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Soviet war in AfghanistanPart of the War in Afghanistan and the Cold War

Mujahideen fighters in the Kunar Province ofAfghanistan in 1987

Date December 24, 1979 – February 15,1989(9 years, 1 month, 3 weeks and 1 day)

Location Afghanistan

ResultMilitary stalemate

Geneva Accords of 1988Withdrawal of Soviet forcesfrom Afghanistan

Afghan Civil War continues[11]

Belligerents

Soviet Union

Democratic Republicof Afghanistan

Sunni Mujahideen:

Jamiat-e Islami[1]

Shura-eNazar

Gulbuddin

faction[1]

Maktab al-Khadamat

Khalis faction[1]

Ittehad i-Islami[1]

IRM[1]

Soviet war in AfghanistanFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Soviet war in Afghanistan lasted over nine yearsfrom December 1979 to February 1989. Part of theCold War, it was fought between Soviet-led Afghanforces against multi-national insurgent groups called theMujahideen, mostly composed of two alliances – thePeshawar Seven and the Tehran Eight. The PeshawarSeven insurgents received military training in neighboringPakistan and China,[8] as well as weapons and billions ofdollars from the United States, United Kingdom, SaudiArabia, and other countries.[2][3][4][8][26] The Shiagroups of the Tehran Eight alliance received supportfrom the Islamic Republic of Iran. Early in the rule of thePDPA government, the Maoist Afghanistan LiberationOrganization also played a significant role in opposition,but its major force was defeated by late 1979, prior tothe Soviet intervention. The decade-long war resulted inthe death of 850,000–1.5 million civilians[23][24] as wellas causing millions of Afghans to flee the country, mostlyto Pakistan and Iran.

In June 1975, militants from the Jamiat Islami partyattempted to overthrow the government. In 1978, theTaraki government initiated a series of reforms, includinga radical modernization of the traditional Islamic civilsociety.[27] Between April 1978 and the SovietIntervention of December 1979, thousands of prisoners,perhaps as many as 27,000, were executed. Large partsof the country went into open rebellion. The Afghangovernment, having secured a treaty in December 1978that allowed them to call on Soviet forces, repeatedlyrequested the introduction of troops in Afghanistan in thespring and summer of 1979. They requested Soviettroops to provide security and to assist in the fight againstthe mujahideen rebels. Foreign ministers from 34 Islamicnations adopted a resolution which condemned theSoviet intervention and demanded "the immediate, urgentand unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops" from theMuslim nation of Afghanistan.[28] The UN GeneralAssembly passed a resolution protesting the Sovietintervention in Afghanistan by a vote of 104–18.[29]

The initial Soviet deployment of the 40th Army inAfghanistan began on December 24, 1979, under Sovietleader Leonid Brezhnev.[30] The first phase began withthe Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and their first

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NLF[1]

NIFA[1]

Shia Mujahedeen:

Harakat i-Islami[1]

Afghan HezbollahNasr Party

(IVOA)[1]

COIRGAShura PartyIRMUOIFRaad Party

Small Maoist groups:

ALOSAMAAMFFF

Commanders and leaders Leonid Brezhnev Yuri Andropov Konstantin

Chernenko Mikhail Gorbachev Dmitriy Ustinov Sergei Sokolov Dmitriy Yazov Valentin Varennikov Igor Rodionov Boris Gromov Babrak Karmal Mohammad

Najibullah Abdul Rashid

Dostum Abdul Qadir

Dagarwal Shahnawaz Tanai Mohammed Rafie

Ahmad ShahMassoud

Abdul Haq Abdullah Azzam Ismail Khan Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar Jalaluddin HaqqaniMohammad Nabi Naqib Alikozai Abdul Rahim

Wardak Fazal Haq Mujahid Burhanuddin

Rabbani

Muhammad Asif MuhsiniAssef KandahariSayeed Ali BegeshtiMosbah Sade

Mulavi Dawood

battles with various opposition groups.[28] The wardeveloped into a new pattern: the Soviets occupied thecities and main axis of communication, while themujahideen, (which the Soviet Army soldiers called'Dushman,' meaning 'enemy')[31] divided into smallgroups, waged a guerrilla war. Almost 80 percent of thecountry escaped government control.[32] In 1985, thesize of the LCOSF (Limited Contingent of SovietForces) was increased to 108,800 and fighting increasedthroughout the country, making 1985 the bloodiest yearof the war. In the mid-1980s, the Afghan resistancemovement, assisted by the United States, Pakistan,Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Egypt,[9] thePeople's Republic of China and others, contributed toMoscow's high military costs and strained internationalrelations. Contingents of so-called Afghan Arabs, foreignfighters who wished to wage jihad against the atheistcommunists, were also present. Notable among themwas a young Saudi named Osama bin Laden, whoseArab group eventually evolved into al-Qaeda.[33][34][35]

By mid 1987 the Soviet Union announced it would startwithdrawing its forces. The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachevon the scene in 1985 and his 'new thinking' on foreignand domestic policy was probably the most importantfactor in the Soviets' decision to leave. The final troopwithdrawal started on May 15, 1988, and ended onFebruary 15, 1989. Due to the interminable nature of thewar, the conflict in Afghanistan has sometimes beenreferred to as the "Soviet Union's Vietnam War" or the"Bear Trap" by the Western media.[36][37][38]

Contents

1 Background1.1 Saur Revolution1.2 Factions inside the PDPA1.3 Soviet–Afghan relations1.4 Initiation of the insurgency

2 1979: Soviet deployment3 1979: Soviet intervention4 International positions on Soviet intervention5 December 1979 – February 1980:Occupation

Supported by

Supported by

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(AMFFF)

Strength

Soviet Forces:

115,000 at

peak[12]

Afghan Forces:

55,000[13]

Mujahideen:

200,000–250,000[14][15][16]

Casualties and losses

Soviet Forces:

14,453 killed (total)

9,500 killed in

combat[17]

4,000 died from

wounds[17]

1,000 died fromdisease and

accidents[17]

53,753 wounded[17]

265 missing[18]

451 aircraft (including333 helicopters)147 tanks1,314 IFV/APCs433 artillery guns andmortars11,369 cargo and fueltanker trucks

Afghan Forces:

18,000 killed[19]

Mujahideen: 75,000–90,000 killed, 75,000+wounded (tentativeestimate)[20]

Pakistan: 300+ killed1 F-16 fighter jet shotdown[21]

Iran:

2 AH-1J helis shot downunknown killed[22]

Civilians (Afghan):

850,000–1,500,000 killed[23][24] 5 million refugeesoutside of Afghanistan

2 million internally displaced personsAround 3 million Afghans wounded (mostly

civilians)[25] Civilians (Soviet):

6 March 1980 – April 1985: Soviet offensives6.1 1980s: Insurrection6.2 1986: Stinger Missile and perceivedimpact6.3 Stinger effect6.4 Endwar

7 April 1985 – January 1987: Exit strategy8 January 1987 – February 1989: Withdrawal9 Consequences of the war

9.1 International reaction9.1.1 Foreign involvement and aidto the mujahideen

9.2 Soviet personnel strengths andcasualties9.3 Destruction in Afghanistan9.4 Use of chemical weapons9.5 Refugees9.6 Civil war9.7 Ideological impact

10 Media and popular culture11 Perception in the former USSR

11.1 Memorials12 See also13 References14 Further reading15 External links

Background

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was formedafter the Saur Revolution on April 27, 1978. Thegovernment was one with a pro-poor, pro-farmer andsocialistic agenda. It had close relations with the SovietUnion. On December 5, 1978, a friendship treaty wassigned between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. OnJuly 3, 1979, United States President Jimmy Cartersigned the first directive for covert financial aid to theopponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.[39]

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Around 100 deadRussian military involvement in Afghanistan has a longhistory, going back to Tsarist expansions in the so-called"Great Game" between Russia and Britain. This began in the 19th century with such events as the PanjdehIncident, a military skirmish that occurred in 1885 when Russian forces seized Afghan territory south of theOxus River around an oasis at Panjdeh. This interest in the region continued on through the Soviet era, withbillions in economic and military aid sent to Afghanistan between 1955 and 1978.[40]

In February 1979 the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped by Setami Millimilitants and was later killed during an assault carried out by the Afghan police, assisted by Soviet advisers. Thedeath of the U.S. Ambassador led to a major degradation in Afghanistan–United States relations.[41]

In the Middle East drastic changes were taking place concurrent with the upheavals in Afghanistan caused bythe Saur Revolution. In February 1979, the Islamic Revolution ousted the American-backed Shah from Iran,making the U.S. lose one of its most powerful allies.[42] The United States then deployed twenty ships to thePersian Gulf and the Arabian Sea including two aircraft carriers, and there was a constant stream of threats ofwarfare between the US and Iran.[43] March 1979 marked the signing of the U.S.-backed peace agreementbetween Israel and Egypt. The Soviet leadership saw the agreement as a major advantage for the United States.One Soviet newspaper stated that Egypt and Israel were now "gendarmes of the Pentagon". The Soviets viewedthe treaty not only as a peace agreement between their erstwhile allies in Egypt and the U.S.-supported Israelisbut also as a military pact.[44] In addition, the U.S. sold more than 5,000 missiles to Saudi Arabia and alsosupplied the Royalist rebels in the North Yemen Civil War against the Nasserist government. Also, the SovietUnion's previously strong relations with Iraq had recently soured. In June 1978, Iraq began entering intofriendlier relations with the Western world and buying French and Italian-made weapons, though the vastmajority still came from the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies, and China.

