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REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048 March 22, 2001

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSULGENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR

CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF AJUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL

CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congressassembled:

Section 1.Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name orNickname No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, exceptfor clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected orchanged by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with theprovisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

Section 2.Definition of Terms As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(1) "City or Municipal civil registrar" refers to the head of the local civil registry office of thecity or municipality, as the case may be, who is appointed as such by the city or municipalmayor in accordance with the provisions of existing laws.

(2) "Petitioner" refers to a natural person filing the petition and who has direct and personalinterest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry or change of firstname or nickname in the civil register.

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance ofclerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that isharmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,

which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected orchanged only by reference to other existing record or records:Provided, however, That nocorrection must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.

(4) "Civil Register" refers to the various registry books and related certificates anddocuments kept in the archives of the local civil registry offices, Philippine Consulates and ofthe Office of the Civil Registrar General.

(5) "Civil registrar general" refers to the Administrator of the National Statistics Office whichis the agency mandated to carry out and administer the provision of laws on civil registration.

(6) "First name" refers to a name or nickname given to a person which may consist of one ormore names in addition to the middle and last names.

Section 3.Who May File the Petition and Where. Any person having direct and personal interestin the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name ornickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office ofthe city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.

In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not bepractical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person


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before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the petition maybe filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where the interested party is presentlyresiding or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitatethe processing of the petition.

Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file their

petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.

The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be processed inaccordance with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames maybe availed of only once.

Section 4.Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first nameor nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or

extremely difficult to write or pronounce.

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by thepetitioner and he has been publicly known by that by that first name or nickname in thecommunity: or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Section 5.Form and Contents of the Petition. The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit,subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavitshall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively thatthe petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular

erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the change sought to be made.

The petition shall be supported with the following documents:

(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry bookcontaining the entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed.

(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries uponwhich the correction or change shall be based; and

(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consulgeneral may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.

In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with thedocuments mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall bepublished at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate law enforcementagencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.


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The petition and its supporting papers shall be filed in three (3) copies to be distributed as follows:first copy to the concerned city or municipal civil registrar, or the consul general; second copy to theOffice of the Civil Registrar General; and third copy to the petitioner.

Section 6.Duties of the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General. The city ormunicipal civil registrar or the consul general to whom the petition is presented shall examine the

petition and its supporting documents. He shall post the petition in a conspicuous place provided forthat purpose for ten (10) consecutive days after he finds the petition and its supporting documentssufficient in form and substance.

The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall act on the petition and shall render adecision not later than five (5) working days after the completion of the posting and/or publicationrequirement. He shall transmit a copy of his decision together with the records of the proceedings tothe Office of the Civil Registrar General within five (5) working days from the date of the decision.

Section 7.Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. The civil registrar general shall,within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision granting a petition, exercise the power toimpugn such decision by way of an objection based on the following grounds:

(1) The error is not clerical or typographical;

(2) The correction of an entry or entries in the civil register is substantial or controversial as itaffects the civil status of a person; or

(3) The basis used in changing the first name or nickname of a person does not fall underSection 4.

The civil registrar general shall immediately notify the city or municipal civil registrar or the consulgeneral of the action taken on the decision. Upon receipt of the notice thereof, the city or municipalcivil registrar or the consul general shall notify the petitioner of such action.

The petitioner may seek reconsideration with the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petitionwith the proper court.

If the civil registrar general fails to exercise his power to impugn the decision of the city or municipalcivil registrar or of the consul general within the period prescribed herein, such decision shallbecome final and executory.

Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general, thepetitioner may either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petitionwith the proper court.

Section 8.Payment of Fees. The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall beauthorized to collect reasonable fees as a condition for accepting the petition. An indigent petitionershall be exempt from the payment of the said fee.

Section 9.Penalty Clause. -A person who violates any of the provisions of this Act shall, uponconviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years but not more than twelve (12)years, or a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than One HundredThousand pesos (P100,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.


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In addition, if the offender is a government official or employee he shall suffer the penalties providedunder civil service laws, rules and regulations.

Section 10.Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The civil registrar general shall, in consultationwith the Department of Justice, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Supreme Court

Administrator, the University of the Philippines Law Center and the Philippine Association of Civil

Registrars, issue the necessary rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this Act notlater than three (3) months from the effectivity of this law.

Section 11.Retroactivity Clause. - This Act shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does notprejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws.

Section 12.Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of this Act is declared void orunconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions thereof shall not be affected by suchdeclaration.

Section 13.Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, other issuances, orparts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 14.Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its completepublication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: March 22, 2001

G.R. No. L-32600 February 26, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguetand ANITA PO alias VERONICA PAO, assisted by her mother HELEN POA, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Can a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in the civil registry be joinedin the same proceeding? This is the issue posed in this petition for review of a decision of the Courtof First Instance of Baguio and Benguet. 1


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The record of the case discloses that on August 28, 1968, the herein private respondent Anita Poalias Veronica Pao, a resident of Baguio City, filed with the then Court of First Instance of Baguioand Benguet a Petition for the change other name fromAnita Po to Veronica Pao. 2For this purpose,she also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father's nameappearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her mother's name recorded as PAKIAT CHANbe changed to HELEN CHAN. At the time the litigation was commenced, the petitioner was a 16-

year old minor. Thus, she was assisted in the case by her mother. The suit was docketed as SpecialProceeding Case No. 642.

