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APPROVED FORRELEASE 1 DATE:16-Jul-2011

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SNIE 11-6-571:', January .:957

44,24523.,

194

SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUM3ER 11-6-57

SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK PI

ON THE CONTINENTAL US IN MID-1960

::ubmitted by the

DIRECTOR CE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEThe following intcMgcnce organizations participated in thepreparation of this e.sizinate: The Central Intelligence Agcnc:yand the intelligence organizations of the Departments ofState, the Army. the N . :(7,W, the Air Force, and The Joint StaV.

ancurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEEon 15 January 1957. i:oncurring were the Special Assistant,Intelligence, Departin.Int of Slate: the Assistant Chief ofStaff, Intelligonce, Department of the Army: the Director ofNaval Intelligewe; the Director Of Intelligence. USAF; theDeputy Director jor Intelligence. The faint Stall: the Atomic.Energy Commission Representative to the !AC, and the

Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of Inuestigation.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM--NRELEASE AS SANITIZED

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CENTRAL INTEL,IGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This estimate was disseminated by :,he Central Intelligence Agency. This copyis for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential disseminationmay be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department ofState

b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Armyc. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navyd. Director of Intelligence, USAF, rot the Department of the Air Forcee. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Stafff. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commissiong. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigationh. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-

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elation cf which in an ynet per ;on is prohibited by w.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageTHE PROBLEM

SCOPE 1

FOREWORD 1

CONCLUSIONS 2

DISCUSSION 3

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 3

Soviet Objectives 3Implications of Soviet Efforts to Achieve Surprise 3

MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIESAGAINST THE CONTINENTAL US 4

H. AVAILABILITY OF MASS DESTRUCTION

WEAPONS 4

Nuclear Weapons 4

Radiological Warfare 4

Biological Warfare 5

Chemical Warfare 5

III. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS — AIRCRAFT 5

Soviet Long-Range Aviation 5

Inflight Refueling 7,

Base Areas 8

Other Factors Affecting Soviet Air Operations 9

Reconnaissance 9Weather Forecasting 10Navigation Aids 10Electronic Countermeasures 10Evasion of US Radar 10Crew Training and Proficiency 10Bombing Accuracy 11

IV. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS — GUIDED MISSILES. 11

Submarine-Launched Missiles 12Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 12

Air-Launched Missiles 12

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V. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS — OTHER FORCES

Airborne,and Amphibious Forces Naval Forces

Page. 12

1212

PROBABLE SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIESAGAINST THE CONTINENTAL US • 13

Methods of Attack 13

VI. ATTACKS BY AIRCRAFT 13Base Areas 14

Staging 14Weather 14

Scale of Pre-strike Preparations 15

Assumptions Underlying Estimated IntercontinentalStriking Forces 15

Maximum Strike Forces for Air Attack in Mid-1960 . . 16Allocation to ECM and Diversionary Tasks . . • 16

VII. ATTACKS BY GUIDED MISSILES 17

Submarine-Launched Missiles 17

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 17

Air-Launched Missiles 17

VIII. CLANDESTINE ATTACK 17

Clandestine Delivery of Nuclear Weapons 17

Clandestine Use of BW and CW Weapons 18

Conventional Sabotage 18

Annex A: Base Areas Suitable for Long-Range Bomber Operations 19B: Maps and Summary Charts 22

C: Estimated Performance Characteristics of Soviet Long-Range Bombers 23

D: Estimated Base Capacity for Staging Long-RangeBombers (Limited Distribution Under Separate Cover)

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APPROVED FOR RELEASECIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THECONTINENTAL US IN MID-1960

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the continental United States,as of mid-1960.

