceintheprovinceinwhichheresidesatthetimeofhisdeath,andifheisaninhabitantofaforeigncountry,theCourtofFirstInstanceofany province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of thesettlementoftheestateofadecedent,shallexercise jurisdictiontotheexclusionofallothercourts.Thejurisdictionassumedbyacourt,sofarasitdependsontheplace of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not becontested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in theoriginal case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." Withparticular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the RevisedRules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show theexistenceofjurisdictiontomaketheappointmentsought,andshouldallegeallthenecessary facts, suchasdeath, thenameand last residenceof thedecedent, theexistence,andsitus ifneedbe,ofassets, intestacy,wherethis isreliedupon,and

the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, orotherwise,tobeappointed.Thefactofdeathoftheintestateandhislastresidencewithinthecountryarefoundationfactsuponwhichallsubsequentproceedingsintheadministrationoftheestaterest,andthatiftheintestatewasnotaninhabitantofthestateatthetimeofhisdeath,andleftnoassetsinthestate,nojurisdictionisconferredonthecourttograntlettersofadministration.Theaforequoted Section1,Rule73 (formerlyRule75, Section1), specifically theclause "so far as itdependson theplaceof residenceof thedecedent,orof thelocationof theestate," is in realityamatterofvenue,as thecaptionof theRuleindicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. Itcould not havebeen intended to define the jurisdictionover the subjectmatter,becausesuchlegalprovisioniscontainedinalawofproceduredealingmerelywithproceduralmatters.Procedureisonething; jurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter isanother.Thepowerorauthorityofthecourtoverthesubjectmatter"existedandwasfixedbeforeprocedureinagivencausebegan."Thatpowerorauthorityisnotaltered or changed by procedure, which simply directs themanner inwhich thepowerorauthorityshallbefullyandjustlyexercised.Therearecasesthoughthatifthepowerisnotexercisedconformablywiththeprovisionsoftheprocedurallaw,purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter.Rather, itmeans that the courtmay thereby lose jurisdiction over the person orthat the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of somethingessential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law atonceraisesastrongpresumptionthatithasnothingtodowiththejurisdictionofthecourtoverthesubjectmatter.Inplainwords,itisjustamatterofmethod,ofconveniencetotheparties.DivergentclaimsaremaintainedbyVirginiaG.FuleandPreciosaB.Garciaontheresidenceof thedeceasedAmadoG.Garciaat the timeofhisdeath.Oneallegesthat he died in Calamba while the other alleges that it was in Quezon City asevincedbythedeathcertificate.Onthisissue,itisruledthatthelastplaceofresidenceofthedeceasedAmadoG.Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not atCalamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of thedecedentatthetimeofhisdeath.Andmoreimportantly…



“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, thepersonal,actualorphysicalhabitationofaperson,actualknowledgeorplaceofabode. It signifiesphysicalpresence inaplaceandactual stay thereat. In thispopularsense,thetermmerelymeansresidence,thatis,personalresidence,andnotlegalresidenceordomicile.Residencesimplyrequiresbodilypresenceinthatparticular place and also an intention tomake it one’s domicile. No particularlengthoftimeofresidenceisrequiredthough. Howeveritshouldbemorethantemporary.

13 CUENCOV.COURTOFAPPEALS 53SCRA360FACTS:UponthedeathofSenatorCuenco,leavinghiswidowand2minorchildren,lettersfor administration of the estate was filed by respondent in Cebu City, allegingthereinthatthedeceaseddiedintestateandthathis lastknownresidencewasinCebuCity.Inthemeantime,thewidowfiledinQuezonCity,whereinthedeceasedhas died, petition to admit into probate the last will and testament of thedecedent. Upon learning of the pending petition in Cebu City, she filed heroppositionandmotiontodismissthepetitionbyrespondent.HELD:The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of FirstInstanceover"allmatterofprobate,bothoftestateandintestateestates."Ontheotherhand,Rule73,sectionoftheRulesofCourtlaysdowntheruleofvenue,astheverycaptionoftheRuleindicates,andinordertopreventconflictamongthedifferentcourtswhichotherwisemayproperlyassumejurisdictionfromdoingso,theRule specifies that "thecourt first takingcognizanceof the settlementof theestateofadecedent,shallexercisejurisdictiontotheexclusionofallothercourts."ItshouldbenotedthattheRuleonvenuedoesnotstatethatthecourtwithwhomtheestateorintestatepetitionisfirstfiledacquiresexclusivejurisdiction.TheRulepreciselyanddeliberatelyprovidesthat"thecourtfirsttakingcognizanceof the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusionofallothercourts."

AfairreadingoftheRule�sinceitdealswithvenueandcomitybetweencourtsofequal and co‐ordinate jurisdiction � indicates that the court with whom thepetitionisfirstfiled,mustalsofirsttakecognizanceofthesettlementoftheestateinordertoexercisejurisdictionoverittotheexclusionofallothercourts.Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of thedecedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedentobviouslyhadhisconjugaldomicileandresidedwithhissurvivingwidowandtheirminor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it statingthat the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to takecognizanceofthepetitionandholdthepetitionbeforeitinabeyance,andinsteaddefer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of thedecedent'sallegedlastwill.This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner‐widow's filing with it amotion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding inabeyanceitsactiononthedismissalmotionanddeferredtotheQuezonCitycourt,awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in theCebucourt'sorderwasthatifthewillwasdulyadmittedtoprobate,bytheQuezonCitycourt,thenitwoulddefinitelydeclinetotakecognizanceofLourdes'intestatepetitionwhichwould therebybe shown tobe false and improper, and leave theexerciseofjurisdictiontotheQuezonCitycourt,totheexclusionofallothercourts.Likewisebyitsactofdeference,theCebucourtleftittotheQuezonCitycourttoresolvethequestionbetweenthepartieswhetherthedecedent'sresidenceatthetime of his deathwas inQuezon Citywhere he had his conjugal domicile ratherthaninCebuCityasclaimedbyrespondents.TheCebucourtthusindicatedthatitwould decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and insteaddefertotheQuezonCitycourt,unlessthelatterwouldmakeanegativefindingastotheprobatepetitionandtheresidenceofthedecedentwithin itsterritoryandvenue.Itcannotbedeniedthataspecialproceedingintendedtoeffectthedistributionoftheestateofadeceasedperson,whetherinaccordancewiththelawonintestatesuccessionorinaccordancewithhiswill,isa"probatematter"oraproceedingforthe settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordancewithsettledjurisprudenceinthisjurisdiction,testateproceedingsforthesettlementofthe estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings forthe same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course ofintestateproceedingspendingbeforeacourtof first instance it is found that the



decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter shouldreplacetheintestateproceedingsevenifatthatstateanadministratorhadalreadybeenappointed,thelatterbeingrequiredtorenderfinalaccountandturnovertheestate inhispossessiontotheexecutorsubsequentlyappointed.Thishowever, isunderstoodtobewithoutprejudicethatshouldtheallegedlastwillberejectedorisdisapproved,theproceedingshallcontinueasanintestacy.Asalreadyadvertedto,thisisaclearindicationthatproceedingsfortheprobateofawillenjoypriorityoverintestateproceedings.14 ONGSINGCOV.TAN 97PHIL330FACTS:Ongsingcowas appointed as judicial guardian of her husbandwhowas declaredincompetentinanearlierproceeding.Shetookoutrightpossessionoftwoparcelsof land which purportedly was owned by her husband. In the ongoing estateproceedingsofFrancisco’sfirstwife,Tangco,theadministratorthereinprayedthatOngsingcobedisallowed fromharvesting thepalay fromthe twoparcelsof land.Theprobatecourtorderedaccordingly.HELD:Thedisputebetweenpetitionerandrespondentadministratorinvolving,asitdoes,theownershipoftwoparcelsoflandsituatedinSantaRosa,NuevaEcija,andthisquestion having been squarely raised in an action pending in the court of firstinstance of said province, whichwas instituted by petitioner against respondentadministratorpreciselybecauseofthedisputethathadarisenbetweenthemoversaid property, it is the sense of this Tribunal that respondent court exceeded itsjurisdictioninactinguponthesaidquestioninitscapacityasprobatecourt.Onthefaceofsuch issuewhichnecessarily involves theownershipof theproperties,weconsiderofnoconsequencetheclaimthatwhatrespondentcourtmerelydidwasto look intotheidentityofsaidproperties.Thisquestionisnecessarily imbibedinthegreaterissueofownershipandbeinginterwovenonecanhardlydrawthelineofdemarcationthatwouldseparateonefromtheother.15 EUSEBIOV.EUSEBIO 100PHIL593FACTS:

ItisnotdisputedthatAndresEusebiowas,andhadalwaysbeen,domiciledinSanFernando,Pampanga,wherehehadhishome, aswell as someotherproperties.Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, whotreatedhim,residedinQuezonCity,AndresEusebioboughtahouseandlotinsaidCity.Whiletransferringhisbelongingstothishouse,soonthereafter,thedecedentsufferedastroke(probablyheartfailure),forwhichreasonDr.Eusebiotookhimtohis (Dr.Eusebio's)aforementionedresidence,where thedecedent remaineduntilhe was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila. On this date, hecontracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, ConcepcionVillanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute leftventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease". Consequently, heneverstayedorevensleptinsaidhouseatEspañaExtention.HELD:Inview,however,ofthelastsentenceofsaidsection,providingthat:. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place ofresidenceofthedecedent,orofthelocationofhisestate,shallnotbecontestedinasuitorproceedings,except inanappealfromthatcourt, intheoriginalcase,orwhenthewantofjurisdictionappearsontherecord.Ifproceedingsforthesettlementoftheestateofadeceasedresidentareinstitutedin twoormore courts, and thequestionof venue is raisedbefore the same, thecourtinwhichthefirstcasewasfiledshallhaveexclusivejurisdictiontodecidesaidissue,andwesoheldinthecaseofTacianaVda.DeBorjavs.Tan,L‐7792(July27,1955).Should itbedecided, in theproceedingsbefore thesaidcourt, thatvenuehadbeen improperly laid, the casepending therein shouldbedismissed and thecorrespondingproceedingsmay,thereafter,beinitiatedinthepropercourt.Inconclusion,wefindthatthedecedentwas,atthetimeofhisdeath,domiciledinSanFernando,Pampanga;thattheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizalhadnoauthority,therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venuehaving been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustainedappellants'oppositionanddismissedappellee'spetition.16 SANDOVALV.SANTIAGO 83PHIL784FACTS:



Sandoval petitioned the admission to probate of the will of Marquez. She wasaccordingly appointed as the executrix of the estate. Pending the probateproceedings,theheirsextrajudiciallypartitionedtheestateamongthemselvesandtookpossessionoftherespectiveproperties. Thiswasmadewithoutauthorityofthe court. When the judge ordered Sandoval to file a bond, petitioner averredtherewasnoneed todo soas theheirsalready tookpossessionandpartitionedtheproperties.HELD:Weareof theopinion, and sohold, that the respondent, JudgeorCourt of FirstInstanceofQuezonProvince,whereinthedeceasedwasresidingatthetimeofhisdeath, has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to settle the testate estate of thedeceasedDanielMarquez and over the heirs and other person interested in theestate of the deceased from themoment the application for the probate of thedecedent'swillwas filedwith the said court and thepublication requiredby lawweremade;andtheheirsofthedeceasedMarquezcouldnotdivesttheCourtofFirst Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction by the mere fact of dividingextrajudiciallytheestateofthedeceasedamongthemselves.17 VDA.DEMANZANEROV.CFI 61PHIL850FACTS:Whileworkingasanassistantcityengineer inAlbay,Estebandied. hisbrother inBatangas,filedforthesettlementofhisestate,allegingthereinthatthedeceasedresided in Batangas prior to his death. Upon publication of the application andsetting theproceedings for hearing, nooppositionwasmadebypetitioner. Andwhentheproceedingshaveended,whereintheinsurancecompanywasorderedtopayproceedstotheheirsoftheinsured,itwasonlythenshesurfacedandtriedtofileapetitionforcertiorari.HELD:Accordingtotheabovecitedlegalprovision,thejurisdictionassumedbyaCourtofFirstInstance,forthesettlementofanestate,sofarasitdependsontheplaceofresidenceofaperson,orofthelocationofhisestate,cannotbecontestedinasuitorproceeding,except inanappeal from that court, in theoriginal case,orwhenthewantofjurisdictionappearsontherecord.

From thepleadingsbeforeus,whichare copiesof theiroriginals attached to therecord in theCourt of First Instanceof Batangas, thewant of jurisdictionof saidcourt does not clearly appear. The communication of themunicipal treasurer ofTabaco,Albay,statingthatthedeceasedEstebanM.Manzaneroappearsinthelistof registered voters, and the affidavit of themunicipal president thereof statingthat thedeceasedresidedbeforehisdeath inTabaco,Albay,donot formpartoftherecordofthelowercourt.Itnotappearingfromtheordersofthelowercourt,as disclosed by the copies thereof attached to the record of these certiorariproceedings,thatsaidcourtlacksjurisdictiontotakecognizanceoftheapplicationforsummarysettlementbyreasonofthelegalresidenceofthedeceased,EstebanM.Manzanero, certioraridoesnot lie, anappealbeing speciallyprovided in suchcasebysection603oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.

REMEMBERCIVILPROCEDUREACCORDINGTOLOUIE (94SACIVPROFINALS ):Jurisdiction isdeterminedfromtheallegations inthepleadings, inthiscase,theallegations of the petitioner in his petition. If there is opposition, then therecouldn'tbeanyquestionifitappearsintherecordornot.

18 BENEDICTOV.JAVELLANA 10PHIL197FACTS:Maximo made a claim against the administrator of the estate of his brotherrespectingpaymentof a sumofmoney creditable forhim in relation to a legacygiven to him by the latter. The administrator questions the claim filed, averringthattheclaimshouldbefiledagainstallthelegateesandpartiestotheestateandnot to administrator alone. It would be seen from thewill by theway that theestatewasdistributedbylegacies.HELD:As to specific devices, section 729 of the Code of Civil Procedure providesexemption from the payment of debts and expenses if there is sufficient otherpropertyandif itappearstothecourtnecessarytocarryintoeffecttheintentionof the testator;and,as the legaciesstated in theaforesaidwill consistofspecificproperty, less the annuity provided for by clause 6,which ismade a special lienuponthepropertyforbyclause6,whichismadeaspeciallienuponthepropertybequeathedtoFranciscoandSofiaJalandoni,it isunquestionablethatinthiscasethedebtsandexpensesoftheestatemustbepaidproratabythelegateesinthe



mannerprovided in thewill,or inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofsections753and754oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.On the other hand, and for such effects as may be proper, it should be statedherein that any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to theauthentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee, orpartyininterestinatestateorintestatesuccessionmaymake,mustbeacteduponanddecidedwithinthesamespecialproceedingsnotinaseparateactionandthesame judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall takecognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will becalledupontomakedistributionandadjudicationofthepropertytotheinterestedparties,asmaybeseeninpartIIoftheCodeofCivilProcedure,fromsection551forward.19 CASIANOV.MALOTO 70SCRA232FACTS:Thenephewsandniecesof thedecedent,believingthatnowillwas left, filed forthe intestateproceedings. Thewillof thedecedentwas later found,onwhich itwasindicatedthattwowouldgetbiggershares.Thesetwosoughttheannulmentoftheintestateproceedingsandtheprobateofthewill.Theyweredeniedbythecourt.Theytheninstitutedanewproceedingfortheadmissiontoprobateoftheallegedwill.HELD:Theprobatecourthadno jurisdictiontoentertainthepetition for theprobateofthe alleged will of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed, themotiontoreopentheproceedingswasdeniedbecausethesamewasfiledoutoftime.Moreover,itisnotpropertomakeafindinginanintestateestateproceedingthatthediscoveredwillhasbeenrevoked.Asamatteroffact,theprobatecourtinSpecial Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that"MovantsshouldhavefiledaseparateactionfortheprobateoftheWill."13Andthis court stated in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that "The more appropriateremedyofthepetitionersinthepremisesstatedinthepetitionisforpetitionerstoinitiateaseparateproceedingfortheprobateoftheallegedwithinquestion."

Youcannotconvertanintestateproceedingintoatestateproceeding.

20 CUIZONV.RAMOLETE

129SCRA495FACTS:Marcianoownedtwoparcelsoflandandadjudicatedthesameinfavorofhistwodaughters—Rufina and Irene. The lot of Irene was subsequently sold topetitioners.TheTCThoweverwasn'tcancelledgiventhattheythoughttheyneednot to because of the lifetime usufruct rights of Irene. Irene died later on andRufina adjudicated to herself the property in question in favor of all petitioners.Respondents then filed in another court for letters of administration. In theinventoryforthesame,theyincludedthedisputedpropertynotwithstandingthattheownershipthereofisofpetitioner’s.Theprobatecourtthenorderedthattheland be sold in public auction and consistently, the respondents tried to forcethemselvesintheland.HELD:Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in thepossessionofthirdpartiesandmoreimportant,coveredbyatransfercertificateoftitle issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should havedenied themotionof the respondentadministratorandexcludedtheproperty inquestion from the inventoryof thepropertyof theestate. Ithadnoauthority todeprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property.Respondent court was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27,1979.Thus, itwasunnecessaryforthepetitionerstofirstapplyforreliefwiththeintestatecourt.Even assuming the truth of the private respondents' allegations that the sale ofDecember29,1971waseffectedundersuspiciouscircumstancesandtaintedwithfraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged half‐sister and sole heir of Ireneremainsopentoquestion,theseissuesmayonlybethreshedoutinaseparatecivilactionfiledbytherespondentadministratoragainstthepetitionersandnotintheintestateproceedings.21 BERNARDOV.COURTOFAPPEALS 7SCRA367FACTS:



Spouses Capili were the owners of parcels of land. The husband died first andtestateproceedingswereheldwhereinhiswife,aswellbrothersandsisterswereinstitutedasheirs.Thewifealsodiedlateronandwassubstitutedbyhercollateralrelatives. In the project of partition submitted by the executor, there wasoppositiononthegroundthatsomepropertieswereconjugalpropertiesandthuspart should not be included in the inventory. Consequently, two projects forpartition was submitted for hearing and the other party contends that thepropertiesindisputewereindeedexclusiveproperty.HELD:Inthecasenowbeforeus,thematterincontroversyisthequestionofownershipof certain of the properties involved whether they belong to the conjugalpartnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within thejurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugalpartnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to bedistributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, ofcourse,thewidow,nowrepresentedbecauseofherdeath,byherheirswhohavebeen substituted upon petition of the executor himself andwho have appearedvoluntarily.Therearenothirdpartieswhoserightsmaybeaffected.Itistruethatthe heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator‐husband, but thewidowis,inadditiontoherownrighttotheconjugalproperty.Anditisthisrightthatisbeingsoughttobeenforcedbyhersubstitutes.Therefore,theclaimthatisbeing asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, itcomplies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (thepetitionersandthewidow,representedbydents)areallheirsclaimingtitleunderthetestator.22 URIARTEV.CFI 33SCRA252FACTS:Upon the death of Don Juan Uriarte, his alleged natural son filed for intestateproceedings in the Negros Court. This was opposed to by one of the nephews,allegingthatawillwas indeedexecuted inSpainandaskedforthesubmissionofthe said will. Meanwhile, one of the nephews, who was in possession of theallegedwill,institutedintheManilaCopurtpetitionforprobateofthewill.HealsosoughttointerveneintheinstestateproceedingsinNegrosCourt.HELD:

Itcannotbedeniedthataspecialproceedingintendedtoeffectthedistributionoftheestateofadeceasedperson,whetherinaccordancewiththelawonintestatesuccessionorinaccordancewithhiswill,isa"probatematter"oraproceedingforthe settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordancewithsettledjurisprudenceinthisjurisdiction,testateproceedings,forthesettlementofthe estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings forthe same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course ofintestateproceedingspendingbeforeacourtoffirstinstanceitisfoundithatthedecedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter shouldreplacetheintestateproceedingsevenifatthatstageanadministratorhadalreadybeenappointed,thelatterbeingrequiredtorenderfinalaccountandturnovertheestateinhispossessiontotheexecutorsubsequentlyappointed.This,however,isunderstoodtobewithoutprejudicethatshouldtheallegedlastwillberejectedorisdisapproved,theproceedingshallcontinueasanintestacy.Asalreadyadvertedto,thisisaclearindicationthatproceedingsfortheprobateofawillenjoypriorityoverintestateproceedings.Zamacona should have submitted for probate the will he has on hand with theNegroscourt.In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly andinexpensiveadministrationofjusticetounnecessarilymultiplylitigation,especiallyifseveralcourtswouldbeinvolved.This,ineffect,wastheresultofthesubmissionof thewill aforesaid to theManila Court. In the second place,when respondentHiginioUriartefiledanoppositiontoVicenteUriarte'spetitionfortheissuanceofletters of administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that thedeceased JuanUriarte yGoitehad left awill in Spain, ofwhich a copyhadbeenrequested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, JuanUriarteZamacona,filedhismotiontodismissSpecialProceedingNo.6344,hehadsubmitted to the Negros Court a copy of the allegedwill of the decedent, fromwhich fact itmaybe inferred that, likeHiginioUriarte, he knewbefore filing thepetition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a specialproceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of thesamedeceasedperson.AsfarasHiginioUriarteisconcerned,itseemsquiteclearthat in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, hehadexpresslypromisedtosubmitsaidwillforprobatetotheNegrosCourt.ButthefactisthatinsteadoftheaforesaidwillbeingpresentedforprobatetotheNegros Court, JuanUriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purposewith the



Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that thelattercourthadno jurisdictiontoconsidersaidpetition,albeitwesaythat itwasnotthepropervenuetherefor.It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveableprocedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instantcase,we areof theopinion, and sohold, that petitioner haswaived the right toraise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough toconsiderinthisconnectionthatpetitionerknewoftheexistenceofawillexecutedby Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed hisopposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; thatpetitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of thealleged lastwill in thePhilippines andof the filingof thepetition for its probatewiththeManilaCourtsinceAugust28,1962whenJuanUriarteZamaconafiledamotionforthedismissalofSpecialProceedingNo.6344.Allthesenotwithstanding,it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in SpecialProceedingNo.51396anOmnibusmotionaskingforleavetointerveneandforthedismissalandannulmentofall theproceedingshad thereinup to thatdate; thusenabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the willannexedbutalso toadmit saidwill toprobatemore than fivemonthsearlier,ormorespecifically,onOctober31,1962.ToallowhimnowtoassailtheexerciseofjurisdictionovertheprobateofthewillbytheManilaCourtandthevalidityofalltheproceedingshadinSpecialProceedingNo.51396wouldputapremiumonhisnegligence.23 PCIBV.ESCOLIN 56SCRA266FACTS:SpousesHodgesmadesimilarwills,whereinoneachwillitwasprovidedthatifonepredeceasestheother,theotherspousewouldgettheestate’spropertiesandcanuseitinhis/herliking.Andincasethewidow/erdiesaswell,thepropertywillgotothesiblingsof thespousewhopredeceased. LinniediedaheadofCharlesandthe latter administered the estate of his wife. However, he wasn't able tocompletely settle the estate when he died. Linnie’s sister took over inadministrationofbothestatesindifferentproceedingsandthisinturn,beganthelong cycle of changes in administrators until the administration of both estatesendedupwithPCIB.Consequently,problemsensuedintheadministrationoftheestates.

HELD:We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When themarriageisdissolvedbythedeathofthehusbandorwife,thecommunitypropertyshallbe inventoried,administered,and liquidated,and thedebts thereofpaid, inthetestateorintestateproceedingsofthedeceasedspouse.Ifbothspouseshavedied, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestateproceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this provisionallowsorpermitstheconjugalpartnershipofspouseswhoarebothdeceasedtobesettledorliquidatedinthetestateorintestateproceedingsofeither,butpreciselybecause said sentence allows or permits that the liquidation be made in eitherproceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it should bemade. After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of the husband'sestateinrespecttosuchliquidationwasdoneawaywithbyAct3176,thepertinentprovisionsofwhicharenowembodiedintherulejustcited.Thus,itcanbeseenthatatthetimeofthedeathofHodges,therewasalreadythepending judicial settlement proceeding of the estate ofMrs. Hodges, and,moreimportantly,thattheformerwastheexecutorofthelatter'swillwhohad,assuch,failedformorethanfiveyearstoseetoitthatthesamewasterminatedearliest,whichwasnotdifficult todo, since fromought thatappears in the record, therewere no serious obstacles on the way, the estate not being indebted and therebeingno immediateheirsother thanHodgeshimself. Suchdilatoryor indifferentattitude could only spell possible prejudice of his co‐heirs, whose rights toinheritance depend entirely on the existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges'shareinthecommunityproperties,andwhoarenowfacedwiththeposeofPCIBthat there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible thesettlement of his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen. All thingsconsidered,Wearefullyconvincedthattheinterestsofjusticewillbebetterservedby not permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Hodgesexclusiveadministrationofallthepropertiesinquestion.Weareoftheconsideredopinionandsoholdthatwhatwouldbejustandproperisforbothadministratorsof the twoestates toact conjointlyuntil after saidestateshavebeensegregatedfromeachother.24 DELROSARIOV.DELROSARIO 67PHIL652FACTS:



SpousesDelRosarioweretheownersofproperties.Thehusbanddiedfirstandnointestateproceedingswereheldtosettlehisestateuntilthetimethatthewifealsodied.HELD:ActNo.3176onlyamendstheformerlawinthesensethatuponthedeathofanyofthespousesthecommunitypropertyshallbeliquidatedinthetestamentaryorintestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. But whatever law might beapplicable,andevenassumingthatitwasthatpriortoActNo.3176,theintestateofRamondelRosarionothavingbeencommenceduponhisdeathin1895untilhiswidow Florencia Arcega also died in 1933, and the testamentary proceedings ofFlorenciaArcegahavingbeensubsequentlyinitiated,wherein,amongotherthings,the liquidation of her conjugal properties with the deceased Ramon del Rosarioshouldbemade,thependencyofthesetestamentaryproceedingsofthedeceasedwife excludes any other proceeding aimed at the same purpose (Zaide vs.ConcepcionandQuintana,32Phil.,403).Attherate,theplaintiffshavearighttointerveneintheseproceedingsaspartiesinterestedintheliquidationandpartitionof the conjugal properties of the deceased spouses Ramon del Rosario andFlorenciaArcegaamongtheirheirs.25 DOLARV.ROMANCATHOLIC 68PHIL727FACTS:Paulino contracted two marriages during his lifetime, leaving children behind inbothmarriages.Thewidowwasappointedastheadministratixoftheestate.Thefirst project of partitionwasn't approved due to the opposition of the heirs andlegacies. She again submitted a second projectwhichwasn't also approved butconsequently,thecourtallowedhertotakepossessionoftheestate’sproperties.HELD:UnlessthewidowTeopistaDolar,theheirsofthedeceasedbyhistwomarriages,the representative of the legacy for P8,00, and the creditors of the estate,otherwise come to an agreement, the partition should be made with theintervention of all the interested parties according to law. All the debts andadministration expenses shall first be paid. (Section 753 of the Code of CivilProcedure).Theconjugalpropertiesofthefirstmarriageshallbeliquidatedsoastodetermine those corresponding to the childrenhadwith the deceasedMargaritaDoctura, as her heirs, and those corresponding to the deceased. Likewise, the

conjugalpropertiesofthesecondmarriageshallbeliquidated,soastodeterminethe half corresponding to the widow Teopista Dolar and the] other halfcorresponding to the deceased (article 1426 of the Civil Code). The propertiescorresponding to the deceased, acquired during his first and second marriages,constitutehisestate,whichshouldbepartitionedamonghiswidowTeopistaDolar(articles931and834oftheCivilCode).Therebeingforcedheirs,thelegacyofP8,000shouldbetakenfromthefreethirdonly,withouttouchingtheobligatorylegitime,andtheotherthefreethird,soastodeterminethepropertiesfromwhichthelegacybeingbywayofusufruct,theheirsmaycomply therewithordeliver to the legateepropertiesequivalent to the freethird (article 820, paragraph 3, of the Civil Code). The fruits of the propertiesalreadyreceivedortobereceivedshallanswerforthelegacywithrespecttoone‐thirdthereofonly,theremainingtwo‐thirdsbeingthoseoftheheirs(article813ofthe Civil Code). The legal usufruct of thewidow should be taken from the thirdavailableforbetterment(article835oftheCivilCode).26 ALFONSOV.NATIVIDAD 6PHIL240FACTS:Alfonso in his capacity as administrator of the estate, brought an action againstrespondentsforthereturnofthelandtheywereallegedlywrongfullypossessing.HELD:BytheprovisionsofthenewCodeofCivilProcedureinthesettlementofestatesofdeceased persons it is necessary to appoint commissioners, before whom thecreditors of the deceased must present their claims within a time fixed by thecourt.Thehusbandistheadministratoroftheconjugalpartnership.(Art.1412.)Hisdebts contractedduring themarriageare its debts. (Art. 1418.)Whena conjugalpartnershipisdissolvedbythedeathofthehusbanditwouldbeextremelydifficultto settle his estate in accordance with the provisions of the present Code ofProcedurewithout settling thepartnership affairs. It is difficult to harmonize thenewsystemwiththepartoftheoldwhichremains,butweconcludethatwhenthepartnership is dissolved by the death of the husband the inventory which ismentioned in article 1418 shouldbemade, and thepartnership affairs settled intheCourtofFirstInstancewhichtakesjurisdictionofthesettlementofhisestate,and in the same proceeding. This view being adopted, it follows as a necessaryconsequencethattheexecutororadministratorappointedinthatproceedingmust



be the person who is entitled to the custody of the property of the conjugalpartnershipwhilethesettlementisbeingmade.Thisconstructionofthelawdoesnotdeprivethewife,thesurvivingpartner,ofallintervention in the settlement of the affairs of the partnership, for in intestateestates she is entitled to be appointed administratrix of her husband's estate,unlesssomegoodreasonfornotappointingherisshown.Applying theseprinciples to thepresent case itappears that thepartnershipwasdissolved by the death of the husband; that its affairs should be settled in theproceedingsforthesettlementofhisestate;thattheplaintiffistheadministratorappointed in that proceeding; that the property in question belonged to thepartnership, and that therefore theplaintiff is entitled tomaintain this action. Inthe settlement of the affairs of the partnership hereafter, this, with all otherpropertyofthepartnership,includingthedebtofPedroNatividad.27 CRUZV.DEJESUS 52PHIL870FACTS:Plaintiffs sought the amendment of their complaint to liquidation and partition,whereintheyallegedthatthedecedentdiedwithoutanydebtsonhandandthus,they shouldbe allowed to liquidate in the samepartitionproceedings. Thiswasdeniedby thecourt. Thecourtordered that the liquidationof conjugalpropertyshouldbemadeintheestateproceedingsbeforeanypartitionmaybemade.HELD:Itistobenotedthatthislegalprovisionestablishestwomethodsofliquidatingthepropertyofaconjugalpartnership,ifthemarriageisdissolvedbythedeathofoneofthespouses:thefirstbyatestateorintestateproceedingaccordingtowhetherthedeceaseddiedwithorwithoutawill;andtheotherbyanordinaryproceedingforliquidationandpartition.Accordingtothe legalprovisionquotedabove,whenthemarriage isdissolvedbythe death of the wife, the legal power of management of the husband ceases,passing to the administrator appointed by the court in the testate or intestateproceedingsinstitutedtothatendiftherebeanydebtstobepaid,andwhenthereis no debt pending, the liquidation and partition may be made in an ordinaryproceedingforthatpurpose.

Since thecomplaint forpartitionalleges that therearenodebts topay,andas itdoesnotappear that thereareany, saidactionwill lie, forwhile it is true that itpraysforaliquidationofthepropertyoftheconjugalpartnershipdissolvedbythedeath of Juliana Nabong, said liquidation is implied in the action for partition(RemolinoandBautistavs.Peralta,G.R.No.10834).1For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and hold, that inaccordancewith section685ofActNo.190, asamendedbyActNo.3176,whenthere are no debts to pay, the liquidation and partition of the property of theconjugalpartnership,dissolvedbythedeathofoneofthespouses,maybemadeinanordinaryactioninstitutedforthatpurpose.28 DELARAMAV.DELARAMA 7PHIL745FACTS:The trial court found in favor of plaintiff in the divorce proceedings against herhusband.Sheallegedadulteryandthereafter,shewasgrantedbythecourt,partof the conjugal property, together with alimony, etc. The husband sought thereversal of the decision on which he was granted reconsideration. The wifeappealedthesametotheSupremeCourtoftheUS.HELD:Therecouldbeliquidationofconjugalpartnershipinthesamedivorceproceedingsifthedecreeofdivorceisgranted.29 VILLCORTEV.MARIANO 89PHIL342FACTS:Calimoncontractedthreemarriages,thelatestwithrespondentMariano.Hehadchildrenduringhisfirstandsecondmarriages.Petitioners,aswidowandchildrenofCalimon,filedfortherecoveryofparcelsoflandagainstthechildrenofthefirstchildren and Mariano. Mariano alleged that the properties were exclusivepropertiesofCalimonand/oracquiredduringtheirco‐venturetogether. Shealsofiled a cross‐claim against Canuta and the latter’s siblings for defrauding herallegedly intosigningacompromiseagreement. The trial court found in favorof



Canuta and her siblings, giving merit to the compromise agreement and it wasunnecessarytoundertakeliquidationandpartitionproceedings.HELD:Itwasunnecessarytopreparetheinventoryandmaketheliquidationbecausetheparties interested, i.e., the heirs of Leon Calimon and his widow had alreadyreachedacompromisebymeansofExhibit1‐Mariano.Andsupposingthatallthoselots were community property, still the said exhibit governs the rights of theparties.AsimilardocumentsofrenunciationwasheldvalidandbindinginAntoniovs. Aloc, 25 Phil. 147. And under the provision of article 1418 of the Civil Code,inventoryshallnotberequiredif,afterthepartnershiphasbeendissolved,oneofthespousesofhisorhersuccessorsshallhaverenounceditseffects.30 CALMAV.TANEDO 66PHIL594FACTS:Esperanza brought suit against Eulalio for debts payable by the conjugalpartnership, when the wife died. The debts payable was incurred during theexistenceof theconjugalpartnershipandwaschargeable to the same. Thewifediedwithawillandappointedherdaughterasadministratixoftheestate.HELD:From the foregoing it follows that when Esperanza Tanedo brought suit againstEulalioCalmaforthepaymentofthesumsofP948.34andP247,whichweredebtschargeable against the conjugal property, the power of Eulalio Calma as legaladministrator of the conjugal property while Fausta Macasaquit was living, hadceased and passed to the administratrix Maria Calma appointed in thetestamentaryproceedingsofFaustaMacasaquit.Hence,thisbeinganindebtednesschargeableagainstconjugalproperty,nocomplaintforitspaymentcanbebroughtagainst Eulalio Calma, who had already ceased as administrator of the conjugalproperty;theclaimforthisamounthadtobefiledinthetestamentaryproceedingsofFaustaMacasaquit.31 OCAMPOV.POTENCIANO 89PHIL160FACTS:

Ocamposoldahouseand lot tospousesPotencianounderapactoderectosale.Upondeathofoneof the spouses,Paz stillwanted to repurchase thehouseandlot.Thechildrenleftbythespousesaverredthatitonlywouldpertaintotheshareoftheirfathersincetheyalreadyinheritedthatofthoseoftheirmother’s.CAruledinfavorofOcampoandruledthatitwasindeedamortgagewithacaveatthattheoption agreement novated the mortgage agreement. The Potenciano childrenalleged that the fatherhadno authority to enter into theoption agreement andtheyweresustainedbytheSC.HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had suchauthority as de facto administrator of the conjugal estate. As pointed out byappellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of its view are nowobsolete. Those decisions laid down the rule that, upon the dissolution of themarriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnershipaffairs. But the procedure has been changed by Act No. 3176 (approved onNovember24,1924),nowsection2,Rule75,oftheRulesofCourt,whichprovidesthatwhen themarriage is dissolved by the death of either husbandorwife, thepartnershipaffairsmustbeliquidatedinthetestateorintestateproceedingsofthedeceasedspouse(Moran,CommentsontheRulesofCourt,3rded.,Vol.II,p.324).32 PRADOV.NATIVIDAD 47PHIL776FACTS:Casimiro and Maria married, and upon marriage, it was Casimiro who broughtpropertyinsidetheconjugalproperty.Mariabroughtnone.Thereafter,Mariadiedoutofpulmonarycomplications. Jose,theadministratorappointedfortheestateof Maria brought an action against Casimiro on the ground that he refused toliquidatetheconjugalpartnership.HELD:Atthetrialofthecase,evidencewasintroducedtendingtoshowtheexistenceofsaid properties with their prices and fruits. Also evidence was introduced in anattempt to show the true expenses incurred during the administration of theconjugalpartnership.Withthatevidenceintherecord,itisnotnecessarytoorderthedefendant,inhiscapacityasadministratoroftheestateofsaidpartnership,tomakeaformal liquidationthereof;becausewhatwasdoneduringthetrialofthecase amounts to a liquidation, and tomake another onewould be to do double



work,andwouldgiverisetonewcontroversieswhentheliquidationissubmittedforthecontestingthereofbytheadverseparty.Thetrialcourthasnot,therefore,committedanyerrorinnotorderingaformalliquidation.33 DELARAMAV.DELARAMA 25SCRA437FACTS:SamefactsbasicallyfromtheearlierDeLaRamacase.HELD:Aspointedoutbythetrialjudge,thisinventoryappearstohavebeenpreparedbyor for the defendant for the purposes of this action; and in any event it wasprepared after this action was originally instituted and under conditions whichjustified the trial judge in believing that the defendant had every opportunity tointerveneinitspreparationandtousehispersonalinfluencetohavethedocumentspeak favorably to his contentions. Granting that it is true, as contended bydefendant, that thisdocumentwasadmitted inevidencewithoutobjection, itbyno means follows that the trial judge was bound to accept its contents as truewhereotherevidenceofrecorddiscloseditsinaccuraciesanditsfailurecorrectlytolistthepropertiesinquestion.Itwasadmittedforwhatitwasworthasevidence,but inverynatureofthings, itshouldnotbeheldasconclusiveofthetruthof itscontents.Wethinkthatthetrialjudgeisfullysustainedbytheevidenceofrecordinhisfindingsthatthisinventoryfailedtosetforththetruestatusoftheaffairsofthe company, andweareofopinion, and sohold, that therewasnoerror inhisfindingsastothetruevalueofthepropertyinquestion.What has been said sufficiency disposes of all the errors assigned. We are ofopinion, therefore, that there is nothing in the record which would justify us insustainingthecontentionsofthedefendant‐appellantastoerrorinthefindingsoffactorintheconclusionsdrawntherefromintheopinionfiledbythetrialjudge.34 FULGENCIOV.GATCHALIAN 21PHIL252FACTS:UpontheappointmentasadministratixofJosefa,shebroughtacomplaintagainstthe defendants to take possession of alleged properties of Dionisio, which wereallegedlywithheldbydefendants.EvidenceshowsthatduringDionisio’smarriage

withBenita,hetookwithhimtotheconjugalpartnershipacertainsumofmoneyinMexicanpesos.IntheinventorymadebyJosefaoftheproperties,sheexcludedtherein the sumofmoneyandconsequentlymade thedemand for the returnofthepropertiesheldbythedefendants.HELD:It is fact, proved by the record, that the conjugal partnership formed betweenDionisioFulgencio,duringhis lifetime,andBenitaGatchaliananddissolvedbythehusband'sdeath,owedseveral largedebtsandthetestamentaryexecutrix, inthefulfillment of her duty, has a right to claim the possession of all the propertybelonging to the estate of which she is the judicial administratrix, in order that,pursuant law, she may make the required inventory and proceed, with theauthorizationofthecourt,topaythedebtsdulypresentedtothecommissionersofappraisalappointedinthespecialproceedings.Itisanincontrovertibleprincipleoflawthat,beforeproceedingwiththedivisionamongtheheirs,ofthepropertylefttothembythedeceasedpredecessorininterest,withoutprejudicetotherightsofthesurvivingwidow,inrelationtoherownpropertywhichdoesnotformapartoftheconjugalpartnershippropertynor is liable for thepaymentof theobligationsexistingagainsttheconjugalpartnership.Evidence was introduced to prove that the widow, Benita Gatchalian, oncontracting marriage with the now deceased Dionisio Fulgencio, brought to theconjugal partnership, property worth about twelve thousand pesos, beingparaphernalia of the wife's exclusive ownership; but once included among thepropertyoftheconjugalpartnership,ademandforitsexclusiononthepartof itslegitimateownercouldproperlybemadeonlyaftertheformationoftheinventoryofthepropertythatconstitutestheestateofherdeceasedhusband.35 LUKBANV.REPUBLIC 98PHIL574FACTS:Lourdes married Francisco and after a big quarrel, Francisco left and was neverheardofagain. Lourdesalso inquiredwithhis friendsand familybut tonoavail.He was nowhere to be found. And now, she files a petition to declare thepresumption of death of her husband for the purpose of securing a secondmarriage.HELD:



While it is truethataspecialproceeding isanapplicationtoestablishastatusorrightofaparty,oraparticularfact,thatremedycanbeinvokedifthepurposeistoseekthedeclarationofdeathofthehusbandbutnottoestablishapresumptionofdeath.

RULE74:SETTLEMENTOFESTATE

Section1.Extrajudicialsettlementbyagreementbetweenheirs. Ifthedecedentleft no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors arerepresented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for thepurpose, the partiesmaywithout securing letters of administration, divide theestateamongthemselvesastheyseefitbymeansofapublicinstrumentfiledintheofficeoftheregisterofdeeds,andshouldtheydisagree,theymaydosoinanordinaryactionofpartition.Ifthereisonlyoneheir,hemayadjudicatetohimselfthe entire estate bymeans of an affidavit filled in the office of the register ofdeeds.Theparties toanextrajudicial settlement,whetherbypublic instrumentor by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir whoadjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file,simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the publicinstrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in theoffice of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in anamountequivalenttothevalueofthepersonalpropertyinvolvedascertifiedtounderoathbythepartiesconcernedandconditioneduponthepaymentofanyjustclaimthatmaybefiledundersection4ofthisrule.Itshallbepresumedthatthe decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters ofadministrationwithintwo(2)yearsafterthedeathofthedecedent.Thefactoftheextrajudicialsettlementoradministrationshallbepublishedinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationinthemannerprovidedinthenestsucceedingsection;butnoextrajudicialsettlementshallbebindinguponanypersonwhohasnotparticipatedthereinorhadnonoticethereof.MODESOFSETTLEMENTOFESTATE

1. Testate2. Partition3. Extrajudicialsettlement4. Summarysettlement5. Intestateproceedingswhereinadministratorisappointed

6. ExecutionofaffidavitadjudicatingtohimselfifheisthesoleheirGENERAL RULE: JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION; EXCEPTION: SUMMARYSETTLEMENTOFTHEESTATE

• When a person dies leaving property, the same should be judiciallyadministered and the competent court should appoint a qualifiedadministrator

• Exception: Section 1, Rule 74—when all the heirs are of legal age andthere are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing topartition the property without instituting the judicial administration orapplyingfortheappointmentofanadministrator

EXTRAJUDICIALSETTLEMENT:REQUIREMENTS

1. Thedecedentleftnowill2. Thedecedentleftnodebts3. Heirsareoflegalageorifthereareminors,theyaredulyrepresentedby

theirguardiansauthorizedforthatpurpose4. Throughapublicinstrument,theyextrajudiciallypartitiontheestate5. Bondshallbefiledequivalenttothevalueofthepersonalpropertyunder

oath6. Publicationrequirements—publishedonceaweekforthreeconsecutive

weeksinnewspaperofgeneralcirculationintheprovinceSOLEADJUDICATION:REQUIREMENTS

1. Thereisonlyoneheir2. Hemayexecuteanaffidavitfiledwiththeregisterofdeeds3. Bondshallbefiledequivalenttothevalueofthepersonalpropertyofthe

decedentunderoath4. Publicationrequirements—publishedonceaweekforthreeconsecutive

weeksinnewspaperofgeneralcirculationintheprovinceSUMMARYSETTLEMENT:REQUIREMENTS

1. Grossvalueoftheestatedoesn’texceedP10,0002. Thedecedentmayhaveorhavenotleftawill3. Theaforementioned fact shouldbemade to the court throughpetition

not less thanonemonthnormorethan3months fromthedateof lastpublication

4. Noadministratororexecutorneedbeappointed5. Publicationandnoticerequirements



Section 2. Summary settlement of estate of small value. Whenever the grossvalueof theestateofadeceasedperson,whetherhedied testateor intestate,doesnotexceedtenthousandpesos,andthatfactismadetoappeartotheCourtofFirstInstancehavingjurisdictionoftheestatebythepetitionofaninterestedperson anduponhearing,which shall be held not less thanone (1)monthnormore than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a noticewhich shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in anewspaperofgeneralcirculation intheprovince,andaftersuchothernoticetointerest persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily,withouttheappointmentofanexecutororadministrator,andwithoutdelay,togrant,ifproper,allowanceofthewill,ifanytherebe,todeterminewhoarethepersonslegallyentitledtoparticipateintheestate,andtoapportionanddivideitamongthemafterthepaymentofsuchdebtsoftheestateasthecourtshallthenfindtobedue;andsuchpersons,intheirownright,iftheyareoflawfulageandlegalcapacity,orbytheirguardiansortrusteeslegallyappointedandqualified,ifotherwise,shallthereuponbeentitledtoreceiveandenterintothepossessionoftheportionsoftheestatesoawardedtothemrespectively.Thecourtshallmakesuchorderasmaybejustrespectingthecostsoftheproceedings,andallordersandjudgmentsmadeorrenderedinthecoursethereofshallberecordedintheofficeoftheclerk,andtheorderofpartitionoraward, if it involvesrealestate,shallberecordedintheproperregister'soffice.Section3.Bondtobefiledbydistributees.Thecourt,beforeallowingapartitionin accordance with the provisions of the preceding section, my require thedistributees, ifpropertyotherthanreal istobedistributed,tofileabondinanamounttobefixedbycourt,conditionedforthepaymentofanyjustclaimwhichmaybefiledunderthenextsucceedingsection.Section4.Liabilityofdistributeesandestate.Ifitshallappearatanytimewithintwo (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordancewiththeprovisionsofeitherofthefirsttwosectionsofthisrule,thatanheirorotherpersonhasbeenundulydeprivedofhis lawfulparticipation intheestate,suchheiror suchotherpersonmay compel the settlementof theestate in thecourts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying suchlawfulparticipation.Andifwithinthesametimeoftwo(2)years,itshallappearthattherearedebtsoutstandingagainsttheestatewhichhavenotbeenpaid,orthatanheirorotherpersonhasbeenundulydeprivedofhislawfulparticipationpayable inmoney, the courthaving jurisdictionof theestatemay,byorder for

that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawfulparticipation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shallcontribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstancesrequire, against the bond provided in the preceding section or against the realestatebelongingtothedeceased,orboth.Suchbondandsuchrealestateshallremain chargedwith a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the fullperiodoftwo(2)yearsaftersuchdistribution,notwithstandinganytransfersofrealestatethatmayhavebeenmade.Section5.Periodforclaimofminoror incapacitatedperson.� Ifonthedateoftheexpirationoftheperiodoftwo(2)yearsprescribedintheprecedingsectionthepersonauthorizedtofileaclaimisaminorormentallyincapacitated,orisinprisonor outside thePhilippines, hemaypresent his claimwithin one (1) yearaftersuchdisabilityisremoved.36 UTULOV.VDA.DEGARCIA

66Phil302(1938)FACTS:JuanGarciadiedintestateleavinghischildren,oneofwhomisLuzGarcia,andhiswifeasheirs.Duringthependencyoftheintestateproceedings,Luzdiedandsheleftnolegitimatedescendants.Heronlyheirswerehermotherandhusband.Herhusband then applied for judicial administration of the property, absent anywillfromhislatewife.Thiswasopposedtobythemotherhowevershewasoverruledandthecourtdecidedinthehusband’sfavor.HELD:As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedureproviding in part that "if no executor is named in the will, or if a person diesintestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision enunciates thegeneral rule thatwhenapersondies livingproperty in thePhilippine Islands,hispropertyshouldbejudiciallyadministeredandthecompetentcourtshouldappointa qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case thedeceasedleftnowill,orincasehehadleftoneshouldhefailtonameanexecutortherein.Thisrule,however,issubjecttotheexceptionsestablishedbysections596and597ofthesameCode,asfinallyamended.Accordingtothefirst,whenalltheheirsareoflawfulageandtherearenodebtsduefromtheestate,theymayagreeinwritingtopartitionthepropertywithoutinstitutingthejudicialadministrationorapplyingfortheappointmentofanadministrator.Accordingtothesecond, if the



property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to thecompetent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the summarypartitionand,afterpayingall theknownobligations, topartitionall thepropertyconstitutingtheinheritanceamongthemselvespursuanttolaw,withoutinstitutingthejudicialadministrationandtheappointmentofanadministrator.Construingthescopeofsection596,thiscourtrepeatedlyheldthatwhenapersondieswithout leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,whether of age ornot, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration and theappointmentofanadministratoraresuperfluousandunnecessaryproceedings37 HERNANDEZV.ANDAL

78Phil196(1947)

FACTS:TheHernandezsiblingssoldapartofaparceloflandtheyinheritedfromtheirlatefather. The share they sold to the Andals allegedly were co‐owned by theintervenors based on an oral partition agreement made amongst them. Herecomespetititonerwhowanted to repurchase theparcel of land from theAndalsbut it was disputed that the Andals didn't want to sell the same to her at herofferedprice.Then,itsohappenedthatallegedlytheAndalssoldthesamelandtotheintervenorsinstead.TheintervenorsthenallegethatHernandezwasactinginbadfaithsince itwasherdelayingtacticsthatresultedtothedelayedsaletotheAndalsandthepermissiontoundergothesametransaction.HELD:There isa conflictofauthorityas towhetheranagreementofpartition is suchacontract as is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. One line ofauthoritiesholdstheaffirmativeview;otherauthoritiessayno.Thereasonfortherule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute of frauds is thatpartitionisnotaconveyancebutsimplyaseparationanddesignationofthatpartof the land which belongs to each tenant in common. The differences in theconclusionsreachedare"dueperhapstovariedphraseologyofthestatutes"intheseveral states. However the case may be, as enacted in the Philippines, first insection335oftheformerCodeofCivilProcedure,andnowinRule123,section21,oftheRulesofCourt,thelawhasbeenuniformlyinterpretedinalonglineofcasestobeapplicabletoexecutoryandnottocompletedorexecutedcontracts. Inthisjurisdictionperformanceofthecontracttakesitoutoftheoperationofthestatute.Thestatuteoffraudsdoesnotdeclarethecontractsthereinenumeratedvoidand

ofnolegaleffect,butonlymakesineffectivetheactionforspecificperformance.IntheUnitedStates,eveninthosestateswheretheaffirmativeviewofthequestionhasbeenfollowed,"theweightofauthorityupholdstherulethatanoralpartitioniseffectivewhenseveralpossession is takenunder itby therespectiveparties totheagreement."Ongeneralprinciple, independentand in spiteof the statuteof frauds, courtsofequity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partlyperformed.Asageneralproposition,transactions,sofarastheyaffecttheparties,arerequiredto be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as ameans ofprovidingevidencetoprovethetransactions.Writtenformexactedbythestatuteoffrauds,forexample,"isforevidentialpurposesonly."ThedecisionsofthisCourtwhichwehave noticedwere predicatedon this assumption. TheCivil Code, too,requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not inordertovalidatetheactorcontractbutonlytoinsureitsefficacysothataftertheexistence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may becompelledtoexecutethedocument.

Issection1ofRule74constitutiveandnotmerelyevidentialofpartition?Inotherwords, iswriting theact that confers legal validity upon theagreement? Thereare no indications in the phraseology of this rule which justify an affirmativeanswertothesequestions.Itmustbenotedthatwherethelawintendsawritingorotherformalitytobetheessentialrequisitetothevalidityofthetransactionsitsays so in clearandunequivocal terms.Thus, the statuteof fraudsasoriginallyenactedinEnglandandasenactedinsomeofthestates,usesthewords"utterlyvoid"withstatutetransactionsrequiredtobeinwritingareabsolutelyvoidandnotmerelyvoidableifnotmadeinthemannerindicated.Againarticle633oftheCivilCodesaysthatdonationmaybevalidonlywhenmadeinapublicdocument.Article146oftheMortgageLawmakesknownitsintentiontohavetheexecutionof a public instrument and its registration in the registry indispensable to thevalidityofthecontractbyusingthisphrase:"inorderthatvoluntarymortgagesmay be legally created in a valid manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code alsoemploysforthesamepurposesimilarexpressionwithreferencetotheexecutionofapublicdocument:"inorderthatmortgagemaybevalidlyconstituted."Andwithrespecttotheformalitiesoflastwillsandtestaments,section618ofActNo.190 makes this emphatic statement: "No will shall be valid to pass upon any



estate realorpersonalnorchangeoraffect thesame,unless itbewrittenetc."Otherexamplesmightbementioned.Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that therequiredpublic instruments is tobe constitutiveofa contractofpartitionoraninherentelementof itseffectivenessasbetweentheparties.AndthisCourthadnoapparentreason, inadoptingthisrule, tomaketheefficacyofapartitionasbetween the parties dependent on the execution of a public instrument and itsregistration. On the other hand, the opposite theory is notwithout reasonablesupport.We can think of possible factors against the proposition that a publicdocumentanditsregistrationwerecontemplatedasnecessaryingredientstogivelifetoacontractofpartitionsothatwithoutthemnooralpartitioncanbindtheparties.

38 TORRESV.TORRES

10SCRA185(1964)FACTS:Oneofthechildrenofthedecedentprayedforthelettersofadministrationfortheestateofhisparent.Thiswasopposedtobyanotherheironthegroundthatitwasunnecessary to undergo judivcial administration since there was a previouslyconcluded extrajudicial partition amongst them. Petitioner doesn't deny theexistence of this partition however, he alleges that the same didn't took intoconsideration some valuable properties of the decedent as well as the existingobligationleftbythesame.HELD:ThisisnottooverlooktheallegationthattheestatehasanoutstandingobligationofP50,000.00. It istobenoted,however,thatappellant,asheretoforeobserved,did not specify from whom and in what manner the said debt was contracted.Indeed, the bare allegation that, "the estate has an existing debt of P50,000.00from third persons" cannot be considered as concise statement to constitute acauseofaction.Itmustbeforthisreasonthatthelowercourt,notwithstandingtheexistenceofsuchavermentinappellant'ssupplementalanswertotheopposition,dismissedthepetitionfiledbysaidappellant.Nordoestheunverifiedstatementthatthereareotherpropertiesnotincludedinthedeedofextrajudicialpartitioninthepossessionofoneoftheheirs,justifytheinstitutionofanadministrationproceedingbecausethesamequestions thatmay

ariseastothem,viz,thetitlethereandtheirpartition, ifproventobelongtotheintestate, can be properly and expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action ofpartition.39 ARCILLASV.MONTEJO

26SCRA197(1968)FACTS:GeronimoArcillasfiledapetitionforthecancellationoftitleinthenameofhislatefather. He asked in the same petition that the title to the property reflect theshares of each sibling laid down in the petition. He alleged that portions of thelandweresoldtoVicenteArcillas,alsoanheir.Petitionerontheotherhandfiledapetitionfortheissuanceoflettersofadministrationfortheestate,includingasoneof theproperties the land inquestion. Respondentsopposed thison thegroundthatitwasunnecessarytoundertakeadministrativeproceedingsastherewasonlyonepropertyinvolvedandthattherewasnodebtspayable.HELD:Havingdecidedto instituteadministrationproceedings insteadofresortingtotheless expensivemodes of settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement orordinaryactionforpartition,theheirsmaynotthenberebuffedintheexerciseoftheirdiscretiongrantedundersection1ofRule74oftheRulesofCourtmerelyonthegroundthattheexpensesusuallycommoninadministrationproceedingsmaydeplete the funds of the estate. The resultant delay and necessary expensesincurred thereafter are consequences which must be deemed to have beenvoluntarilyassumedbytheheirsthemselvessothattheymaynotinthefuturebeheard to complainof thesematters. Besides, the truthor veracity of petitioner'sclaimastotheallegedexistenceofotherpropertiesofthedeceasedasidefromthelot inquestioncanbemoreadequatelyascertainedinadministrationproceedingsratherthaninanyotheraction.Understandablytheallowanceofthehearingofthe"cadastral"motion,supposedlybroughtundertheauthorityofsection112ofAct496,cannotbesustained.Whilethissectionauthorizes,amongothers,apersonininteresttoaskthecourtforanyerasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon the ground thatregistered interestsofanydescription,whethervested, contingent,expectant,orinchoatehaveterminatedandceased,"andapparentlytheNovember12petitioncomeswithinitsscope,suchreliefcanonlybegrantedifthereisunanimityamongthe parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any



partyininterest;otherwisethecasebecomescontroversialandshouldbethreshedout in an ordinary case or in the casewhere the incident properly belongs (seePuguid v. Reyes, L‐21311, August 10, 1967 and the cases cited therein). In theinstantcasetheobviouslackofunanimityamongthepartiesininterest,manifestlydemonstratedbypetitioners'expressobjectiontothecancellationofTCTNo.RT‐244,sufficientlyremovestheNovember12petitionfromthescopeofsection112of Act 496. Besides, the proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act aresummaryinnatureandhenceinadequateforthelitigationofissueswhichproperlypertaintothecasewheretheincidentbelongs.40 ERM8CV.MEDELO

64SCRA359(1975) FACTS:Oneofthegrandchildrenofthedeceasedspousesfiledforsummarysettlementoftheestate. Therebeingnooppositionthereto,hewasorderedtomakeaprojectofpartition.Thecourtapprovedthesame.However,amotionforreconsiderationwas filedbyoneof the childrenof thedeceased spouses, alleging that the lot inissueshouldn'tbeincludedintheinventoryasthesamewasownedbyhim. Thetrialcourtoverruledhismotionanddecidedinfavorofthesummarysettlement.HELD:Thepolicyofthelawistoterminateproceedingsforthesettlementoftheestateofdeceased persons with the least loss of time. This is specially true with smallestatesforwhichtherulesprovidepreciselyasummaryproceduredispensingwiththe appointment of an administrator together with the other involved andcumbersome steps ordinarily required in the determination of the assets of thedeceased and the persons entitled to inhirit therefrom and the payment of hisobligations.Definitely,theprobatecourtisnotthebestforumfortheresolutionofadverseclaimsofownershipofanypropertyostensiblybelongingtothedecedent'sestate. While there are settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regularadministrationproceedings,itisnotpropertodelaythesummarysettlementofadeceased person just because an heir or a third person claims that certainpropertiesdonotbelongtotheestatebuttohim.Suchclaimmustbeventilatedinanindependentaction,andtheprobatecourtshouldproceedtothedistributionoftheestate,iftherearenootherlegalobstaclestoit,forafterall,suchdistributionmustalwaysbesubjecttotheresultsofthesuit.Fortheprotectionoftheclaimanttheappropriatestepistohavetheproperannotationoflispendensentered.