The petitioner alleged before the trial court that the maiden name of her mother is Helen Chan andthat the given name Pakiatwritten on her birth certificate is actually the given name of her maternalgrandmother. The petitioner also asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu aserroneously written in her birth certificate and as such her real surname is Pao. She assigns thesealleged errors to the common misunderstanding of Chinese names. The petitioner also averred thatshe had been baptized by a Catholic priest and that she was christened as Veronica Pao, the firstbeing her Christian given name and the latter being the correct spelling of her surname; that sinceher childhood up to the present, she had always been known and referred to as Veronica Pao andnotAnita Po.

On the basis of these allegations, the petitioner asked the trial court to allow her change of nameand to order the correction of her records in the Local Civil Registrar's Office at La Trinidad, Benguetto conform to the nameVeronica Pao. She also asked the trial court to order the correction of herfather's name recorded in her birth certificate from Po Yu to Pao Yu, as well as her mother's nameappearing as Pakiat Chan changed to Helen Chan.

At the hearing scheduled by the trial court on March 4,1969, the Office of the Solicitor Generalpresented its Opposition to the Petition and sought the dismissal of the same. The thrust of the saidOpposition is that the remedies prayed for by the petitioner cannot be allowed by the meresubmission of the said Petition. The pertinent portions of the written arguments in the Opposition areas follows

... A petition for change of name is filed under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court ... anda petition for correction or cancellation of entries in the Civil Register is filed underRule 108 of the same Rules... . Rule 103 and Rule 108 are distinct and separatefrom each other and each provides for different requirements that must be satisfied inorder that a person may avail of any one of them. The present petition apparentlysatisfies the requirements of Rule 103 on change of name but fails insofar as therequest for correction of certain entries is concerned because the civil registrarconcerned and the other parties affected by the corrections sought to be made havenot been included in the petition as required by section 3 of Rule 108. And from thenature of the change sought to be made by the herein petitioner in her surname, itseems that orderly and proper procedure requires that a correction be first made ofthe alleged errors in the names of the petitioner's parents to justify her petition forchange of name. Thus, petitioner alleges that her father's name is correctly Pao Yubut the same is recorded in her birth certificate as Po Yu However, in the said birthcertificate, petitioner's name appears as Anita Po following the name of her father asregistered in the same birth certificate, which is Po Yu. It therefore appears that untilthe name of the father is shown to have been registered erroneously, there is no

justification for allowing the petitioner to use the surname Poa The importance andnecessity of first determining the propriety of the corrections sought to be made bythe herein petitioner before allowing her to change her name is magnified when it isnoted that the corrections sought involve the very identity of the parents of the hereinpetitioner, without a clear-cut clarification of which, the court may unwittingly allow


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itself to become an instrument in the substitution in a public record of the Identities ofcertain persons.

In view of these circumstances, it appears that considered as a petition for change ofname, the present petition does not state a cause of action considering that on thebasis of the data appearing in the birth certificate, petitioner's father is Po Yu and not

Pao Yu And the present petition can not be considered (sufficient) in form andsubstance as a petition for correction because it does not satisfy the requirementsset forth by section 3 (Rule 108) of the Rules of Court and there is no allegation ofhow the alleged error was committed.

xxx xxx xxx 3

In a Decision dated July 24,1969, the trial court, with respondent Judge Feliciano Belmontepresiding therein, ruled in favor of the petitioner. 4The petitioner was allowed to change her namefromAnita Po to Veronica Pao. The court also allowed the correction of the names of her parents asprayed for in the Petition in the registry of birth. The Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad Benguet wasordered to implement the corresponding corrections.

On behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, the Office of the Solicitor General elevated the case tothis Court by way of the instant Petition. 5 The Solicitor General raises the following issues

(1) Whether or not the private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao has presenteda proper and reasonable cause for the change of her name; and

(2) Whether or not the names Po Yu and Pakiat Chan appearing in the birthcertificate of Anita Po can be changed in the same proceeding for the change ofname of Anita Po.

The parties having submitted their respective briefs, the case is now submitted for decision.

We have gone through the entire record of the case and We find merit in the instant Petition.

The allegations of the private respondent are not disputed by the petitioner. The respondent Judgerendered judgment in accordance with these undisputed facts. A conclusion of a court drawn fromundisputed facts raises a question of law. 6 The issues raised in the instant Petition are directedagainst the conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge and drawn from undisputed facts. Takinginto account these observations and considering that the resolution of the issues raised herein wouldnot require this Court to re-examine the evidence presented before the trial court, We hold that thetwo issues raised in this Petition are questions of law. Inasmuch as the two issues are related toeach other, they will be resolved together.

In fine, the petitioner maintains that her correct name is Veronica Pao inasmuch as Veronica is herChristian name and Pao is the surname of her father. She does not, however, deny that the name ofher father appearing in her birth certificate is Po Yu and not Pao Yu. She assigns the discrepancy tomere clerical error.

An examination of her allegations reveal that her claim to the supposed correct name ofVeronicaPao is predicated on the assumption that the correct name other father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu asrecited in her own birth certificate. The assumption is baseless, absent any proof that the name otherfather in her birth certificate was entered erroneously. As correctly observed by the Office of the


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Solicitor General, until the name of her father is shown to have been registered in her birth certificateerroneously, there is no justification for allowing the petitioner to use the surname Pao. Thecorrections sought by the petitioner involve the very Identity of her parents. Surely, the propriety ofsuch corrections should first be determined in a different proceeding more adversary in characterthan the summary case instituted by the petitioner with the trial court. Aside from the change of hername, the petitioner seeks a correction of entries in the civil registry for the benefit of her parents.

