Special Civil Actions Case Digest_Rule 66 and 67

8/11/2019 Special Civil Actions Case Digest_Rule 66 and 67

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Provisional Remedies (Rule 66-67 Cases)

1. TECSON VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as

Fernando Poe, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy

for the position of President of the Republic ofthe Philippines.

In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing

himself to be a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824,

initiated before the Commission on Elections

("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due

course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy

upon the thesis that FPJ made a material

misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by

claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when

in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were

foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an

American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish

national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish

subject.

Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe

was a Filipino citizen, he could not have

transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the

latter being an illegitimate child of an alienmother. Petitioner based the allegation of the

illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions -

first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a

certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie

Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage

had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly

only a year after the birth of respondent.

The COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack

of merit.

Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The

motion was denied.

Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC

before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in

relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil

Procedure.

The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R.

No. 161824 both challenging the jurisdiction of the

COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,

Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,

only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive

jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT FORNIER MAY ASSAIL

THE DECISION OF THE COMELEC BEFORE

THE SUPREME COURT CONFORMABLY WITH

RULE 64 IN RELATION TO RULE 65 OF THE

REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

WHETHER OR NOT THE OTHER PETITIONERS

MAY ASSAIL THE DECISION OF THE

COMELEC BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

CONFORMABLY ARTICLE VII, SECTION 4,

PARAGRAPH 7, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

RULING:

AS TO THE FIRST ISSUE

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases

may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64[2]in an

action for certiorari under Rule 65[3]

of the Revised Rules ofCivil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987

Constitution also reads

"Each Commission shall decide by a

majority vote of all its Members any case

or matter brought before it within sixty

days from the date of its submission for

decision or resolution. A case or matter is

deemed submitted for decision or

resolution upon the filing of the last

pleading, brief, or memorandum, required

by the rules of the Commission or by theCommission itself. Unless otherwise

provided by this Constitution or by law,

any decision, order, or ruling of each

Commission may be brought to the

Supreme Court on certiorari by the

aggrieved party within thirty days from

receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same

Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be

established by law which power includes the duty of thecourts of justice to settle actual controversies involving

rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and

to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

Government.

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.

R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be

taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could

be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right

to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who

could or should be elected to occupy the highest

government post in the land.

AS TO THE SECOND ISSUE
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Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and

Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article

VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in

assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took

cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme

Court to instead take on the petitions they directlyinstituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited

reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall

be the sole judge of all contests relating to

the election, returns, and qualifications of

the President or Vice-President, and may

promulgate its rules for the purpose."

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in

reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests

consist of either an election protest or a quo warrantowhich,

although two distinct remedies, would have one objective

in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from

office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13,

and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en bancon 18

April 1992, would support this premise -

Rule 12.Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall

be the sole judge of all contests relating

to the election, returns, and

qualifications of the President or Vice-

President of the Philippines.

Rule 13.How Initiated. - An election

contest is initiated by the filing of an

election protest or a petition for quo

warranto against the President or Vice-

President. An election protest shall not

include a petition for quo warranto. A

petition for quo warrantoshall not

include an election protest.

Rule 14.Election Protest.- Only the

registered candidatefor President or for

Vice-President of the Philippines whoreceived the second or third highest

number of votes may contest the election

of the President or the Vice-President, as

the case may be, by filing a verified

petition with the Clerk of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal within

thirty (30) days after the proclamation of

the winner.

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the

tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and

qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", ofthe Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or

Vice-President. A quo warrantoproceeding is generally

defined as being an action against a person who usurps,

intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public

office.[5]In such context, the election contest can only

contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a

registered candidate who would have received either the

second or third highest number of votes could file an

election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-

election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly

brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a

candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the

elections are held.

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria

Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et

al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs.

Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a.Fernando Poe, Jr." would

have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

2. DIVINAGRACIA v. CONSOLIDATEDBROADCASTING

FACTS:

Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System,

Inc. (CBS) and Peoples Broadcasting Service, Inc.

(PBS) were grantees of legislative franchises by

virtue of two laws, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7477

and R.A. No. 7582.

The CBS and PBS radio networks are two of thethree networks that comprise the well-known

"Bombo Radyo Philippines.

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7477 and Section 3 of R.A.

No. 7582 contain a common provision predicated

on the "constitutional mandate to democratize

ownership of public utilities.

It further appears that following the enactment of

these franchise laws, the NTC issued four (4)

Provisional Authorities to PBS and six (6)

Provisional Authorities to CBS, allowing them to

install, operate and maintain various AM and FM

broadcast stations in various locations throughout

the nation. These Provisional Authorities were

issued between 1993 to 1998, or after the enactment

of R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582.

Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia filed two

complaints both dated 1 March 1999 with the NTC,

respectively lodged against PBS and CBS. He

alleged that he was "the actual and beneficial

owner of Twelve percent (12%) of the shares ofstock" of PBS and CBS separately, and that despite

the provisions in R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582

mandating the public offering of at least 30% of the

common stocks of PBS and CBS, both entities had

failed to make such offering. Thus, Divinagracia

commonly argued in his complaints that the failure
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on the part of PBS and CBS "to comply with the

mandate of their legislative franchise is a misuse of

the franchise conferred upon it by law and it

continues to exercise its franchise in contravention

of the law to the detriment of the general public

and of complainant who are unable to enjoy thebenefits being offered by a publicly listed

company.

The NTC issued a consolidated decision

dismissing both complaints. it held that the

complaints actually constituted collateral attacks

on the legislative franchises of PBS and CBS since

the sole issue for determination was whether the

franchisees had violated the mandate to

democratize ownership in their respective

legislative franchises. The NTC ruled that it was

not competent to render a ruling on that issue, thesame being more properly the subject of an action

for quo warranto to be commenced by the Solicitor

General in the name of the Republic of the

Philippines, pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of

Court.

After the NTC had denied Divinagracias motion

for reconsideration, he filed a petition for review

under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court

of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a

decision upholding the NTC. The appellate courtagreed with the earlier conclusion that the

complaints were indeed a collateral attack on the

legislative franchises of CBS and PBS and that

a quo warranto action was the proper mode to

thresh out the issues raised in the complaints.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CORRECT REMEDY IS

AN ACTION FOR QUO WARRANTO UNDER

RULE 66 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

RULING:

There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-tailored

and least restrictive remedy that is afforded by the law.

Such remedy is that adverted to by the NTC and the Court

of Appeals the resort to quo warranto proceedings under

Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 1 of Rule 66, "an action for the usurpation of

a public office, position or franchise may be brought in the

name of the Republic of the Philippines against a person

who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises

public office, position or franchise."61Even while the action

is maintained in the name of the Republic62, the Solicitor

General or a public prosecutor is obliged to commence

such action upon complaint, and upon good reason to

believe that any case specified under Section 1 of Rule 66

can be established by proof.63

The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ

by which the Government can call upon any person to

show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercisesa public franchise.64It is settled that "[t]he determination of

the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right

to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is

more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo

warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the

State upon complaint or otherwise, the reason being that

the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private

injury."65A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared

in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State

because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful

exercise is primarily a concern of Government.66Quo

warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it is thought

that a government corporation has offended against its

corporate charter or misused its franchise.67

Petitioners argue that since their prayer involves the

cancellation of the provisional authority and CPCs, and not

the legislative franchise, then quo warranto fails as a

remedy. The argument is artificial. The authority of the

franchisee to engage in broadcast operations is derived in

the legislative mandate. To cancel the provisional authority

or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel the franchise or otherwise

prevent its exercise. By law, the NTC is incapacitated tofrustrate such mandate by unduly withholding or

canceling the provisional authority or the CPC for reasons

other than the orderly administration of the frequencies in

the radio spectrum.

What should occur instead is the converse. If the courts

conclude that private respondents have violated the terms

of their franchise and thus issue the writs of quo

warranto against them, then the NTC is obliged to cancel

any existing licenses and CPCs since these permits draw

strength from the possession of a valid franchise. If thepoint has not already been made clear, then licenses issued

by the NTC such as CPCs and provisional authorities are

junior to the legislative franchise enacted by Congress. The

licensing authority of the NTC is not on equal footing with

the franchising authority of the State through Congress.

The issuance of licenses by the NTC implements the

legislative franchises established by Congress, in the same

manner that the executive branch implements the laws of

Congress rather than creates its own laws. And similar to

the inability of the executive branch to prevent the

implementation of laws by Congress, the NTC cannot,

without clear and proper delegation by Congress, prevent

the exercise of a legislative franchise by withholding or

canceling the licenses of the franchisee.

And the role of the courts, through quo

warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional

separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The
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courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal

status of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and

obligations under law. The question of whether a

franchisee is in breach of the franchise specially enacted for

it by Congress is one inherently suited to a court of law,

and not for an administrative agency, much less one towhich no such function has been delegated by Congress. In

the same way that availability of judicial review over laws

does not preclude Congress from undertaking its own

remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the

viability of quo warranto in the instant cases does not

preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by

abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents should

it be distressed enough by the franchisees violation of the

franchises extended to them.

3. MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, petitioner,

vs. ANDRES GABRIEL, provincial governor of Rizal, and

the PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL, composed of

ANDRES GABRIEL, PEDRO MAGSALIN and

CATALINO S. CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner in this case, the suspended

municipal president of Pasay, Rizal, seeks by these

proceedings in mandamus to have the provincial governor

and the provincial board of the Province of Rizal

temporarily restrained from going ahead with

investigation of the charges filed against him pending

resolution of the case, and to have an order issue directed

to the provincial governor commanding him to return the

petitioner to his position as municipal president of Pasay.

The provincial governor has filed an answer to the

petition, in which he alleges as a special defense that

numerous complaints have been received by him against

the conduct of Miguel R. Cornejo, municipal president of

Pasay; that these complaints were investigated by him; that

he came to the conclusion that agreeable to the powersconferred upon provincial governors, the municipal

president should be temporarily suspended, and that an

investigation is now being conducted by the provincial

board.