41 CARREONV.AGCAOILI1SCRA521(1961)

FACTS:WhenBonifacioCarreondied,hiswidowadjudicatedtoherselftheparcelof landwhichtheyacquiredduringhis lifetime. Shedidn'tdisclosethatshehadchildrenwithBonifacio.Shewasgranted,subjecttotheannotationinthetitleofSection4,Rule74.Thereafter,sheobtainedaloanfromthebankandassecurity,mortgaged½oftheland.Shewasnotabletopaytheloanontimeandlookedforabuyerforthe land. There came Agcaoili who bought the same. The loan was paid., themortgagesubsequentlyreleased.Consequently,thechildrenofCelerinasoughttheannulmentofthesaletoAgcaoilion the ground of fraud employed by their mother in adjudicating the land toherselfnotwithstandingthatshehadchildrenwhowerealsoheirstothedeceasedBonficacio.HELD:On the transfer certificate of title issued to Agcaoili there was annotated astatementthatitwassubjecttoSection4,Rule74oftheRulesofCourt.Thiswasanannotationcarriedover fromCelerina's transfercertificate.Section4,Rule74,providesthefollowing:SEC.4. Liabilityofdistributeesandestate.� If it shall appearat any timewithintwoyearsafterthesettlementanddistributionofanestateinaccordancewiththeprovisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or otherpersonhasbeenundulydeprivedofhislawfulparticipationintheestate,suchheirorsuchotherpersonmaycompelthesettlementoftheestateinthecourtsinthemannerhereinafterprovidedforthepurposeofsatisfyingsuchlawfulparticipation.And if within the same time of two years, it shall appear that there are debtsoutstandingagainsttheestatewhichhavenotbeenpaid,orthatanheirorotherpersonhasbeenundulydeprivedofhislawfulparticipationpayableinmoney,thecourthavingjurisdictionoftheestatemay,byorderforthatpurpose,afterhearing,settletheamountofsuchdebtsorlawfulparticipationandorderhowmuchandinwhatmanner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, andmayissue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in thepreceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both.Suchbondand such real estate shall remain chargedwith a liability to creditors,



heirs, or other persons for the full period of two years after such distribution,notwithstandinganytransfersoftherealestatethatmayhavebeenmade.The above lien is effective only for a period of two years. From September 28,1946,whena transfer certificateof titlewas issued toCelerina, to September8,1949when thedeedof sale in favorofAgcaoiliwas issuedand registered,morethantwoyearshadelapsedWesustainthelowercourt'sopinionthatthenceforththerighttohavesuchliencancelledbecamevestedonappelleeAgcaoiliandthatthesamehadbecomefunctusoficio.Andtherebeingnofraud inthetransactiononthepartofappellee,norproofthatheknewofanylegalinfirmityinthetitleofhis vendor,we find no reason to apply the proposition that he is deemed to beholdingthelandintrustforthechildrenofCelerinaDauag.42 MCMICKINGV.SYCONBIENG

21Phil211(1912)FACTS:Margarita Jose died intestate and left properties here and abroad. Palancaqualifiedasadministratoroftheestateandtookpossessionofallthepropertiesofthedecedent.OcampoandanotherservedassuretiesofPalanca.WhenOcampodied,Palancawasorderedtofileanadditionalbondinreplacementofthesuretygiven by Ocampo. Ocampo’s estate was in turn administered by Velasco, withseveralpersons servingashis sureties. Theestatewasextrajudiciallypartitionedbytheheirsandtheyundertooktopayanydebtsoftheestate.Lateron,Palarcawasremovedfromofficeforhisrefusaltorenderaccountingofthepropertieshetook in administration. McMicking tookhis steadand consequently fileda claimagainst the estate of Ocampo, arising allegedly from the surety it undertook forPalarca.HELD:Inthecaseatthebarweareoftheopinionthat,underthebroadandliberalpolicywhich we must adopt in the interpretation and application of the provisionsreferred to, the decision of the property of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, in theform,inthemannerandforthepurposesexpressed,fallswithintheprovisionsofsaidsectionsandmaybetermed,therefore,andweholdittobe,apartitionoftheproperty of a decedent without legal proceedings within the meaning of thosesections.Thefactofthepriorappointmentofanadministratorandthefilingofaninventory before such partition is of no consequence so far as the right of theownerstopartitionisconcerned.Theonlyrequisiteforsuchpetitionprescribedby

thelawisthat"therearenodebts...orallthedebtshavebeenpaidbytheheirs."Whenthecondition is fulfilledthepartitioncantakeplace,nomatterwhatstagetheadministrationmayhave reached.By this it is,of course,notmeant that thepartition after the appointment of an administratorwill interferewith the rightsacquired by third person dealing with said administrator within the limits of hisauthorityandpriortothepartition;northattheadministratorcanbedeprivedofthepropertyofwhichhe is legally inpossessionwithoutproperproceedingsandtheconsentofthecourt.As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety on anadministrators' bond is the fault or failure of the principal. The liability of theprincipalprecedesthatofthesurety.IfVelascoincurrednoliability,thenhissuretyincurred none. The question that naturally suggests itself is, then, In what wasVelascoatfaultorinwhatdidhefail?WhenthepersonsinterestedintheestateofMarianoOcampoagreedvoluntarilyuponapartitionanddivisionofthepropertyofsaidestateandtheactualpartitionfollowed,thematterpassedoutofthehandsofVelascoasadministrator.Thepartiestothepartitionstoodinvokingtheirrightsundersection596and597.Velascowashelpless.Hewaspowerlesstopreventthepartiesfromtakingthepropertytowhichtheywereentitledundertheagreement,it being conceded that theywereactually entitled thereto in law. Those sectionswere applicable to the situation and therewas nothing that Velasco could do toprevent the estate frombeing divided according to their provisions. In giving hisconsent to thepartitionand inassisting theparties toobtain theapprovalof thecourttheretohedidnowrong.Moreover,thesuretiesofanadministratorsoappointedcannotbeheldliableforpropertywhichbyforceoflawhasbeentakenfromtheprincipalanditsownershipandcontrolturnedovertoothers.Theirobligationisthattheirprincipalshallobeythelawinthehandlinganddistributionoftheestate.Theirobligationisdischargedwhentheestate is legally turnedovertothoseentitledthereto.The lawrequirestheprincipaltoturnitovertothosewhobringthemselveswithintheprovisionsofsection596.Havingturnedover thewholeestateunder thecompellingpowerofthelaw,hisobligationceased.Theresponsibilityofthesuretiesceasedatthesametime.Withouttheirconsentanotherobligationcouldnotbeimposedupontheminrelationtothesameprincipal,andthesameproperty,orapartthereof,especiallyafter the lapse of two years. Their undertaking was that their principal shoulddischargeoneobligation,nottwo.



Wehavenotoverlookedthecontentionthatat thetimethispartitiontookplacethere was a contingent claim against the estate partitioned, namely, the claimwhichwould arise on the contingency that the administrator forwhomMarianoOcampo was surety might default or otherwise fail to perform his duties thusrenderingMariano Ocampo liable on his bond; and that contingent claim, beingoneexpresslyrecognizedbysections746to749oftheCodeofCivilProcedureasaclaimentirelypropertopresent,nopartitionofthisestateundersection596and597 was legally possible until such claim was provided for by the petitioningparties. This contention goes upon the assumption that a partition under thesections of the Code of Civil Procedure so often referred to is void unless everydebt is paid or provided for by the petitioning parties, and may therefore beentirelydisregardedbythecreditorholdingaclaimeitherunpaidorprovidedfor.Wedonotbelieve that this assumption iswarranted. In the first place,wemustrememberthatthepartitionproceedingsinquestionareproceedingsoutofcourt.Consequently there is no prescribedmethod of ascertaining and settling claims.Theappointmentofcommissioners, thepublicationofnotice tocreditors,andallthe other proceedings necessary in cases of administration in court are notrequiredinpartitionoutofcourt.Thelawissilentastohowtheclaimsaretobeascertained, presented and determined. We must assume, therefore, that themethodof ascertaining themand determining their validitywas left to the goodsenseandsoundjudgmentofthepersonsconcerned.In the second place, it must be on served that express provisions is made bysections596and597forthepaymentofaclaimdiscoveredbythemorpresentedafterthepartition.Thatisoneofthemainprovisions.It isanecessarydeduction,therefore,thatitwasnottheintentionofthelawtopronouncethepartitionvoidofnoeffectsimplybecausenotallofthedebtswerepaidbeforethepartitionwasmade.Thefactofnonpaymentcannot,then,becausebythecreditorasareasonfor attacking the partition directly; that is, by asserting that, inasmuch as apayment of all the debts is a condition precedent to the right of partition, suchpartitioncannotlegallyandvalidlytakeplacewhileadebtisoutstanding.Whileapartitionmanifestly fraudulent in inceptionand resultmightpossiblybeattackeddirectlybyanactiontosetaside,aquestionwhichwedonotdiscussordecide,themanner of attacking the partition prescribed by the law is the one, generallyspeaking, preferably to be followed; and that is to throw into administration somuch of the estate as is necessary to pay the outstanding claim. The method,thoughindirect,accomplishesabetterresultthanadirectattack.43 PEREIRAV.COURTOFAPPEALS

174SCRA154(1939)FACTS:PereirawasanemployeeofPALuntilhedied. hewassurvivedbyhiswidowandsister. His sister then filed a petition for letters of administration of his estate.Notwithstandingopposition fromthewidow,shewasappointedasadministratix.Itwasthepetitioner’scontentionthatjudicialadministrationisunnecessarygiventherewasnoestateleftbythehusbandandthatnodebtsarepayable.HELD:Thegeneralrule isthatwhenapersondies leavingproperty,thesameshouldbejudicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualifiedadministrator, intheorderestablishedinSection6,Rule78, incasethedeceasedleftnowill,orincasehehadleftone,shouldhefailtonameanexecutortherein.An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under thisexception,whenalltheheirsareoflawfulageandtherearenodebtsduefromtheestate,theymayagree inwritingtopartitionthepropertywithout institutingthejudicialadministrationorapplyingfortheappointmentofanadministrator.Section1,Rule74of theRevisedRulesofCourt,however,doesnotprecludetheheirsfrominstitutingadministrationproceedings,eveniftheestatehasnodebtsorobligations, if theydonotdesiretoresort forgoodreasonstoanordinaryactionfor partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate amongthemselvesastheymayseefit,ortoresorttoanordinaryactionforpartition,thesaidprovisiondoesnotcompelthemtodosoiftheyhavegoodreasonstotakeadifferent course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administrationproceedingeveniftheestatehasnodebtsissanctionedonlyiftheheirshavegoodreasons for not resorting to an action for partition.Where partition is possible,eitherinoroutofcourt,theestateshouldnotbeburdenedwithanadministrationproceedingwithoutgoodandcompellingreasons.Thus,ithasbeenrepeatedlyheldthatwhenapersondieswithoutleavingpendingobligationstobepaid,hisheirs,whetherofageornot,arenotboundtosubmitthepropertytoajudicialadministration,whichisalwayslongandcostly,ortoapplyfortheappointmentofanadministratorbytheCourt.Ithasbeenuniformlyheldthatin such case the judicial administration and the appointmentof an administratoraresuperfluousandunnecessaryproceedings.



Now,what constitutes "good reason" towarrant a judicial administration of theestateofadeceasedwhentheheirsarealloflegalageandtherearenocreditorswilldependonthecircumstancesofeachcase.44 JEREZV.NIETES

30SCRA905(1969)FACTS:When Nietes died, his widowwas appointed as administratix of his estate. Shesubmitteddulyaprojectofpartitionandaccountingandwasdulyapprovedbytheorder of the court. upon closing of the intestate proceedings, here came theillegitimatechildrenofthedeceasedallegingthatthepartitionwascontrarytolawastheyweredeprivedoftheirrespectiveshares.Uponthismereunsubstantiatedmotion,thetrialcourtjudgereopenedtheproceedingshastily.HELD:Wedosonowanddefinitelyholdthatratherthanrequireanypartywhocanallegeagrievancethathisinterestwasnotrecognizedinatestateorintestateproceedingtofileaseparateandindependentaction,hemaywithinthereglementaryperiodsecurethereliefthatishisduebyareopeningofthecaseevenafteraprojectofpartitionandfinalaccountinghadbeenapproved.It is indisputable that after the project of partition and final accounting wassubmittedby the counsel forpetitioner Lucrecia Jerez, as administratrix, on June14, 1966, respondent Judge approved the same and declared closed andterminatedthe intestacythenextday, June15,1966.Subsequently,onaverifiedpetition by private respondents, filed on June 29, 1966, based on the assertionmadethat theyshouldhavehadashare in theestateas illegitimatechildrenbutthat they were omitted in the aforesaid project of partition, they sought to beallowed to intervene and "to have the project of partition rejected for beingcontrarytolaw."Suchapleading,withoutmore,resultedinthequestionedorderofJuly30,1966,reopeningtheproceedingsandreconsideringtheapprovaloftheproject of partition and final accounting, to enable the private respondents "topresentwhateverevidencetheymayhavetoshowtheirrighttoparticipateintheestate of the deceased." Although the recognition of their right to interveneappearedtobetentativeandconditional,itcannotbedeniedthattheyweregivenastandingsufficienttosetasidetheprojectofpartition.

Respondent Judge acted too soon. The verified motion on the part of privaterespondents did not suffice to call into play the power of respondent Judge toallowintervention.Theremustbeproofbeyondallegationsinsuchmotiontoshowthe interest of the privatemovants. In the absence thereof, the action taken byrespondentJudgecouldbeconsideredpremature.

RULE75PRODUCTIONOFWILL.ALLOWANCEOFWILLNECESSARY

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. No will shall passeitherrealorpersonalestateunlessitisprovedandallowedinthepropercourt.Subjecttotherightofappeal,suchallowanceofthewillshallbeconclusiveastoitsdueexecution.WILL,DEFINED.

• Anactwherebyapersonispermitted,withtheformalitiesprescribedbylaw, to control toa certaindegree thedispositionofhisestate, to takeeffectafterhisdeath.

Section2.Custodianofwilltodeliver.Thepersonwhohascustodyofawillshall,withintwenty(20)daysafterheknowsofthedeathofthetestator,deliverthewilltothecourthavingjurisdiction,ortotheexecutornamedinthewill.Section3.Executortopresentwillandacceptorrefusetrust.Apersonnamedasexecutor inawill shall,within twenty (20)daysafterheknowsof thedeathofthetestate,orwithintwenty(20)daysafterheknowsthatheisnamedexecutorifheobtainedsuchknowledgeafterthedeathofthetestator,presentsuchwilltothecourthavingjurisdiction,unlessthewillhasreachedthecourtinanyothermanner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing hisacceptanceofthetrustorhisrefusaltoacceptit.Section 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect. A person whoneglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections withoutexcused satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousandpesos.Section5.Personretainingwillmaybecommitted.Apersonhavingcustodyofawill after the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to



deliverthesame,whenorderedsotodo,tothecourthavingjurisdiction,maybecommittedtoprisonandtherekeptuntilhedeliversthewill.

RULE76ALLOWANCEORDISALLOWANCEOFWILL

DEFINITIONOFPROBATE

• Probateisaspecialproceedingforestablishingthevalidityofawill• It seeks to prove that instrument submitted is thewill of the testator,

that it was executed according to the formalities required by law, andthatthetestatorhadthetestamentarycapacityatthetimeofexecution

KINDSOFPROBATEPROCEEDINGS

1. Post‐mortem where the proceedings are held after the death of thetestator

2. Ante‐mortemwhere the testator tests thevalidityofhiswillbefore theprobatecourtduringhislifetime

ADVANTAGESOFANTE‐MORTEMPROCEEDINGS

1. Fraud, intimidation, and undue influence are minimized because thecourtswillhaveaneasiertimedeterminingthementalconditionofalivetestatorthanadeadone

2. If the will doesn't comply with the requirements of law, it can becorrectedimmediately

3. Ifprobatedduringthelifetimeofthetestator,theonlyquestionleftafterthetestator’sdeathwouldbetheintrinsicvalidityofthedispositions

QUESTIONSTOBEDETERMINEDBYTHEPROBATECOURT

1. Questionofidentityofthewill2. Questionofthedueexecutionofthewill inaccordancewithformalities

requiredbylaw3. Questionoftestamentarycapacity

NECESSITYFORPROBATE

• Certainsafeguardsmustbeinplacetopreventforgeryandotheractsofunscrupulousindividualsandatthesametime,toinsurethatthetestatorunderstoodandmeantwhatheplacedinthewill

NATUREOFAPROBATEPROCEEDING• KindofspecialproceedingsanctionedundertheRulesofCourt• It isaproceeding inrem, it isbindingonallpersons in interestwhether

theyappeartocontesttheprobateornot• Theadmissionofwilltoprobatehasalltheeffectsofajudgment,andis

entitledtogoodfaithandcreditinothercourtsNATUREOFPROBATEORDERS

• Whenaprobateorderhasbeen issuedandno timely appealwas filed,theorderbecomesfinalandbindinguponthewholeworld

• Upon such finality, the case can no longer be opened for petition forannulmentofthewill

PURPOSEOFPROBATEPROCEEDINGS

• Probatecourtshavelimitedjurisdiction• Mainpurposeoftheproceedingsistodeterminethefollowing—

o Identityofthewillo Testamentarycapacityofthetestatoro Compliance of the will itself with the formalities required by

law• Once these three thingshavebeenestablished, then the court issues a

probateorder• Theprobateorderthenhaslimitedjurisdictiontodeterminewhatmayor

maynotbeincludedintheinventoryofthetestator’sestate• Theissueofownershipisdeterminedprovisionallybytheprobatecourt

inordertogiveeffecttothewillWHENJURISDICTIONVEST

• Uponfilingofpetitionforprobate



Section1.Whomaypetitionfortheallowanceofwill.Anyexecutor,devisee,orlegateenamedinawill,oranyotherpersoninterestedintheestate,may,atanytimeafterthedeathofthetestator,petitionthecourthavingjurisdictiontohavethe will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost ordestroyed.Thetestatorhimselfmay,duringhislifetime,petitionthecourtfortheallowanceofhiswill.WHOMAYFILEAPETITIONFORPROBATEOFAWILL

1. Testatorduringanante‐mortemprobate2. Legateesordevisees3. Heirs4. Anyotherpersoninterestedintheestate

ANYDEFECT IN THEPETITION SHALLNOTRENDERTHEDISALLOWANCEOF THEWILL

• The rules provide that no defect in the petition shall render void theallowance of the will, or the issuance of letters testamentary or ofadministrationwiththewillannexed

• Ifthereisanydefect,thenthecourtwouldjustorderthepartiestomakethenecessaryamendments

Section2.Contentsofpetition.Apetitionfortheallowanceofawillmustshow,sofarasknowntothepetitioner:(a)Thejurisdictionalfacts;(b) Thenames, ages, and residencesof theheirs, legatees, anddeviseesof thetestatorordecedent;(c)Theprobablevalueandcharacterofthepropertyoftheestate;(d)Thenameofthepersonforwhomlettersareprayed;(e)Ifthewillhasnotbeendeliveredtothecourt,thenameofthepersonhavingcustodyofit.



Butnodefect in thepetition shall rendervoid theallowanceof thewill,or theissuanceofletterstestamentaryorofadministrationwiththewillannexed.PETITIONFORPROBATECONTAINSTHEFOLLOWING

1. Thejurisdictionalfacts;2. Thenames,ages,and residencesof theheirs, legatees,anddeviseesof

thetestatorordecedent;3. Theprobablevalueandcharacterofthepropertyoftheestate;4. Thenameofthepersonforwhomlettersareprayed;5. If thewill hasnotbeendelivered to the court, thenameof theperson

havingcustodyofit.Section3.Courttoappointtimeforprovingwill.Noticethereoftobepublished.Whenawillisdeliveredto,orapetitionfortheallowanceofawillisfiledin,thecourthavingjurisdiction,suchcourtshallfixatimeandplaceforprovingthewillwhenallconcernedmayappeartocontesttheallowancethereof,andshallcausenotice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively,previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in theprovince.Butnonewspaperpublicationshallbemadewherethepetitionforprobatehasbeenfiledbythetestatorhimself.Section 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail orpersonally.Thecourtshallalsocausecopiesofthenoticeofthetimeandplacefixedforprovingthewilltobeaddressedtothedesignatedorotherknownheirs,legatees,anddeviseesofthetestatorresidentinthePhilippinesattheirplacesofresidence,anddeposited inthepostofficewiththepostagethereonprepaidatleasttwenty(20)daysbeforethehearing,ifsuchplacesofresidencebeknown.Acopy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named asexecutor,ifhebenotthepetitioner;also,toanypersonnamedascoexecutornotpetitioning, if their placesof residencebe known.Personal serviceof copiesofthe notice at lest (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent tomailing.Ifthetestatorasksfortheallowanceofhisownwill,noticeshallbesentonlytohiscompulsoryheirs.

Section5.Proofathearing.Whatsufficientinabsenceofcontest.Atthehearingcompliancewiththeprovisionsofthelasttwoprecedingsectionsmustbeshownbefore the introduction of testimony in support of thewill. All such testimonyshallbetakenunderoathandreducedtowriting.Itnopersonappearstocontestthe allowance of the will, the court may grant allowance thereof on thetestimonyofoneofthesubscribingwitnessesonly,ifsuchwitnesstestifythatthewillwasexecutedasisrequiredbylaw.In the caseofaholographicwill, it shallbenecessary thatat leastonewitnesswhoknowsthehandwritingandsignatureof thetestatorexplicitlydeclarethatthewillandthesignatureareinthehandwritingofthetestator.Intheabsenceofanysuchcompetentwitness,andifthecourtdeemitnecessary,experttestimonymayberesortedto.IFTHENOTARIALWILL ISUNCONTESTED,HOWMANYSUBSCRIBINGWITNESSESARENEEDEDTOTESTIFY?

• Onlyonesubscribingwitnessmaytestifyifthewillisuncontested• Ifthewilliscontested,allsubscribingwitnessesmusttestify

WITHRESPECTTOHOLOGRAPHICWILLS,HOWMANYWITNESSESMUSTTESTIFY?

• At least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of thetestator explicitly declaring that the will and signature are in thehandwritingofthetestator

• In the absenceof such competentwitness and/or if the court deems itnecessary,experttestimonymayberesortedto

Section6.Proofof lostordestroyedwill.Certificatethereupon. Nowillshallbeprovedasa lostordestroyedwillunlesstheexecutionandvalidityofthesamebeestablished,andthewillisprovedtohavebeeninexistenceatthetimeofthedeath of the testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentallydestroyed in the lifetime of the testatorwithout his knowledge, nor unless itsprovisionsareclearlyanddistinctlyprovedbyatleasttwo(2)crediblewitnesses.Whena lostwill isproved, theprovisions thereofmustbedistinctly statedandcertified by the judge, under the seal of the court, and the certificatemust befiledandrecordedasotherwillsarefiledandrecorded.Section 7. Proofwhenwitnesses do not reside in province. If it appears at thetime fixed for thehearing thatnoneof the subscribingwitnesses resides in theprovince,butthatthedepositionofoneormoreofthemcanbetakenelsewhere,



the court may, on motion, direct it to be taken, and may authorize aphotographiccopyofthewilltobemadeandtobepresentedtothewitnessonhisexamination,whomaybeaskedthesamequestionswithrespecttoit,andtothehandwritingofthetestatorandothers,aswouldbepertinentandcompetentiftheoriginalwillwerepresent.Section8.ProofwhenwitnessesdeadorinsaneordonotresideinthePhilippines.Iftheappearsatthetimefixedforthehearingthatthesubscribingwitnessesaredead or insane, or thatnone of them resides in the Philippines, the courtmayadmit thetestimonyofotherwitnessestoprovethesanityof thetestator,andthedueexecutionofthewill;andasevidenceoftheexecutionofthewill,itmayadmitproofofthehandwritingofthetestatorandofthesubscribingwitnesses,orofanyofthem.STAGESOFAPROBATEPROCEEDING

1. Probate proper where the court determines the existence oftestamentarycapacity,dueexecutionandidentityofthewill

2. Thecourtshallthenissueanorderallowingthewill3. Second stage is the distribution, where for the purposes of judicial

orderliness,thewillmustbeenforcedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof the will so long as the will doesn't violate the law, especially theprovisionsonlegitimeandthequalificationsofthebeneficiarytosucceed

Section9.Groundsfordisallowingwill.Thewillshallbedisallowedinanyofthefollowingcases:(a)Ifnotexecutedandattestedasrequiredbylaw;(b)Ifthetestatorwasinsane,orotherwisementallyincapabletomakeawill,atthetimeofitsexecution;(c)Ifitwasexecutedunderduress,ortheinfluenceoffear,orthreats;(d)Ifitwasprocuredbyundueandimproperpressureandinfluence,onthepartofthebeneficiary,orofsomeotherpersonforhisbenefit;(e)Ifthesignatureofthetestatorwasprocuredbyfraudortrick,andhedidnotintend that the instrument shouldbehiswill at the timeof fixinghis signaturethereto.

GROUNDSFORDISALLOWANCE1. Non‐compliance2. Insanityormentallyincapable3. Duressorfear4. Undueinfluence5. Fraud

Section10.Contestant to filegroundsof contest. Anyoneappearing to contestthewillmuststateinwritinghisgroundsforopposingitsallowance,andserveacopythereofonthepetitionerandotherpartiesinterestedintheestate.Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where willcontested.Ifthewilliscontested,allthesubscribingwitnesses,andthenotaryinthecaseofwillsexecutedundertheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,ifpresentinthePhilippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death,absence,orinsanityofanyofthemmustbesatisfactorilyshowntothecourt.Ifall or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside theprovincewherethewillhasbeenfiled,theirdepositionmustbetaken.Ifanyorall of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not rememberhaving attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will maynevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of otherwitnesses and from all the evidence presented that thewillwas executed andattestedinthemannerrequiredbylaw.Ifaholographicwill iscontested, thesameshallbeallowed ifat least three (3)witnesseswho know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that thewill and the signatureare in thehandwritingof the testator; in theabsenceofany competentwitnesses,and if the courtdeem itnecessary,expert testimonymayberesortedto.Section 12. Proof where testator petitions for allowance of holographic will.Wherethetestatorhimselfpetitionsfortheprobateofhisholographicwillandno contest is filed, the fact that the affirms that the holographic will and thesignature are in his own handwriting, shall be sufficient evidence of thegenuinenessanddueexecutionthereof. Iftheholographicwill iscontested,theburdenofdisprovingthegenuinenessanddueexecutionthereofshallbeonthecontestant.Thetestatortorebuttheevidenceforthecontestant.



Section13.Certificateofallowanceattachedtoprovewill.ToberecordedintheOfficeofRegisterofDeeds. If thecourt is satisfied,uponproof takenand filed,thatthewillwasdulyexecuted,andthatthetestatoratthetimeofitsexecutionwas of sound and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace, andundueinfluence,orfraud,acertificateofitsallowance,signedbythejudge,andattestedby the seal of the court shall be attached to thewill and thewill andcertificatefiledandrecordedbytheclerk.Attestedcopiesofthewilldevisingrealestateandofcertificateofallowancethereof,shallberecordedintheregisterofdeedsoftheprovinceinwhichthelandslie.45 FERNANDEZV.DIMAGIBA 21SCRA428FACTS:Dimagiba submitted a petition for probate of the will of the late delos Reyes,institutingtheformerasthesoleheir.OppositionwaslaterenteredbyFernandezand others. They alleged themselves to be intestate heirs and they oppose theprobate on grounds of forgery amongst others. They were overruled and theprobatewasallowed. Theylater introduceevidencethatthewillwasrevokedbyallegeddeedsofsaleexecutedallegedlybythetestatrixbutagain,theprobatewasupheld.Theytriedtoappealthedecisionofthetrialcourtbuttheappellatecourtheldthattheprobatehadbecomefinalduetolackofopportuneappealfromtheoppositors.HELD:Astothefirstpoint,oppositors‐appellantscontendthattheorderallowingthewilltoprobateshouldbeconsideredinterlocutory,becauseitfailstoresolvetheissuesofestoppelandrevocationpropoundedintheiropposition.Theappellant'sstandisuntenable.Itiselementarythataprobatedecreefinallyanddefinitivelysettlesallquestions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution andwitnessingofhislastwillandtestament,irrespectiveofwhetheritsprovisionsarevalid and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final andappealable;andit issorecognizedbyexpressprovisionsofSection1ofRule109,that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in specialproceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a)allowsordisallowsawill."46 MERCADOV.SANTOS 66SCRA215

FACTS:Mercadosoughttheprobateofthewillofhislatewife.Thewillwasdulyprobatedandfiveyearsaftersaidproceedings,thefiveintervenorsfiledforthereopeningoftheproceedings.Theirmotionwasdenied.Thereafter,theyfiledonfourdifferentinstances the same complaint for alleged forgery and falsification employed byMercado.ThispromptedMercadotobeimprisonedandhadtofileforbailseveraltimes.Hethenfiledforinjunctionwiththeappellatecourt.HELD:The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is usuallyconsideredasconclusiveastoitsdueexecutionandvalidity,andisalsoconclusivethatthetestatorwasofsoundanddisposingmindatthetimewhenheexecutedthewill,andwasnotactingunderduress,menace,fraud,orundueinfluence,andthatthewillisgenuineandnotaforgery.The probate of awill in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision ofnotice by Publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructivenoticetothewholeworld,andwhenprobateisgranted,thejudgmentofthecourtisbindinguponeverybody,evenagainsttheState.47 SUMILANGV.RAMAGOSA 21SCRA1369FACTS:Sumilang filedapetition for theprobateof thedecedentRamagosa,wherein theformer was the sole heir to the estate. The probate was opposed by therespondentsallegingthatthewillwasmadeunderduressandnotintendedtobethe decedent’s last will and testament. When the petitioner finished adducingevidenceonhis behalf, theoppositorsdidn’t adduce their ownbut instead, theymovedforthedismissaloftheprobateproceedings,allegingthatthecourtdidn’thavejurisdictionasthewillwasallegedlyrevokedbylawwhenthedecedentsoldtheparcelsof land,subjectofthewill, topetitioners. Themotionwasdeniedonthegroundthatitgoesintotheintrinsicvalueofthewill,whichtheprobatecourtdoesn’thavejurisdictiontosettle.HELD:The petition below being for the probate of awill, the court's area of inquiry islimited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and



thecompliancewiththeformalrequisitesorsolemnitiesprescribedbylawaretheonly questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into theintrinsicvalidityorefficacyoftheprovisionsofthewillorthelegalityofanydeviseorlegacyispremature.Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss petition for probate on thegroundthatthetestatorhadimpliedlyrevokedhiswillbyselling,priortohisdeath,thelandsdisposedoftherein.True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition forprobate.Probateisonethingthevalidityofthetestamentaryprovisionsisanother.Thefirstdecidestheexecutionofthedocumentandthetestamentarycapacityofthetestator;thesecondrelatestodescentanddistribution.48 BALANAYV.MARTINEZ 64SCRA452FACTS:BalanayJr.filedapetitionfortheprobateofthewillofhislatemother,whichwasopposedbyhisfatherandsiblings.Thefatherclaimstohavebeenpreteritedandthat there was an illegal partition of the conjugal properties. Balanay Jr. thenpresenteddocumentsallegedlyexecutedbythefatherwithdrawinganyoppositionto the probate proceedings aswell as the renunciation ofwhatever share in theestate of his late wife. The opposition was then overruled by the court andproceedingscontinued. However,duringtheproceedings,onewhowasallegedlyBalanay’snewcounselfiledamotionforthedismissaloftheprobateproceedingsonthegroundthatthewillisvoidforillegallypartitioningtheconjugalassetsandconstitutedacompromiseonfuturelegitime.Themotionincludedthatthetestateproceedings should be dismissed and replacedwith an intestate one. The courtsustainedthemotionanddismissedtheproceedings.BalanayJr.thenaverredthathe didn’t authorized Montinolla to file the same motion and that the courtshouldn’tdismisstheproceedings. Thetrialcourtheldthatitdidn’tdecidesolelyonthebasisofthemotionfiledbutduetothereadingoftheprovisionsofthewillitself.HELD:Inviewofcertainunusualprovisionsofthewill,whichareofdubiouslegality,andbecauseofthemotiontowithdrawthepetitionforprobate(whichthelowercourtassumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court

acted correctly in passing upon thewill's intrinsic validity even before its formalvalidityhadbeenestablished.Theprobateofawillmightbecomeanidleceremonyif on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerationsdemand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it isprobated,thecourtshouldmeettheissue.It waswrong however for the probate court to convert the proceedings into anintestate one. The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositionscontainedinawilldoesnotresultintheinvalidityoftheotherdispositions,unlessitistobepresumedthatthetestatorwouldnothavemadesuchotherdispositionsif the first invalid disposition had not beenmade" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Wheresomeoftheprovisionsofawillarevalidandothersinvalid,thevalidpartswillbeupheldiftheycanbeseparatedfromtheinvalidwithoutdefeatingtheintentionofthetestatororinterferingwiththegeneraltestamentaryscheme,ordoinginjusticetothebeneficiaries"49 PASTORV.COURTOFAPPEALS 122SCRA885FACTS:Pastor Sr. died and was survived by his wife, who later also died, 2 legitimatechildren—Pastor Jr., and Sofia, and one illegitimate child Quemada Pastor Jr.QuemadaPastorJr.soughttheprobateoftheallegedholographicwillofhisfather.The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor ofQUEMADAconsistingof30%ofPASTOR,SR.'s42%shareintheoperationbyAtlasConsolidatedMiningandDevelopmentCorporation(ATLAS)ofsomeminingclaimsinCebu.Hewassubsequentlyappointedasthespecialadministratoroftheestateand by purview of this authority, he instituted actions against Pastor Jr. for thereconveyance of some properties of the estate, which covers the legacybequeathed to Quemada. This was opposed by Pastor Jr. and his wife but wasoverruled.ProbateproceedingscommencedandQuemadakeptonaskingforthepaymentofhislegacies.Whilethereconveyancesuitwasstillpending,thePROBATECOURTissuedthenowassailedOrderofExecutionandGarnishment,resolvingthequestionofownershipoftheroyaltiespayablebyATLASandrulingineffectthatthelegacytoQUEMADAwasnotinofficious.



TheorderfoundthataspertheholographicwillandawrittenacknowledgmentofPastor, Jr.oftheabove60%interest intheminingclaimsbelongingtothePastorGroup, 42% belonged to Pastor, Sr. and only 33% belonged to Pastor, Jr. Theremaining25%belongedtoE.Pelaez,alsoofthePastorGroup.TheprobatecourtthusdirectedATLAStoremitdirectlytoQuemadathe42%royaltiesduedecedent'sestate,ofwhichQuemadawasauthorizedtoretain75%forhimselfaslegateeandtodeposit25%withareputablebankinginstitutionforpaymentoftheestatetaxesand other obligations of the estate. The 33% share of PASTOR, JR. and/or hisassignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy ofQuemadafromthetimeofPastor,Sr.'sdeath,whichamountedtoovertwomillionpesos.Theorderbeing"immediatelyexecutory",QuemadasucceededinobtainingaWritofExecutionandGarnishment.PastorJr.soughtreconsideration.HELD:Inaspecialproceedingfortheprobateofawill,theissuebyandlargeisrestrictedtotheextrinsicvalidityofthewill,i.e.,whetherthetestator,beingofsoundmind,freelyexecutedthewill inaccordancewiththeformalitiesprescribedbylaw.Asarule, thequestionofownership isanextraneousmatterwhichtheProbateCourtcannotresolvewithfinality.Thus,forthepurposeofdeterminingwhetheracertainpropertyshouldorshouldnotbeincludedintheinventoryofestateproperties,theProbate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination isprovisional,notconclusive,andissubjecttothefinaldecisioninaseparateactiontoresolvetitle.Nowhere in thedispositiveportion is thereadeclarationofownershipof specificproperties.Onthecontrary,itismanifestthereinthatownershipwasnotresolved.For itconfined itself to thequestionofextrinsicvalidityof thewin,andtheneedfor and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed andapproved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the samehaving been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnitiesprescribedbylaw."Itdeclaredthattheintestateestateadministrationaspectmustproceed" subject to theoutcomeof thesuit for reconveyanceofownershipandpossessionofrealandpersonalproperties inCivilCase274‐TbeforeBranch IXoftheCFIofCebu."Thenagain,theProbateOrder(whileindeeditdoesnotdirecttheimplementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestateadministrationaspectmustproceed"unless... it isproven...thatthelegacytobegivenanddelivered to thepetitionerdoesnotexceed the freeportionof the

estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment oflegitime(anaspectofintrinsicvalidity)wasinfactnotresolved.Finally,theProbateOrder did not rule on the propriety of allowing Quemada to remain as specialadministratorofestatepropertiesnotcoveredbytheholographicwill,"consideringthatthis(Probate)Ordershouldhavebeenproperlyissuedsolelyasaresolutionontheissueofwhetherornottoallowandapprovetheaforestatedwill."Itwas,therefore,errorfortheassailedimplementingOrderstoconcludethattheProbate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the miningproperties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositiveportion of the said Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay thelegacyindispute.With respect to the intrinsic validity of the will, there was no appropriatedetermination,much less payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate.Norhad theestate taxbeendeterminedandpaid,orat leastprovided for, asofDecember 5, 1972. The net assets of the estate not having been determined,therefore, the legitime of the forced heirs in concrete figures could not beascertained. All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible todeterminewhether the legacy ofQuemada ‐ a fixed share in a specific propertyrather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of the deceased ‐ wouldproduceanimpairmentofthelegitimeofthecompulsoryheirs.Finally, there actuallywas no determination of the intrinsic validity of thewill inotherrespects.ItwasobviouslyforthisreasonthataslateasMarch5,1980‐morethan7yearsafter theProbateOrderwas issued theProbateCourt scheduledonMarch25,1980ahearingontheintrinsicvalidityofthewill.50 USV.CHIUGUIMOO 36PHIL917FACTS:Joaquin Cruz was a wealthy Chinese merchant who resided permanently in acertainmunicipality.WhenhevisitedChina,hemarriedUyChuanandhadachildwithher. Whenhe returned,he thenmetMariawhohealsomarried. He thendecidedtoreturntoChinabuthewasn’tabletocomebackashedied.Beforehisdeath, he executed a will which named his brother, defendant in this case, andanother person as heir. The brother filed a petition for the probate but didn’tproducethewill.HethennegotiatedwithMariafortherenunciationofhershare



intheestateinexchangeformoney.Thereafter,criminalactionwasfiledagainstdefendant for refusing to produce thewill of his deceased brother aswell as todistributetheestate.HELD:The judge of first instance believed that he had authority to give the notice andmaketheorderinquestionundersection629oftheCodeofCivilProcedurewhichprovidesthetestatorneglectswithoutreasonablecausetodeliverthesametothecourthavingjurisdiction,afternoticebythecoursesotodo,hemaybecommittedto theprisonof theprovincebyawarrant issuedby the court and there kept incloseconfinementuntilhedeliversthewill.Itisouropinionthatthisprovisioncanonlybeappliedwhenacourtisactingintheexercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceasedpersons;andwhereadministrationproceedingsarenotalreadypending,thecourt,beforetakingactionunderthissection,shouldrequirethattherebebeforeitsomepetition,information,oraffidavitofsuchcharacterastomakeactionbythecourtunderthissectionappropriate.Theproceedingsinthiscase,undersection628oftheCodeoftheCivilProcedure,is an ordinary criminal prosecution. The act penalized in that section (628) is aspecialstatutoryoffenseandisproperlyprosecuteduponcomplaintorinformationas other criminal offenses created by law. The fact that this penal provision iscontainedintheCodeofCivilProceduredoesnotmaketheproceedingtoenforcethepenaltyacivilproceedinginanysense.Theremedyprovidedinsection629ofthe Codeof Procedure is evidently a totally different remedy, having no relationwith that provided in section 628; and it is in our opinion not permissible in aprosecutionunderthelastmentionedsectiontosuperimposeuponthepenaltyoffine therein prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed insection629.Imayfurtherbeobservedthatonegracedifficultyinapplyingtheremedyprovidedinsection629inaprosecutionundersection628isthattoenforcetheproductionofthewillbtheaccusedatsuchtrialwouldvirtuallycompelhimtoconvicthimself,since the mere production of the will by him would be conclusive that he hadpossessionof it as charged in thecriminal complaint;and it seemsprobable thatthiswouldconstituteaninfringementofthatprovisionoflawwhichsaysthatinacriminalactionthedefendantshallbeexemptfromtestifyingagainsthimself.(SeeGen.OrdersNo.58,sec.15.)

Fromwhat has been said it follows that the order of commitmentmade by thelower court remanding the accused to jail should be vacated and if subsidiaryimprisonment should be imposed for insolvency the defendant shall, under theprovisionsofActNo.2557,becreditedwiththetimeduringwhichhewasconfinedinpursuanceoftheorderofthelowercourt,Withthismodificationthejudgmentofthecourtbelowshouldbeaffirmedwithcostsagainsttheappellant.51 RODRIGUEZV.DEBORJA 17SCRA418FACTS:AfterthedeathofFr.Rodriguez,apurportedwillofhiswassubmittedforprobate.Maria and Angela Rodriguez sought the examination of the will but later onwithdrawnthesame.Instead,theyfiledforthesettlementoftheintestateestateof Fr.Rodriguez,alleging therein that thedecedentdidn't leaveanywill. Oneoftheirallegationsisthattheiractionprecludedtheprobateproceedingsintheothercourt. The same parties, petitioners herein, sought the dismissal of the probateproceedings,butwasdenied.HELD:Intestatesuccessionisonlysubordinateorsubsidiarytothetestate,sinceintestacyonlytakesplaceintheabsenceofavalidoperativewill.Thus,followingthesameprinciple, it is onlywhen the testate succession is invalidated could an intestatesuccessionbeinstitutedintheformofpre‐establishedaction.52 TEOTICOV.DELVAL 13SCRA406FACTS:Aguirrediedandleftawill,whichprovidedamongothersalegacyinfavorofReneTeotico,thehusbandofherniece.ThewillwassubmittedforprobatebyVicenteTeoticobutwasopposedagainstbytheadoptedchildofAguirre’ssister. OneoftheallegationswasthatthelegacytoTeoticowasvoidonthegroundthatTeoticowasthephysicianwhoadministeredmedicalattentiontoAguirrebeforeherdeath.Vicente in turn filed amotion to dismiss the opposition on the ground that shedoesn’thaveanylegalpersonalitytointervene.Intheendoftheproceedings,thewill’svaliditywassustainedbytheprobatecourtbutthelegacywasheldvoid.Thepetitionersoughtreconsiderationofthedecisiontonullifythelegacy.



HELD:Questiononthelegalpersonalityofoppositortointervene…Beforeapersonmayinterveneinestateproceedings,heshouldhaveaninterestintheestate,orinhiswill,orinthepropertytobeaffectedbyiteitherasanexecutororasaclaimantoftheestate,andaninterestedpartyhasbeendefinedasonewhowouldbebenefitedbytheestatelikeacreditor.Whereunderthewill’sterms,anoppositorhasnointerest intheestateeitherasan heir, executor or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any propertyaffectedbythewill,norwouldsheacquireanyinterestinanyportionoftheestateasalegalheirifthewillweredeniedprobate,itisheldthatsaidoppositorcannotintervene.Questiononintrinsicvalidityofthewill…OppositiontotheintrinsicvalidityorlegalityoftheprovisionsofthewillcannotbeentertainedinProbateproceedingbecauseitsonlypurposeismerelytodetermineifthewillhasbeenexecutedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofthelaw."PursuanttotheforegoingprecedentsthepronouncementmadebythecourtaquodeclaringinvalidthelegacymadetoDr.ReneTeoticointhewillExhibitAmustbesetasideashavingbeenmadeinexcessofitsjurisdiction.Anotherreasonwhysaidpronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given anopportunitytodefendthevalidityofthelegacyforhewasnotallowedtointervenein this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on thedispositionoftheestateinfavorofsomerelativesofthedeceasedshouldalsobesetasideforthesamereason.53 FERNANDOV.CRISOSTOMO 90SCRA585FACTS:FernandowastheguardianofRufinoSr.andhischildren.Whenthefatherdied,hebecametheguardianof thechildren. He then filedamotion for theapprovalofthe extrajudicial partition of the estate of spouses Rufino Crisostomo and PetraFernando.Theguardianadlitemopposedthisandwassustainedbythetrialcourt.ApetitionwasthenfiledforthereopeningoftheintestateproceedingsbyGerman

Crisostomo. A corresponding prayer for the appointment of an additionaladministratoroftheestate.ThiswasopposedbytheFernandoandinsteadmovedfor thedismissal of the intestateproceedingson theground thathealreadyhadpossessionofthepropertyinfavorofthechildren.HELD:ItwillbeseenfromtheabovethattheprincipalissueinthiscaseastowhethertheintestateproceedingsshouldbedismissedhasalreadybeendecidedbythisCourtinthecertiorariproceedingsasfarbackasJuly2,1948,withtheexceptionthatiftherehadbeenerrorscommitted in theappointmentof theguardian (not in theinstitution of the intestate proceedings, which had been declared within thejurisdictionof thecourt) thoseerrors in theappointmentmaybecorrected inanappeal.Afterexaminingtherecord,wedonotseeanyerrorintheappointmentofGerman Crisostomo and Pacita Fernando as co‐administrators as they were thebrother and sister, respectively, of the deceased, no evidence having beenpresentedbytheappellantwhythosepersonsshouldnotbeappointed,eitheronaccountoftheirincompetencyorlackofmoralqualifications.We,therefore,affirmtheorderofthecourtappointingthem.Itshouldbeborne inmindthattheaboveresolutionsof thisCourtconstitute resjudicataand"thelawofthecase"withregardtothisappealandtheycannolongerbequestionedorputinissueinthepresentcase.Itresultsthen,thattheclaimoftheappellantthattheintestateproceedingsshouldbedismissedhastobedeniedand, as all the other questions are dependent on said issue, they should also bedecidedadverselytotheappellant.54 ARAUJOV.CELIS 6PHIL459FACTS:Rosario Araujo owned property inherited from her late mother. She wed thedefendant’sson.Shediedwithnodescendantsandascendantsbutonlycollateralrelatives. These relativeswanted the properties in question be delivered by thefatherofRosario’shusbandas theywereallegedly the survivingheirsofRosario.GregorioCelisasamatterofdefensedidn’tdenythepossessionofthepropertiesbutallegedthathewasentitledtothesame.HeallegedlyinheritedthesamefromhislatesonwhointurninheritedthepropertyfromRosario.HELD:



Asthecourtbelowproperlyfound,theonlyimportantanddecisivequestioninthiscase iswhetherornotRosarioDarwinexecuteda legalandvalidwill in the formandmannerallegedby thedefendant. If so thedefendant's right to thepropertywouldbeunquestionable.Ifnotsothecontrarywouldnecessarilybetheresult.Thispointastothewill,however,wasnotasclearlyestablishedasitshouldhavebeen. The defendant introduced no will in evidence, offered secondary parolevidenceastoitscontentsundertheclaimthattheoriginalwillhadbeenlost.Thecourtallowedthisevidenceover theobjectionof theplaintiffs,andthis isoneofthe errors assigned by them on this appeal. The plaintiffs' objection to theadmissionofsuchevidencewaswell takenandthat itcouldthereforehavebeensustained.Thelossoftheallegedoriginalwillhasnotbeensufficientlyestablished.Further,thewitnesstestifiedthatthewill,acopyofwhichhesawandhad inhispossession,wassignedbytwowitnessesonly.Awillsignedbytwowitnessesonlycould not under any circumstances be valid under the law in force at the timereferredtobythewitness,andlegallyspeakingsuchwillcouldnotthenhavebeenprobatedorrecorded.Thecaseisremandedtothelowercourtforfurtherproceedings.55 LIMBILLIANV.SUNTAY 63PHIL793FACTS:JoseSuntaydiedinChina.Hemarriedtwice,havingmanychildrenduringhisfirstmarriageandasonduringhissecond.Whenhedied,oneofthechildrenfromthefirst marriage instituted intestate proceedings. On the same proceedings, thesecond wife instituted for probate of the will of Jose. She alleged that beforeleaving forChina, shewashandeda sealedenvelopepurporting tobe thewillofthetestator. Itwassnatchedallegedlybythechildrenofthefirstmarriage. Thiswasofcoursedeniedbythechildren. Witnesseshoweverattestedtothe factofthewill.HELD:In our opinion, the evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the documentcontained in theenvelope.Oppositors'answeradmits that,according toBarrettohepreparedawill of thedeceased towhichhe laterbecameawitness together

withGoTohandManuelLopez,andthatthiswillwasplacedinanenvelopewhichwassignedbythedeceasedandbytheinstrumentalwitnesses.IncourttherewaspresentedandattachedtothecaseanopenandemptyenvelopesignedbyJoseB.Suntay,AlbertoBarretto,GoTohandManuelLopez.Itisthusundeniablethatthisenvelope Exhibit A is the same one that contained the will executed by thedeceased drafted by Barretto and with the latter, Go Toh andManuel Lopez asattestingwitnesses. These tokens sufficiently point to the loss of thewill of thedeceased.,acircumstancejustifyingthepresentationofsecondaryevidenceof itscontentsandofwhetheritwasexecutedwithalltheessentialandnecessarylegalformalities.Thetrialofthiscasewaslimitedtotheproofoflossofthewill,andfromwhathastaken place we deduce that it was not petitioner's intention to raise, upon theevidence adduced by her, the other points involved herein, namely, as we haveheretoforeindicated,whetherExhibitBisatruecopyofthewillandwhetherthelatter was executedwith all the formalities required by law for its probate. ThetestimonyofAlbertoBarrettobearsimportantlyinthisconnection.Wherefore,the lossofthewillexecutedbythedeceasedhavingbeensufficientlyestablished, it is ordered that this case be remanded to the court of origin forfurtherproceedings inobediencetothisdecision,withoutanypronouncementastothecosts.Soordered56 BASAV.MERCADO 61PHIL632FACTS:The judge allowed the probate of the will of Ines Basa. The administrator’sinventory was then duly approved and he was held to be the sole heir of thetestatrix. Thepetitioners thereafter came forthandprayed for the reopeningoftheproceedingsonthegroundthatthecourtdidn’thavejurisdictionduetonon‐compliancewithpublicationrequirements.HELD:Itisheldthatthelanguageusedinsection630oftheCodeofCivilProceduredoesnotmean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three fullweeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the firstpublication of the notice need not be made twenty‐one days before the dayappointedforthehearing.



57 DEARANZV.GALANG 161SCRA628FACTS:JoaquinInfantefiledapetitionfortheprobateofthewillofMontserratInfanteandhe likewise named the legatees anddevisees and their corresponding addresses.The court ordered for the publication of notice of the hearing in newspapers ofgeneral circulation once aweek, for three consecutiveweeks. It however didn’tsendpersonalnoticestothedeviseesandlegatees.Nooppositionwasfiledduringthe reglamentary period and thus, the court accepted evidence ex parte fromprivaterespondent.Thepetitionersthenmovedforreconsiderationonthegroundofjurisdictionalissues.HELD:Itisclearfromtheaforecitedrulethatnoticeofthetimeandplaceofthehearingfor the allowanceof awill shall be forwarded to the designatedor other knownheirs,legatees,anddeviseesresidinginthePhilippinesattheirplacesofresidence,if suchplacesof residencebeknown.There isnoquestionthat theresidencesofherein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. Thepetition for theallowanceof thewig itself indicated thenamesandaddressesofthelegateesanddeviseesofthetestator.Butdespitesuchknowledge,theprobatecourtdidnotcausecopiesofthenoticetobesenttopetitioners.Therequirementofthelawfortheallowanceofthewillwasnotsatisfiedbymerepublicationofthenoticeofhearing for three (3)weeks inanewspaperofgeneralcirculation in theprovince.58 INREESTATEOFJOHNSON 39PHIL156FACTS:EmilH.Johnson,anativeofSwedenandanaturalizedcitizenoftheUnitedStates,died in the city ofManila, leaving awill, bywhich he disposed of an estate, thevalue of which, as estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is anholographic instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting, and issignedbyhimselfandtwowitnessesonly, insteadof threewitnesses requiredbysection618oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.Thiswill,therefore,wasnotexecutedinconformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed byinhabitants of the Philippines, and hence could not have been proved under

section618. However, apetitionwaspresented in theCourtof First InstanceofthecityofManila for theprobateof thiswill,onthegroundthat JohnsonwasatthetimeofhisdeathacitizenoftheStateofIllinois,UnitedStatesofAmerica;thatthewillwas duly executed in accordancewith the lawsof that State; andhencecould properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of CivilProcedure.Thissectionreadsasfollows:Willmadeherebyalien. AwillmadewithinthePhilippine Islandsbyacitizenorsubjectofanotherstateorcountry,whichisexecutedinaccordancewiththelawof the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might beproved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved,allowed,andrecordedinthePhilippineIslands,andshallhavethesameeffectasifexecutedaccordingtothelawsoftheseIslands.The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are four innumberandmaybestated,inthesamesequenceinwhichtheyaresetforthinthepetition,asfollows:(1)EmilH.JohnsonwasaresidentofthecityofManilaandnotaresidentoftheStateofIllinoisatthetimethewillinquestionwasexecuted;(2)ThewillisinvalidandinadequatetopassrealandpersonalpropertyintheStateofIllinois;(3)Theorderadmitting thewill toprobatewasmadewithoutnotice to thepetitioner;and(4)Theorderinquestionwasbeyondthejurisdictionofthecourt.HELD:Principally, the issue being raised by petitioner is the citizenship of the testator.Assuming that he became a US citizen, he apparently lost the same when heresided in thePhilippines. However, therewasno law in forcebyvirtueofwhichany person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the PhilippineIslands;anditwas,therefore,impossibleforthetestator,evenifhehadsodesired,toexpatriatehimselffromtheUnitedStatesandchangehispoliticalstatusfromacitizenoftheUnitedStatestoacitizenoftheseIslands.Thisbeingtrue, it istobepresumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with hisstatus as a citizen of theUnited States. Itwould be novel doctrine toAmericans



living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose theircitizenshipintheStateoftheirnaturalizationornativity.The courtwasn'tunmindfulof the fact thatwhena citizenofoneState leaves itand takes up his abode in another State with no intention of returning, heimmediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This is inaccordancewiththatprovisionoftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateswhichsaysthateverycitizenoftheUnitedStatesisacitizenofthe State where in he resides. The effect of this provision necessarily is that apersontransferringhisdomicile fromoneStatetoanother loseshiscitizenship inthe State of his original aboveupon acquiring citizenship in the State of his newabode. The acquisition of the new State citizenship extinguishes the old. Thatsituation however has no analogy to that which arises when a citizen of anAmericanStatecomestoresideinthePhilippineIslands.Herehecannotacquireanew citizenship; nor by themere changeof domicile doeshe lose thatwhichhebroughtwithhim.With respect to the issueofcompliancewith the rulespertaining toexecutionofwills inIllinois,thelowercourtmayhaveerredwhenittookjudicialnoticeofthestate lawsof Illinoisbutevenso, the remedy isn’tavailable to thepetitioneranylonger. First, because the petition does not state any fact fromwhich it wouldappearthatthelawofIllinoisisdifferentfromwhatthecourtfound,and,secondly,becausetheassignmentoferrorandargumentfortheappellantinthiscourtraisesnoquestionbasedonsuchsupposederror.Thoughthetrialcourtmayhaveacteduponpureconjectureastothe lawprevailing intheStateof Illinois, its judgmentcould not be set aside, even upon application made within six months undersection 113 of the Code of Civil procedure, unless it should bemade to appearaffirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states ingeneral terms that thewill inquestion is invalidand inadequate topass realandpersonalpropertyintheStateofIllinois,butthisismerelyaconclusionoflaw.Theaffidavitsbywhichthepetitionisaccompaniedcontainnoreferencetothesubject,andwearecitedtonoauthorityintheappellant'sbriefwhichmighttenttoraiseadoubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear,therefore,thatthispointcannotbeurgedasofseriousmoment.But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was notproperly admissible to probate because it contains provisions which cannot begiveneffectconsistentlywiththelawsofthePhilippineIslands;anditissuggestedthatasthepetitionerisalegitimateheirofthetestatorshecannotbedeprivedof

the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentarysuccessionsintheseIslands.Uponthispointitissufficienttosaythattheprobateof the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree ofprobatebeingconclusiveonlyasregardsthedueexecutionofthewill.59 ABUTV.ABUT 45SCRA326FACTS:Gavina sought to substitute her deceased brother as a party to the probateproceedingsofthewilloftheirlatefather.Originally,Generosofiledapetitionforprobate of the will of his father. He was a child from the second marriage.Opposition was entered by the children of the first marriage but they wereoverruledandGenerosowasappointedexecutor.Whenhedied,Gavinasoughttosubstitutebutthecourtinsteadconsequentlydismissedtheproceedingsasnonewpublicationwasallegedlymade.HELD:We find the dismissal of the original petition for probate and the refusal of theprobatecourttoadmittheamendedpetitionwithoutanewpublicationthereoftobe untenable. The jurisdiction of the court became vested upon the filing of theoriginalpetitionanduponcompliancewithSections3and4ofRule76.A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with thecorresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to allpersons interested insaidwillor inthesettlementoftheestateofthedeceased.The fact that the amended petition named additional heirs not included in theoriginalpetitiondidnotrequirethatnoticeoftheamendedpetitionbepublishedanew.Jurisdictionofthecourtonceacquiredcontinuesuntiltheterminationofthecase,and remains unaffected by subsequent events. The court below erred in holdingthatitwasdivestedofjurisdictionjustbecausetheoriginalpetitionerdiedbeforethepetitioncouldbeformallyheard.Partieswhocouldhavecomeinandopposedthe original petition, as herein appellees did, could still come in and oppose theamendedpetition,havingalreadybeennotifiedofthependencyoftheproceedingbythepublicationofthenoticethereof.