This she may not do through a summary proceeding. The summary procedure for correction of thecivil register under Rule 108 is confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to a material changein the spelling of a surname as prayed for by the petitioner. 7A clerical error must be apparent on theface of the record and should be capable of being corrected by reference to the record alone. 8 Thepetitioner seeks more than just the correction of a clerical error.

Moreover, under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civilregister is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would beaffected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding. An inspection of all the pleadings filed bythe petitioner with the trial court shows that the local civil registrar concerned was never made aparty to the proceeding. Said civil registrar being an indispensable party, a final determination of thecase cannot be made. 9

The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning thecancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not besubstituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency To hold otherwise would rendernugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one's name or the correction ofentries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the sameproceedings all the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 must be complied with.

Accordingly, We hold that the Petition filed with the trial court is not sufficient in form and substanceand should have been dismissed by the trial court for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio andBenguet in Special Proceeding Case No. 642 dated July 24,1969 is hereby SET ASIDE and

declared to be without force or effect. The entries in the local civil registry of La Trinidad, Benguetpertaining to the petitioner Anita Po and her parents Po Yu and Pakiat Chan stand as they werebefore such Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of LaTrinidad, Benguet for his information and implementation. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-21194 April 29, 1966


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HAW LIONG, petitioner-appellee,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, First Assistant Solicitor General E. Umali and Atty. J.Domingo de Leon for oppositor-appellant.

Feliciano A. Asoy for petitioner-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J .:

Petitioner seeks to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin in a petition filed before theCourt of First Instance of Leyte.

He testified that he is 47 years old, married, and an employee of the Leyte Asia Trading Company;that he has been a resident of Tacloban City for more than 20 years; that he wants to change hisname to Alfonso Lantin because he is called by his Filipino friends as Alfonso and the name of hisfather is Placido Lantin; that he wants to have a Filipino name because he will soon be a Filipinocitizen; that he came to the Philippines in 1925 and since then his Filipino friends have been calling

him Alfonso; that there is no pending case against him as Haw Liong; and that in the event a casewill arise against him as Haw Liong he is willing to appear and answer the same.

After hearing, the court a quo allowed petitioner to change his name from Haw Liong to AlfonsoLantin. The government has appealed.

This Court has already had occasion to state the view that the State has an interest in the namesborne by individuals for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not amatter of right. So that before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in hiscertificate of birth or civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compellingreason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oao vs.Republic, G.R. No. L-8035, November 29, 1957). The following may be considered, among others,as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name: (1)when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2)when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child isacknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (Tolentino,Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).1wph1.t

Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for a changeof name other than his desire to adopt the name Alfonso for the reason that he has always beenknown by that name by his Filipino friends and associates and because that is the family name of hisfather which he desires to follow to conform with the customs and traditions in the Philippines. Butthis claim which is merely supported by his own testimony cannot overcome the fact that the namegiven him from the very beginning as Haw Liong as in fact this is the name that appears in hislanding certificate. The fact that he claims to be the son of one Placido Lantin, a Filipino is of no

moment because if the same were true it is strange that the name that was given him upon birth isHaw Liong and he had to file a petition for naturalization to become a Filipino citizen. This indirectlybelies his claim that the name that should be given him is Alfonso Lantin because that is the familyname of his father "to conform with the customs and traditions and also for sentimental reasons."

The true situation however is, as was disclosed in his cross examination, that in his businessdealings with other people he always signed as Haw Liong and never used the name Alfonso Lantin;that he came to be called Alfonso by his friends only when during the Japanese occupation hisFilipino friends asked him how he was called and he told them that his name was Alfonso, and since


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then they started calling him by that name; and that he is known in Tacloban City as Haw Liong andhas not contracted with any person under the name of Alfonso Lantin. We find, therefore, no properor compelling reason that may justify the change of name desired by petitioner for his petition doesnot come under any of the cases above adverted to.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside. The petition is denied, with costs.

G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLAVERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON, petitioner,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J .:+. wph!1

This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order of the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29, 1978, which partially denied petitioner's prayerfor a change of name. Only a question of law is involved and there is no controversy over the factswhich are well-stated in the questioned Order as follows: t.hqw

This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella VeronicaPrimitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her namebe changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.

The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock inthe morning was published in the Times Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and11, 1978 and a copy thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished theOffice of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3).

At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appearedfor the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of theSolicitor General, Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on thepart of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was appointed commissioner toreceive the evidence and to submit the same for resolution of the Court.

From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that petitionerMaria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T.Hospital (Exhibit A). She was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria


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Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15, 1952, she was baptized as MariaEstrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church Singalong,Manila (Exhibit B). Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica PrimitivaDuterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and heruncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street,Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner started

schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up tofourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon(Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high school she enrolled at the

Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing (Exhibit E-4). Herscholastic records from elementary to college show that she was registered by thename of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under thesame name (Exhibit D). She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor (ExhibitsG, G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4).

Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition:

1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;

2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same name;

3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all herfriends and acquaintances know her by this name;

4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.

Section 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:

Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such orderhas been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the

court shall if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of thepetitioner adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of thepetition.

The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella VeronicaPrimitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to thesurname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different surname and hasbecome known with such surname does not constitute proper and reasonable causeto legally authorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birth certificate clearlyshows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admittedthis fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to

Alfon is equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of theCivil Code provides:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because heruncle who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy isnot a petition for change of name.