Saur Revolution

King Mohammed Zahir Shah ascended to the throne and reigned from 1933 to 1973. Zahir's cousin,Mohammad Daoud Khan, served as Prime Minister from 1954 to 1963. The Marxist People's DemocraticParty of Afghanistan's (PDPA's) strength grew considerably in these years. In 1967, the PDPA split into tworival factions, the Khalq (Masses) faction headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and theParcham (Flag) faction led by Babrak Karmal.[45]

Former Prime Minister Daoud seized power in a military coup on July 17, 1973, after allegations of corruptionand poor economic conditions against the King's government. Daoud put an end to the monarchy, and his timein power was widely popular amongst the general populace but unpopular amongst PDPA supporters.

Intense opposition from factions of the PDPA was sparked by the repression imposed on them by Daoud'sregime and the death of a leading PDPA member, Mir Akbar Khyber.[46] The mysterious circumstances ofKhyber's death sparked massive anti-Daoud demonstrations in Kabul, which resulted in the arrest of severalprominent PDPA leaders.[47]

On April 27, 1978, the Afghan army, which had been sympathetic to the PDPA cause, overthrew and executedDaoud along with members of his family.[48] Nur Muhammad Taraki, Secretary General of the PDPA, becamePresident of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the newly established Democratic Republic ofAfghanistan.

Factions inside the PDPA

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Afghanistan Scout Association in1950s.

“ We believe it would bea fatal mistake tocommit ground troops.[...] If our troops wentin, the situation in yourcountry would notimprove. On the

After the revolution, Taraki assumed the Presidency, Prime Ministership and General Secretaryship of thePDPA. The government was divided along factional lines, with President Taraki and Deputy Prime MinisterHafizullah Amin of the Khalq faction against Parcham leaders such as Babrak Karmal and MohammadNajibullah. Within the PDPA, conflicts resulted in exiles, purges and executions of Parcham members.[49]

During its first 18 months of rule, the PDPA applied a Soviet-style program of modernizing reforms, many ofwhich were viewed by conservatives as opposing Islam.[50] Decrees setting forth changes in marriage customsand land reform were not received well by a population deeply immersed in tradition and Islam, particularly bythe powerful land owners who were harmed economically by the abolition of usury (though usury is prohibited inIslam) and the cancellation of farmers' debts. By mid-1978, a rebellion started with rebels attacking the localmilitary garrison in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan and soon civil war spread throughout the country.In September 1979, Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin seized power, arresting and killing PresidentTaraki. Over two months of instability overwhelmed Amin's regime as he moved against his opponents in thePDPA and the growing rebellion.

Soviet–Afghan relations

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had been a majorpower broker and influential mentor in Afghan politics, ranging from civil-military infrastructure to Afghan society.[51] In the 1980s, many Afghanswere proficient in the Russian language.[51] Since 1947, Afghanistan hadbeen under the influence of the Soviet government and received largeamounts of aid, economic assistance, military equipment training andmilitary hardware from the Soviet Union.

The economic assistance and aid had been provided to Afghanistan asearly as 1919, shortly after the Russian Revolution and when the regimewas facing the Russian Civil War. Provisions were given in the form of

small arms, ammunition, a few aircraft, and (according to debated Soviet sources) a million gold rubles tosupport the resistance during the Third Anglo-Afghan War. In 1942, the USSR again moved to strengthen theAfghan Armed Forces, by providing small arms and aircraft, and establishing training centers in Tashkent(Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic). Soviet-Afghan military cooperation began on a regular basis in 1956, andfurther agreements were made in the 1970s, which saw the USSR send advisers and specialists. The SovietUnion built an extensive amount of infrastructure, notably giving assistance building the Kabul University,Polytechnical institutes, hospitals, civilian infrastructure, power plants, and local schools. During the 1980s,Soviets established the universities in Blakhe, Herate, Takhar, Nangarhar and Fariyab provinces. Russian facultysoon joined the universities, teaching Afghan students in Russian language proficiency.

In 1978, after witnessing India's nuclear test, Smiling Buddha, President Daud Khan initiated a military buildupto counter Pakistan's armed forces and Iranian military influence in Afghan politics. A final pre-war treaty, signedin December 1978, allowed the PDPA to call upon the Soviet Union for military support.[52]

Following the Herat uprising, President Taraki contacted AlexeiKosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and asked for"practical and technical assistance with men and armament". Kosyginwas unfavorable to the proposal on the basis of the negative politicalrepercussions such an action would have for his country, and herejected all further attempts by Taraki to solicit Soviet military aid inAfghanistan.[54] Following Kosygin's rejection Taraki requested aidfrom Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Communist Party

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contrary, it would getworse. Our troopswould have to strugglenot only with anexternal aggressor, butwith a significant partof your own people.And the people wouldnever forgive suchthings"

”—Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the

USSR Council of Ministers, in responseto Taraki's request for Soviet presence in

Afghanistan[53]

Soviet infantry at the time ofdeployment.

of the Soviet Union and Soviet head of state, who warned Taraki thatfull Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies –both yours and ours". Brezhnev also advised Taraki to ease up on thedrastic social reforms and to seek broader support for his regime.[55]

In 1979, Taraki attended a conference of the Non-Aligned Movementin Havana, Cuba. On his way back, he stopped in Moscow on March20 and met with Brezhnev, foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and otherSoviet officials. It was rumoured that Karmal was present at themeeting in an attempt to reconcile Taraki's Khalq faction and theParcham against Amin and his followers. At the meeting, Taraki wassuccessful in negotiating some Soviet support, including theredeployment of two Soviet armed divisions at the Soviet-Afghanborder, the sending of 500 military and civilian advisers and specialistsand the immediate delivery of Soviet armed equipment sold at 25percent below the original price; however, the Soviets were notpleased about the developments in Afghanistan and Brezhnev impressed upon Taraki the need for party unity.Despite reaching this agreement with Taraki, the Soviets continued to be reluctant to intervene further inAfghanistan and repeatedly refused Soviet military intervention within Afghan borders during Taraki's rule aswell as later during Amin's short rule.[56]

Initiation of the insurgency

Afghanistan cemented regional problems with Pakistan, after Daoudpressed his hard-line Pashtunistan policies to Pakistan.[57] Pakistanretaliated, and Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto authorized a covertoperation under M.I.'s Major-General Naseerullah Babar.[57] In1974, Bhutto authorized another secret operation in Kabul where theISI and the AI extradited Burhanuddin Rabbani and GulbadinHekmatyar to Peshawar, amid fear that Rabbani and Hekmatyarmight be assassinated by Daoud.[57] According to Baber, Bhutto'soperation was an excellent idea and it had hard-hitting impact onDaoud and his government which forced Daoud to increase his desireto make peace with Bhutto.[57] Another part of this operation was totrain hard-line Jamiat-e Islami militants against the Daoud's secular government.[57] However, this operationwent into cold-storage after Bhutto was removed from power.[57]

In June 1975, militants from the Jamiat Islami party attempted to overthrow the government. They started theirrebellion in the Panjshir valley (a part of the greater Parwan province), in the present day Panjshir province,some 100 kilometers north of Kabul, and in a number of other provinces of the country. However, governmentforces easily defeated the insurgency and a sizable portion of the insurgents sought refuge in Pakistan where theyenjoyed the support of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government, which had been alarmed by Daoud's revival of thePashtunistan issue.[58]

In 1978, the Taraki government initiated a series of reforms, including a radical modernization of the traditionalIslamic civil and especially marriage law, aimed at "uprooting feudalism" in Afghan society.[27] The governmentbrooked no opposition to the reforms[49] and responded with violence to unrest. Between April 1978 and the

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Soviet forces after capturing someMujahideen.

40th Army headquarters, TajbegPalace, 1986.

Soviet soldiers conductingtraining.