The admission of the amended petition, of course, does not mean that GavinaAbut's prayer that she be appointed administratrix with the will annexed isnecessarily meritorious. It simply recognizes that since the lower court hasacquiredjurisdictionovertheres,suchjurisdictioncontinuesuntiltheterminationof thecase.Thefirstquestionthat the lowercourtshouldhearanddecide is theprobate of the will; and the question of whether or not Gavina Abut should beappointedadministratrixmustbedecidedonthebasisofthefactstobepresentedandafterthewillisprovedandallowed,asprovidedinSection6ofRule78.60 RODELASV.ARANZA 119SCRA16FACTS:RodelassoughttheprobateofthewillofRicardoBonilla.Thiswasopposedonthegroundthatwhatwaspresentedwasthephotostaticcopyoftheholographicwillandnottheoriginal.Theoppositionmaintainedthatfirst,thecopywasn'tthetruecopyoftheholographicwillandthatitsexistencemaynotbeprovedbysecondaryevidence.HELD:Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is theallowance of thewill by the court after its due execution has been proved. Theprobatemaybeuncontestedornot.Ifuncontested,atleastoneIdentifyingwitnessisrequiredand,ifnowitnessisavailable,expertsmayberesortedto.Ifcontested,at least three Identifyingwitnessesare required.However, if theholographicwillhas been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not beprobatedbecausethebestandonlyevidenceisthehandwritingofthetestatorinsaidwill. It isnecessarythattherebeacomparisonbetweensamplehandwrittenstatements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy orxerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can bemadewith thestandardwritingsof the testator. In thecaseofGamvs.Yap,104PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost ordestroyedholographicwillmaynotbeprovedbythebaretestimonyofwitnesseswhohaveseenand/orreadsuchwill.Thewillitselfmustbepresented;otherwise,itshallproducenoeffect.Thelawregardsthedocumentitselfasmaterialproofofauthenticity."But, in Footnote8of saiddecision, it says that "Perhaps itmaybeproved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even amimeographed or carboncopy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of thehandwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate

court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyedholographicwillmaybeadmittedbecausethentheauthenticityofthehandwritingofthedeceasedcanbedeterminedbytheprobatecourt.61 GANV.YAP 104PHIL509FACTS:FelicidadYapdiedfromaheartattack.Daysafterherdeath,FaustoGanpetitionedthat her allegedholographicwill be admitted toprobate. Thehusbandopposedtheexistenceofsaidwill,maintaininghiswifedidn'tleftanywill.During the court proceedings, the will wasn't really presented as evidence butinstead,witnesseswhoallegedlysawthewillwerepresentedtotestify.Allegedly,sincethetestatrixwassufferingfromalong‐timeheartailment,sheexpressedherintent to execute awill to her cousin. She allegedly didn'twant her husband toknowabout it. Asking thehelpofhernephew,shedrewaholographicwill. Butafterhedeath,thiswasallegedlylost.HELD:In the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity aredemanded,sinceasstated, theyneednowitnesses;providedhowever, that theyare"entirelywritten,dated,andsignedbythehandof thetestatorhimself."Thelaw, it is reasonable tosuppose, regards thedocument itselfasmaterialproofofauthenticity,andasitsownsafeguard,sinceitcouldatanytime,bedemonstratedto be or not to be in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of aholographicwill" says theNewCivilCode, "it shallbenecessary thatat leastonewitnesswhoknowsthehandwritingandsignatureofthetestatorexplicitlydeclarethatthewillandthesignatureareinthehandwritingofthetestator. Ifthewill iscontested, at least three suchwitnesses shall be required. In the absenceof anysuch witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the court deem itnecessary,experttestimonymayberesortedto."The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of theholographicwill.Theymaybemistakenintheiropinionofthehandwriting,ortheymaydeliberatelylieinaffirmingitisinthetestator'shand.However,theoppositormaypresent otherwitnesseswho also know the testator's handwriting, or someexpertwitnesses,whoaftercomparingthewillwithotherwritingsorlettersofthedeceased,havecometotheconclusionthatsuchwillhasnotbeenwrittenbythe



hand of the deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of suchcontradictorytestimonymayuseitsownvisualsense,anddecideinthefaceofthedocument, whether the will submitted to it has indeed been written by thetestator.Obviously,whenthewillitselfisnotsubmitted,thesemeansofopposition,andofassessingtheevidencearenotavailable.Andthentheonlyguarantyofauthenticitythetestator'shandwritinghasdisappeared.Normally, the relatives of the decedent are allowed to inspect the document totestify as towhether thewill was executed by the testator. They are given theopportunity to oppose or abide by the will. But this is frustrated, when thedocument itself is notpresented to themas evidence. Furthermore, it is notablethat commentators have the common submission that before the court allowsdistribution of property in accordance with a holographic will, the testator’shandwritingandsignaturemustbepresented.Takingalltheabovecircumstancestogether,thecourtreachedtheconclusionthattheexecutionandthecontentsofalostordestroyedholographicwillmaynotbeprovedbythebaretestimonyofwitnesseswhohaveseenand/orreadsuchwill.Theabovecouldeasilybeenadoptedasa rule forholographicwillsby theCourtbutinthiscase,ithesitatedtoapplytheruleandtackledfurtheronthesufficiencyoftheevidencepresentedbyGanandtheothers.Inthecaseofordinarywills,itisquitehardtoconvincethreewitnesses(fourwiththenotary)deliberately to lie.Andthentheir liescouldbecheckedandexposed,theirwhereaboutsandactsontheparticularday,thelikelihoodthattheywouldbecalled by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they wereintimatesortrustedfriendsofthetestatortheyarenotlikelytoendthemselvestoanyfraudulentschemetodistorthiswishes.Lastbutnotleast,theycannotreceiveanythingonaccountofthewill.Whereas in the case of holographicwills, if oral testimonywere admissible onlyone man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passableimitationofthehandwritingandsignatureofthedeceased,hemaycontrivetoletthree honest and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter,havingnointerest,couldeasilyfallforit,andincourttheywouldinallgoodfaithaffirm its genuineness andauthenticity. Thewill havingbeen lost the forgermay

havepurposelydestroyeditinan"accident"theoppositorshavenowaytoexposethetrickandtheerror,becausethedocumentitselfisnotathand.Andconsideringthattheholographicwillmayconsistoftwoorthreepages,andonlyoneofthemneed be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages,whichmay be themostimportantones,maygoundetected.If testimonialevidenceofholographicwillsbepermitted,onemoreobjectionablefeaturefeasibilityofforgerywouldbeaddedtotheseveralobjectionstothiskindofwills.Furthermore, in the caseof a lostwill, the three subscribingwitnesseswouldbetestifyingtoafactwhichtheysaw,namelytheactofthetestatorofsubscribingthewill;whereasinthecaseofalostholographicwill,thewitnesseswouldtestifyastotheir opinion of the handwritingwhich they allegedly saw, an opinionwhich cannot be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because thehandwritingitselfisnotathand.Giventhis,theCourtfinallyagreedwiththetrialjudgeindisbelievingthedubioustestimonies.First,whywouldthetestatrixshowthewillpreciselytorelativeswhodidn'tevenhadashareintheinheritance.Second,ifshetrulywantedtoconcealthewillfromherhusband,whynotjustentrustitwithherbeneficiaries.62 GAGOV.MAMUYAC 49PHIL902FACTS:Gago filed a petition for the probate of the will of Miguel Mamuyac. This wasopposedonthegroundthatthetestatorexecutedanewwillandtestament.Gago,onasecondtime,petitionedtheprobateofthelaterwillofMiguel.Thisagainwasopposedbythesameoppositorsonthegroundthatwhatwaspresentedwasjustacarboncopyoftheoriginal2ndwillandthatthesamewasrevokedbythetestatorduringhislifetime.HELD:With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positiveproof,notdenied,whichwasacceptedbythelowercourt,thatwillinquestionhadbeencancelledin1920.Thelawdoesnotrequireanyevidenceoftherevocationorcancellationofawilltobepreserved.Itthereforebecomesdifficultattimestoprove the revocation or cancellation ofwills. The fact that such cancellation or



revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred fromevidenceshowingthatafterduesearchtheoriginalwillcannotbefound.Whereawillwhichcannotbefoundisshowntohavebeeninthepossessionofthetestator,when lastseen,thepresumption is, intheabsenceofothercompetentevidence,thatthesamewascancelledordestroyed.Thesamepresumptionariseswhereitisshownthatthetestatorhadreadyaccesstothewilland itcannotbefoundafterhisdeath. Itwillnotbepresumedthatsuchwillhasbeendestroyedbyanyotherperson without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of thepresumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly,beingweakorstrongaccordingtothecircumstances,isneverconclusive,butmaybeovercomebyproofthatthewillwasnotdestroyedbythetestatorwithintenttorevokeit.Inviewofthefactthattheoriginalwillof1919couldnotbefoundafterthedeathof the testatorMiguelMamuyacand in viewof thepositiveproof that the samehadbeencancelled, it isconcludedthat theconclusionsof the lowercourtare inaccordancewiththeweightoftheevidence.Inaproceedingtoprobateawilltheburdenofproofs isupontheproponentclearlytoestablishnotonly itsexecutionbutitsexistence.Havingproveditsexecutionbytheproponents,theburdenisonthecontestanttoshowthatithasbeenrevoked.63 ALDANESEV.SALUTILLO 47PHIL548FACTS:AldanesefiledapetitionfortheprobateofthewillofAvila.Afterduepublication,Salutillo and others opposed the probate. During the proceedings, Aldanesemovedforthetakingofdepositionsofwitnessestothewill.Thiswasopposedbythe respondents on the ground that the witnesses should be physicially presentduring thewitnesses to give their testimonies. The probate court sustained therespondents.HELD:In our opinion the court below erred in holding that the depositions in questionwere inadmissible inevidence in theprobateproceedings. It is true that the ruleprevailinginthisjurisdictionisthatwhenawilliscontestedtheattestingwitnessesmustbecalledtoprovethewillorashowingmustbemadethat theycannotbehad,butthatdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheymustbebroughtbodilybeforethe court. It is their testimony which is needed and not their actual personal

presence in thecourt room.As faraswecansee, there isnothing in the leadingcase, Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), cited by the appellees, to justify adifferentconclusion;inthatcasenoeffectwasmadetoproducethetestimonyofthetwosubscribingwitnessesthoughtheirabodewasknowntotheproponentofthewill.In the present case, the will was presented for probate in Cebu; the attestingwitnesses were living in Manila and were beyond the process of the court forcompulsoryattendance.Theywerecalledtotestifyandproducedbeforeanofficerlegally authorized to take their testimony in the form of depositions. The noticerequired by section 361, supra, was duly given and the opponents given theopportunity to be present and to cross‐examine the witnesses. In thecircumstances, this must certainly be considered a sufficient "calling" of thewitnessesandsatisfiesthelaw.The depositions in question appear to be in due form and would ordinarily beadmissible, but the record indicates that the failure of the opponents to bepresentedattheexaminationofthewitnesseswasduetothefactthattheyweremisledbythepetitioner'sactioninseekingspecialauthorizationfromthecourtforthetakingofthedepositions.Intheinterestofjusticewethereforethinkthatthedepositions should be retaken and the opponents given another opportunity toexaminethewitnesses.64 CABANGV.DELFINADO 34PHIL291FACTS:CabangsoughttheprobateofthewillofCelestinoDelfinado.ThiswasopposedbyrespondentDelfinado.Duringtheproceedings,thepetitionerfailedtopresenttwoof thesubscribingwitnessesof thewillandbasedontheordersof thecourtandrecords,noreasonwasadducedforfailingtopresentthewitnesses.Thequestionthenarisesonwhetherthesameshouldbesustainedandthewillbeallowedtobeprobated.HELD:The rule that no will shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, unless"attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses," is a matter ofsubstantive law and an element of thewill's validity. The rule that the attestingwitnessesmustbecalledtoproveawillforprobateisoneofpreferencemadeso



bystatute.Thisruleofevidenceisnottobeconfusedwithrulesofquantity.Therehave been several reasons given for this rule of preference for the attestingwitnesses,onereasonbeingthatthepartyopposingtheclaimofproperexecutionofthewillhasarighttothebenefitofcross‐examiningtheattestingwitnessesastofraud,duress,orothermattersofdefense.Thelawplacesthesewitnesses"aroundthetestator toascertainand judgeofhiscapacity" for thepurposeofpreventingfrauds.Thesoundnessoftheruleiswellillustratedinthecaseunderconsideration.Here the attesting clause was omitted and the testator signed by mark. Thepetitioner produced only one of the attesting witnesses. Had there not been acontest,thiswouldhaveprobablybeensufficientundersection631.Whilethereisno testimony in the record to theeffect that the testator couldneither readnorwrite, there is conclusive evidence that he could sign his name. This fact isestablishedbytheproductionofExhibit1,whichallagreethetestatordidsign.Thetestator'ssignaturetothedocumentshowsthathecouldwrite,atleasthisname,in a plain, clear manner, indicating a fairly good knowledge of writing. Had theproponent shown that the other two subscribing witnesses were not within thejurisdictionof thecourtandcouldnot, therefore,becalled, thedueexecutionofthewillwouldstillbeverydoubtful.Believing,aswedo,thatitwastheintentionoftheLegislaturethatthesubscribingwitnessesmustbecalledorgoodandsufficientreasonshownwhytheycouldnotbehad,andbeingsupportedbytheauthoritiesabovecitedandquoted,wemustconcludethattheproponentdidnotcomplywiththeprovisionsofthelawinthepresentationofhercase.65 AVERAV.GARCIA 42PHIL145FACTS:Averapetitionedfortheprobateof thewillofEusebioGarcia. Thiswasopposedagainstbytherespondents.Averapresentedonlyoneofthesubscribingwitnessesandadducednoreasonwhytheothertwoweren’tpresented.Acaveatthoughtothis casewas that from the time petitionwas filed by Avera till the time of thehearing, no opposition was made. It was only during the same day as of thehearingwhereinoppositionwasentered.HELD:Uponthefirstpoint,while it isundoubtedlytruethatanuncontestedwillbaybeprovedbythetestimonyofonlyoneofthethreeattestingwitnesses,neverthelessin Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court declared after an elaborateexamination of the American and English authorities that when a contest is

instituted,alloftheattestingwitnessesmustbeexamined,ifaliveandwithinreachoftheprocessofthecourt.Inthepresentcasenoexplanationwasmadeatthetrialastowhyallthreeoftheattestingwitnesseswerenotproduced,buttheprobablereasonisfoundinthefactthat,althoughthepetitionfortheprobateofthiswillhadbeenpendinguntilthedatesetforthehearing,noformalcontestwasentereduntil theverydaysetforthe hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for the proponent, believing ingoodfaiththeprobatewouldnotbecontested,repairedtothecourtwithonlyoneof the three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will wascontested, incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking for apostponement of the trial in order that he might produce all the attestingwitnesses.Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were notproduced,itdoesnotinitselfsupplyanybasisforchangingtheruleexpoundedinthecaseabove referred to;andwere itnot fora factnowtobementioned, thiscourt would probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that theexecution of the will had not been proved by a sufficient number of attestingwitnesses.66 SOLIVIOV.CA 182SCRA119FACTS:This case is regards the estateof the late author Esteban Javellana Jr. Whenhedied, he was survived by only his maternal aunt, petitioner Solivio and paternalaunt, respondent Villanueva. Wishing to fulfill the decedent’s wish to place hispropertiesintoafoundation,Soliviofiledapetitionforthelettersofadministrationof the estate be issued to her and consequently be appointed as a specialadministrator. Thepetitionwas lateramended todeclareheras soleheirof thedecedent.ThecourtruledinSolivio’sfavorandsheexplainedthatshedidthistofacilitate the formation of the foundation among other reasons. Subsequently,Villanuevabelatedlysoughtthereconsiderationoftheorderofthecourt,averringthat Soliviowasn’t the only heir of the decedent but to this, shewas overruled.Shethenfiledacaseforreconveyanceandpossessionofproperty,whichthetrialcourtdecidedinherfavor.HELD:



Afteracareful reviewof therecords,wefindmerit in thepetitioner'scontentionthat the RTC lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action forpartitionandrecoveryofhershareoftheestateofEstebanJavellana,Jr.whiletheprobateproceedingsforthesettlementofsaidestatearestillpendinginBranch23ofthesamecourt,therebeingasyetnoordersforthesubmissionandapprovaloftheadministratix'sinventoryandaccounting,distributingtheresidueoftheestatetotheheir,andterminatingtheproceedings.Itistheorderofdistributiondirectingthedeliveryoftheresidueoftheestatetothepersonsentitledtheretothatbringstoaclosetheintestateproceedings,putsan end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from hisduties. The assailed order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate ofEstebanJavellana, Jr.didnottoll theendoftheproceedings.Asamatterof fact,the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up thesettlementoftheestate."67 MANALOV.PAREDES SupraHELD:Theproceedingfortheprobateofawill isaproceedinginrem(40Cyc.,p.1265),and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested through thepublicationofthenoticeprescribedbysection630oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them. Through thepublicationorderedbytheCourtofFirst InstanceofLagunaoftheapplicationforthe probate of the supposedwill of Francisco Villegas, filed by JustinaMendietaandherminorchildrenLazaroandDariaMendietaandMelecioFule,testamentaryexecutor, through their attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, said court acquiredjurisdictionoverallsuchpersonsaswereinterestedinthesupposedwill,includingGelacioMalihan.Thecourthavingtriedsaidapplicationforprobate,hearingallthetestimonyoftheattestingwitnessesofthesaidsupposedwill,theapplicantJustinaMendieta forherselfandasguardianad litemofherminorchildren, representedbytheirattorneys,Messrs.MarcelinoLontokandMarcialAzada,ontheonehand,and LaureanaHidalgo,widowof Francisco Villegas, represented by her attorney,Jesus.E.Blanco,ontheother,havingsubmittedastipulationwhereinthe formerwithdrewherapplicationandthelatterreservedcertainrightsovertheestateleftbyFranciscoVillegasinfavorofJustinaMendietaandherminorchildren;andthecourt having approved said stipulation and declared that Francisco Villegas diedintestate according to said agreement, all the parties became bound by said

judgment;and ifanyof themorotherpersons interestedwerenotsatisfiedwiththe court's decision, they had the remedyof appeal to correct any injustice thatmight have been committed, and cannot now through the special remedy ofmandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new application for theprobateofthesamewill inordertocompeltherespondentjudgetocomplywithhisministerialdutyimposedbysection330oftheCodeofCivilProcedure;becausethisremedy,beingextraordinary,cannotbeusedinlieuofappeal,orwritoferror(26 Cyc., 177; 18 R.C.L., par. 443); especially when the parties interested haveagreed to disregard the testamentary provisions and divide the estate as theypleased,eachofthemtakingwhatpertainedtohim(25R.C.L.,359).68 RIERAV.PALMAROLI 40PHIL105FACTS:PonswasaSpanishresidentwhodiedinthePhilippines.Subsequently,theConsulGeneral submitted for probate his purported will. The will was admitted toprobate. Thiswas lateronopposedby thewidowof thedecedent, alleging thatdue to uncontrollable circumstances, she wasn’t able to outright enter heropposition.ShepetitionedtheSC,throughsection513,toreconsiderthedecisionof the lower court, averring regularities in the formalities of executing the will.Section513provides—“SEC.513.WhenajudgmentisrenderedbyaCourtofFirstInstance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing byfraud, accident,mistake,or excusablenegligence, and theCourtof First Instancewhich rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedyexistsinthatcourt,thepartysodeprivedofahearingmaypresenthispetitiontotheSupremeCourtwithin sixtydaysafterhe first learnsof the renditionof suchjudgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have suchjudgmentsetaside...“HELD:FromwhathasbeensaiditwillbeseenthatthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtto entertain a petition of the character of that nowbefore us begins in point oftimewhentheperiodhaspassedwithinwhich itwascompetent fortheCourtofFirst Instance to entertain an application under section 113; and apart from therequirementthattheapplicationmustbemadetotheSupremeCourtwithintwomonthsafterthepetitionerfirstlearnsoftherenditionofjudgmentagainstwhichreliefissought,thereisnoabsolutelimittotheperiodwithinwhichtheapplicationmay be made. But of course if relief from a judgment is sought by timely



application in theCourt of First Instance, and the application is theredenied, nopetitionbasedonthesamegroundwill thereafterbeentertainedintheSupremeCourt under section 513, as the proper remedy in that casewould be to appealfromtheactionoftheCourtofFirstInstance.It is manifest from this that the remedy given in section 513 can have noapplicationtotheorderofMay20,1918,legalizingthewillofJuanPonsyColl;andthis is necessarily fatal to the petition before us. This consequence followsregardlessofanyirregularitiesthatmayhaveoccurredintheCourtofFirstInstanceinadmittingthewill toprobateandregardlessofanyerrorwhichthatcourtmayhavecommittedintheactiontakenupontheproofsubmittedatthehearing.Itisnot alleged that any fraud has been attempted or committed, or that thedocument probated is any other than a testamentary memorial in which thedecedentactuallygaveexpression tohisdesireswith regard to thedispositionofhisproperty.Butiffraudhadbeenchargedas,forinstance,ifitwereallegedthatthe purported will is forged document the remedy, if any exists, would not befound inaproceedingundersection513,but inanoriginalaction intheCourtofFirstInstance.Itthusbecomesunneccessarytoinquirewhetherthewillinquestionwas in fact executed in conformitywith the requirements of law either of theseIslandsorofSpain.Asaresultofthisdecisionitcannotbedeniedthat,withoutanyfaultonthepartofthepetitionerorherattorneys,shehasbeendeprivednotonlyoftheopportunityof opposing the will and appealing from the order of probate but also of theopportunityofapplyingtotheCourtofFirst Instanceforreliefundersection113.Evenassumingthatshecouldhaveprocuredthedisallowanceofthewillbyeitherofthosemethods�apointuponwhichnopronouncementcanherebemade�itis obvious that the impossibility of her thus obtaining relief was due tocircumstances peculiar to this case; and the possibility of occassional hardshipcannotaffectthevalidityofourprocedurefortheprobateofwills.Ashasbeenrepeatedlystatedinthedecisionsofthiscourt,theprobateofawill,whileconclusiveastoitsdueexecution,innowiseinvolvestheintrinsicvalidityofitsprovisions.If,therefore,uponthedistributionoftheestateofJuanPonsyColl,itshouldappearthatanyprovisionofhiswilliscontrarytothelawapplicabletohiscase, thewillmustnecessarilyyielduponthatpointandthedispositionmadebylawmust prevail. The petitioner is therefore free to appear in the Court of FirstInstance at the proper juncture and discuss the questions of the validity of suchprovisionsofthewillasaffectherinterestsadversely;andsofaraswecansee,on

thefactsbeforeus,thisisheronlyrecourse.Butifthewillinquestionwasinfactproved as the will of a Spanish subject under section 636 of the Code of CivilProcedure, the intrinsic validity of its provisions must be determined under theSpanishlawapplicabletothistestator.69 MANAHANV.MANAHAN 58PHIL448FACTS:ThenieceofthedeceasedManahanpetitionedfortheprobateofherwill. Sinceno opposition was entered and evidence was received, the will was probated.Aftermore than a year, respondentManahan filed amotion for reconsiderationandnewtrialbutwasdenied. Sheallegedamongothers thatshe is thesisterofthetestatrixandthatshewasentitledtonotice,etc.HELD:First, respondent was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will andneitherhadshetherighttoexpectit,inasmuchasshewasnotaninterestedparty,not having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Herallegation that shehad the statusofanheir,being thedeceased's sister, didnotconferonhertherighttobenotifiedonthegroundthatthetestatrixdiedleavingawill inwhichtheappellanthasnotbeen institutedheir.Furthermore,notbeingaforcedheir,shedidnotacquireanysuccessionalright.Second, the court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will inquestion,whichistheonlypronouncementrequiredofthetrialcourtbythelawinorderthatthewillmaybeconsideredvalidanddulyexecutedinaccordancewiththelaw.Inthephraseologyoftheprocedural law,thereisnoessentialdifferencebetween the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The wordsauthenticationandprobatearesynonymousinthiscase.Allthelawrequiresisthatthe competent court declared that in the execution of the will the essentialexternal formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, thedocument,asawill,isvalidandeffectiveintheeyesofthelaw.Lastly, once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questionsrelative to the validity thereof can nomore be raised on appeal. The decree ofprobate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannotimpugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in anyseparateorindependentactionorproceedings



RULE77ALLOWANCEOFWILLPROVEDOUTSIDEOFTHEPHILIPPINES

Section1.WillprovedoutsidePhilippinesmaybeallowedhere.Willsprovedandallowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may beallowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in thePhilippines.Section2.Noticeofhearingforallowance.Whenacopyofsuchwillandoftheorderordecreeoftheallowancethereof,bothdulyauthenticated,arefiledwitha petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other personinterested, in thecourthaving jurisdiction,suchcourtshall fixa timeandplaceforthehearing,andcausenoticethereoftobegivenasincaseofanoriginalwillpresentedforallowance.Section3.Whenwillallowed,andeffectthereof.Ifitappearsatthehearingthatthe will should be allowed in the Philippines, the shall so allow it, and acertificateof itsallowance,signedbythe judge,andattestedbythesealof thecourt,towhichshallbeattachedacopyofthewill,shallbefiledandrecordedbythe clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proves andallowedinsuchcourt.Section4.Estate,howadministered.Whenawillisthusallowed,thecourtshallgrantletterstestamentary,orlettersofadministrationwiththewillannexed,andsuch letters testamentaryorof administration, shall extend toall theestateofthetestator inthePhilippines.Suchestate,afterthepaymentof justdebtsandexpensesofadministration,shallbedisposedofaccordingtosuchwill,sofarassuchwillmayoperateupon it;andtheresidue, ifanyshallbedisposedofas isprovidedby law incasesofestates inthePhilippinesbelongingtopersonswhoareinhabitantsofanotherstateorcountry.

Art.815.WhenaFilipinoisinaforeigncountry,heisauthorizedtomakeawillinanyoftheformsestablishedbythelawofthecountryinwhichhemaybe.SuchwillmaybeprobatedinthePhilippines.(n)

Art.816.Thewillofanalienwho isabroadproduceseffect inthePhilippines ifmadewiththeformalitiesprescribedbythelawoftheplaceinwhichheresides,or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity withthosewhichthisCodeprescribes.(n)Art.817.AwillmadeinthePhilippinesbyacitizenorsubjectofanothercountry,which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is acitizenorsubject,andwhichmightbeprovedandallowedbythelawofhisowncountry, shall have the sameeffect as if executed according to the lawsof thePhilippines.(n)



HOWCANAWILLPROVEDABROADPRODUCEEFFECTINTHEPHILIPPINES?1. Petitionforallowanceofwill2. Dulyauthenticatedcopyofthewill3. Dulyauthenticatedorderordecreeoftheallowance4. Thewillshouldbethefollowing—

a. If accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law ofplaceinwhichheresides,or

b. Inaccordancewithformalitiesobservedinhiscountry,orc. InaccordancewithformalitiesobservedinthePhilippines

5. In accordance to Suntay v. Suntay, it must be proved that the foreigncourtorderingtheallowanceisaprobatecourt

6. InaccordancetoFluemerv.Hix,ifthewillwasmadeinaforeigncountry,itmustbeshownthatthewillwasmadeinaccordancetothelawsofthesame,andnecessarily,acopyofthelaw(s)mustbeproducedorprovedincourt

7. In case there is failure to prove the laws and procedure of the foreigncountry,thenitispresumedtobethesamewithPhilippinelaw

70 SUNTAYV.SUNTAY 95PHIL500FACTS:SuntaywasaFilipinocitizenwhodiedinAmoy,China. Hehadproperties inboththe Philippines and China, and was survived by his children from the first andsecond marriages as well as by his second wife. After his death, petition forintestateproceedingsandconsequently,forlettersforadministrationofhisestatewasfiledbyoneofhissonsfromhisfirstmarriageandwasdulyallowedthesamebythecourt.Anotherpetitionwasfiledconsequently,thistimebythewidow,forthe probate of the allegedwill of the testator. But the probate proceedingwasdismissed, for the alleged loss of the will and failure to adduce evidence on itsexecution. Subsequently,thesonfromthesecondmarriagefiledamotionintheintestateproceedingtoadmittheallegedwillhefoundofhisfather inChina,butwasdeniedbythecourt.HELD:There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and hismotherareestoppedfromaskingfortheprobateofthelostwilloroftheforeignwillbecauseofthetransferorassignmentoftheirshareright,titleandinterestintheestateforthevalidityandlegalityofsuchassignmentscannotbethreshedout

in this proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will andtestamentexecuted inthePhilippines oroftheforeignwillallegedlyexecuted inAmoyandclaimedtohavebeenprobatedinthemunicipaldistrictcourtofAmoy,Fookienprovince,RepublicofChina.Astothewillclaimedtohavebeenexecutedon4January1931inAmoy,China,thelawonthepointinRule78.Section1oftheruleprovides:Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of suchcountry,maybeallowed,filed,andrecordedbytheproperCourtofFirstInstanceinthePhilippines.Section2provides:When a copy of suchwill and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filedwith a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other personinterested,inthecourthavingjurisdiction,suchcourtshallfixatimeandplaceforthe hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original willpresentedforallowance.Section3provides:If itappearsat thehearing that thewill shouldbeallowed in thePhilippines, thecourtshallsoallowit,andacertificateof itsallowance,signedbytheJudge,andattested by the seal of the courts, towhich shall be attached a copy of thewill,shallbefiledandrecordedbytheclerk,andthewillshallhavethesameeffectasiforiginallyprovedandallowedinsuchcourt.ThefactthatthemunicipaldistrictcourtofAmoy,China,isaprobatecourtmustbeproved.ThelawofChinaonprocedureintheprobateorallowanceofwillsmustalsobeproved.ThelegalrequirementsfortheexecutionofavalidwillinChinain1931shouldalsobeestablishedbycompetentevidence.Thereisnoproofonthesepoints.Moreover,itappearsthatalltheproceedingshadinthemunicipaldistrictcourt of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attestingwitnesses to thewill and that the order of themunicipal district court of Amoydoesnotpurport toprobate thewill. In theabsenceofproof that themunicipaldistrictcourtofAmoyisaprobatecourtandontheChineselawofprocedureinprobate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter ofprobating or allowing awill in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to aperpetuationof testimony, and even if itwere so it does notmeasure sameasthoseprovidedforinourlawsonthesubject.Itisaproceedingsinremandforthevalidity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all



interestedpartiesmustbemade.TheinterestedpartiesinthecasewereknowntoresideinthePhilippines.Theevidenceshowsthatnosuchnoticewasreceivedbythe interested parties residing in the Philippines. The proceedings had in themunicipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to thestandardofsuchproceedings inthePhilippinesfor lackofnoticetoall interestedpartiesand theproceedingswereheldat thebackof such interestedparties. Inviewthereof,thewillandtheallegedprobatethereofcannotbesaidtohavebeendone in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts andprinciples followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, theauthenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court ofAmoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to theprobateorallowanceofawilland,therefore,thewillreferredtothereincannotbeallowed,filedandrecordedbyacompetentcourtofthiscountry.71 FLUEMERV.HIX 54PHIL610FACTS:Edward Hix allegedly executed a will in West Virginia where he was allegedlyresiding. When he died, the special administrator of his estate petitioned theprobateofthewillbutwasdeniedbythecourt.HeallegedamongothersthatthewillwasexecutedinWestVirginiaandinaccordancewiththerulesprovidedinthesaidjurisdiction.HELD:The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. ThecourtsofthePhilippineIslandsarenotauthorizedtotakeAmericanUnion.Suchlawsmust be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the lawwere notmet.Therewasnowasprintedorpublishedunder theauthorityof the StateofWestVirginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Norwas theextractfromthelawattestedbythecertificateoftheofficerhavingchargeoftheoriginal,underthesaleoftheStateofWestVirginia,asprovidedinsection301oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.Noevidencewasintroducedtoshowthattheextractfrom the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will wasexecuted.Inaddition,thedueexecutionofthewillwasnotestablished.Theonlyevidenceonthispoint istobefoundinthetestimonyofthepetitioner.Asidefromthis,therewas nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the

presenceoftwocompetentwitnesses,ofthatthesewitnessessubscribedthewillinthepresenceofthetestatorandofeachotherasthelawofWestVirginiaseemsto require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without thePhilippine Islands, itwould then thedutyof thepetitioner toproveexecutionbysomeothermeans.ItwasalsonecessaryforthepetitionertoprovethatthetestatorhadhisdomicileinWestVirginiaandnotestablishthisfactconsistedoftherecitals inthewillandthe testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedingsoriginallyinthePhilippines,thepetitionerviolatedhisowntheorybyattemptingtohavetheprincipaladministrationinthePhilippines.While the appeal pending submission in this court, petitioner presented anunverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence thedocumentsattachedtothepetition.Oneofthesedocumentsdisclosesthatapaperwritingpurporting tobe thewillwaspresented forprobate inWestVirginia,andordered to be recorded and filed. In this connection, it is to be noted that theapplicationfortheprobateofthewillinthePhilippineswasfiledearlierthanthatinWest Virginia. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention tomake thePhilippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillaryadministration.However thismaybe,noattempthasbeenmadetocomplywithCivil Procedure, fornohearingon thequestionof theallowanceof awill said tohavebeenproved and allowed inWestVirginia has been requested. There is noshowingthatthedeceasedleftanypropertyatanyplaceotherthanthePhilippinesandnocontentionthatheleftanyinWestVirginia.72 MICIANOV.BRIMO 50PHIL867FACTS:The judicial administrator of Brimo’s estate submitted a plan of partition, whichwas opposed by the decedent’s brother. He alleged that the same was inaccordancewiththedeniedwillofhisbrother,fornotcomplyingwith lawsofhisTurkishnationality.HELD:Thebrotherisoverruled.HefailedtostatewhatTurkishlawshavebeenviolatedbythewill inquestion. Hehimselfacknowledgedthisfactwhenhedesirestobe



giventheopportunitytoprovehispoint.Assuch,theTurkishlawsarepresumedtobethesameasPhilippinelaws.73 LEONANDGHEZZIV.MANUFACTURERSLIFEINSURANCE 90PHIL459FACTS:ButlerwasaformerPhilippineresidentwhodiedinthestateofNewYork.Hiswillwas probated and it contained a residuary clause, which provided that afterlegacieshavebeendistributedandjustdebtspaid,theresidualestateshallbepaidtoMercedesdeLeoninannuity.Incompliancewiththewill,Ross(administratorinNewYork)boughtanannuityinherfavorwiththeinsurancecompany.Mercedes,probablywanting to take themoney inwhole, filedapetition forprobateof thesamewillwiththeManilacourt.Sheprayedthatthecourtorderedtheinsurancecompanybringforththemoneydueallegedlytoher.HELD:Theimportantthingtoinquire intoistheManilacourt'sauthoritywithrespecttothe assets herein involved. The general rule universally recognized is thatadministrationextendsonlytotheassetsofadecedentfoundwithinthestateorcountrywhereitwasgranted,sothatanadministratorappointedinonestateorcountryhasnopoweroverpropertyinanotherstateorcountry.It ismanifestfromthefactsbeforesetoutthatthefunds inquestionareoutsidethejurisdictionoftheprobatecourtofManila.Havingbeeninvestedinanannuityin Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of themoney.Thepartywhoseappearancetheappellantseeksisonlyabranchoragencyofthecompanywhichholdsthefundsinitspossession,theagency's interventionbeing limitedtodeliveringtotheannuitantthechecksmadeoutandissuedfromthe home office. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have beentransferredorremovedtotheManilaBranch.EvenifthemoneywereinthehandsoftheManilaBranch,yetitnolongerformspart of Butler's estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passedcompletely intothehandsof thecompany invirtueofacontractdulyauthorizedandvalidlyexecuted.Whetherconsideredasatrustorassimpleconsiderationforthe company's assumed obligation, which it has been religiously performing, ofpayingperiodicalallowancestotheannuitant,theproceedsofthesalecannotbewithdrawn without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of the

annuitant,theresiduarylegateemayclaimtheremainder,iftherebeany.Neitherthe domiciliary or ancillary executor of Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor theannuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amounts and exceptupontheconditionsagreeduponinthecontractforannuity.

RULE78LETTERSTESTAMENTARYANDOFADMINISTRATION,WHENANDTOWHOM

ISSUED

Section 1.Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. Nopersonincompetenttoserveasexecutororadministratorwho:(a)Isaminor;(b)IsnotaresidentofthePhilippines;and(c)Isintheopinionofthecourtunfittoexecutethedutiesofthetrustbyreasonof drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or byreasonofconvictionofanoffenseinvolvingmoralturpitude.WHO DETERMINES WHETHER A PERSON IS UNFIT TO BE ANADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTOR?

• Thecourthasthediscretiontodecidewhetheroneisunfitornot

CANTHECOURTNOTAPPOINTTHENAMEDEXECUTORINTHEWILL?• Yesiftheexecutorfailstocomplywithhisdutiesasanexecutor

EXECUTOR

ADMINISTRATOR

Person named in the will to administer thedecedent’s estate and carry out theprovisionsthereof

Personappointedbythecourttoadministerthe estate where the decedent diedintestateorwherethewillwasvoidandnotallowed to probate, or where no executorwasnamedinthewill,ortheexecutorwasnamed in the will, or the executor namedtherein is incompetent or refuses to serveassuch

Section 2. Executor of executor not to administer estate. The executor of anexecutorshallnot,assuch,administertheestateofthefirsttestator.



Section3.Marriedwomenmayserve.Amarriedwomanmayserveasexecutrixor administratrix, and the marriage of a single woman shall not affect herauthoritysotoserveunderapreviousappointment.Section4.Letterstestamentary issuedwhenwillallowed.Whenawillhasbeenproved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to thepersonnamedasexecutortherein,ifheiscompetent,acceptsthetrust,andgivesbondasrequiredbytheserules.Section5.Wheresomecoexecutorsdisqualifiedothersmayact.Whenalloftheexecutorsnamedinawillcannotactbecauseofincompetency,refusaltoacceptthe trust, or failure to give bond, on the part of one ormore of them, letterstestamentarymayissuetosuchofthemasarecompetent,acceptandgivebond,andtheymayperformthedutiesanddischargethetrustrequiredbythewill.Section6.Whenandtowhomlettersofadministrationgranted.Ifnoexecutorisnamedinthewill,ortheexecutororexecutorsareincompetent,refusethetrust,orfailtogivebond,orapersondiesintestate,administrationshallbegranted:(a)Tothesurvivinghusbandorwife,asthecasemaybe,ornextofkin,orboth,inthediscretionofthecourt,ortosuchpersonassuchsurvivinghusbandorwife,ornextofkin,requeststohaveappointed,ifcompetentandwillingtoserve;(b) If suchsurvivinghusbandorwife,as thecasemaybe,ornextofkin,or theperson selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband orwidow,ornextofkin,neglectsforthirty(30)daysafterthedeathofthepersontoapplyforadministrationortorequestthatadministrationbegrantedtosomeotherperson,itmaybegrantedtooneormoreoftheprincipalcreditors,ifmaybegrantedtooneormoreoftheprincipalcreditors,ifcompetentandwillingtoserve;(c)Ifthereisnosuchcreditorcompetentandwillingtoserve,itmaybegrantedtosuchotherpersonasthecourtmayselect.ATWHATINSTANCESMAYCO‐ADMINISTRATORSBEAPPOINTEDBYTHECOURT?

1. To have the benefit of judgment and perhaps, at all times, to havedifferentinterestsrepresented

2. Where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions berepresentedinthemanagementoftheestate

3. Wheretheestateislarge,orfromanycause,anintricateandperplexingonetosettle

4. Tohaveallinterestedpartiessatisfiedandtherepresentationtoworkinharmonyforthebestinterestsoftheestate

5. When a person is entitled to the administration of an estate desiresanothercompetentassociatedwithhiminoffice

74 GUERREROV.TERAN 13PHIL212FACTS:TeranwaspreliminarilytheadministratoroftheestateofAntonioMunoz.Heonlyservedasadministratorof theestate foraperiodandwassubsequentlychangedwhenMariaMunozwasappointedasguardianofthepropertiesoftheheirsintheestateofAntonio.Mariawashoweverchangedasguardian/administratorwhenitwasshownshewasn’taresidentofthePhilippines.Subsequently,Guerrerofiledacase against Teran for differences in account of the properties of thewards theformer represents. Teran counterclaimed that it was the other way around—Guerrero was the one who owed him. The trial court held that Teran wasaccountableforannamountofmoney.HELD:The administrators of an estate belonging to minors is liable to them for themanagement of their interests therein from the time of his acceptance of theappointment until his removal or release. If such administrator has in themeantime, permitted other persons to intervene in the management, theresponsibilityfortheiractsfallsuponhim.Theadministratorhowevermayhavearightofactionagainstsuchpersonsforanylossoccasionedbytheirnegligenceorcorruption.Inthecaseatbar,Teranwouldbeheldliableforaccountsduringtheperiodhewastheadministratorof theestate. Therecords failedtoadducethatlosseswereincurredduringthesaidperiod.However,TeranacknowledgesthatheowedaminimalamountofmoneytoGuerrero.WithrespecttotheissueoftheremovalofMunozasadministratorbyvirtueofhernon‐residencestatus,thereisnothinginlawwhichrequiresthecourtstoappointresidents only as administrators or executors. However, notwithstanding lack ofstatutoryrequirements,thecourtswill finddifficulty insafeguardingthe interestsof thewards by appointing administrators and guardianswho are not personallysubjecttotheirjurisdiction.



75 SIOCANAVASV.GARCIA 44PHIL711FACTS:Sioca is thewidowofthedecedent. Shequestionedthecourt fornotappointingherasadministratorofherlatehusband’sestatebutinstead,appointedanother.HELD:It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficientreason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to theadministration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoyingsuchpreferentialrights isunsuitable,thecourtmayappointanotherperson. Thedetermination of a person's suitability for the office of administrator rests, to agreat extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power ofappointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless itappearsaffirmativelythatthecourtbelowwasinerror.Inthepresentcasethecourtbaseditsrulingonthefactthatitappearedfromtherecord in Civil Case No. 1041 of the same court, that the appellant had adverseinterest in the estate of such a character as to render him unsuitable asadministrator. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind orhostilitytothoseimmediatelyinterestedintheestate.(18Cyc.,93,94.)Thecourtbelow therefore stated facts whichmay constitute sufficient grounds for settingasidetheappellant'spreferentialrightsandwhich, intheabsenceofprooftothecontrary,mustbepresumedsufficient.76 MERCADOV.VDA.DEJAEN 64PHIL75FACTS:MonsignorGorordoleftawillwhenhedied.Inthesaidwill,heinstitutedhissisterassoleheirandincaseofherdeath,hisnieces.HelikewiseinstitutedMercadoastheexecutoroftheestateandinhisabsence,Espina.Mercadowasdulyappointedas executor and the heirs opposed this on several grounds. They alleged thatMercadowasunfitandincapableoffurtheringhisdutiesasexecutor.Itisallegedthathewouldbebiasasa legacywasprovidedforhisparish. Themotionoftheheirswasdeniedbythecourt.

HELD:Thereasonsadvancedbytheappellantsdonotseemtocarrysufficientweighttowarrant the reversalof theappealedorders.When the retiredbishopMonsignorJuan Bautista Perfecto Gorordo chose Father EmilianoMercado as executor andadministratorofhisestateafterhisdeath,hemusthavehadgoodandsufficientreasonstherefore,andhiswillmustberespected.Theevidenceshowsthatwhenthe deceased bishopmade his will naming said priest in preference to anybodyelse, he was in the full enjoyment of his intellectual faculties. Under thecircumstances,itisnotonlyjustbutalsorighttofullycomplywithhislastwill;andthisispreciselywhatthelowercourtdidinconfirmingtheappointmentofFatherMercado as executor herein. As a matter of fact, section 641 of Act No. 190providesthatwhenawillhasbeenprobedandallowed,thecourtisboundtoissueletterstestamentarythereontothepersonnamedasexecutorthereinprovidedheaccepts the trust and gives the bond as required by law, which Father EmilianoMercado certainly didwillingly before assuming his trust.While it is true, as theappellantscontend,thatthisprovisionofthelawshouldnotbestrictlyinterpretedbecausethecourtwouldbedeprivedofitspowernottoappoint,incertaincases,onewhoisunworthyofthetrust,notwithstandingthefactthathewasnamedassuchbythetestator(sec.653,ActNo.190);itisalsotruethatinordertodothis,the unworthiness, incapacity, ineptitude and unfitness of such person must bemanifestandrealandnotmerelyimaginary.77 OZAETAV.PECSON 93PHIL416FACTS:CarlosPalancawasabletoleaveawillbeforehedied.HenamedthereinOzaetaasexecutorofthewillincaseofunavailabilityofGeneralRoxas.WhenPalancadied,Roxas died after and Ozaeta was prompted to file a petition for the probate ofPalanca’swill,withtheprayerofbeingappointedasaspecialadministrator. Theheirsopposed theappointment. Thebankpreviouslyappointedasadministratorresignedongroundsofconflictofinterest.HELD:It should be noted at the outset that Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, under theprovisions ofwhich the order appealed fromwasmade, grants discretion to theprobatecourttoappointornottoappointaspecialadministrator.Itissilentastothepersonthatmaybeappointedasspecialadministrator,unlikesection6ofRule79, which expressly gives the order of preference of the persons that may be



appointedregularadministrator.Theappointmentofspecialadministrators isnotgoverned by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators.However,thatwhilethechoiceofthepersonlieswithinthecourt'sdiscretion,suchdiscretion should not be awhimsical one, but one that is reasonable and logicalandinaccordwithfundamentallegalprinciplesandjustice.Thefactthatajudgeisgranted discretion does not authorize him to become partial, or to make hispersonal likesanddislikesprevailover,orhispassionstorule,hisjudgment.Suchdiscretionmustbebasedon reasonand legalprinciple, and itmustbeexercisedwithin the limits thereof.And there isno reasonwhy the same fundamentalandlegalprinciplesgoverningthechoiceofaregularadministratorshouldnotbetakenintoaccountintheappointmentofthespecialadministrator.The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessaryconcomitantofhis right todisposeofhisproperty in themannerhewishes. It isnaturalthatthetestatorshoulddesiretoappointoneofhisconfidence,onewhocanbetrustedtocarryouthiswishesinthedisposaloftheestate.Thecurtailmentofthisrightmaybeconsideredasacurtailmentoftherighttodispose.Andastherightsgrantedbywill takeeffect fromthe timeofdeath, themanagementofhisestateby theadministratorofhis choice shouldbemadeas soonaspracticable,whennoreasonableobjectiontohisassumptionofthetrustcanbeinterposedanylonger. It hasbeenheld thatwhenawill hasbeenadmitted toprobate, it is thedutyof the court to issue letters testamentary to thepersonnamedas executoruponhisapplication. It isthetestatorthatappointshisexecutor,asthequestionas tohis peculiar fitness for suchaposition orhiswantof ability tomanage theestatecannotbeaddressedtothediscretionofthecountyjudge.Inthecaseatbar,thewillhasalreadybeenadmittedtoprobate,andrespondentjudgehimselfhasexpresslyappointedpetitionerasadministrator.Theonlyreasonorground,therefore,forsuspendinghisappointment,andfortheappointmentofaspecialadministrator,whoisnotthepetitionerhimself,isaverytechnicalone.Italso appears that the Philippine Trust Company, which had acted as specialadministratorforaperiodofonlyafewmonths,hassubmittedabillforP90,000.This would cut deep into the income of the estate, and if the new specialadministratorappointedbytherespondentjudgetakesoffice,itisnotimprobablethat the estate may again be subjected to the same expensive cost ofadministration.Underthesecircumstances, itwouldseemunreasonabletorefusetoappointthepetitionerasspecialadministrator.Todosowouldbedelayingthefulfillmentof thewishesof the testatorandsubjecting theestate tounnecessaryexpense.//

78 DEGUZMANV.LIMCOLIOC 68PHIL673FACTS:LimcoliocopposedtheappointmentofApolinariodeGuzmanasco‐administratorof the estate of the deceased. It turns out that Apolinario is the brother of thepresent administrator, Nicolasa. The estate is that of their father’s and iscomposedofmanyfisheriesandotherproperties.HELD:Asheldinthecaseinvolvingthesameparties,theprincipalconsiderationreckonedwithintheappointmentoftheadministratoroftheestateofadeceasedpersonistheinterestinsaidestateoftheonebeappointedassuchadministrator.Thisisthesameconsiderationwhichthelawtakesintoaccountinestablishingthepreferenceof the widow to administer the estate of her husband, upon the latter's death,because she is supposed tohavean interest therein as apartner in the conjugalpartnership. But this preference established by law is not absolute, if there areother reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other than thesurviving spouse. If the interest in the estate is what principally determines thepreference in the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceasedperson, and if, under the circumstances of each case, it develops that there isanotherwhohasmore interest thereinthanthesurvivingspouse, thepreferenceestablishedinthelatter'sfavorfallstotheground.Thesamereasonsareapplicabletothecaseunderconsideration,inasmuchastheappointed co‐administrator, Apolinario de Guzman � as brother of Nicolasa deGuzmanwhomthelatterneedstohelpherintheadministrationofthepropertiesleft by their deceased father, many of which consist in fisheries situated in theprovinces � is as interested as his sister in that said properties be dulyadministeredandconservedforthebenefitoftheheirs.ItistruethatApolinariodeGuzman's father,ProcesodeGuzman, in life, filedacomplaintagainsthis sononthegroundthatthelatter,asadministratorofhisfather'sestate,misappropriatedcash,butsaidcomplaintwasdismissedattheinstanceofthefatherhimself.Inthepresentcase,asidefromthefactthatApolinariodeGuzman,asco‐administrator,will administer properties in which he has a greater share than that of theoppositor,thechildlesswidowofthedeceasedbyasecondmarriage,andwillactmerely as a helper of his sister, there is no ground to believe that he wouldsquandersaidpropertiesandtheproductsthereof.



79 GONZALESV.AGUINALDO 190SCRA112FACTS:In the estate proceedings of Ramona Gonzales, two of her four children wereappointed as co‐administratix. While one was in the US to accompany her sickhusband to treatment, theother filed amotion in court for her removal. Itwasalleged that there is conflict between the two co‐administratrices as well ascontinuedmisunderstandings.Withoutreallyhearingthesideoftheadministratrixsoughttoberemoved,thecourtissuedanorderforherremoval.HELD:In the appointmentof the administrator of the estateof a deceasedperson, theprincipalconsiderationreckonedwithistheinterestinsaidestateoftheonetobeappointedasadministrator.ThisisthesameconsiderationwhichSection6ofRule78takesintoaccountinestablishingtheorderofpreferenceintheappointmentofadministrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is thatthosewhowillreapthebenefitofawise,speedy,economicaladministrationoftheestate,or,ontheotherhand,suffertheconsequencesofwaste, improvidenceormismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive toadministertheestatecorrectly.

Administratorshavesuchaninterestintheexecutionoftheirtrustasentitlethemtoprotectionfromremovalwithoutjustcause.Hence,Section2ofRule82oftheRules of Court provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the court toremoveanadministrator.

Whileitisconcededthatthecourtisinvestedwithamplediscretionintheremovalof an administrator, it howevermust have some fact legally before it in order tojustifyaremoval.Theremustbeevidenceofanactoromissiononthepartoftheadministratornotconformabletoor indisregardoftherulesortheordersofthecourt, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of theadministrator. In making such a determination, the court must exercise goodjudgment,guidedbylawandprecedents.Inthepresentcase,thecourtreliednotonthefactsallegedbythemotionsfiledbythe parties but on the alleged conflicts andmisunderstandings between the co‐administrators. Yes, co‐administratorsmust have harmonious relationships with

each other. Nonetheless, but mere disagreements without misconduct doesn’tjustifyremoval.

RULE79OPPOSINGISSUANCEOFLETTERSTESTAMENTARY.PETITIONANDCONTESTFOR

LETTERSOFADMINISTRATION

Section1.Opposition to issuanceof letters testamentary.Simultaneouspetitionfor administration. Any person interested in a will may state in writing thegroundswhyletterstestamentaryshouldnotissuetothepersonsnamedthereinasexecutors,oranyofthem,andthecourt,afterhearinguponnotice,shallpassupon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petitionmay, at the time, be filed forlettersofadministrationwiththewillannexed.Section2.Contentsofpetitionforlettersofadministration.Apetitionforlettersofadministrationmustbefiledbyaninterestedpersonandmustshow,sofarasknowntothepetitioner:(a)Thejurisdictionalfacts;(b)Thenames,ages,andresidencesoftheheirs,andthenamesandresidencesofthecreditors,ofthedecedent;(c)Theprobablevalueandcharacterofthepropertyoftheestate;(d)Thenameofthepersonforwhomlettersofadministrationareprayed.But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters ofadministration.Section 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof.When a petition forlettersofadministration is filed inthecourthaving jurisdiction,suchcourtshallfixatimeandplaceforhearingthepetition,andshallcausenoticethereoftobegiventotheknownheirsandcreditorsofthedecedent,andtoanyotherpersonsbelievedtohavean interest intheestate, inthemannerprovided insections3and4ofRule76.Section4.Oppositiontopetitionforadministration.Anyinterestedpersonmay,by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of theincompetency of the person for whom letters are prayed therein, or on theground of the contestant's own right to the administration, andmay pray thatletters issue to himself, or to any competent person or person named in theopposition.



Section5.Hearingandorderforletterstoissue.Atthehearingofthepetition,itmust first be shown that notice has been given as hereinabove required, andthereafter the court shall hear the proofs of the parties in support of theirrespectiveallegations,andifsatisfiedthatthedecedentleftnowill,orthatthereis no competent and willing executor, it shall order the issuance of letters ofadministrationtothepartybestentitledthereto.Section 6.When letters of administration granted to any applicant. Letters ofadministrationmaybegrantedtoanyqualifiedapplicant,thoughitappearsthatthereareother competentpersonshavingbetter right to theadministration, ifsuch persons fail to appear when notified and claim the issuance of letters tothemselves.80 JOHANNESV.HARVEY 43PHIL175FACTS:Carmen diedwhile residing in Singapore. Shewas survived by her husband andbrothersandsisters.EstateproceedingswereheldinSingapore.Herhusbandwasappointedas theadministrator. Thereafter,estateproceedingswas institutedbyoneofthedeceased’sbrotherinthePhilippines.Thehusbandopposedthis.HELD:It isoftennecessary tohavemore thanoneadministrationofanestate.Whenapersondiesintestateowningpropertyinthecountryofhisdomicileaswellasinaforeign country, administration ishad inboth countries. Thatwhich is granted inthe jurisdictionofdecedent's lastdomicile is termedtheprincipaladministration,whileanyotheradministration is termedtheancillaryadministration.The reasonforthelatterisbecauseagrantofadministrationdoesnotexpropriovigorehaveany effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, anadministrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in theUnited States.Theancillaryadministrationisproper,wheneverapersondies,leavinginacountryother than that of his las domicile, property to be administered in the nature ofassetsofthedecedent,liableforhisindividualdebtsortobedistributedamonghisheirs.The principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile of the lateCarmenTheodoraJohannesinSingapore,StraitsSettlements.Whatissoughtinthe

Philippine Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliaryadministration,conformabletotheprovisionsofsections601,602,and603oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.Thepropercourseofprocedurewouldbefortheancillaryadministrator topay the claimsof creditors, if therebe any, settle the accounts,and remit the surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction, for distribution among thenextofkin.Suchadministrationappearstoberequiredinthisjurisdictionsincetheprovisions of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permit of thesettlementofcertainestateswithoutlegalproceedings,havenotbeenmet.81 GUTIERREZDEOCAMPOV.CALDERON 59PHIL631FACTS:The decedent was a bachelor and left no ascendants. He was survived by hisbrotherandsister,aswellashisillegitimatechildren.Therebeingnoforcedheirs,he instituted his illegitimate children as his beneficiaries upon his death. Hisbrotherandsisteropposedthis.HELD:Asstatedabovetheappellantsinthiscasearenotforcedheirsofthedeceasedandthereforehavenorighttoanypartofthepropertyleftbythetestator,oncehehaddisposed of the same by will. If any of them were forced heirs they would beentitled to intervene in this case andprotect their interest in so far as theymayhavebeenprejudicedby thewill. It isevident therefore that theyhavenotbeeninjured or prejudiced in anymannerwhatsoever. Only forced heirswhose rightshavebeenprejudicedhavearighttointerveneinacaseofthischaracter.82 TRILLANAV.CRISOSTOMO 89PHIL710FACTS:Crisostomoandothersappealedthedenialoftheirpetitionforreliefof judgmentoftheprobateofthewillofthedeceased.Theyallegedthatthejudgmentallowingtheprobateof the laterwillwasprocuredby fraud, that thecourterredwhen itdidn’tsetadateforprovingtheprobateoftheAugust1948willandthefailuretoprovewasduetothecourt’sownfaultandnegligence.HELD:



The petitioners‐appellants having failed to show that the judgment of the lowercourtofJanuary5,1948,probatingthewilloftestatrixofOctober19,wasobtainedthroughfraud,thelowercourtdidnotcommitanyerrorindenyingtheappellant'spetitionforreliefundersec.2,Rule38oftheRulesofCourt,andthereforeitisnotnecessaryforustodiscussandpassupontheotherpropositionsoftheappellant.Besides, evenassumingwithoutdeciding, thatunder sec. 3ofRule77, the courtshallsetasideadateforprovingawillevenwithoutpetitionwhenitisdeliveredtothe,courthavingjurisdiction,ascontendedbytheappellants,thelowercourtwasrightinnotsettingadateforprovingthewillofAugust16,1948,becausethiswillwasexpresslyandabsolutelyrevokedbythewillofOctober19,1948,executedbythe same executrix or deceased, which was filed for allowance on November 1,1948,with the samecourt.According to theattorneys for theappellant, thewilldatedAugust16,1948,wassenttogetherwithawritingcalled"Manifestation"byregisteredmailonOctober30,1948,fromManilatotheCourtofFirstInstanceofBulacan,byAttorneyMr.TomasV.Barnes,andsaidwillmusthavebeenreceivedby the Clerk of Said Court on or after November 1, 1948, the date when thesubsequentwillofOctober19,wasfiledforprobate.Itstandstoreasonthatiftwowillsarepresentedforallowancebutoneofthemrevokedwillcannotbeincludedintheprobateofthelattersubsequentwill,becauseitwouldbeawasteoftimetoallowtherevokedwill ifthesubsequentrevokingwill isallowed.Therevokedwillmaybeprobatedandallowedonlyifthesubsequentrevokingwillisdisallowed.83 GUTIERREZV.VILLEGAS 5SCRA313FACTS:IreneSantosdiedandwassurvivedbyherhusbandandtwonieces,daughtersofherdeceasedbrother. Herhusband filedapetition for the issuanceof lettersofadministration, naming himself and the two nieces as the surviving heirs of thedecedent. He was later named by the court as administrator. Thereafter, anunverifiedmanifestationwasfiledbyAdelaGutierrez,oneofthenieces, incourt,attestingtoadeedofassignmentconveyingallher interest inparticipatingintheproceedings to her sister. On a later date however, another manifestation wasfiledbyAdela,allegingthatthedeedofassignmentmentionedintheearlierfiledmanifestationwasprocuredbytheadministratorbyfraudandthatshesignedthesamebymistake. Sheallegedthatshewasmisledbythehusbandinsigningsaidmanifestation in exchange for money loaned to her by her sister, and that shecontinuously seeks to participate in the intestate proceedings of her aunt. She

thenfiledamotiontotransferthespecialproceedingsinthesamebranchwhereacaseforthenullityofdeedofassignmentwasfiled.Thismotionwasdenied.Adelathen sought that the administrator be ordered to furnish her all records of theproceedings. The administrator opposed this on the ground of the earlier filedmanifestation.Thecourtorderedinfavoroftheadministrator.HELD:It cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos Gutierrez is an indispensableparty totheproceedings inquestion.Her interest in theestate isnot inchoate, itwas established at the time of death of Irene Santos. While it is true that sheexecuted a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that she asked the same to beannulled,which action is nowpending.AlthoughAdela had filed amanifestationdropping herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith the supposedDeedofAssignment,therecord,neverthelessfailstoshowthatactionthereonhadbeen takenby theprobateCourt. Every act intended to put an end to indivisionamongco‐heirsand legateesordevisees isdeemed tobeapartition,although itshouldpurporttobeasale,anexchange,acompromise,oranyothertransaction(Art. 1082,NCC).No serious argument canbeoffered todeny the co‐heirshipofappelleeintheestateunderprobate.Itappearing(ifWeassumethedueexecutionof theDeed of Assignment), that the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicialpartition,courtapprovalisimperative,andtheheirscannotjustdivestthecourtofits jurisdiction over the estate and over their persons, by the mere act ofassignmentanddesistance.Themotion in question is not oneof intervention, but solely a plea to enforce arightandthatistoreceivepleadingsandordersrelatedtothecase.Evidently,theuse of theword "intervention" in themanifestation and pleadings presented byAdela was resorted to for want of another appropriate word. In effect, all shewanted to conveywas that she should participate or continue taking part in thecase for being an original party therein. It was her belief that in filing themanifestationdroppingherselffromtheproceedings(butwhichshelaterinformedthecourttohavebeensecuredthrufraud),herstandingmighthavebeenaffected.Intervention as contemplated by the Rules is a proceeding in a suit or action bywhich a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, eitherjoining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting withdefendantinresistingtheclaimsofplaintiff,ordemandingsomethingadverselytobothofthem;theactorproceedingbywhichathirdpersonbecomesapartyinasuitpendingbetweenothers;theadmission,byleaveofcourt,ofapersonnotanoriginal party to pending legal proceedings, which such person becomes a party



theretofortheprotectionofsomerightorinterestallegedbyhimtobeaffectedbysuchproceedings.TheaforementionedcircumstancesdonotfitAdelaasshewasnotathirdpartytotheproceedingsbutrather,anoriginalpartytherein.84 DURANV.DURAN 20SCRA379FACTS:PioDuran died intestate andwas survived by his surviving spouse Josephine, hisbrothersandsisters, togetherwithhisnephewsandnieces. At theonset,oneofhis brothers, Cipriano, for a consideration, signed a deed of conveyance,bequeathingallishisinterestintheestateofhisdeceasedbrother.After,hefiledapetitionforthelettersofadministrationofhisbrother’sestate,andforhimtobenamed as the administrator. The widow opposed this on the ground of lack ofinterestintheestatebyvirtueofthedeedofconveyancesignedbyCipriano.Thecourtruledinfavoroftheoppositionanddismissedthepetition.HELD:TheRulesofCourtprovidesthatapetitionforadministrationandsettlementofanestatemustbefiledbyan"interestedperson"(See.2,Rule79).AppellantscontendthatthedeedofassignmentexecutedbyCiprianodidnotoperatetorenderhimapersonwithout interest intheestate.Relyingon Inre IreneSantos,L‐11848,May31,1962,theyarguethatanassignmentbyoneheirofhisshareintheestatetoaco‐heir amounts to a partition needing approval by the settlement court to beeffective;andthattheassigningheirdoesnotlosehisstatusasapersoninterestedintheestate,evenaftersaidassignmentisapprovedbythecourt.ThesituationintheSantoscaseinvolvesanassignmentbetweenco‐heirspendentelite,duringthecourseofsettlementproceedings,properlyandvalidlycommenced.At the time of said assignment, therefore, the settlement court had alreadyacquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate. As a result, any assignmentregardingthesamehadtobeapprovedbysaidcourt.Andsincetheapprovalthecourt is notdeemed final until theestate is closed theassigningheir remains aninterestedpersoninproceedingsevenaftersaidapproval,whichcanbevacatedisgiven.In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no settlementproceedingwaspending.Thepropertiessubjectmatteroftheassignmentwasnotunderthejurisdictionofasettlementcourt.Allowingthattheassignmentmustbe

deemedapartitionasbetweentheassignorandassignee,thesamedoesnotneedcourtapproval tobeeffectiveasbetweentheparties.Anextrajudicialpartition isvalid as between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 forextrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for purposes ofbindingcreditorsandnon‐participatingheirsonly.

RULE80SPECIALADMINISTRATOR

Section1.Appointmentofspecialadministrator.Whenthereisdelayingrantingletterstestamentaryorofadministrationbyanycauseincludinganappealfromthe allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a specialadministrator totakepossessionandchargeof theestateof thedeceaseduntilthe questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administratorsappointed.Section2.Powersanddutiesofspecialadminsitrator.Suchspecialadministratorshalltakepossessionandchargeofthegoods,chattels,rights,credits,andestateof the deceased and preserve the same for the executors or administratorafterwardsappointed,andforthatpurposemaycommenceandmaintainsuitsasadministrator.Hemaysellonlysuchperishableandotherpropertyasthecourtorders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of thedeceasedunlesssoorderedbythecourt.Section 3. When powers of special administrator cease. Transfer of effects.Pendingsuits.Whenletterstestamentaryorofadministrationaregrantedontheestateofthedeceased,thepowersofthespecialadministratorshallcease,andhe shall forthwith deliver to the executor or administrator the goods, chattels,money,andestateof thedeceased inhishands.Theexecutororadministratormayprosecutetofinaljudgmentsuitscommencedbysuchspecialadministrator.85 DEGUZMANV.ANGELES 162SCRA347FACTS:ElainedeGuzmanfiledapetitionfortheintestateproceedingsofherlatehusband.After,shefiledamotionfortheissuanceofwritofpossessionofvehiclesallegedlyownedbytheconjugalpartnershipwhichwerecurrently in thepossessionof the



petitioner,herfather‐in‐law.Shefollowedthisupbyfilinganex‐partemotionfortheappointmentas special administratorof theestateofher latehusband. Thecourtorderednotice tobemade toall interestedpartiesbutnonoticewaseverreceived by the petitioner. The court then appointed Elaine as specialadministratrix. Another order was issued by the court for the taking intopossessionofthevehiclesinpetitioner’spossession.Thisorderhaddifficultybeingexecuted. Petitionermoved for the reconsiderationof the court’s orders on thegroundthatithadnotacquiredjurisdictionduetolackofpublicationandnotice,asrequiredbytherules.HELD:In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquiredjurisdictionovertheproceedingsuponthefilingofapetitionforthesettlementofanintestateestatebytheprivaterespondentsincethepetitionhadallegedallthejurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased person, the possible heirs andcreditors and the probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito deGuzmanpursuanttoSection2,Rule79oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.Differentiation must be made however between the jurisdiction of the probatecourtovertheproceedings fortheadministrationofanestateand its jurisdictionover the persons who are interested in the settlement of the estate of thedeceased person. The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of thedeceased person but the determination of the properties comprising that estatemust follow established rules. The probate court must cause notice throughpublicationofthepetitionafteritreceivesthesame.Thepurposeofthisnoticeisto bring all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so that thejudgmentthereinbecomesbindingonalltheworld. Wherenonoticeasrequiredby Section3,Rule79of theRulesofCourthasbeengiven topersonsbelieved tohave an interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for thesettlement of the estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as tonotice is essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may bedeprivedofhisrighttopropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.Verily,noticethroughpublicationofthepetitionforthesettlementoftheestateofa deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court ordersaffectingotherpersons,subsequenttothepetitionvoidandsubjecttoannulment.In the instant case, no notice asmandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the RevisedRulesofCourtwascausedtobegivenbytheprobatecourtbeforeitactedonthe

motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, toissue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in thewidow's favor, and to grant hermotion for assistance to preserve the estate ofManolitodeGuzman.86 GARCIAFULEV.CA SupraHELD:87 ROXASV.PECSON 82PHIL407FACTS:PabloRoxaswas survivedbyhiswidow,adulterous child, andbrotherand sister.The siblings instituted intestate proceedings, praying thatMaria be appointed asspecialadministratrix. Thisproceedingwashoweverdismissedat the instanceofthe filingof petitionby thewidow for theprobateof her husband’s allegedwill.Correspondingly to this was the prayer to be appointed as the specialadministratrix. The probate was consequently denied for the failure of thewitnesses to sign in the presence of the testator. However, thewidowwas stillappointed as administratrix. This was appealed by the siblings who wantedthemselvestobeadministrators.Thecourtsubsequentlyorderedthewidowtobespecialadministratrixwithrespecttoconjugalpropertiesandthesisterasspecialadministratrixwithrespecttothecapitalpropertiesofthedeceased.HELD:There is nothingwrong in that the respondent judge, in exercising his discretionand appointing the petitioner as special administratrix, had taken intoconsiderationthebeneficialinterestofthepetitionerintheestateofthedecedentand her being designated in the will as executrix thereof. But the respondent'ssubsequentactofappointingherasspecialadministratrixonlyof theconjugalorcommunity property, andMaria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital orexclusivepropertyofthedecedent,doesnotseemtobeinconformitywithlogicorreason.Thepetitionerhasorclaimstohavethesamebeneficialinterestafterthedecisionofthecourtdisapprovingthewill,whichisnowpendingonappeal,asshehadprior to it, because thedecision is not yet final andmaybe reversedby theappellatecourt.



