Spatially Layered Defenses Against Terrorism FY 2015 ...create.usc.edu/.../files/projects/sow/890/vonwinterfeldtcreate-fy15annualreport150930.pdfVon Winterfeldt, Spatially Layered

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Spatially Layered Defenses Against Terrorism

FY 2015 Annual Report

Detlof von Winterfeldt

University of Southern California

[email protected]

Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................. 1 2. Research and Research Transition Accomplishments .......................................................................................... 2 2.1 Research Results ...................................................................................................................................................... 2 2.1.1 Modeling Layered Defenses ................................................................................................................................. 2 2.1.2 SOCCENT Request .............................................................................................................................................. 5 2.2 Research Transition ................................................................................................................................................. 7 2.3. Publications, Reports and Presentations ........................................................................................................... 7 2.4. Models, Databases, Software Tools, Invention Disclosure and Patents ........................................................... 9 3. Education Program ............................................................................................................................................. 10 4. Outreach Programs ............................................................................................................................................. 10

1. Executive Summary

Year 11 (FY2015) was the second year of a project on spatially layered defenses against terrorist.

The purpose of this research is to provide guidance to DHS policy makers on how to improve

layered defenses. The research was originally motivated by the PI’s involvement in a National

Academy study on evaluating the effectiveness of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

(GNDA), a major effort of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Organization (DNDO). The GNDA

employs a geographically layered defense strategy to prevent the theft and transportation of

radiological and nuclear materials from a foreign source to a target in the US. The GNDA

concept of a layered defense is similar to the concept of “defense in depth” promoted by the

Nuclear Regulatory Agency for nuclear power plant safety. Layered defenses occur in several

DHS contexts, for example, in approaches to catching smugglers (in the foreign country, upon

crossing the border, in the US) or in bioterrorism (stopping the production of biological

materials, preventing the importation in the US, stopping the distribution and spread of the

disease after a biological attack). Modeling layered defense systems involves an extension of

traditional probabilistic risk analysis methods (PRA, exemplified by BTRA and RNTRA) as well

as innovations in risk analysis for networks (exemplied, for example, by PEM, DNDO’s

Probabilistic Effectiveness Model). We will developed these advanced risk analysis models, first

for the general case of layered defenses, and then apply them to assessing the effectiveness of

features of the GNDA.

During the first year of this project we reviewed the existing models for layered defenses used by

the DNDO, in particular, the Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Risk Analysis model

(RNTRA) and the Probabilistic Effectiveness Model (PEM). Some of the results of this review

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are described in a National Academy of Science report “Evaluating the performance measures

and metrics for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture,” parts of which were drafted by the

PI. Relevant to the current projects, we discussed strengths and weaknesses of the two models in

the report and we argued for a more integrated modeling solution – which is the core of the

current project. We also reviewed other literature on layered defenses and search and detection

games, for example by Bier and her colleagues and by Morton and we developed an annotated

bibliography of these models

Building on existing models, we designed an integrated model that combines a transportation

model (how to get nuclear materials from point A to point B) with a risk analysis model (how

likely is the interception of these materials at various points along the way). We have

superimposed a decision and resource allocation model over this baseline model to examine

optimal allocations of resources to maximize detections and increase deterrence of transporting

RN materials from their source to a target in the US.

In February 2015 we learned of an interesting concept that could change the global nuclear

detection architecture. It consists of placing radiological isotope identification devices (RIIDs)

on each container at the port of lading - long before it enters the United States. This would

increase the dwell time and thus improve detection and identification tremendously. Before

arrival at US points of entry, the RIIDs would automatically transmit information about any

radiological materials in the container, thus making the current system of portals unnecessary.

Since then, we have begun to shift our effort to evaluating this concept.

Another line of research opened up in early August of 2014, when CREATE received a request

from DHS to assist the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) of the U.S. Central

Command (USCENTCOM) to answer the following questions: 1) What are the objectives of the

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)? 2) Why is ISIS attractive to its followers? 3) What are the

scenarios for the future of ISIS? Since then we have spent a significant amount of unfunded time

to respond to this request. Based on a review of some 50 interviews with subject matter experts,

we developed several results, which are also reported here. They include an objectives hierarchy

for ISIS answering the first question; an objectives hierarchy for its followers answering the

second question; and an event tree answering the third question. The results have been published

in a White paper submitted to SOCCENT. A longer paper was recently submitted to a journal

for publication.