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WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied withrespect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from MariaEstrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.

Let copy of this order be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manilapursuant to Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

The lower court should have fully granted the petition.

The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her surname is that aslegitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of herfather invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision isnot equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated childshould choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. Moreover, this Court inHaw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said: t.hqw

The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causesthat may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is

ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2)when the request for change is a consequence of a change of' status, such as whena natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessaryto avoid confusion Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).

In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S.Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in theschools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by thisname; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma underthis name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is thereforeample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on asolid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.

WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that, the petitioner is allowed tochange not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON.No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27347 April 28, 1969

JOSE D. VILLEGAS and RIZALINA SANTOS RIVERA, oppositors-appellants,vs.


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AL FERNANDO, ANGUSTIA IBAY, JUSTO IBAY and VALENTIN BUENVIAJE, ETAL., petitioners-appellees.

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G.R. No. L-24901 April 28, 1969

JOSE MIRANDA SAMPEDRO and PEDRO MANAHAN, applicants-appellants,vs.DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

Sixto Natividad, Justo Ibay, Andres F. Santos and Maximo Calalang for petitioners-appellees AlfredoFernando, et al.Tolentino and Garcia and D. R. Cruz for petitioners-appellees Ramon San Diego, et al.Mariano Manahan, Jr. and Froilan P. Pobre for applicants-appellants Jose Miranda Sampedro, et al.Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee Director of Lands.

REYES J.B.L., Ac tg. C.J.:

Appeals from two orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its capacity as a landregistration court. 1

These twin cases arose from the following set of facts: On 27 October 1959, the heirs of JoseMiranda Sampedro and Leocadio Manahan, hereinafter referred to as appellee appellantsheirs 2 petitioned the Court of First Instance of Rizal to approve their amended plan Psu 697

Amd. corresponding to a parcel of land situated in Macabud Montalban, Rizal, and allegedly plattedin accordance with a certain decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on 26 November 1938, andto direct the Land Registration Commission to issue in their name, as successors-in-interest of theoriginal applicants Sampedro, and Pedro Manahan, 3 a decree of registration for lot No. 1 of thesame plan. In the copy of the decision appended to the petition, the Court of Appeals affirmed a

lower court's purported award of said lot to the original applicants with the modification that one-sixthof the same lot was to belong to the spouses Jose Villegas and Irene Santos 4 after excludingtherefrom those portions of land encompassed by the forest zone, those covered by particular titledhomesteads, and those occupied by the non-christian tribes.

Noting that there was no objection on the part of the directors of the Bureau of Lands and theBureau of Forestry, the original oppositors of record, the lower court issued an order on 2 December1959 approving the plan, together with its technical descriptions, and directing the Land RegistrationCommission to issue the appropriate decree. Accordingly, Decree No. N-75048 was issued on 22December 1959 with the spouses Villegas and Santos as the denoted owners of an undivided one-sixth portion of the lot and the two groups of appellants heirs as pro-indiviso owners, in two equalshares, of the remainder. The decree was transcribed two days later in the registration book of theRegister of Deeds of Rizal as Original Certificate of Title No. 2180.

Within one year from the issuance of the decree, several persons, 5 namely, PrudencioAngeles, Macario Bonifacio, Valentin Buenviaje, the heirs of Roberto Cruz, Severino Cruz, JuanaEstanislao, Alfredo Fernando, Justo and Angustia Ibay, Julita Ocampo, Marcelino Ocampo,Dominador Ramos and Biviano Reynoso, Jose Salamat, Roman San Diego and Arcadio Tolentinofiled petitions for review in the lower court. Claiming diverse interests prejudiced by the allegedundue inclusion of some tracts of land in lot No. 1, petitioners for review levelled against appellantsheirs various charges commonly denominated by them as fraud in the procurement of theaforementioned decree of registration. They all prayed that said decree be reopened and, together


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with the Original Certificate of Title No. 2180, annulled; and that the tracts of land over which theyclaimed interests be segregated and decreed instead in their favor. The annulment of the order of 2December 1959 was, by the way, also specifically prayed for by Angeles, Buenviaje, the heirs ofRoberto Cruz, Fernando, Justo and Angustia Ibay, Ramos and Reynoso, and San Diego.

Instead of filing an answer as required by the lower court, appellants heirs moved for the

dismissal of the petitions for review on the grounds that Petitioners Marcelino and Julita Ocampo'sproperty were not included in the decree and that the rest of the petitioners were without personalityto question said decree, they being mere homestead or free patent applicants whose interests weresubsidiary to that of the government.

On 26 July 1961, the lower court issued an order setting for hearing the motion to dismiss thepetitions for review of Marcelino and Julita Ocampo and denying the motion to dismiss those of theother petitioners. The lower court opined that homestead applicants were included in the phrase"any person deprived of ... interest therein" found in section 38 6 of Act No. 496 and, consequently,entitled to file petitions for review thereunder. A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed byappellants heirs was belatedly denied on 23 March 1963.

During one of the pre-trials in the lower-court, it was discovered that the copy of the Court ofAppeals decision submitted thereto by appellants heirs was merely a "certified copy of another copyin the office of the Land Registration Commission which in turn was copied from a copy of theBureau of Lands". The record of the case, including the original of the Court of Appeals decisionsupposedly rendered therein, were allegedly lost or destroyed during the second world war.