Besides,evenifthewillisnotprobated,thewidowinthepresentcasewouldhave,underthelaw,therightofusufructoverone‐halfoftheexclusivepropertyofthedecedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. The beneficial interestrequired as a qualification for appointment as administrator of the estate of adecedentistheinterestinthewholeestateandnotonlyinsomepartthereof.Thepetitioner being entitled to one‐half in usufruct of all the exclusive properties ofthe decedent, shewould have asmuch if notmore interest in administering theentireestatecorrectly, inordertoreapthebenefitofawise,speedy,economicaladministration of the state, and not suffer the consequences of the waste,improvidenceormismanagement thereof.Thegoodorbadadministrationof thepropertymayaffectratherthefruitsthanthenakedownershipofaproperty.Thereisabsolutelynoreasonforappointingtwoseparateadministrators,speciallyiftheestatetobesettledisthatofadeceasedhusbandasinthepresentcase,foraccording to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only after the dowry andparapherna of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations of the conjugalpartnershiphavebeenpaid,thecapitalorexclusivepropertyofthehusbandmaybe liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried estatemay reach; and if theestateinventoriedshouldnotbesufficienttopaythedowryandtheparaphernaofthewifeand thedebts, chargesandobligationsof thepartnership, theprovisionrelatingtoconcurrenceandpreferenceofcreditsshallbeobserved.Iftwoseparateadministrators are appointed as done in the present case, in every actionwhichone of them may institute to recover properties or credit of the deceased, thedefendantmay raise thequestionor setup thedefense that theplaintiff hasnocauseofaction,becausethepropertyorcreditinissuebelongstotheclasswhichisbeing administered by the other administrator, which can not be done if theadministratoroftheentireestateisonlyone.Asunderthelawonlyonegeneraladministratormaybeappointedtoadminister,liquidateanddistributetheestateofadeceasedspouse,itclearlyfollowsthatonlyonespecialadministratormaybeappointedtoadministertemporarilysaidestate,becauseaspecialadministratorisbutatemporaryadministratorwhoisappointedtoactinlieuofthegeneraladministrator."Whenthereisdelayingrantingletterstestamentaryorofadministrationoccasionedbyanappealfromtheallowanceordisallowance of will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a specialadministrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased until thequestionscausingthedelayaredecidedandexecutorsoradministratorsthereuponappointed,"(sec.1,Rule81).Althoughhispowersanddutiesarelimitedto"collectandtakechargeofthegoods,chattels,rights,credits,andestateofthedeceased

and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed,andforthatpurposemaycommenceandmaintainsuitsasadministrator,andmaysell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A specialadministratorshallnotbeliabletopayanydebtsofthedeceased."Inviewofalltheforegoing,weholdthatthecourtbelowhasnopowertoappointtwospecialadministraticesoftheestateofadeceasedhusbandorwife,oneofthecommunity property and anotherof the exclusivepropertyof thedecedent, andtherefore the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction inrenderingorissuingtheordercomplainedof,andthereforesaidorderisherebysetaside,withcostsagainsttherespondents.88 PIJUANV.VDA.DEGURREA 18SCRA898FACTS:Manuela Ruiz was the surviving legitimate spouse of Carlos Gurrea. They werepreviously living in Spain when the husband subsequently left her, lived in thePhilippineswiththeirson.Healsolivedwithacommon‐lawwifewhilebeinginthecountry.WhenManuelafollowedhiminthecountry,shefiledforsupportandthecourtruledinherfavor. CarloslaterondiedandallegedlyleftawilldisinheritingManuela and their son, as well as instituting Pijuan as executor. The will wassubmitted for probate and pending proceedings, Manuela not only prayed forsupportpendentelitebutlikewise,forappointmentasadministrator.HELD:Upon theotherhand, the lower courtdenied support toMrs.Gurreabecauseofabsenceof proof as regards the status, nature or character of the property nowunderthecustodyoftheSpecialAdministrator.Precisely,however,onaccountofsuchlackofproofthereon,weareboundbylawtoassumethattheestateofthedeceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal partnership, one‐half ofwhichbelongspresumptivelytoMrs.Gurrea,asidefromsuchpartoftheshareofthedeceased in saidpartnershipasmaybelong toherasoneof the compulsoryheirs, if his allegedwillwerenot allowed toprobate, or, even if probated, if theprovisionthereindisinheritingherwerenullified.Inasmuchastheaforementionedestate isworthP205,397.64, according to the inventory submittedby the specialadministrator, it is clear to us that the continuation of the monthly alimony,pendentelite,ofP1,000,authorizedinsaidCivilCaseNo.5820,isfairlyjustified.



It isnexturgedbyMrs.Gurreathatthe lowercourterred indenyingherpetitionforappointmentasadministratrix,for,aswidowofthedeceased,sheclaimsarightof preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. In thelanguageofthisprovision,saidpreferenceexists"ifnoexecutorisnamedinthewillortheexecutororexecutorsareincompetent,refusethetrust,orfailtogivebond,orapersondiesintestate."Noneoftheseconditionsobtains,however,inthecaseatbar.ThedeceasedCarlosGurreahas leftadocumentpurportingtobehiswill,seemingly, is still pendingprobate. So, it cannotbe said, as yet, thathehasdiedintestate.Again,saiddocumentnamesMarceloPijuanasexecutorthereof,anditisnot claimed that he is incompetent therefor.What ismore, he has not only notrefused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for hisappointmentasexecutor,and,uponhisappointmentasspecialadministrator,hasassumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preferenceaccordedby the aforementionedprovisionof theRules of Court to the survivingspouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not tothatofaspecialadministrator,andthattheorderappointingthelatterlieswithinthediscretionoftheprobatecourt,andisnotappealable.89 TANV.GOCHIONGLEE 46PHIL200FACTS:Duringthelifetimeofthedeceased,Gowastheencargado.Whenhedied,Gowasappointedpreliminarilyasthespecialadministratoroftheestate.Hedidhisdutieswithoutopposition fromanyone. Later,hisappointmentasspecialadministratorceased and he began acting as the general administrator. He then askedpermissionforthecontinuousoperationofthetwostoresownedbytheestate,forwhich the court granted him to do so. He religiously submitted reports andaccountsfortheestate,withoutagainanyopposition.HethenceasedfrombeingadministratorandhewasreplacedbyTan.Hewasthereafterorderedbythecourttopay certainaccounts, towhichhedenied for allegedly alreadyhavingpaid forthesame.HELD:Thepermissiontooperate thestoreswasgrantedtoGoChiongLeeonthesamedatewhenhewasrelievedasspecialadministratorandappointed"administradordefinitivo"oftheestate.Heproceededtoactundersuchauthorityforoverayearwithout being challenged by anyone. It would now be preposterous to supposethat the power to run the stores actually granted by the trial judge continued

merelyforaninfinitesimalmomentoftimeonMay25,1920,betweentheprecisemoment when Go Chiong Lee acted under it as special administrator, and thesucceeding moment when he became the administrator. The only reasonabledeductionisthatthepowersofthespecialadministratorhavingceased,andthatatthe same time that they ceasedpermissionwasgiven tooperate the stores, thisauthority was intended for the administrator, or if intended for the specialadministrator, was transmitted to the general administrator as soon as he wasappointed.ThattheattorneyofthedefendantGoChiongLeehadknowledgeoftheadditiontotheorderofthecourtnamingGoChiongLeeadministrator,bywhichthelatterwasboundtorenderwrittenmonthlyreportsofhisadministration,isestablished,but thatsubsequently thecourt tacitlymodified itsorder, is likewisedisclosedbytherecord.Theadministratorwasrepeatedlyenjoinedtosubmitaccountswithoutspecifying monthly accounts. On three occasions the administrator rendered hisaccountswithoutprotestfromanysource.Thatmonthlyreportswouldhavepossessedanyparticularvirtueoverthereportsactuallysubmitted, toplacethecourton itsguardandthustoprotect theestatefrom losses, ishardlyplausible.On thecontrary, that the losses sustainedby theestateresultedfromtherisknecessarilyattendingtheoperationofthetwostores,isamuchmorereasonableassumption.AtleasttheonlytestimonyrefutingthatoftheformeradministratorcomesfromoneVidalReynes,atailorbyprofession,andisnotatallimpressive.Thestandardofresponsibilityoftheadministratorisbestmeasuredasinessencethe responsibility of a bailee. Like any bailee, he must pursue his discretionhonestlyand ingood faith,orhewillbecomepersonally liable, to thosewhoareinterested in the estate, for waste, conversion, or embezzlement. But where anadministrator,entrustedwiththecarryingonofanestate,actsingoodfaithandinaccordancewith the usual rules andmethods obtaining in such business, hewillnotbeheldliableforlossesincurred.

RULE81BONDOFEXECUTORSANDADMINISTRATORS

Section1.Bond tobegiven issuanceof letters. Amount. Conditions. Beforeanexecutor or administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters



testamentary or administration issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as thecourtdirects,conditionedasfollows:(a)Tomakeandreturntothecourt,withinthree(3)months,atrueandcompleteinventoryofallgoods,chattels,rights,credits,andestateofthedeceasedwhichshall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession of any otherpersonforhim;(b)Toadministeraccordingto theserules,and, ifanexecutor,accordingto thewillof the testator,all goods, chattels, rights, credits,andestatewhichshallatanytimecometohispossessionortothepossessionofanyotherpersonforhim,and fromtheproceeds topayanddischargealldebts, legacies,andchargesonthesame,orsuchdividendsthereonasshallbedecreedbythecourt;(c)Torenderatrueandjustaccountofhisadministrationtothecourtwithinone(1)years,andatanyothertimewhenrequiredbythecourt;(d)Toperformallordersofthecourtbyhimtobeperformed.Section2.Bondofexecutorwheredirectedinwill.Whenfurtherbondrequired.Ifthetestatorinhiswilldirectsthattheexecutorsservewithoutbond,orwithonlyhisindividualbond,hemaybeallowedbythecourttogivebondinsuchsumandwithsuchsuretyasthecourtapprovesconditionedonlytopaythedebtsofthetestator;but the courtmay requireof theexecutora furtherbond in caseof achange in his circumstance, or for other sufficient case, with the conditionsnamedinthelastprecedingsection.Section 3. Bonds of joint executors and administrators. When two or morepersonsareappointedexecutorsoradministratorsthecourtmaytakeaseparatebondfromeach,orajointbondfromall.Section4.Bondofspecialadministrator.Aspecialadministratorbeforeenteringupon thedutiesofhis trust shall giveabond, in such sumas the courtdirects,conditionedthathewillmakeandreturnatrueinventoryofthegoods,chattels,rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession orknowledge,andthathewilltrulyaccountforsuchasarereceivedbyhimwhenrequiredbythecourt,andwilldeliverthesametothepersonappointedexecutororadministrator,ortosuchotherpersonasmaybeauthorizedtoreceivethem.

RULE82

REVOCATIONOFADMINISTRATION,DEATH,RESIGNATION,ANDREMOVALOFEXECUTORSORADMINISTRATORS

Section 1. Administration revoked if will discovered. Proceedings thereupon. Ifafterlettersofadministrationhavebeengrantedontheestateofadecedentasifhehaddied intestate,hiswill isprovedandallowedbythecourt,the lettersofadministration shall be revoked and all powers thereunder cease, and theadministrator shall forthwith surrender the letters to the court, and render hisaccountwithsuchtimeasthecourtdirects.Proceedingfortheissuanceofletterstestamentary or of administration under the will shall be as hereinbeforeprovided.Section 2. Court may be remove or accept resignation of executor oradministrator.Proceedingupondeath,resignation,orremoval.Ifanexecutororadministrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according tolaw, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expresslyprovidedbytheserules,orabsconds,orbecomesinsane,orotherwiseincapableor insuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in itsdiscretion,may permit him to resign.When an executor or administrator dies,resign, or is removed the remaining executor or administratormay administerthethetrustalone,unlessthecourtgrantsletterstosomeonetoactwithhim.Ifthere is no remaining executor or administrator, administrationmay be to anysuitableperson.Section3.Actsbeforerevocation,resignation,orremovaltobevalid.Thelawfulacts of an executor or administrator before the revocation of his letterstestamentary or of administration, or before his resignation or removal, shallhave the like validity as if there had been no such revocation, resignation, orremoval.Section 4.Powers of new executor or administrator. Renewal of license to sellreal estate. The person towhom letters testamentary or of administration aregranted after the revocation of former letters, or the death, resignation, orremoval of a former executor or administrator, shall have the like powers tocollect and settle the estate not administered that the former executor oradministrator had, and may prosecute or defend actions commenced by oragainsttheformerexecutororadministrator,andhaveexecutiononjudgmentsrecovered in the name of such former executor or administrator. An authority



granted by the court to the former executor or administrator for the sale ormortgageofrealestatemayberenewedinfavorofsuchpersonwithoutfurthernoticeorhearing.90 SOCIEDADDELIZZARGAHERMANOSV.ABADA 40PHIL124FACTS:

1. Caponongdiedwithdebtspayable to theSociedad. Caponong’swidowwasdulyappointedasadministratrix, togetherwiththeappointmentofcommissionerstoappraisetheestateaswellastofacilitatepaymentofaccountsleftbythedecedent.

2. In the meanwhile, the widow leased the Hacienda Coronacion to acertain Zayco and when she married her co‐defendant Alvarez, ZaycotransferredtheleasetoAlvarez.

3. The plaintiffs after 7 years from the death of Caponong then sued thewidowinherownpersonalcapacityandasadministratrix. Theyallegedthat the widow owed them money, which she used in exploiting theHacienda.

4. Thewidow in turn admitted to her debt payable. The guardian of theminorchildrenofCaponong thensought to intervene,andwasallowedtodoso,andaverredthattheestatedidn’toweanythingtotheplaintiffs.

5. Thereafter, the parties alleged that they had all reached an amicablesettlementandsoughtthedismissaloftheproceedings. Thecourtdulydismissedthecomplaint. Atthispoint intime,the intestateproceedingwasstillpending.

6. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought attachment of properties forsatisfaction of the debt notwithstanding the compromise agreement.They averred that the defendants were not complying with theagreementandsoughtsatisfactionofthedebt.

7. Priortoattaching,thedefendantsfiledanamendedanswer,wheretheyaverredthat thecommissionersonlyallowednamountofmoneytobepaid, that the properties sought to be attached were owned by thechildrenand that the interestof thewidowwas limited tousufructuaryrights.

8. Defendants were in turn sustained by the court and consequently, theclaimsagainst theminor childrenweredroppedand the courtheld thewidowliablefornamountofmoney.Tothis,sheappealed.

HELD:Thelawdeclaresthatcommissionersshallpassuponallclaimsagainsttheestate.Theyhaddoneso inthiscase.The lawfixedthe limitof theestate's liability.Thecourtcouldnotchargeitwithdebtsthatwereneverowedbyit.Theadministratrixcould only charge the estate with the reasonable and proper expenses ofadministration.The estate owedplaintiffs less than P13,000when the commissioners passed ontheir claim. Part of this has beenpaid, and therewas a balance due plaintiffs ofP8,555.78atthetimeofthetrial,plusinterest.Theplaintiffs,aftertheirclaimhadbeen presented and allowed by the commissioners, made advances to theadministratrixtilltheirclaimwasmorethanP68,000.It isurgedthat themajorpartof thisdebtofP68,000 isadministrationexpenses,andassuchischargeableagainsttheassetsoftheestate.Noreasonisgivenwhytheexpenseofadministrationshouldbesogreat,andtheevidencefailstosustainthisposition.The administration expense would be the necessary expenses of handling theproperty, of protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and possiblyproducinga crop,but ifplaintiffs,holdinga claimoriginally for less thanP13,000against the estate, let the administratrix havemoney and effects till their claimgrow toP68,000 they cannotbepermitted to charge this amountasexpenseofadministration. They might be allowed to charge it against the current revenuefrom the hacienda or the net proceeds of the "exploitation of the hacienda" forwhichitwasobtainedandused,asplaintiffsallege,butitcannotrelatebacktothepresenting of their claim to the commissioners, and be a charge against theinheritance of the heirs, or even a claim to prorate with other creditors' claimsallowedbythecommissioners.Byexpenseofadministrationweunderstandtobethereasonableandnecessaryexpenseofcaringforthepropertyandmanaging ittillthedebtsarepaid,asprovidedbylaw,andofdividingit, ifnecessary,soastopartitionitanddelivertotheheirs.Thecourtcouldnotapproveasettlementsaddlingupontheestatedebtsitneverowed,andifitdid,itsapprovalwouldbeanullity.To give effect to the compromise as written would result in great wrong, anddestroy every chance theminor children had to participate in the inheritance oftheirfather.



91 WARNERBARNESV.LUZONSURETY 95PHIL924FACTS:WarnerBarnesfiledacaseforrecoveryofsumofmoneyfromLuzonSurety.ThisispremisedonthefailureofthedeceasedadministratrixoftheestateofGonzagatocomplywiththeconditionsofherbond,andtopaytheallegedclaimsofWarnerfrom theestate. LuzonSurety alleged thatuntil the time that theadministratrixdied,thecourtdidn’tallowheryettopayWarner’sclaims.Luzonalsoallegedthatwere it not for her untimely death, the administratrix could have compliedfaithfullywithherobligationsaswellastheconditionsimposedbythebond.Thetrialcourtruledinfavoroftheplaintiffandordereddefendanttopay.HELD:Itwasproperforthecourttodecideontheclaimagainstthesuretybond.Whilethe probate court has jurisdiction over the forfeiture and enforcement of anadministrator’s bond, it doesn’t mean that the samemay not be litigated in anordinary civil actionbroughtbefore thecourtof first instance. Moreover,wherethere are no proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceasedadministrator, the creditor may enforce then his bond against the surety whichbounditselfjointlyandseverallyinthecasewherethebondwasfiled.92 WILSONV.REAR 55PHIL44FACTS:CharlesRearwasmurderedwhilebeinginhisplantationinCotabato.Wilsonwasappointedasadministrator. Thecommissionerswereabletomakethe inventoryof the properties of the estate and likewise, the claims against it. Theadministrator was then allowed, with the approval of the heirs, to sell all theproperties,duetothefactthattherewasn’tsufficientmoneytosettletheclaims.Afterthesaleandpayment,theadministratorfileditsfinalreportandaccounting.Thiswasapprovedbythecourtnotwithstandingnumerousobjectionsonthepartoftheheirs.HELD:Wilsonwas appointedandqualified as administrator, and the law imposeduponhim legal duties and obligations, among which was to handle the estate in a

business‐like manner, marshal its assets, and close the estate without anyunreasonableorunnecessarydelay.Hewasnotappointedtoactfororonbehalfofthe creditors, or to represent the interests of the heirs only. He should haveadministeredtheaffairsoftheestatefortheuseandbenefitalikeofallinterestedpersons, as any prudent businessmanwould handle his own personal business.Whenappointed,itisthelegaldutyoftheadministratortoadminister,settle,andclose the administration in the ordinary course of business, without anyunnecessarydelay.Neitherdoesanadministrator, inparticular,withoutaspecificshowingoranorderofthecourt,haveanylegalrighttocontinuetheoperationofthe business in which the deceased was engaged, or to eat up and absorb theassetsoftheestateinthepaymentofoperatingexpenses.Yet,intheinstantcase,theadministratoronhisownvolitionandwithoutanyauthorityorprocessofcourtcontinued the operation of the plantation, and in the end, as shownby his ownreport,theestatewasdiminishedandlost.93 LUZONSURETYV.QUEBRAL 127SCRA295FACTS:Luzon Surety issued administrator bonds in favor of administrator Quebral withrespect to twoestateproceedings. Indemnityagreementswereentered into forthepaymentof thepremiumsdue. Because thepremiumswerenot yet paid infull, Luzon Surety sought payment. In themeanwhile,Quebral filed amotion incourtforthecancellationofthebondsbyvirtueoftheapprovaloftheprojectofpartitionandliquidation.HELD:Section1ofRule81of theRulesofCourt requires theadministrator/executor toputupabondforthepurposeofindemnifyingthecreditors,heirs,legateesandtheestate.Itisconditioneduponthefaithfulperformanceoftheadministrator'strust.Having inmindthepurposeand intentof the law, thesurety is then liableundertheadministrator'sbond,foraslongastheadministratorhasdutiestodoassuchadministrator/executor.Sincethe liabilityof thesureties isco‐extensivewiththatoftheadministratorandembracestheperformanceofeverydutyheiscalledupontoperforminthecourseofadministration,itfollowsthattheadministratorisstillduty bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him inconsiderationofthesuretyship.



It isshownthatthedefendant‐appellantPastorT.Quebrar,stillhadsomethingtodoasanadministrator/executorevenaftertheapprovaloftheamendedprojectofpartitionandaccounts.Thecontentionofthedefendants‐appellantsthattheadministrator'sbondceasedto be of legal force and effect with the approval of the project of partition andstatementofaccountsonJune6,1957 iswithoutmerit.Thedefendant‐appellantPastor T. Quebrar did not cease as administrator after June 6, 1957, foradministrationisforthepurposeofliquidationoftheestateanddistributionoftheresidueamongtheheirsandlegatees.Andliquidationmeansthedeterminationofalltheassetsoftheestateandpaymentofallthedebtsandexpenses.Itappearsthat there were still debts and expenses to be paid. To allow the defendants‐appellants to evade their liability under the Indemnity Agreements by non‐payment of the premiumswould ultimately lead to giving the administrator thepower to diminish or reduce and altogether nullify his liability under theAdministrator'sBonds.Asalreadystated,thisiscontrarytotheintentandpurposeof the law in providing for the administrator's bonds for the protection of thecreditors,heirs,legatees,andtheestate.94 COSMEDEMENDOZAV.PACHECO 64PHIL134FACTS:Sorianowastheformeradministratoroftheestate.Toensurecompliancewithhisduties,hewasmadetoissueabond,whereindefendantsactedassureties.Whenthe new administratrix was appointed, the former administrator had accountspayable to the estate. And since he had insufficient funds, the bondwasmadeanswerable.However,havingrealpropertiestosatisfypartiallythepayables,onlya small balance was left to be paid. The sureties sought to be excused frompayment but was overruled. On appeal, the case was remanded to the lowercourt. And on the second time it reached the appellate court, the suretiesquestionedthejurisdictionoftheprobatecourttoorderexecutionofthebond.HELD:It is clear that a Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, isempowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amountthereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty.Possessed,asitis,withanall‐embracingpowerovertheadministrator'sbondandoveradministrationproceedings,aCourtofFirstInstanceinaprobateproceeding

cannotbedevoidoflegalauthoritytoexecuteandmakethatbondanswerablefortheverypurposeforwhichitwasfiled.Itistruethatthelawdoesnotsayexpresslyor in so many words that such court has power to execute the bond of anadministrator, but by necessary and logical implication, the power is there aseloquentlyasifitwerephrasedinunequivocalterm.Whentheaccountabilityofanadministrator'sbond is spokenof in theveryprovisionsdealingwithandbearingdirectlyonadministrationproceedings,itwouldinvolveastrainedconstructiontohold,asappellantswouldhaveusdo,thatwhereanadministratorisheldliableforadevastravitforhavingsquanderedandmisappliedpropertywhichhewasindutyboundtomarshalandconserve,theestate iswithoutaremedytogoagainsttheadministrator'sbondinthesameprobateproceedings,butinanactionoutsideofandseparatefromit.Inthisconnection,itshouldbeobservedthatsection683oftheCodeofCivilProcedureprovidesthat"Uponthesettlementoftheaccountofan executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person liable as surety inrespect to such amount may, upon application, be admitted as a party to suchaccounting, andmay have the right to appeal as hereinafter provided." There ishere afforded to a person who may be held liable as surety in respect to anadministrator's account the right, upon application, to be admitted as a party totheiraccounting,fromwhichwemaynotunreasonablyinferthatasurety,liketheappellants in the case before us, may be charged with liability upon the bondduringtheprocessofaccounting,thatis,withintherecognizedconfinesofprobateproceedings,andnotinanactionapartanddistinctfromsuchproceedings.95 GUSTILOV.SIAN 53PHIL155FACTS:Agripinowas appointed as the administrator of his late father’s estate. His ownmotherandfellowheirsmovedforhisremoval,forallegedlybeingnegligentinhisduties as well as for incurring exorbitant and illegal accounts. Agripino in themeanwhile submitted reportswhichdidn’t coincidewitheachotherandheevenprayedthathebeallowedamonthlysalarythatcreditorsoftheestateopposedto.Thecourtconsequentlyorderedhisremovalaswellas theexecutionofthebondhefiled.HELD:AcarefulexaminationofthefactsrevealedinthisrecordconcerningtheactivitiesofAgripinoS.Gustilo,asadministratorofAngelGustilo, convinces thiscourt thatheisnotafitpersontobeadministratorofthisestateandthathehasnotinfact



administereditsofarwithdueregardtotherightsofotherpersonsininterest.Itisthe opinion of the court, therefore, that he should be removed and required torenderhisaccountsasadministrator,inaccordancewiththesecondassignmentoferror.Thethirdassignmentoferror, takingexceptiontotherefusalofthetrialcourttoordertheforfeitureofthebondoftheadministrator,inouropinioncontemplatesanorderthatwouldbepremature.96 DEGALAV.CENIZAANDUMIPIG 78PHIL791FACTS:Umipigwas appointed as administrator of the estate ofMina. PetitionerDegalasought his removal and upon being denied by the court, filed a petition forcertiorari. Amongothers, he alleged thatUmipig is a stranger to the estate andthathehasanadverse interest totheestate,andassuch,shouldberemovedassoonaspossible.HELD:Undertheveryruleinvokedbythepetitioner,theremovalofanadministratorlieswithinthediscretionofthecourtappointinghim.Thesufficiencyofanygroundforremoval should thusbedeterminedby said court,whose sensibilitiesare, in firstplace, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator notconformabletoor indisregardoftherulesortheordersofthecourt.Wecannotmerelysubstituteourwayofthinkingforthatofalowercourtinmattersunderitsdiscretionarypower.And in thecaseatbar,wecannothold that the respondentJudge gravely abusedhis discretion, particularly in viewof the circumstance thattheallegedgroundsforremovalarenotinfactweighty.First, the fact that the former administrator is his counsel doesn’t automaticallymean that he has an adverse interest in the estate. Second, it doesn’tautomatically mean that when he has failed to pay some taxes, it was donewillfully. It might be the case that there was lack of funds to sustain payment.Third,whetherthestatementofaccountswasfiledontimeandwhetherthesameiscompleteandcorrect,aremattersaddressedtothejudgmentanddiscretionofthe respondent Judge. It may not be amiss to add that the latter will of courseknowwhen to resort to thebond filedby the respondent administratorwho, by

theway,isnotaloneinthetrust,itappearingthathiscounselhasbeenappointedspecialco‐administrator.

RULE83INVENTORYANDAPPRAISAL.PROVISIONFORSUPPORTOFFAMILY

Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returnedwithin threemonths.Withinthree (3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shallreturntothecourtatrueinventoryandappraisalofallrealandpersonalestateof the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In theappraisementofsuchestate,thecourtmayorderoneormoreoftheinheritancetaxappraiserstogivehisortheirassistance.WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INVENTORIED AND APPRAISED BY THEADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTOR?

• RealorpersonalestateofthedecedentARE ONLY THOSE PROPERTIESWHICH IS IN HIS POSSESSION THAT SHOULD BEINVENTORIEDANDAPPRAISED?

• No• Inpossessionorhascomeintohisknowledge

Section 2. Certain article not to be inventoried. The wearing apparel of thesurviving husband orwife andminor children., themarriage bed and bedding,and such provisions and other articles as will necessarily be consumed in thesubstinenceofthefamilyofthedeceased,underthedirectionofthecourt,shallnotbeconsideredasassets,noradministeredassuch,andshallnotbeincludedintheinventory.Section 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor orincapacitatedchildrenofadeceasedperson,duringthesettlementoftheestate,shall receive therefrom,under thedirectionof thecourt, suchallowanceasareprovidedbylaw.97 CHUATANV.DELROSARIO 57PHIL411FACTS:



Santa Juanawas the administratrix of theestateofChuaPiaco. She filed a caseagainstdelRosario,theadministratrixoftheestateofChuaToco,Piaco’sadoptedson. Santa Juana demanded del Rosario to render an accounting on allegedlydeliveredfundsintrustbytheChuaPiacotoChuaToco,whichdelRosarioallegedlyrefusedtodo.JudgmentonthiscasewasrenderedagainstSantaJuanahowever.And in the present case, plaintiffs are the presumptive heirs of Chua Piacowhosoughtpartitionoffunds.Thelowercourtsustainedthedefenseofresjudicata.HELD:Itisthedutyoftheadministratorofthetestateorintestateestateofadeceasedtopresentaninventoryoftherealestateandallgoods,chattels,rights,andcreditsofthe deceasedwhich have come into his possession or knowledge, in accordancewith theprovisionsofsection668of theCodeofCivilProcedure,andtomanagethemaccordingtosection643ofthesameCode;andinorderthathemayhaveinhis power and under his custody all such property, section 702 of the aforesaidCode authorizes him to bring such actions for the purpose as he may deemnecessary.Section642inprovidingfortheappointmentofanadministratorwherethereisnowillorthewilldoesnotnameanexecutor,seekstoprotectnotonlytheestateofthedeceasedbutalsotherightsofthecreditorsinorderthattheymaybeable tocollect their credits,andof theheirsand legatees inorder that theymayreceivetheportionoftheinheritanceor legacyappertainingtothemafterallthedebts and expenses chargeable against the deceased's estate have been paid.Undertheprovisionsofthelaw,therefore,thejudicialadministratoristhelegalrepresentativenotonlyofthetestateorintestateestate,butalsoofthecreditors,andheirsandlegatees, inasmuchasherepresentstheir interest intheestateofthedeceased.Santa Juana, as administratrixof the intestateestateof the lateChuaPiaco,wasthelegalrepresentativenotonlyofsaidestatebutalsoofitscreditorsandheirs.Inviewof this relationof agent andprincipal betweenher and theplaintiffs in thepresent case, the decision rendered against Benedicta Santa Juana, as suchadministratrix, in the formercase isconclusiveandbindinguponsaidplaintiffs inthepresentcase..Afinaljudgmentuponthemeritsrenderedagainstthejudicialadministratrixofanintestateestate,assuch, inacasewhereshe isplaintiffandtheadministratrixofanotherintestateestate,assuchisthedefendant,inwhichsheseekstosecureanaccounting of funds alleged to have been delivered in trust by the deceased,representedbytheplaintiffadministratrix,totheotherdeceased,representedby

the defendant administratrix, constitutes res judicata in another casewhere theheirs of the alleged donor are plaintiffs and the administratrix of the supposedtrusteeisdefendant,andinwhichthepartitionofthesamefundsandtheproductsthereofissoughtbetweentheheirsofboth,underthesameallegationoftrust,theallegedtrusteebeingtheadoptedchildofthedonor.98 ADAPONV.MARALIT 69PHIL411FACTS:Pedro Adapon petitioned the probate of his late father’s will and it was dulyprobated.Hewasappointedastheadministratoroftheestateanddulyfiledtheinventoryofproperties. Thesecondwifeofhis late fatheropposed. Sheallegedthat the administrator failed to account for certain properties owned by thetestator.Heisalsodemandedtopaymonthlyallowancetothewidow.Adaponontheotherhandallegedthatheownedtheproperties indisputeandshouldn’tbeincludedintheinventory.TheprobatecourtdecidedinfavorofAdapon.HELD:Under section599of theCodeofCivil Procedure, theprobate jurisdictionof theCourtofFirstInstancerelatesonlytomattershavingtodowiththesettlementofestatesandprobateofwillsofdeceasedpersons,theappointmentandremovalofguardiansandtrustees,andthepowers,duties,andrightsofguardiansandwards,trustees, and cestuis que trust." As may be seen, the law does not extend thejurisdictionofaprobatecourttothedeterminationofquestionsofownershipthatariseduringtheproceeding.InthecaseofBauermannvs.Casas (10Phil.,392‐393)thiscourt, inpassinguponthesamequestionnowraisedobservedthat"themerefactthatoneofthepartiesis an executor or administrator of a certain estate does not give exclusivejurisdiction to theprobatecourtwherein theestate isbeingsettled,ofquestionsarisingbetweensuchtheexecutorsoradministratorsandthirdpersons,astotheownershipofspecificproperty.Ofcoursewhenit isoncedeterminedthatcertainproperty is the property of the estate is being settled, but until this question isdecided themere allegation that certain property is theproperty of an estate incourseofjurisdictionoverquestionstouchingtheownershipofsuchpropertyandrights based on the right of ownership." InDevesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil., 281), thesame doctrine was reiterated with greater force and emphasis, the court thereholdingthatacontestedclaimofanadministratorthatcertainrightsofpossession



and ownership are the property, of the estate which he represent must bedeterminedinaseparateaction,andnotintheadministrationproceedings."Again,this Court in Guzman vs. Anog and Anog (37 Phil., 62‐63),decided that "whenquestionsariseastotheownershipofproperty,allegedtobeapartoftheestateofadeceasedperson,butclaimedbysomeotherpersontobehisproperty,notbyvirtueofanyrightofinheritancefromthedeceased,butbytitleadversetothatofthedeceasedandhisestate,suchquestionscannotbedeterminedinthatcourseofadministrationproceedings.TheCourtofFirstInstance,actingasaprobatecourt,hasnojurisdictionto,adjudicatesuchcontentions,whichmustbesubmittedtothecourtintheexerciseofitsgeneraljurisdictionasaCourtofFirstInstancetotryanddeterminetheordinaryactionsmentionedintheCodeofCivilProcedure."Finally,in the case of Lunsod vs.Ortega (46 Phil., 676)where the same question like aspresented, the Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated in the foregoing casesstatingthat"itisanestablisheddoctrineofthiscourtthatthemerefactthatoneofthepartiesistheexecutororadministratoroftheestateofadeceasedpersondoesnotconferupontheprobatecourt,inwhichtheproceedingforthedistributionandsettlementofsaidestatearepending,exclusive jurisdictiontodecideallquestionthatmayarisebetweenthesaidexecutororadministratorandthirdpersonsastothetitleofaspecificproperty."99 MOOREANDSONSMERCANTILECO.V.WAGNER 50PHIL128FACTS:InthesettlementoftheintestateestateofSamuelAllen,hiswidowprayedthatthecourtorders theadministrator togiveherandherchildrenallowance. Thecourtorderedforthesame,despiteoppositiononthegroundthattheestateisinsolvent.HELD:Thatthesupportdoesnotencumberthepropertyofthedeceasedspouse,butthegeneralestate,and thatby thegeneralestateor the inventoriedestate ismeantthedowryorcapitalof thewife;wherefore,even if the indebtednessexceedtheresidueoftheestate,thewifecanalwaysbeallowedsupportaspartpaymentofthe income of her property. In any case, the support is given prior to theterminationof the liquidationof thepartnership, and itdoesnot seem logical todenythesamebeforeknowingexactlytheresultoftheliquidation,justbecauseofthe fear that the liabilitieswill exceed the estate, or on the groundof estimatesmoreorlessuncertain,andwithoutanysufficientproofofitsreality.Thejudgeortheadministrator,asthecasemaybe,mustgrantthesupportreferredtoinarticle

1430, when the same is requested, and if the creditors believe that they areprejudicedby suchanaction,by separating from theestateapartof its income,they canappeal to the court therefrom,by satisfactorilyproving that there isnoproperty or asset thatmay, in any case, be allotted to the interested parties. Ithavingproventhatnoproperty,eitherprivateorconjugal,pertainstothesurvivingspouseortheheirsofthedeceased,thesupportcannotbegranted,becausethis,ineffect,accordingtoarticle1430,isonlyanadvancepaymentonaccoountoftherespectiveshareofeachpartner.Such is the case now before us. It appears from the record that the liabilitiesexceedtheassetsoftheestateofSamuelWilliamAllenandthathiswidow,byherownadmission,hadnotcontributedanypropertytothemarriage.Wherefore,itisunlawful, in the present case, to grant the support, having the character of anadvancepaymenttobedeductedfromtherespectiveshareofeachpartner,whenthereisnopropertytobepartitioned,lacksthelegalbasisprovidedbyarticle1430.100 SANTEROV.CFI 153SCRA728FACTS:PabloSanterodied,begottingchildrenfromtwowomen.Onthesettlementofhisestate, on behalf of her children, Diaz filed for the grant of allowance. Sheprovidedinhermotion,theneedtosustaindailyschoolingandotherexpensesofthe children. Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to anyallowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfullyemployedandoneismarriedasprovidedforunderSec.3Rule83,oftheRulesofCourt.Petitionersalsoallegethattherewasmisrepresentationonthepartoftheguardianinaskingforallowancefortuitionfees,booksandotherschoolmaterialsand othermiscellaneous expenses for school term1982‐83 because thesewardshavealreadyattainedmajorityagesothattheyarenolongerunderguardianship.TheyfurtherallegethattheadministratoroftheestateofPabloSanterodoesnothave sufficient funds to cover said allowance becausewhatever funds are in thehandsoftheadministratorconstitutefundsheldintrustforthebenefitofwhoeverwillbeadjudgedasownersof theKawitproperties fromwhere these fundsnowheldbytheadministratorarederived.HELD:Thefact thatprivaterespondentsareofage,gainfullyemployed,ormarried isofnomomentandshouldnotberegardedasthedeterminingfactoroftheirrightto



allowanceunderArt.188.WhiletheRulesofCourtlimitallowancestothewidowandminororincapacitatedchildrenofthedeceased,theNewCivilCodegivesthesurviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the privaterespondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero areentitledtoallowancesasadvancesfromtheirsharesintheinheritancefromtheirfatherPabloSantero.SincetheprovisionoftheCivilCode,asubstantivelaw,givesthe surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during theliquidationoftheestateofthedeceased,suchrightcannotbeimpairedbyRule83Sec.3of theRulesofCourtwhich isaprocedural rule.Be itnotedhowever thatwithrespectto"spouse,"thesamemustbethe"legitimatespouse"(notcommon‐lawspouseswhoarethemothersofthechildrenhere).

RULE84GENERALPOWERSANDDUTIESOFEXECUTORSANDADMINISTRATORS

Section 1. Executor or administrator to have access to partnership books andproperty. How right enforced. The executor or administrator of the estate of adeceased partner shall at all times have access to, andmay examine and takecopies of, books and papers relating to the partnership business, and makeexamineandmake invoicesof thepropertybelonging to suchpartnership; andthesurvivingpartnerorpartners,onrequest,shallexhibittohimallsuchbooks,papers,andpropertyintheirhandsorcontrol.Onthewrittenapplicationofsuchexecutororadministrator, thecourthaving jurisdictionof theestatemayorderanysuchsurvivingpartnerorpartnerstofreelypermittheexerciseoftherights,andtoexhibit thebooks,papers,andproperty,as in this sectionprovided,andmaypunishanypartnerfailingtodosoforcontempt.Section2.Executororadministrator tokeepbuildings in repair.Anexecutororadministrator shall maintain in tenable repair the houses and other structuresand fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to theheirsordeviseeswhendirectedsotodobythecourt.Section3.Executororadministratortoretainwholeestatetopaydebts,andtoadministerestatenotwilled.Anexecutororadministratorshallhavetherighttothepossessionandmanagementoftherealaswellasthepersonalestateofthedeceasedsolongasitisnecessaryforthepaymentofthedebtsandtheexpensesofadministration.

WHATARETHEGENERALPOWERSOFANEXECUTORORADMINISTRATOR?1. Have access to partnership books and accounts, in the case of

partnership2. Tokeepbuildingsandotherpropertiesinrepair3. Toretainwholeestatetopaydebts4. Toadministerpropertiesnotmentionedinthewill5. To bring and defend suits which survived upon death of the decedent

(Rule87)101 CONCEPCIONJOCSONDEHILADOV.NAVA 69PHIL1FACTS:Theadministratrixenteredintoacontractofleaseofoneofthepropertiesoftheestate. Thiswasentered intowithout the interventionof the court. Oppositionwasthenentered,fortheannulmentofsuchcontract.HELD:Thecontracthere inquestionbeingamereactofadministration,couldvalidybeentered into by the administratrix within her powers of administration, evenwithout the court's previous authority. And the court had no power to annul orinvalidate thecontract in the intestateproceedingswherein ithadno jurisdictionoverthepersonofthelessee.102 SANDIEGOV.NOMBRE 11SCRA165FACTS:Nombrewasinitiallytheappointedadministratoroftheestate.Heenteredintoalease contract with Escaler for a period of 3 years. This was done withoutauthorization of the court. Nombre was removed as an administrator and wasreplaced. The court then sought the annulment of the contract, for lack ofauthorization.HELD:TheCourtofAppealswascorrectinsustainingthevalidityofthecontractofleaseinfavorofEscanlar,notwithstandingthelackofpriorauthorityandapproval.Thelawandprevailingjurisprudenceonthemattermilitatesinfavorofthisview.Whileit may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent



(petitionerallegesthatbothact inrepresentativecapacity),are insomerespects,identical, theprovisionsonagency(Art.1878,C.C.),shouldnotapplytoa judicialadministrator.AjudicialadministratorisappointedbytheCourt.Heisnotonlytherepresentativeof saidCourt, but also theheirs and creditorsof theestate (ChuaTanv.DelRosario,57Phil. 411).A judicial administratorbeforeentering intohisduties, is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not true in case ofagency.Theagentisonlyanswerabletohisprincipal.Theprotectionwhichthelawgives theprincipal, in limiting thepowersand rightsofanagent, stems from thefactthatcontrolbytheprincipalcanonlybethruagreements,whereastheactsofa judicialadministratoraresubject tospecificprovisionsof lawandordersof theappointingcourt.103 JARODAV.CUSI 28SCRA1008FACTS:Tan filed a petition for the estate proceedings of Villa Abrille. He was dulyappointed as regular administrator. During the proceedings, he first soughtpermissiontowithdrawmoneyfromthebankaccountofthedeceased.Thecourtfoundthemotionmeritorious.Next,allegingthatthedeceasedwasthemanagerandco‐ownerofasubdivision,hesoughtauthorizationtosell thesame. Hewaslikewiseauthorized.Jarodathenenteredhisoppositionbutthecourtoverruledhisopposition.HELD:The order allowing the special administrator to withdraw the bank depositsstandinginthenameofthedecedentisinabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdiction.Inthefirstplace,saidwithdrawalisforeigntothepowersanddutiesofa special administrator, which, are to take possession and charge of the goods,chattels, rights, credits andestateof thedecease andpreserve the same for theexecutor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose maycommenceandmaintain suits as administrator.Hemay sell only suchperishableandother property as the court orders sold.A special administrator shall not beliabletopayanydebtsofthedeceasedunlesssoorderedbythecourt.In the secondplace, the orderwas issuedwithout notice to, andhearing of, theheirs of the deceased. Thewithdrawal of the bank depositsmay be viewed as atakingofpossessionandchargeofthecreditsoftheestate,andapparentlywithinthepowersanddutiesofaspecialadministrator;butactually,saidwithdrawalisa

waiverbythespecialadministratorofaprimafacieexclusiverightoftheintestateestatetothebankdepositsinfavoroftheco‐ownersoftheJunaSubdivision,whowere allegedly claiming the same as alleged by the administrator in his motion.Thebankdepositswereinthenameofthedeceased;they,therefore,belongprimafacie to his estate after his death. And until the contrary is shown by properevidence at the proper stage, whenmoney claimsmay be filed in the intestateproceedings,thespecialadministrator iswithoutpowertomakethewaiverortohandoverpartoftheestate,orwhatappearstobeaprimafaciepartoftheestate,tootherpersonsonthegroundthattheestateisnottheownerthereof.Ifeventosellforvaluableconsiderationpropertyoftheestaterequirespriorwrittennoticeoftheapplicationtotheheirs,legatees,ordeviseesunderRule89oftheRulesofCourt,suchnotice isequally, ifnotmore, indispensable fordisposinggratuitouslyof assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. Admittedly, no such notice wasgiven,andwithoutitthecourt'sauthorityisinvalidandimproper.Secondly, the order approving the power of attorney executed by administratorTanandappointinghimselfasattorney‐in‐facttosellthesubdivisionlotsforapriceathisdiscretionis,likewise,voidforwantofnoticeandforapprovinganimpropercontractortransaction.The rule requires "written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who areinterested in the estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did notfurnishsuchnotice.Withoutsuchnotice,theorderofthecourtauthorizingthesaleisvoid.

RULE85ACCOUNTABILITYANDCOMPENSATIONOFEXECUTORSANDADMINISTRATORS

Section 1. Executor or administrator chargeable with all estate and income.Exceptasotherwiseexpresslyprovidedinthefollowingsections,everyexecutororadministratorischargeableinhisaccountwiththewholeoftheestateofthedeceasedwhichhascome intohispossession,at thevalueof theappraisementcontained in the inventory; with all the interest, profit, and income of suchestate;andwiththeproceedsofsomuchoftheestateas issoldbyhim,atthepriceatwhichitwassold.TOWHATISTHEADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTORACCOUNTABLEFOR?



• With thewhole of the estate of the deceasedwhich has come into hispossession,atthevalueoftheappraisementcontainedintheinventory;with all the interest, profit, and income of such estate; and with theproceedsofsomuchoftheestateasissoldbyhim,atthepriceatwhichitwassold.

Section2.Nottoprofitby increaseor losebydecrease invalue.Noexecutororadministrator shall profit by the increase, or suffer loss by the decrease ordestruction,withouthisfault,ofanypartoftheestate.Hemustaccountfortheexcesswhenhesellsanypartoftheestateformorethantheappraisement,andifanyissoldforthelessthantheappraisement,heisnotresponsiblefortheloss,ifthesalehasjustlymade.Ifhesettlesanyclaimagainsttheestateforlessthanits nominal value, he is entitled to charge in his account only the amount heactuallypaidonthesettlement.Section 3. When not accountable for debts due estate. No executor oradministrator shall be accountable for debts due the deceased which remainuncollectedwithouthisfault.Section 4.Accountable for income from realty used by him. If the executor oradministrator uses or occupies any part of the real estate himself, he shallaccountforitasmaybeagreeduponbetweenhimandthepartiesinterested,oradjustedbythecourtwiththeirassent;andifthepartiesdonotagreeuponthesum to be allowed, the same may be ascertained by the court, whosedeterminationinthisrespectshallbefinal.Section5.Accountable ifheneglectsordelays to raiseorpaymoney.Whenanexecutor or administrator neglects or unreasonably delays to raise money, bycollecting the debts or selling the real or personal estate of the deceased, orneglectstopayoverthemoneyhehasinhishands,andthevalueoftheestateisthereby lessened or unnecessary cost or interest accrues, or the personsinterestedsufferloss,thesameshallbedeemedwasteandthedamagesustainedmay be charged and allowed against him in his account, and he shall be liablethereforonhisbond.WHEN MAY UNCOLLECTED DEBTS BE CHARGEABLE TO THEEXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR’SACCOUNT?

• If there is negligence, fault or unreasonable delay on the part of theexecutororadministrator

Section6.Whenallowedmoneypaidascost.Theamountpaidbyanexecutororadministrator for costs awarded against him shall be allowed in hisadministrationaccount,unlessitappearsthattheactionorproceedinginwhichthe costs are taxed was prosecuted or resisted without just cause, and not ingoodfaith.MAY COSTS AWARDED AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATOR OR EXECUTOR BEALLOWEDINHISADMINISTRATIONACCOUNT?

• Generallyyes,hemaychargeitinhisadministrationaccount• Exceptionstotherule—

o The actionor proceeding involvedwas prosecutedor resistedwithoutjustcause,andnotingoodfaith

Section 7.What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not tocharge for services as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unlessrenounced.Anexecutororadministratorshallbeallowedthenecessaryexpensesthe care,management, and settlement of the estate, and for his services, fourpesosperday for the timeactuallyandnecessarilyemployed,ora commissionupon the value of so much of the estate as comes into his possession and isfinally disposed of by him in the payment of debts, expenses, legacies, ordistributiveshares,orbydeliverytoheirsordevisees,oftwopercentumofthefirstfivethousandpesosofsuchvalue,onepercentumofsomuchofsuchvalueasexceedsfivethousandpesosanddoesnotexceedthirtythousandpesos,one‐halfpercentumofsomuchofsuchvalueasexceedonehundredthousandpesos.But inany special case,where theestate is large,and the settlementhasbeenattendedwithgreatdifficulty,andhasrequiredahighdegreeofcapacityonthepartoftheexecutororadministrator,agreatersummaybeallowed.Ifobjectiontothefeesallowedbetaken,theallowancemaybere‐examinedonappeal.Iftherearetwoormoreexecutorsoradministrators,thecompensationshallbeapportionedamongthembythecourtaccordingtotheservicesactuallyrenderedbythemrespectively.Whentheexecutorsoradministrator isanattorney,heshallnotchargeagainsttheestateanyprofessionalfeesforlegalservicesrenderedbyhim.Whenthedeceasedbywillmakessomeotherprovisionforthecompensationofhisexecutor,thatprovisionshallbeafullsatisfactionforhisservicesunlessbya



writteninstrumentfiledinthecourtherenouncesallclaimtothecompensationprovidedbythewill.HOWCANTHEADMINISTRATOROREXECUTORBECOMPENSATED?

• Fornecessaryexpensesforthecare,managementandsettlementoftheestate

• ForhisservicesHOW CAN AN ADMINISTRATOR OR EXECUTOR BE COMPENSATED FOR HISSERVICES?

• Itdependsifitistime‐basedorcommission‐based• Iftime‐based,P4/dayactuallyandnecessarilyemployed• Ifcommission‐based—

o 2%forfirstP5000o 1%forP5000‐30000o 0.5%forexceedingP100,000

WHATARETHEEXCEPTIONSTOTHERULEONCOMPENSATION?

1. Whenthedecedentmakesprovisioninhiswillforcompensation2. In any special case, upondiscretionof the court, the settlement of the

estateisattendedwithgreatdifficulty,andhasrequiredahighdegreeofcapacityonthepartoftheadministratororexecutor

WHOISPRIMARYLIABLEFORATTORNEY’SFEES?

• Theadministratororexecutor,subjecttoreimbursementSection8.Whenexecutororadministratortorenderaccount.Everyexecutororadministrator shall render an account of his administrationwithin one (1) yearfromthe timeof receiving letters testamentaryorofadministration,unless thecourt otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claimsagainst,orpayingthedebtsof,theestate,orfordisposingoftheestate;andheshall render such further accounts as the courtmay require until the estate iswhollysettled.WHENSHALLANEXECUTORORADMINISTRATORRENDERANACCOUNT?

• Generalrule:within1yearsince issuanceof lettersofadministrationortestamentary

• Exception: when the court directs otherwise because of extensions oftimeforpresentationofclaimsagainsttheestate,payingdebtsofestate,orfordisposingtheestate

Section9.Examinationsonoathwithrespecttoaccount.Thecourtmayexaminetheexecutororadministratoruponoathwithrespecttoeverymatterrelatingtoanyaccountrenderedbyhim,andshallsoexaminehimastothecorrectnessofhisaccountbeforethesameisallowed,exceptwhennoobjectionismadetotheallowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily established bycompetent proof. The heirs, legatees, distributees, and creditors of the estateshallhavethesameprivilegeastheexecutororadministratorofbeingexaminedonoathonanymatterrelatingtoanadministrationaccount.MAY THE RENDITION OF ACCOUNT BE FORGONE IF THERE IS A PARTITIONAGREEMENT?

• No(Josonv.Joson)• Fortheheirstoknowthestateoftheestateandthishasbeenmandated

bytherulesSection10.Accounttobesettledonnotice.Beforetheaccountofanexecutororadministrator isallowed,noticeshallbegiventopersons interestedofthetimeand place of examining and allowing the same; and such noticemay be givenpersonally to such persons interested or by advertisement in a newspaper ornewspapers,orboth,asthecourtdirects.MAYACOURTAUTOMATICALLYAPPROVEANACCOUNT?

• No• Theremustbethefollowing—

o Notice to all interested parties of the estate—heirs, legatees,devisees,creditors,distributees

o Noticemaybemadepersonallyorbypublication,orbybothSection11.Suretyonbondmaybepartytoaccounting.Uponthesettlementoftheaccountofanexecutororadministrator,apersonliableassuretyinrespecttosuchaccountmay,uponapplication,beadmittedaspartytosuchaccounting.DOESASURETYAUTOMATICALLYBECOMEAPARTYTOACCOUNTING?

• No• Hemustfileanapplicationtothateffect



104 GARCIAV.ESCUDERO 43PHIL437FACTS:Plaintiff’s as the testator’s sisters were the testamentary heirs. Escudero andanother were appointed as administrators of the estate. Plaintiffs subsequentlyprayed for the delivery of properties to them as well as the accounting for thesame.Escuderoassailedsuchmotionbyallegingthattheplaintiffsdon’thaveanystanding in court, the properties in dispute not having been administered inaccordancewiththerules.HELD:The administrator isn’t responsible for the loss, by a fortuitous event, of thepersonalpropertiesunderadministrationintheabsenceofproofthatsaidlosswasduetohisnegligence.Nordoesthefactthatnowrittenevidencewasintroducedtoprovethattheanimalsunderadministrationdiedofrinderpestrenderhimliableforthevalueoftheanimals.105 NICOLASV.NICOLAS 63PHIL332FACTS:DomingoNicolas is theex‐administratorof theestate. Heappealed theorderofthecourt,allowingthe2accountshesubmittedbutlesserthanwhatheprayedfor.Among others, he alleged not being given the opportunity to be heard on theaccounts he submitted. He likewise contested the fact of disapproving certainpaymentshemadeandtheexclusionofsomepleadingsandordershesubmittedtosupporthisclaim.HELD:Whatsection779oftheCodeofCivilProcedurerequirestobetransmittedtothiscourt in caseof anappeal fromadecreeororder approvingordisapproving theaccountsofanadministrator,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofsection778,isacertifiedtranscriptoftheappeal,order,decreeorjudgmentappealedfromandofthe accounts embraced in the order, the inclusion of any other order, decree orjudgment from which no appeal has been taken being unnecessary andsuperfluous. The appealed order is the one dated June 20, 1934, and accountspartially disapproved therein are those submitted by the ex‐administrator‐

appellant, dated August 14, 1933, and March 15, 1934, respectively, whichaccountsappearintherecordonappeal,asamendedbyorderofthecourt.The courtaquo, therefore, committednoerror inordering theelimination fromthe record on appeal of the other pleadings, decrees, orders and judgments notappealed from,which,according to theappellanthimself,arenothingmore thanevidenceoftheservicesrenderedbyhimandhisattorney.Withrespecttotheotherexpensesandfeeswhichtheex‐administrator‐appellantseeks to collect andwhich the lower court, rejected, the lawonly authorizes theadministratortocollectforhisservicesassuchthesumofP4foreverydayactuallyand necessarily spent by him in the administration and care of the estate of adeceasedperson,notforeveryactortaskhemightperform,evenifitweretotakeonlyafewminutestodoso,asindicatedbythenatureofthegreatmajorityofthetask performed by him, for each and every one ofwhich he seeks to collect P4.Thereforethiscourtisoftheopinionthatthe18daysgrantedbythelowercourttothe ex‐administrator‐appellant as actually and necessarily spent by him in theperformanceofhisduties,atP4aday,arereasonable.106 UYTIOCOV.IMPERIAL 53PHIL802FACTS:Paniswas formerly thecounsel for thesettlementof theestateof thedeceased.Uy Tiocowas the administrator. Upon cessation of services, Panis submitted anaccountforthepaymentofhisattorney’sfees.Despiteoppositionbytheguardianad litemof theminor childrenofdeceased, thecourtgranted the requestof thelawyerandorderedconsequently theadministrator topay the formeroutof theestate’sfunds.HELD:Theargumentssubmittedindicateamisconceptionofthecharacteroftheliabilityfor the attorney's fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to theexecutororadministratortoassisthimintheexecutionofhistrust.Theattorneycanthereforenotholdtheestatedirectlyliableforhisfees;suchfeesareallowedto the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for thepaymentrestsontheexecutororadministrator,butifthefeespaidarebeneficialtotheestateandreasonable,heisentitledtothereimbursementfromtheestate.



Suchpaymentshouldbeincludedinhisaccountsandthereimbursementthereforesettleduponthenoticeprescribedinsection682oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.107 DACANAYV.GERNANDEZ 53PHIL824FACTS:JustinianoDacanaydiedandwasoriginallysurvivedbyhislegitimatedaughterandnaturalchildren.ThelegitimatedaughtereventuallydiedandwassurvivedbyherspouseHernandez and children. The deceasedDacanay in this casewas able toleaveawill.Thelegitimatedaughterwasdeprivedofherrightfulshareduetoheralleged disobedience. And despite opposition from Hernandez, the will wasadmitted to probate. On the accounting of expenses, Tirso indicated therein asaccountthepaymentofattorney’sfees.Thiswasoneofthethingscontested,onthegroundthatthefeesshouldbeshoulderedbytheadministratorhimself.HELD:Aswill be seen, all of the fees relate to services rendered for the benefit of theadministrator himself and for that of the other natural children of JustinianoDacanayandnotforthebenefitoftheestate."The estate cannot be held liable for the costs of counsel fees arising out oflitigationbetweenthebeneficiariesthereofamongthemselves,orintheprotectionof the interest of a particular persons" (Woerner on Administration, 2d ed., sec.516, and authorities there cited). It is true that an administrator may employcompetentcounselonquestionswhichaffectshisdutiesasadministratorandonwhich he is in reasonable doubt and that reasonable expenses for such servicesmaybechargedagainsttheestatesubjecttotheapprovalofthecourt.Butsuchisnot the case here. In this case the administrator deliberately and knowinglyresortedtofalsifieddocumentsforthepurposeofdefraudingthelegitimateheirsofthedeceasedandthroughhisownbreachoftrust,broughtonthelitigationforwhich he now demands reimbursement for counsel fees. We know of no legalauthority forsuchreimbursement in thesecircumstances.TheclaimforP6,175 isthereforedisallowed.108 LACSONV.REYES 182SCRA729FACTS:

Serquina submitted for probate the will of deceased Farlin. There being noopposition, the will was duly admitted to probate. Thereafter, the counselSerquinasubmittedamotionforpaymentofattorney’sfees.ThiswasopposedbytheheirsofFarlin,nonetheless, thecourt favored thepaymentandordered thatthesamewouldconstitutealienoverthedistributionoftheestate.HELD:Anadministratororexecutormaybeallowed fees for thenecessaryexpenseshehas incurredassuch,buthemaynotrecoverattorney's feesfromtheestate.Hiscompensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is in the nature ofexecutor's or administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's fees. In onecase,"agreatersum[other thanthatestablishedbytherule]maybeallowed 'inanyspecialcase,wheretheestateislarge,andthesettlementhasbeenattendedwithgreatdifficulty,andhasrequiredahighdegreeofcapacityonthepartoftheexecutororadministrator.'"Itisalsolefttothesounddiscretionofthecourt.Withrespecttoattorney'sfees,therule,disallowsthem.Accordingly,totheextentthatthetrialcourtsetasidethesumofP65,000.00asandforMr.Serquina'sattorney'sfees,tooperateasa"lienonthesubjectproperties,"thetrialjudgemustbesaidtohave gravely abused its discretion (apart from the fact that it never acquiredjurisdiction, inthefirstplace,toactonsaidMr.Serquina's"motionforattorney'sfees").Thenextquestionisquiteobvious:Whoshouldersattorney'sfees?Wehaveheldthat a lawyer of an administrator or executormay not charge the estate for hisfees, but rather, his client.Mutatismutandis,where the administrator is himselfthecounselfortheheirs,itisthelatterwhomustpaytherefor.Inthatconnection,attorney'sfeesareinthenatureofactualdamages,whichmustbedulyproved.Theyarealsosubjecttocertainstandards,towit:(1)theymustbereasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the importance of thesubjectmatterincontroversy;(2)theextentoftheservicesrendered;and(3)theprofessionalstandingofthelawyer. Inallcases,theymustbeaddressedinafull‐blowntrialandnotonthebarewordoftheparties.Andalways,theyaresubjecttothemoderatinghandofthecourts.109 ROSENSTOCKV.ELSER 48PHIL708FACTS:



RosenstockpetitionedthewillofdeceasedElsertobeadmittedtoprobate.Itwasdulyadmittedandconsequently,Rosenstockwasappointedastheexecutor.Onalater date, he filed a motion for payment of additional compensation andallowance.Thiswasapprovedbythecourt.Thewidowofthedeceasedmovedforreconsiderationbutwasdenied.HELD:During thatperiodall of theassets and liabilitiesof theestate shouldhavebeenlegallyascertainedanddetermined. Inotherwordsthecharacterandclassoftheworkwhichdevolvesupontheexecutorisofaverydifferenttypeandnaturenowthanatthetimeofhisappointment.AlthoughbymutualconsenthiscompensationwasfixedatP1,0000permonthatthetimeofhisappointmentthatwasnotvalidorbindingcontractcontinuousthroughoutthewholeadministrationoftheestate.It was always subject to change and the approval of the court and to either anincreaseordecreaseasconditionsmightwarrant.Atalltimesthecompensationoftheprobatecourt.110 JOSONV.JOSON 2SCRA83FACTS:Joson(father)diedandleftawill.Hewassurvivedbymanychildren,ashemarriedthriceduringhis lifetime. Thewillwasadmittedforprobateandoneofthesonswasappointedasanadministrator. Hefiledaccountingreports indifferentdatesandthiswasopposedbysomeoftheheirs,onthegroundthattheshareofeachheir in the yearly produce was allegedly being diminished. Thereafter, anextrajudicialpartitionancompromiseagreementwasenteredintobyallheirs.Thiswasapproved.Despitelackofhearingfortheaccounts,theadministratormovedfortheclosureofproceedings,whichthecourtdulysustained.Thus,thisappeal.HELD:Section1ofRule86categoricallychargesanadministrator"withthewholeoftheestate of the deceased which has come into his possession at the value ofappraisementcontained inthe inventory;withall the interest,profit,and incomeofsuchanestate;andwiththeproceedsofsomuchoftheestateasisholdbyhim,atthepriceatwhichsold."Section8ofthesameruleimposesuponhimthedutytorenderanaccountofhisadministrationwithinoneyearfromhisappointment,unlessthecourtotherwisedirects,aswellastorendersuchfurtheraccountsasthecourtmayrequireuntiltheestateisfullysettled.Section10likewiseprovidesthat

before an account of the administrator is allowed notice shall be given to allpersonsinterestedofthetimeandplaceofexaminingandallowingthesame.Andfinally Section 9 expressly directs that the court shall examine the administratorupon oathwith respect to everymatter relating to his account except when noobjection is made to the allowance of the account and its correctness issatisfactorilyestablishedbycompetenttestimony.Itthusappearsthatthedutyofanadministratortorenderanaccountisnotamereincidentofanadministrationproceedingwhichranbewaivedordisregardedwhenthe same is terminated, but that it is a duty that has to be performed and dulyacted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered closed andterminated. Here the administrator has submitted his accounts for several yearsnotonlymotupropriobutuponrequirementof thecourt, towhichaccounts theheirs have seasonably submitted their opposition. And when the administratormovedthecourttoclosetheproceedingsandrelievehimofhisadministrationandofhisaccounts,theheirswhoobjectedtheretoobjectedlikewisetotheclosingofthe proceedings invoking their right to be heard but the court ignored theiropposition and granted the motion setting forth as reasons therefor what wequotedintheearlypartofthisdecision.Verily,thetrialcourterredinaccedingtothemotionforindoingsoitdisregardedtheexpressprovisionsofourrulesrelativetothesettlementofaccountsofajudicialadministrator.The fact that all the heirs of the estate have entered into an extrajudicialsettlementandpartition inordertoputanendtotheirdifferencescannot inanyway be interpreted as a waiver of the objections of the heirs to the accountssubmittedbytheadministratornotonlybecausetosoholdwouldbeaderogationofthepertinentprovisionsofourrulesbutalsobecausethereisnothingprovidedinsaidpartitionthattheaforesaidaccountsshallbedeemedwaivedorcondoned.While the attitude of the heirs in concluding said extrajudicial settlement isplausible and has contributed to the early settlement of the estate, the samecannothoweverbeconsideredasreleaseoftheobligationoftheadministratortoprove his accounts. This is more so when, according to the oppositors, theadministrator has committed in his accounts a shortage in the amount ofP132,600.00whichcertainlycannotjustbebrushedasidebyameretechnicality.111 PHIL.TRUSTCOMPANYV.LUZONSURETY 2SCRA122FACTS:



PicardwasontheonsetappointedastheadministratoroftheintestateesatateofBurt.Heaccordinglyfiledabond,withLuzonSuretyashissurety.Thereafter,duetofailuretodohisdutiesasadministratorproperly,hewasreplacedbyPTC.PTCreported that it only had in its possession a small amount of money but if theaccountspreviouslysubmittedbyPicardisreferredto,itwouldshowthatPicardisaccountable for a bigger amount of money. As such, the court ordered him todeliverthesame.Failingtoreallyaccountforhisdutiesandaccounting,thebondwasmadeliableandconsequentlyrevokedbythecourt.HELD:Appellant's contention that theprobatecourt,expropriomotu, cannotorder theconfiscation or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is clearly without merit.Whatevermaybetheruleprevailinginotherjurisdictions,inoursprobatecourtispossessedwithanall‐embracingpowernotonly inrequiringbutalso infixingtheamount, and executing or forfeiting an administrator's bond. The execution orforfeitureofanadministrator'sbond, isdeemedbeanecessarypartand incidentoftheadministrationproceedingsasmuchasitsfilingandthefixingofitsamount.Therule,therefore, isthattheprobatecourtmayhavesaidbondexecutedinthesameprobateproceeding.Moreover, theconditionof theadministrator'sbond inquestion is thatFrancisL.Picardshallfaithfullyexecutetheordersanddecreesofthecourt;thatifhedidso,theobligationshallbecomevoid,otherwiseitshallremaininfullforceandeffect.In having been established that Picard disbursed funds of the estate withoutauthority, theconclusion follows thathehadandhis suretybecamebounduponthetermsoftheirbond.