Keywords: Layered defenses, defense in depth, radiological and nuclear terrorism, Global

Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

2. Research and Research Transition Accomplishments

2.1 Research Results

2.1.1 Modeling Layered Defenses

In 2012 and 2013, the PI was a member of a committee by the National Academy of Science to

examine the question: How can we measure the performance of the Global Nuclear Defense

Architecture (GNDA, National Research Council, 2013). This committee was funded by the

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which is the lead agency for the GNDA. Part of


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this committee’s review consisted of developing a template for a new strategic plan for the

GNDA. Building on prior work for CREATE, the PI developed a notional example of the goals

and objectives for to be used in this effort (see Figure 1). In this context important objectives are

“To Detect RN Materials out of Regulatory Control,” to “Deter RN Attacks,” and to “Divert RN

Attacks.”

Figure 1: Goals and Objectives of the GNDA

The GNDA has a philosophy of layered defenses, as illustrated in Figure 2.

The committee concluded that it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the GNDA through data

and observations and recognized that models are needed for this assessment. The DNDO had

developed two models for this purpose: The Radiological/Nuclear Terrorism Risk Assessment

(RNTRA) and the Probabilistic Effectiveness Model (PEM). RNTRA is essentially an event tree

model, similar to those previously developed for biological risk assessment (BTRA) and for

chemical risk assessment (CTRA). PEM is a very different network transportation optimization

model. Using the perspective of the terrorist attacker, PEM analyses what transportation routes

are optimal for terrorists in order to avoid detection.

The starting point for this project was the recommendation by the NAS committee to develop an

integrated version of PEM and RNTRA.


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Figure 2: Multilayered Defenses of the GNDA

We reviewed existing models, including RNTRA and PEM, as well as network detection models

by Morton and his colleagues (Morton, 2005; Morton et al., 2007; Dimitrov et al, 2008) and

game theoretic models Haphuriwat et al., 2011).

Figure 3 illustrate the basic concept of an integrated risk and transportation model.

Figure 3: A Simple Network for RN Transportation

In this example network, like in any other transportation network, the attacker has a choice

between a land/sea rout and a land/air route to transport RN materials from a foreign source (say,

Ukraine) to a target in the US (say, New York City). At each node and along each arc, there is a

probability of detection, depending on the defender’s choice of placing detection equipment and

capabilities. The attacker wants to minimize the probability of detection (plus other costs


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associated with choosing a route); the defender wants to maximize the probability of detection

(plus keeping costs of detection in line).

We explored two mathematical formulations of this problem: A game theoretic formulation, in

which the defenders maximizes the minimum detection probability of the attacker; and a

decision theoretic formulation, in which the defender evaluates alternative improvements in

detection capabilities and attacker responds by changing his or her probability of choosing a

specific route. The first formulation is consistent with much of CREATE’s previous work on

game theory, including ARMOR and other efforts. The second formulation is consistent with

CREATE’s development of defender-attacker decision trees developed primarily by the PI and

his team. We are still working on examples and parametric comparisons of the two formulations

and plan to have a small workshop on this topic later this year.

In early 2015 we learned of a new concept for radiation detection that could change the whole

nature of the GNDA, is feasible and cost-effective. In this concept, a radioisotope identification

device (RIID) would be attached to each container destined for the United States and continually

obtain readings from possible radiological sources in the container. Because this would increase

the dwell time from seconds or minutes to hours and days, the accuracy of these readings would

greatly improve and would make it virtually impossible to miss any threat source. Prior to

arrival at the US point of entry, the devices would be remotely read and containers either cleared

or, in case of an identified threat, be denied entry. Use of RIIDs attached to all containers would

dramatically change the architecture of the GNDA, because portals and secondary inspections

would become unnecessary, saving Customs and Border Control hundreds of millions of dollars

per year.