Soviet Intervention of December 1979, thousands of prisoners, perhaps as many as 27,000, were executed atthe notorious[59] Pul-e-Charkhi prison, including many village mullahs and headmen.[60] Other members of thetraditional elite, the religious establishment and intelligentsia fled the country.[60]

Large parts of the countrywent into open rebellion. TheParcham Government claimedthat 11,000 were executedduring the Amin/Taraki periodin response to the revolts.[61]

The revolt began in Octoberamong the Nuristani tribes ofthe Kunar Valley in thenortheastern part of thecountry near the border withPakistan, and rapidly spread among the other ethnic groups. By thespring of 1979, 24 of the 28 provinces had suffered outbreaks ofviolence.[62][63] The rebellion began to take hold in the cities: in March1979 in Herat, rebels led by Ismail Khan revolted. Between 3,000 and5,000 people were killed and wounded during the Herat revolt. Some100 Soviet citizens and their families were killed.[64][65] In 1979, thecontentious law and order situation led to a serious diplomatic incidentinvolving United States, Soviet Union and Afghanistan when U.S.Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph "Spike" Dubs was kidnapped byfour militants belonging to radical communist faction, Settam-e-Melli (lit.National Oppression).[66] The National Operation demanded therelease of their communist leader Badruddin Bahes, which the Afghan

government denied holding and refused categorically to negotiate with the militants, in spite of the U.S.embassy's demands.[66] The U.S. increased pressure on the Afghan government and the Soviet Union forcefullydemanding for peaceful negotiations for the release of their ambassador.[67]

Dubs was held in Room 117 of the Kabul Hotel (now called Kabul Serena Hotel), the United States sent itsembassy and diplomatic staff at the Kabul Serena Hotel where the negotiation with the communist faction andthe U.S. was started.[66] During this time, the Afghan security forces, accompanied by the Russian advisersswarmed the hallway and surrounding rooftops, but negotiations stalled, leading to an intense exchange of crossfire, after Russian advisers ordered an assault.[67] Documents released from the Soviet KGB bureau archives byVasily Mitrokhin in the early 1990s clearly showed that the Afghan government clearly authorized the assaultand that the KGB adviser on scene, Sergei Batrukihn, may have recommended the assault, as well as theexecution of a kidnapper before U.S. experts could interrogate him.[68] All attempts failed, and U.S.Ambassador Adolph Dubs was caught between the cross fire leading to his death.[67] Afterwards the UnitedStates formally expressed to Soviet Union its disapproval of the assault by the security forces, putting morestress on U.S.-Soviet relations.[69]

Despite these drastic measures, by the end of 1980, out of the 80,000 soldiers strong Afghan Army, more thanhalf had either deserted or joined the rebels.[62]

1979: Soviet deployment

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The headquarters of the Soviet 40thArmy in Kabul, 1987. Before theSoviet intervention, the building wasTajbeg Palace, where Hafizullah Aminwas killed.

“ "We should tell Tarakiand Amin to changetheir tactics. They stillcontinue to executethose people whodisagree with them.They are killing nearlyall of the Parchamleaders, not only thehighest rank, but of themiddle rank, too." ”

—Kosygin speaking at a Politburosession.[70]

The Afghan government, having secured a treaty in December 1978that allowed them to call on Soviet forces, repeatedly requested theintroduction of troops in Afghanistan in the spring and summer of1979. They requested Soviet troops to provide security and to assistin the fight against the mujahideen rebels. On April 14, 1979, theAfghan government requested that the USSR send 15 to 20helicopters with their crews to Afghanistan, and on June 16, theSoviet government responded and sent a detachment of tanks,BMPs, and crews to guard the government in Kabul and to securethe Bagram and Shindand airfields. In response to this request, anairborne battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Lomakin,arrived at the Bagram Air Base on July 7. They arrived without theircombat gear, disguised as technical specialists. They were thepersonal bodyguards for President Taraki. The paratroopers weredirectly subordinate to the senior Soviet military advisor and did notinterfere in Afghan politics. Several leading politicians at the time such as Alexei Kosygin and Andrei Gromykowere against intervention.

After a month, the Afghan requests were no longer for individual crews and subunits, but for regiments andlarger units. In July, the Afghan government requested that two motorized rifle divisions be sent to Afghanistan.The following day, they requested an airborne division in addition to the earlier requests. They repeated theserequests and variants to these requests over the following months right up to December 1979. However, theSoviet government was in no hurry to grant them.

Based on information from the KGB, Soviet leaders felt that PrimeMinister Hafizullah Amin's actions had destabilized the situation inAfghanistan. Following his initial coup against and killing of PresidentTaraki, the KGB station in Kabul warned Moscow that Amin'sleadership would lead to "harsh repressions, and as a result, theactivation and consolidation of the opposition."[71]

The Soviets established a special commission on Afghanistan,comprising KGB chairman Yuri Andropov, Boris Ponomarev from theCentral Committee and Dmitriy Ustinov, the Minister of Defence. Inlate April 1978, the committee reported that Amin was purging hisopponents, including Soviet loyalists, that his loyalty to Moscow was inquestion and that he was seeking diplomatic links with Pakistan andpossibly the People's Republic of China (which at the time had poorrelations with the Soviet Union). Of specific concern were Amin'ssecret meetings with the U.S. chargé d'affaires, J. Bruce Amstutz,

which, while never amounting to any agreement between Amin and the United States, sowed suspicion in theKremlin.[72]

Information obtained by the KGB from its agents in Kabul provided the last arguments to eliminate Amin.Supposedly, two of Amin's guards killed the former president Nur Muhammad Taraki with a pillow, and Aminwas suspected to be a CIA agent. The latter, however, is still disputed: Amin repeatedly demonstrated officialfriendliness to the Soviet Union. Soviet General Vasily Zaplatin, a political advisor at that time, claimed that fourof President Taraki's ministers were responsible for the destabilization. However, Zaplatin failed to emphasizethis enough.[73]

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Soviet ground forces in actionwhile conducting an offensiveoperation against the Islamistresistance, the Mujahideen.

The Soviet intervention

Soviet paratroopers aboard a BMD-1 inKabul

Also during the 1970s, the Soviet Union reached the peak of its political influence in comparison to the U.S. asthe SALT I treaty was created to cooperate in matters of nuclear weapons and technology between the twonations. A second round of talks between Soviet premier Brezhnev and President Carter yielded the SALT IItreaty in June 1979. (The United States Senate failed to ratify the treaty). This process would eventuallyculminate and lead up to the buildup and intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 to preserve, stabilize andmilitarily intervene on behalf of the communist regime there.

1979: Soviet intervention

On October 31, 1979 Soviet informants to the Afghan Armed Forces who were under orders from the innercircle of advisors underSoviet premier Brezhnev,relayed information forthem to undergomaintenance cycles fortheir tanks and othercrucial equipment.Meanwhile,telecommunications linksto areas outside of Kabulwere severed, isolatingthe capital. With adeteriorating securitysituation, large numbers of Soviet Airborne Forces joined stationedground troops and began to land in Kabul on December 25.Simultaneously, Amin moved the offices of the president to the TajbegPalace, believing this location to be more secure from possible threats.According to Colonel General Tukharinov and Merimsky, Amin was fullyinformed of the military movements, having requested Soviet militaryassistance to northern Afghanistan on December 17.[74][75] His brotherand General Dmitry Chiangov met with the commander of the 40th Armybefore Soviet troops entered the country, to work out initial routes andlocations for Soviet troops.[74]

On December 27, 1979, 700 Soviet troops dressed in Afghan uniforms, including KGB and GRU specialforces officers from the Alpha Group and Zenith Group, occupied major governmental, military and mediabuildings in Kabul, including their primary target – the Tajbeg Presidential Palace.

That operation began at 19:00 hr., when the KGB-led SovietZenith Group destroyed Kabul's communications hub,paralyzing Afghan military command. At 19:15, the assault onTajbeg Palace began; as planned, president Hafizullah Amin waskilled. Simultaneously, other objectives were occupied (e.g., theMinistry of Interior at 19:15). The operation was fully completeby the morning of December 28, 1979.

The Soviet military command at Termez, Uzbek SSR,announced on Radio Kabul that Afghanistan had been liberatedfrom Amin's rule. According to the Soviet Politburo they werecomplying with the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation

and Good Neighborliness and Amin had been "executed by a tribunal for his crimes" by the Afghan

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Revolutionary Central Committee. That committee then elected as head of government former Deputy PrimeMinister Babrak Karmal, who had been demoted to the relatively insignificant post of ambassador toCzechoslovakia following the Khalq takeover, and announced that it had requested Soviet militaryassistance.[76]

Soviet ground forces, under the command of Marshal Sergei Sokolov, entered Afghanistan from the north onDecember 27. In the morning, the 103rd Guards 'Vitebsk' Airborne Division landed at the airport at Bagramand the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was underway. The force that entered Afghanistan, inaddition to the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, was under command of the 40th Army and consisted of the108th and 5th Guards Motor Rifle Divisions, the 860th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment, the 56th SeparateAirborne Assault Brigade, the 36th Mixed Air Corps. Later on the 201st and 58th Motor Rifle Divisions alsoentered the country, along with other smaller units.[77] In all, the initial Soviet force was around 1,800 tanks,80,000 soldiers and 2,000 AFVs. In the second week alone, Soviet aircraft had made a total of 4,000 flightsinto Kabul.[78] With the arrival of the two later divisions, the total Soviet force rose to over 100,000 personnel.