Counsel for petitioner has argued, with much

eloquence, that his client has been deprived of an office, to

which he was elected by popular vote, without having an

opportunity to be heard in his own defense. The

respondents reply that all that the provincial governor and

the provincial board have done in this case is to complywith the requirements of the law which they are sworn to

enforce.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner, being a municipal officer,

has been deprived of his right to due process when he was

suspended without notice and hearing

RULING:

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are

dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a

judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading

American writer on constitutional Law, has well said, dueprocess of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of

the process by means of which the Government is carried

on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive

or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as

is judicial process. In certain proceedings, therefore, of an

administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of

contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not

essential to due process of law.

For this petition to come under the due process of

law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office

as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United

States, that a public office is not property within the sense

of the constitutional guaranties of due proces of law, but is

a public trust or agency. Decisions are numerous to the

effect that public offices are mere agencies or trust, and not

property as such. The basic idea of government in the

Philippine Islands, as in the United States, is that of a

popular representative government, the officers being

mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one

man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to

an office.

A later compilation of the pertinent authorities is to be

found in 22 Ruling Case Law, pp. 564, 565. On the subject

of suspension of public officers it is heared said:

The suspension of an officer pending his trial for

misconduct, so as to tie his hands for the time

being, seems to be universally accepted as fair, and

often necessary. . . . Notice and hearing are not

prerequisite to suspension unless required by

statute and therefore suspension without such

notice does not deprive the officer of propertywithout due process of law. Nor is a suspension

wanting in due process of law or a denial of the

equal protection of the laws because the evidence

against the officer is not produced and he is not

given an opportunity to confront his accusers and

cross-examine the witnesses.lawph!l.net

The suggestion that an unfriendly governor might

unduly delay the hearing is also without much force. The

same might be said of any administrative officer, or in fact

of any judicial officer. The presumption, again, is that

every officer will do his duty promptly, and if he does not,

certainly a remedy can be found to make him do so. Not

only this, but the law before us expedites the proceedings

by fixing a short period of ten days within which the

provincial governor must lay the charges before the

provincial board, which must be heard by the latter body

within fifteen days. Of more compelling force is the


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suggestion from the other side that the public interest

might suffer detriment by postponing the temporary

suspension until after the hearing.

4. Municipality of Bian vs. Garcia Decemberm 22,

1989

Facts:

The expropriation suit was commenced by

complaint of the Municipality of Bian, Laguna filed in the

RTC. The complaint named as defendants the owners of

eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Bian The land

sought to be expropriated was intended for use as the new

site of a modern public market and the acquisition was

authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. One

of the defendants, Francisco filed a MTD. Her motion was

filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67. Her "motion todismiss" was thus actually a pleading, taking the place of

an answer in an ordinary civil action; it was not an

ordinary motion governed by Rule 15, or a "motion to

dismiss" within the contemplation of Rule 16. Respondent

Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff

Municipality.

Francisco filed a "Motion for Separate Trial. She

alleged she had the special defense of "a constitutional

defense of vested right via a pre-existing approved

Locational Clearance from the H.S.R.C. The Court granted

the motion. It directed that a separate trial be held for

Francisco regarding her special defenses.

Judge issued order dismissing the complaint "as

against defendant FRANCISCO," and amending the Writ

of Possessions as to "exclude therefrom and from its force

and effects said defendant .. and her property ..."

The Municipality filed a MR. Francisco filed an

"Ex-Parte Motion for Execution and/or Finality of Order,"

contending that the Order had become "final and executory

for failure of the Municipality to file a motion for

reconsideration and/or appeal within the reglementary

period," i.e "fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the

final order .. appealed from.

The Municipality contended that "multiple appeals are

allowed by law" in actions of eminent domain, and hence

the period of appeal is thirty (30), not fifteen (15) days;the

special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule

69.

Issue: whether the special civil action of eminent domain

under Rule 67 is a case "wherein multiple appeals areallowed, as regards which 'the period of appeal shall be

thirty [30] days, instead of fifteen (15) days

Held:

In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for

partition, since no less than two (2) appeals are allowed by

law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation

is thirty (30) days counted from notice of order and not the

ordinary period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions

in general, conformably with the provision of Section 39 of

BP129 to the effect that in "appeals in special proceedings

in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court andother cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the

period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of

appeal being required.

The municipality's MR was therefore timely presented,

well within the thirty-day period laid down by law

therefor; and it was error for the Trial Court to have ruled

otherwise and to have declared that the order sought to be

considered had become final and executory.

It is claimed by the Municipality that the issuance of such a

separate, final order or judgment had given rise "ipso factoto a situation where multiple appeals became available."

The Municipality is right. In an action against several

defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is

proper, render judgment against one or more of them,

leaving the action to proceed against the others. " In lieu of

the original record, a record on appeal will per force have

to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court. More

than one appeal being permitted in this case, therefore, "the

period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of

appeal being required as provided by the Implementing

Rules in relation to Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129.

5. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. JOCSON

GR No. 94193-99

February 25, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner is a GOCC created and existing by virtue

of Republic Act No. 6395.

In order to carry out its purposes, it is authorized

to exercise the power of eminent domain.

Petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases before the

RTC. Subsequently, a Motion to consolidate these cases for

joint trial and an Urgent Motion to Fix Provisional Value

was filed.

The respondent judge issued an Order fixing the

provisional values of the subject areas.

In compliance w/ the said Order, petitioner

deposited the total sum of P23,180,828.00 w/ the PNB.

The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration

alleging that the provisional value of the property involved

had been set much too low.

Respondent judge issued an Order increasing the

provisional values of the properties enumerated in the


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motions for reconsideration, directing the petitioner to

deposit "whatever differential between the amounts above

fixed and those already deposited w/in 24 hours from

receipt of the Order" and holding in abeyance the issuance

of the writ of possession pending compliance therewith.

In compliance w/ the said Order, petitioner

immediately deposited the additional sum of

P22,866,860.00 w/ the PNB.

Respondent Judge issued an Order mandatorily

requiring the defendants:

. . . to state in writing w/in 24 hours whether or not they are

amenable to accept and withdraw the amounts already

deposited by the plaintiff for each of them at final and full

satisfaction of the value of their respective property

affected by expropriation, and this is mandatory.

[t]he Writ of Possession sought for by the plaintiff will be

issued immediately after manifestation of acceptance and

receipt of said amounts.

ISSUE: W/N prior hearing is required before the Republic

of the Philippines can be granted immediate possession of

the property.

HELD: No.

InMunicipality of Bian vs.Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al., the

Court ruled that there are 2 stages in every action of

expropriation:

The first is concerned with the determination of the

authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent

domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of

the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of

dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the

plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be

condemned, for the public use or purpose described in thecomplaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An

order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one,

of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves

nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So,

too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for

thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings

before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the

right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be

filed or heard."

The second phase of the eminent domain action is

concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just

compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is

done by the Court with the assistance of not more than 3

commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on

the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the

commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose

of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to

be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .

However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any time

thereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter upon

the possession of the property involved upon compliancewith P.D. No. 42 which requires the petitioner, after due

notice to the defendant, to deposit with the PNB in its main

office or any of its branches or agencies, "an amount

equivalent to the assessed value of the property for

purposes of taxation." This assessed value is that indicated

in the tax declaration.

P.D. No. 42 repealed the "provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules

of Court and of any other existing law contrary to or

inconsistent" with it. Accordingly, it repealed Section 2 of

Rule 67 insofar as the determination of the provisional

value, the form of payment and the agency with which the

deposit shall be made, are concerned.

It will be noted that under section Section 2 of Rule 67, the

court has the discretion to determine the provisional value

which must be deposited by the plaintiff to enable it "to

take or enter upon the possession of the property." Notice

to the parties is not indispensable.

P.D. No. 42, however, effectively removes the discretion of

the court in determining the provisional value. What is to

be deposited is an amount equivalent to the assessed value fortaxation purpose. No hearing is required for that purpose.

All that is needed is notice to the owner of the property

sought to be condemned.

6. National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit

Sangkay GR No. 165828. August 24, 2011

Facts:

NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power

Plant Project to generate electricity for Mindanao

The project included several underground tunnels to be

used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the

hydroelectric plants

The respondents, heirs of Macabangkit, as owners of

land sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and

property with the alternative prayer for the payment of just

compensation, alleging that one of the NPC's tunnels

traversed their land and was constructed without their

knowledge and consent

NPC countered that respondent heirs had no right to

compensation since a mere legal easements on the land

was established and their cause of action already

prescribed, under either:


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a] RA 6395, Section 3[i] - "a period of only five

years from the date of the construction within which the

affected landowner could bring a claim against it OR

b] Article 620 of Civil Code [being a continuous

and apparent legal easement] - underground tunnel being

susceptible to acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10

years

Issue:

W/N the construction of the tunnel constituted taking of

the land and entitled owners to just compensation

Held: YES

NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land without

going through formal expropriation proceedings and

without procuring their consent

NPC's construction adversely affected the owners' rights

and interests because the subterranean intervention by

NPC prevented them from introducing any developments

on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any

portion of it, either by sale or mortgage

RTC and CA correctly ruled that there was full taking on

the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not

completely and actually dispossessed

Settled rule: Taking of private property for public use, tobe compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or

appropriation

The expropriator's action may be short of

acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but

may still amount to a taking

Compensable taking includes destruction,

restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of

ownership or of the common and necessary use and

enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or

destroying its value

It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly

deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether

the property is removed from the possession of the owner,

or in any respect changes hands

NPC should pay just compensation for theentire landat

P500.00/square meter based on the prevailing market value

of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint

Interest at the rate of 12%per annumis IMPOSED on the

principal amount of P113, 532,500.00 as just compensation,

reckoned from the filing of the complaint on November 21,1997 until the full liability is paid

7. Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor

Expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, it

falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC, regardless of the value of

the subject property.