This new concept has led us to shift our emphasis from the question of where to put traditional

detection devices along the route from origin to the target to the question of whether this new

concept of placing RIIDs on each container is feasible and cost effective. We have engaged with

Northrup Grumman to explore the technical feasibility. We also have done some preliminary

cost analysis on the current system of portals and container inspections. We estimate that the

current system costs about $500 million to $1 billion per year (for comparison, the CBP budget

is $12 billion/year). With 25 million containers entering the United States every year, attaching

a RIID to each container would therefore be cost-effective, if the total costs are between $200

and $400 per container per year.

We are currently exploring, if this is a feasible cost target. If the answer is positive, we will shift

our effort to examine the risk and benefits of further developing this concept into an R&D phase.

Northrop Grumman estimates the R&D costs at $40 million. We would use R&D risk analysis

methods to evaluate whether this investment is worthwhile.

2.1.2 SOCCENT Request

In early August of 2014 CREATE received a request from DHS to assist the Special Operations

Command Central (SOCCENT) of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) to answer the

following questions: 1) What are the objectives of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)? 2)

Why is ISIS attractive to its followers? 3) What are the scenarios for the future of ISIS?


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Because of the urgency of the request and the limited ability to set up a contract for this project

in the short time period (August-September) allocated for it, CREATE decided to participate in

this multi-institutional effort pro bono. A small CREATE team including Ali Abbas, Richard

John, Detlof von Winterfeldt, and Johannes Siebert conducted the following analyses in response

to the three SOCCENT questions:

1. Develop an objectives hierarchy for ISIS

a. Based on 53 interview transcripts with subject matter experts (von Winterfeldt)

b. Based on open sources, including speeches of ISIS leaders (Siebert)

2. Develop an objective hierarchy for ISIS Followers

a. Based on 53 interview transcripts with subject matter experts (von Winterfeldt)

b. Based on open sources, including speeches of ISIS leaders (Siebert)

Selected results are shown in Figures 4 an 5. We presented our final results to SOCCENT on

October 6-7, 2014 and submitted a chapter to a White Paper submitted to General Nagata, the

commander of SOCCENT. We also drafted a more extensive article, which has been submitted

to a refereed journal.

Figure 4: ISIS Objectives from All Sources


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Figure 5: Followers’ Objectives from All Sources

2.2 Research Transition

The assessments of the major GNDA models – PEM and RNTRA – by the National Academy

committee was summarized in an NAS report to the DNDO and briefed to the Director of the

DNDO and her staff. The research on layered defense models and on container affixed RIIDs is

new and has not yet entered a mature transition phase. The research on the objectives of the

leaders and followers of ISIL were briefed to the SOCCENT leadership and incorporated in a

major briefing to General Nagata.

2.3. Publications, Reports and Presentations

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Detlof von Winterfeldt - 2010-2015 only, for prior

publications, see CREATE library

1. Garcia, R. & von Winterfeldt, D. (2010). Defender-

attacker decision trees for terrorism risk management.

CREATE Report, Los Angeles: Center for Risk and

Economic Analysis of terrorism Events, USC.

RA x

2. Prager, F., Asay, G., & von Winterfeldt, D. (2011).

Exploring reductions in London Underground

passenger journeys following the July 2005 bombings.

Risk Analysis, Vol. 31, 5, pp. 773-786.

RA x x

3. Bakir, N.O. & von Winterfeldt, D. (2011). Is better RA x x


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nuclear weapons detection capability justified? Journal

of Homeland Security and Emergency Management,

Vol. 8, 1, pp. 1-18.

4. Ermoliev, Y. & von Winterfeldt, D. (2011) Risk,

security, and robust solutions. IIASA Interim Report,

No. IR-10-013. Laxenburg, Austria: International

Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.

RA x

5. Keeney, R.L. & von Winterfeldt, D. (2011). A value

model to evaluate homeland security decisions. Risk

Analysis, Vol. 39, 9, pp. 1470-1487.

RA x x

6. von Winterfeldt, D. (2013) Bridging the gap between

science and decision making. Proceedings of the

National Academy of Science, August, pp.1-7.

RM x

7. von Winterfeldt, D. (2013) Improving the policy

relevance of global systems analysis. European Journal

of Decision Processes, 1, pp. 59-76.