SCOPE

This estimate is made for a special, limited purpose, as a direct contribution toa study of Soviet net capabilities to attack the continental United States during theinitial, nuclear phase of a general war occurring in mid-1960. For this purpose,Soviet initiation of general war with a nuclear attack on the continental US is as-sumed. Moreover, this estimate does not set forth the maximum capabilities whichthe USSR could acquire if it set a date for attack well in advance and determinedto maximize its capabilities for such an attack. The estimate is not intended to con-sider all the aspects of a general war. In particular, it does not estimate the extentto which the scale of attack on the continental US would be reduced by the alloca-tion of Soviet resources to attack on targets in other areas. Similarly, althoughreference is made to the suitability of various methods of attack in relation to theachievement of surprise, no estimate is made of the precise extent to which the scaleof attack might be reduced if the USSR attempted to achieve surprise. =

Because of its limited scope and special purpose, this estimate is designated aSpecial National Intelligence Estimate for specially limited distribution.

FOREWORD

The problem of estimating Soviet capabilities three years or more in the futurecannot be treated exclusively in terms of present indications of how these capabil-ities are developing. Current evidence is incomplete and sometimes even fragmen-

The term "gross capabilities" as used in this estimate means the maximum scale of attack by theforces estimated to be available in mid-1960, taking into account operational factors but not consider-ing combat attrition. This estimate does not set forth the maximum capabilities which the USSRcould acquire if it set a date for attack well in advance and determined to maximize its capabilitiesfor such an attack.

'For discussion of considerations bearing on the achievement of surprise, see paragraphs 2-4, and theforthcoming NIE 11-3-57, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US through Mid-1960."

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tary. Moreover, this estimate is more than usually difficult in that its terminaldate approximates the estimated date of emergence of a major Soviet threat in theguided missile field. For these reasons, we are obliged to make our estimate of fu-ture capabilities not only on the evidence at hand but also on the basis of judgmentsof how Soviet leaders may , assess their future general requirements.

The judgments which underlie our estimate of Soviet gross capabilities in mid-1960 are: (a) that throughout the period of this estimate the Soviet rulers willregard it as mandatory to strengthen their .capabilities to attack the continental US,but that they will not do so with the intention deliberately to initiate general warat any specific date; (b) that while the Soviet rulers will consider that they willacquire increasing guided missile capabilities throughout the period, they must relyprimarily on aircraft carrying nuclear weapons for long range attacks; and, conse-quently, (c) that the Soviet rulers will devote a substantial effort to the productionof heavy bombers..'

' The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State. the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,Department of the Army, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director ofNaval Intelligence, believe the following paragraph should be added to the FOREWORD:While we believe these judgments provide the best basis for estimating Soviet gross capabilities in

mid-1960, the USSR might decide to devote less effort to its heavy bomber program than we haveestimated. Hence, we feel it necessary to emphasize that the gross capabilities described in thispaper are those which the USSR would have with the forces which we believe it is likely to acquireby mid-1960, but we cannot say with confidence that these are the capabilities which it will have atthat date.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Capabilities for Air Attack. We be-lieve that in mid-1960 the USSR wouldplace chief reliance in attacks on the con-tinental US upon aircraft carrying nu-clear weapons. In mid-1960 the USSRwill probably have about 1,500 long-rangebombers in operational units, includingabout 700 BADGER jet medium bombers,500 BISON jet heavy bombers, and 300BEAR turboprop heavy bombers. Itwill probably have developed a substantialinflight refueling capability. Its mostpowerful nuclear bombs could have yields

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intellicence. De-partment of the Army, believes it. unlikely thata force of this magnitude and composition willbe developed. See his footnotes to 'paragraph14 of the DISCUSSION.

of at least 20 MT. Moreover, by mid-1960, the capacity of the forward baseareas could have been increased suffi-ciently to stage simultaneously the entirelong-range bomber and tanker force esti-mated for that date. (Paras. 5, 14-20,26-28, 48, 52)

B. Maximum Air Strike Force. Underthe circumstances outlined above, theUSSR in mid-1960 could launch from itsforward bases about 1,150 mission air-craft in an initial attack, including 270BISONS and 230 BEARS on two-way un-

'-The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-partment of the Army, does not concur in themid-1960 strike capabilities estimated in CON-CLUSIONS B and C. See his footnotes toparagraphs 14 and 62 of the DISCUSSION.