Facts:

Petitioner filed before the MTC a complaint to

expropriate a property of the respondents

MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction, stating that in an action for eminent domain,the principal cause is the exercise of such power or right;

thus, it is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the

RTC

RTC also dismissed the complaint holding that an action

for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence,

the value of the property to be expropriated would

determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC

or RTC and since the value of the property was less tha

n

P20, 000.00 or P1, 740.00 to be exact, it should be filed

before the MTC

Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising a pure

question of law, in which the court denied the Petition for

Review for being posted out of time

Issue:

Whether the MTC has jurisdiction over cases for eminent

domain where the assessed value is below P20, 000 or the

RTC.

Held: RTC

We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is

incapable of pecuniary estimation

The court adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the

nature of the principal action or remedy sought:

1] If it is primarily for the recovery of sum of

money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary

estimation; the jurisdiction would depend on the amount

of the claim

2] If the basic issue is other than the right torecover money or the money claim is purely incidental to

or a consequence of the principal relief sought --- subject of

litigation may not be estimated in terms of money and are

cognizable exclusively by the courts of first instance

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not

involve the recovery of a sum of money

It deals with the exercise by the government of its

authority and right to take private property for public use

The value of the property to be expropriated is estimatedin monetary terms, however, it is merely incidental to the

expropriation suit because the amount of compensation is

determined only after the court is satisfied with the

propriety of the expropriation.


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8. BARDILLON VS BRGY. MASILI OF CALAMBA

Facts: Respondent Brgy. Masili filed 2 complaints for

eminent domain owned by petitioner Bardillon. The 1st

complaint was filed with MTC following a failure to reach

an agreement on the purchase offer of 200k. The MRC

dismissed the case for lack of interest for failure of Brgy

and its counsel to appear at pre-trial.

The 2nd complaint was filed before the RTC over the same

lot and for the same purpose (erection of a multi-purpose

barangay hall). Bardillon filed a motion to dismisson the

ground of res judicata. Judge denied motion holding that

the MTC which ordered the dismissal of the first case had

no jurisdiction over the expropriation proceeding. RTC

decided in favor of Brgy and issued a Writ of Possession.

CA dismissed the petition , no grave abuse of discretionbecause the 2nd complaint was not barred by res judicata,

since MTC had no jurisdiction over the action. Bardillon

claims that since the value of the land is only P11k, the

MTC had jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the case -

NO

whether the dismissal before the MTC constituted

res judicata -NO

whether the CA erred when it ignored the issueentry upon the premise (writ of possession) -NO

Ratio:

Jurisdiction

An expropriation deals with the exercise by the

government of its authority and right to take property for

public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation

and should be filed with the RTCs.

The SC explained in Brgy. San Roque v heirs of

Pastor that the primary cinsideration in an expropriation

suit is whether the government has complied with the

requisites for the taking of private property. The courts

determine the authority of the government entitym the

necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due

process. The subject of expropriation suits is the

government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is

incapable of pecuniary estimation. Although the value if

the property is estimated in monetary terms, this is merely

incidental to the suit. The amount is determined only after

the court is satisfied with the propriety of theexpropriation.

Res Judicata

One of the requisites of the doctrine of res judicata is that

the court that rendered the final judgment has jurisdiction

over the subject matter and the parties. Since the MTC had

no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, res judicata

does not apply even if the order of dismissal may have

been an adjudication on the merits.

Legality of entry into premises

Bardillon argued that the CA erred when it ignored theRTC's Writ of Possession over her

property issued despite the pending MR. SC not

persuaded. The requirement for the issuance of writ if

Possession in an expropriation case are governed by Sec. 2,

Rule 67. On the part of the LGUs, it is also governed by Sec.

19 of the LGC. The requisites for authorizing immediate

entry are: 1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation

sufficient in form and substance and 2) the deposit of the

amount equivalent to 15% of the FMV of the property to be

expropriated based on its current tax declaration. In the

instant case, the issuance of the writ after it had filed the

complaint and deposited the amount required was proper.

The issue of necessity of the expropriation is a matter

properly addressedto the RTC in the course of the

proceedings. If petitioner objects to the necessity of the

takeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer.

The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the

exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine

whether there is a genuine necessity for it.

9. NATIONAL POWER CORP., Petitioner,vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO AND JOSEFINA DELA

CRUZ, METROBANK, Dasmarias, Cavite Branch,

REYNALDO FERRER, and S.K. DYNAMICS

MANUFACTURER CORP., Respondents.

Facts:

- NAPOCOR filed a Complaint for eminent domain and

expropriation of an easement of right-of-way over portions

of land within the areas of Dasmarias and Imus, Cavite

for the construction and maintenance of the proposed

Dasmarias-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project

against respondents as registered owners of the parcels ofland sought to be expropriated.

- After respondents filed their respective answers to

petitioners Complaint, petitioner deposited PhP 5,788.50

to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance

with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

-Then petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the

Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court

granted. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession over

the lots owned by respondents spouses de la Cruz and

respondent Ferrer.