8. Montibeller, G. & von Winterfeldt, D. (2014).

Cognitive and motivational biases in decision and risk

analysis. Risk Analysis, in print.

9. Montibeller, G. & von Winterfeldt, D. (2014). Biases

and Debiasing in Mutlicriteria Decision Analysis.

Proceedings of the 38th Hawaiian International

Conference on System Science, Kauai, Hawaii.

10. Abbas, A., John, R., Siebert, J. & von Winterfeldt, D.

(2014) Objectives and Scenarios for ISIL. In D.

Cabayan et al. (eds). White Paper on ISIL. Submitted

to SOCCENT, November 2014.

11. Garcia, R. & von Winterfeldt, D. (2015) Defender-

Attacker decision tree analysis: An introduction and an

application. Submitted to Risk Analysis.

12. Siebert, J., von Winterfeldt, D., and John, R. (2015)

Identifying and structuring the objectives of ISIL and

its followers. Submitted to Decision Analysis

13. Ferretti, V., Guney, S., Montibeller, G., and von

Winterfeldt, D. (2015). Testing Best Practices to

Reduce the Overconfidence Bias in Multi-Criteria

Decision Analysis. Submitted to the 49th

Hawaiian

International Conference on Systems Science.

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CREATE SCHOLARLY/CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

Detlof von Winterfeldt - 2010-2015 only, for prior publications, see CREATE

library

1. Gilberto Montibeller and Detlof von Winterfeldt, Biases and Debiasing in Multicriteria

Decision Analysis. 38th

Hawaiian International Conference on Systems Science, Kauai, HI,

January 5-9, 2015.

2. Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive and Motivational Biases in Decision and Risk

Analysis. INFORMS Annual Conference, San Francisco, CA, November 9-12, 2015.

3. Detlof von Winterfeldt, Expert Elicitation. Conference on Integrated Climate Modeling

and Analysis, Snowmass, Colorado, August 31, 2014.

4. Detlof von Winterfeldt, Biases that matter for Decision and Risk Analysis. 37th

Hawaiian International Conference on Systems Science, Kona, Hawaii, January 8, 2014.

5. Detlof von Winterfeldt, Defender-Attacker Games and Decisions. INFORMS National

Conference, Phoenix, October 15, 2012.

6. Detlof von Winterfeldt, The Relevance of Scientific Information for Personal and Policy

Decisions., National Academies, Sackler Symposium, May 14, 2012.

7. Detlof von Winterfeldt, Risk Analysis and the Challenges of Extreme Events.

International Conference on Integrated Disaster Risk Management, Los Angeles,

California, July 16, 2011

8. Detlof von Winterfeldt, Systems and Risk Analysis for Food Protection and Security.

23rd Annual National Agricultural Biotechnology Council Conference, Bloomington, MN,

June 16, 2011.

9. Detlof von Winterfeldt. Terrorism Risks and Complex Adaptive Systems. Femtorisk

Workshop. International Institute fro Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, June

10, 2011.

10. Detlof von Winterfeldt, The Global Risk Landscape: Challenges of Extreme Events.

3rd International Disaster and Risk Conference, Global Risk Forum, Davos, Switzerland.

June 2, 2010.

2.4. Models, Databases, Software Tools, Invention Disclosure and Patents

The research on layered defenses has primarily relevance for designing detection systems and

locating detectors for the DNDO in the context of the GNDA. However, important lessons and

implications are directly applicable to the CBP as well. The new emphasis on RIIDs attached to

each container opens up a new avenue for transition – to support an R&D stream for a

commercial developer. We have been in discussion with Northrup Grumman leadership in this

regard.

The work for SOCCENT has obvious applied relevance. Fighting ISIS is the most important

national security issue of the current time and helping to understand ISIS and its followers as


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well as considering alternative futures for ISIS will help SOCCENT and the DoD improve their

plans for disabling ISIS.