International positions on Soviet intervention

Foreign ministers from 34 Islamic nations adopted a resolution which condemned the Soviet intervention anddemanded "the immediate, urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops" from the Muslim nation ofAfghanistan.[28] The UN General Assembly passed a resolution protesting the Soviet intervention in Afghanistanby a vote of 104–18.[29]

Weapons supplies were made available through numerous countries; the United States purchased all of Israel'scaptured Soviet weapons clandestinely, and then funnelled the weapons to the Mujahideen, while Egyptupgraded their own army's weapons, and sent the older weapons to the militants, Turkey sold their World WarII stockpiles to the warlords, and the British and Swiss provided Blowpipe missiles and Oerlikon anti-aircraftguns respectively, after they were found to be poor models for their own forces.[26] China provided the mostrelevant weapons, likely due to their own experience with guerrilla warfare, and kept meticulous record of all theshipments.[26]

December 1979 – February 1980: Occupation

The first phase began with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and their first battles with various oppositiongroups.[28] Soviet troops entered Afghanistan along two ground routes and one air corridor, quickly takingcontrol of the major urban centers, military bases and strategic installations. However, the presence of Soviettroops did not have the desired effect of pacifying the country. On the contrary, it exacerbated a nationalisticfeeling, causing the rebellion to spread further.[79] Babrak Karmal, Afghanistan's new president, charged theSoviets with causing an increase in the unrest, and demanded that the 40th Army step in and quell the rebellion,as his own army had proved untrustworthy.[80] Thus, Soviet troops found themselves drawn into fighting againsturban uprisings, tribal armies (called lashkar), and sometimes against mutinying Afghan Army units. Theseforces mostly fought in the open, and Soviet airpower and artillery made short work of them.[81]

March 1980 – April 1985: Soviet offensives

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A mujahideen fighter in Kunar uses acommunications receiver.

Mujahideen with two capturedartillery field guns in Jaji, 1984.

The war now developed into a new pattern: the Soviets occupied the cities and main axis of communication,while the mujahideen, (which the Soviet Army soldiers called 'Dushman,' meaning 'enemy')[31] divided into smallgroups, waged a guerrilla war. Almost 80 percent of the countryescaped government control.[32] Soviet troops were deployed instrategic areas in the northeast, especially along the road from Termezto Kabul. In the west, a strong Soviet presence was maintained tocounter Iranian influence. Incidentally, special Soviet units would havealso performed secret attacks on Iranian territory to destroysuspected mujahideen bases, and their helicopters then got engaged inshootings with Iranian jets.[82] Conversely, some regions such asNuristan, in the northeast, and Hazarajat, in the central mountains ofAfghanistan, were virtually untouched by the fighting, and lived inalmost complete independence.

Periodically the Soviet Armyundertook multi-divisionaloffensives into mujahideen-controlled areas. Between 1980 and 1985,nine offensives were launched into the strategically important PanjshirValley, but government control of the area did not improve.[83] Heavyfighting also occurred in the provinces neighbouring Pakistan, where citiesand government outposts were constantly under siege by the mujahideen.Massive Soviet operations would regularly break these sieges, but themujahideen would return as soon as the Soviets left.[36] In the west andsouth, fighting was more sporadic, except in the cities of Herat and

Kandahar, that were always partly controlled by the resistance.[84]

The Soviets did not, at first, foresee taking on such an active role in fighting the rebels and attempted to playdown their role there as giving light assistance to the Afghan army. However, the arrival of the Soviets had theopposite effect as it incensed instead of pacified the people, causing the mujahideen to gain in strength andnumbers.[85] Originally the Soviets thought that their forces would strengthen the backbone of the Afghan armyand provide assistance by securing major cities, lines of communication and transportation.[86] The Afghan armyforces had a high desertion rate and were loath to fight, especially since the Soviet forces pushed them intoinfantry roles while they manned the armored vehicles and artillery. The main reason though that the Afghansoldiers were so ineffective was their lack of morale as many of them were not truly loyal to the communistgovernment but simply collecting a paycheck. Once it became apparent that the Soviets would have to get theirhands dirty, they followed three main strategies aimed at quelling the uprising.[87] Intimidation was the firststrategy, in which the Soviets would use airborne attacks as well as armored ground attacks to destroy villages,livestock and crops in trouble areas. The Soviets would bomb villages that were near sites of guerrilla attacks onSoviet convoys or known to support resistance groups. Local peoples were forced to either flee their homes ordie as daily Soviet attacks made it impossible to live in these areas. By forcing the people of Afghanistan to fleetheir homes, the Soviets hoped to deprive the guerillas of resources and safe havens. The second strategyconsisted of subversion which entailed sending spies to join resistance groups and report information as well asbribing local tribes or guerrilla leaders into ceasing operations. Finally, the Soviets used military forays intocontested territories in an effort to root out the guerillas and limit their options. Classic search and destroyoperations were implemented using Mil Mi-24 helicopter gunships that would provide cover for ground forces inarmored vehicles. Once the villages were occupied by Soviet forces, inhabitants who remained were frequentlyinterrogated and tortured for information or killed.[88]

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The Afghan village left in ruinsafter being destroyed by Sovietforces.

A Soviet Spetsnaz (special operations) group prepares for amission in Afghanistan, 1988.

To complement their brute force approach to weeding out the insurgency, the Soviets used KHAD (Afghansecret police) to gather intelligence, infiltrate the mujahideen, spread falseinformation, bribe tribal militias into fighting and organize a governmentmilitia. While it is impossible to know exactly how successful the KHADwas in infiltrating mujahideen groups, it is thought that they succeeded inpenetrating a good many resistance groups based in Afghanistan,Pakistan and Iran.[89] KHAD is thought to have had particular success inigniting internal rivalries and political divisions amongst the resistancegroups, rendering some of them completely useless because ofinfighting.[90] The KHAD had some success in securing tribal loyalties butmany of these relationships were fickle and temporary. Often KHADsecured neutrality agreements rather than committed politicalalignment.[91] The Sarandoy, a KHAD controlled government militia, hadmixed success in the war. Large salaries and proper weapons attracted a good number of recruits to the cause,even if they were not necessarily "pro-communist". The problem was that many of the recruits they attractedwere in fact mujahideen who would join up to procure arms, ammunition and money while also gatheringinformation about forthcoming military operations.[90]

In 1985, the size of the LCOSF (Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces) was increased to 108,800 and fightingincreased throughout the country, making 1985 the bloodiest year of the war. However, despite sufferingheavily, the mujahideen were able to remain in the field, mostly because they received thousands of newvolunteers daily, and continue resisting the Soviets.

1980s: Insurrection

In the mid-1980s, the Afghan resistancemovement, assisted by the United States,Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the UnitedKingdom, Egypt,[9] the People's Republicof China and others, contributed toMoscow's high military costs and strainedinternational relations. The U.S. viewed theconflict in Afghanistan as an integral ColdWar struggle, and the CIA providedassistance to anti-Soviet forces through thePakistani intelligence services, in a programcalled Operation Cyclone.[92]

A similar movement occurred in otherMuslim countries, bringing contingents of so-called Afghan Arabs, foreign fighters who wished to wage jihadagainst the atheist communists. Notable among them was a young Saudi named Osama bin Laden, whose Arabgroup eventually evolved into al-Qaeda.[33][34][35]

In the course of the guerrilla war, leadership came to be distinctively associated with the title of "commander". Itapplied to independent leaders, eschewing identification with elaborate military bureaucracy associated withsuch ranks as general. As the war produced leaders of reputation, "commander" was conferred on leaders offighting units of all sizes, signifying pride in independence, self-sufficiency, and distinct ties to local communities.The title epitomized Afghan pride in their struggle against a powerful foe. Segmentation of power and religiousleadership were the two values evoked by nomenclature generated in the war. Neither had been favored in theideology of the former Afghan state.