This discovery prompted Buenviaje, Fernando, and Justo and Angustia Ibay to file, as they didfile in March, 1963, separate petitions to set aside the order of 2 December 1959. In addition to theirprevious argument of fraud, they contended that the lower court had no jurisdiction to issue saidorder of 2 December 1959 considering that the rendition or the very existence of the Court of

Appeals decision on which it was based was doubtful; that said decision was most probablyfictitious, or, granting that it was genuine, that it was no longer enforceable not only because it wasbarred by the statute of limitations but also because it had not been properly reconstituted pursuant

to the provisions of Act No. 3110. 7

In their opposition to the petition to set aside the order of 2 December 1959, appellants heirspointed out to the lower court that said order was already final, and was in fact already executed,and, therefore, already beyond the latter's control; that Act No. 3110 was not applicable to a decidedcase like the one under consideration; and that the record of the case, including the Court of

Appeals decision in question which was of imprescriptible nature, were, in effect, virtually re-constituted upon the issuance of the aforesaid order.

On 23 August 1963, the lower court issued another order. Invoking lack of authority to issuethe order of 2 December 1959 in view of the non-reconstitution of the record of the case as well asthe Court of Appeals decision, it set aside said order of 2 December 1959.

Appellants heirs moved for reconsideration of the order of 23 August 1963. And, for the firsttime, Jose Villegas and the heir of Irene Santos, Rizalina Santos Rivera, appeared with a petition toset aside the same. The latter claimed that since they were not notified of the proceedingsculminating in the issuance of the order of 23 August 1963, the same was a nullity insofar as theirshare in lot No. 1 was concerned. Both were denied, as per the lower court's order of 11 April 1964.


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Appellants heirs appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Villegas and Rivera, on the otherhand, went to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, certified their case involving purely questions oflaw to the Supreme Court. 8

Imputed, to the lower court are allegedly reversible errors consisting, according to appellantsheirs, (1) in holding mere homestead or free patent applicants included in the phrase "any person

deprived of ... interest therein" appearing in section 38 of Act No. 496, and (2) in setting aside theorder of 2 December 1959 after the same became final and executory; and, according to appellantsVillegas and Rivera, in addition to appellants heirs' second assigned error, (3) in entertaining andgranting the petitions to set aside the order of 2 December 1959 which were not only filed after morethan three years from the issuance of said order but were also based on charges not constituting thekind of fraud contemplated by section 38 of Act No. 496; (4) in not granting their petition to set asidethe order of 23 August 1963 notwithstanding that the same was issued without notice to them; and(5) in holding that it had no authority to issue the order of 2 December 1959 by not dispensing withthe reconstitution despite the confirmation by the Land Registration Commission of the existence ofthe Court of Appeals decision and the submission to the lower court of a certified copy of an allegedoriginal duplicate thereof kept in the Bureau of Lands. Appellants accordingly pray that the twoorders, respectively dated 23 August 1963 and 11 April 1964, be vacated; that the order of 2December 1959 be reinstated; and that the various petitions for review be dismissed.

We shall consider the foregoing assigned errors in the order thus presented.

(1) It is to be noted that the first error assigned does not refer to the orders of 23 August1963 and 11 April 1964, which concern the annulment of the order of 2 December 1959(directing the issuance of the decree) on the ground of non-reconstitution of the record of thecase and the Court of Appeals decision. This first assigned error (assailing the personality ofthe appellees to ask for a review of the decision and decree in the registration case) isactually directed at and earlier order dated 26 April 1961 denying appellants heirs' motion todismiss the petitions for review filed by the present appellees. And inasmuch as said order of26 April 1961 is interlocutory, 9 there being as yet no trail and decision on the merits of thepetitions for review, it is premature to raise said assigned error in appellants heirs' instant

appeal. We shall rule thereon only when the proper time comes, i.e., after the lower courtshall have settled not only the still unresolved status and rights of the parties, particularlythose of petitioners for review, now appellees herein, almost all of whom are claiming thatthey are not mere homestead or free patent applicants but patent or title holders, but alsowhether the original decision should be maintained or not. For the court below, afterreceiving the evidence and hearing the parties, may still conclude in favor of appellantsherein.

(2) Neither do we find merit in the other assignments of error, mainly questioning the act ofthe court below in revoking the previous order for the issuance of a decree of registration forthe reason that neither the records of the registration proceedings nor the decision of theCourt of Appeals in 1938 had been properly reconstituted conformably to the law (Act 3110).

The contention of appellants on this particular issue is that the provisions of Act 3110(establishing the procedure to be followed in reconstituting pending cases the records of which havebeen destroyed) do not apply to Land Registration Case 1117 (G.L.R.O. Record No. 48237)because when the records were destroyed the case was no longer pendingbut had been finallydecided by the pre-war, Court of Appeals in 1938. This position we find to be untenable, So, long asa decree of registration has not been issued, registration proceedings are still pendingfor thepurposes of the pre-Commonwealth Act 3110, and, when lost or destroyed, must be reconstituted inconformity with said act. This is apparent from the provisions of notion 9 thereof which reads:


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SEC. 9. Registration proceedings pending the issuance of decree shall bereconstituted by means of copies furnished by the Chief of the General Land RegistrationOffice. It shall be the duty of this officer, immediately upon receipt of the notice provided forin section one of this Act, to direct fully certified true copies of all destroyed registrationproceedings pending at the time of the destruction, and all decrees destroyed, to be sent tothe Clerk of Court of First Instance concerned.