- However, the trial court dropped the Dela Cruz spouses

and their mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-defendants in

view of the Motion to Intervene filed by

respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed

ownership of the land sought to be expropriated from

respondents spouses Dela Cruz.


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- the trial court terminated the pre-trial in so far as

respondent Ferrer was concerned, considering that the sole

issue was the amount of just compensation, and issued an

Order directing the constitution of a Board of

Commissioners with respect to the property of respondent

S.K. Dynamics

- As to the just compensation for the property of Saulog,

successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the trial

court ordered the latter and petitioner to submit their

compromise agreement.

- The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of S.K.

Dynamics property and they recommended that the

property of S.K. Dynamics to be expropriated by petitioner

be valued at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. And the

valuation is Based on the analysis of data gathered and

making the proper adjustments with respect to the

location, area, shape, accessibility, and the highest and bestuse of the subject properties.

*******

IT is to be noted that the commissioners did not afford the

parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their

favor, nor did they conduct hearings before them. In fact,

the commissioners did not issue notices to the parties to

attend hearings nor provide the concerned parties the

opportunity to argue their respective causes.

Upon the submission of the commissioners report,

petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of itnor given any opportunity to file its objections to it. ******

- Respondent Ferrer filed a motion adopting in toto the

commissioners report with respect to the valuation of his

property. The trial court consequently issued the Order

approving the commissioners report, and granted

respondent Ferrers motion to adopt the subject report.

- Subsequently, the just compensation for the disparate

properties to be expropriated by NAPOCOR for its project

was uniformly pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.

- NAPOCOR filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

abovementioned Order, but said motion was denied in thetrial courts Order.

- The basis of NAPOCOR in seeking to set aside the Order

is its claim that the Commissioners Report fixing the just

compensation at P10,000.00 per square meter is exorbitant,

unjust and unreasonable. To support its contention,

NAPOCOR invoked Provincial Appraisal Committee

Report No. 08-95 dated October 25, 1995 which set the just

compensation of lots along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway at

P3,000.00 per sq.m. only.

- Unsatisfied with the amount of just compensation,NAPOCOR then filed an appeal before the CA. But The CA

find nothing on record which would warrant the reversal

of the Order.

- NAPOCOR did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of

the CA Decision.

It directly filed a petition for review before the supreme

Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the NAPOCOR was deprived of due

process when it was not given the opportunity to present

evidence before the commissioners.

2. Whether or not the legal basis for the determination of

just compensation was insufficient.

Held:

1. YES.

Based on the pertinent provisions (Sections 6,7&8) on

expropriation, under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, It is

clear that in addition to the ocular inspection performed by

the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they are

also required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine

just compensation; and to provide the parties the

following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the

opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity tointroduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings;

and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue their

respective causes during the said hearings.

The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just

compensation for the property sought to be taken is a

mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the

instant expropriation case, where the principal issue is the

determination of just compensation, a hearing before the

commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to

present evidence on the issue of just compensation. While

it is true that the findings of commissioners may bedisregarded and the trial court may substitute its own

estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid

reasons, that is, where the commissioners have applied

illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where

they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence,

or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate

or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners

is a substantial right that may not be done away with

capriciously or for no reason at all."

In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted

to afford the parties the opportunity to present their ownevidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard

the commissioners findings. The absence of such trial or

hearing constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial

court because the parties (in particular, petitioners) right

to due process was violated.

2. YES.

IN this case, the sole basis for the determination of just

compensation was the commissioners ocular inspection of

the properties in question, as gleaned from the

commissioners October 5, 1999 report. The trial courts

reliance on the said report is a serious error considering

that the recommended compensation was highly

speculative and had no strong factual moorings. For one,

the report did not indicate the fair market value of the lots

occupied by the Orchard Golf and Country Club, Golden

City Subdivision, Arcontica Sports Complex, and other

business establishments cited. Also, the report did not


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show how convenience facilities, public transportation, and

the residential and commercial zoning could have added

value to the lots being expropriated.

Moreover, the trial court did not amply explain the nature

and application of the "highest and best use" method to

determine the just compensation in expropriation cases. Noattempt was made to justify the recommended "just price"

in the subject report through other sufficient and reliable

means such as the holding of a trial or hearing at which the

parties could have had adequate opportunity to adduce

their own evidence, the testimony of realtors in the area

concerned, the fair market value and tax declaration, actual

sales of lots in the vicinity of the lot being expropriated on

or about the date of the filing of the complaint for

expropriation, the pertinent zonal valuation derived from

the Bureau of Internal Revenue, among others.

More so, the commissioners did not take into account thatthe Asian financial crisis in the second semester of 1997

affected the fair market value of the subject lots. Judicial

notice can be taken of the fact that after the crisis hit the

real estate market, there was a downward trend in the

prices of real estate in the country.