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Afghanistan's resistance movement was born in chaos, spread and triumphed chaotically, and did not find a wayto govern differently. Virtually all of its war was waged locally by regional warlords. As warfare became moresophisticated, outside support and regional coordination grew. Even so, the basic units of mujahideenorganization and action continued to reflect the highly segmented nature of Afghan society.[93]

Olivier Roy estimates that after four years of war, there were at least 4,000 bases from which mujahideen unitsoperated. Most of these were affiliated with the seven expatriate parties headquartered in Pakistan, whichserved as sources of supply and varying degrees of supervision. Significant commanders typically led 300 ormore men, controlled several bases and dominated a district or a sub-division of a province. Hierarchies oforganization above the bases were attempted. Their operations varied greatly in scope, the most ambitious beingachieved by Ahmad Shah Massoud of the Panjshir valley north of Kabul. He led at least 10,000 trainedtroopers at the end of the Soviet war and had expanded his political control of Tajik-dominated areas toAfghanistan's northeastern provinces under the Supervisory Council of the North.[93]

Roy also describes regional, ethnic and sectarian variations in mujahideen organization. In the Pashtun areas ofthe east, south and southwest, tribal structure, with its many rival sub-divisions, provided the basis for militaryorganization and leadership. Mobilization could be readily linked to traditional fighting allegiances of the triballashkar (fighting force). In favorable circumstances such formations could quickly reach more than 10,000, ashappened when large Soviet assaults were launched in the eastern provinces, or when the mujahideen besiegedtowns, such as Khost in Paktia province in July 1983.[94] But in campaigns of the latter type the traditionalexplosions of manpower—customarily common immediately after the completion of harvest—proved obsoletewhen confronted by well dug-in defenders with modern weapons. Lashkar durability was notoriously short; fewsieges succeeded.[93]

Mujahideen mobilization in non-Pashtun regions faced very different obstacles. Prior to the intervention, fewnon-Pashtuns possessed firearms. Early in the war they were most readily available from army troops orgendarmerie who defected or were ambushed. The international arms market and foreign military supporttended to reach the minority areas last. In the northern regions, little military tradition had survived upon which tobuild an armed resistance. Mobilization mostly came from political leadership closely tied to Islam. Royconvincingly contrasts the social leadership of religious figures in the Persian- and Turkic-speaking regions ofAfghanistan with that of the Pashtuns. Lacking a strong political representation in a state dominated by Pashtuns,minority communities commonly looked to pious learned or charismatically revered pirs (saints) for leadership.Extensive Sufi and maraboutic networks were spread through the minority communities, readily available asfoundations for leadership, organization, communication and indoctrination. These networks also provided forpolitical mobilization, which led to some of the most effective of the resistance operations during the war.[93]

The mujahideen favoured sabotage operations. The more common types of sabotage included damaging powerlines, knocking out pipelines and radio stations, blowing up government office buildings, air terminals, hotels,cinemas, and so on. In the border region with Pakistan, the mujahideen would often launch 800 rockets per day.Between April 1985 and January 1987, they carried out over 23,500 shelling attacks on government targets.The mujahideen surveyed firing positions that they normally located near villages within the range of Sovietartillery posts, putting the villagers in danger of death from Soviet retaliation. The mujahideen used land minesheavily. Often, they would enlist the services of the local inhabitants, even children.

They concentrated on both civilian and military targets, knocking out bridges, closing major roads, attackingconvoys, disrupting the electric power system and industrial production, and attacking police stations and Sovietmilitary installations and air bases. They assassinated government officials and PDPA members, and laid siege tosmall rural outposts. In March 1982, a bomb exploded at the Ministry of Education, damaging several buildings.In the same month, a widespread power failure darkened Kabul when a pylon on the transmission line from theNaghlu power station was blown up. In June 1982 a column of about 1,000 young communist party memberssent out to work in the Panjshir valley were ambushed within 30 km of Kabul, with heavy loss of life. On

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Mujahideen praying in Shultan Valley,1987.

The areas where the different mujahideenforces operated in 1985.

The image of Afghan fighters shoulderingFIM-92 Stinger missiles and shootingdown Soviet helicopters became an icon ofthe latter years of the War in Afghanistan.

September 4, 1985, insurgents shot down a domestic BakhtarAirlines plane as it took off from Kandahar airport, killing all 52people aboard.

Mujahideen groups used for assassination had three to five men ineach. After they received their mission to kill certain governmentofficials, they busied themselves with studying his pattern of life and itsdetails and then selecting the method of fulfilling their establishedmission. They practiced shooting at automobiles, shooting out ofautomobiles, laying mines in government accommodation or houses,using poison, and rigging explosive charges in transport.

In May 1985, the seven principal rebel organizations formed theSeven Party Mujahideen Alliance to coordinate their militaryoperations against the Soviet army. Late in 1985, the groupswere active in and around Kabul, unleashing rocket attacks andconducting operations against the communist government.

1986: Stinger Missile and perceived impact

Many Westernmilitary analystscredit theintroduction ofthe Stinger as theturning point inthe war but manyRussian military analysts tend to be dismissive of the impact tothe Stinger. With a kill ratio of about 70% and with over 350aircraft and helicopters downed in the last two years of the war,most directly attributed to the Stingers, the effect of the Stingerwas at least notable. In a 2011 article commemorating severalMujahideen fighters, the Wall Street Journal celebrated theStinger as "The Missile that Made History." [95] A ForeignPolicy article about the Stinger used in Afghanistan called it so

much a "game changer" in the Afghanistan war, that military analysts had coined the term "Stinger effect".[96]

In reality, the weapons' effectiveness even by western reports, were considerably less, closer to 40 percent, andeven as low as 20 percent. Also, during the first six, seven months, only about 20 STINGERS per month weresent to the war torn area, making a prolonged rate of more than one aircraft downed per day impossible, evenwith an improbable success rate of 100 percent.[97]

Stinger effect

According to American analysts, the introduction of the Stinger changed the battlefield and the Soviet aircraftturned from being the hunter to being the hunted. The SU 25 and Mi 24 were particularly vulnerable as theytended to fly low and thus remained for a long time within the range of a Stinger missile. After the Stinger wasintroduced to the war, the Mujahideen shot down on average more than one aircraft per day. The suddenlyescalating costs of aircraft losses became a major additional drain on the costs of the war and many analystsbelieve the unsustainable aircraft losses caused by the Stinger was the primary catalyst to cause the Soviet Union

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Awards ceremony for the 9th Company

Soviet soldier in Afghanistan, 1988.

to withdraw from the war. US Congressman Charlie Wilson who was instrumental in funding the Stingers for theMujahideen said that before the Stinger the Mujahideen never won a set piece battle with the Soviets but after itwas introduced, the Mujahideen never again lost one. Through most of the war, the Soviet air force was able tocontrol the skies and fly sorties at will. With the introduction of the Su-25 ground-attack jet and the Mi-24attack helicopter, the Soviets had aircraft that were impervious to Mujahideen attacks, as both aircraft werearmored to withstand even large calibre machine gun fire. This meant that whenever the Soviet army would finditself in trouble, all it needed was to call air support and either the SU 25 or Mi 24 would arrive shortly todisperse any marauding Mujahideen units. Through an increasing project of military assistance via the US CIAand partly funded by Saudi Arabia, the USA started to supply the Mujahideen with its man-portable anti-aircraftmissile system called the Stinger. The US supplied at least 250 launcher systems and at least 500 individualStinger missiles to the Mujahideen as well as the training needed to operate the system.

Endwar

By mid-1987 the Soviet Union announced it would start withdrawing its forces. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi wasselected as the head of the Interim Islamic State of Afghanistan, in an attempt to reassert its legitimacy againstthe Moscow-sponsored Kabul regime. Mojaddedi, as head of the Interim Afghan Government, met with thenVice President of the United States George H. W. Bush, achieving a critical diplomatic victory for the Afghanresistance. Defeat of the Kabul government was their solution for peace. This confidence, sharpened by theirdistrust of the United Nations, virtually guaranteed their refusal to accept a political compromise.

April 1985 – January 1987: Exit strategy

The first step of the Soviet Union's exit strategy was to transferthe burden of fighting the mujahideen to the Afghan armedforces, with the aim of preparing them to operate without Soviethelp. During this phase, the Soviet contingent was restricted tosupporting the DRA forces by providing artillery, air support andtechnical assistance, though some large-scale operations werestill carried out by Soviet troops.

Under Soviet guidance, the DRA armed forces were built up toan official strength of 302,000 in 1986. To minimize the risk of acoup d'état, they were divided into different branches, eachmodeled on its Soviet counterpart. The ministry of defenceforces numbered 132,000, the ministry of interior 70,000 andthe ministry of state security (KHAD) 80,000. However, thesewere theoretical figures: in reality each service was plagued withdesertions, the army alone suffering 32,000 per year.