RULE86CLAIMSAGAINSTESTATE

Section 1.Notice to creditors to be issued by court. Immediately after grantingletterstestamentaryorofadministration,thecourtshallissueanoticerequiringallpersonshavingmoneyclaimsagainstthedecedenttofilethemintheofficeoftheclerkofsaidcourt.Section2.Timewithinwhichclaims shallbe filed. In thenoticeprovided in theprecedingsection,thecourtshallstatethetimeforthefilingofclaimsagainsttheestate,whichshallnotbemorethantwelve(12)notlessthansix(6)monthsafter

the date of the first publication of the notice.However, at any timebefore anorderofdistributionisentered,onapplicationofacreditorwhohasfailedtofilehis claimwithin thepreviously limited, the courtmay, for cause shownandonsuch terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time notexceedingone(1)month.WHAT IS THEMAXIMUM PERIODWHEN A COURT CAN ALLOW THE FILING OFCLAIMS?

• 12months• Timeperiod:6monthsto12months• The court can set a period less than 12 months but not less than 6

monthsWHENDOESTHE1‐MONTHPERIODCOMMENCE?

• FromapprovalofthecourtCANTHECOURTSETALESSERTIMEPERIOD?

• Yes,the1‐monthisthemaximumperiodSection3.Publicationofnoticetocreditors.Everyexecutororadministratorshall,immediately after the notice to creditors is issued, cause the same to bepublished three (3)weeks successively in a newspaper of general circulation intheprovince,and tobeposted for the sameperiod in fourpublicplaces in theprovince and in two public places in themunicipality where the decedent lastresided.WHATARETHEPOSTINGANDPUBLICATIONREQUIREMENTS?

1. Publication in newspapers of general circulation once aweek for threeconsecutiveweeks

2. Postingofnoticeforsameperiodinfourpublicplacesintheprovince3. Postingofnoticeforsameperiodintwopublicplacesinthemunicipality

wheredecedentlastresidedSection4.Filingof copyofprintednotice.Within ten (10)daysafter thenoticehas been published and posted in accordance with the preceding section, theexecutororadministratorshallfileorcausetobefiledinthecourtaprintedcopyofthenoticeaccompaniedwithanaffidavitsettingforththedatesofthefirstandlast publication thereof and the name of the newspaper in which the same isprinted.



WHATSHOULDTHEADMINISTRATOROREXECUTORDOWITHIN10DAYSFROMPOSTINGANDPUBLICATION?

1. Executeanaffidavita. Alldetailsofpostingandpublicationb. Datesoffirstandlastpublicationc. Nameofnewspaperinwhichitwaspublished

2. PrintedcopyofthenoticeSection 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,expressor implied,whetherthesamebedue,notdue,orcontingent,allclaimsfor funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of the decedent, andjudgmentformoneyagainstthedecedent,mustbefiledwithinthetimelimitedin the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that theymay be setforthascounterclaimsinanyactionthattheexecutororadministratormaybringagainsttheclaimants.Whereanexecutororadministratorcommencesanaction,orprosecutesanactionalreadycommencedbythedeceasedinhis lifetime,thedebtormaysetforthbyanswertheclaimshehasagainstthedecedent, insteadof presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, andmutualclaimsmaybesetoffagainsteachother insuchaction;and if final judgment isrendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall beconsidered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had beenpresenteddirectlybeforethecourtintheadministrationproceedings.Claimsnotyetdue,orcontingent,maybeapprovedattheirpresentvalue.WHAT CLAIMS ARE BARRED IF NOT CLAIMEDWITHIN THE PERIOD SET BY THERULES?

1. Claimsformoneyarisingfromcontract2. Contingentclaimsformoneyarisingfromcontract3. Funeralexpenses4. Expensesforlastsicknessofdecedent5. Judgmentofmoneyagainstdecedent

Section6.Solidaryobligationofdecedent.Wheretheobligationofthedecedentissolidarywithanotherdebtor,theclaimshallbefiledagainstthedecedentasifheweretheonlydebtor,withoutprejudicetotherightoftheestatetorecovercontributionfromthedebtor.Inajointobligationofthedecedent,theclaimshallbeconfinedtotheportionbelongingtohim.

WHEREMUSTACLAIMBASEDONASOLIDARYOBLIGATIONOFTHEDECEDENTBEFILED?

• Itmustbeclaimedfromtheestateasifthedecedentisthesoledebtor• Withoutprejudicetoreimbursementfromtheothersolidarydebtor• Caveat—thecreditorhowever isnotprecluded from filingclaimagainst

theothersolidarydebtorSection7.Mortgagedebtduefromestate.Acreditorholdingaclaimagainstthedeceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon thesecurityandprosecutehisclaiminthemannerprovidedinthisrule,andshareinthe general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose hismortgageorrealizeuponhissecurity,byactionincourt,makingtheexecutororadministratorapartydefendant,andifthereisajudgmentforadeficiency,afterthesaleofthemortgagedpremises,orthepropertypledged, intheforeclosureor other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiencyjudgment inthemannerprovided intheprecedingsectionorhemayrelyuponhismortgageorothersecurityalone,andforeclosurethesameatanytimewithintheperiodofthestatuteoflimitations,andinthateventheshallnotbeadmittedasacreditor,andshallreceivenoshareinthedistributionoftheotherassetsofestate;butnothinghereincontainedshallprohibittheexecutororadministratorfrom redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt forwhich it is held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court shalladjudgeittobeforthebestinterestoftheestatethatsuchredemptionshallbemade.Section8.Claimofexecutororadministratoragainstanestate.Iftheexecutororadministrator has a claimagainst the estatehe represents, he shall givenoticethereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a specialadministrator,whoshall, intheadjustmentofsuchclaim,havethesamepowerandbe subject to the same liabilityas thegeneraladministratororexecutor inthe settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor oradministratortopaytothespecialadministratornecessaryfundstodefendsuchclaim.ATWHATINSTANCESMAYASPECIALADMINISTRATORBEAPPOINTED?

1. Whenthereisdelayintheappointmentofadministratororexecutor2. Whenthereisclaimsbytheadministratororexecutorhimself3. When the proceedings have ended and there are claims against the

estatefiledwithinthereglementaryperiod



Section 9. How to file a claim. Contents thereof. Notice to executor oradministrator. A claimmay be filed by delivering the samewith the necessaryvoucherstotheclerkofcourtandbyservingacopythereofontheexecutororadministrator. If the claim be founded on a bond, bill, note, or any otherinstrument, the original need not be filed, but a copy thereof with allindorsements shall be attached to the claim and filed therewith. On demand,however,oftheexecutororadministrator,orbyorderofthecourtorjudge,theoriginal shall be exhibited, unless it be list or destroyed, in which case theclaimantmustaccompanyhisclaimwithaffidavitoraffidavitscontainingacopyor particular description of the instrument and stating its loss or destruction.Whentheclaimisdue,itmustbesupportedbyaffidavitstatingtheamountjustlydue,thatnopaymentshavebeenmadethereonwhicharenotcredited,andthattherearenooffsetstothesame,totheknowledgeoftheaffiant.Iftheclaimisnot due, or is contingent, when filed, it must also be supported by affidavitsstatingtheparticularsthereof.Whentheaffidavitismadebyapersonotherthanthe claimant, hemust set forth therein the reason why it is not made by theclaimant.Theclaimoncefiledshallbeattachedtotherecordofthecaseinwhichtheletterstestamentaryorofadministrationwereissued,althoughthecourt,inits discretion, and as a matter of convenience, may order all the claims to becollectedinaseparatefolder.Section10.Answerofexecutororadministrator.Offsets.Withinfifteen(15)daysafterserviceofacopyoftheclaimontheexecutororadministrator,heshallfilehis answer admitting or denying the claim specifically, and setting forth theadmissionordenial.Ifhehasnoknowledgesufficienttoenablehimtoadmitordeny specifically, he shall state such want of knowledge. The executor oradministrator in his answer shall allege in offset any claimwhich thedecedentbeforedeathhadagainsttheclaimant,andhisfailuretodososhallbartheclaimforever.Acopyoftheanswershallbeservedbytheexecutororadministratoronthe claimant. The court in its discretion may extend the time for filing suchanswer.Section 11. Disposition of admitted claim. Any claim admitted entirely by theexecutor or administrator shall immediately be submitted by the clerk to thecourtwhomayapprovethesamewithouthearing;butthecourt,initsdiscretion,beforeapprovingtheclaim,mayorderthatknownheirs,legatees,ordeviseesbenotified and heard. If upon hearing, an heir, legatees, or devisee opposes the

claim, the court may, in its discretion, allow him fifteen (15) days to file ananswertotheclaiminthemannerprescribedintheprecedingsection.Section12.Trialof contestedclaim.Upon the filingofananswer toa claim,orupon the expiration of the time for such filing, the clerk of court shall set theclaim for trial with notice to both parties. The court may refer the claim to acommissioner.Section 13. Judgment appealable. The judgment of the court approving ordisapproving a claim, shall be filed with the record of the administrationproceedingswithnoticetobothparties,andisappealableasinordinarycases.Ajudgment against the executor or administrator shall be that he pay, in duecourse of administration, the amount ascertained to be due, and it shall notcreateanylienuponthepropertyoftheestate,orgivetothejudgmentcreditoranypriorityofpayment.Section14.Costs.Whentheexecutororadministrator,inhisanswer,admitsandoffers to pay part of a claim, and the claimant refuses to accept the amountoffered in satisfaction of his claim, if he fails to obtain a more favorablejudgment,hecannotrecovercosts,butmustpaytotheexecutororadministratorcosts from the time of the offer. Where an action commenced against thedeceased for money has been discontinued and the claim embraced thereinpresentedasinthisruleprovided,theprevailingpartyshallbeallowedthecostsofhisactionuptothetimeofitsdiscontinuance.

RULE87ACTIONSBYANDAGAINSTEXECUTORSANDADMINISTRATORS

Section1.Actionswhichmayandwhichmaynotbebroughtagainstexecutororadministrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt orinterestthereonshallbecommencedagainsttheexecutororadministrator;buttorecoverrealorpersonalproperty,oraninteresttherein,fromtheestate,ortoenforcealienthereon,andactionstorecoverdamagesforaninjurytopersonorproperty,realorpersonal,maybecommencedagainsthim.WHATACTIONSMAYBEFILEDAGAINSTANADMINISTRATOROREXECUTOR?

1. Recoveryofrealorpersonalproperty,oraninteresttherein2. Toenforcelienagainstanyrealorpersonalproperty



3. ActionstorecoverdamagesforaninjurytopersonorpropertyWHATACTIONSMAYNOTBEFILED?

• ClaimfortherecoveryofmoneyordebtorinterestthereonSection2.Executororadministratormaybringordefendactionswhichsurvive.For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased, anexecutororadministratormaybringordefend,intherightofdeceased,actionsforcauseswhichsurvive.Section 3. Heir may not sue until shall assigned. When an executor oradministratorisappointedandassumesthetrust,noactiontorecoverthetitleorpossession of lands or for damages done to such lands shall be maintainedagainst himby anheir or devisee until there is an order of the court assigningsuchlandstosuchheirordeviseeoruntilthetimeallowedforpayingdebtshasexpired.Section 4. Executor or administrator may compound with debtor. Within theapproval of the court, an executor or administrator may compound with thedebtorofthedeceasedforadebtdue,andmaygiveadischargeofsuchdebtonreceivingajustdividendoftheestateofthedebtor.WHATDOESITMEANFORTHEADMINISTRATOROREXECUTORTOCOMPOUNDWITHTHEDEBTOR?

• It means to enter into a compromise agreement with the deceased’sdebtor

• Hemaydoso,withtheapprovalofthecourt• Heshallaccountfortheamountrecoveredonthedebtdue

Section5.Mortgagedueestatemaybeforeclosed.Amortgagebelongingtotheestateofadeceasedperson,asmortgageeorassigneeoftherightoramortgage,maybeforeclosedbytheexecutororadministrator.Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulentlyconveyed. If an executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor or otherindividualinterestedintheestateofthedeceased,complainstothecourthavingjurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of having concealed,embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, or chattels of thedeceased, or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any

deed,conveyance,bond,contract,orotherwritingwhichcontainsevidenceofortendsordisclosestheright,title,interest,orclaimofthedeceased,thecourtmaycitesuchsuspectedpersontoappearbeforeitanymayexaminehimonoathonthematterofsuchcomplaint;andifthepersonsocitedrefusestoappear,ortoansweronsuchexaminationorsuchinterrogatoriesasareputtohim,thecourtmaypunishhimforcontempt,andmaycommithimtoprisonuntilhesubmitstotheorderofthecourt.Theinterrogatoriesputanysuchperson,andhisanswersthereto,shallbeinwritingandshallbefiledintheclerk'soffice.Section7.Personentrustedwithestatecompelledtorenderaccount.Thecourt,oncomplaintofanexecutororadministrator,mayciteapersonentrustedbyanexecutororadministratorwithanypartoftheestateofthedeceasedtoappearbefore it,andmayrequiresuchpersontorenderafullaccount,onoath,ofthemoney,goods,chattels,bonds,account,orotherpapersbelongingtosuchestateascametohispossessionintrustforsuchexecutororadministrator,andofhisproceedingsthereon;andifthepersonsocitedrefusestoappeartorendersuchaccount, the courtmay punish him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawfulorderofthecourt.WHOMAYBECOMPELLEDOTHERTHANTHEADMINISTRATOROREXECUTOR,TORENDERANACCOUNT?

• Apersonentrustedbyanexecutororadministratorwithanypartoftheestateofthedeceased

Section8.Embezzlementbeforelettersissued.Ifaperson,beforethegrantingofletters testamentary or of administration on the estate of the deceased,embezzles or alienates any of the money, goods, chattels, or effects of suchdeceased, such person shall be liable to an action in favor of the executor oradministratoroftheestatefordoublethevalueofthepropertysold,embezzled,oralienated,toberecoveredforthebenefitofsuchestate.Section9.Propertyfraudulentlyconveyedbydeceasedmayberecovered.Whenexecutororadministratormustbringaction.Whenthereisadeficiencyofassetsin the hands of an executor or administrator for the payment of debts andexpensesofadministration,andthedeceasedinhislifetimehadconveyedrealorpersonalproperty,orarightorinteresttherein,orandebtorcredit,withintenttodefraudhiscreditorsortoavoidanyright,debt,orduty;orhadsoconveyedsuchproperty,right,interest,debtorcreditthatbylawtheconveyancewouldbevoidasagainsthiscreditors,andthesubjectoftheattemptedconveyancewould



be liable to attachment by any of them in his lifetime, the executor oradministratormaycommenceandprosecutetofinaljudgmentanactionfortherecovery of such property, right, interest, debt, or credit for the benefit of thecreditors; but he shall not be bound to commence the action unless onapplicationofthecreditorsofthedeceased,notunlessthecreditorsmakingtheapplicationpaysuchpartofthecostsandexpenses,orgivesecuritytherefortotheexecutororadministrator,asthecourtdeemsequitable.Section10.Whencreditormaybringaction.Lienforcosts.Whenthereissuchadeficiencyofassets,andthedeceasedinhislifetimehadmadeorattemptedsucha conveyance, as is stated in the last preceding section, and the executor oradministratorhasnotcommencedtheactionthereinprovidedfor,anycreditorofthe estatemay,with the permission of the court, commence and prosecute tofinaljudgment,inthenameoftheexecutororadministrator,alikeactionfortherecovery of the subject of the conveyance or attempted conveyance for thebenefitofthecreditors.Buttheactionshallnotbecommenceduntilthecreditorhas filed in a court a bond executed to the executor or administrator, in anamount approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor oradministratoragainstthecostsandexpenses incurredbyreasonofsuchaction.Suchcreditorshallhavealienuponanyjudgmentrecoveredbyhimintheactionforsuchcostsandotherexpensesincurredthereinasthecourtdeemsequitable.Where the conveyance or attempted conveyance had been made by thedeceased in his lifetime in favor of the executor or administrator, the actionwhichacreditmaybringshallbeinthenameofallthecreditors,andpermissionofthecourtandfilingofbondasaboveprescribed,arenotnecessary.112 DELACRUZV.CAMON 16SCRA886FACTS:TheestateofFallonandMurphyowneda2/4prodivisoshareinHaciendaRosario.Camon was the lessee of the said land long before intestate proceedings havecommenced. Dela Cruz as administrator of the estate, filed a motion in theprobatecourttoorderCamontopaytheestateitsshareintherentalsforacertainspan of years over the rice and agricultural lands. Camon alleged on the otherhandthattheprobatecourtdoesn’thavejurisdictionoverhisperson.HELD:

Here,thecourtsitsasaprobatecourt.Saidcourt isprimarilyconcernedwiththeadministration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. For these purposes,propertyinthehandsoftheestate'sadministratorcomeswithinthepoweroftheprobatecourt.With the foregoing as parting point, let us look at the administrator's claim forrentals allegedly due. The amount demanded is not, by any means, liquidated.Conceivably,thelesseemayinterposedefenses.Compromise,payment,statuteoflimitations, lack of cause of action and the like, may be urged to defeat theadministrator's case.Here, appellee's opposition to themotion served awarningthat at the proper time he will set up the defense that the administrator, asattorney‐in‐factofthedeclaredheirs,hadtheretoforesoldtheestate'stwo‐fourthsshareinHaciendaRosariotogetherwith"alltherights,titleandinterest(includingallaccruedrents)thatsaidheirshadinheritedfromthesaiddeceased."Appellantadministratorinhisreplytotheoppositionadmitsthefactofsaleoftheland,butnotoftherentalsdue.Accordingly,therighttocollecttherentalsisstill inafluidstate.That right remains tobe threshedoutupona full‐dress trialon themerits.Because of all of these, themoney (rentals) allegedly due is not property in thehandsoftheadministrator;itisnotthuswithintheeffectivecontroloftheprobatecourt. Neither does it come within the concept of money of the deceased"concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away", which would confer upon the courtincidentalprerogativetoreachoutitsarmstogetitbackand,ifnecessary,tocitethepossessorthereofincontempt.113 QUIRINOV.GOROSPE 169SCRA702FACTS:This involvesthesettlementof issuesclaimedbydifferentpartiestotheintestateproceedings of Don Alfonso. Mostly are claims for attorney’s fees as well asdifferent expenses incurredwith respect to acts of administration of the estate.Thecourtdecidedtheissuesbypiecemeal.HELD:Ontheissueofclaimsagainsttheestateforattorney’sfeesandfortransportationandrepresentationexpenses…theterm"claims"requiredtobepresentedagainstadecedent'sestateisgenerallyconstruedtomeandebtsordemandsofapecuniarynature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime orliabilitycontractedby thedeceasedbeforehisdeath. It is important tonote that



movants claims for attorney's fees and transportation as wen as representationexpenses are for services rendered to the alleged substituted heirs of Don JuanCastellviandsuchservicesdidnotinuretothebenefitofDonAlfonsoCastellviorhis estate. The court charged with the settlement of the estate of Don AlfonsoCastellvi is bound toprotect the estate fromanydisbursements basedon claimsnotchargeabletotheestate.Withrespecttotheissueofexpensesrelatedtoactsofadministration…Withregardto Floro's claim for payment for services rendered to the estate of Don AlfonsoCastellvi,theruleisthatwherethemonetaryclaimagainsttheadministratorhasarelationtohisactsofadministrationintheordinarycoursethereof,suchclaimscanbe presented for payment with the court where a special proceeding for thesettlementoftheestateispending,althoughsaidclaimswerenotincurredbythedeceasedduringhislifetimeandcollectibleafterhisdeath.Thisisso,becausetheadministrationisunderthedirectsupervisionofthecourtandtheadministratorissubjecttoitsauthority.114 AGUASV.LILEMOS 5SCRA959FACTS:Hermogenes Llemos on the relevant date, mailed a copy of a petition for theissuanceofawritofpossessiontoAguasandothers.Helikewiseindicatedthathewillfilethesame.ThispromptedAguasandotherstotravelallthewaytoSamarwith their lawyers, only to find out that no petition has been filed. Thisconsequently led to a case filed against Llemos but the latter died eventually.Aguas and others then modified their complaint, including therein the heirs ofLlemos.Theyallegedamongothersthatthedeathofthedefendantdoesn’tabatethecauseofactionfortort.HELD:UnderRule87,section5, theactions thatareabatedbydeathare: (1)claims forfuneralexpensesandthoseforthelastsicknessofthedecedent;(2)judgmentsformoney;and (3) "all claims formoneyagainst thedecedent,arising fromcontractexpressorimplied".Noneoftheseincludesthatoftheplaintiffs‐appellants;foritisnot enough that the claimagainst thedeceasedpartybe formoney, but itmustarisefrom"contractexpressorimplied".

Upontheotherhand,Rule88,section1,enumeratesactionsthatsurviveagainstadecedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover realandpersonalproperty fromtheestate; (2)actions toenforcea lien thereon;and(3)actionstorecoverdamagesforaninjurytopersonorproperty.Thepresentsuitis one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury toproperty"isnotlimitedtoinjuriestospecificproperty,butextendstootherwrongsbywhichpersonalestateisinjuredordiminished.Tomaliciouslycauseapartytoincur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to thatparty'sproperty.115 MELGARV.BUENVIAJE 179SCRA196FACTS:Avehicularcollisionhappenedamong2passengerbusesandaFordFiera.ThebusownedbyBella suddenly swerved to the left lane and collidedhead‐onwith theFiera.Itfurtherswervedtotheleftlaneandcollidedagainwiththeotherbus.Thiscausedtheinjuriesanddeathsofmany.ThevictimsinthiscasethenconsequentlyfiledacaseagainsttheheirsofBella—thelatterhavingbeenkilledintheaccident.HELD:UnderSection5Rule86oftheRulesofCourt,actionsthatareabatedbydeathare:(1) All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express orimplied,whetherthesamebedue,notdueorcontingent;(2)Allclaimsforfuneralexpensesandexpensesforthelastsicknessofthedecedent;and(3)Judgmentsformoneyagainstthedecedent.Itisevidentthatthecaseatbarisnotamongthoseenumerated.Otherwisestated,actionsfordamagescausedbythetortiousconductofthedefendantsurvivethedeathofthelatter.TheactioncanthereforebeproperlybroughtunderSection1,Rule87oftheRulesofCourt,againstanexecutororadministrator.Thepointofcontroversyishoweveronthefactthatnoestateproceedingsexistforthereasonthatherchildrenhadnotfiledanyproceedingsforthesettlementofherestate,claimingthatBallaleftnoproperties.Thus,whilepetitionersmayhavecorrectlymovedforthedismissalofthecaseandprivaterespondentshaveforthwithcorrectedthedeficiencybyfilinganamendedcomplaint, even before the lower court could act on petitioner's motion forreconsiderationof thedenialof theirmotiontodismiss, theactionunderSection



17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which allows the suit against the legalrepresentativeofthedeceased,thatis,theexecutororadministratorofhisestate,wouldstillbefutile, forthesamereasonthatthereappearstobenostepstakentowardsthesettlementoftheestateofthelateFelicidadBalla,norhasanexecutororadministratorof theestatebeenappointed. From the statementmadeby thepetitioners that "many persons die without leaving any asset at all" whichinsinuates that the deceased left no assets, it is reasonable to believe that thepetitionerswill not take any step to expedite the early settlement of the estate,judiciallyorextra‐judiciallyifonlytodefeatthedamagesuitagainsttheestate.116 PAJARILLOV.IAC 176SCRA340FACTS:

1. The mother was Juana Balane de Suterio, who had a brother namedFelipeBalaneandasisternamedPerfectaBalanedeCordero.

2. Perfectadiedin1945leavingatractofland.JuanaandFelipeexecutedapublic instrumententitled"Extra‐judicialSettlementoftheEstateoftheDeceased Perfecta Balane de Cordero." These instrumentswere neverregisterednorwastitletransferredinSalud'snamealthoughshesayssheimmediatelytookpossessionoftheland.

3. Meantime, intestate proceedings were instituted on the estate ofPerfectaandthesaidlandwasamongthoseincludedintheinventoryofthepropertiesbelongingtothedecedent.

4. Salud interposed no objection to its inclusion nor did she oppose itssubsequentadjudicationtohermotherJuanaintheprojectofpartition.

5. It isnotclear if the landwaseverregistered inJuana'sname.However,thereisevidencethatJuanaconfirmedtheearlierdonationofthelandtoSaludbutrequestedthatshebeallowedtopossessthesameandenjoyitsfruits,untilherdeath.

6. Salud says that sometime in 1951, acceding to this request, shetransferred the possession of the land to her mother, who was thenstaying with Claudio and his family. During the period they wereoccupyingtheland,Claudiopaidtherealtytaxesthereon.

7. A deed of sale was executed by Juana in favor of Claudio for aconsiderationof P12,000. Years later, Claudio registered the land in hisname.

8. JuanaandClaudiosubsequentlydied.Saludnowcameforthandfiledforreconveyanceof the land,on thegroundthat thedeedofsalewasnullandvoidandwasprocuredthroughfraud.

HELD:ThepetitionerswouldalsofaulttheprivaterespondentsforlachesandarguethatSalud's inaction inprotectionofher rights shouldbarher fromasserting thematthis latehour.Specifically, it ispointedoutthatshefailedtoregisterthedeedofdonationanditsacceptance;didnotopposetheinclusionofthesubjectlandintheinventoryofPerfecta'spropertiessubmitted in the intestateproceedings;didnotobjecttotheadjudicationofthe landtoJuana intheprojectofpartition;didnotprotestthesaleofthelandtoClaudioSuterio;anddidnotquestionitsregistrationinhisname. It is contended thatall theseacts constitute laches,whichhasbeendescribedbythisCourtthus:An estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a rightwithin a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled toassertiteitherhasabandoneditordeclinedtoassertit.Theproblemwiththepetitioners'theoryisthatitwouldregardJuanaandSaludasstrangerswhentheyareinfactmotheranddaughter.Onemayexpectapersontobe vigilant of his rightswhendealingwith an acquaintanceor associate, or evenwitha friend,butnotwhentheotherperson isacloserelative,as in thecaseatbar.Tobeginwith,thelandcamefromJuanaherself.Secondly,sherequestedherdaughternottoregisterthelandaslongasshewasstillalivesoshecouldenjoyitsfruits until her death. To Salud, it was not difficult to comply with this request,comingasitdidfromherownmother.Therewasnoreasontodisobeyher.Shedidnothavetoprotectherselfagainstherownmother.Indeed,whatwouldhavebeenunseemlywasherregisteringthelandagainsthermother'srequestasifshehadnoconfidence in her. Salud did no less thanwhat any dutiful daughterwould havedoneunderthecircumstances.If Salud did not protest the inclusion of the land in the inventory of Perfecta'spropertiesanditssubsequentadjudicationtoJuanaintheintestateproceedings,itwas because she did not feel threatened by these acts. She did not distrust hermother.Moreover, Juana had herself acknowledged the donationwhen shewasasked in whose name the property would be registered following the intestateproceedings.Saludfeltsafebecauseshehadtheextrajudicialsettlementtorelyontoprovethathermotherandherunclehaddonatedthesubjectlandtoher.



117 BERNARDOV.CA 7SCRA367FACTS:Capili andReyeswere husband andwife. WhenCapili died, testate proceedingswere instituted. Hiswillwasdulyprobatedandtheheirsweredeterminedtobehiswidow and cousins. Thereafter, Reyes died andwas substituted by her owncollateralrelatives.Aprojectofpartitionwassubmittedbytheadministratorandthiswasopposedbythewife’scollateralrelatives.Theyaverredthatsomeofthepropertiesofthehusbandweren’thisexclusivelybutoftheconjugalpartnership.Ontheonehand,theotherpartiesaverredthatitisexclusivepropertybyvirtueofthedeedofdonationexecutedbythewifeduringherlifetime,donatinghersharein the conjugal property to her husband. The court found the deedof donationvoidandthatthepropertiesindisputewereconjugalinnature.HELD:Inalineofdecisions,thisCourtconsistentlyheldthatasageneralrule,questionasto title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings,exceptwhereoneof thepartiespraysmerely for the inclusionorexclusion fromthe inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may passprovisionally upon the questionwithout prejudice to its final determination in aseparateaction.However,wehavealsoheldthatwhenthepartiesinterestedareall heirsof thedeceased, it isoptional to them to submit to theprobate court aquestion as to title to property, andwhen so submitted, said probate courtmaydefinitelypassjudgmentthereon;andthatwiththeconsentoftheparties,mattersaffectingpropertyunderjudicialadministrationmaybetakencognizanceofbythecourtinthecourseofintestateproceeding,providedinterestsofthirdpersonsarenotprejudiced.Inthecasenowbeforeus,thematterincontroversyisthequestionofownershipof certain of the properties involved � whether they belong to the conjugalpartnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within thejurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugalpartnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to bedistributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, ofcourse,thewidow,nowrepresentedbecauseofherdeath,byherheirswhohavebeen substituted upon petition of the executor himself andwho have appearedvoluntarily.Therearenothirdpartieswhoserightsmaybeaffected.Itistruethat

the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator‐husband, but thewidowis,inadditiontoherownrighttotheconjugalproperty.Anditisthisrightthatisbeingsoughttobeenforcedbyhersubstitutes.Therefore,theclaimthatisbeing asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, itcomplies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (thepetitionersandthewidow,representedbydents)areallheirsclaimingtitleunderthetestator.118 GUANCOV.NATIONALBANK 54PHIL244FACTS:The now deceased Guanco during his lifetime obtained a loan from PNB. Hefurnishedthebankwithhissharesindifferentcorporationsassecurityfortheloan.Whenhedied,oneofthecorporations,forwhichhehassharesofstock,issuedtothe bank a promissory note with an amount covering the debt of Guanco. Itlikewisefurnishedthebankwithadditionalsecuritytocoveranyadditionalloanitwouldliketotakefromthebank.Inthemeantime,theadministratorintheestateproceedingsmovedthatthebankmanagerpresenthimselfincourtwithrespecttothe shares of stock being held by him. The bank manager didn’t appear butinstead,thecounselofthebankfiledamotion,allegingthereinthatthesharesinquestionwerestillinitspossessionassecurityfortheoutstandingdebtofGuanco.Thereafter, the administrator prayed that the shares be brought in court. Thecourt ordered for the same and the bank sought reconsideration on the groundthatthecourtexceededitsjurisdiction.HELD:Upon appeal to this court, counsel for the bankmaintains that the court belowexceededitsjurisdictioninorderingthedeliveryofthesharestotheadministratorinaproceedingundersection709oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.Thiscontentionisentirelycorrect.As will be seen, the section quoted only provides a proceeding for examiningpersonssuspectedofhavingconcealed,embezzled,orconveyedawaypropertyofthe deceased or withholds information of documentary evidence tending todisclose rights or claims of the deceased to such property or to disclose thepossessionofhislastwillandtestament.Thepurposeoftheproceedingistoelicitevidence, and the section does not, in terms, authorize the court to enforce



delivery of possession of the things involved. To obtain the possession, recoursemustthereforegenerallybehadtoanordinaryaction.Inissuingtheorderfromwhichtheappealhasbeentaken,thecourtbelowreliedlargelyonadictumintheAlafrizcasethat"theremaybecases,wherepapersanddocumentary evidence of ownership of property are held by a third personbelongingtotheestateofadeceasedperson,inwhichitwouldbeperfectlyproperto the court to order the same turned over to the court." That may be true; itmight, for instance, apply to the possession of a will. But in the same case, thecourt also said that "the court hadno right todepriveher (the appellant) of herevidence relating to the property, until the question of ownership had beensettled."

Thatispracticallythiscase.Thebankmaintainsthatthepledgeofthe250sharesisstillinforce.Itmayhavedocumentaryevidencetothateffect,anditwasnotunderobligation to turn such evidence over to the court or to a third party, on thestrengthofacitationundersection709.Thepossessionof thecertificatesof theshares in question is a part of that evidence and it is obvious that if they aresurrenderedtotheadministratoroftheestateandpossiblydisposedofbyhim,thebank will lose its day in court, and its rights can only be determined in acorrespondingaction.119 ALAFRIZV.MINA 28PHIL137FACTS:Alafrizwas theadministratorof theestateofNavarro. He filedamotion for thecourttoorderMinatoproduceadocumentevincingthedepositmadebyNavarrotosecurealoanheearlierobtained.Minacompliedwiththesubsequentorderofthecourtbysurrenderingthepawntickettotheclerkandatthesametime,prayedtobeexemptedfromthesamebyaverringthatsheandhermotherweretherealownersofthejewelry.Thejewelryinquestionwaslaterincludedintheinventoryofpropertiesoftheestate,towhichMinaprayedthat itberatherexcluded. Shealso prayed to be further heard so that she could prove her ownership over theproperties. However, she was overruled and the property in question was stillincluded in the inventory. Sheappealed thison several grounds—amongothers,thatthereisnolegalbasistoorderhertoproducethepawnticket;thatthecourtwaswrong toorderAlafriz to institute adequate actions againstMinaasmaybenecessaryinfurtheranceofhisdutiesasadministrator.

HELD:Insupportofthefirstassignmentoferror,theappellantcontendsthatthereisnolaw justifying the order made by the lower court, citing her to appear and todeclareconcerningthequestionwhethershehadpropertybelongingtotheestate.She also contends that the administrator should have proceeded by an ordinaryaction,ifhebelievedthatshehadinherpossessionpropertyoftheestate.Section709oftheCodeofProcedureinCivilActions(ActNo.190)expresslyauthorizestheorderofwhichcomplaintismade.Onthesecondandthirdassignmentsoferror,itistobenotedthatthepawnticketshowed that it had been issued to the deceased Navarro. That fact, perhaps,constitutedprimafacieproofofownership,butitcertainlywasnotabsoluteproofof ownership. The lower court not only ordered the appellant to turn the pawnticketovertotheclerk,butalsoorderedtheadministratortopaytotheclerkwithwhichtoredeemsaid jewels. Inaccordancewiththeorderofthecourt,theclerkdidactually redeemsaid jewelsandnowhas them inhispossession.All thiswasdone without permitting the appellant to be jewels did, in fact, belong to theappellantthen,ofcourse,thecourthadnorighttodepriveherofthepawnticket,nortousethefundsoftheestateinredeemingthem.Thereisnothinginsection709whichjustifiestheorderscomplainedofinthesecondandthirdassignmentsoferror. Said section (709) simplyprovides that "thecourtmaycite such suspectedperson toappearbefore it andmayexaminehimonoathon thematterof suchcomplaint." There is nothing in the section which authorizes the court to takepossession of the property, if any should be found in the possession of thedefendantorofthepersoncited.If,uponthehearing,therewasgoodreasonforbelievingthatthepersoncitedhadpropertyinhisorherpossessionbelongingtotheestate, then itwas thedutyof theadministrator toproceedbyanordinaryactiontorecoverpossessionofthesame.Theremaybecases,wherepapersanddocumentary evidence of ownership of property are held by a third personbelongingtotheestateofadeceasedperson,inwhichitwouldbeperfectlyproperforthecourttoorderthesameturnedovertothecourt.Wedonotnow,however,attemptinanywaytoindicatewhatwouldbesuchaconditionnoreventofinallydecide that such a conditionmight exist. In the present case the defendantwasentitledtoretainpossessionofthepawnticket,untilthequestionoftheownershipof the jewels shouldbedetermined in theproperway.Thecourthadnoright todeprive her of her evidence relating to the property, until the question ofownershiphadbeensettled.



Regarding the court ordering Alafriz to institute actions againstMina asmay benecessary in furtherance of his claims, this order, it would seem, was notauthorized in the proceedings then pending, neitherwas the order directing theadministrator to pay, out of the funds of the estate, the amount necessary toredeem the jewels, until the question of ownership had been settled. Nocomplaint,however, isheremadebyanyone,relatingtothatorder.Thatpartoftheordermayproperlybeconsideredwhentheadministratorrendershisaccount.If,however,theestateorPiaMinahasbeendamagedbysaidorder,suchdamagesmay,perhaps,besettled inanactionbroughtforthepurposeofdeterminingtheownershipofthejewels.Forthepresentwearenotinclinedtorevokesaidorder.Itmay finallyappear that the jewelsactuallybelonged to theestateandnot toPiaMina. In that case the jewelswill thenbewhere they canbe turnedover to theadministratorwithoutfurtherdelay.120 HEIRSOFGREGORIEV.BAKER 51PHIL75FACTS:Baker was the appointed administrator of the estate of Ankrom. When hepreparedthe inventoryoftheestate,hemistakenly includedatractof land. TheheirsofGregorieduringtheproceedingfiledtheirclaimagainsttheestate,basedona foreign judgment,whichwasdulyacceptedby thecourt. Theassetsof theestateseemedsufficienttocoveralldebts.However,onasubsequentdate,BakerdiscoveredthatduringAnkrom’slifetime,heobtainedaloanfromPTCsecuredbythelandindispute.Andthatafewdaysaftertheloanandmortgage,heconveyedthe land toacertainperson inOhio foraconsiderationofP1andothervaluableconsideration. As such, Baker filed an amended inventory andwas approved bythecourt.HELD:Whenthereisadeficiencyofassetsinthehandsofanexecutororadministratortopaydebtsandexpenses,andwhenthedeceasedpersonmadeinhislife‐timesuchfraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right or interesttherein, as is stated in the preceding section, any creditor of the estatemay, bylicense of the court, if the executor or administrator has not commenced suchaction,commenceandprosecutetofinaljudgment,inthenameoftheexecutororadministrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for thebenefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein soconveyed.Butsuchactionshallnotbecommenceduntilthecreditorfilesincourta

bondwithsufficientsurety,tobeapprovedbythejudge,conditionedtoindemnifytheexecutororadministratoragainstthecostsofsuchaction.Suchcreditorshallhavealienuponthejudgmentbyhimsorecoveredforthecostsincurredandsuchotherexpensesasthecourtdeemsequitable.Theremedyoftheappellantsis,therefore,toindemnifytheadministratoragainstcostsand,byleaveofcourt,toinstituteanactioninthenameoftheadministratorto set aside the assignmentorother conveyancebelieved tohavebeenmade infraudofcreditors.121 VELASQUEZV.GEORGE 125SCRA456 FACTS:Defendants‐mortgagors are officers of the Island Associates Inc. Andres Muñoz,asidefrombeingthetreasurer‐directorofsaidcorporation,wasalsoappointedandqualified as administrator of the estate of BenjaminGeorge in the above specialproceedings. In life, the latter owned 64.8 percent or 636 shares out of theoutstanding980 sharesof stock in the corporation.Without theproper approvalfrom the probate court and without notice to the heirs and their counsel, thedefendants‐mortgagorsexecutedaDeedofFirstRealEstateMortgage in favorofthedefendant‐mortgageeErlindaVillanueva,coveringthreeparcelsoflandownedby Island Associates. In said Deed, the defendants‐mortgagors also expresslywaived their right to redeemthesaidparcels.Subsequently,apowerofattorneywas executed by the defendants‐mortgagors in favor of Villanueva whereby thelatter was given the full power and authority to cede, transfer, and convey theparcelsof landwithinthereglementaryperiodprovidedbylawforredemption.AcertificateofsalewasconsequentlyissuedtoVillanueva.Theplaintiffsthenfiledacomplaint for the annulment of the same but was overruled by the court. ThecourtheldthattheSECistheproperforumfortheircomplaint.HELD:Whether or not the mortgage contract, with an unusual provision whereby themortgagors waived their right to redeem the mortgaged property, could beexecutedwithoutproperapprovaloftheprobatecourtandwithoutnoticetothewidow and legitimate children of the deceased is a matter clearly within theauthorityofatrialcourttodecide.If inthecourseoftrial,thecourtbelievesthatthevalidityofthecompositionoftheboardofdirectorsisabsolutelynecessaryforresolutionoftheissuesbeforeit,theremedyis,atmost,torequirethatoneissue



tobethreshedoutbeforetheSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionandtoholdinabeyance,thetrialonthemeritsoftheprincipalissuesinthemeantime.Certainly,the solution is not for the lower court to surrender its judicial questions to anadministrativeagencyforresolution.

Theadministratorisnottheproperpartytoinstitutetheaction.Theadministrator,Andres Muñoz, is the same person charged by the plaintiffs‐appellants to havevoted in the board of directors without securing the proper authority from theprobatecourt towhichhe isaccountableasadministrator. InRamirezv.Baltazar(24SCRA918),weruledthat"sincethegroundforthepresentactiontoannultheaforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidiousmachinationsandcollusioninwhichtheadministratorhasallegedlyparticipated,itwouldbefarfetchedtoexpectthesaidadministratorhimselftofiletheaction inbehalfoftheestate.Andwhoelsebuttheheirs,whohaveaninteresttoassertandto protect, would bring the action? Inevitably, this case should fall under theexception, rather than the general rule that pending proceedings for thesettlementoftheestate,theheirshavenorighttocommenceanactionarisingoutof the rights belonging to the deceased." The case at bar falls under such anexception.

RULE88PAYMENTOFTHEDEBTSOFTHEESTATE

Section 1.Debts paid in full if estate sufficient. If, after hearing all themoneyclaims against the estate, and after ascertaining the amount of such claims, itappears that there are sufficient assets to pay the debts, the executor oradministratorpaythesamewithinthetimelimitedforthatpurpose.Section 11. Order for payment of debts. � Before the expiration of the timelimitedforthepaymentofthedebts,thecourtshallorderthepaymentthereof,and thedistributionof theassets receivedby theexecutororadministrator forthatpurposeamongthecreditors,asthecircumstancesoftheestaterequireandinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisrule.Section12.Orders relating topaymentofdebtswhereappeal is taken.� If anappealhasbeentakenfromadecisionofthecourtconcerningaclaim,thecourtmay suspend the order for the payment of the debts or may order thedistributionsamongthecreditorswhoseclaimsaredefinitelyallowed,leavingin

the hands of the executor or administrator sufficient assets to pay the claimdisputedandappealed.Whenadisputedclaimisfinallysettledthecourthavingjurisdiction of the estate shall order the same to be paid out of the assetsretainedtothesameextentandinthesameproportionwiththeclaimsofothercreditors.Section13.Whensubsequentdistributionofassetsordered.�Ifthewholeofthedebts are not paid on the first distribution, and if the whole assets are notdistributed, or other assets afterwards come to the hands of the executor oradministrator, the court may from time to time make further orders for thedistributionsofassets.Section14.Creditors tobepaid inaccordancewith termsoforder.�Whenanorderismadeforthedistributionofassetsamongthecreditors,theexecutororadministrationshall,assoonasthetimeofpaymentarrives,paythecreditorstheamountsoftheirclaims,orthedividendthereon,inaccordancewiththetermsofsuchorder.Section 15. Time for paying debts and legacies fixed, or extended after notice,withinwhat periods.� On granting letters testamentary or administration thecourt shall allow to the executor or administrator a time for disposing of theestateandpayingthedebtsandlegaciesofthedeceased,whichshallnot,inthefirst instance, exceed one (1) year; but the court may, on application of theexecutororadministratorandafterhearingonsuchnoticeofthetimeandplacethereforgiventoallpersons interestedas itshalldirect,extendthetimeasthecircumstances of the estate require not exceeding six (6) months for a singleextension not so that the whole period allowed to the original executor oradministratorshallexceedtwo(2)years.Section2.Partofestate fromwhichdebtpaidwhenprovisionmadebywill. Ifthe testator makes provision by his will, or designates the estate to beappropriatedforthepaymentofhisdebts,theexpensesofadministration,orthefamilyexpenses,theyshallbepaidaccordingtotheprovisionsofthewill;butifthe provisionmade by thewill or the estate appropriated, is not sufficient forthatpurpose, suchpartof theestateof the testator, realorpersonal,as isnotdisposedofbywill,ifanyshallbeappropriatedforthatpurpose.Section3.Personaltyfirstchargeablefordebts,thenrealty.Thepersonalestateofthedeceasednotdisposedofbywillshallbefirstchargeablewiththepayment



of debts and expenses; and if said personal estate is not sufficient for thatpurpose,or its salewould redound to thedetrimentof theparticipants for theestate,thewholeoftherealestatenotdisposeofbywill,orsomuchthereofasisnecessary,maybesold,mortgaged,orotherwiseencumberedforthatpurposeby the executor or administrator, after obtaining the authority of the courttherefor. Any deficiency shall be met by contributions in accordance with theprovisionsofsection6ofthisrule.Section6.Courttofixcontributiveshareswheredevisees,legalitees,orheirshavebeen possession. � Where devisees, legalitees, or heirs have entered intopossession of portions of the estate before the debts and expenses have beensettledandpaid,andhavebecomeliabletocontributeforthepaymentofsuchdebtsandexpenses,thecourthavingjurisdictionoftheestatemay,byorderforthat purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, andorderhowmuchandinwhatmannereachpersonshallcontribute,andmayissueexecutionascircumstancesrequire.PAYMENTOFDEBTSMUSTBETAKENFROMTHEFOLLOWING,INTHISORDER—

1. Fromtheportionorpropertydesignatedinthewill2. Fromthepersonalpropertyand3. Fromtherealproperty

MAYTHECOURTISSUEAWRITOFEXECUTIONFORTHEPAYMENTOFLEGACY?

• NosincethelegacyisnotadebtoftheestateSection4.Estatetoberetainedtomeetcontingentclaims.Ifthecourtissatisfiedthat a contingent claim duly filed is valid, it may order the executor oradministratortoretaininhishandssufficientestatetopaysuchcontingentclaimwhenthesamebecomesabsolute,oriftheestateisinsolvent,sufficienttopayaportionequaltothedividendoftheothercreditors.Section 5.How contingent claim becoming absolute in two years allowed andpaid.Actionagainstdistributeeslater.Ifsuchcontingentclaimbecomesabsoluteandispresentedtothecourt,ortotheexecutororadministrator,withintwo(2)yearsfromthetimelimitedforothercreditorstopresenttheirclaims,itmaybeallowed by the court if not disputed by the executor or administrator and, ifdisputed, itmaybeprovedandallowedordisallowedby thecourtas the factsmay warrant. If the contingent claim is allowed, the creditor shall receivepaymenttothesameextentastheothercreditors if theestateretainedbythe

executororadministratorissufficient.Butiftheclaimisnotsopresented,afterhaving become absolute, within said two (2) years, and allowed, the assetsretained in the hands of the executor or administrator, not exhausted in thepayment of claims, shall be disturbedby theorder of the court to thepersonsentitled to the same; but the assets so distributedmay still be applied to thepaymentoftheclaimwhenestablished,andthecreditormaymaintainanactionagainst the distributees to recover the debt, and such distributees and theirestates shall be liable for the debt in proportion to the estate they haverespectivelyreceivedfromthepropertyofthedeceased.PAYMENTOFCONTINGENTCLAIMS

• Ifthecontingentclaimbecomesabsoluteandispresentedtothecourtasan absolute claim within 2 years from the time allowed for thepresentationof claims, itwill bepaid in the samemanner as theotherabsoluteclaims

• After said period, the creditor may proceed against the distributees,providedsaidcontingentclaimshadbeenseasonablyfiledinandallowedbytheprobatecourt

• The property reserved for payment of such contingent claims maythereforeberetainedonlywithinthetwo‐yearperiodasthereafter,thesameshallbeincludedamongassetsfordistributiontotheheirs

Section 7. Order of payment if estate insolvent � If the assets which can beappropriated for the payment of debts are not sufficient for that purpose, theexecutor or administrator shall pay the debts against the estate, observing theprovisionsofArticles1059and2239to2251oftheCivilCode.Section8.Dividendstobepaid inproportiontoclaims.� If therearenoassetssufficienttopaythecreditsofanyonceclassofcreditorsafterpayingthecreditsentitled to preference over it, each creditor within such class shall be paid adividendinproportiontohisclaim.Nocreditorofanyoneclassshallreceiveanypaymentuntilthoseoftheprecedingclassarepaid.Section 9. Estate of insolvent non‐resident, how disposed of. � In caseadministrationistakeninthePhilippineoftheestateofapersonwhowasatthetimeofhisdeathan inhabitantofanothercountry,andwhodied insolvent,hisestatefoundinthePhilippinesshall,asfaraspracticable,besodisposedofthathiscreditorshereandelsewheremayreceiveeachanequalshare,inproportiontotheirrespectivecredits.



Section10.WhenandhowclaimprovedoutsidethePhilippinesagainstinsolventresident'sestatepaid.�Ifitappearstothecourthavingjurisdictionthatclaimshavebeendulyproveninanothercountryagainsttheestateofaninsolventwhowas at the time of his death an inhabitant of the Philippines, and that theexecutororadministrator in thePhilippineshadknowledgeof thepresentationofsuchclaimsinsuchcountryandanopportunitytocontesttheirallowance,thecourtshallreceiveacertifiedlistofsuchclaims,whenperfectedinsuchcountry,andaddthesametothelistofclaimsprovedagainstthedeceasedpersoninthePhilippinesso thata justdistributionof thewholeestatemaybemadeequallyamongallitscreditorsaccordingtotheirrespectiveclaims;butthebenefitofthisand the preceding sections shall not be extended to the creditors in anothercountry if the property of such deceased person there found is not equallyapportioned to the creditors residing in the Philippines and the other creditor,accordingtotheirrespectiveclaims.Section16.Successorofdeadexecutororadministratormayhavetimeextendedonnoticewithincertainperiod.�Whenanexecutororadministratordies,andanew administrator of the same estate is appointed, the courtmay extend thetimeallowedforthepaymentofthedebtsor legaciesbeyondthetimeallowedtotheoriginalexecutororadministrator,notexceedingsix(6)monthsatatimeandnot exceeding six (6)monthsbeyond the timewhich the courtmighthaveallowed to suchoriginalexecutororadministrator;andnotice shallbegivenofthetimeandplaceforhearingsuchapplication,asrequiredinthelastprecedingsection.122 TIMBOLV.CANO

1SCRA1271FACTS:IntestateCanodiedleavinghisonlysonTimbolassoleheir.Timbolatthetimeofdeathofhisfatherwasstillaminor.HisuncleJosewasappointedinthemeantimeastheadministratoroftheestate.JosepetitionedthathebeallowedtoleasethelandownedbyCanoandhewouldaccordinglypayforitsrental.Thiswasallowedby the court together with the approval to convert a portion of the land into asubdivision.Plansofpartitionwereaswellapprvoved.Lateron,whenTimbolwasappointed as the administrator in Jose’s stead, he petitioned that the land areaallotted for subdivisiondevelopmentbe increased. Thiswasopposedby Joseon

the ground of prejudice on its part with respect to the portion of land he wasleasing,amongotherobjections.Themotionhoweverwasstillgranted.HELD:Inthesecondandthirdassignmentsoferrorappellantarguesthatthecourtbelow,asaprobatecourt,hasnojurisdictiontodeprivetheappellantofhisrightsunderthe lease, because these rights may be annulled or modified only by a court ofgeneral jurisdiction. The above arguments are without merit. In probateproceedingsthecourtorderstheprobateofthewillofthedecedent(Rule80,See.5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to anyqualifiedapplicant (Id., Sec.6); supervisesandcontrolsall actsof administration;hears andapproves claimsagainst theestateof thedeceased (Rule87, See. 13);orderspaymentoflawfuldebts(Rule89,Sec.14);authorizessale,mortgageoranyencumbranceof realestate (Rule90,Sec.2);directs thedeliveryof theestatetothoseentitled thereto (Rule91, See.1). Ithasbeenheld that the courtactsasatrustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the estate and see that it iswiselyandeconomicallyadministered,notdissipated.Eventhecontractofleaseunderwhichtheappellantholdstheagriculturallandsofthe intestate andwhich he now seeks to protect,was obtainedwith the court'sapproval.Iftheprobatecourthastherighttoapprovethelease,somayitorderitsrevocation,or the reductionof the subjectof the lease.Thematterofgiving thepropertytoalesseeisanactofadministration,alsosubjecttotheapprovalofthecourt.Ofcourse,ifthecourtabusesitsdiscretionintheapprovalofthecontractsor acts of the administrator, its orders may be subject to appeal and may bereversedonappeal;butnotbecausethecourtmaymakeanerrormay itbesaidthatitlacksjurisdictiontocontrolactsofadministrationoftheadministrator.123 JAUCIANV.QEUROL

38PHILFACTS:RogeroandDayandantesignedadocumentacknowledgingtheirdebttoJaucian.ItseemedthatRogerosignedthedocumentinthecapacityofsuretybutnowhereinthedocumentisthisapparent. Areadingofthedocumentwouldshowthattheywerebindingthemselvesjointlyandseverally. Onarelevantdate,Rogerosoughtthe annulment of the document on the ground that his signature was procuredfromfraud.Asamatterofcross‐claim,Jaucianinterposedthepaymentofdebttohim. During thependencyof this casehowever,Rogerodiedandhisestatewas



substituted as party. Later on, Jaucianwon the case. In themeanwhile, estateproceedingswereinstitutedforRogero. Onthebasisofjudgment,Jaucianclaimspaymentbutwasdeniedbythecourtformanyreasons.Amongothers,isthenon‐submissionwiththecommissiononclaimswithintherequiredperiod.HELD:Anexaminationoftheorderinquestion,however,leadsustoconcludethatitwasnot a final order, and therefore it was not appealable. In effect, it held thatwhatever rights Jaucianmighthave against theestateofRogerowere subject totheperformanceofaconditionprecedent,namely,thatheshouldfirstexhaustthisremedyagainstDayandante.Thecourt regardedDayandante.Thecourt regardedDayandante as the principal debtor, and the deceased as a surety only liable forsuchdeficiencyasmight resultafter theexhaustionof theassetsof theprincipalco‐obligor. The pivotal fact upon which the order was based was the failure ofappellanttoshowthathehadexhaustedhisremedyagainstDayandante,andthisfailurethecourtregardedasacompletebartothegrantingofthepetitionatthattime. The court made no order requiring the appellee to make any paymentwhatever, and that part of the opinion, uponwhich the orderwas based,whichcontainedstatementsofwhatthecourt intendedtodowhenthepetitionshouldberenewed,wasnotbindinguponhimoranyother judgebywhomhemightbesucceeded.Regardlessofwhatmaybeourviewswithrespecttothejurisdictionofthecourttohavegrantedthereliefdemandedbyappellantinanyevent,itisquiteclearfromwhatwehavestatedthattheorderofApril13,1914,requirednoactionbytheadministratoratthattime,wasnotfinal,andthereforewasnotappealable.WethereforeconcludethatnorightswereconferredbythesaidorderofApril13,1914,andthatitdidnotprecludetheadministratorfrommakingoppositiontothepetitionoftheappellantwhenitwasrenewed.124 CUUNJIENGV.TIAOQUI

64PHILFACTS:TiaoquifiledacaseforcollectionofmoneyfromtheCuUnjiengs.Inthesaidcaseinitiallyinstituted,propertiesoftheCuUnjiengswerepreliminarilyattacheduponfiling of bond by Tiaoqui during his lifetime. During the pendency of theproceedings,Tiaoquidiedandwassubstitutedlateronbytheadministratorsofhisestate. Whenhedied, estateproceedingswere commencedandwhenasked tofile accounts and project of partition, the administrators found difficulty in thesameduetothependinglitigationwiththeCuUnjiengs.Whentheaccountingwas

submittedanddulyapproved,thefinalprojectofpartitiontookalatertimetodo.Inthemeanwhile,CuUnjiengshadacounterclaimagainsttheplaintiff.Theissueinthiscaserevolvesaroundthenatureofthecounterclaimasacontingentclaimandwhetherthesameshouldhavebeenrelayedtotheprobatecourt.HELD:From the definitions just quoted, it is evident that the counterclaim of thedefendants‐appellants isnot a contingent claimbecause theobligation sought tobeenforcedagainstthedeceasedorhis legalrepresentatives, theadministrators,doesnotdependonanuncertainor futureevent.Accordingtotheallegationsofthecounterclaimcontainedintheamendedanswer,theobligationcontradictedbythe deceased arose from the time the conspiracy was carried out and from thetimethepreliminaryattachmentwasobtainedillegallyandwithoutanyjustcause.However,theadministratorscontendintheirbriefthatthecounterclaimisofthenatureofacontingentclaimbecauseitcannotberealizeduntilfinaljudgmenthasbeenrenderedbythecourt.ThiscontentionissufficientlyrefutedbyreproducingwhathasbeenstatedinthecaseofE.Gaskell&Co.vs.TanSit,supra,totheeffectthat"thetermcontigenthasreferencetotheuncertaintyoftheliabilityandnottotheuncertaintyinwhichtherealizationorcollectionoftheclaimmaybeinvolved."Referringnowtothecontentionofthedefendants‐appellantsthattheywerenotindutyboundtoinformtheprobatecourtthattheyhadfiledacounterclaimagainstthe deceased, it is true that the Code of Civil Procedure contains nor provisiondirectly imposing suchdutyon them.However, if under section602of the sameCode the probate court alone had acquired jurisdiction to try and decide thesettlement,paymentofdebtsanddistributionoftheestateofthedeceased,totheexclusionofallothercourts,itcannotbedeniedthatifthedefendants‐appellantswantedsomeremedyfromsaidcourtfortheprotectionoftheirrights,theyshouldtimelyapply to itandask for the retentionofproperties sufficient topay for thecounterclaimincaseitshouldprosper.Thiscourtisnotunmindfulofthefactthatinthiscasetheadministratorswerealsoindutyboundtoinformtheprobatecourtoftheexistenceofthecounterclaim,whichdutywaspartlycompliedwithbythemwhen they reiteratedly informed the court that it was not possible to present afinal account or project of partition on the ground that there were pendinglitigations, among them that brought against the defendants Cu Unjiengs, andwhentheyappliedforthereopeningoftheintestateproceedingsandforauthoritytocontinuethesuitagainstsaiddefendants.Suchduty,however,wascoextensivewiththatofthedefendants‐appellantsandthatlatterwerenotrelievedthereofbytheconductthatmighthavebeenobservedbytheadministrators,whichconduct,



ontheotherhand,cannotbeconsideredimpropertakingintoconsiderationallthecircumstanceshereinbeforestated.125 INTESTATEOFJANUARIAGONZALES

72PHIL245FACTS:In the summary settlement of the estate of Gonzales, the court ordered thepaymenttocreditorAbarro.Nopaymentbeingmade,theonlypropertyleftbythedeceased was sold in public auction and proceeds were used to pay the debt.However,thecourtorderedthesametobesubjecttolegalredemption.Oneyearhaspassedandsince then,noredemptionwasmade. Thereafter,Abarrosoughtthe finality of the sale. Tomasa as one of the heirs opposed the same on thegroundshehastenderedthemoneyalreadytothesherifftoredeemtheproperty.HELD:Tomasa de Guia has no right to redeem and that the sale made in favor ofSisenandoAbarro is final. In theadministrationand liquidationof theestateofadeceasedperson,salesorderedbytheprobatecourtforpaymentofdebtsarefinalandarenotsubjecttolegalredemption.Unlikeinordinaryexecutionsales,thereisnolegalprovisionallowingredemptioninthesaleofpropertyforpaymentofdebtsofadeceasedperson126 ECHAUSV.BLANCO

179SCRA704FACTS:Eschaus filed a claim in her capacity as administratrix of her late father’s estateagainst Hodges for allegedly profits from a business endeavor. During thependencyof thecase,Hodgesdied. However, thecaseproceededandPCIBwaseven substituted as a party to the casewith no objection. When judgmentwasrenderedinfavorofEschaus,insteadofawritofexecution,amotionforpaymentpursuanttojudgmentwasfiledinthespecialproceedings.Thewidowopposedthesame.HELD:Itmustbenoted thatCivilCaseNo.6628which isamoneyclaim,was Institutedduring the lifetime of C. N. Hodges. During its pendency and before a decisioncouldberenderedbytheRegionalTrialCourthearingthecase,C.N.Hodgesdied.