The record on appeal, pages 11-19, makes it clear that when the records of the case weredestroyed no registration decree had as yet been issued, because appellants precisely asked thecourt below to order the issuance of a decree, annexing thereto an alleged copy of the decision. Theregistration proceeding concerned was, therefore, still, a pending one under section 9 of Act 3110,and should have been first reconstituted, as prescribed by that law. It does not appear that the copyof the decision in question (and upon which the revoked order was based) was a fully certified copyissued by the chief of the General Land Registration Office. The certification appended thereto(Record on Appeal, page 30) is to the effect that the same is "a true copy from a photostatic copyattached to the Record on (of) Civil Case No. 3726", issued by a deputy clerk of the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal, who did not even specify what said Civil Case was about. Hence, said copy cannot be deemed properly attested by an officer having legal custody of the record, and did not afford itproper basis for the order of 2 December 1959 to issue the corresponding decree. The court belowdid not, therefore, err in revoking said order on the basis that the pre-war decision of the Court of

Appeals was not properly reconstituted, particularly in view of its undisputed finding (in the appealedorder of 23 August 1963) that the copy attached to the petition for issuance of the decree merely"was a certified copy of another copy in the office of the Land Registration Commission, which in turnwas copied from a copy of the Bureau of Lands" (Record on Appeal, page 268).

Appellants argue that their attaching a copy of the Court of Appeals' pre-war decision wassubstantially a step to reconstitute the records of the case. This argument deserves scantconsideration, since there was no sufficient compliance with Act 3110, particularly section 2 thereof,providing for giving of notice of the destruction of the records to those persons who might beinterested, such notice to be published for four consecutive weeks "in the Official Gazette and in oneof the newspapers most widely read in the province"; nor with Section 3 of the same Act further

prescribing that upon receipt of the application for reconstitution the Clerk of Court "shall send noticeto all parties interested, or their counsel, of the day, hour and place when the Court may proceed tothe reconstitution". Strict compliance of notice requirements under statutes governing reconstitutionis the rule (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Moya, L-17913, 22 June 1965).

The records before us show that notice of the petition for approval of the amended plan forissuance of the corresponding decree was given only to the Director of Lands and to the Director ofForestry. This was plainly insufficient, since the law requires notice to "all other persons as might beinterested". There is no showing that notice of the motion was given to the petitioners-appellees,who are possessors of lands affected by the decree, or even to the persons whose lots were orderedexcluded by the decision of the Court of Appeals. That petitioners-appellees are merely applicantsfor homesteads or free patents, as contended by appellants, does not excuse the lack of notice tothem, considering the broad terms of sections 2 and 3 of the Reconstitution Act (No. 3110) requiringnotice "to allpersons as might be interested" through publication in the Official Gazette and in anewspaper widely read in the province.

The jurisprudence of this Court is to the effect that upon failure to reconstitute destroyedjudicial records within the period prescribed by law (which expired on 17 June 1963, pursuant toRepublic Act No. 3081) the parties are deemed to have waived the effects of the decision renderedin their favor and their only alternative is to file an action anew for the registration in their names ofthe long in question". 10Appellants not having applied in due time for proper reconstitution of their


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registration proceedings, the court below had no recourse but to set, aside the order for the issuanceof the decree.

As a last argument, appellants vigorously contend that the court below had jurisdiction todetermine the authenticity and reliability of the copy of the Court of Appeals decision submitted to it,and to act thereon; that having accepted said copy as authentic in its order of 2 December 1959, the

court could not backtrack and set aside that finding by its order of 23 August 1963, because thepreceding order by then had become final. This plea is unavailing against herein appellees, for thelatter had not been given notice of the petition, and were not heard on its merits. The order of 2December 1959 never acquired finality as to said appellant and the latter were free to contest thepropriety and correctness thereof. For the same reason, the court below was not, barred from re-examining its previous position and could legally reach the conclusion that the previous order, beingerroneous, should be set aside.lawphi1.nt

(3) Appellants in Case G.R. No. L-27347, Jose Villegas and Rizalina Santos Rivera, stressthat anyway the Office of the Land Registration Commissioner confirmed the existence of theoriginal decision of the pre-war Court of Appeals in a report to the lower court dated 10December 1959. Submitted after the issuance of the revoked order of 2 December 1959, thisreport can not dispense with the need of proper reconstitution, there being no showing thatnotice and opportunity was given to all the interested persons to make known their objectionsthereto.

(4) Anent the claim of appellants that the fraud averred in the petition for review is not thefraud contemplated in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, suffice it to say that the courtbelow provisionally ruled otherwise when it denied the motion to dismiss the petition forreview on 26 April 1961. Such resolution by a court having jurisdiction is not appealable, asalready observed in our discussion of the first assignment of error, hence, anypronouncement now on the merits of this claim of appellants would be altogether prematureand improper. For aught we know, the court below may find, after hearing on the merits, thatthe petition for review should be denied.

Nor is there any inconsistency between the resolutions setting aside the order of 2 December1959, directing the issuance of a decree of registration, and proceeding ahead with the petition forreview. It is a doctrine settled by previous decisions of this Supreme Court that a petition for reviewunder section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) may be filed any time after the rendition ofthe court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree ofregistration (Rivera vs. Moran, 48 Phil. 836, 839-840; Director of Lands vs. Aba et al., 68 Phil. 85,and cases cited therein).