Furthermore, the commissioners report itself is flawed

considering that its recommended just compensation was

pegged as of October 5, 1999, or the date when the said

report was issued, and not the just compensation as of the

date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, or as

of November 27, 1998. The period between the time of thefiling of the complaint (when just compensation should

have been determined), and the time when the

commissioners report recommending the just

compensation was issued (or almost one [1] year after the

filing of the complaint), may have distorted the correct

amount of just compensation.

Notes : ( Definition of Just Compensation as stated in this

case)

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent

of the property sought to be expropriated. The measure isnot the takers gain but the owners loss. The

compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner

but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would

deprive the owner of his property without due process, so

too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the

prejudice of the public.

To determine just compensation, the trial court should first

ascertain the market value of the property, to which should

be added the consequential damages after deducting

therefrom the consequential benefits which may arise from

the expropriation. If the consequential benefits exceed the

consequential damages, these items should be disregarded

altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid

in every case.

The market value of the property is the price that may be

agreed upon by parties willing but not compelled to enter

into the contract of sale. Not unlikely, a buyer desperate to

acquire a piece of property would agree to pay more, and a

seller in urgent need of funds would agree to accept less,

than what it is actually worth.

Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair

market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the

current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses,and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape,

location, and the tax declarations thereon.

It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of

the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the

commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where

the institution of the action precedes entry into the

property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of

the time of the filing of the complaint.

10. Republic of the Philippines, represented by AirTransportation Office, versus Sarabia

Facts:

In 1956, ATO justly expropriated aportionof the property

of Sarabia

ATO took possession and control of the portion of

respondents property

ATO utilized the property for parking area, control

tower, airport fire rescue station, terminal, and HQ of

PNP aviation security

ATO assured respondents payment. However, the partiesdid not agree on the amount for just compensation.

In 1998, Republic filed with RTC an action for the

expropriation of the wholeproperty

In 1999, RTC appointed commissioners to ascertain

just compensation

Commissioners submitted report

On hearing, the court required ATO to prove that

portions not occupied by the government is still

needed for public purpose. ATO did not present

evidence as they countered there was no need to do

so, being that almost 1/2 of the entire property hasalready been devoted to public purpose

RTC held against ATO, ruling that the additional area

submitted for expropriation is not needed by ATO for

public purpose

RTC adopted commissioners report which fixed the

just compensation using the current market value of the

lot in 1999 (at the time of the issuance of the writ of

possession - because this is the time of legal

acquisition of property).

ATO filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal, the

entire records were then transmitted to the CA. CA

affirmed RTC decision. MR was denied. PR under Rule 45

was filed.

ATO contends that the just compensation fixed by the

trial court based on the market value of the property

after the commencement of the expropriation

proceedings contradicts established jurisprudence

ATO also contends that the just compensation for the


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entirelot should be fixed in the amount based on its

assessed value in 1956

Issue:

WON just compensation should be reckoned from the time

of actual taking or at the issuance of the writ of possession

WON just compensation for the entireproperty should be

fixed in the amount based on its assessed value in 1956

Held:

1. SC agrees with ATO. It said that the value of the

property as it was when the government took possession of

the land represents its true value for just compensation, not

as of the time of the institution of the expropriation

proceeding.

2.

SC disagreed with ATO. It ruled that there is nothing onrecord that ATO occupied the remaining portion of the

property (back in 1956, only a portion of the lot was

occupied). To add to that, neither did it ever present proof

that said unoccupied portion is necessary for public use.

Therefore, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED - CA

decision is modified in the sense that it was wrong in

computing just compensation based on the market value at

the time of the issuance of the writ of possession.

11.

Yujuico vs. Atienza, Jr 472 SCRA 463

On 8 December 1995, the City Council of Manila enacted

an Ordinance authorizing the City Mayor to acquire by

negotiation or expropriation certain parcels of land for

utilization as a site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary

School. The Ordinance provides that an amount not to

exceed the fair market value of the land then prevailing in

the area will be allocated out of the Special Education Fund

(SEF) of the City of Manila (City). Failing to acquire the

land by negotiation, the City filed a case for eminent

domain against petitioner as owner of the property. OnRTC, the case is in favor of the City. The judgment became

final and executory, no appeal having been interposed by

either party. On 6 April 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for

Execution of Judgment which the trial court granted.

Pursuant to a Writ of Execution, the branch sheriff served a

Notice of Garnishment on the funds of the City deposited

with the Land Bank of the Philippines, YMCA Branch,

Manila (Land Bank) to satisfy the judgment. Invoking

jurisprudence holding that public funds cannot be made

subject to garnishment, the City filed a motion to quash the

Notice of Garnishment.

On 6 June 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus

against the members of the CSB, the same respondents in

the petition for contempt of court, seeking to compel them

to pass a resolution appropriating the amount necessary to

pay the balance of the just compensation awarded to

petitioner. Upon petitioners motion, it directed its

consolidation with the expropriation case before Branch 15.

In a Decision dated 9 October 2002, the lower court (Branch

15) granted the petition for mandamus. Specifically, it

ordered respondents to immediately pass a resolution

appropriating the necessary amount and the

corresponding disbursement thereof for the full andcomplete payment of the balance of the court-adjudged

compensation still due petitioner. Respondents filed a

motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied.