Uponhisdeath,hewassubstitutedbyPCIBasadministratorofhisestate.Beingamoneyclaim,saidcivilcaseshouldhavebeendismissedandinstitutedasamoneyclaimintheintestateestateofC.N.Hodges.However,thisisnottosuggestthatbecausetheclaimofpetitionerwaspursuedtoitsconclusioninCivilCaseNo.6682insteadofbeingdismissedandfiledasamoneyclaim inSpecialProceedingsNo.1672, the judgment rendered therein isnullandvoid.Moreover,whenPCIBasadministratoroftheestateofC.N.Hodgeswasorderedtobesubstitutedasdefendant, itregisterednoobjectiontotheorder.Thus,evenifWe admit for the sake of argument that the trial court, after the death of C. N.Hodgeshasno jurisdiction to rendera judgment therein, theargumentmust fail.PCIB,participatedactivelyinthesaidcase.Itdidnotappealthedecisionrenderedtherein, neither did it raise the issueof jurisdiction ion at any stage. It has beenconsistentlyheldbythiscourtthatwhilelackofjurisdictionmaybeassailedatanystage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before the court withoutjurisdictionwillestopsuchpartyfromassailingsuchlackofjurisdiction.The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim after the period set by thecourt in the notice to creditors, provided the conditions stated in the rules arepresent. The period prescribed for creditors isn’t exclusive and may be madebefore theorderofdistribution, subject to thediscretionof the courtandunderequitableterms.

RULE89SALES,MORTGAGES,ANDOTHERENCUMBRANCESOFPROPERTYOFDECEDENT

Section 1.Order of sale of personalty.Upon the applicationof the executor oradministrator, andonwrittennotice to theheirs andotherpersons interested,the courtmayorder thewholeorapartof thepersonalestate tobe sold, if itappearsnecessary for thepurposeofpayingdebts,expensesofadministration,orlegacies,orforthepreservationoftheproperty.Section 2.When courtmay authorize sale,mortgage, or other encumbrance ofrealty to pay debts and legacies though personalty not exhausted. When thepersonal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses ofadministration,andlegacies,orwherethesaleofsuchpersonalestatemayinjure



the business or other interests of those interested in the estate, and where atestator has not otherwise made sufficient provision for the payment of suchdebts, expenses, and legacies, the court, on the application of the executor oradministratorandonwrittennoticeoftheheirs,devisees,andlegateesresidinginthePhilippines,mayauthorizetheexecutororadministratortosell,mortgage,orotherwiseencumbersomuchasmaybenecessaryoftherealestate,inlieuofpersonalestate,forthepurposeofpayingsuchdebts,expenses,andlegacies,ifitclearlyappearsthatsuchsale,mortgage,orencumbrancewouldbebeneficialtothe persons interested; and if a part cannot be sold, mortgaged, or otherwiseencumberedwithout injury to those interested in the remainder, the authoritymaybeforthesale,mortgage,orotherencumbranceofthewholeofsuchrealestate,orsomuchthereofasisnecessaryorbeneficialunderthecircumstances.Section3.Personsinterestedmaypreventsuchsale,etc.,bygivingbond.Nosuchauthoritytosell,mortgage,orotherwiseencumberrealorpersonalestateshallbe granted if any person interested in the estate gives a bond, in a sum to befixedbythecourt,conditionedtopaythedebts,expensesofadministration,andlegacies within such time as the court directs; and such bond shall be for thesecurityofthecreditors,aswellasoftheexecutororadministrator,andmaybeprosecutedforthebenefitofeither.Section 4.When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interestedpersons.Disposal of proceeds.When it appears that the saleof thewholeor apart of the real or personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees,legatees, and other interested persons, the courtmay, upon application of theexecutor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, andlegateeswhoare interested in theestate tobe sold, authorize theexecutororadministratortosellthewholeorapartofsaidestate,althoughnotnecessarytopaydebts,legacies,orexpensesofadministration;butsuchauthorityshallnotbegranted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such sale, theproceeds shall be assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in the properproportions.Section 5.When courtmay authorize sale,mortgage, or other encumbrance ofestate to pay debts and legacies in other countries.When the sale of personalestate, or the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of real estate is notnecessary to pay the debts, expenses of administration, or legacies in thePhilippines, but it appears from records and proceedings of a probate court inanother country that the estate of the deceased in such other country is not

sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies there, thecourt here may authorize the executor or administrator to sell the personalestate or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber the real estate for thepayment of debts or legacies in the other country, in samemanner as for thepaymentofdebtsorlegaciesinthePhilippines.Section 6.When courtmay authorize sale,mortgage, or other encumbrance ofrealtyacquiredonexecutionorforeclosure.Thecourtmayauthorizeanexecutororadministratortosellmortgage,orotherwiseencumberrealestateacquiredbyhimonexecutionor foreclosure sale,under the samecircumstancesandunderthe same regulations as prescribed in this rule for the sale,mortgage, or otherencumbranceofotherrealestate.WHEN PERSONAL PROPERTYMAY BE SOLD, OR THE REAL PROPERTY BE SOLD,MORTGAGED,OROTHERWISEBEENCUMBERED—

1. Forthepaymentofdebts,expensesofadministration,andlegaciesinthePhilippines

2. When such sale would be beneficial to the persons interested in theestate

3. For the payment of debts, expenses of administration and legaciesinvolved in the settlement of the estate of a decedent in a foreigncountry

Section 7. Regulation for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwiseencumberestate.� The courthaving jurisdictionof theestateof thedeceasedmay authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell,mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rulesandwhenitappearsnecessaryorbeneficialunderthefollowingregulations.(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth thedebtsdue from thedeceased, theexpensesof administration, the legacies, thevalueofthepersonalestate,thesituationoftheestatetobesold,mortgaged,orotherwiseencumbered,andsuchotherfactsasshowthatthesale,mortgage,orotherencumbranceisnecessaryorbeneficial.(b)Thecourtshallthereuponfixatimeandplaceforhearingsuchpetition,andcausenoticestatingthenatureofthepetition,thereasonsforthesame,andthetime and place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the persons



interested, and may cause such further notice to be given, by publication orotherwise,asitshalldeemproper;(c) Ifthecourtrequires it,theexecutororadministratorshallgiveanadditionalbond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that such executor oradministrator will account for the proceeds of the sale, mortgage, or otherencumbrance;(d) If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this section have beencompliedwith, the court, by order stating such compliance,may authorize theexecutor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber, in propercases, such part of the estate as is deemed necessary, and in case of sale thecourtmayauthorizeittobepublicorprivate,aswouldbemostbeneficialtoallparties concerned. The executor or administrator shall be furnished with acertifiedcopyofsuchorder;(e)Iftheestateistobesoldatauction,themodeofgivingnoticeofthetimeandplace of the sale shall be governed by the provisions concerning notice ofexecutionsale;(f)Thereshallberecorded intheregistryofdeedsof theprovince inwhichtherealestatethussold,mortgage,orotherwiseencumberedissituated,acertifiedcopy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor oradministratorforsuchrealestate,whichshallbeasvalidasifthedeedhadbeenexecutedbythedeceasedinhislifetime.PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN AUTHORITY FROM COURT TO SELL, ENCUMBER, ORMORTGAGEPROPERTY—

1. Theexecutororadministratorshallfileawrittenpetitionsettingforththedebts due from the deceased, the expenses of administration, thelegacies,thevalueofthepersonalestate,thesituationoftheestatetobesold,mortgaged,orotherwiseencumbered,andsuchotherfactsasshowthatthesale,mortgage,orotherencumbranceisnecessaryorbeneficial.

2. Thecourtshallthereuponfixatimeandplaceforhearingsuchpetition,and causenotice stating thenatureof thepetition, the reasons for thesame, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or bymailtothepersonsinterested,andmaycausesuchfurthernoticetobegiven,bypublicationorotherwise,asitshalldeemproper;

3. If the court requires it, the executor or administrator shall give anadditionalbond, insuchsumasthecourtdirects,conditionedthatsuchexecutor or administrator will account for the proceeds of the sale,mortgage,orotherencumbrance;

4. If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this section havebeen complied with, the court, by order stating such compliance, mayauthorize the executor or administrator to sell,mortgage, or otherwiseencumber, in proper cases, such part of the estate as is deemednecessary,and incaseofsalethecourtmayauthorize ittobepublicorprivate, as would be most beneficial to all parties concerned. Theexecutororadministratorshallbefurnishedwithacertifiedcopyofsuchorder;

5. Iftheestateistobesoldatauction,themodeofgivingnoticeofthetimeand place of the sale shall be governed by the provisions concerningnoticeofexecutionsale;

6. Thereshallberecordedintheregistryofdeedsoftheprovinceinwhichtherealestatethussold,mortgage,orotherwiseencumberedissituated,acertifiedcopyoftheorderofthecourt,togetherwiththedeedoftheexecutororadministratorforsuchrealestate,whichshallbeasvalidasifthedeedhadbeenexecutedbythedeceasedinhislifetime.

TWOGROUNDSTOGRANTTHESALE,ENCUMBERANCE,MORTGAGE…

1. Tosettleexistingdebts2. Forthebenefitoftheheirsandlegatees

Section 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceasedcontracted to convey.Notice. Effect of deed.�Where thedeceasedwas in hislifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interesttherein, the court having jurisdictionof the estatemay, on application for thatpurpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such propertyaccordingtosuchcontract,orwithsuchmodificationsasareagreeduponbythepartiesandapprovedbythecourt;andifthecontractistoconveyrealpropertyto theexecutororadministrator, theclerkof court shallexecute thedeed.Thedeed executed by such executor, administrator, or clerk of court shall be asaffectual to convey thepropertyas if executedby thedeceased inhis lifetime;butnosuchconveyanceshallbeauthorizeduntilnoticeoftheapplicationforthatpurposehasbeengivenpersonallyorbymailtoallpersonsinterested,andsuchfurther noticehas been given, bypublicationor otherwise, as the court deemsproper; nor if the assets in the hands of the executor or administrator will



thereby be reduced so as to prevent a creditor from receiving his full debt ordiminishhisdividend.Section9.Whencourtmayauthorizeconveyanceoflandswhichdeceasedheldintrust.�Wherethedeceasedinhislifetimeheldrealpropertyintrustforanotherperson,thecourtmayafternoticegivenasrequiredinthelastprecedingsection,authorizetheexecutororadministratortodeedsuchpropertytotheperson,orhisexecutororadministrator,forwhoseuseandbenefititwassoheld;andthecourtmayordertheexecutionofsuchtrust,whethercreatedbydeedorbylaw.127 ESTATEOFGAMBOAV.FLORENZA

12PHIL.191FACTS:Theadministrator filed in the special proceedings amotionpraying for ahearingforpreferenceofcreditsas somecreditsweresecuredbymortgageswhile somewerenot.Inthewholecourseoftheproceedings,thecourtallowedthesaleofaproperty for thepaymentofa specificdebt. The ruleshoweverprovide that thesalecanbeallowedtosatisfythedebts.HELD:Thereisnothinginanyoneofthesesectionsnorinanyothersectionsofthecodewhich indicates that the Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its probatejurisdiction,hasanypowertoorderthesaleofaspecificpieceofrealestateforthepurposeofpayingamortgagedebtwhichisalienthereon.Itmaybethatthecourtwould have authority to sell the property, subject to themortgage lien, for thepurposeofpayingotherdebtsoftheestate,butthere isnothinggivingthecourtauthoritytosellitforthepurposeofpayingthatspecificdebt.Anotherfatalobjectiontotheorderofthe12thofNovember,directingthesale,isthat the court entirely failed to complywith theprovisionsof section722of theCode of Civil Procedure. That section requires the administrator to present apetitionaskingforthesaleoftherealestate.Italsodistinctlyprovidesthat,whensuchpetition ismade, thecourtshallappointa timeandplace forhearing itandshallrequirenoticeofthepetitionandofthetimeandplaceofsuchhearingtobegiven in a newspaper of general circulation, and that the court may order suchfurthernoticegivenasitdeemsproper.128 BOÑAGAV.SOLER

2SCRA755FACTS:InthesettlementofestateofspousesRos,theadministratorthenwasallowedtosellparcelsoflandtoSoler,toraisemoneytosettledebts.Onarelevantdate,therecords of the special proceedingswere burned. Recordswere reinstituted andBonagawas issuedlettersofadministration. HethenfiledanactiontoannulthedeedsofsaletoSoler. Thelattersoughtthedismissalofthesamedueto lackofcapacity tosueandthe finalityattainedby theorders. Withoutanyhearing, thecourtdismissedtheaction.HELD:ThesaleonAugust30,1944appearstobeof21parcelsofabaca,coconut,forestandpasturelands,coveringanaggregateareaofmorethan1,001hectaresforthelump sum of P142,800, Japanese currency. Plaintiff‐appellant alleges (and therecord nowhere indicates the contrary), that these lands comprised almost theentireestate.Nothingintherecordwouldshowwhether,asrequiredbyRule90,sections4and7,theapplicationforauthoritytosellwassetforhearing,orthatthecourt ever caused notice thereof to be issued to the heirs of Alejandro RosIncidentally, these heirs seemnot to have gotten any part of the purchase pricesincetheywerethenallegedlyinSpain.Yet,intheorderofdeclarationofheirsofthewifeandapprovingthesaletoSoler(Annex"B"),thedeclarationoftheheirsofthehusbandAlejandroRoswasexpresslyheldinabeyance,indicatingarecognitionof theirexistence.Appelleesmaintain that the salewasmade for thepurposeofpaying debts, but this, at lease, is controversial. Appellant asserts that the totaloutstandingdebtsoftheestateatthetimeofthesaleamountedtoonlyP4,641.48,arelativelymeagersumcomparedtothelargetractsoflandsold.

The lowercourterred indismissingtheactionwithoutahearingonthemerits.Asale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested parties, underSections4and7,Rule90,mustcomplywiththerequisitesthereinprovided,whicharemandatory.Amongtheserequisites,thefixingofthetimeandplaceofhearingfor an application to sell, and the notice thereof to the heirs, are essential; andwithout them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it,wouldbenullandvoidabinitio.Rule90,Section4,doesnotdistinguishbetweenheirs residing in and those residing outside the Philippines. Therefore, itsrequirementsshouldapplyregardlessoftheplaceofresidenceofthoserequiredtobenotifiedundersaidrule.



ThecontentionthatthesalewasmadeunderSection2,Rule90(whereinnoticeisrequiredonlytothoseheirs,etc.,residing inthePhilippines), isnotsubstantiatedbytherecord.Neitherthedeedofsale,northeordersissuedbytheprobatecourtinconnectiontherewith,showwhether,asrequiredbysaidSection2,thepersonalpropertieswereinsufficienttopaythedebtsandexpensesofadministration.Thereis not even a showing, to startwith, that the salewasmade for the purpose ofpaying debts or expenses of administration (or legacies), a condition whichcircumscribes the applicability of that section. On the face of the reamendedcomplaint at any rate, it doesnotappear that the contested salewasoneundersection 2 of Rule 90; and the same can not be invoked to sustain themotion todismiss. Without reception of further evidence to determine whether therequisitesoftheapplicableprovisionsoftheRuleshadbeenfollowed,thedismissalof theactionwaserroneousand improvident. Plaintiff shouldat leasthavebeengivenachancetoprovehiscase.129 VDA.DECELISVVDA.DELASANTA

93PHIL909FACTS:HELD:130 DEJESUSV.DEJESUS

3SCRA548FACTS:InesAlejandrino,asadministratrixofher latehusband’sestate, filedan inventorywhich includedaparcelof land. Thedecedent’s sisteropposed this inclusiononthegroundthatitwasco‐ownedwithherandanotherbrother.Insteadoflitigatingthe same, the parties entered into an agreement dubbed as Statement of Facts.Inesacknowledgedthatthelandwasco‐ownedandthatherlatehusbandwasjustholding the same in trust. Later on, when Ines’ son substituted his mother asadministrator,heinstitutedanactiontoannulsaidagreement.HELD:Onthequestionof jurisdiction,wethinktheprobatecourthad jurisdictiontoactonandapproveofthestipulationsinquestion,notonlyasanincidenttoitspowerto exclude any property from the inventory of the estate of the deceased, butunder section 9, Rule 90, Rules of Court, which permits the probate court,

whenever the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust for anotherperson, to authorize the executor or administrator to deed such property to theperson or persons for whose use and benefit it was so held. There being nocontroversybetweentheformeradministratrixandthedefendantsthatthelatterandthedeceasedMeleciodeJesusownthelotinquestionincommonandthatitwasregisteredinthedeceased'snameonlyintrustforalltheco‐owners,therewasno need to file a separate action to an ordinary court to establish the commonownershipofthepartiesoversaidproperty;andtheprobatecourtcouldapprove,as it did approve, the agreement wherein the parties expressly recognized theircommon ownership of the property in question and the trust character of theexclusive title held by the deceased over the same, especially since the partiesthemselvesstatethatsuchagreementwasenteredintoinordertoforestallfuturelitigation between them and to foster family relations, and in addition, thedefendantEusebiadeJesushadagreed,inconsiderationofthecourt'sapprovalofsaidagreement,towaiveamoneyclaimagainsttheestate,sothatcourtapprovalofsaidagreementwouldreallyredoundtothebenefitoftheestateandtheheirs.Section9,Rule90,however,provides thatauthoritycanbegivenby theprobatecourttotheadministratortoconveypropertyheldintrustbythedeceasedtothebeneficiariesofthetrustonly"afternoticegivenasrequired inthe lastprecedingsection"; i.e., that. "no such conveyance shall be authorized until notice of theapplication for that purpose has been given personally or by mail to all personsinterested,andsuchfurthernoticehasbeengiven,bypublicationorotherwise,asthecourtdeemsproper"(sec.8,Rule90).Thisrulemakesitmandatorythatnoticebeservedontheheirsandotherinterestedpersonsoftheapplicationforapprovalofanyconveyanceofpropertyheld in trustby thedeceased,andwherenosuchnotice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance, aswell as the conveyanceitself, is completely void.Here,plaintiffs claim thatno suchnoticewas given theheirs of the deceased Melecio de Jesus of the petition for the approval of thestipulationsinquestion,anditisquiteprobablethattheclaimistrue,becausesaidheirswereallminorswhentheproceedings inquestiontookplace. Itwouldhavebeen necessary, therefore, to appoint a guardian ad litem for them before theycould be validly served said notice, yet the records here do not show that suchappointment of guardian was obtained. In fact, any such appointment appearsimprobable,considering that thestipulations inquestionwereapprovedtheverynext day following their execution and submission for approval. It must beobservedthatin1948,beforethepromulgationoftheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,parents as such were not the legal representatives of their children before thecourtsandcouldnotdisposeoftheirpropertywithoutjudicialauthorization.



RULE90DISTRIBUTIONANDPARTITIONOFTHEESTATE

Section1.Whenorderfordistributionofresiduemade.Whenthedebts,funeralcharges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, andinheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, havebeenpaid,thecourt,ontheapplicationoftheexecutororadministrator,orofaperson interested in the estate, and after hearing uponnotice, shall assign theresidueoftheestatetothepersonsentitledtothesame,namingthemandtheproportions,orparts, towhicheach is entitled, and suchpersonsmaydemandand recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or anyotherpersonhavingthesameinhispossession. If there isacontroversybeforethe court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as thedistributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, thecontroversyshallbeheardanddecidedasinordinarycases.No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations abovementioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any ofthem,giveabond,inasumtobefixedbythecourt,conditionedforthepaymentofsaidobligationswithinsuchtimeasthecourtdirects.Section 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as toadvancementmade,orallegedtohavebeenmade,bythedeceasedtoanyheirmay be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estateproceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on thepersonraisingthequestionsandontheheir.Section3.Bywhomexpensesofpartitionpaid. Ifatthetimeofdistributiontheexecutororadministratorhasretainedsufficienteffects inhishandswhichmaylawfully be applied for the expenses of partition of the properties distributed,suchexpensesofpartitionmaybepaidbysuchexecutororadministratorwhenitappears equitable to the court and not inconsistent with the intention of thetestator; otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to theirrespective shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment shall besettled andallowedby the court, and, if anyperson interested in thepartitiondoes not pay his proportion or share, the courtmay issue an execution in the

name of the executor or administrator against the party not paying the sumassessed.Section4.Recording theorderof partitionof estate.� Certified copiesof finalorders and judgments of the court relating to the real estate or the partitionthereof shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province where thepropertyissituated.131 LOPEZV.LOPEZ

68PHIL227FACTS:ConcepcionfiledapetitionintheintestateproceedingsofEmeterioLopezforthesummaryentitlement tohisestate,alleging therein thatshe is theacknowledgednatural childof the latter. Oppositionwasmadebyallegednephewsandniecesdenying her allegations. The petition was later amended by averring that theestatevalueisbiggerthanwhatwaspreviouslyallegedandisbeyondthescopeofasummarysettlement.HELD:Appellantsclaimthattheyhadnonoticeeitherofthepetitionforthedeclarationof heirs or of the date set for the hearing thereof. We find in the record noevidence affirmatively showing that they had no such notice; therefore, thepresumption of regularity of proceedings should stand. In the motion forreconsideration filedby them, the lackofnotice isalleged;but themotion isnotevenverified.Besides,accordingtotherecordAttorneySimplicioB.Pe�awasthecounselforboththeadministratorandtheoppositors‐appellants.Thepetitionfordeclarationofheirs,althoughsignedbyAttorneySimplicioB.Pe�aas"abogadodeladministrador",was, infact,apetitionfiled inbehalfoftheoppositors‐appellantsas their right to succession is therein asserted and prayed for. Under thiscircumstances, thereexists sufficient ground forholding, aswedohold, that theoppositors‐appellantshadnoticeofthepetitionaswellasofthehearingwherethesaidattorneywaspresent.132 HEIRSOFPERFECTOSANTIESBANV.SANTIESBAN

68PHIL367FACTS:



Ambrosiowasappointedastheadministratorofhislatewife’sestate.Sincethereweren’tanyaccountspayable, theheirsextrajudiciallypartitionedtheproperties.Thepropertieshavingbeendistributedandaccounted for, the courtordered theproceeding’sclosure.Morethantwoyearsafter,thefatherconveyedhisinterestto the eight parcels of land he got to his daughter. This was opposed byMacondrayandlikewise,itprayedfortheappointmentofanewadministrator.Theheirsopposedthis.HELD:The appellants contend in their assigned error that the court exceeded itsjurisdiction in issuingthenorderofDecember11,1935whichsetasidetheotherorderofNovember12,1934,reopeningtheintestateandrequiringthatthenameof the a new administrator be proposed. They argue that this last order, havingbecomefinal,wasnotsubjecttomodificationorreversal.Wefindnomeritintheassignment of error because the order of November 12, 1934, did not finallydetermine the action andwas interlocutory in nature (section 123, Code of CivilProcedure). By said order the court did not determineor adjudicate any right orcontroversyand ithadnootherobject thantoopenthewayforthehearingandresolution of the rights to alleged damages which one of the parties claimed tohave suffered. The orders irregularly issued by the court were those whichreopened the intestate and appointed a new administrator, because the orderclosing the intestate,datedNovember29,1932,putanend theretoand relievedtheadministratorfromhisduties.Undersection753oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,whatbringsanintestateproceedingtoacloseistheorderofdistributiondirectingthe delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after paying theindebtedness, if any, left by thedeceased. This orderwas issued in the intestatesince October 18, 1932 when the court approved the partition executed andsubmittedbyalltheheirs.133 SOLIVIOV.CA

SupraHELD:However,inasmuchasConcordiahadagreedtodelivertheestateofthedeceasedto the foundation inhonorofhismother,SalustiaSolivioVda.de Javellana (fromwhom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her"MotiontoReopenand/orReconsiderOrderdatedApril3,1978"whichshefiledinSpl.ProceedingNo.2540:

4. That ...prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio andmovant Concordia Javellana) have agreed tomake the estate of the decedent afoundation,besidestheyhavecloselyknowneachotherduetotheirfiliationtothedecedentand theyhavebeenvisitingeachother'shousewhicharenot farawayfor(sic)eachother.(p.234,Record;Emphasissupplied)

She is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did notwaive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all ofEsteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" whichEsteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and tofinancetheeducationofindigentbutdeservingstudentsaswell.

Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicialadmission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove theagreement.134 SALVADORV.STA.MARIA

20SCRA604FACTS:CelestinoSalvadorsoldpreviouslyalandtospousesHalili. Allegingthereaftertheabsenceofconsideration,hesoughtreconveyanceoftheland.Hediedduringthependency of proceedings and his heirs were substituted to his part. In themeanwhile, intestateproceedingswere instituted. Inthe inventoryoftheestate,the parcel of land was included. The land in question was later reconveyed.However, the landwas reconveyed to the heirs andnot to the estate. Thiswasquestioned.HELD:It isasettledpointof lawthat therightofheirs tospecific,distributivesharesofinheritancedoesnotbecomefinallydeterminableuntilall thedebtsoftheestatearepaid.Untilthen,inthefaceofsaidclaims,theirrightscannotbeenforced,areinchoate,andsubjecttotheexistenceofaresidueafterpaymentofthedebts.Petitionersdonotquestiontheexistenceofthedebtsabovementioned.Theyonlycontend that the properties involved having been ordered by final judgmentreconveyed to them, not to theestate the samearenotpropertiesof theestatebuttheirown,andthus,notliablefordebtsoftheestate.



Said contention is self‐refuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on their allegedcharacterasheirsofCelestino;assuch,theyweresubstitutedinthereconveyancecase; the reconveyance to themwas reconveyance to themas heirs of CelestinoSalvador.Itfollowsthatthepropertiestheyclaimare,evenbytheirownreasoning,partofCelestino'sestate.TherighttheretoasallegedlyhisheirswouldariseonlyifsaidparcelsoflandarepartoftheestateofCelestino,nototherwise.Theirhavingreceivedthesame,therefore,inthereconveyanceaction,wasperforceintrustfortheestate,subjecttoitsobligations.Theycannotdistributesaidpropertiesamongthemselvesassubstitutedheirswithoutthedebtsoftheestatebeingfirstsatisfied.135 TIMBOLV.CANO

Supra136 URIARTEV.CFIOFNEGROSOCCIDENTAL

SupraFACTS:HELD:Whentheestatetobesettledisthatofanon‐residentalien(likethedeceased)theCourts of First Instance in provinceswhere the deceased left any property haveconcurrentjurisdictiontotakecognizanceoftheproperspecialproceedingforthesettlementofhisestate. In thecasebeforeUs, theseCourtsofFirst Instancearethe Negros and the Manila Courts ‐ province and city where the deceased leftconsiderableproperties.Aspecialproceedingintendedtoeffectthedistributionoftheestateofadeceasedperson, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or inaccordancewithhiswill, isa"probatematter"oraproceedingforthesettlementof his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settledjurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of theestate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for thesamepurpose.Thus ithasbeenheldrepeatedlythat, if inthecourseof intestateproceedingspendingbeforeaCFIitisfounditthatthedecedenthadleftalastwill,proceedingsfortheprobateofthelattershouldreplacetheintestateproceedingsevenifatthatstageanadministratorhadalreadybeenappointed,thelatterbeingrequiredtorenderfinalaccountandturnovertheestate inhispossessiontotheexecutor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be withoutprejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the

proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clearindication thatproceedings for theprobateof awill enjoypriorityover intestateproceedings.Vicente Uriarte is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finallydetermined,orinterveneinSpecialProceedingNo.51396oftheManilaCourt,ifitisstillopen,ortoaskforitsreopeningifithasalreadybeenclosed,soastobeabletosubmitfordeterminationthequestionofhisacknowledgmentasnaturalchildofthe deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court,jurisdictiontodeclarewhoaretheheirsofthedeceasedtestatorandwhetherornotaparticularpartyisorshouldbedeclaredhisacknowledgednaturalchild.

RULE91ESCHEATS

Section1.Whenandbywhompetitionfiled.Whenapersondiesintestate,seizedofrealpropertyinthePhilippines,leavingnoheirorpersonbylawentitledtothesame,theSolicitorGeneralorhisrepresentativeinbehalfoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,mayfileapetitionintheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovincewherethe deceased last resided or in which he had estate, if he resided out of thePhilippines,settingforththefacts,andprayingthattheestateofthedeceasedbedeclaredescheated.WHERESHOULDAPETITIONFORESCHEATBEFILED?

• IntheprovincewherethedeceasedlastresidedorwhichhehadestateWHATSHOULDTHEPETITIONCONTAINASMINIMUMREQUIREMENTS?

• Setforththefacts• Prayerthattheestatebedeclaredescheated

INWHATINSTANCESCANESCHEATBEFILED?

• Decedentdiedintestatewithnoheirsandpersonentitledtothesame• Actionsofreversion• PropertiesalienatedinviolationofConstitutionorstatute• Dormantbankaccounts

Decedentdyingintestate Resident Wherelastresided



Non‐resident WherepropertiesarelocatedEscheat of properties alienated inviolationofConstitutionorstatute

Wherepropertiesarelocated

Escheatofdormantbankaccounts WherethemoneyisdepositedActionsforreversion WherepropertiesarelocatedSection2.Order for hearing. If thepetition is sufficient in formand substance,the court, by anorder reciting thepurposeof thepetition, shall fix a date andplaceforthehearingthereof,whichdateshallbenotmorethansix (6)monthsaftertheentryoftheorder,andshalldirectthatacopyoftheorderbepublishedbefore the hearing at least once a week for six (6) successive weeks in somenewspaperofgeneralcirculationpublishedintheprovince,asthecourtshallbedeembest.Section3.Hearingand judgment.Upon satisfactoryproof inopen courton thedate fixed intheorderthatsuchorderhasbeenpublishedasdirectedandthatthepersondied intestate,seizedofrealorpersonalproperty inthePhilippines,leaving no heir or person entitled to the same, and no sufficient cause beingshowntothecontrary,thecourtshalladjudgethattheestateoftheestateofthedeceased in the Philippines, after the payment of just debts and charges, shallescheat;andshall,pursuanttolaw,assignthepersonalestatetothemunicipalityor city where he last resided in the Philippines, and the real estate to themunicipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is situated. If thedeceasedneverresided inthePhilippines, thewholeestatemaybeassignedtotherespectivemunicipalitiesorcitieswherethesameislocated.Shallestateshallbeforthebenefitofpublicschools,andpubliccharitableinstitutionsandcentersinsaidmunicipalitiesorcities.Thecourt,attheinstanceofaninterestedparty,oronitsownmotion,mayorderthe establishment of a permanent trust, so that the only income from thepropertyshallbeused.Section 4.Whenand bywhom claim to estate filed. If a devisee, legatee, heir,widow,widower,orotherpersonentitledtosuchestateappearsandfilesaclaimtheretowiththecourtwithinfive(5)yearsfromthedateofsuchjudgment,suchpersonshallhavepossessionofandtitletothesame,orifsold,themunicipalityor city shallbeaccountable tohim for theproceedsafterdeducting reasonablechargesforthecareoftheestate;butaclaimnotmadewithinthesaidtimeshallbeforeverbarred.

Section5.Otheractionsforescheat.Untilotherwiseprovidedbylaw,actionsforreversionorescheatofpropertiesalienatedinviolationoftheConstitutionorofany statute shall be governed by this rule, except that the action shall beinstitutedintheprovincewherethelandliesinwholeorinpart.137 MUNICIPALCOUNCILOFLAGUNAV.COLEGIODESANJOSE

65PHILFACTS:Thiscasewascommencedinthesaidbyapetitionfiledbythepetitionersinbehalfof the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they claim theHacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of escheat. The Colegio de San Jose,Inc.,appearedspeciallyandassailedthepetitionuponthegroundsthatthecourthas no jurisdiction to take cognizance and decide the case and that the petitiondoesnotallegesufficientfactstoentitletheapplicantstotheremedyprayedfor;andaskedthatthepetitionbefinallydismissed.CarlosYoungintervenedandfiledamotionaskingforthedismissalorthepetitionuponthegroundthattheCodeofCivilProcedure,underwhich thesamewas filed, isnotapplicablebecause itwasnotyetinforcewhentheoriginalownerofthehaciendadied,whichwasinApril,1596,andthatthepetitionwasirregularlydocketedastheapplicantshadpaidatthedocketfeeswhichtheclerkofcourtshouldcollect.Subsequentlytheattorneysfor both parties filed anothermotions ofminor importance, almost all of whichcontainstheargumentsadvancedinsupportoftheircontentions.OnOctober29,1936,thecourtoverruledtheobjectiontotheappearanceandinterventioninthecasebytheColegiodeSanJoseandCarlosYoung,enteringtheorderwhichisoneofthoseappealedfrom.Andonthe30thofthesamemoththecourtenteredtheresolution,alsoappealedfrom,dismissingthepetitionforescheat,withthecoststothepetitioners.HELD:Accordingly to the first of the said sections, the essential facts which should beallegedinthepetition,whicharejurisdictionbecausetheyconferjurisdictionupontheCourtofFirstInstance,are:Thatapersonhasdiedintestateorwithoutleavinganywill;thathehasleftrealorpersonalproperty;thathewastheownerthereof;thathehasnotleftanyheirorpersonwhoisbylawentitledtotheproperty;andthat theonewhoapplies for theescheat is themunicipalitywheredeceasedhadhis last residence, or in case should have no residence in the country, themunicipalitywherethepropertyissituated.



The following section provides that after the publications and trial, if the courtfindsthatthedeceasedisinfacttheownerofrealandpersonalpropertysituatedin thecountryandhasnot leftanyheirsorotherpersonentitled thereto, itmayorder,after thepaymentsofdebtsandother legalexpenses, theescheat,and insuch case it shall adjudicate thepersonalproperty to themunicipalitywhere thedeceasedhadhis lastplaceofresidenceandtherealpropertytothemunicipalityormunicipalitieswheretheyaresituated.Escheat, under sections 750 and 751, is a proceeding whereby the real andpersonalpropertyofadeceasedpersonbecomethepropertyoftheStateuponhisdeath without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary actioncontemplatedbysection1oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,butaspecialproceedinginaccordancewiththesaidsectionandChapterXXXIX,Part II,ofthesameCode.Theproceeding,asprovidedbysection750,shouldbecommencedbypetitionandnotbycomplaint.Inaspecialproceedingforescheatundersection750and751thepetitionerisnotthesoleandexclusiveinterestedparty.Anypersonallegingtohaveadirectrightorinterest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise and interest andnecessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In thepresentcasetheColegiodeSanJose, Inc.,andCarlosYoungappearedallegingtohave a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa; and the formerbecauseitclaimstobetheexclusiveownerofthehacienda,andthelatterbecauseheclaimtobethelesseethereofunderacontractlegalityenteredwiththeformer.Inviewoftheseallegationsitiserroneoustoholdthatthesaidpartiesarewithoutrighteithertoappearincaseortosubstantiatetheirrespectiveallegedright.Thisunfavorablyresolvesthepetitioners'firstassignmentoferror.

Amotion to dismiss is an allowedpleading in escheat proceedingswhenon itsface,theescheatproceedingsshouldbedismissed.Anescheatproceedingisimproperwhenthepropertyissubjecttotheownershipofthestatealready.

138 REPUBLICV.IAC

148SCRA271

FACTS:The property in dispute was among the lands taken over by the United StatesGovernmentunder thePhilippinePropertyActof 1946enactedby theAmericanCongress. Itwasregistered in1930underTransferCertificateofTitleNo.9509oftheRegisterofDeedsof Zamboanga in thenameofKantiroKoyama, a Japanesenational,whohasnotbeenheardfromsincetheendofWorldWar II.Underthesaid Act, the land was supposed to be transferred to the Republic of thePhilippines.RepublicofthePhilippineshadfiledescheatproceedingsagainstthesaidproperty,claimingthat theregisteredownerof the land"hadbeenabsent for thepast tenyears or more and he, therefore, may be presumed dead for the purpose ofappointing his successor." It also alleged that since he left no heirs or personsentitled to the aforementioned property, the State should inherit the same inaccordancewithRule91oftheRulesofCourt.Thecourtsubsequentlyallowedtheescheat.HELD:Itisclear,andtherespondentCityofZamboangadoesnotdenyit,thattherewasmereinadvertenceonthepartoftheAmericangovernmentinomittingtotransferthedisputedlandtotheRepublicofthePhilippines.TheobviouspurposeoftheActwastoturnovertothePhilippinegovernmentallenemypropertiessituatedinitsterritorythathadbeenseizedandwerebeingheldforthetimebeingbytheUnitedStates,whichwasthenexercisingsovereigntyoverthePhilippines.ThetransferofsuchenemypropertiestothePhilippineRepublicwasoneoftheactsbywhichtheUnited States acknowledged the elevation of this country to the status of asovereignstateonJuly4,1946.While it is true that thereareno recordsof such transfer,wemaypresume thatsuch transferwasmade.The lackof such recordsdoesnotmean that itwasnotmadeasthiswouldruncountertothemandateof thePhilippinePropertyActof1946,which, to repeat, intendedtovest title in thePhilippinesenemypropertiesfoundinitsterritory.ItwouldbemorereasonabletosupposethatthePresidentoftheUnitedStates,orthepersonactingunderhisauthority,compliedwith,ratherthanneglected (and so violated) this requirement of Section 3 of the saidAct, ifonlyon thebasisof thepresumptionof the regularityofofficial functions. In theextreme, we can even say that this section legally effected the transfer, to beevidenced later by the formality of the correspondingdeed, and that the lack ofsuchdeeddoesnotmeanthatnotransferwasmade.Otherwise,wewouldhaveto



facethedubiousconclusionthatthesaidpropertyisstillownedandsostillsubjecttodispositionbytheUnitedStates.Weholdthatwhereitcomestoordinaryrealpropertiestheownersofwhichmaybepresumeddeadandleftnoheirs,thesamemaybeescheated,conformablytoRule91oftheRulesofCourt,infavorofthepoliticalsubdivisionsinwhichtheyarelocated. The said Rule, however, does not cover properties taken from enemynationalsasaresultofWorldWarIIandrequiredtobetransferredtotheRepublicof the Philippines by the United States in accordance with its own enactmentcommonlyknownasthePhilippinePropertyActof1946.Suchproperties,includingthe land in dispute, belong to the Philippine government not by virtue of theescheatproceedingsbutonthestrengthofthetransferauthorizedandrequiredbythesaidAct.139 VICENTETANV.CITYOFDAVAO

166SCRA73FACTS:The spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia, during their lifetime, wereresidentsofDavaoCity.Astheywerechildless,theyadoptedathree‐yearoldgirlwhom they named Dominga Garcia and brought up as their own. At the age ofnineteenyears,DomingaGarciamarriedaChinaman,TanSengaliasSengYap,withwhom she had three children, namedVicente,whowas born in 1916. DomingaGarciaandherthreechildrenemigratedtoCanton,China.Inlessthanayear,TanSengfollowedhisfamilytohiscountryoforigin.TheyleftaparceloflandinDavaowhichwassubjectofescheatproceedings.HELD:With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the Philippines,representedbytheSolicitor‐General,mayfiletheescheatpetitionunderSection1,Rule91of theRevised (1964)RulesofCourt, theAppellateCourt correctly ruledthat the case did not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed onSeptember12,1962,whentheapplicablerulewasstillRule92ofthe1940RulesofCourtwhichprovided:Sec.1.Whenandbywhom,petitionfiled. Whenapersondiesintestate,seizedofreal or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heirs or person by lawentitledtothesame,themunicipalityorcitywherethedeceasedlastresided,ifheresided in thePhilippines,or themunicipalityorcity inwhichhehadestate ifhe

residedoutofthePhilippines,mayfileapetitioninthecourtoffirstinstanceoftheprovince setting forth the facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased bedeclaredescheated.Rule91oftheRevisedrulesofCourt,whichprovidesthatonlytheRepublicofthePhilippines,throughtheSolicitorGeneral,maycommenceescheatproceedings,didnottakeeffectuntil January1,1964.Althoughtheescheatproceedingswerestillpending then, the Revised Rules of Court could not be applied to the petitionbecausetodosowouldworkinjusticetotheCityofDavao.TheCourtofAppealsshouldhavedismissedtheappealofVicentaTanandRamonPizarro earlier because the records show that Vicenta was never a party in theescheatproceedings.The trial court'sorderdatedFebruary4,1972ordering thatshebesubstituted forRamonPizarroasoppositor (p.16,RecordonAppeal)wasset aside by the same court in its Order of March 23, 1972 (p. 178, Record onAppeal)whichwasnotappealed.Vicenta Tan, if she still exists,was never servedwith summons extra‐territoriallyunder Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. She never appeared in the trialcourt by herself, or counsel andnever filed a pleading therein, hence, sheneversubmittedtothecourt'sjurisdiction.140 BERMUDOV.CA

55SCRA8FACTS:Caseregardingaparceloflandbeingdisputedamongthreeparties—ChinesemenandtheChineseCommunistParty.HELD:Sincethereisdisputeonwhoownstrulytheparcelofland,thestateshouldhaveinstitutedescheatproceedings.141 REPUBLICV.CFIOFMANILA

165SCRA11FACTS:Pursuant to theUnclaimed Balance Law, some 31 banks including herein privaterespondentPres.RoxasRuralBank forwarded to theTreasurerof thePhilippinesseparate statements under oath by their respective managing officers of all



depositsandcreditsheldbytheminfavor,or inthenamesofsuchdepositorsorcreditorsknowntobedead,orwhohavenotbeenheard from,orwhohavenotmade furtherdepositsorwithdrawalsduring thepreceding tenyearsormore. Inthe sworn statement submittedby private respondentBank, only two (2) namesappeared:JesusYdirinandLeonoraTrumpeta.The aforementioned statements were published in two newspapers, one was inEnglish while the other was in Spanish. Both are of general circulation in thePhilippines. This consequently led to a complaint for escheat lodged by thegovernment against the 31 banks. The private respondent bank sought thedismissalofthesameonthegroundofimpropervenue.Inopposingthedismissalof thecase,petitionermaintained thatprivate respondentbank is justanominalparty and the proper parties to lodge the motion to dismiss are the depositorsthemselves.HELD:IssueofrealpartyininterestA"realpartyininterest"hasbeendefinedasthepartywhowouldbebenefittedorinjuredbythejudgmentofthesuitorthepartyentitledtoavailofthesuit.Therecan be no doubt that private respondent bank falls under this definition for theescheat of the dormant deposits in favor of the government would necessarilydeprivesaidbankoftheuseofsuchdeposits.Itisinthissensethatitstandstobe"injuredbythejudgmentofthesuit;"anditisforthisreasonthatSection3ofActNo.3936specificallyprovidesthatthebankshallbejoinedasapartyintheactionforescheat.QuestionofimpropervenueThefirstsentenceofSection3ofActNo.3936directstheAttorneyGeneral,nowSolicitorGeneral,tocommenceanactionoractions inthenameofthePeopleofthe Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province where the bank islocated. The phrase "or actions" in this section is very significant. It manifestsawareness on the part of the legislators that a single action to cover all bankswherever located in the Philippines would not be legally feasible in view of thevenueprescribedforsuchactionunderthesamesection,i.e.,theprovincewherethebankislocated.Thus,theadditionofthelastsentence,whichthelowercourthadcorrectlyinterpretedtomean"thatforescheatofunclaimedbankbalancesallbanks located in one and the same province where the Court of First Instance

concerned is locatedmaybemadepartiesdefendant "inoneaction"was clearlyintended to save on litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not asauthorityforthelumpingtogetherofallbankswhereverfoundinthePhilippinesinonesingleescheatproceedings.

GENERALGUARDIANSANDGUARDIANSHIP

RULE92VENUE

Section1.Wheretoinstituteproceedings.Guardianshipofapersonorestateofaminor or incompetent may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of theprovince, or in the justice of the peace court of the municipality, or in themunicipalcourtcharteredcitywheretheminororincompetentpersonsresides,andifheresidesinaforeigncountry,intheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovincewherein his property or the party thereof is situated; provided, however, thatwhere the value of the property of such minor or incompetent exceeds thatjurisdictionof the justiceof thepeaceormunicipalcourt, theproceedingsshallbeinstitutedintheCourtofFirstInstance.In the City of Manila the proceedings shall be instituted in the Juvenile andDomesticRelationsCourt.THREEKINDSOFGUARDIAN

1. Legal guardian—who is such by provision of law without the need ofjudicial appointment, as in the case of the parents over the person oftheirminorchildren,etc.

2. Judicial guardian—who is a competent person appointed by the courtoverthepersonand/orpropertyofthewardtorepresentthelatterinallhis civil acts and transactions, and is the one contemplated in theaforementionedrules

3. Guardian ad litem—whomaybe a competentperson appointedby thecourtforpurposesofaparticularactionorproceedinginvolvingaminor

TOWHICHJUDICIALGUARDIANSHIPPERTAINS

• Withrespecttothepersonoftheward,hispropertyorboth



• Where the person has no property, guardianship may only with hisperson

• Withrespecttoanon‐residentward,withrespecttohispropertySection 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." Under this rule, the word"incompetent"includespersonssufferingthepenaltyofcivilinterdictionorwhoare hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumbwho are unable to read andwrite, thosewho are of unsoundmind, even though they have lucid intervals,and persons not being of unsoundmind, but by reason of age, disease, weakmind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care ofthemselvesandmanagetheirproperty,becomingtherebyaneasypreyfordeceitandexploitation.WHOISANINCOMPETENT?

• Includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who arehospitalizedlepers,prodigals,deafanddumbwhoareunabletoreadandwrite, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucidintervals,andpersonsnotbeingofunsoundmind,butbyreasonofage,disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outsideaid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becomingtherebyaneasypreyfordeceitandexploitation.

Section 3. Transfer of venue.� The court taking cognizance of a guardianshipproceeding, may transfer the same to the court of another province ormunicipalitywherein thewardhasacquired realproperty, ifhehas transferredtheretohisbona‐fideresidence,andthelattercourtshallhavefulljurisdictiontocontinuetheproceedings,withoutrequiringpaymentofadditionalcourtfees.142 FRANCISCOV.CA

127SCRA371FACTS:PetitioneristheguardianoftheincompetentSanPedro.Partiesallegingtobetheincompetent’srelativessoughthisremovalforallegedlyfailingtofileaninventory.Heactuallydid render anaccountingand lateron, an inventorybuthis accountswere questioned on the ground it didn’t coincide on what he truly received asguardian.Thejudgeorderedhimremoveandforhimtopayforhispayables.Onreconsideration,thejudgereverseditsorderofpaymentbutstill,removedhimonthegroundofoldage—evenifhewas72andstillabletofulfillhisduties.

HELD:PetitioneristhedulyappointedguardianoftheincompetentEstefaniaSanPedroinSpecialProceedingsNo.532oftheCourtofFirstInstanceofBulacanpresidedoverby respondent Judge.OnAugust30,1974 respondentPelagioFrancisco, claimingto be a first cousin of Estefania San Pedro, togetherwith two others, said to beniecesofthe incompetent,petitionedthecourtfortheremovalofpetitionerandfor the appointment in his stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco. Among othergrounds, the petition was based on the failure of the guardian to submit aninventoryoftheestateofhiswardandtorenderanaccounting.Itwould seem thatpetitioner subsequently renderedan accountingbut failed tosubmitaninventory,forwhichreasonthecourtonMarch20,1975gavepetitionerten (10) days within which to do so, otherwise he would be removed fromguardianship Petitioner thereafter submitted an inventory to which respondentPelagioFranciscofiledanobjectiononthegroundthatpetitioneractuallyreceivedP14,000.00 for thesaleofa residential landandnotP12,000.00onlyasstated inthedeedofsaleandreportedbyhiminhisinventory.TherespondentJudgefoundtheclaimtobetrue,and, inhisorderofApril17,1980relievedthepetitionerasguardian.Onmotionofpetitioner,however,therespondentJudgereconsideredhisfinding,relyingonthedeedofsaleasthebestevidenceofthepricepaidforthesaleoftheland.inhisorderdatedSeptember12,1980,respondentjudgeacknowledgedthathis finding was "rather harsh and somewhat unfair to the said guardian."Nevertheless, respondent Judge ordered the retirement of petitioner on thegroundofoldage.143 LAVIDESV.CITYCOURTOFLUCENA

114SCRA187FACTS:Upon the death of his wife, petitioner Alberto Lavides instituted a guardianshipproceeding with respect to the person and property of their seven (7) minorchildren.Saidpetitionalleged that theestate leftby thedeceasedwifeofhereinpetitioner, mother of the above‐ named minors, has a total value of thirty‐fivethousandpesos(P35,000.00)oranamountofP5,000.00pertainingtoeachminor.Although there had been no previous settlement of the estate of the deceased,petitionerwasappointedandqualifiedasjudicialguardian.



The City Court, upon motion, authorized petitioner to settle the estateextrajudiciallyandtosellaportionthereofconsistingofsharesofstocks.Pursuantto said authority, petitioner extrajudicially settled the estate, and on August 28,1971,soldthesaidsharesofstocksforthesumofP64,512.00Petitioner filed a motion for confirmation and approval of a Deed of ExchangeAgreement. While this latter motion was still pending consideration, therespondentcourt,reviewedtherecordsofthecaseandfindingthattheundividedestate leftbythedeceasedwasworthat leastP35,000.00,dismissedthecaseforlack of jurisdiction, revoked the appointment of petitioner as guardian andannulledallproceedingstakenpriortotheissuanceofthesaidorderofDecember5,1978.HELD:Theabovesection,inclearterms,grantsconcurrentjurisdictionbetweenmunicipalandcitycourtandCourtsofFirst Instanceintheappointmentofguardianseitherwith respect to thepersonorpropertyof theminoror incompetent,except thatwhere the value of the property of such minor or incompetent exceeds thejurisdictionof themunicipalor city courts, theguardianshipproceedings shall beinstitutedintheCourtofFirstInstance.Itisclear,therefore,thatthevalueoftheproperty of the minor or incompetent sought to be placed in guardianshipdetermines which court has jurisdiction. And that property referred to is theindividual estate of the minor so much so that when there are more than oneminoror incompetentsoughttobeplacedunderguardianship,whatdetermineswhichcourthasjurisdictionisthevalueoftheindividualpropertyofeachminororincompetent.Inthecaseatbar,itappearsthatrespondentcitycourtdismissedthepetitionforguardianshipongroundof lackof jurisdictionbecauseaperusal of the recordofthe case shows that the undivided estate left by the deceasedmother is worthP35,000.00whichamountisclearlyoutsideitsjurisdiction.Thisreasoningmustberejectedfor itoverlooksthefactthatthepetitionforguardianshipfiledbyhereinpetitioner before the respondent city court clearly alleged that the individualestate or share of each of the seven minor children sought to be placed underguardianship is P5,000.00, which amount is well within the jurisdiction of therespondent city court (Section88, JudiciaryActof1948, asamendedbyR.A.No.3828). That the respondent city court has jurisdiction over the case cannot bedenied, for the rule iswell‐settled that jurisdiction of the court over the subjectmatterisdeterminedbytheallegationsofthecomplaintand/orpetition.

144 PARCOV.CA

111SCRA262FACTS:Francisco Rodriguez is the guardian of the Soledad Rodriguez (ward). With theauthorityandapprovalofCFIJudge(whotookcognizanceoftheproceedingsuponauthorizationfromtheSecretaryofJustice),Rodriguezsold3parcelsoflandtoLuisParco and Virginia Bautista (“Petitioners”). The sale was made for the support,maintenanceandmedical treatmentof theward.Titlesoversaidparcelsof landswereissuedinfavorofthePETITIONERS.More than a year after the sale, RODRIGUEZ sought an order requiringPETITIONERS to appear before the court for examinationon the basis that the 3parcelsof landwereallegedly indangerofbeinglost,squandered,concealedandembezzled.HELD:As held in the case of Cui v. Piccio, where title to any property said to beembezzled,concealedorconveyedis indispute,thedeterminationofsaidtitleorright whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed orconveyedthepropertymustbedeterminedinaseparateordinaryactionandnotinguardianshipproceedings.Inthiscase,thereisdefinitelyacloudofdoubtastowhohasabetterrightortitletothedisputedproperties.Thus, thissituationrequiresthedeterminationoftitleor ownership of the 3 parcels of land which is beyond the jurisdiction of theguardianshipcourtandshouldbethreshedoutinaseparateordinaryaction.

Inthiscase,twobranchesoftheCFIofQuezonconcurrentlyassumedjurisdictionover the proceedings. Branch I assumed original jurisdiction which was later onassigned toBranch IV (by virtueof theorderof the Sec. of Justice tounclog thedockets).When Branch I issued an order re‐assuming jurisdiction over the case,Branch IV actually ordered that the records be forwarded and returned to theformer. However, it subsequently threshed out the issue of ownership of theparcels of land, which decision is the subject of the present appeal. This onlybolstersthatthecourtnolongerhadjurisdictionovertheproceedingsofthecase.



145 OFFICEOFCOURTADMINISTRATORV.GINES224SCRA261

FACTS:Gineswasaccostedforgraveignoranceoflawandprocedure…HELD:1. “Branch 26” was originally typewritten as part of the caption. Further,Flores’name(CourtInterpreter)wasalreadyindicatedinthepetition.2. ReginaVALDEZ(claimingtobethenieceofLAGMAY)filedthepetitionforguardianship,allegingthatsheisaresidentofSanFernando,LaUnion.Sheallegedhowever, thatLAGMAY (ward)waspresently residing inMabalacat,Pampanga. ItwasalsoallegedthatLAGMAYisanAmericancitizen,single,childlessandaretiredseamanreceivingpensionfromtheUS.Despitethisfact(undertheRules,jurisdictionliesinthecourtwheretheminororincompetent person resides, see Sec 1, Rule 92), GINES immediately gave duecourseto thepetitionanddirectedthatnoticesbeserved,andgranted lettersofguardianshipinfavorofVALDEZ.(*Note:VALDEZisalsotheauntofGINES)3. Further, therewasnoorder setting thecase forhearing,ataparticulardate time and place. No notices were sent to any of the “kin” or even to JuanLagmayhimself.4. The bond supposedly required from Valdez was not yet filed, but still,Floresadministeredoathtotheformer.5. JudgeGinesalsodirectedthatthepersonhavingcustodyofJuanLagmaybe ordered to release the latter and turn himover to the special sheriffs, underpainofcontempt.WhenthispersonrefusedtoturnovercustodyoverLagmay,thejudgeorderedhisarrest (Theremedy inthiscaseshouldhavebeenapetitionforhabeas corpus, and not to have the person having custody cited for contempt,muchlessarrested).146 VANCILV.BELMES

358SCRA707

FACTS:

BonifaciaVancil,isthemotherofReederC.Vancil,aNavyservicemanoftheUnitedStatesofAmericawhodiedinthesaidcountry.Duringhislifetime,hehad2minorchildren. Petitionerfiledapetitiontobeappointedasguardianofthetwominorchildren. Shealleged that theminor childrenwere residentsofCebuCity. Afterbeing appointed, oppositionwas entered by themother of the children, allegingthatshehaspreviouslyfiledapetitionwiththeRTCofPagadianCity.HELD:Petitioner,asthesurvivinggrandparent,canexercisesubstituteparentalauthorityonly in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering thatrespondent is verymuch alive and has exercised continuously parental authorityover Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor�sguardian, respondent�s unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not profferedconvincingevidence showing that respondent isnot suited tobe theguardianofVincent. Petitionermerely insists that respondent ismorally unfit as guardian ofValerie considering that her (respondent�s) live‐in partner raped Valerie severaltimes. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of thisguardianshipproceeding.EvenassumingthatrespondentisunfitasguardianofminorVincent,stillpetitionercannotqualifyasasubstituteguardian. Itbearsstressingthatshe isanAmericancitizenandaresidentofColorado.Obviously,shewillnotbeabletoperformtheresponsibilitiesandobligationsrequiredofaguardian. Infact, inherpetition,sheadmittedthedifficultyofdischargingthedutiesofaguardianbyanexpatriate,likeher.Tobesure, shewillmerelydelegate thoseduties to someoneelsewhomaynotalsoqualifyasaguardian.Moreover, we observe that respondent�s allegation that petitioner has not setfoot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides,petitioner�soldageandherconvictionoflibelbytheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch6,CebuCityinCriminalCaseNo.CBU‐168846filedbyoneDaniloR.Deen,willgiveherasecondthoughtofstayinghere.Indeed,hercomingbacktothiscountryjusttofulfillthedutiesofaguardiantoVincentforonlytwoyearsisnotcertain.147 KATIPUNANV.KATIPUNAN

375SCRA200FACTS:



BraulioKatipunan,assistedbyhisbrotherMiguel,soldalot/apartmentbuildingtotheBalgumabrothers.Braulio'stitlewascancelledandanewonewasissuedtotheBalgumas. Ina laterdate,BrauliofiledacomplaintforannulmentoftheDeedofAbsoluteSale.HeaverredthathisbrotherMiguel,Atty.BalgumaandInocencioValdezconvincedhim towork abroad. Theymade him sign a document purportedly a contract ofemployment,whichdocumentturnedouttobeaDeedofAbsoluteSale.Hefurtheralleged thathedidnot receive the consideration stated in the contract. HewasshockedwhenhissisterAguedatoldhimthattheBalgumabrotherssentalettertothe lessees of the apartment informing them that they are the new owners. Heclaimedthatthethree,withevidentbadfaith,conspiredwithoneanotherintakingadvantageofhisignorance,hebeingonlyathirdgrader.TwiceBrauliomovedtodismisshiscomplaint,whichweregranted.Ingrantinghismotions for reconsideration (to pursue the case again), the trial court wasconvincedthatrespondentdidnotsignthemotionstodismissvoluntarilybecauseofhispoorcomprehension,asshownbythemedicalreportofDr.AnnetteRevilla,aResidentPsychiatristatthePGH.Besides, thetrialcourtnotedthatBrauliowasnotassistedbycounsel insigning thesaidmotions, thus it ispossible thathedidnotunderstandtheconsequencesofhisaction.Thetrialcourtsetthecaseforpre‐trial.ThecourtlikewisegrantedBraulio'smotiontoappointAguedaashisguardianadlitem.Thetrialcourtdismissedthecomplaint,holdingthatrespondentfailedtoprovehiscausesofactionsinceheadmittedthat:(1)heobtainedloansfromtheBalgumas;(2) he signed the Deed of Absolute Sale; and (3) he acknowledged selling thepropertyandthathestoppedcollectingtherentals.HELD:The title of the Balgumas should be annulled. It is apparent that the contractentered into by Braulio and Atty. Balguma is voidable because Braulio is anincompetent.SinceBrauliohasamentalstateofasixyearoldchild,hecannotbeconsideredasfully capacitated. He falls under the category of “incompetent” as defined inSection2,Rule92oftheRulesofCourt:

The word “incompetent” includes persons suffering the penalty of civilinterdictionorwhoarehospitalizedlepers,prodigals,deafanddumbwhoareunable to readandwrite, thosewhoareofunsoundmind,eventhoughtheyhavelucidintervals,andpersonsnotbeingofunsoundmind,butbyreasonofage,disease,weakmind,andothersimilarcauses,cannot,withoutoutsideaid,takecareofthemselvesandmanagetheirproperty,becomingtherebyaneasypreyfordeceitandexploitation.

The circumstances surrounding the execution of the contractmanifest a vitiatedconsent on the part of Braulio. Undue influence was exerted upon him by hisbrotherMiguel and InocencioValdez andAtty. Balguma. They did not explain tohim the nature and contents of the document. Worse, they deprived him of areasonablefreedomofchoice.Itbearsstressingthathereachedonlygradethree.Thus,itwasimpossibleforhimtounderstandthecontentsofthecontractwrittenin English and embellished in legal jargon. The trial court took cognizanceof themedicalfindingofDr.Revilla(asanexpertwitness)whotestifiedthat,basedonthetestssheconducted,shefoundthatBrauliohasaverylowIQandamindofasix‐yearoldchild.Infact,thetrialcourthadtoclarifycertainmattersbecauseBrauliowas either confused, forgetful or could not comprehend. Thus, his lack ofeducation,coupledwithhismentalaffliction,placedhimnotonlyatahopelesslydisadvantageouspositionvis‐à‐vispetitionerstoenterintoacontract,butvirtuallyrenderedhim incapableof giving rational consent. Tobe sure, his ignorance andweaknessmadehimmostvulnerable to thedeceitful cajolingand intimidationofpetitioners.