The decision to engage primarily Afghan forces was taken by theSoviets, but was resented by the PDPA, who viewed thedeparture of their protectors without enthusiasm. In May 1987 aDRA force attacked well-entrenched mujahideen positions in the Arghandab District, but the mujahideen heldtheir ground, and the attackers suffered heavy casualties.[98] In the spring of 1986, an offensive into PaktiaProvince briefly occupied the mujahideen base at Zhawar only at the cost of heavy losses.[99] Meanwhile, themujahideen benefited from expanded foreign military support from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistanand other Muslim nations. The US tended to favor the Afghan resistance forces led by Ahmed Shah Massoud,and US support for Massoud's forces increased considerably during the Reagan administration in what USmilitary and intelligence forces called "Operation Cyclone". Primary advocates for supporting Massoud included

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Soviet T-62M main battle tank withdrawsfrom Afghanistan

two Heritage Foundation foreign policy analysts, Michael Johns and James A. Phillips, both of whomchampioned Massoud as the Afghan resistance leader most worthy of US support under the ReaganDoctrine.[100][101][102]

January 1987 – February 1989: Withdrawal

The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev on the scene in 1985 and his'new thinking' on foreign and domestic policy was probably themost important factor in the Soviets' decision to leave.Gorbachev was attempting to change the stagnant years ofBrezhnev and reform the Soviet Union's economy and imageacross the board with Glasnost and Perestroika. Gorbachev wasalso trying to ease cold war tensions by signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987 with the U.S. andwithdrawing the troops from Afghanistan whose presence hadgarnered so much international condemnation. Gorbachevregarded confrontation with China and resulting military build upson that border as one of Brezhnev's biggest mistakes. Beijinghad stipulated that a normalization of relations would have towait until Moscow withdrew its army from Afghanistan (among other things) and in 1989 the first Sino-Sovietsummit in 30 years took place.[103] At the same time, Gorbachev pressured his Cuban allies in Angola to scaledown activities and withdraw even though Soviet allies were faring somewhat better there.[104] The Soviets alsopulled many of their troops out of Mongolia in 1987 where they were also having a far easier time than inAfghanistan and restrained the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea to the point of an all out withdrawal in1988.[105] This mass withdrawal of Soviet forces from contested areas shows that the Soviet government'sdecision to leave Afghanistan was based on a general change over in Soviet foreign policy.

In the last phase, Soviet troops prepared and executed their withdrawal from Afghanistan. They limited offensiveoperations.

In September 1988, Soviet MiG-23 fighters shot down one Pakistani F-16 and two Iranian AH-1J Cobra, whointruded in Afghan airspace.[106]

The one exception was Operation Magistral, a successful sweep that cleared the road between Gardez andKhost. This operation did not have any lasting effect, but it allowed the Soviets to symbolically end theirpresence with a victory.[107]

The first half of the Soviet contingent was withdrawn from May 15 to August 16, 1988 and the second fromNovember 15 to February 15, 1989. In order to ensure a safe passage the Soviets had negotiated ceasefireswith local mujahideen commanders, so the withdrawal was generally executed peacefully,[108] except for theoperation "Typhoon".

General Yazov, the Defense Minister of Soviet Union, ordered the 40th Army to violate the agreement withAhmed Shah Masood, who commanded a large force in the Panjshir Valley, and attack his relaxed andexposed forces. The Soviet attack was initiated to protect Najibullah, who did not have a cease fire in effectwith Masood, and who rightly feared an offensive by Masood's forces after the Soviet withdrawal.[109] GeneralGromov, the 40th Army Commander, objected to the operation, but reluctantly obeyed the order. "Typhoon"began on January 23 and continued for three days. To minimize their own losses the Soviets abstained fromclose-range fight, instead they used long-range artillery, surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles.

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Soviet troops withdrawing fromAfghanistan in 1988

CGen of 40th Army, BorisGromov, announcing thewithdrawal of Soviet contingentforces.

A column of Soviet BTR armoredpersonnel carriers departing fromAfghanistan.

Numerous civilian casualties were reported. Masood had not threatened the withdrawal to this point, and didnot attack Soviet forces after they breached the agreement.[110] Overall, the Soviet attack represented a defeatfor Masood's forces, who lost 600 fighters killed and wounded.[109]

After the withdrawal of the Soviets the DRA forces were left fighting alone and had to abandon some provincialcapitals, and it was widely believed that they would not be able to resist the mujahideen for long. However, inthe spring of 1989 DRA forces inflicted a sharp defeat on the mujahideen at Jalalabad.

The government ofPresident Karmal, apuppet regime, waslargely ineffective. It wasweakened by divisionswithin the PDPA and theParcham faction, and theregime's efforts to expandits base of support provedfutile. Moscow came toregard Karmal as a failureand blamed him for theproblems. Years later,

when Karmal's inability to consolidate his government had become obvious, Mikhail Gorbachev, then GeneralSecretary of the Soviet Communist Party, said:

"The main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal ishoping to continue sitting in Kabul with our help".

In November 1986, Mohammad Najibullah, former chief of the Afghan secret police (KHAD), was electedpresident and a new constitution was adopted. He also introduced in 1987 a policy of "national reconciliation,"devised by experts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and later used in other regions of the world.Despite high expectations, the new policy neither made the Moscow-backed Kabul regime more popular, nordid it convince the insurgents to negotiate with the ruling government.

Informal negotiations for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had beenunderway since 1982. In 1988, the governments of Pakistan andAfghanistan, with the United States and Soviet Union serving asguarantors, signed an agreement settling the major differences betweenthem known as the Geneva Accords. The United Nations set up aspecial Mission to oversee the process. In this way, Najibullah hadstabilized his political position enough to begin matching Moscow'smoves toward withdrawal. On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviettroops from the country was announced. The withdrawal of Soviet forceswas planned out by Lt. Gen. Boris Gromov, who, at the time, was thecommander of the 40th Army.

Among other things the Geneva accords identified the US and Sovietnon-intervention in the internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan and a timetable for full Soviet withdrawal. Theagreement on withdrawal held, and on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet troops departed on schedule fromAfghanistan.

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“ Those hopelesslybrave warriors Iwalked with, and theirfamilies, who sufferedso much for faith andfreedom and who arestill not free, they weretruly the people ofGod. ”

— Journalist Rob Schultheis,1992.[111][112]

U.S. President Reagan supportively meeting withAfghan Mujahideen at the White House, to highlightSoviet atrocities in Afghanistan.

“ To watch thecourageous Afghanfreedom fighters battlemodern arsenals withsimple hand-heldweapons is aninspiration to thosewho love freedom. ”

— U.S. President Ronald Reagan, March21, 1983[117]

Consequences of the war

International reaction

Carter placed a trade embargo against the Soviet Union on shipmentsof commodities such as grain and weapons. The increased tensions, aswell as the anxiety in the West about tens of thousands of Soviettroops being in such proximity to oil-rich regions in the Persian Gulf,effectively brought about the end of détente.

The international diplomatic response was severe, ranging from sternwarnings to a US-led boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics inMoscow (in which Afghanistan competed). The intervention, alongwith other events, such as the Iranian revolution and the US hostagestand-off that accompanied it, the Iran–Iraq War, the 1982 LebanonWar, the escalating tensions between Pakistan and India, contributedto making the Middle East and South Asia extremely violent andturbulent regions during the 1980s. The Non-Aligned Movement wassharply divided between those who believed the Soviet deployment tobe legal and others who considered the deployment an illegal invasion. Among the Warsaw Pact countries, theintervention was condemned only by Romania.[113] India, a close ally of the Soviet Union, refused to supportthe Afghan war,[114] though by the end of the hostilities offered to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghangovernment.[115][116]

Foreign involvement and aid to the mujahideen

The AfghanMujahideenweresupportedby anumber ofothercountries,with theU.S. andSaudiArabiaoffering thegreatest financial support.[2][3][4][10][118] UnitedStates President Carter insisted that what he termed"Soviet aggression" could not be viewed as anisolated event of limited geographical importance but had to be contested as a potential threat to US influence inthe Persian Gulf region. The US was also worried about the USSR gaining access to the Indian Ocean bycoming to an arrangement with Pakistan.

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, known for his hardline policies on the Soviet Union, initiated in1979 a campaign supporting mujaheddin in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which was run by Pakistani securityservices with financial support from the Central Intelligence Agency and Britain's MI6.[3] Years later, in a 1997

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Three mujahideen in Asmar, 1985.

CNN/National Security Archive interview, Brzezinski detailed the strategy taken by the Carter administrationagainst the Soviets in 1979:

We immediately launched a twofold process when we heard that the Soviets had enteredAfghanistan. The first involved direct reactions and sanctions focused on the Soviet Union, andboth the State Department and the National Security Council prepared long lists of sanctions to beadopted, of steps to be taken to increase the international costs to the Soviet Union of theiractions. And the second course of action led to my going to Pakistan a month or so after theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan, for the purpose of coordinating with the Pakistanis a joint response,the purpose of which would be to make the Soviets bleed for as much and as long as is possible;and we engaged in that effort in a collaborative sense with the Saudis, the Egyptians, the British,the Chinese, and we started providing weapons to the Mujaheddin, from various sources again –for example, some Soviet arms from the Egyptians and the Chinese. We even got Soviet armsfrom the Czechoslovak communist government, since it was obviously susceptible to materialincentives; and at some point we started buying arms for the Mujaheddin from the Soviet army inAfghanistan, because that army was increasingly corrupt.[119]

The supplying of billions of dollars in arms to the Afghanmujahideen militants was one of the CIA's longest and mostexpensive covert operations.[120] The CIA provided assistanceto the fundamentalist insurgents through the Pakistani secretservices, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in a program calledOperation Cyclone. At least 3 billion in U.S. dollars werefunneled into the country to train and equip troops with weapons.Together with similar programs by Saudi Arabia, Britain's MI6and SAS, Egypt, Iran, and the People's Republic of China,[6] thearms included FIM-43 Redeye, shoulder-fired, antiaircraftweapons that they used against Soviet helicopters. Pakistan'ssecret service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was used as anintermediary for most of these activities to disguise the sources ofsupport for the resistance.