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed orders of 24 August 1963 and 11April 1964, the same are hereby affirmed. As to the order of 26 April 1961, denying the motion todismiss the petition for review, the appeal therefrom is dismissed for being premature. Let therecords be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

Costs shall be paid in solidum by appellants in both cases G.R. Nos. L-27347 and L-24901.


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G.R. No. L-23609 March 31, 1966

THEODORE GRANT, JR., represented by the mother FRANCISCA CASTRO, guardian adli tem, petitioner-appellee,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, First Asst. Solicitor General E. Umali and Solicitor T.R. Dio, for appellant.Eladio P. Oleta, for appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J .:

Petitioner seeks to change his name from Patrick J. Bolan to Theodore Grant, Jr.

Francisca Castro gave birth to the petitioner on April 30, 1949 at the Bautista Hospital, Cavite City.According to her the father of petitioner is an American soldier by the name of Theodore Grant. SaidAmerican and Francisca Castro allegedly lived together prior to the conception of petitioner andcontinuously up to a few months before his birth. Theodore Grant then left for the United States andhis whereabouts is unknown to Francisca Castro.

Another American soldier, Sgt. Patrick Bolan, a friend of Francisca Castro was the one who broughther to the hospital when she was about to give birth to petitioner. It was he who talked with theattending physician. According to petitioner's mother, Sgt. Patrick Bolan must have furnished thedata appearing in petitioner's certificate of birth, naming petitioner Patrick J. Bolan and giving himselfas the father (Exh. B).

At that time, however, Francisca Castro believed that the nurse at the hospital had followed herinstructions to name the child if a boy Theodore Grant, Jr. Francisca Castro therefore called herson Theodore Grant, Jr., and gave him that name when he was baptized on May 21, 1950 (Exh. 87.)Petitioner has been using the name Theodore Grant, Jr., and is known as such name by hisplaymates, friends, teachers and classmates.

Francisca Castro subsequently discovered that her son was named Patrick J. Bolan in the record ofbirth, when she got a certificate of birth for him.

Petitioner, who resides with her mother in Pasay City, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal onMay 7, 1960 through his mother as guardian ad litem, a petition for change of name. 1wph1.t

After publication and hearing - the Republic of the Philippines opposing the petition, filing a motion todismiss, which was denied - the aforesaid court rendered judgment on July 26, 1961 granting thepetition.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. Said Court, on September 30, 1964, certified theappeal to us as involving questions purely of law.


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The principal question raised is whether proper and reasonable cause exists, under the afore-statedfacts, for the desired change of name.

Petitioner, is clearly prompted to change his name from Patrick J. Bolan to Theodore Grant, Jr., notonly by the inconvenience that his real name may bring him but also by his desire to carry and usethe surname of his supposed or putative

father Theodore Grant as his natural child. As the record shows, the principal evidencesubmitted by petitioner during the trial is his mother's testimony that he was born sans wedlock aftershe and Theodore Grant lived together as common law husband and wife; that petitioner's father isTheodore Grant; that for this reason she has always called him Theodore Grant, Jr. Such is thebasis of the petition, so much so that it asked for amendment of petitioner's record of birth byentering Theodore Grant, Jr. as his true name and Theodore Grant in lieu of Patrick Bolan ashis true father (Record on Appeal, p. 4).

For a natural child to use the surname of his father, however, he should be acknowledged by bothparents (Arts. 282, 366, New Civil Code). And there is here admittedly no evidence of recognition byTheodore Grant of the petitioner as his child. Since petitioner is not allowed under the law to use thesurname of his supposed or putative father, he should not be allowed to do so by way of change ofname. Said this Court to such effect in Manuel v. Republic, L-15811, March 21, 1961:

It may be observed from the petition quoted above that the plea for change of name, fromJuan Manuel to Juan M. Eaton, is prompted not only by the inconveniences his presentname brings to petitioner but also by his desire to carry and use the surname of his putativefather. Actually, therefore, the granting of the petition would not only result in the change ofthe name by which he is customarily known, but would also give judicial sanction to the useby petitioner who, admittedly, was born out of wedlock to Maria Arachea Manuel and oneJohn Eaton, of his alleged father's surname.

Under the Civil Code, a natural child may use the father's surname if he is acknowledged byboth parents. Should he be recognized by only one of the parents, the natural child shallemploy the surname of such recognizing parent. (Art. 366; also Art. 282). There is no

evidence on record that petitioner Juan Manuel was duly recognized by the alleged father.The petition, therefore, for change of his name from Juan Manuel to Juan M. Eaton, shouldhave been denied by the trial court.

It is true that the question of paternity issue in the instant case, and there may really be some for achange of his name, yet petitioner should not be allowed to use a surname which otherwise he is notpermitted to employ under the law.

As pointed out in Lerma Garcia v. Republic, L-16085, November 29, 1961, petitioner's remedy is nota petition for change of name but should there be evidence to support it an action forrecognition.

Petitioner would however urge on appeal that even solely on consideration of the inconvenience hispresent name would cause him, without regard to the question as to who is his father, he should beallowed to change his name. The point, however, is that the name he seeks in his petition isTheodore Grant, Jr. From such a name the question as to who is his father cannot be disengaged.For needless to say the word "Jr." is used by a son who bears the same name as his father. 1

And, finally, the fact alone that petitioner has been using a different name and has become known byit, does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name (Ong Tevs. Republic, L-15549, June 30, 1962).