Mycasedigestsunfortunatelyendhere. ThoughassignmentsweregivenuptoTRUSTEES, I unfortunately was not able to make them. For cross‐referencehowever,pleaserefertothecasedigestscompendiummadebymyblockfortherestoftherulesconcerned.=)

RULE93APPOINTMENTOFGUARDIANS

Section 1.Whomay petition for appointment of guardian for resident.� Anyrelative, friend, or other person on behalf of a residentminor or incompetentwhohasnoparentor lawfulguardian,ortheminorhimself if fourteenyearsofageorover,maypetitionthecourthaving jurisdictionfortheappointmentofa



generalguardianforthepersonorestate,orboth,ofsuchminororincompetent.Anofficer of the FederalAdministrationof theUnited States in thePhilippinesmayalsofileapetitioninfavorofawardthereof,andtheDirectorofHealth,infavorofan insanepersonwhoshouldbehospitalized,or infavorofan isolatedleper.Section 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a generalguardianmustshow,sofarasknowntothepetitioner:(a)Thejurisdictionfacts;(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary orconvenient;(c)Thenames,ages,andresidenceoftherelativesoftheminororincompetent,andofthepersonhavinghimintheircare;(d)Theprobablevalueandcharacterofhisestate;(e)Thenameofthepersonforwhomlettersofguardianship.The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shallrendervoidtheissuanceoflettersofguardianship.Section3.Courttosettimeforhearing.Noticethereof.Whenapetitionfortheappointmentofageneralguardianisfiled,thecourtshallfixatimeandplaceforhearing the same,and shall cause reasonablenotice thereof tobegiven to thepersonsmentionedinthepetitionresidingintheprovince,includingtheminorifabove14yearsofageortheincompetenthimself,andmaydirectothergeneralorspecialnoticethereoftobegiven.Section4.Oppositiontopetition.Any interestedpersonmay,byfilingawrittenopposition,contestthepetitiononthegroundofmajorityoftheallegedminor,competency of the alleged incompetent, or the insuitability of the person forwhom letters areprayed, andmaypray that thepetitionbedismissed, or thatlettersofguardianship issue tohimself,or toanysuitablepersonnamed in theopposition.Section5.Hearingandorderforletterstoissue.Atthehearingofthepetitionthealleged in competentmust be present if able to attend, and itmust be shownthat the required notice has been given. Thereupon the courts shall hear theevidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and, if theperson in question is a minor, or incompetent it shall be appoint a suitable

guardianofhispersonorestate,orboth,withthepowersanddutieshereinafterspecified.Section6.Whenandhowguardian fornon‐residentappointed.Notice.Whenaperson liable to be put under guardianship resideswithout the Philippines buttheestatetherein,anyrelativeorfriendofsuchperson,oranyoneinterestedinhisestate,inexpectancyorotherwise,maypetitionacourthavingjurisdictionfortheappointmentofaguardian for theestate,and if, afternoticegiven to suchperson and in such manner as the court deems proper, by publication orotherwise,andhearing,thecourtissatisfiedthatsuchnon‐residentisaminororincompetent rendering a guardian necessary or convenient, it may appoint aguardianforsuchestate.Section7.Parentsasguardians.Whenthepropertyof thechildunderparentalauthorityisworthtwothousandpesosorless,thefatherofthemother,withoutthe necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When thepropertyofthechild isworthmorethantwothousandpesos,thefatherorthemothershallbeconsideredguardianofthechild'sproperty,withthedutiesandobligationsof guardiansunder this rules, and shall file thepetition requiredbysection 2 hereof. For good reasons the court may, however, appoint anothersuitableperson.Section8.Serviceofjudgment.Finalordersorjudgmentsunderthisruleshallbeserved upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor orincompetentpersonresidesorwherehispropertyorpartthereofissituated.

RULE94BONDSOFGUARDIANS

Section 1. Bond to be given before issuance of letters. Amount. Condition. �Beforeaguardianappointedentersupontheexecutionofhistrust,orlettersofguardianship issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs,conditionedasfollows:(a)Tomakeandreturntothecourt,withinthree(3)months,atrueandcompleteinventoryofalltheestate,realandpersonal,ofhiswardwhichshallcometohispossessionorknowledgeofanyotherpersonforhim;



(b) To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, tomanage and dispose of theestateaccordingtotheserulesforthebestinterestsoftheward,andtoprovideforthepropercare,custody,andeducationoftheward;(c)To rendera trueand justaccountofall theestateof theward inhishands,andof all proceedsor interestderived therefrom,andof themanagementanddisposition of the same, at the time designated by these rules and such othertimesasthecourtsdirects,andattheexpirationofhistrusttosettlehisaccountswith the court and deliver and pay over all the estate, effects, and moneysremaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the personlawfullyentitledthereto;(d)Toperformallordersofthecourtbyhimtobeperformed.Section 2. When new bond may be required and old sureties discharged. �Wheneveritisdeemednecessary,thecourtmayrequireanewbondtobegivenby the guardian, andmay discharge the sureties on the old bond from furtherliability, after due notice to interested persons, when no injury can resulttherefromtothoseinterestedintheestate.Section3.Bondstobefiled.Actionsthereon.�Everybondgivenbyaguardianshallbefiledintheofficeoftheclerkofthecourt,and,incaseofthebreachofacondition thereof,may be prosecuted in the same proceeding or in a separateaction for the use and benefit of the ward or of any other person legallyinterestedintheestate.

RULE95SELLINGANDENCUMBERINGPROPERTYOFWARD

Section1.Petitionofguardianforleavetosellorencumberestate.�Whentheincomeoftheestateunderguardianshipisinsufficienttomaintainthewardandhis family, or to maintain and educate the ward when a minor, or when itappears that it is for the benefit of theward that his real estate or some partthereof be sold, or mortgaged or otherwise encumbered, and the proceedsthereof put out at interest, or invested in some productive security, or in theimprovement or security or other real estate of the ward, the guardian maypresentaverifiedpetitiontothecourtbywhichhewasappointedsettingforthsuchfacts,andprayingthatanorderissueauthorizingthesaleorencumbrance.

DOES THE GUARDIAN NEED TO SECURE COURT APPROVAL FOR SALE OFPERISHABLEGOODSOWNEDBYTHEWARD?

• Therulesdoesn’tdistinguishonthetypeofgoods• The guardian needs to always secure court approval before sale or

encumbranceofthepropertiesofthewardSection2.Ordertoshowcausethereupon.� If itseemsprobablethatsuchsaleorencumbranceisnecessary,orwouldbebeneficialtotheward,thecourtshallmakeanorderdirectingthenextofkinoftheward,andallpersonsinterestedintheestate, to appear at a reasonable timeandplace therein specified to showcausewhytheprayerofthepetitionshouldnotbegranted.Section3.Hearingonreturnoforder.Costs.�Atthetimeandplacedesignatedintheordertoshowcause,thecourtshallheartheproofsandallegationsofthepetitioner and next of kin, and other persons interested, together with theirwitnesses,andgrantandrefusetheprayerofthepetitionasthebestinterestoftheward require. The court shallmake suchorder as to cost of thehearing asmaybejust.Section 4. Contents of order for sale or encumbrance, and how long effective.Bond.� If, after full examination, it appears that it is necessary, or would bebeneficialtotheward,tosellorencumbertheestate,orsomeportionofit,thecourt shall order such sale or encumbrance and that the proceeds thereof beexpendedforthemaintenanceofthewardandhisfamily,ortheeducationoftheward,ifaminor,orfortheputtingofthesameinterest,ortheinvestmentofthesameas thecircumstancesmay require.Theorder shall specify thecauseswhythe sale or encumbrance is necessary or beneficial, andmay direct that estateordered sold be disposed of at either public or private sale, subject to suchconditionsastothetimeandmannerofpayment,andsecuritywhereapartofthe payment is deferred as in the discretion of the court are deemed mostbeneficial totheward.Theoriginalbondof theguardianshallstandassecurityfor theproper appropriationof theproceedsof the sale, but the judgemay, ifdeemedexpedient,requireanadditionalbondasaconditionforthegrantingofthe order of sale. No order of sale granted in pursuance of this section shallcontinueinforcemorethanone(1)yearaftergrantingthesame,withoutasalebeinghad.WHATSHALLTHEORDERSTATE?



1. Specifythecauseswhythesaleorencumbranceisnecessaryorbeneficial2. Itmaydirectthatestateorderedsoldbedisposedofateitherpublicor

private sale, subject to such conditions as to the time and manner ofpayment,andsecuritywhereapartofthepaymentisdeferredasinthediscretionofthecourtaredeemedmostbeneficialtothe

Section 5. Courtmay order investment of proceeds and directmanagement ofestate. � The court may authorize and require the guardian to invest theproceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other of his ward's money in hishands, in real estate or otherwise, as shall be for the best interest of allconcerned, andmaymake such other orders for themanagement, investment,anddispositionoftheestateandeffects,ascircumstancesmayrequire.

RULE96GENERALPOWERSANDDUTIESOFGUARDIANS

Section1.Towhatguardianshipshallextend.�Aguardianappointedshallhavethe care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of hisestate,orthemanagementoftheestateonly,asthecasemaybe.Theguardianoftheestateofanon‐residentshallhavethemanagementofalltheestateofthewardwithinthePhilippines,andnocourtotherthanthatinwhichsuchguardianwasappointedshallhavejurisdictionovertheguardianship.WHYISGUARDIANSHIPFORMANAGEMENTOFESTATEONLYALLOWED?

• Managementofestatedoesn’tnecessarilyneedthecareandcustodyoftheperson

Section2.Guardiantopaydebtsofward.�Everyguardianmustpaytheward'sjust debts out of his personal estate and the income of his real estate, ifsufficient;ifnot,thenoutofhisrealestateuponobtaininganorderforthesaleorencumbrancethereof.Section 3.Guardian to settle accounts, collect debts, and appear in actions forward.� A guardianmust settle all accountsof hisward, anddemand, sue for,andreceivealldebtsduehim,ormay,withtheapprovalofthecourt,compoundfor the same and give discharges to the debtor, on receiving a fair and justdividendoftheestateandeffects;andheshallappearforandrepresenthisward

in all actions and special proceedings, unless another person be appointed forthatpurpose.Section4.Estatetobemanagedfrugally,andproceedsappliedtomaintenanceofward.�Aguardianmustmanagetheestateofhiswardfrugallyandwithoutthewaste,andapplytheincomeandprofitsthereof,sofarasmaybenecessary,tothecomfortableandsuitablemaintenanceofthewardandhisfamily,iftherebeany;andifsuchincomeandprofitsbeinsufficientforthatpurpose,theguardianmaysellorencumbertherealestate,uponbeingauthorizedbyordersotodo,andapplytosuchoftheproceedsasmaybenecessarytosuchmaintenance.Section 5. Guardian may be authorized to join in partition proceedings afterhearing. � The court may authorized the guardian to join in an assent to apartitionof realorpersonalestateheldby theward jointlyor incommonwithothers,butsuchauthorityshallonlybegrantedafterhearing,uponsuchnoticetorelativesofthewardasthecourtmaydirect,andacarefulinvestigationastothenecessityandproprietyoftheproposedaction.Section 6.Proceedingswhen the person suspected of embezzling or concealingpropertyofward.�Uponcomplaintof theguardianorward,orofanypersonhavingactualorprospectiveinterestintheestateofthewardascreditor,heir,orotherwise,thatanyoneissuspectedofhavingembezzled,concealed,orconveyedaway anymoney, goods, or interest, or awritten instrument, belonging to theward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear forexaminationtouchingsuchmoney,goods,interest,orinstrument,andmakesuchorders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment orconveyance.Section7.Inventoriesandaccountsofguardians,andappraisementofestates.�Aguardianmustrendertothecourtaninventoryoftheestateofhiswardwithinthree(3)monthsafterhisappointment,andannuallyaftersuchappointmentaninventoryandaccount,therenditionofanyofwhichmaybecompelledupontheapplicationofaninterestedperson.Suchinventoriesandaccountsshallbesworntobytheguardian.Alltheestateofthewarddescribedinthefirstinventoryshallbeappraised.Intheappraisementthecourtmayrequesttheassistanceofoneormoreoftheinheritancetaxappraisers.Andwheneveranypropertyofthewardnot included inan inventoryalready rendered isdiscovered,or suceeded to,oracquiredbytheward,likeproceedingsshallbehadforsecuringaninventoryand



appraisementthereofwithinthree(3)monthsaftersuchdiscovery,succession,oracquisition.Section 8.When guardian's accounts presented for settlement. Expenses andcompensation allowed.� Upon the expiration of a year from the time of hisappointment, and as often thereafter as may be required, a guardian mustpresenthisaccounttothecourtforsettlementandallowance.Inthesettlementoftheaccount,theguardian,otherthanaparent,shallbeallowedtheamountofhis reasonable expenses incurred in the execution of his trust and also suchcompensationforhisservicesasthecourtdeemsjust,notexceedingfifteenpercentumofthenetincomeoftheward.WHATARETHEGENERALPOWERSOFAGUARDIAN?

1. Careandcustodyoftheward,and/ormanagementofhisestate2. Paythedebtsofhisward3. Tosettleaccounts,collectdebts,andappearinactionsforward4. Managetheestatefrugally5. Maybeauthorizedtojoininpartitionproceedingsafterhearing6. To institute proceedings where the person is suspected of embezzling,

concealingpropertyofward7. Inventoriesandaccountsofguardians,andappraisementofestate

RULE97TERMINATIONOFGUARDIANSHIP

Section 1. Petition that competency of ward be adjudged, and proceedingsthereupon.�Apersonwhohasbeendeclaredincompetentforanyreason,orhisguardian, relative, or friend, may petition the court to have his presentcompetency judicially determined. The petition shall be verified by oath, andshallstatethatsuchperson isthencompetent.Uponreceivingthepetition,thecourt shall fix a time for hearing the questions raised thereby, and causereasonablenoticethereoftobegiventotheguardianofthepersonsodeclaredincompetent,andtotheward.Onthetrial,theguardianorrelativesoftheward,and,inthediscretionofthecourt,anyotherperson,maycontesttherighttothereliefdemanded,andwitnessesmaybecalledandexaminedbythepartiesorbythe court on its own motion. If it be found that the person is no longerincompetent,hiscompetencyshallbeadjudgedandtheguardianshipshallcease.

GROUNDSFORTERMINATIONOFGUARDIANSHIP1. Competencyofward2. Insanityandincompetencyoftheguardianhimself3. Deathofthewardorguardianhimself4. Resignationoftheguardian5. Guardianincapableofdischarginghistrust6. Guardianmismanagedorwastedtheestate7. Conflictofinterest8. Guardian failed to render accounting and inventory for 30 days after

courtorderSection2.Whentheguardianremovedorallowedtoresign.Newappointment.�Whenaguardianbecomesinsaneorotherwiseincapableofdischarginghistrustor unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed forthirty (30)daysafter it isduetorenderanaccountormakeareturn, thecourtmay, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, removehim, and compel him tosurrender the estate of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitledthereto.Aguardianmay resignwhen it appearsproper toallow the same;anduponhisresignationorremovalthecourtmayappointanotherinhisplace.Section 3. Other termination of guardianship. � The marriage or voluntaryemancipationofaminorward terminates theguardianshipof thepesonof theward,andshallenabletheminortoadministerhispropertyasthoughhewereofage, but he cannot borrow the money or alienate or encumber real propertywithouttheconsentofhisfatherormother,orguardian.Hecansueandbesuedincourtonlywiththeassistanceofhisfather,motherorguardian.Theguardianof any person may be discharged by the court when it appears, upon theapplication of the ward or otherwise, that the guardianship is no longernecessary.Section 4.Record to be kept by the justice of the peace ormunicipal judge.�When a justice of the peace or municipal court takes cognizance of theproceedings in pursuance of the provisions of these rules, the record of theproceedingsshallbekeptasintheCourtofFirstInstance.Section5.Serviceofjudgment.�Finalordersofjudgmentsunderthisruleshallbeserveduponthecivilregistrarofthemunicipalityorcitywheretheminororincompetentpersonresidesorwherehispropertyorpartthereofissituated.



A.M.No.03‐02‐05‐SC2003‐05‐01RULEONGUARDIANSHIPOFMINORS

Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. – This Rule shall apply to petitions forguardianshipoverthepersonorproperty,orboth,ofaminor.The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over thepersonandpropertyoftheirunemancipatedcommonchildwithoutthenecessityof a court appointment. In such case, this Rule shall be suppletory to theprovisionsoftheFamilyCodeonguardianship.Sec.2.Whomaypetitionforappointmentofguardian.–Ongroundsauthorizedbylaw,anyrelativeorotherpersononbehalfofaminor,ortheminorhimselfiffourteenyearsofageorover,maypetitiontheFamilyCourtfortheappointmentof a general guardianover thepersonorproperty,orboth,of suchminor. Thepetitionmay also be filed by the Secretary of SocialWelfare andDevelopmentandby theSecretaryofHealth in thecaseofan insaneminorwhoneeds tobehospitalized.Sec. 3.Where to file petition. – A petition for guardianship over the person orproperty,orboth,ofaminormaybefiledintheFamilyCourtoftheprovinceorcity where the minor actually resides. If he resides in a foreign country, thepetition shall be flied with the Family Court of the province or city where hispropertyoranypartthereofissituated.Sec.4.Groundsofpetition.‐Thegroundsfortheappointmentofaguardianoverthepersonorproperty,orboth,ofaminorarethefollowing:(a)death,continuedabsence,orincapacityofhisparents;(b)suspension,deprivationorterminationofparentalauthority;(c)remarriageofhissurvivingparent,ifthelatterIsfoundunsuitabletoexerciseparentalauthority;or(d)whenthebestinterestsoftheminorsorequire.

Sec. 5.Qualifications of guardians. – In appointing a guardian, the court shallconsidertheguardian’s:(a)moralcharacter;(b)physical,mentalandpsychologicalcondition;(c)financialstatus;(d)relationshipoftrustwiththeminor;(e)availabilitytoexercisethepowersanddutiesofaguardianforthefullperiodoftheguardianship;(f)lackofconflictofinterestwiththeminor;and(g)abilitytomanagethepropertyoftheminor.Sec.6.Whomaybeappointedguardianofthepersonorproperty,orboth,ofaminor. – In default of parents or a court‐appointed guardian, the court mayappointaguardianof thepersonorproperty,orboth,ofaminor,observingasfaraspracticable,thefollowingorderofpreference:(a)thesurvivinggrandparentandIncaseseveralgrandparentssurvive,thecourtshallselectanyofthemtakingIntoaccountallrelevantconsiderations;(b)theoldestbrotherorsisteroftheminorovertwenty‐oneyearsofage,unlessunfitordisqualified;(c)theactualcustodianoftheminorovertwenty‐oneyearsofage,unlessunfitordisqualified;and(d)anyotherperson,whointhesounddiscretionofthecourt,wouldservethebestinterestsoftheminor.Sec. 7. Contents of petition. – A petition for the appointment of a generalguardianmustallegethefollowing:(a)Thejurisdictionalfacts;



(b)Thename,ageandresidenceoftheprospectiveward;(c)Thegroundrenderingtheappointmentnecessaryorconvenient;(d) The death of the parents of the minor or the termination, deprivation orsuspensionoftheirparentalauthority;(e)Theremarriageoftheminor’ssurvivingparent;(f)Thenames,ages,andresidencesofrelativeswithinthe4thcivildegreeoftheminor,andofpersonshavinghimintheircareandcustody;(g)Theprobablevalue,characterandlocationofthepropertyoftheminor;and(h)Thename,ageandresidenceofthepersonforwhomlettersofguardianshipareprayed.Thepetition shall be verified and accompaniedby a certification against forumshopping.However,nodefectinthepetitionorverificationshallrendervoidtheissuanceoflettersofguardianship.Sec.8.Timeandnoticeofhearing.–Whenapetition for theappointmentofageneralguardianisfiled,thecourtshallfixatimeandplacefor itshearing,andshall cause reasonable notice to be given to the persons mentioned in thepetition,includingtheminorifheisfourteenyearsofageorover,andmaydirectothergeneralorspecialnoticetobegiven.Sec.9.Casestudyreport.–Thecourtshallorderasocialworkertoconductacasestudyof theminorandall theprospectiveguardiansandsubmithis reportandrecommendationtothecourtforitsguidancebeforethescheduledhearing.Thesocialworkermay interveneonbehalfoftheminor ifhefindsthatthepetitionforguardianshipshouldbedenied.Sec.10.Oppositiontopetition.–Anyinterestedpersonmaycontestthepetitionbyfilingawrittenoppositionbasedonsuchgroundsasthemajorityoftheminorortheunsuitabilityofthepersonforwhomlettersareprayed,andpraythatthepetition be denied, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to anysuitablepersonnamedintheopposition.

Sec.11.Hearingandorderforletterstoissue.–Atthehearingofthepetition,itmust be shown that the requirement of notice has been complied with. Theprospective ward shall be presented to the court. The court shall hear theevidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations. Ifwarranted,thecourtshallappointasuitableguardianofthepersonorproperty,orboth,oftheminor.Atthediscretionofthecourt,thehearingonguardianshipmaybeclosedtothepublicandtherecordsofthecaseshallnotbereleasedwithoutitsapproval.Sec. 12.When and how a guardian of the property for non‐resident minor isappointed; notice. – When the minor resides outside the Philippines but hasproperty in the Philippines, any relative or friend of such minor, or any oneinterested in his property, in expectancyor otherwise,maypetition the FamilyCourtfortheappointmentofaguardianovertheproperty.Noticeofhearingofthepetitionshallbegiventotheminorbypublicationoranyothermeans as the courtmay deem proper. The courtmay dispensewith thepresenceofthenon‐residentminor.If after hearing the court is satisfied that such non‐resident is a minor and aguardianisnecessaryorconvenient,itmayappointaguardianoverhisproperty.Sec. 13. Service of final and executory judgment or order. – The final andexecutoryjudgmentorordershallbeservedupontheLocalCivilRegistrarofthemunicipality or city where theminor resides and the Register of Deeds of theplacewherehispropertyorpart thereof is situated shall annotate the same inthecorrespondingtitle,andreporttothecourthiscompliancewithinfifteendaysfromreceiptoftheorder.Sec. 14. Bond of guardian; amount; conditions.‐Before he enters upon theexecution of his trust, or letters of guardianship issue, an appointed guardianmay be required to post a bond in such sum as the court shall determine andconditionedasfollows:(a)Tomakeandreturntothecourt,withinthreemonthsaftertheissuanceofhisletters of guardianship, a true and complete Inventory of all the property, real



andpersonal,ofhiswardwhichshallcometohispossessionorknowledgeortothepossessionorknowledgeofanyotherpersoninhisbehalf;(b) To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, tomanage and dispose of thepropertyaccordingtothisruleforthebestinterestsoftheward,andtoprovideforhispropercare,custodyandeducation;(c)TorenderatrueandJustaccountofallthepropertyofthewardinhishands,andof all proceedsor interestderived therefrom,andof themanagementanddispositionofthesame,atthetimedesignatedbythisruleandsuchothertimesasthecourtdirects;andattheexpirationofhistrust,tosettlehisaccountswiththe court and deliver and pay over all the property, effects, and moniesremaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the personlawfullyentitledthereto;and(d)Toperformallordersofthecourtandsuchotherdutiesasmayberequiredbylaw.Sec.15.Wheretofilethebond;actionthereon.–Thebondpostedbyaguardianshallbefiled intheFamilyCourtand, Incaseofbreachofanyof itsconditions,the guardianmaybeprosecuted in the sameproceeding for thebenefit of thewardorofanyotherpersonlegallyinterestedintheproperty.Whenevernecessary,thecourtmayrequiretheguardiantopostanewbondandmaydischargefromfurtherliabilitythesuretiesontheoldbondafterduenoticetointerestedpersons,ifnoinjurymayresulttherefromtothoseinterestedintheproperty.Sec.16.Bondofparentsasguardiansofpropertyofminor.–lfthemarketvalueofthepropertyortheannualIncomeofthechildexceedsP50,000.00,theparentconcernedshallfurnishabondInsuchamountasthecourtmaydetermine,butin no case less than ten per centurn of the value of such property or annualincome, toguaranteetheperformanceof theobligationsprescribed forgeneralguardians.Averifiedpetitionforapprovalof thebondshallbeflied intheFamilyCourtoftheplacewhere thechild residesor, if thechild resides ina foreigncountry, intheFamilyCourtoftheplacewherethepropertyoranypartthereofissituated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding In which allincidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations of a generalguardianshallbeheardandresolved.Sec.17.Generaldutiesofguardian.–Aguardianshallhavethecareandcustodyof the person of his ward and the management of his property, or only themanagement of his property. The guardian of the property of a nonresidentminorshallhavethemanagementofallhispropertywithinthePhilippines.Aguardianshallperformthefollowingduties:(a)Topaythejustdebtsofthewardoutofthepersonalpropertyandtheincomeof therealpropertyof theward, If thesame issufficient;otherwise,outof therealpropertyofthewarduponobtaininganorderforitssaleorencumbrance;(b)Tosettleallaccountsofhisward,anddemand,suefor,receivealldebtsduehim, ormay,with the approval of the court, compound for the same and givedischargestothedebtoronreceivingafairandjustdividendofthepropertyandeffects; and to appear for and represent the ward in all actions and specialproceedings,unlessanotherpersonisappointedforthatpurpose;(c)Tomanagethepropertyofthewardfrugallyandwithoutwaste,andapplytheincomeandprofitsthereon,insofarasmaybenecessary,tothecomfortableandsuitablemaintenanceoftheward;andifsuchincomeandprofitsbeinsufficientfor thatpurpose, tosellorencumbertherealorpersonalproperty,uponbeingauthorizedbythecourttodoso;(d) To consent to a partition of real or personal property owned by the wardjointly or in common with others upon authority granted by the court afterhearing, notice to relatives of the ward, and a careful investigation as to thenecessityandproprietyoftheproposedaction;(e)Tosubmittothecourtaverifiedinventoryofthepropertyofhiswardwithinthree months after his appointment, and annually thereafter, the rendition ofwhichmayberequiredupontheapplicationofaninterestedperson;(f)Toreporttothecourtanypropertyofthewardnotincludedintheinventorywhich is discovered, or succeeded to, or acquired by the ward within threemonthsaftersuchdiscovery,succession,oracquisition;and



(g)Torendertothecourtforitsapprovalanaccountingofthepropertyoneyearfromhisappointment,andeveryyearthereafterorasoftenasmayberequired.Sec.18.Poweranddutyofthecourt–Thecourtmay:(a)Requesttheassistanceofoneormorecommissionersintheappraisalofthepropertyofthewardreportedintheinitialandsubsequentinventories;(b)Authorizereimbursementtotheguardian,otherthanaparent,ofreasonableexpenses incurred in the execution of his trust, and allow payment ofcompensationforhisservicesasthecourtmaydeemjust,notexceedingtenpercentum of the net income of the ward, if any; otherwise, in such amount thecourtdeterminestobeareasonablecompensationforhisservices;and(c)Upon complaint of the guardian orward, or of any person having actual orprospectiveinterestinthepropertyattheward,requireanypersonsuspectedofhavingembezzled,concealed,ordisposedofanymoney,goodsor interest,orawritten instrument belonging to the ward or his property to appear forexamination concerningany thereof and issue suchorders aswould secure thepropertyagainstsuchembezzlement,concealmentorconveyance.Sec. 19.Petition to sell or encumber property.‐When the income of a propertyunderguardianshipisinsufficienttomaintainandeducatetheward,orwhenitisfor his benefit that his personal or real property or any part thereof be sold,mortgaged or otherwise encumbered, and the proceeds invested in safe andproductivesecurity,orintheimprovementorsecurityofotherrealproperty,theguardianmayfileaverifiedpetitionsettingforthsuchfacts,andprayingthatanorderissueauthorizingthesaleorencumbranceoftheproperty.Sec.20.Ordertoshowcause.–Ifthesaleorencumbranceisnecessaryorwouldbebeneficial to theward, the court shallorderhisnextof kinandallperson/sinterested in the property to appear at a reasonable time and place thereinspecifiedandshowcausewhythepetitionshouldnotbegranted.Sec.21.Hearingonreturnoforder;costs.–Atthetimeandplacedesignatedintheordertoshowcause,thecourtshallheartheallegationsandevidenceofthepetitioner and next of kin, and other persons interested, together with their

witnesses,andgrantordenythepetitionasthebest interestsofthewardmayrequire.Sec. 22.Contentsoforder for saleor encumbranceand itsduration;bond. – If,afterfullexamination,itisnecessary,orwouldbebeneficialtotheward,tosellorencumbertheproperty,orsomeportionofit,thecourtshallordersuchsaleorencumbrance theproceedsofwhich shall be expended for themaintenanceorthe education of theward, or invested as the circumstancesmay require. Theordershallspecifythegroundsforthesaleorencumbranceandmaydirectthatthepropertyorderedsoldbedisposedofatpublicsale,subjecttosuchconditionsastothetimeandmannerofpayment,andsecuritywhereapartofthepaymentis deferred. The original bond of the guardian shall stand as security for theproperappropriationoftheproceedsofthesaleorencumbrance,butthecourtmay,ifdeemedexpedient,requireanadditionalbondasaconditionforthesaleorencumbrance.Theauthoritytosellorencumbershallnotextendbeyondoneyear,unlessrenewedbythecourt.Sec. 23. Court may order investment of proceeds and direct management ofproperty. – The court may authorize and require the guardian to invest theproceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other money of his ward in hishands, inrealorpersonalproperty, forthebest interestsof theward,andmaymakesuchotherordersforthemanagement,investment,anddispositionofthepropertyandeffects,ascircumstancesmaywarrant.Sec. 24. Grounds for removal or resignation of guardian. – When a guardianbecomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or is foundthereafter to be unsuitable, or haswasted ormismanaged the property of theward,orhasfailedtorenderanaccountormakeareturnforthirtydaysafteritisdue,thecourtmay,uponreasonablenoticetotheguardian,removehimassuchandrequirehimtosurrenderthepropertyofthewardtothepersonfoundtobelawfullyentitledthereto.Thecourtmayallowtheguardiantoresignforjustifiablecauses.Upontheremovalorresignationof theguardian, thecourtshallappointanewone.



Nomotion for removal or resignation shall be granted unless the guardian hassubmittedtheproperaccountingofthepropertyofthewardandthecourthasapprovedthesame.Sec. 25.Ground for termination of guardianship. – The court motu proprio orupon verifiedmotion of any person allowed to file a petition for guardianshipmayterminatetheguardianshiponthegroundthatthewardhascomeofageorhasdied. The guardian shall notify the courtof such factwithin tendaysof itsoccurrence.Sec. 26. Service of final and executory judgment or order. – The final andexecutoryjudgmentorordershallbeservedupontheLocalCivilRegistrarofthemunicipality or city where theminor resides and the Register of Deeds of theprovinceorcitywherehispropertyoranypartthereofissituated.BoththeLocalCivil Registrar and’ the Register of Deeds shall enter the final and executoryjudgmentororderintheappropriatebooksintheiroffices.Sec.27.Effectoftherule.–ThisRuleamendsRules92to97inclusiveoftheRulesofCourtonguardianshipofminors.Guardianshipof incompetentswhoarenotminors shall continue to be under the jurisdiction of the regular courts andgovernedbytheRulesofCourt.Sec. 28. Effectivity. ‐ This Rule shall take effect on May 1, 2003 following itspublicationinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationnotlaterthanApril15,2003.

RULE98TRUSTEES

Section1.Wheretrusteeappointed.�AtrusteenecessarytocarryintoeffecttheprovisionsofawillonwritteninstrumentshallbeappointedbytheCourtofFirstInstance inwhichthewillwasallowed, if itbeawillallowedinthePhilippines,otherwisebytheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovinceinwhichtheproperty,orsomeportionthereof,affectedbythetrustissituated.APPLICABILITYOFRULES

• This rule applies only to express trusts as these are understood in theCivilCodeprovisionsanddoesn’tapplytoimpliedtrustswhicharisefromoperationoflaw

PARTIESINVOLVEDINANEXPRESSTRUST

1. Trustor2. Trustee3. Beneficiary

FILINGOFPETITIONMAYBEDONEINTESTATEESTATEPROCEEDINGS

• Wheretheappointmentofatrusteeisnecessarytocarryintoeffecttheprovisionsofthewill,aswherethetestatorprovidedthereinthatcertainportionsofhispropertybeplacedintrust

Section 2.Appointment and powers of trustees under will. Executor of formertrusteeneednotadministertrust.�Ifatestatorhasomittedinhiswilltoappointa trustee in the Philippines, and if such appointment is necessary to carry intoeffect the provisions of the will, the proper Court of First Instance may, afternoticetoallpersonsinterested,appointatrusteewhoshallhavethesamerights,powers, and duties, and in whom the estate shall vest, as if he had beenappointed by the testator. No person succeeding to a trust as executor oradministratorofaformertrusteeshallberequiredtoacceptsuchtrust.Section3.Appointmentandpowersofnewtrusteeunderwritten instrument.�When a trustee under a written instrument declines, resigns, dies or removedbefore theobjects of the trust are accomplished, andno adequateprovision ismade in such instrument for supplying the vacancy, the proper Court of FirstInstancemay,afterduenoticetoallpersonsinterested,appointanewtrusteetoactaloneor jointlywiththeothers,as thecasemaybe.Suchnewtrusteeshallhaveandexercisethesamepowers,right,anddutiesasifhehadbeenoriginallyappointed,andthetrustestateshallvestinhiminlikemannerasithadvestedorwouldhavevested,inthetrusteeinwhoseplaceheissubstitutedandthecourtmay order such conveyance to be made by the former trustee or hisrepresentatives, or by the other remaining trustees, as may be necessary orproper to vest the trust estate in the new trustee, either or jointly with theothers.Section 4. Proceedings where trustee appointed abroad. � When land in thePhilippinesisheldintrustforpersonsresidentherebyatrusteewhoderiveshisauthorityfromwithoutthePhilippines,suchtrusteeshall,onpetitionfiledintheCourtofFirst Instanceoftheprovincewherethe landissituated,andafterduenoticetoallpersonsinterested,beorderedtoapplytothecourtforappointment



astrustee;anduponhisneglectorrefusaltocomplywithsuchorder,thecourtshalldeclaresuchtrustvacant,andshallappointanewtrusteeinwhomthetrustestate shall vest in likemanner as if he had been originally appointed by suchcourt.Section5.Trusteemustfilebond.�Beforeenteringonthedutiesofhistrust,atrusteeshallfilewiththeclerkofthecourthavingjurisdictionofthetrustabondintheamountfixedbythejudgeofsaidcourt,payabletotheGovernmentofthePhilippinesandsufficientandavailablefortheprotectionofanypartyininterest,andatrusteewhoneglectstofilesuchbondshallbeconsideredtohavedeclinedor resigned the trust; but the court may until further order exempt a trusteeunderawillfromgivingabondwhenthetestatorhasdirectedorrequestedsuchexemption and may so exempt any trustee when all persons beneficiallyinterestedinthetrust,beingoffullage,requesttheexemption.Suchexemptionmaybecancelledbythecourtatanytimeandthetrusteerequiredtoforthwithfileabond.Section 6. Conditions included in bond. � The following conditions shall bedeemedtobepartofthebondwhetherwrittenthereinornot;(a) That the trusteewillmake and return to the court, at such time as itmayorder, a true inventory of all the real and personal estate belonging to him astrustee,whichatthetimeofthemakingofsuchinventoryshallhavecometohispossessionorknowledge;(b)Thathewillmanageanddisposeofallsuchestate,andfaithfullydischargehistrust in relation thereto, according to law and the will of the testator or theprovisionsoftheinstrumentororderunderwhichheisappointed;(c)Thathewill renderuponoathat leastonceayearuntilhis trust is fulfilled,unless he is excused therefrom in any year by the court, a true account of theproperty in his hands and the management and disposition thereof, and willrendersuchotheraccountsasthecourtmayorder;(d)Thatattheexpirationofhistrusthewillsettlehisaccount incourtandpayoveranddeliverall theestateremaining inhishands,orduefromhimonsuchsettlement,tothepersonorpersonsentitledtothereto.Butwhenthetrusteeisappointedasasuccessortoapriortrustee,thecourtmaydispensewith themaking and return of an inventory, if one has already beenfiled,and insuchcasetheconditionof thebondshallbedeemedtobealteredaccordingly.Section7.Appraisal.Compensationoftrustee.�Whenaninventory isrequired

tobereturnedbyatrustee,theestateandeffectsbelongingtothetrustshallbeappraised and the court may order one or more inheritance tax appraisers toassistintheappraisement.Thecompensationofthetrusteeshallbefixedbythecourt,ifitbenotdeterminedintheinstrumentcreatingthetrust.Section8.Removalorresignationoftrustee.�TheproperCourtofFirstInstancemay,uponpetitionofthepartiesbeneficially interestedandafterduenoticetothetrusteeandhearing,removeatrusteeifsuchremovalappearsessentialintheinterest of the petitioner. The court may also, after due notice to all personsinterested,removeatrusteewhoisinsaneorotherwiseincapableofdischarginghis trust or evidently unsuitable therefor. A trustee,whether appointed by thecourtorunderawritteninstrument,mayresignhistrustifitappearstothecourtpropertoallowsuchresignation.Section9.Proceedingsforsaleorencumbranceoftrustestate.�Whenthesaleor encumbrance of any real or personal estate held in trust is necessary orexpedient, the court having jurisdiction of the trustmay, on petition and afterduenoticeandhearing,ordersuchsaleorencumbrancetobemade,andthere‐investmentandapplicationof theproceedsthereof insuchmanneraswillbesteffect the objects of the trust. The petition, notice, hearing, order of sale orencumbrance, and recordofproceedings, shall conformasnearly asmaybe totheprovisionsconcerningthesaleorimcumbrancebyguardiansofthepropertyofminorsorotherwards.EXEMPTIONOFTRUSTEEFROMPOSTINGBOND

• Unlike an executor who must still post a bond notwithstandingexemptionstatedinwill,thetrusteeisnotmandatedtopostabondifhewasexemptedunderthewill

RULE102HABEASCORPUS

Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. � Except as otherwise expresslyprovided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegalconfinement or detention bywhich any person is deprivedof his liberty, or bywhich the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitledthereto.



WRITOFHABEASCORPUS• Writ directed to thepersondetaining another and commandinghim to

produce thebodyof theprisoner at a certain time andplace,with theday and the cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, andreceivewhatsoeverthecourtorjudgeawardingthewritshallconsiderinthatbehalf

HABEASCORPUSASAREMEDYUNDERTHERULES

• Remedy in all cases of illegal confinement or detention or where therightfulcustodyofapersoniswithheldfromoneentitledtosuchcustody

• Actualoreffective,notmerelynominalormoral,restraintisrequired• However,actualphysicalrestrainedisnotalwaysrequired,anyrestraint

thatwillprejudicefreedomofactionissufficientINSTANCESWHENTHEWRITMAYLIKEWISEBEAVAILEDOF

1. There has been deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in arestraintofaperson

2. Thecourthadnojurisdictiontoimposethesentence3. Anexcessivepenaltyhasbeen imposed, suchsentencebeingvoidas to

suchexcessWHAT IS NECESSARY FORWRIT TO BE ISSUED IN CASE OF COURT JUDGMENTRESULTINGTOILLEGALDEPRIVATIONOFLIBERTY?

• Judgmentnolongerappealable,inwhichcasethewritisinthenatureofacollateralattackagainstafinalandvoidjudgment

• If the judgment is still appealable then the remedy of the person is todulyappealtherefrom

Section2.Whomaygrantthewrit.�ThewritofhabeascorpusmaybegrantedbytheSupremeCourt,oranymemberthereofintheinstancesauthorizedbylaw,andifsogranteditshallbeenforceableanywhereinthePhilippines,andmaybemade returnablebefore thecourtoranymember thereof,orbeforeaCourtofFirstInstance,oranyjudgethereofforthehearinganddecisiononthemerits.ItmayalsobegrantedbyaCourtofFirst Instance,orajudgethereof,onanydayand at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within hisjudicialdistrict.Section3.Requisitesofapplicationtherefor.�Applicationforthewritshallbebypetitionsignedandverifiedeitherbythepartyforwhosereliefitisintended,or

bysomepersononhisbehalf,andshallsetforth:(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned orrestrainedonhisliberty;(b)Theofficerornameofthepersonbywhomheissoimprisonedorrestrained;or,ifbothareunknownoruncertain,suchofficerorpersonmaybedescribedbyan assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall bedeemedthepersonintended;(c)Theplacewhereheissoimprisonedorrestrained,ifknown;(d)Acopyofthecommitmentorcauseofdetentionofsuchperson, if itcanbeprocuredwithoutimpairingtheefficiencyoftheremedy;or,iftheimprisonmentorrestraintiswithoutanylegalauthority,suchfactshallappear.Section4.Whenwritnotallowedordischargeauthorized.�Ifitappearsthatthepersonallegedtoberestrainedofhislibertyisinthecustodyofanofficerunderprocessissuedbyacourtorjudgeorbyvirtueofajudgmentororderofacourtofrecord,andthatthecourtorjudgehadjurisdictiontoissuetheprocess,renderthe judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if thejurisdictionappearsafterthewritisallowed,thepersonshallnotbedischargedby reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Notshallanythinginthisrulebeheldtoauthorizethedischargeofapersonchargedwith or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person sufferingimprisonmentunderlawfuljudgment.Section 5. When the writ must be granted and issued. � A court or judgeauthorized togrant thewritmust,whenapetition therefor ispresentedand itappearsthatthewritoughttoissue,grantthesameforthwith,andimmediatelythereupontheclerkofthecourtshall issuethewritunderthesealofthecourt;or incaseofemergency, the judgemay issuethewritunderhisownhand,andmaydeputeanyofficerorpersontoserveit.Section6.Towhomwritdirected,andwhattorequire.�Incaseofimprisonmentor restraintbyanofficer, thewrit shallbedirected tohim,andshall commandhimtohavethebodyofthepersonrestrainedofhis libertybeforethecourtorjudgedesignated in thewrit at the timeandplace therein specified. In caseofimprisonmentorrestraintbyapersonnotanofficer,thewritshallbedirectedtoan officer, and shall command him to take and have the body of the personrestrainedofhis libertybefore the courtor judgedesignated in thewrit at thetime and place therein specified, and to summon the person by whom he isrestrainedthenandtheretoappearbeforesaidcourtorjudgetoshowthecause



oftheimprisonmentorrestraint.Section 7. How prisoner designated and writ served. � The person to beproducedshouldbedesignatedinthewritbyhisname,ifknown,butifhisnameis not known he may be otherwise described or identified. The writ may beserved in any province by the sheriff or other proper officer, or by a persondeputedbythecourtor judge.Serviceof thewritshallbemadeby leavingtheoriginalwiththepersontowhomitisdirectedandpreservingacopyonwhichtomakereturnorservice.Ifthatpersoncannotbefound,orhasnottheprisonerinhis custody, then the service shall be made on any other person having orexercisingsuchcustody.Section 8.Howwrit executed and returned.� The officer towhom thewrit isdirectedshallconveythepersonso imprisonedorrestrained,andnamedinthewrit, before the judge allowing thewrit, or in caseof his absenceor disability,before some other judge of the same court, on the day specified in the writ,unless, from sickness or infirmity of the person directed to be produced, suchperson cannot, without danger, be bought before the court or judge; and theofficershallmakeduereturnofthewrit,togetherwiththedayandthecauseofthecaptionandrestraintofsuchpersonaccordingtothecommandthereof.Section9.Defectofform.�Nowritofhabeascorpuscanbedisobeyedfordefectof form, if it sufficiently appears therefrom in whose custody or under whoserestraintthepartyimprisonedorrestrainedisheldandthecourtorjudgebeforewhomheistobebought.Section10.Contentsofreturn.�Whenthepersontobeproducedisimprisonedorrestrainedbyanofficer,thepersonwhomakesthereturnshallstatetherein,andinothercasesthepersoninwhosecustodytheprisonerisfoundshallstate,inwritingtothecourtor judgebeforewhomthewrit is returnable,plainlyandunequivocably:(a) Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or power, or underrestraint;(b) Ifhehastheparty inhiscustodyorpower,orunderrestraint,theauthorityandthetrueandwholecausethereof,setforthatlarge,withacopyofthewrit,orderexecution,orotherprocess,ifany,uponwhichthepartyisheld;(c) If the party is in his custody or power or is restrained by him, and is notproduced,particularlythenatureandgravityofthesicknessorinfirmityofsuchpartybyreasonofwhichhecannot,withoutdanger,beboughtbeforethecourt

orjudge;(d) Ifhehashad theparty inhis custodyorpower,orunder restraint,andhastransferred such custodyor restraint toanother,particularly towhom,atwhattime,forwhatcause,andbywhatauthoritysuchtransferwasmade.Section11.Returntobesignedandswornto.�Thereturnorstatementshallbesignedbythepersonwhomakesit;andshallalsobeswornbyhimiftheprisonerisnotproduced,andinallothercasesunlessthereturnismadeandsignedbyaswornpublicofficerinhisofficialcapacity.Section12.Hearingonreturn.Adjournments.�Whenthewritisreturnedbeforeonejudge,atatimewhenthecourt is insession,hemayforthwithadjournthecaseintothecourt,theretobeheardanddetermined.Thecourtorjudgebeforewhomthewrit isreturnedoradjournedmust immediatelyproceedtohearandexamine the return, and such other matters as are properly submitted forconsideration, unless for good cause shown the hearing is adjourned, inwhicheventthecourtorjudgeshallmakesuchorderforthesafekeepingofthepersonimprisoned or restrained as the nature of the case requires. If the personimprisoned or restrained is not produced because of his alleged sickness orinfirmity,thecourtorjudgemustbesatisfiedthatitissogravethatsuchpersoncannot be producedwithout danger, before proceeding to hear anddispose ofthematter.Onthehearingthecourtorjudgeshalldisregardmattersofformandtechnicalities in respect to any warrant or order of commitment of a court orofficerauthorizedtocommitbylaw.Section13.Whenthereturnevidence,andwhenonlyaplea.�Ifitappearsthattheprisoner is incustodyunderawarrantofcommitment inpursuanceof law,thereturnshallbeconsideredprimafacieevidenceofthecauseofrestraint,butifheisrestrainedofhislibertybyanyallegedprivateauthority,thereturnshallbeconsideredonlyasapleaofthefactsthereinsetforth,andthepartyclaimingthecustodymustprovesuchfacts.Section14.Whenpersonlawfullyimprisonedrecommitted,andwhenlettobail.� If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly andspecificallychargedinthewarrantofcommitmentwithanoffensepunishablebydeath,heshallnotbereleased,discharged,orbailed.Ifheislawfullyimprisonedorrestrainedonachargeofhavingcommittedanoffensenotsopunishable,hemayberecommittedtoimprisonmentoradmittedtobailinthediscretionofthecourtorjudge.Ifhebeadmittedtobail,heshallforthwithfileabondinsuchsum



as the court or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of theprisonerand thenatureof theoffensecharged, conditioned forhisappearancebefore the courtwhere theoffense is properly cognizable to abide its order ofjudgment;andthecourtorjudgeshallcertifytheproceedings,togetherwiththebond,forthwithtothepropercourt.Ifsuchbondisnotsofiled,theprisonershallberecommittedtoconfinement.Section15.Whenprisonerdischarged if noappeal.�When the courtor judgehas examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and issatisfiedthatheisunlawfully imprisonedorrestrained,heshallforthwithorderhisdischargefromconfinement,butsuchdischargeshallnotbeeffectiveuntilacopyoftheorderhasbeenservedontheofficerorpersondetainingtheprisoner.If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal, theprisonershallbeforthwithreleased.Section 16.Penalty for refusing to issuewrit, or for disobeying the same.� Aclerkofacourtwhorefusestoissuethewritafterallowancethereofanddemandtherefor,orapersontowhomawritisdirected,whoneglectsorrefusestoobeyormake returnof the sameaccording to the command thereof,ormakes falsereturn thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf of the prisoner,refusestodelivertothepersondemanding,withinsix(6)hoursafterthedemandtherefor,atruecopyofthewarrantororderofcommitment,shallforfeittotheparty aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recorded in a properaction,andmayalsobepunishedbythecourtorjudgeasforcontempt.Section17.Persondischargednottobeagainimprisoned.�Apersonwhoissetat liberty upon a writ of habeas corpus shall not be again imprisoned for thesameoffenseunlessbythelawfulorderorprocessofacourthavingjurisdictionofthecauseoroffense;andapersonwhoknowingly,contrarytotheprovisionsof this rule, recommitsor imprisons,or causes tobe committedor imprisoned,for the same offense, or pretended offense, any person so set at liberty, orknowinglyaidsorassiststherein,shall forfeit tothepartyaggrievedthesumofone thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, notwithstanding anycolorablepretenseorvariation inthewarrantofcommitment,andmayalsobepunishedbythecourtorjudgegrantingthewritasforcontempt.Section 18.When prisonermay be removed from one custody to another.� Apersoncommittedtoprison,orincustodyofanofficer,foranycriminalmatter,shall not be removed therefrom into the custody of another unless by legal

process,ortheprisonerbedeliveredtoan inferiorofficertocarryto jail,or,byorderofthepropercourtorjudge,beremovedfromoneplacetoanotherwithinthe Philippines for trial, or in case of fire epidemic, insurrection, or othernecessityorpublic calamity;andapersonwho,after such commitment,makessigns,orcounter‐signsanyorderforsuchremovalcontrarytothissection,shallforfeittothepartyaggrievedthesumofonethousandpesos,toberecoveredinaproperaction.Section 19. Record of writ, fees and costs. � The proceedings upon a writ ofhabeas corpus shall be recorded by the clerk of the court, and upon the finaldisposition of such proceedings the court or judge shallmake such order as tocostsasthecaserequires.Thefeesofofficersandwitnessesshallbeincludedinthecoststaxed,butnoofficerorpersonshallhavetherighttodemandpaymentinadvanceofanyfeestowhichheisentitledbyvirtueoftheproceedings.Whenapersonconfinedundercolorofproceedingsinacriminalcaseisdischarged,thecosts shall be taxed against theRepublic of thePhilippines, andpaidout of itsTreasury;whenapersonincustodybyvirtueorundercolorofproceedingsinacivilcaseisdischarged,thecostsshallbetaxedagainsthim,oragainstthepersonwhosignedtheapplicationforthewrit,orboth,asthecourtshalldirect.

A.M.No.07‐9‐12‐SCWRITOFAMPARO

SECTION1.Petition. Thepetition for awrit of amparo is a remedyavailable toanypersonwhoserighttolife,libertyandsecurityisviolatedorthreatenedwithviolationbyanunlawfulactoromissionofapublicofficialoremployee,orofaprivateindividualorentity.The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threatsthereof.SEC.2.WhoMayFile.Thepetitionmaybefiledbytheaggrievedpartyorbyanyqualifiedpersonorentityinthefollowingorder:

1. Anymemberoftheimmediatefamily,namely:thespouse,childrenandparentsoftheaggrievedparty;

2. Anyascendant,descendantorcollateralrelativeoftheaggrievedpartywithinthefourthcivildegreeofconsanguinityoraffinity, indefaultofthosementionedintheprecedingparagraph;or



3. Anyconcernedcitizen,organization,associationorinstitution,ifthereisnoknownmemberoftheimmediatefamilyorrelativeoftheaggrievedparty.

The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all otherauthorizedparties to filesimilarpetitions.Likewise, the filingof thepetitionbyan authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of allothers,observingtheorderestablishedherein.SEC.3.WheretoFile.Thepetitionmaybefiledonanydayandatanytimewiththe Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission wascommittedoranyofitselementsoccurred,orwiththeSandiganbayan,theCourtof Appeals, the SupremeCourt, or any justice of such courts. Thewrit shall beenforceableanywhereinthePhilippines.When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall bereturnablebeforesuchcourtorjudge.When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of theirjustices, itmaybereturnablebeforesuchcourtoranyjusticethereof,ortoanyRegional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission wascommittedoranyofitselementsoccurred.When issued by the SupremeCourt or any of its justices, itmay be returnablebefore such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or theCourt of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of theplacewhere the threat, act or omissionwas committed or any of its elementsoccurred.SEC.4.NoDocketFees. Thepetitionershallbeexemptedfromthepaymentofthe docket and other lawful feeswhen filing the petition. The court, justice orjudgeshalldocketthepetitionandactuponitimmediately.SEC.5.ContentsofPetition. Thepetition shallbe signedandverifiedandshallallegethefollowing:

1. Thepersonalcircumstancesofthepetitioner;2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible

forthethreat,actoromission,or, if thenameisunknownoruncertain,therespondentmaybedescribedbyanassumedappellation;

3. Therightto life, libertyandsecurityoftheaggrievedpartyviolatedorthreatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of therespondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with theattendantcircumstancesdetailedinsupportingaffidavits;

4. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personalcircumstances,andaddressesoftheinvestigatingauthorityorindividuals,aswellasthemannerandconductoftheinvestigation,togetherwithanyreport;

5. Theactionsandrecoursestakenbythepetitionertodeterminethefateor whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the personresponsibleforthethreat,actoromission;and

6. Thereliefprayedfor.Thepetitionmayincludeageneralprayerforotherjustandequitablereliefs.SEC.6.IssuanceoftheWrit. Uponthefilingofthepetition,thecourt,justiceorjudge shall immediatelyorder the issuanceof thewrit if on its face it ought toissue.Theclerkofcourtshallissuethewritunderthesealofthecourt;orincaseofurgentnecessity, the justiceorthe judgemay issuethewritunderhisorherownhand,andmaydeputizeanyofficerorpersontoserveit.The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petitionwhichshallnotbelaterthanseven(7)daysfromthedateofitsissuance.SEC. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve theWrit. A clerk of court whorefusestoissuethewritafteritsallowance,oradeputizedpersonwhorefusestoserve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contemptwithoutprejudicetootherdisciplinaryactions.SEC.8.HowtheWritisServed.Thewritshallbeservedupontherespondentbyajudicialofficerorbyapersondeputizedbythecourt, justiceor judgewhoshallretain a copyonwhich tomakea returnof service. In case thewrit cannotbeservedpersonallyontherespondent,therulesonsubstitutedserviceshallapply.SEC.9.Return;Contents.Withinseventy‐two(72)hoursafterserviceofthewrit,the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supportingaffidavitswhichshall,amongotherthings,containthefollowing:

1. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate orthreaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the



aggrievedparty,throughanyactoromission;2. Thestepsoractionstakenbytherespondenttodeterminethefateor

whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or personsresponsibleforthethreat,actoromission;

3. Allrelevantinformationinthepossessionoftherespondentpertainingtothethreat,actoromissionagainsttheaggrievedparty;and

4. If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shallfurtherstatetheactionsthathavebeenorwillstillbetaken:

a. Toverifytheidentityoftheaggrievedparty;b. To recover and preserve evidence related to the death or

disappearance of the person identified in the petition whichmay aid in the prosecution of the person or personsresponsible;

c. To identify witnesses and obtain statements from themconcerningthedeathordisappearance;

d. Todeterminethecause,manner,locationandtimeofdeathordisappearanceaswellasanypatternorpracticethatmayhavebroughtaboutthedeathordisappearance;

e. Toidentifyandapprehendthepersonorpersonsinvolvedinthedeathordisappearance;and

f. Tobringthesuspectedoffendersbeforeacompetentcourt.The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, itsresolutionandtheprosecutionofthecase.Ageneraldenialoftheallegationsinthepetitionshallnotbeallowed.SEC. 10.Defensesnot PleadedDeemedWaived. All defenses shall be raised inthereturn,otherwise,theyshallbedeemedwaived.SEC.11.ProhibitedPleadingsandMotions.Thefollowingpleadingsandmotionsareprohibited:

1. Motiontodismiss;2. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit,

positionpaperandotherpleadings;3. Dilatorymotionforpostponement;4. Motionforabillofparticulars;5. Counterclaimorcross‐claim;6. Third‐partycomplaint;

7. Reply;8. Motiontodeclarerespondentindefault;9. Intervention;10. Memorandum;11. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief

orders;and12. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any

interlocutoryorder.SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. In case the respondent fails to file areturn,thecourt,justiceorjudgeshallproceedtohearthepetitionexparte.SEC. 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary.However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference tosimplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations andadmissionsfromtheparties.Thehearingshallbefromdaytodayuntilcompletedandgiventhesamepriorityaspetitionsforhabeascorpus.SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before finaljudgment,thecourt,justiceorjudgemaygrantanyofthefollowingreliefs:(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion ormotu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and anymemberoftheimmediatefamilybeprotectedinagovernmentagencyorbyanaccredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing theirsafety.Ifthepetitionerisanorganization,associationorinstitutionreferredtoinSection3(c)ofthisRule,theprotectionmaybeextendedtotheofficersinvolved.TheSupremeCourt shallaccredit thepersonsandprivate institutions that shallextend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and anymember of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shallissue.Theaccreditedpersonsandprivate institutions shall complywith the rules andconditionsthatmaybeimposedbythecourt,justiceorjudge.(b)InspectionOrder.Thecourt,justiceorjudge,uponverifiedmotionandafter



duehearing,mayorderanypersoninpossessionorcontrolofadesignatedlandor other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operationthereon.Themotion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall besupportedbyaffidavitsortestimoniesofwitnesseshavingpersonalknowledgeoftheenforceddisappearanceorwhereaboutsoftheaggrievedparty.If themotion isopposedonthegroundofnationalsecurityorof theprivilegednatureof the information, the court, justiceor judgemay conduct ahearing inchamberstodeterminethemeritoftheopposition.Themovantmust show that the inspection order is necessary to establish therightoftheaggrievedpartyallegedtobethreatenedorviolated.Theinspectionordershallspecifythepersonorpersonsauthorizedtomaketheinspection and the date, time, place andmanner ofmaking the inspection andmayprescribeotherconditionstoprotecttheconstitutionalrightsofallparties.Theordershallexpirefive(5)daysafterthedateofitsissuance,unlessextendedforjustifiablereasons.(c)ProductionOrder.Thecourt,justiceorjudge,uponverifiedmotionandafterdue hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of anydesignateddocuments,papers,books,accounts,letters,photographs,objectsortangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute orcontain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permittheirinspection,copyingorphotographingbyoronbehalfofthemovant.The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of theprivilegednatureoftheinformation,inwhichcasethecourt,justiceorjudgemayconductahearinginchamberstodeterminethemeritoftheopposition.The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect theconstitutionalrightsofalltheparties.(d)WitnessProtectionOrder. Thecourt, justiceor judge,uponmotionormotuproprio,may refer thewitnesses to theDepartmentof Justice foradmission totheWitnessProtection,SecurityandBenefitProgram,pursuant toRepublicActNo.6981.

The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other governmentagencies,ortoaccreditedpersonsorprivateinstitutionscapableofkeepingandsecuringtheirsafety.SEC. 15.Availability of InterimReliefs toRespondent. Upon verifiedmotionofthe respondent and after duehearing, the court, justice or judgemay issue aninspection order or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of theprecedingsection.Amotionforinspectionorderunderthissectionshallbesupportedbyaffidavitsor testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the defenses of therespondent.SEC. 16.Contempt. The court, justice or judgemay order the respondentwhorefuses to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person whootherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to bepunishedforcontempt.Thecontemnormaybeimprisonedorimposedafine.SEC. 17.BurdenofProofand StandardofDiligenceRequired. Theparties shallestablishtheirclaimsbysubstantialevidence.The respondentwho is a private individual or entitymust prove that ordinarydiligence as requiredby applicable laws, rules and regulationswasobserved intheperformanceofduty.The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove thatextraordinarydiligenceasrequiredbyapplicablelaws,rulesandregulationswasobservedintheperformanceofduty.Therespondentpublicofficialoremployeecannot invokethepresumptionthatofficialdutyhasbeenregularlyperformedtoevaderesponsibilityorliability.SEC.18.Judgment.Thecourtshallrenderjudgmentwithinten(10)daysfromthetimethepetition is submitted fordecision. If theallegations in thepetitionareprovenbysubstantialevidence,thecourtshallgranttheprivilegeofthewritandsuchreliefsasmaybeproperandappropriate;otherwise, theprivilegeshallbedenied.SEC.19.Appeal. Anypartymayappealfromthefinal judgmentorordertothe



SupremeCourtunderRule45.Theappealmayraisequestionsof factor laworboth.Theperiodofappealshallbefive(5)workingdaysfromthedateofnoticeoftheadversejudgment.Theappealshallbegiventhesamepriorityasinhabeascorpuscases.SEC.20.ArchivingandRevivalofCases.Thecourtshallnotdismissthepetition,butshallarchiveit, ifuponitsdeterminationitcannotproceedforavalidcausesuchas the failureofpetitionerorwitnesses to appeardue to threatson theirlives.Aperiodicreviewofthearchivedcasesshallbemadebytheamparocourtthatshall,motupropriooruponmotionbyanyparty,ordertheirrevivalwhenreadyfor further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice uponfailuretoprosecutethecaseafterthe lapseoftwo(2)years fromnoticetothepetitioneroftheorderarchivingthecase.The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator aconsolidatedlistofarchivedcasesunderthisRulenotlaterthanthefirstweekofJanuaryofeveryyear.SEC.21.InstitutionofSeparateActions.ThisRuleshallnotprecludethefilingofseparatecriminal,civiloradministrativeactions.SEC. 22.Effect of Filing of a CriminalAction. When a criminal actionhas beencommenced,noseparatepetitionforthewritshallbefiled.Thereliefsunderthewritshallbeavailablebymotioninthecriminalcase.TheprocedureunderthisRuleshallgovernthedispositionofthereliefsavailableunderthewritofamparo.SEC.23.Consolidation.Whenacriminalactionisfiledsubsequenttothefilingofapetitionforthewrit,thelattershallbeconsolidatedwiththecriminalaction.When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to apetition forawritofamparo, the latter shallbe consolidatedwith thecriminalaction.

Afterconsolidation,theprocedureunderthisRuleshallcontinuetoapplytothedispositionofthereliefsinthepetition.SEC. 24. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modifysubstantiverightsrecognizedandprotectedbytheConstitution.SEC. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shallapplysuppletorilyinsofarasitisnotinconsistentwiththisRule.SEC. 26.Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern cases involvingextralegalkillingsandenforceddisappearancesorthreatsthereofpendinginthetrialandappellatecourts.

CERTIORARI,PROHIBITION,MANDAMUS

HABEASCORPUS

AMPARO HABEASDATA

WEIGHT OFEVIDENCE

Preponderanceofevidence


Substantialevidence


BURDEN OFPROOF

Petitioner Petitioner Petitionerandrespondent

Petitioner andrespondent

DISMISSALOFPETITION

If failedburden ofproof


Notdismissed,archived


DILIGENCEREQUIRED

Ordinary Ordinary If publicrespondent,extraordinary

Ordinary

GENERALDENIAL

OK OK Notallowed Notallowed

PRESUMPTION OFREGULARITY

Yes Yes No Yes

RIGHTSPROTECTED

Constitutionaland statutoryrights

Right toliberty

Right to life,liberty, andsecurity

Right toprivacy in life,liberty, andsecurity



DOCKETFEES Yes Yes No Yes

A.M.No.08‐1‐16‐SCTHERULEONTHEWRITOFHABEASDATA

SECTION1.HabeasData. Thewrit of habeasdata is a remedyavailable to anypersonwhoserighttoprivacyinlife,libertyorsecurityisviolatedorthreatenedby anunlawful act or omissionof a public official or employee, or of a privateindividual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data orinformation regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of theaggrievedparty.WHATISTHEWRITFORHABEASDATA?