No Americans trained or had direct contact with the mujahideen.[121] The skittish CIA had fewer than 10operatives in the region because it "feared it would be blamed, like in Guatemala."[122] Civilian personnel fromthe U.S. Department of State and the CIA frequently visited the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area during thistime.

Shortly after the intervention, Pakistan's military ruler General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq called for a meeting ofsenior military members and technocrats of his military government.[123] At this meeting, General Zia-ul-Haqasked the Chief of Army Staff General Khalid Mahmud Arif and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffAdmiral Muhammad Shariff to lead a specialized civil-military team to formulate a geo-strategy to counter theSoviet aggression.[123] At this meeting, the Director-General of the ISI at that time, Lieutenant-General AkhtarAbdur Rahman advocated for an idea of covert operation in Afghanistan by arming the Islamic extremist, andwas loudly heard saying: "Kabul must burn! Kabul must burn!".[123] As for Pakistan, the Soviet war withIslamist mujaheddin was viewed as retaliation for the Soviet Union's long unconditional support of regional rival,India, notably during the 1965 and the 1971 wars, which led the loss of East Pakistan.[123]

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Spetsnaz troops interrogate a capturedmujahideen with Western weapons in thebackground, 1986

A German database showing thechanneling of the money andweapons, provided by ISI officerMohammad Yousaf in his book:Afghanistan – The Bear Trap:The Defeat of a Superpower

After the Soviet deployment, Pakistan's military ruler General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq started accepting financialaid from the Western powers to aid the mujahideen. In 1981, following the election of US President RonaldReagan, aid for the mujahideen through Zia's Pakistan significantly increased, mostly due to the efforts of TexasCongressman Charlie Wilson and CIA officer Gust Avrakotos.[124][125]

The early foundations of al-Qaeda were allegedly built in part onrelationships and weaponry that came from the billions of dollarsin U.S. support for the Afghan mujahideen during the war toexpel Soviet forces from that country.[126] However, scholarssuch as Jason Burke, Steve Coll, Peter Bergen, ChristopherAndrew, and Vasily Mitrokhin have argued that Osama BinLaden was "outside of CIA eyesight" and that there is "nosupport" in any "reliable source" for "the claim that the CIAfunded bin Laden or any of the other Arab volunteers who cameto support the mujahideen."[127]

Pakistan's ISI and SpecialService Group (SSG)were actively involved inthe conflict. The SSG are

widely suspected of participating in Operation Hill 3234, near thePakistani border where nearly 200 suspected SSG personnel were killedin a futile attempt to assault the Soviet held hill.

The theft of large sums of aid spurred Pakistan's economic growth, butalong with the war in general had devastating side effects for that country.The siphoning off of aid weapons, in which the weapons logistics andcoordination were put under the Pakistan Navy in the port city ofKarachi, contributed to disorder and violence there, while heroin enteringfrom Afghanistan to pay for arms contributed to addiction problems.[128]

The Navy went into covert war and coordinated the foreign weaponsinto Afghanistan, while some of its high-ranking admirals wereresponsible for storing the weapons in the Navy depot, later coordinatedthe weapons supply to mujahideen.

In retaliation for Pakistan's assistance to the insurgents, the KHADAfghan security service, under leader Mohammad Najibullah, carried out(according to the Mitrokhin Archives and other sources) a large numberof operations against Pakistan. In 1987, 127 incidents resulted in 234deaths in Pakistan. In April 1988, an ammunition depot outside the Pakistani capital of Islamabad was blown upkilling 100 and injuring more than 1000 people. The KHAD and KGB were suspected in the perpetration ofthese acts.[129] Soviet and Afghan fighters and bombers occasionally bombed Pakistani villages along thePakistani-Afghan border. These attacks are known to have caused at least 300 civilian deaths and extensivedamage. Sometimes they got involved in shootings with the Pakistani jets defending the airspace.[130]

Pakistan took in millions of Afghan refugees (mostly Pashtun) fleeing the Soviet occupation. Although therefugees were controlled within Pakistan's largest province, Balochistan under then-martial law ruler GeneralRahimuddin Khan, the influx of so many refugees – believed to be the largest refugee population in theworld[131] – spread into several other regions.

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Soviet soldiers return fromAfghanistan, October 1986

Afghans commemorating MujahideenVictory Day.

All of this had a heavy impact on Pakistan and its effects continue to this day. Pakistan, through its support forthe mujahideen, played a significant role in the eventual withdrawal of Soviet military personnel fromAfghanistan.

During the Sino-Soviet split, strained relations between China and Soviet Russia resulted in bloody borderclashes and mutual backing for the opponent's enemies. China and Afghanistan had neutral relations with eachother during the King's rule. When the pro Soviet Afghan Communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978,relations between China and the Afghan communists quickly turned hostile. The Afghan pro Soviet communistssupported China's enemies in Vietnam and blamed China for supporting Afghan anti communist militants. Chinaresponded to the Soviet war in Afghanistan by supporting the Afghan mujahideen and ramping up their militarypresence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang. China acquired military equipment from America to defend itself fromSoviet attack.[132]

The Chinese People's Liberation Army trained and supported the Afghan mujahideen during the war. Thetraining camps were moved from Pakistan into China itself. Anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers and machineguns, valued at hundreds of millions, were given to the mujahideen by the Chinese. Chinese military advisors andarmy troops were present with the Mujahidin during training.[133]

Soviet personnel strengths and casualties

Between December 25, 1979, and February 15, 1989, a total of620,000 soldiers served with the forces in Afghanistan (though therewere only 80,000–104,000 serving at one time): 525,000 in theArmy, 90,000 with border troops and other KGB sub-units, 5,000 inindependent formations of MVD Internal Troops, and police forces.A further 21,000 personnel were with the Soviet troop contingentover the same period doing various white collar and blue collar jobs.

The total irrecoverable personnel losses of the Soviet Armed Forces,frontier, and internal security troops came to 14,453. Soviet Armyformations, units, and HQ elements lost 13,833, KGB sub-units lost572, MVD formations lost 28, and other ministries anddepartments lost 20 men. During this period 312 servicemenwere missing in action or taken prisoner; 119 were later freed, ofwhom 97 returned to the USSR and 22 went to other countries.

Of the troops deployed, 53,753 were wounded, injured, orsustained concussion and 415,932 fell sick. A high proportion ofcasualties were those who fell ill. This was because of localclimatic and sanitary conditions, which were such that acuteinfections spread rapidly among the troops. There were 115,308cases of infectious hepatitis, 31,080 of typhoid fever, and140,665 of other diseases. Of the 11,654 who were dischargedfrom the army after being wounded, maimed, or contractingserious diseases, 10,751 men, were left disabled.[134]

Material losses were as follows:[17]{not in the source given}

451 aircraft (includes 333 helicopters)147 tanks

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U.S. military personnel(with civilian far right, insuit) at Rhein Main AirBase, Frankfurt,Germany. A civilianvolunteer with an AfghanNGO in Germany assistsa blinded Afghan Mujahidoff the air stair.

Charlie Wilson (D-TX), 2nd fromthe left, dressing in Afghanclothing (armed with AK-47) withthe local Afghan mujahideen.

1,314 IFV/APCs433 artillery guns and mortars11,369 cargo and fuel tanker trucks.