3. Education Program

During FY 14 and 15 von Winterfeldt supervised four students: Beril Behruz, a Masters student

in Industrial and Systems Engineering; Toni Boadi, a Ph.D. student in Public Policy and a

recipient of a DHS scholarship; Ashley Endo, a recent Ph.D. student in the Public Policy

Program; Maryam Tabibzadeh, a Ph.D. student in Civil and Environmental Engineering, and

Blake Cignarella, a Ph.D. student in Industrial and Systems Engineering. With the exception of

Maryam Tabizadeh, all students were or are partially supported by CREATE

Education Initiatives #

# of students supported (funded by CREATE) 4

# of students involved (funded by CREATE + any other programs) 1

# of students graduated 0

# of student theses or dissertations 0

# of contacts with DHS, other Federal agencies, or State/Local (committees) 2

# of existing courses modified with new material 2

# of new courses developed 0

# of new certificate programs developed 0

# of new degree programs developed 0

CREATE PROJECT-FUNDED AND OTHER (VOLUNTEER/INTERN) STUDENTS

Last Name First Name

University School Department Degree Research Area CREATE Funded

Graduated

1. Behruz Beril USC Engineering Industrial & Systems Masters Security x x

2. Boadi Toni USC Public Policy

Public Policy PhD Security Policy x

3. Endo Ashley USC Public Policy

Public Policy PhD Disaster Management

x

4. Cignarella Blake USC Engineering Industrial and Systems PhD Border Patrol x

5. Tabibzadeh Mayryam USC Engineering Civil/Env. Engineering PhD Risk Analysis x

Von Winterfeldt modified two course to include additional homeland security and risk analysis

materials:

1. PPD 587 Risk Analysis, which will be taught in the spring of 2014 at the Price School for

Public Policy

2. ISE 562 Decision and Value Theory, taught in the spring of 2012 and 2013 at the Viterbi

School of Engineering

4. Outreach Programs


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Von Winterfeldt’s main outreach activity in 2013 and 2014 was his participation in the National

Academies’ Committee on Performance Metrics for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture,

which convened in 2012 and completed its work in September of 2013. von Winterfeldt also

was part of a sub-committee of 4 to brief the leadership of the DNDO, leaders of other US

agencies involved in the GNDA, and staffers in Congress on the results of the committee’s work.

Von Winterfeldt also responded to a request by DoD/DNDO to participate in a major study of

ISIL.

REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE

Requester Name and Agency/Institution Brief (2-3 sentence) Description of Assistance Provided

Dates / Time Period

From DHS:

DNDO Request to assess the performance metrics for the GNDA, NAS Committee 2013-2014

DNDO Request to develop methodologies for evaluating radiological detection devices

2013-present

From Other Federal, State and Local Governments:

DoD/SOCCENT

Request by SOCCENT (General Nagata) to assess the objectives of the leaders and followers of ISIL

July-November, 2014

5. Project Performance Metrics

Categories of Accomplishments –

Number of:

FY2015

(Year 11)

Student Enrollment in COE Programs: 55

Traditional undergraduate and graduate students attending classes 40

Students registered in on-line or other distance learning courses 15

Homeland security professionals attending courses 0

Project-Funded Students 4

Papers 5

Software Products Developed 2

New Courses Developed 0

New Certificates or Degree Programs Developed:

New Degree Programs

New Certificates


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New private or public licensees/partners using coursework licensed by the COE

Patent Applications

Patents Awarded

Requests for assistance or advice from DHS (# of different DHS contacts/projects/requests)

2

Requests for assistance or advice from Federal, State, Local Government 1

Follow-on funding from other sources $700,000

Presentations 4

Congressional Testimonies 0

Projects Completed 1

Follow-on Funding from Other Sources (Other than OUP)

FOLLOW-ON FUNDING FROM OTHER SOURCES (OTHER THAN OUP)

Funding Name and Agency/Institution

Project Title Amount Dates /

Fiscal Year

From DHS:

DNDO Decision Analysis Support for Experimental Design

$550,000 2013-1024

From Other Federal, State and Local Governments:

Battelle PNNL Methodologies for Evaluating Radiological Detection devices

$167,000 2014-2015

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Spatially Layered Defenses Against Terrorism FY 2015 ...create.usc.edu/.../files/projects/sow/890/vonwinterfeldtcreate-fy15annualreport150930.pdfVon Winterfeldt, Spatially Layered