With respondents not interposing an appeal, the Decision

became final and executory. However, respondents filed a

Petition for Relief from Judgment,[43] wherein they also

prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ

of preliminary injunction. Respondents invoked excusable

negligence as a ground for their failure to seasonably file

an appeal. While it denied the application for TRO in view

of its prior order granting petitioners Motion for

Execution, the court granted the Petition for Relief fromJudgment. Finding the Order unacceptable, petitioner

elevated it to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari

under Rule 45.

Respondents assail the correctness and propriety of the

mode of appeal resorted to by petitioner. According to

them, the order granting the petition for relief from

judgment is an interlocutory order which cannot be made

the subject of an appeal. Respondents have correctly

pointed out that an interlocutory order cannot be made

subject to an appeal. However, when viewed in context,the recitals of the petition clearly disclose and the Court is

convinced that the lower court committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when

it granted respondents petition for relief from judgment.

While this case should have been elevated to this Court not

by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 but through

a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, in the

exercise of our sound discretion and in order to write finis

to this case which has needlessly dragged on for so long,

we shall treat the petition as a special civil action for

certiorari. After all, it was filed within the reglementary

period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition. Anent the alleged

breach of the rule on hierarchy of courts, the doctrine is not

an iron-clad dictum. The rule may be relaxed when

exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant the

exercise of this Courts primary jurisdiction. In this case,

the judgment sought to be satisfied has long attained

finality and the expropriated property has been utilized as

a school site for five (5) years now; yet, the awarded just

compensation has not been fully paid. These

circumstances, in the Courts estimation, merit the

relaxation of the technical rules of procedure to ensure that

substantial justice will be served.

Concerning petitioners alleged failure to implead the CSB

or its new members before the trial court, respondents

argue that since there are five (5) new members in the CSB

any decision in the case requiring the CSB to act as a body

would prove to be legally impossible. The former members

of the CSB could no longer be compelled to act according


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to the orders of the Court since they no longer have the

capacity to do so. On the other hand, respondents

continue, the new members cannot be directed to comply

with the Courts judgment either; they have never been

impleaded in the case; thus, the Court never acquired

jurisdiction over their persons.

ISSUE: WON respondent is justified in not paying the

petitioner her just compensation.

HELD: NO. While this Court recognizes the power of LGU

to expropriate private property for public use, it will not

stand idly by while the expropriating authority maneuvers

to evade the payment of just compensation of property

already in its possession. The notion of expropriation is

hard enough to take for a private owner. He is compelled

to give up his property for the common weal. But to give it

up and wait in vain for the just compensation decreed bythe courts is too much to bear. In cases like these, courts

will not hesitate to step in to ensure that justice and fair

play are served. The notion of expropriation is hard

enough to take for a private owner. He is compelled to give

up his property for the common weal. But to give it up and

wait in vain for the just compensation decreed by the

courts is too much to bear. In cases like these, courts will

not hesitate to step in to ensure that justice and fair play

are served. The decision rendering just compensation in

petitioners favor was promulgated way back in the year

2000.[87] Five years have passed, yet the award still has

not been fully satisfied. The reversion of the expropriated

property to the petitioner would prove not to be a remote

prospect should respondents and the City they represent

insist on trudging on their intransigent course.

Sec. 4, RA 8974 (AN ACT TO FACILITATE THE

ACQUISITION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY, SITE OR

LOCATION FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS AND FOR OTHER

PURPOSES)

Section 4.Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. -Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the

right-of-way or location for any national government

infrastructure project through expropriation, the

appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the

expropriation proceedings before the proper court under

the following guidelines:

(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to

the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately

pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the

sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of theproperty based on the current relevant zonal valuation of

the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of

the improvements and/or structures as determined under

Section 7 hereof;

(b) In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas

where there is no zonal valuation, the BIR is hereby

mandated within the period of sixty (60) days from the

date of the expropriation case, to come up with a zonal

valuation for said area; and

(c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure

project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there isno existing valuation of the area concerned, the

implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of

the property its proffered value taking into consideration

the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.

Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the

court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency

an order to take possession of the property and start the

implementation of the project.

Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the

implementing agency shall present to the court a certificate

of availability of funds from the proper official concerned.

In the event that the owner of the property contests the

implementing agencys proffered value, the court shall

determine the just compensation to be paid the owner

within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the

expropriation case. When the decision of the court becomes

final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the

owner the difference between the amount already paid and

the just compensation as determined by the court.

Sec. 19, RA 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE)

Section 19.Eminent Domain.- A local government unit

may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an

ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for

public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor

and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,

pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and

pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of

eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and

definite offer has been previously made to the owner, andsuch offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the

local government unit may immediately take possession of

the property upon the filing of the expropriation

proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper

court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market

value of the property based on the current tax declaration

of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That,

the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall

be determined by the proper court, based on the fair

market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Documents

Special Civil Actions Case Digest_Rule 66 and 67