Destruction in Afghanistan

Estimates of Afghan civilian deaths vary from 850,000 to 1,500,000.[23][24] 5–10 million Afghans fled toPakistan and Iran, 1/3 of the prewar population of the country, and another 2 million were displaced within thecountry. In the 1980s, half of all refugees in the world were Afghan.[135]

Felix Ermacora, the UN Special Rapporteur to Afghanistan, said that heavyfighting in combat areas cost the lives of more than 35,000 civilians in 1985,15,000 in 1986, and around 14,000 in 1987. Ermacora also noted that armedattacks by anti-government forces, such as rocket attacks on Kabul's residentialareas, caused more than 4000 civilian deaths in 1987.[136] R.J. Rummel, ananalyst of political killings, estimated that Soviet forces were responsible for250,000 democidal killings during the war and that the government of Afghanistanwas responsible for 178,000 democidal killings.[137] There were also a number ofreports of large scale executions of hundreds of civilians by Soviet and DRAsoldiers.[138][139][140]

Along with fatalities were 1.2 million Afghans disabled (mujahideen, governmentsoldiers and noncombatants) and 3 million maimed or wounded (primarilynoncombatants).[141]

Irrigation systems, crucial to agriculture in Afghanistan's arid climate, weredestroyed by aerial bombing and strafing by Soviet or government forces. In theworst year of the war, 1985, well over half of all the farmers who remained inAfghanistan had their fields bombed, and over one quarter had their irrigationsystems destroyed and their livestock shot by Soviet or government troops,according to a survey conducted by Swedish relief experts[135]

The population of Afghanistan's second largest city, Kandahar, wasreduced from 200,000 before the war to no more than 25,000inhabitants, following a months-long campaign of carpet bombing andbulldozing by the Soviets and Afghan communist soldiers in 1987.[142]

Land mines had killed 25,000 Afghans during the war and another 10–15 million land mines, most planted by Soviet and government forces,were left scattered throughout the countryside.[143] The InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross estimated in 1994 that it would take 4,300years to remove all the Soviet land mines in Afghanistan.[144]

A great deal of damage was done to the civilian children population byland mines.[146] A 2005 report estimated 3–4% of the Afghan populationwere disabled due to Soviet and government land mines. In the city of Quetta, a survey of refugee women andchildren taken shortly after the Soviet withdrawal found child mortality at 31%, and over 80% of the childrenrefugees to be unregistered. Of children who survived, 67% were severely malnourished, with malnutritionincreasing with age.[147]

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A PFM-1 mine, often mistakenfor a toy by children. The mine'sshape was dictated by

aerodynamics.[145]

Afghan guerrillas that were chosen toreceive medical treatment in theUnited States, Norton Air Force Base,California, 1986.

Critics of Soviet and Afghan government forces describe their effect on Afghan culture as working in threestages: first, the center of customary Afghan culture, Islam, was pushed aside; second, Soviet patterns of life,especially amongst the young, were imported; third, shared Afghan cultural characteristics were destroyed bythe emphasis on so-called nationalities, with the outcome that the country was split into different ethnic groups,with no language, religion, or culture in common.[148]

The Geneva Accords of 1988, which ultimately led to the withdrawal ofthe Soviet forces in early 1989, left the Afghan government in ruins. Theaccords had failed to address adequately the issue of the post-occupationperiod and the future governance of Afghanistan. The assumption amongmost Western diplomats was that the Soviet-backed government in Kabulwould soon collapse; however, this was not to happen for another threeyears. During this time the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan(IIGA) was established in exile. The exclusion of key groups such asrefugees and Shias, combined with major disagreements between thedifferent mujaheddin factions, meant that the IIGA never succeeded inacting as a functional government.[149]

Before the war, Afghanistan wasalready one of the world's poorest nations. The prolonged conflict leftAfghanistan ranked 170 out of 174 in the UNDP's HumanDevelopment Index, making Afghanistan one of the least developedcountries in the world.[150]

Once the Soviets withdrew, US interest in Afghanistan slowlydecreased over the following four years, much of it administeredthrough the DoD Office of Humanitarian Assistance, under the thenDirector of HA, George M. Dykes III. With the first years of theClinton Administration in Washington, DC, all aid ceased. The USdecided not to help with reconstruction of the country, insteadhanding the interests of the country over to US allies Saudi Arabiaand Pakistan. Pakistan quickly took advantage of this opportunity and

forged relations with warlords and later the Taliban, to secure trade interests and routes. From wiping out thecountry's trees through logging practices, which has destroyed all but 2% of forest cover country-wide, tosubstantial uprooting of wild pistachio trees for the exportation of their roots for therapeutic uses, to opiumagriculture, the ten years following the war saw much ecological and agrarian destruction.[151]

Captain Tarlan Eyvazov, a soldier in the Soviet forces during the war, stated that the Afghan children's future isdestined for war. Eyvazov said, "Children born in Afghanistan at the start of the war... have been brought up inwar conditions, this is their way of life." Eyvazov's theory was later strengthened when the Taliban movementdeveloped and formed from orphans or refugee children who were forced by the Soviets to flee their homes andrelocate their lives in Pakistan. The swift rise to power, from the young Taliban in 1996, was the result of thedisorder and civil war that had warlords running wild because of the complete breakdown of law and order inAfghanistan after the departure of the Soviets.[152]

The CIA World Fact Book reported that as of 2004, Afghanistan still owed $8 billion in bilateral debt, mostlyto Russia,[153] however, in 2007 Russia agreed to cancel most of the debt.[154]

Use of chemical weapons

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Two Soviet T-55 tanks left by theSoviet army during their withdrawallie rusting in a field near BagramAirfield, in 2002.

There have also been numerous reports of chemical weapons being used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, oftenindiscriminately against civilians.[88][155][156] A declassified CIA report from 1982 states that between 1979 and1982 there were 43 separate chemical weapons attacks which caused more than 3000 deaths.[157] By spring1980, attacks with chemical weapons were reported in "all areas with concentrated resistance activity".[157]

Refugees

A massive total of 3.3 million Afghan refugees were housed in Pakistan by 1988, some whom continue to live inthe country up until today. Of this total, about 100,000 were based in the city of Peshawar, while more than 2million were located in other parts of the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then known as theNorth-West Frontier Province).[158][159] At the same time, close to two million Afghans were living in Iran.Over the years Pakistan and Iran has put on tighter controls for refugees that has resulted in numerousreturnees.[160][161] In 2012 Pakistan banned extension of visas to foreigners.[159][162] Afghan refugees have alsosettled in India and became Indian citizens over time.[163][164][165] Some also made their way into NorthAmerica, the European Union, Australia, and other parts of the world.[166] The photo of Sharbat Gula placedon National Geographic cover in 1985 became a symbol both of the 1980s Afghan conflict and of the refugeesituation.

Civil war

The civil war continued in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal.About 400,000 Afghan civilians had lost their lives in the chaos andcivil war of the 1990s.[167] The Soviet Union left Afghanistan deep inwinter, with intimations of panic among Kabul officials. The Afghanmujahideen were poised to attack provincial towns and cities andeventually Kabul, if necessary.

Najibullah's government, though failing to win popular support,territory, or international recognition, was however able to remain inpower until 1992. Ironically, until demoralized by the defections of itssenior officers, the Afghan Army had achieved a level of performanceit had never reached under direct Soviet tutelage. Kabul had achieveda stalemate that exposed the mujahideen's weaknesses, political andmilitary. But for nearly three years, while Najibullah's government

successfully defended itself against mujahideen attacks, factions within the government had also developedconnections with its opponents.

According to Russian publicist Andrey Karaulov, the main trigger for Najibullah losing power was Russia'srefusal to sell oil products to Afghanistan in 1992 for political reasons (the new Yeltsin government did not wantto support the former communists), which effectively triggered an embargo. The defection of General AbdulRashid Dostam and his Uzbek militia, in March 1992, further undermined Najibullah's control of the state. InApril, Najibullah and his communist government fell to the mujahideen, who replaced Najibullah with a newgoverning council for the country.

Grain production declined an average of 3.5% per year between 1978 and 1990 due to sustained fighting,instability in rural areas, prolonged drought, and deteriorated infrastructure. Soviet efforts to disrupt productionin rebel-dominated areas also contributed to this decline. During the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Afghanistan'snatural gas fields were capped to prevent sabotage. Restoration of gas production has been hampered byinternal strife and the disruption of traditional trading relationships following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

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20th Anniversary ofWithdrawal of SovietMilitary Forces fromAfghanistan. Stamp ofBelarus, 2009.

Ideological impact

The Islamists who fought believed that they were responsible for the fall of the Soviet Union. Osama bin Laden,for example, asserted that the credit for "the dissolution of the Soviet Union ... goes to God and the mujahideenin Afghanistan ..."[168]

Media and popular culture

Perception in the former USSR

Commemorating the intervention of December 25, 1979, in December 2009,veterans of the Soviet war in Afghanistan were honoured by the Duma orParliament of the Russian Federation. On December 25, the lower house of theparliament defended the Soviet war in Afghanistan on the 30th anniversary of itsstart, and praised the veterans of the conflict. Differing assessments of the war"mustn't erode the Russian people's respect for the soldiers who honestly fulfilledtheir duty in implementing tasks to combat international terrorism and religiousextremists".

Duma member Semyon Bagdasarov (Just Russia) advocated that Russia had toreject Western calls for stronger assistance to the US-led ISAF-coalition inAfghanistan and also had to establish contacts with the "anti-Western forces"; theTaliban, in case they regain power.[169][170]

Memorials

Russian PresidentVladimir Putin at thememorial in Moscow topaying respect to thesoldiers killed inAfghanistan.

Speaker of theFederation CouncilSergei Mironov, right,commemorate the warveterans who performedthe international duty inAfghanistan on the dayof the 15th anniversaryof the Soviet troopwithdrawal from thatcountry.

Russian PresidentDmitry Medvedevattending the ceremonyto commemorate theveterans of Afghan warin 2010.

Afghan War veteranscelebrate 20 years sincethe withdrawal of Soviettroops from Afghanistan.