• Remedyavailable toanypersonwhoseright toprivacy in life, libertyorsecurity is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of apublicofficialoremployee,orofaprivateindividualorentityengagedinthegathering, collectingor storingofdataor information regarding theperson,family,homeandcorrespondenceoftheaggrievedparty

WHATRIGHTSAREPROTECTEDBYTHISWRIT?

• Righttoprivacyinlife,liberty,orsecurityILLUSTRATION:MAYAPETITIONFORWRITOFHABEASDATABEFILEDAGAINSTSWS?

• With respect to being a respondent, SWS as an entity may be arespondent—itisengagedinthegathering,collectingandstoringofdataorinformationregardingtheperson,family,homeandcorrespondence

• With respect to theactsconductedofSWS, if thesameareunlawful innature, then it may be made a respondent to the petition for theissuanceofwritofhabeasdata

SEC. 2. WhoMay File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ ofhabeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforceddisappearances,thepetitionmaybefiledby:

1. Anymemberof the immediate familyof theaggrievedparty,namely:thespouse,childrenandparents;or

2. Anyascendant,descendantorcollateralrelativeoftheaggrievedpartywithinthefourthcivildegreeofconsanguinityoraffinity, indefaultofthosementionedintheprecedingparagraph.

SEC. 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Courtwhere thepetitioner or respondent resides, or thatwhichhas jurisdictionovertheplacewherethedataor information isgathered,collectedorstored,at theoptionofthepetitioner.ThepetitionmayalsobefiledwiththeSupremeCourtortheCourtofAppealsorthe Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of governmentoffices.SEC. 4.Where Returnable; Enforceable.When the writ is issued by a RegionalTrialCourtoranyjudgethereof,itshallbereturnablebeforesuchcourtorjudge.WhenissuedbytheCourtofAppealsortheSandiganbayanoranyofitsjustices,itmaybereturnablebeforesuchcourtoranyjusticethereof,ortoanyRegionalTrialCourtoftheplacewherethepetitionerorrespondentresides,orthatwhichhas jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered,collectedorstored.When issued by the SupremeCourt or any of its justices, itmay be returnablebefore suchCourtor any justice thereof,orbefore theCourtofAppealsor theSandiganbayanoranyof its justices,or toanyRegionalTrialCourtof theplacewhere thepetitioner or respondent resides, or thatwhichhas jurisdictionovertheplacewherethedataorinformationisgathered,collectedorstored.ThewritofhabeasdatashallbeenforceableanywhereinthePhilippines.Sec. 5.Docket Fees.Nodocket andother lawful fees shall be required fromanindigentpetitioner.Thepetitionoftheindigentshallbedockedandacteduponimmediately,withoutprejudice to subsequent submissionofproofof indigencynotlaterthanfifteen(15)daysfromthefilingofthepetition.SEC. 6. Petition. A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data shouldcontain:

(a) Thepersonalcircumstancesofthepetitionerandtherespondent;



(b) Themanner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how itaffectstherighttolife,libertyorsecurityoftheaggrievedparty;

(c) Theactionsandrecoursestakenbythepetitionertosecurethedataorinformation;

(d) Thelocationofthefiles,registersordatabases,thegovernmentoffice,and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data orinformation,ifknown;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,suppressionordestructionofthedatabaseorinformationorfileskeptbytherespondent.Incaseofthreats,thereliefmayincludeaprayerforanorderenjoining

theactcomplainedof;and

(f) Suchotherrelevantreliefsasarejustandequitable.SEC.7.IssuanceoftheWrit. Uponthefilingofthepetition,thecourt,justiceorjudge shall immediatelyorder the issuanceof thewrit if on its face it ought toissue.Theclerkofcourtshallissuethewritunderthesealofthecourtandcauseit to be served within three (3) days from the issuance; or, in case of urgentnecessity,thejusticeorjudgemayissuethewritunderhisorherownhand,andmaydeputizeanyofficerorpersonserveit.The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petitionwhichshallnotbelaterthanten(10)workdaysfromthedateofitsissuance.SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve theWrit. A clerk of court whorefusestoissuethewritafteritsallowance,oradeputizedpersonwhorefusestoserve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contemptwithoutprejudicetootherdisciplinaryactions.SEC.9.HowtheWritisServed.Thewritshallbeservedupontherespondentbyajudicialofficerorbyapersondeputizedbythecourt, justiceor judgewhoshallretain a copyonwhich tomakea returnof service. In case thewrit cannotbeservedpersonallyontherespondent,therulesonsubstitutedserviceshallapply.SEC. 10. Return; Contents. The respondent shall file a verified written returntogetherwith supportingaffidavitswithin five (5)workingdays fromserviceofthewrit,whichperiodmaybe reasonablyextendedby theCourt for justifiablereasons.Thereturnshall,amongotherthings,containthefollowing:

(a) The lawfuldefenses suchasnational security, state secrets,privilegedcommunications,confidentialityof thesourceof informationofmediaandothers;

(b) Incaseofrespondentincharge,inpossessionorincontrolofthedataorinformationsubjectofthepetition;

(i) Adisclosureof thedataor informationabout thepetitioner,thenatureofsuchdataor information,andthepurposeforitscollection;

(ii) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure thesecurity and confidentiality of the data or information;and,

(iii) The currency and accuracy of the data or information held;and,

(c) Otherallegationsrelevanttotheresolutionoftheproceeding.Ageneraldenialoftheallegationsinthepetitionshallnotbeallowed.SEC.11.Contempt.Thecourt,justiceorjudgemaypunishwithimprisonmentorfinearespondentwhocommitscontemptbymakingafalsereturn,orrefusingtomakeareturn;oranypersonwhootherwisedisobeysorresista lawfulprocessororderofthecourt.SEC.12.WhenDefensesMaybeHeardinChambers.Ahearinginchambersmaybeconductedwheretherespondentinvokesthedefensethatthereleaseofthedata or information in question shall compromise national security or statesecrets,orwhenthedataorinformationcannotbedivulgedtothepublicduetoitsnatureorprivilegedcharacter.Sec.13.ProhibitedPleadingsandMotions.Thefollowingpleadingsandmotionsareprohibited:

1. Motiontodismiss;2. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit,

positionpaperandotherpleadings;3. Dilatorymotionforpostponement;4. Motionforabillofparticulars;5. Counterclaimorcross‐claim;6. Third‐partycomplaint;7. Reply;8. Motiontodeclarerespondentindefault;



9. Intervention;10. Memorandum;11. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief

orders;and12. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any

interlocutoryorder.SEC. 14. Return; Filing. In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court,justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting thepetitionersuchreliefasthepetitionmaywarrantunlessthecourtinitsdiscretionrequiresthepetitionertosubmitevidence.SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary.However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference tosimplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations andadmissionsfromtheparties.SEC.16. Judgment. ‐Thecourt shall render judgmentwithin ten (10)days fromthetimethepetition is submitted fordecision. If theallegations in thepetitionareprovenbysubstantialevidence,thecourtshallenjointheactcomplainedof,or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data orinformation and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable;otherwise,theprivilegeofthewritshallbedenied.Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawfulofficersasmaybedesignatedbythecourt,justiceorjudgewithinfive(5)workingdays.SEC. 17. Return of Service. The officer who executed the final judgment shall,withinthree(3)daysfromitsenforcement,makeaverifiedreturntothecourt.Thereturnshallcontainafullstatementoftheproceedingsunderthewritandacomplete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articlesinspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitionerandtherespondent.Theofficershallstateinthereturnhowthejudgmentwasenforcedandcompliedwith by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding themannerandregularityoftheserviceofthewrit.

SEC. 18.Hearing onOfficer?s Return. The court shall set the return for hearingwithduenoticetothepartiesandactaccordingly.SEC.19.Appeal.Anypartymayappeal fromthe final judgmentororder to theSupremeCourtunderRule45.Theappealmayraisequestionsof factor laworboth.Theperiodofappealshallbefive(5)workingdaysfromthedateofnoticeofthejudgmentorfinalorder.The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparocases.SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. The filing of a petition for the writ ofhabeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil oradministrativeactions.SEC.21.Consolidation.Whenacriminalactionisfiledsubsequenttothefilingofapetitionforthewrit,thelattershallbeconsolidatedwiththecriminalaction.When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to apetition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with thecriminalaction.After consolidation, theprocedureunder thisRule shall continue togovern thedispositionofthereliefsinthepetition.SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action.When a criminal action has beencommenced,noseparatepetitionforthewritshallbefiled.Thereliefunderthewritshallbeavailabletoanaggrievedpartybymotioninthecriminalcase.TheprocedureunderthisRuleshallgovernthedispositionofthereliefsavailableunderthewritofhabeasdata.SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. ‐ This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modifysubstantiverights.SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shallapplysuppletorilyinsofarasitisnotinconsistentwiththisRule.



SEC.25.Effectivity.ThisRuleshall takeeffectonFebruary2,2008, following itspublicationinthree(3)newspapersofgeneralcirculation.

RULE103CHANGEOFNAME

Section1.Venue.ApersondesiringtochangehisnameshallpresentthepetitiontotheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovinceinwhichheresides,or,intheCityofManila,totheJuvenileandDomesticRelationsCourt.RULE103AND108DIFFERENTFROMONEANOTHER

• Rule 103 and 108 differ from one another—they involve differentallegations,issuestobethreshedout,andthereliefsbeingaskedof

• If the reliefsofboth the rulesareprayed for, then the requirementsofbothshouldbesatisfiedbeforesuchshallbegranted

CHANGEOFNAMECANNOTBESUMMARILYDECIDEDON

• The change of name of a person as recorded in the registry cannot beeffected through summary proceedings as provided for in Article 412,whichrefersonlytothecorrectionofclericalerrorsandnotthosewhichwillinvolvesubstantialchange

ALIENMAYPETITIONFORCHANGEOFNAME

• HemayifheisdomiciledinthePhilippinesNAMETHATAPPEARSINTHEBIRTHCERTIFICATE

• Thenamethatcanbechangedunderthisrule• Notthenamereflectedinthebaptismalcertificateorthatbywhichthe

personisknowninthecommunitySection2.Contentsofpetition.Apetitionforchangeofnameshallbesignedandverifiedby thepersondesiringhisnamechanged,or someotherpersononhisbehalf,andshallsetforth:

1. Thatthepetitionerhasbeenabonafideresidentoftheprovincewherethepetitionisfiledforatleastthree(3)yearspriortothedateofsuchfiling;

2. Thecauseforwhichthechangeofthepetitioner'snameissought;

3. Thenameaskedfor.POSSIBLECAUSESFORCHANGEOFNAME

1. Whenthenameisridiculous,dishonorable,orextremelydifficulttowriteorpronounce

2. Whenthechangeresultsasalegalconsequence,asinlegitimation3. Whenthechangewillavoidconfusion4. HavingcontinuouslyusedandbeenknownsincechildhoodbyaFilipino

name,unawareofalienparentage5. AsinceredesiretoadoptaFilipinotoerasesignsofforeignalienage,all

ingoodfaithandwithoutprejudicinganybodyCHANGEOFNAMESHOULDNOTBEPERMITTED

• Would not be permitted if it would give a false impression of familyrelationshiptoanother

• It will be allowed however if it wouldn’t cause prejudice to the familywhosesurnameitis

Section 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form andsubstance,thecourt,byanorderrecitingthepurposeofthepetition,shallfixadateandplaceforthehearingthereof,andshalldirectthatacopyoftheorderbe published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successiveweeksinsomenewspaperofgeneralcirculationpublishedintheprovince,asthecourtshalldeembest.Thedatesetforthehearingshallnotbewithinthirty(30)daysprior toanelectionnorwithin four (4)monthafter the lastpublicationofthenotice.PETITIONFORCHANGEOFNAMEISAPROCEEDINGINREM

• Thepublicationrequirementisajurisdictionalrequirement• To be valid and to confer jurisdiction upon the court, such publication

mustgivetheproperinformationSection4.Hearing.Anyinterestedpersonmayappearatthehearingandopposethe petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shallappearonbehalfoftheGovernmentoftheRepublic.Section5.Judgment.Uponsatisfactoryproof inopencourtonthedate fixed intheorderthatsuchorderhasbeenpublishedasdirectedandthattheallegationsofthepetitionaretrue,thecourtshall, ifproperandreasonablecauseappears



forchangingthenameofthepetitioner,adjudgethatsuchnamebechangedinaccordancewiththeprayerofthepetition.Section6.Serviceofjudgment.Judgmentsorordersrenderedinconnectionwiththisruleshallbefurnishedthecivilregistrarofthemunicipalityorcitywherethecourtissuingthesameissituated,whoshallforthwithenterthesameinthecivilregister.

RULE108CANCELLATIONORCORRECTIONOFENTRIESINTHECIVILREGISTRY

Section1.Whomayfilepetition.�Anypersoninterestedinanyact,event,orderordecreeconcerningthecivilstatusofpersonswhichhasbeenrecorded inthecivilregister,mayfileaverifiedpetitionforthecancellationorcorrectionofanyentryrelatingthereto,withtheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovincewherethecorrespondingcivilregistryislocated.Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. � Upon good and validgrounds,thefollowingentriesinthecivilregistermaybecancelledorcorrected:(a) births: (b) marriage; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments ofannulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from thebeginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of naturalchildren; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civilinterdiction;(m)judicialdeterminationoffiliation;(n)voluntaryemancipationofaminor;and(o)changesofname.CHANGESINDETAILSOFCITIZENSHIPANDNATIONALITYNOTALLOWED

• Whilebirthismentionedasoneoftheentriesthatmaybecorrected,thisreferred only to such particulars as are attendant to birth excludingcitizenshipandnationality

• Citizenshipdetailsthatmaybechanged—election,lossorrecoveryILLEGITIMATECHILDRENMAYUSETHEIRFATHER’SSURNAME

• RA9255allowsillegitimatechildrentousethesurnameoftheirfathersiftheirfiliationhasbeenexpresslyrecognizedbyhimthroughtherecordofbirth in the civil register, or by an admission in the public instrumentmadebythefather,providedthathehadtherighttoinstituteanactionincourttoprovenon‐filiationduringhislifetime

SUMMARYORADVERSARIALPROCEEDING

• Evensubstantialerrorsinacivilregistermaybecorrectedprovidedthatthe aggrieved parties avail themselves of the appropriate adversaryproceeding; and that the proceeding under Rule 108 ceases to besummary innatureandtakesthecharacterofanappropriateadversaryproceedingwhen all the procedural requirements therein are compliedwith

• If thepetition filedunderRule108 ismerely to correctobvious clericalerrorsthecourtmayconductasummaryproceedingandissueanorderforthecorrectionofthatmistake

Section 3. Parties. � When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civilregister is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim anyinterest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to theproceeding.Section4.Noticeandpublication.�Uponthefilingofthepetition,thecourtshall,by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and causereasonablenoticethereoftobegiventothepersonsnamedinthepetition.Thecourt shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)consecutiveweeksinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationintheprovince.Section5.Opposition.�Thecivilregistrarandanypersonhavingorclaiminganyinterestunder theentrywhosecancellationorcorrection is soughtmay,withinfifteen(15)daysfromnoticeofthepetition,orfromthelastdateofpublicationofsuchnotice,filehisoppositionthereto.Section6.Expeditingproceedings.�Thecourtinwhichtheproceedingisbroughtmay make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminaryinjunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending suchproceedings.Section 7.Order. � After hearing, the courtmay either dismiss the petition orissueanordergrantingthecancellationorcorrectionprayedfor.Ineithercase,acertifiedcopyofthejudgmentshallbeserveduponthecivilregistrarconcernedwhoshallannotatedthesameinhisrecord.

REPUBLICACTNo.6085



ANACTAMENDINGCOMMONWEALTHACTNUMBEREDONEHUNDREDFORTY‐TWOREGULATINGTHEUSEOFALIASES

Section1.SectiononeofCommonwealthActNumberedOnehundredforty‐twoisherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:"Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio orother entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use ofpseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any namedifferentfromtheonewithwhichhewasregisteredatbirthintheofficeofthelocalcivilregistry,orwithwhichhewasbaptizedforthefirsttime,or,incaseofanalien,withwhichhewasregisteredinthebureauofimmigrationuponentry;or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court:Provided,Thatpersons,whosebirthshavenotbeenregistered inany local civilregistryandwhohavenotbeenbaptized,haveoneyearfromtheapprovalofthisactwithinwhichtoregistertheirnamesinthecivilregistryoftheirresidence.Thenameshallcomprisethepatronymicnameandoneortwosurnames."Section2.SectionTwoofCommonwealthActNumberedOnehundredforty‐twoisherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:"Sec.2.Anypersondesiring touseanaliasshallapply forauthority therefor inproceedingslikethoselegallyprovidedtoobtainjudicialauthorityforachangeofname,andnopersonshallbeallowedtosecuresuchjudicialauthorityformorethanonealias.Thepetitionforanaliasshallsetforththeperson'sbaptismalandfamily name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, hisimmigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names otherthanhisoriginalorrealname,specifyingthereasonorreasonsfortheuseofthedesiredalias.ThejudicialauthorityfortheuseofaliastheChristiannameandthealienimmigrant'snameshallberecordedintheproperlocalcivilregistry,andnopersonshalluseanynameornamesother,thanhisoriginalorrealnameunlessthesameisoraredulyrecordedintheproperlocalcivilregistry."Section 3. Section three of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty‐two,isherebyamendedtoreadasFollows:"Sec. 3.Nopersonhaving beenbaptizedwith a namedifferent from thatwithwhichhewasregisteredatbirth inthelocalcivilregistry,or incaseofanalien,registeredinthebureauofimmigrationuponentry,oranypersonwhoobtainedjudicial authority to use an alias, or who uses a pseudonym, shall representhimselfinanypublicorprivatetransactionorshallsignorexecuteanypublicor

private document without stating or affixing his real or original name and allnamesoraliasesorpseudonymheisormayhavebeenauthorizedtouse."Section 4. Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty‐two is herebyamendedbytheinsertionofthefollowingnewsectiontobedesignatedSectionfourtoreadasfollows:"Sec.4.Sixmonthsfromtheapprovalofthisactandsubjecttotheprovisionsofsection1hereof,allpersonswhohaveusedanynameand/ornamesandaliasoraliases different from those authorized in section one of this act and dulyrecordedinthelocalcivilregistry,shallbeprohibitedtousesuchothernameornamesand/oraliasoraliases."Section5.SectionfourofCommonwealthActNumberedOnehundredforty‐twoisherebyamendedtoreadasSectionfive,asfollows:"Sec. 5. Any violation of this Act shall be punishedwith imprisonment of fromoneyeartofiveyearsandafineofP5,000toP10,000."Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and all Acts, rules orregulationsoflawsinconsistentherewithareherebyrepealed.DIFFERENCEBETWEENRA9048ANDRULE108

RA9048 RULE108Administrativeproceeding Summaryproceeding

Affidavitisfiled Petitionisfiled

Penaltyclause Nopenaltyclause

Publication requirement: once a weekfor2consecutiveweeks

Publication requirement: once a weekforthreeconsecutiveweeks

Postinginconspicuousplace Noposting

Change of name is based on 3enumeratedground

Change of name is to correct clericaland/orinnocuouserrors

RULE101



PROCEEDINGSFORHOSPITALIZATIONOFINSANEPERSONS

Section1.Venue,Petitionforcommitment. ApetitionforthecommitmentofapersontoahospitalorotherplacefortheinsanemaybefiledwiththeCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovincewherethepersonallegedtobeinsaneisfound.ThepetitionshallbefiledbytheDirectorofHealthinallcaseswhere,inhisopinion,suchcommitmentisforthepublicwelfare,orforthewelfareofsaidpersonwho,in his judgment, is insane and such person or the one having charge of him isopposedtohisbeingtakentoahospitalorotherplacefortheinsane.WHOMAYFILEPETITION?

• May be filed by the person who has custody or having charge of saidinsaneperson

• If he refuses to do so and where it is required for the welfare of theinsanepersonorthepublic,thepetitionshallbefiledbytheDirectorofHealthorthepresentauthorizedofficer

Section 2. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form andsubstance,thecourt,byanorderrecitingthepurposeofthepetition,shallfixadateforthehearingthereof,andcopyofsuchordershallbeservedonthepersonallegedtobeinsane,andtotheonehavingchargehim,oronsuchofhisrelativesresiding in the province or city as the judgemay deemproper. The court shallfurthermoreorder the sheriff toproduce thealleged insaneperson, ifpossible,onthedateofthehearing.Section3.Hearingand judgment.Uponsatisfactoryproof, inopencourtonthedatefixedintheorder,thatthecommitmentappliedforisforthepublicwelfareorforthewelfareoftheinsaneperson,andthathisrelativesareunableforanyreason to take proper custody and care of him, the court shall order hiscommitment to such hospital or other place for the insane as may berecommendedbytheDirectorofHealth.Thecourtshallmakeproperprovisionsforthecustodyofpropertyormoneybelongingtotheinsaneuntilaguardianbeproperlyappointed.Section4.Dischargeofinsane.When,intheopinionoftheDirectorofHealth,theperson ordered to be committed to a hospital or other place for the insane istemporarily or permanently cured, ormay be releasedwithout danger hemay

file the proper petition with the Court of First Instance which ordered thecommitment.Section 5. Assistance of fiscal in the proceeding. It shall be the duty of theprovincial fiscal or in the City of Manila the fiscal of the city, to prepare thepetitionfortheDirectorofHealthandrepresenthimincourt inallproceedingsarisingundertheprovisionsofthisrule.NOTES:

1. Where the insane person was judicially commited to the hospital orasylum, the Director of Healthmay not order his releasewithout priorcourtapproval

2. Likewise, the court may not order his release without therecommendationoftheDirector

RULEONADOPTION

A.DOMESTICADOPTION

Section1.ApplicabilityoftheRule.�ThisRulecoversthedomesticadoptionofFilipinochildren.Section2.Objectives.�(a)Thebestinterestsofthechildshallbetheparamountconsideration in all matters relating to his care, custody and adoption, inaccordance with Philippine laws, the United Nations (UN) Convention on theRightsoftheChild,UNDeclarationonSocialandLegalPrinciplesRelatingtotheProtection andWelfare of Childrenwith Special Reference to Foster PlacementandAdoption,Nationallyand Internationally,andtheHagueConventionontheProtectionofChildrenandCooperationinRespectofInter‐countryAdoption.(b) The State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through fostercare or adoption for every child who is a foundling, neglected, orphaned, orabandoned.Tothisend,theStateshall:

1. Ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of hisparentsandisprovidedwithlove,care,understandingandsecurityforthe full and harmonious development of his personality. Only whensuch efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or



adoptionwithinthechild�sextendedfamilyisavailableshalladoptionbyanunrelatedpersonbeconsidered.

2. Safeguard the biological parents from making hasty decisions inrelinquishingtheirparentalauthorityovertheirchild;

3. Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his biologicalparents;

4. Conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote apositiveenvironmentforadoption;

5. Ensurethatgovernmentandprivatesectoragencieshavethecapacityto handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption applicationsandofferadoption‐relatedservicesincluding,butnotlimitedto,parentpreparationandpost‐adoptioneducationandcounseling;

6. Encouragedomesticadoptionsoastopreservethechild’sidentityandcultureinhisnativeland,andonlywhenthisisnotavailableshallinter‐countryadoptionbeconsideredasalastresort;and

7. Protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their parentalauthorityandcustodyovertheiradoptedchild.

Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall beadministrativelyorjudiciallydeclaredsoastoestablishthestatusofthechildaslegallyavailableforadoption�andhiscustodytransferredtotheDepartmentofSocial Welfare and Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child‐placingorchild‐caringagency,whichentityshallbeauthorizedtotakestepsforthepermanentplacementofthechild.Section4.Whomayadopt.�Thefollowingmayadopt:

(1) AnyFilipinocitizenof legalage, inpossessionof full civil capacityandlegal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of anycrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude;whoisemotionallyandpsychologicallycapableofcaringforchildren,atleastsixteen(16)yearsolderthantheadoptee,andwhoisinapositiontosupportandcareforhischildreninkeeping with the means of the family. The requirement of a 16‐yeardifferencebetweentheageoftheadopterandadopteemaybewaivedwhen the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is thespouseoftheadoptee�sparent;

(2) Anyalienpossessingthesamequalificationsasabove‐statedforFilipino

nationals:Provided,ThathiscountryhasdiplomaticrelationswiththeRepublicofthePhilippines,thathehasbeenlivinginthePhilippinesfor

atleastthree(3)continuousyearspriortothefilingofthepetitionforadoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree isentered,thathehasbeencertifiedbyhisdiplomaticorconsularofficeor any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity toadopt in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee toenter his country as his adopted child. Provided, further, That therequirementsonresidencyandcertificationofthealien�squalificationtoadoptinhiscountrymaybewaivedforthefollowing:

(i) aformerFilipinocitizenwhoseekstoadoptarelativewithin

thefourth(4th)degreeofconsanguinityoraffinity;or(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino

spouse;or(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt

jointlywithhis spousea relativewithin the fourth (4th)degreeofconsanguinityoraffinityoftheFilipinospouse.

(3) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of theguardianshipandclearanceofhisfinancialaccountabilities.Husbandandwifeshalljointlyadopt,exceptinthefollowingcases:

1. ifonespouseseekstoadoptthelegitimatechildofonespousebytheotherspouse;or

2. if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child: Provided,however,Thattheotherspousehassignifiedhisconsentthereto;or

3. ifthespousesarelegallyseparatedfromeachother.Incasehusbandandwifejointlyadoptoronespouseadoptstheillegitimatechildoftheother,jointparentalauthorityshallbeexercisedbythespouses.Section5.Whomaybeadopted.�Thefollowingmaybeadopted:

1. Anypersonbeloweighteen(18)yearsofagewhohasbeenvoluntarilycommittedto theDepartmentunderArticles154,155and156ofP.D.No.603orjudiciallydeclaredavailableforadoption;

2. Thelegitimatechildofonespouse,bytheotherspouse;3. An illegitimate child, by a qualified adopter to raise the status of the

formertothatoflegitimacy;4. Apersonoflegalageregardlessofcivilstatus,if,priortotheadoption,

said person has been consistently considered and treated by the



adoptersastheirownchildsinceminority;5. Achildwhoseadoptionhasbeenpreviouslyrescinded;or6. Achildwhosebiologicaloradoptiveparentshavedied:Provided,That

noproceedingsshallbeinitiatedwithinsix(6)monthsfromthetimeofdeathofsaidparents.

7. Achildnototherwisedisqualifiedbylawortheserules.Section6.Venue.�ThepetitionforadoptionshallbefiledwiththeFamilyCourtoftheprovinceorcitywheretheprospectiveadoptiveparentsreside.Section 7. Contents of the Petition. � The petition shall be verified andspecifically state at the heading of the initiatory pleadingwhether the petitioncontains an application for change of name, rectification of simulated birth,voluntary or involuntary commitment of children, or declaration of child asabandoned,dependentorneglected.1)IftheadopterisaFilipinocitizen,thepetitionshallallegethefollowing:(a)Thejurisdictionalfacts;(b)Thatthepetitionerisoflegalage,inpossessionoffullcivilcapacityandlegalrights;isofgoodmoralcharacter;hasnotbeenconvictedofanycrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude;isemotionallyandpsychologicallycapableofcaringforchildren;is at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, unless the adopter is thebiologicalparentoftheadopteeoristhespouseoftheadoptee�sparent;andisinapositiontosupportandcareforhischildreninkeepingwiththemeansofthefamily and has undergone pre‐adoption services as required by Section 4 ofRepublicActNo.8552.2)Iftheadopterisanalien,thepetitionshallallegethefollowing:(a)Thejurisdictionalfacts;(b)Sub‐paragraph1(b)above;(c)ThathiscountryhasdiplomaticrelationswiththeRepublicofthePhilippines;(d) That he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or anyappropriategovernmentagencytohavethelegalcapacitytoadoptinhiscountryandhisgovernmentallowstheadopteetoenterhiscountryashisadoptedchildandresidetherepermanentlyasanadoptedchild;and(e) That he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuousyearspriortothefilingofthepetitionandhemaintainssuchresidenceuntiltheadoptiondecreeisentered.

The requirements of certification of the alien�s qualification to adopt in hiscountryandofresidencymaybewaivedifthealien:(i) is a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourthdegreeofconsanguinityoraffinity;or(ii)seekstoadoptthelegitimatechildofhisFilipinospouse;or(iii) ismarried to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointlywithhis spouse arelative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipinospouse.3)Iftheadopteristhelegalguardianoftheadoptee,thepetitionshallallegethatguardianship had been terminated and the guardian had cleared his financialaccountabilities.4)Iftheadopterismarried,thespouseshallbeaco‐petitionerforjointadoptionexceptif:(a)onespouseseekstoadoptthelegitimatechildoftheother,or(b) ifonespouseseekstoadopthisownillegitimatechildandtheotherspousesignifiedwrittenconsentthereto,or(c)ifthespousesarelegallyseparatedfromeachother.5)Iftheadopteeisafoundling,thepetitionshallallegetheentrieswhichshouldappearinhisbirthcertificate,suchasnameofchild,dateofbirth,placeofbirth,ifknown;sex,nameandcitizenshipofadoptivemotherandfather,andthedateandplaceoftheirmarriage.6) If the petition prays for a change of name, it shall also state the cause orreasonforthechangeofname.Inallpetitions,itshallbealleged:(a) The first name, surname or names, age and residence of the adoptee asshown by his record of birth, baptismal or foundling certificate and schoolrecords.(b)Thattheadopteeisnotdisqualifiedbylawtobeadopted.(c)Theprobablevalueandcharacteroftheestateoftheadoptee.(d)Thefirstname,surnameornamesbywhichtheadopteeistobeknownandregisteredintheCivilRegistry.A certification of non‐forum shopping shall be included pursuant to Section 5,Rule7ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.



Section 8. Rectification of Simulated Birth. � In case the petition also seeksrectificationofasimulatedofbirth,itshallallegethat:(a)Petitionerisapplyingforrectificationofasimulatedbirth;(b)ThesimulationofbirthwasmadepriortothedateofeffectivityofRepublicActNo.8552andtheapplicationforrectificationofthebirthregistrationandthepetitionforadoptionwerefiledwithinfiveyearsfromsaiddate;(c) The petitioner made the simulation of birth for the best interests of theadoptee;and(d)Theadopteehasbeenconsistentlyconsideredandtreatedbypetitionerashisownchild.Section9.Adoptionofafoundling,anabandoned,dependentorneglectedchild.� In case the adoptee is a foundling, an abandoned, dependent or neglectedchild,thepetitionshallallege:(a) The facts showing that the child is a foundling, abandoned, dependent orneglected;(b)Thenamesof theparents, ifknown,and their residence. If thechildhasnoknownorlivingparents,thenthenameandresidenceoftheguardian,ifany;(c) The name of the duly licensed child‐placement agency or individual underwhosecarethechildisincustody;and(d)ThattheDepartment,child‐placementorchild‐caringagencyisauthorizedtogiveitsconsent.Section10.Changeofname.�Incasethepetitionalsopraysforchangeofname,thetitleorcaptionmustcontain:(a)Theregisterednameofthechild;(b)Aliasesorothernamesbywhichthechildhasbeenknown;and(c)Thefullnamebywhichthechildistobeknown.Section11.AnnexestothePetition.�Thefollowingdocumentsshallbeattachedtothepetition:A. Birth, baptismal or foundling certificate, as the case may be, and schoolrecordsshowingthename,ageandresidenceoftheadoptee;B.Affidavitofconsentofthefollowing:1.Theadoptee,iften(10)yearsofageorover;2.Thebiologicalparentsofthechild,ifknown,orthelegalguardian,orthechild‐placementagency,child‐caringagency,orthepropergovernmentinstrumentalitywhichhaslegalcustodyofthechild;

3.Thelegitimateandadoptedchildrenoftheadopterandoftheadoptee,ifany,whoareten(10)yearsofageorover;4.Theillegitimatechildrenoftheadopterlivingwithhimwhoareten(10)yearsofageorover;and5.Thespouse,ifany,oftheadopteroradoptee.C.Childstudyreportontheadopteeandhisbiologicalparents;D.Ifthepetitionerisanalien,certificationbyhisdiplomaticorconsularofficeoranyappropriategovernmentagencythathehasthelegalcapacitytoadoptinhiscountryandthathisgovernmentallowstheadopteetoenterhiscountryashisownadoptedchildunlessexemptedunderSection4(2);E. Home study report on the adopters. If the adopter is an alien or residingabroad but qualified to adopt, the home study report by a foreign adoptionagencydulyaccreditedbytheInter‐CountryAdoptionBoard;andF.Decreeofannulment,nullityorlegalseparationoftheadopteraswellasthatofthebiologicalparentsoftheadoptee,ifany.Section12.OrderofHearing.� Ifthepetitionandattachmentsaresufficient inform and substance, the court shall issue an order which shall contain thefollowing:

1. The registered name of the adoptee in the birth certificate and thenamesbywhichtheadopteehasbeenknownwhichshallbestatedinthecaption;

2. Thepurposeofthepetition;3. The complete name which the adoptee will use if the petition is

granted;4. Thedateandplaceofhearingwhichshallbesetwithinsix(6)months

fromthedateoftheissuanceoftheorderandshalldirectthatacopythereofbepublishedbeforethedateofhearingatleastonceaweekforthree successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in theprovince or citywhere the court is situated; provided, that in case ofapplication for change of name, the date set for hearing shall not bewithinfour(4)monthsafterthelastpublicationofthenoticenorwithinthirty(30)dayspriortoanelection.

ThenewspapershallbeselectedbyraffleunderthesupervisionoftheExecutive



Judge.

5. Adirectivetothesocialworkerofthecourt,thesocialserviceofficeofthelocalgovernmentunitoranychild‐placingorchild‐caringagency,ortheDepartment to prepare and submit child and home study reportsbeforethehearingifsuchreportshadnotbeenattachedtothepetitionduetounavailabilityatthetimeofthefilingofthelatter;and

6. A directive to the social worker of the court to conduct counseling

sessionswith the biological parents on thematter of adoption of theadopteeandsubmitherreportbeforethedateofhearing.

At the discretion of the court, copies of the order of hearing shall also befurnished the Office of the Solicitor General through the provincial or cityprosecutor,theDepartmentandthebiologicalparentsoftheadoptee,ifknown.Ifachangeinthenameoftheadopteeisprayedforinthepetition,noticetotheSolicitorGeneralshallbemandatory.Section13.ChildandHomeStudyReports.� Inpreparingthechildstudyreporton theadoptee, the concerned socialworker shall verifywith theCivilRegistrytherealidentityandregisterednameoftheadoptee.Ifthebirthoftheadopteewas not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of thesocialworkertoregistertheadopteeandsecureacertificateoffoundlingorlateregistration,asthecasemaybe.The socialworker shall establish that the child is legally available for adoptionandthedocuments insupportthereofarevalidandauthentic,thattheadopterhassincere intentionsand that theadoptionshall inure to thebest interestsofthechild.In case the adopter is an alien, the home study report must show the legalcapacity to adopt and that his government allows the adoptee to enter hiscountry as his adopted child in the absence of the certification required underSection7(b)ofRepublicActNo.8552.If after the conduct of the case studies, the social worker finds that there aregroundstodenythepetition,heshallmaketheproperrecommendationtothecourt,furnishingacopythereoftothepetitioner.

Section14.Hearing.�Uponsatisfactoryproofthattheorderofhearinghasbeenpublished and jurisdictional requirements have been complied with, the courtshall proceed to hear the petition. The petitioner and the adoptee mustpersonallyappearandtheformermusttestifybeforethepresidingjudgeofthecourtonthedatesetforhearing.The court shall verify from the social worker and determine whether thebiological parent has been properly counseled against making hasty decisionscaused by strain or anxiety to give up the child; ensure that all measures tostrengthenthefamilyhavebeenexhausted;andascertain ifanyprolongedstayofthechildinhisownhomewillbeinimicaltohiswelfareandinterest.Section15.SupervisedTrialCustody.�Beforeissuanceofthedecreeofadoption,the court shall give the adopter trial custody of the adoptee for a period of atleast six (6) months within which the parties are expected to adjustpsychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a bondingrelationship. The trial custody shall be monitored by the social worker of thecourt,theDepartment,orthesocialserviceofthelocalgovernmentunit,orthechild‐placement or child‐caring agencywhich submitted and prepared the casestudies.Duringsaidperiod, temporaryparentalauthority shallbevested in theadopter.Thecourtmay,motupropriooruponmotionofanyparty,reducetheperiodorexemptthepartiesif itfindsthatthesameshallbeforthebestinterestsoftheadoptee,statingthereasonstherefor.Analienadopterhowevermust complete the6‐month trial custodyexcept thefollowing:

1. AformerFilipinocitizenwhoseekstoadoptarelativewithinthefourth(4th)degreeofconsanguinityoraffinity;or

2. OnewhoseekstoadoptthelegitimatechildofhisFilipinospouse;or3. OnewhoismarriedtoaFilipinocitizenandseekstoadoptjointlywith

hisorherspousethelatter�srelativewithinthefourth(4th)degreeofconsanguinityoraffinity.

If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placedwith the prospectiveadopterthroughapre‐adoptionplacementauthority issuedbytheDepartment,thecourtshallorderthattheprospectiveadoptershallenjoyall thebenefitsto



whichthebiologicalparent isentitledfromthedatetheadoptee isplacedwithhim.The social worker shall submit to the court a report on the result of the trialcustodywithintwoweeksafteritstermination.Section16.DecreeofAdoption.�Ifthesupervisedtrialcustodyissatisfactorytothe parties and the court is convinced from the trial custody report and theevidence adduced that the adoption shall redound to the best interests of theadoptee, a decree of adoption shall be issuedwhich shall take effect as of thedatetheoriginalpetitionwasfiledevenifthepetitionersdiebeforeitsissuance.Thedecreeshall:A.Statethenamebywhichthechildistobeknownandregistered;B.Order:

1. TheClerkofCourtto issuetotheadopteracertificateoffinalityuponexpirationofthe15‐dayreglementaryperiodwithinwhichtoappeal;

2. Theadopter to submita certified truecopyof thedecreeofadoptionandthecertificateoffinalitytotheCivilRegistrarwherethechildwasoriginally registered within thirty (30) days from receipt of thecertificate of finality. In case of change of name, the decree shall besubmitted to the Civil Registrar where the court issuing the same issituated.

3. TheCivilRegistraroftheplacewheretheadopteewasregistered:a. Toannotateontheadoptee�soriginalcertificateofbirththe

decreeofadoptionwithinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptofthecertificateoffinality;

b. Toissueacertificateofbirthwhichshallnotbearanynotationthatit isaneworamendedcertificateandwhichshallshow,among others, the following: registry number, date ofregistration, nameof child, sex, dateof birth, placeof birth,nameandcitizenshipofadoptivemotherandfather,andthedateandplaceoftheirmarriage,whenapplicable;

c. To seal the original certificate of birth in the civil registryrecords which can be opened only upon order of the courtwhichissuedthedecreeofadoption;and

d. Tosubmittothecourtissuingthedecreeofadoptionproofofcompliance with all the foregoing within thirty days fromreceiptofthedecree.

If theadoptee isa foundling, thecourtshallorder theCivilRegistrarwherethefoundlingwas registered, to annotate the decree of adoption on the foundlingcertificate and a new birth certificate shall be ordered prepared by the CivilRegistrarinaccordancewiththedecree.Section 17. Book of Adoptions. � The Clerk of Court shall keep a book ofadoptionsshowingthedateofissuanceofthedecreeineachcase,compliancebytheCivilRegistrarwithSection16(B)(3)andallincidentsarisingaftertheissuanceofthedecree.Section 18. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records.� All hearings inadoption cases, after compliance with the jurisdictional requirements shall beconfidential and shall not beopen to thepublic.All records, books andpapersrelating to theadoption cases in the filesof the court, theDepartment, or anyotheragencyorinstitutionparticipatingintheadoptionproceedingsshallbekeptstrictlyconfidential.If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person isnecessary for security reasonsor forpurposes connectedwithor arisingoutofthe adoption andwill be for the best interests of the adoptee, the courtmay,uponpropermotion,orderthenecessaryinformationtobereleased,restrictingthepurposesforwhichitmaybeused.Section19.RescissionofAdoptionoftheAdoptee.�Thepetitionshallbeverifiedand filed by the adoptee who is over eighteen (18) years of age, or with theassistanceoftheDepartment,ifheisaminor,orifheisovereighteen(18)yearsofagebutisincapacitated,byhisguardianorcounsel.Theadoptionmayberescindedbasedonanyofthefollowinggroundscommittedbytheadopter:

1. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despitehavingundergonecounseling;

2. Attemptonthelifeoftheadoptee;3. Sexualassaultorviolence;or4. Abandonmentorfailuretocomplywithparentalobligations.

Adoption,beinginthebestinterestsofthechild,shallnotbesubjecttorescissionby the adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes



providedinArticle919oftheCivilCode.

MAYTHEADOPTERRESCINDTHEADOPTION?• No• But hemay disinherit the adoptee for causes provided for by the Civil

Code

Section20.Venue.ThepetitionshallbefiledwiththeFamilyCourtofthecityorprovincewheretheadopteeresides.Section21.Timewithinwhichtofilepetition.Theadoptee,ifincapacitated,mustfilethepetitionforrescissionorrevocationofadoptionwithinfive(5)yearsafterhe reaches the age of majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of theadoption,withinfive(5)yearsafterrecoveryfromsuchincompetency.Section22.OrdertoAnswer.Thecourtshallissueanorderrequiringtheadverseparty to answer the petition within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copythereof.Theorderandcopyofthepetitionshallbeservedontheadversepartyinsuchmannerasthecourtmaydirect.Section23.Judgment.�Ifthecourtfindsthattheallegationsofthepetitionaretrue,itshallrenderjudgmentorderingtherescissionofadoption,withorwithoutcosts,asjusticerequires.Thecourt shallorder that theparentalauthorityof thebiologicalparentof theadoptee,ifknown,orthelegalcustodyoftheDepartmentshallberestorediftheadopteeisstillaminororincapacitatedanddeclarethatthereciprocalrightsandobligationsoftheadopterandtheadopteetoeachothershallbeextinguished.The court shall further declare that successional rights shall revert to its statuspriortoadoption,asofthedateofjudgmentofjudicialrescission.Vestedrightsacquiredpriortojudicialrescissionshallberespected.It shall also order the adoptee to use the name stated in his original birth orfoundlingcertificate.Thecourt shall furtherorder theCivilRegistrarwhere theadoptiondecreewasregistered to cancel the new birth certificate of the adoptee and reinstate hisoriginalbirthorfoundlingcertificate.

Section24.ServiceofJudgment.�Acertifiedtruecopyofthejudgmenttogetherwith a certificate of finality issued by the Branch Clerk of the Court whichrendered thedecision inaccordancewith theprecedingSection shallbe servedbythepetitionerupontheCivilRegistrarconcernedwithinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptof the certificateof finality. TheCivilRegistrar shall forthwithenter therescission decree in the register and submit proof of compliance to the courtissuingthedecreeandtheClerkofCourtwithinthirty (30)daysfromreceiptofthedecree.The Clerk of Court shall enter the compliance in accordance with Section 17hereof.Section25.Repeal. ‐ This supersedesRule 99onAdoption andRule 100of theRulesofCourt.

EFFECTSOFADOPTION

1. Theadoptershallhaveparentalauthorityovertheadoptedchild2. Adoptedshallbeconsideredas legitimatechildoftheadopterandshall

beonlyconsidereddirectlyrelatedtotheadopted

B.INTER‐COUNTRYADOPTION

Section 26. Applicability. � The following sections apply to inter‐countryadoption of Filipino children by foreign nationals and Filipino citizenspermanentlyresidingabroad.Section27.Objectives.�TheStateshall:

a. Considerinter‐countryadoptionasanalternativemeansofchildcare,ifthechildcannotbeplacedinafosteroranadoptivefamilyorcannot,inanysuitablemanner,becaredforinthePhilippines;

b. Ensurethatthechildsubjectofinter‐countryadoptionenjoysthesameprotectionaccordedtochildrenindomesticadoption;and

c. Takeallmeasurestoensurethattheplacementarisingtherefromdoesnotresultinimproperfinancialgainforthoseinvolved.

Section28.WheretoFilePetition.�AverifiedpetitiontoadoptaFilipinochildmaybefiledbyaforeignnationalorFilipinocitizenpermanentlyresidingabroadwiththeFamilyCourthavingjurisdictionovertheplacewherethechildresidesor



maybefound.ItmaybefileddirectlywiththeInter‐CountryAdoptionBoard.Section29.Whomaybeadopted.�Only a child legally available for domesticadoptionmaybethesubjectofinter‐countryadoption.Section30.ContentsofPetition.�Thepetitionermustallege:

a. His ageand theageof the child tobeadopted, showing thathe is atleasttwenty‐seven(27)yearsofageandatleastsixteen(16)yearsolderthan the child to be adopted at the time of application, unless thepetitioner is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or thespouseofsuchparent,inwhichcasetheagedifferencedoesnotapply;

b. Ifmarried,thenameofthespousewhomustbejoinedasco‐petitionerexceptwhentheadopteeisalegitimatechildofhisspouse;

c. Thathehasthecapacitytoactandassumeallrightsandresponsibilitiesof parental authority under his national laws, and has undergone theappropriatecounselingfromanaccreditedcounselorinhiscountry;

d. Thathehasnotbeenconvictedofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude;e. Thatheiseligibletoadoptunderhisnationallaw;f. That he can provide the proper care and support and instill the

necessarymoral values and example to all his children, including thechildtobeadopted;

g. That he agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child, as embodiedunder Philippine laws and the U. N. Convention on the rights of thechild,andtoabidebytherulesandregulationsissuedtoimplementtheprovisionsofRepublicActno.8043;

h. ThathecomesfromacountrywithwhichthePhilippineshasdiplomaticrelations andwhose governmentmaintains a similarly authorizedandaccreditedagencyandthatadoptionofafilipinochildisallowedunderhisnationallaws;and

i. Thathepossessesallthequalificationsandnoneofthedisqualificationsprovidedinthisrule,inRepublicActno.8043andinallotherapplicablePhilippinelaws.

Section 31. Annexes. ‐ The petition for adoption shall contain the followingannexeswrittenandofficiallytranslatedinEnglish:

1. Birthcertificateofpetitioner;2. Marriagecontract, ifmarried,and,ifapplicable,thedivorcedecree,or

judgmentdissolvingthemarriage;3. Sworn statement of consent of petitioner�s biological or adopted

childrenaboveten(10)yearsofage;4. Physical, medical and psychological evaluation of the petitioner

certifiedbyadulylicensedphysicianandpsychologist;5. Income tax returns or any authentic document showing the current

financialcapabilityofthepetitioner;6. Police clearance of petitioner issuedwithin six (6)months before the

filingofthepetitioner;7. Character reference from the local church/minister, the petitioner�s

employerandamemberoftheimmediatecommunitywhohaveknownthepetitionerforatleastfive(5)years;

8. Full body postcard‐size pictures of the petitioner and his immediatefamilytakenatleastsix(6)monthsbeforethefilingofthepetition.

Section32.DutyofCourt.�Thecourt,afterfindingthatthepetitionissufficientin form and substance and a proper case for inter‐country adoption, shallimmediately transmit the petition to the Inter‐Country Adoption Board forappropriateaction.Section33.Effectivity. ‐ThisRuleshall takeeffectonAugust22,2002followingitspublicationinanewspaperofgeneralcirculation.WHATIFTHECHILDISALLOWEDTOENTERCOUNTRYOFADOPTERBUTHEISNOTGRANTEDCITIZENSHIP?

• Law only provides that entry and residence should be allowed but itdidn’tprovidethattheforeigncountryshouldgrantcitizenship

DOMESTICADOPTION

RA8552INTER‐COUNTRYADOPTION

RA8043

DEFINITION Definedasasocio‐legalprocessofprovidingapermanentfamily Inter‐country adoption refers to the socio‐legal process of



to a child whose parents have voluntarily or involuntarilyrelinquishedparentalauthorityoverthechild

adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizenpermanently residing abroad where the petition is filed, thesupervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree ofadoptionisissuedoutsidethePhilippines.

PROCEDURE

Sec. 7.Inter‐CountryAdoptionas the LastResort.—TheBoardshallensurethatallpossibilities foradoptionof thechildunderthe Family Code have been exhausted and that inter‐countryadoptionisinthebestinterestofthechild.Towardsthisend,theBoard shall set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will betaken to place the child in the Philippines before the child isplaced for inter‐country adoption: Provided, however, That themaximumnumberthatmaybeallowedforforeignadoptionshallnotexceedsixhundred(600)ayearforthefirstfive(5)years.

WHERETOFILE

TheapplicationfortheadoptionofachildshallbefiledwiththeDSWD

A verified petition to adopt a Filipino child may be filed by aforeign national or Filipino citizen permanently residing abroadwith the Family Court having jurisdiction over the placewherethechildresidesormaybefound.

ItmaybefileddirectlywiththeInter‐CountryAdoptionBoard.

Itshallbesupportedbythefollowing—1. Birthcertificateofpetitioner;2. Marriage contract, if married, and, if applicable, the

divorcedecree,orjudgmentdissolvingthemarriage;3. Swornstatementofconsentofpetitioner�sbiological

oradoptedchildrenaboveten(10)yearsofage;4. Physical, medical and psychological evaluation of the

petitioner certified by a duly licensed physician andpsychologist;

5. Incometaxreturnsoranyauthenticdocumentshowingthecurrentfinancialcapabilityofthepetitioner;

6. Police clearance of petitioner issued within six (6)monthsbeforethefilingofthepetitioner;

7. Character reference from the local church/minister,the petitioner�s employer and a member of theimmediatecommunitywhohaveknownthepetitionerforatleastfive(5)years;



8. Full body postcard‐size pictures of the petitioner andhis immediate family taken at least six (6) monthsbeforethefilingofthepetition.

WHOMAYADOPT

(1) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of fullcivil capacity and legal rights, of goodmoral character, has notbeen convicted of any crime involvingmoral turpitude; who isemotionallyandpsychologicallycapableofcaringforchildren,atleastsixteen(16)yearsolderthantheadoptee,andwho is inapositiontosupportandcareforhischildreninkeepingwiththemeans of the family. The requirement of a 16‐year differencebetween the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waivedwhentheadopteristhebiologicalparentoftheadopteeoristhespouseoftheadoptee�sparent;(2) Anyalienpossessingthesamequalificationsasabove‐stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his country hasdiplomaticrelationswiththeRepublicofthePhilippines,thathehasbeenlivinginthePhilippinesforatleastthree(3)continuousyears prior to the filing of the petition for adoption andmaintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered,thathehasbeencertifiedbyhisdiplomaticorconsularofficeoranyappropriategovernmentagencytohavethelegalcapacitytoadoptinhiscountry,andthathisgovernmentallowstheadopteetoenterhiscountryashisadoptedchild.Provided,further,Thatthe requirements on residency and certification of the alien�squalification to adopt in his country may be waived for thefollowing:(i) a formerFilipinocitizenwhoseeks toadopta relativewithinthefourth(4th)degreeofconsanguinityoraffinity;or(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of hisFilipinospouse;or(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks toadopt jointly with his spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)degreeofconsanguinityoraffinityoftheFilipinospouse.(3)Theguardianwithrespecttothewardafterthetermination

AnalienoraFilipinocitizenpermanentlyresidingabroadmayfilean application for inter‐country adoption of a Filipino child ifhe/she:

1. Isat least twenty‐seven (27)yearsofageandat leastsixteen (16) yearsolder than the child tobeadopted,at the time of application unless the adopter is theparent by nature of the child to be adopted or thespouseofsuchparent:

2. If married, his/her spouse must jointly file for theadoption;

3. Has the capacity to act and assume all rights andresponsibilitiesofparentalauthorityunderhisnationallaws, and has undergone the appropriate counselingfromanaccreditedcounselorinhis/hercountry;

4. Has not been convicted of a crime involving moral

turpitude;

5. Iseligibletoadoptunderhis/hernationallaw;6. Isinapositiontoprovidethepropercareandsupport

andtogivethenecessarymoralvaluesandexampletoallhischildren,includingthechildtobeadopted;

7. Agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as

embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N.CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, and toabidebytherulesandregulationsissuedtoimplementtheprovisionsofthisact;

8. Comes froma countrywithwhomthePhilippineshas



of the guardianship and clearance of his financialaccountabilities.Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the followingcases:1. ifonespouseseekstoadoptthelegitimatechildofonespousebytheotherspouse;or2. ifonespouseseekstoadopthisownillegitimatechild:Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified hisconsentthereto;or3. ifthespousesarelegallyseparatedfromeachother.Incasehusbandandwifejointlyadoptoronespouseadoptstheillegitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall beexercisedbythespouses.

diplomaticrelationsandwhosegovernmentmaintainsa similarly authorized and accredited agency and thatadoptionisallowedunderhis/hernationallaws;and

9. Possesses all the qualifications and none of the

disqualifications provided herein and in otherapplicablePhilippinelaws.

WHOMAYBEADOPTED

1. Anypersonbeloweighteen (18)yearsofagewhohasbeen voluntarily committed to theDepartment underArticles154,155and156ofP.D.No.603or judiciallydeclaredavailableforadoption;

2. The legitimate child of one spouse, by the otherspouse;

3. Anillegitimatechild,byaqualifiedadoptertoraisethestatusoftheformertothatoflegitimacy;

4. Apersonoflegalageregardlessofcivilstatus,if,priorto the adoption, said person has been consistentlyconsidered and treated by the adopters as their ownchildsinceminority;

5. Achildwhoseadoptionhasbeenpreviouslyrescinded;or

6. Achildwhosebiologicaloradoptiveparentshavedied:Provided,Thatnoproceedingsshallbeinitiatedwithinsix(6)monthsfromthetimeofdeathofsaidparents.

7. Achildnototherwisedisqualifiedbylawortheserules.

Child means a person below fifteen (15) years of age unlesssooneremancipatedbylaw.

STEPBYSTEPPROCEDURE

1. HurriedDecisions.Inallproceedingsforadoption,thecourtshallrequireproofthatthebiologicalparent(s)hasbeenproperlycounseledtoprevent

1. FamilySelection/Matching.Nochildshallbematchedtoaforeignadoptivefamilyunlessitissatisfactorilyshownthatthechildcannotbeadoptedlocally.The



him/her from making hurried decisions caused by strain oranxiety togiveupthechild,andtosustain thatallmeasures tostrengthen the family have been exhausted and that anyprolongedstayofthechildinhis/herownhomewillbeinimicaltohis/herwelfareandinterest.2. CaseStudy.NopetitionforadoptionshallbesetforhearingunlessalicensedsocialworkeroftheDepartment,thesocialserviceofficeofthelocalgovernmentunit,oranychild‐placingorchild‐caringagencyhas made a case study of the adoptee, his/her biologicalparent(s),aswellastheadopter(s),andhassubmittedthereportand recommendationson thematter to the court hearing suchpetition.The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she islegallyavailableforadoptionandthatthedocumentstosupportthis fact are valid andauthentic. Further, the case studyof theadopter(s)shallascertainhis/hergenuineintentionsandthattheadoptionisinthebestinterestofthechild.The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if itfinds, after the conduct of the case studies, that the petitionshould be denied. The case studies and other relevantdocuments and records pertaining to the adoptee and theadoptionshallbepreservedbytheDepartment.3. SupervisedTrialCustody.No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until theadopter(s)hasbeengivenbythecourtasupervisedtrialcustodyperiod for at least six (6) months within which the parties areexpectedtoadjustpsychologicallyandemotionallytoeachotherand establish a bonding relationship. During said period,temporaryparentalauthorityshallbevestedintheadopter(s).Thecourtmaymotupropriooruponmotionofanypartyreduce

clearance,as issuedbytheBoard,withthecopyoftheminutesofthemeetings,shallformpartoftherecordsofthechildtobeadopted. When the Board is ready to transmit the PlacementAuthority to the authorized and accredited inter‐countryadoption agency and all the travel documents of the child areready,theadoptiveparents,oranyoneofthem,shallpersonallyfetchthechildinthePhilippines.2. Pre‐adoptivePlacementCosts.The applicant(s) shall bear the following costs incidental to theplacementofthechild;(a) The cost of bringing the child from the Philippines to theresidenceoftheapplicant(s)abroad,includingalltravelexpenseswithinthePhilippinesandabroad;(b) The cost of passport, visa, medical examination andpsychologicalevaluationrequired,andotherrelatedexpenses.3. Fees,ChargesandAssessments.Fees, charges, and assessments collected by the Board in theexercise of its functions shall be used solely to processapplications for inter‐country adoption and to support theactivitiesoftheBoard.4. SupervisionofTrialCustody.The governmental agency or the authorized and accreditedagency in the country of the adoptive parents which filed theapplication for inter‐country adoption shall be responsible forthe trial custody and the care of the child. It shall also providefamily counseling and other related services. The trial custodyshall be for a period of six (6) months from the time ofplacement. Only after the lapse of the period of trial custodyshalladecreeofadoptionbeissuedinthesaidcountryacopyofwhichshallbe sent to theBoard to formpartof the recordsofthechild.



the trialperiod if it finds thesametobe in thebest interestoftheadoptee,statingthereasonsforthereductionoftheperiod.However,foralienadopter(s),he/shemustcompletethesix(6)‐monthtrialcustodyexceptforthoseenumeratedinSec.7(b)(i)(ii)(iii).Ifthechildisbelowseven(7)yearsofageandisplacedwiththeprospective adopter(s) through a pre‐adoption placementauthority issuedby theDepartment, theprospectiveadopter(s)shall enjoy all the benefits to which biological parent(s) isentitledfromthedatetheadopteeisplacedwiththeprospectiveadopter(s).4. DecreeofAdoption.If, after the publication of the order of hearing has beencomplied with, and no opposition has been interposed to thepetition, and after consideration of the case studies, thequalifications of the adopter(s), trial custody report and theevidence submitted, the court is convinced that thepetitionersarequalifiedtoadopt,andthattheadoptionwouldredoundtothebest interest of the adoptee, a decreeof adoption shall beentered which shall be effective as of the date the originalpetition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case thepetitioner(s)diesbeforethe issuanceof thedecreeofadoptiontoprotecttheinterestoftheadoptee.Thedecreeshallstatethenamebywhichthechildistobeknown.5. CivilRegistryRecord.An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the CivilRegistry,asrequiredbytheRulesofCourt,attestingtothefactthat the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by beingregisteredwithhis/hersurname.Theoriginalcertificateofbirthshallbestamped"cancelled"withtheannotationoftheissuanceofanamendedbirthcertificateinitsplaceandshallbesealedinthecivilregistryrecords.Thenewbirthcertificatetobeissuedtothe adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended

During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit tothe governmental agency or the authorized and accreditedagency, which shall in turn transmit a copy to the Board, aprogress report of the child's adjustment. The progress reportshall be taken into consideration in decidingwhether or not toissuethedecreeofadoption.TheDepartmentofForeignAffairsshallsetupasystembywhichFilipinochildrensentabroadfortrialcustodyaremonitoredandchecked as reported by the authorized and accredited inter‐country adoption agency as well as the repatriation to thePhilippines of a Filipino child whose adoption has not beenapproved.5. ExecutiveAgreements.The Department of Foreign Affairs, upon representation of theBoard,shallcausethepreparationofExecutiveAgreementswithcountries of the foreign adoption agencies to ensure thelegitimate concurrence of said countries in upholding thesafeguardsprovidedbythisAct.



issue.

EFFECTS

ParentalAuthority.Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and theadopteeshallbeseveredandthesameshallthenbevestedontheadopter(s).Legitimacy.Theadopteeshallbeconsideredthelegitimateson/daughteroftheadopter(s)forallintentsandpurposesandassuchisentitledtoalltherightsandobligationsprovidedbylawtolegitimatesons/daughtersborntothemwithoutdiscriminationofanykind.Tothisend,theadopteeisentitledtolove,guidance,andsupportinkeepingwiththemeansofthefamily.Succession.Inlegalandintestatesuccession,theadopter(s)andtheadopteeshallhavereciprocalrightsofsuccessionwithoutdistinctionfromlegitimatefiliation.However,iftheadopteeandhis/herbiologicalparent(s)hadleftawill,thelawontestamentarysuccessionshallgovern.

RULE109APPEALSINSPECIALPROCEEDINGS

Section1.Ordersorjudgmentsfromwhichappealsmaybetaken.�AninterestedpersonmayappealinspecialproceedingsfromanorderorjudgmentrenderedbyaCourt of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where suchorderorjudgment:

a) Allowsordisallowsawill;b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the

distributiveshareoftheestatetowhichsuchpersonisentitled;c) Allowsordisallows,inwholeorinpart,anyclaimagainsttheestateofa

deceasedperson,oranyclaimpresentedonbehalfoftheestateinoffsettoaclaimagainstit;

d) Settlestheaccountofanexecutor,administrator,trusteeorguardian;e) Constitutes, inproceedings relating to thesettlementof theestateofa

deceasedperson,or theadministrationofa trusteeorguardian, a finaldetermination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing,exceptthatnoappealshallbeallowedfromtheappointmentofaspecialadministrator;and

f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects thesubstantial rightsof thepersonappealingunless itbeanordergrantingordenyingamotionforanewtrialorforreconsideration.

Section2.Advancedistributioninspecialproceedings.�Notwithstandingapendingcontroversyorappealinproceedingstosettletheestateofadecedent,thecourtmay,initsdiscretionanduponsuchtermsasitmaydeemproperandjust,permitthatsuchpartoftheestatemaynotbeaffectedbythecontroversyorappealbedistributedamongtheheirsor legatees,uponcompliancewiththeconditionssetforthinRule90ofthisrules.

APPEALINORDINARYCIVILACTION

APPEALINSPECIALPROCEEDINGS

NUMBEROFDAYS 15days 30days

NOTICE OR RECORD OFAPPEAL?

Notice of appeal andpaymentofdocketfees

Record of appeal andpaymentofdocketfees

GRANTOFEXTENSION None May extend onmeritoriousgrounds

Documents

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (REGALADO TEXT; CHUA) 1 · PDF fileConcurrent jurisdiction over guardianship and adoption cases is now eliminated ... SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (REGALADO TEXT; CHUA)