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Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the petition for change of namedenied. Without costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRYIN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, tobe amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by hismother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners,vs.CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.MOLO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA,J.:

I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.

Revelation3:5

On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his motherAnna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/orcorrection/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner soughtto drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang toJulian Lin Wang.

The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the RegionalTrial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.

The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wangand Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequentlygot married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that thechilds name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they willlet him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore.Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a perso nsname, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his


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current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be askingwhether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny inSingapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce itas "L." It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to bechanged to Julian Lin Wang.1

On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.2

The trial court found that thereason given for the change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may bediscriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall within thegrounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for theconvenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot bechanged to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimatechildren have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reasonwhy this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trialcourt added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether hewill change his name by dropping his middle name.3

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a resolution dated20 May 2004.4The trial court maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middlename does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends tostudy there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to orapplication of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change ofname would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not sufficeto grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.5

Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)6arguing that the trial courthas decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or notdropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 1747of the Family Code. Petitionercontends that "[W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court torule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, forconsistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the "best interest of the child."8It

is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will notprejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan" will cause himundue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his socialacceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error forthe trial court to have denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the age of majorityfor him to decide the name to use, contrary to previous cases9decided by this Court that allowed aminor to petition for change of name.10

The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition. The OSGfiled itsComment11positing that the trial court correctly denied the petition for change of name. TheOSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear thesurnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient ofdropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middlename "Carulasan" is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient tosupport a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry.12The OSG also adds that thepetitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of themiddle name, for that matter. Petitioners allegation that the continued use of the middle name mayresult in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates itsargument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the childs middle name could only triggermuch deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian hasa sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the surname of their father,
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Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also notbeen shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law.13

We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.

The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne

by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege andnot a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in hiscertificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compellingreason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.14

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause forwhich the change is sought.15To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not onlysome proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his trueand official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) whenthe name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the changeresults as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was

unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of formeralienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causesembarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulentpurpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.16

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause isleft to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to thecourt and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance ordisallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the

justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grantand with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.17

The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek to

change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middlename altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usuallydeal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests forchange of the given name18and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name.Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer inthe negative.

A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this point. We quote, thus:

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known andcalled in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combinationof words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or

appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speakingof or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons;they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it hasfrequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name isimmaterial.

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the surnameor family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism,to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the family
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to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selectedby the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect theindividual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can bewithout a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be

changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man,and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It isimprescriptible.19

This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middlenames have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage orfiliation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same givenname and surname as he has.

Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally usethe surname of the father.20The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnamesof the father and the mother,21while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother,

unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname .

22

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only agiven name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of theunrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child islegitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a publicdocument or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middlename and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or anacknowledged illegitimate child.

Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that themiddle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated andrecognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.

Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would helphim to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support, hecites Oshita v. Republic23andCalderon v. Republic,24which, however, are not apropos both.

In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena Bartolome, and aJapanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to

Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the following considerations: she hadelected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who had alsoelected Philippine citizenship have been using their mothers surname; she was embarrassed tobear a Japanese surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War;and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it

will prejudice public interest.

In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate minor childacting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her name to GertudesJosefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothershusband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted where todo is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into consideration the opportunityprovided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if shecontinued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates
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that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long asdoing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.

Petitioner citesAlfon v. Republic,25in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family Code gives thelegitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the mother, it is not mandatory suchthat the child could use only one family name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the

petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to changeher name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local CivilRegistry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her school recordsand in her voters registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court overturned thedenial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, shouldprincipally use the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use thesurname of herm other to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample

justification to grant her petition,i.e., to avoid confusion.

Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards set inthe cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to saythe least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.

The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all analogous to thecase at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases ofOshita andAlfon, where thepetitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name. Being of age, theyare considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of theirdecision to change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for thegrant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable orcompelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinoshad during that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the fact oftherein petitioners election of Philippine citizenship. InAlfon, the Court granted the petition since thepetitioner had been known since childhood by a name different from her registered name and shehad not used her registered name in her school records and voters registration records; thus,denying the petition would only result to confusion.

Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in behalf ofher illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that he does not haveto reach the age of majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon thatthe Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the bestinterests of the minor petitioner therein.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name isconvenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporeansociety easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle namewould cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it fromhis registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition forchange of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment anddiscretion when he reaches the age of majority.26As he is of tender age, he may not yet understandand appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may justprejudice him in his rights under our laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorariis DENIED.
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SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97906 May 21, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner seeks to set aside the judgment of respondent Court ofAppeals 1 in affirmance of the decision of the court a quo 2 granting the petition filed by herein privaterespondent Maximo Wong for the change of his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. which was his nameprior to his adoption by Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong.

The facts are undisputed. Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala,Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo

Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the consent oftheir natural parents 3 and by order of the court in Special Case No. 593 4 issued on September 9,1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a highschool teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen years ofmarriage. The couples showered their adopted children with parental love and reared them as theirown children.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and a juniorEngineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name toMaximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him

from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact heis a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implicationwhatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thushampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire torevert to his former surname.

As earlier stated, on July 2, 1986, the matter was resolved in favor of private respondent, the trialcourt decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with, petitioner'sprayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted. 5 On appeal to


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respondent court, and over the opposition of petitioner Republic through the Solicitor General, thedecision of the court below was affirmed in full, hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The lone issue to be settled is whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petitionfor change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.

The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation fromfamily and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for chan

Documents

Spec Pro Sep 5