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refueled missions, 115 BISONS on two-way refueled missions, and 535 BADG-ERS on one-way missions. Of theseaircraft, about 910 could arrive in tar-get areas, not considering combat losses.(Paras. 58-62)

C. Should the USSR elect to employonly heavy bombers in an Initial strikefrom forward bases, about 610 could belaunched, of which about 485 could ar-rive in target areas. If heavy bomberswere launched from home bases, the num-bers launched and arriving in targetareas could be about 720 and 570, re-spectively. (Paras. 58-61, 63)

D. Guided Missile Attack. Missileslaunched from submarines probablywould be used in coordination with nu-clear strikes by aircraft. In mid-1960,the USSR may have available about 30submarines equipped to launch guidedmissiles, including about eight nuclear-powered submarines. Their missiles couldprobably carry high-yield nuclear war-heads at supersonic speeds to ranges upto 500 n.m. We believe that the earliestpossible date by which the USSR couldhave a limited number of intercontinental

ballistic missiles (ICBM) available foroperational use is mid-1960. If available,ICBMs would almost certainly be usedto augment attacks by manned aircraft.Mission aircraft could employ supersonicair-to-surface missiles of 55 n.m. rangeto deliver high-yield nuclear warheadsagainst selected targets. (Paras. 39-43,48, 65-68)

E. Clandestine Attack. The clandestinedelivery of nuclear and other weapons ofmass destruction might also be attempt-ed, but we estimate that this form of at-tack would probably be employed onlyagainst a few selected targets. Sabotageof certain key installations might occurconcurrently with or immediately follow-ing the initial Soviet attacks. (Paras.8-11, 48, 69-74)

F. The Surprise Factor. The USSR wouldhave to consider the advantages of themaximum chance of surprise as againstthe maximum weight of attack. An all-out effort to maximize the chance of at-taining surprise would force the USSRto limit the size and type of effort itemployed in initial attacks. (Paras. 2,63, 65,71,74)

DISCUSSION

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Soviet Objectives1. In conducting attacks against the conti-nental US, the USSR would probably havethe following major military objectives:

a. To destroy or neutralize US capabilitiesfor nuclear retaliation;b. To deliver attacks on US military installa-

tions, forces, and communications in order toprevent effective operational deployment ofUS military forces; and

C. To deliver attacks on urban, industrial,political, and psychological targets in the USin order to reduce to the maximum extentpracticable the mobilization of US militaryand industrial strengths.

Implications of Soviet Efforts toAchieve Surprise

2. A maximum Soviet attack on the conti-nental US, involving utilization of all or mostof the capabilities discussed in this estimate,

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would require such substantial preparationsas almost certainly to result in the loss ofsurprise. If, however, the USSR attemptedto attack without warning it would probablybe forced to accept major restrictions withrespect to substantial mobilization, redeploy-ment, or unusual movement of Soviet forces!'Thus, the USSR would have to consider theadvantages of the maximum chance of sur-prise as against the maximum weight ofattack.

3. In planning initial attacks on continentalUS targets, the timing and strength of theSoviet effort would be determined largely byrecognition of the need for neutralizing themost immediate threat to Soviet security — anuclear attack by US forces and Allied forces,wherever disposed. The Soviet timetable

would almost certainly call for virtually simul-taneous assaults on other target systems.4. Since Soviet attacks on the continental USwould be tantamount to general war, theUSSR would have to prepare at the sametime to commit military forces against tar-gets and areas overseas. While Soviet capa-bilities for attacking overseas bases, forces,and areas are outside the scope of this esti-mate, it is pertinent that Soviet requirementsfor such attacks would not only affect thesize and weight of the forces the USSR wouldactually commit against the continental US,but also the degree to which surprise couldbe achieved in attacking the continental US.In mid-1960, the USSR probably could notcount upon being able to achieve surpriseagainst both the continental US and US andAllied bases and forces elsewhere.

MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES

AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL US

II. AVAILABILITY OF MASS DESTRUCTIONWEAPONS

Nuclear Weapons'5. The USSR is continuing to give high pri-ority to the development and production ofnuclear weapons. We estimate that the USSRcould now have nuclear bombs with yieldsranging from 0.5 KT to 10 MT. We also esti-mate that by 1957-1958, the USSR could in-crease the yield of its most powerful nuclearbombs to at least 20 MT, and by mid-1960could further increase the economy of use ofnuclear materials in these very large-yieldweapons. In addition, warheads with yields

could be provided foruse in submarine-launched surface-to-surfacemissiles and in air-to-surface missiles by 1957-1958, and for use in ICBMs as they becomeavailable. (For the yields of particular war-heads, sec NIE 11-2-56.)

G. Available evidence is inadequate to justifya calculation of the probable Soviet stockpileof nuclear weapons of various types and yields.

Within the limits of nuclear weapons tech-nology and of fissionable materials availa-bility, the actual stockpile developed duringthe period of this estimate will be determinedby Soviet military requirements, as currentlyvisualized by Soviet planners and as revisedduring the period."7. Radiological Warfare. During the periodof this estimate, it is most unlikely that theUSSR will be able to stockpile militarily sig-nificant quantities of radioactive materialsfor use in radiological warfare weapons. How-ever, the USSR will possess nuclear weapons

• For extended discussion of the problem of achiev-ing surprise, see NIE 11-6-55, "Probable Intelli-gence Warning of Soviet Attack on the USThrough Mid-1958," published 1 July 1955. Thispaper will be superseded by the forthcomingNIE 11-3-57, covering the period through mid-1980.For details, see NIE 11-2-56, "The Soviet AtomicEnergy Program," published 8 June 1956 (LimitedDistribution). This paper will be superseded Inearly 1957 by NIE 11-2-57.

' Arbitrary future stockpiles based on variousassumptions are presented in NIE 11-2-56.

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capable of producing widespread radioactivefall-out, and these weapons could be used pri-marily for that purpose.

BioIogical Warfare

8. Relatively little is known 'about the natureand magnitude of the Soviet BW program,particularly its offensive aspects. However,accumulated evidence shows that the USSRalmost certainly has an active BW researchand development program encompassing anti-personnel, antilivestock, and possibly anti-crop agents. The causative organisms of atleast four human diseases (anthrax, tulare-mia, plague, brucellosis) and of two animaldiseases (foot-and-mouth disease, rinder-pest) are believed to be under consideration asBW agents.

9. Based on a general appreciation of Sovietcapabilities in this field, we estimate that inmid-1960 the USSR could be prepared to dis-seminate BW agents both covertly and overt-ly. The USSR already has the capability forclandestine BW attack against personnel inbuildings or concentrated in relatively smallareas, and for such attack against livestockand certain crops. The small amounts of BWagents required could be introduced into theUS clandestinely or, in some cases, producednear the sites of their planned employment.They could be employed by saboteurs using awide variety of disseminating devices, some ofwhich could be procured locally. We believecovert BW attack could be highly effectiveagainst livestock and moderately effectiveagainst humans and crops. With regard toovert delivery, relatively large quantities ofBW agents would probably be required. So-viet capabilities for this means of attackwould therefore be limited by the infeasibilityof stockpiling large quantities of most BWagents in prolonged storage.

Chemical Warfare

10. The USSR has a well-established CW re-search and development program, which webelieve emphasizes the development of nerveagents. In addition to agents of the tabunand sarin types, the USSR is believed to beworking on the more persistent, extremely

lethal nerve agents of the "V" series as wellas agents having psychogenic effects.

11. The Soviet stockpile of standard CWagents, in bulk and in munitions, is esti-mated to have been 140,000 metric tons- atthe end of World War II. Although there isno direct evidence that the USSR is current-ly engaged in large-scale production of CWagents, a stockpile of a similar magnitudeprobably represents the minimum which theUSSR maintains in peacetime. Losses causedby deterioration and in reloading into newermunitions in the intervening period have prob-ably been made up with nerve gases. By 1960,the Soviet CW stockpile will probably consistmainly of nerve gases, including limited quan-tities of "V" agents.

12. We have no firm evidence of Soviet CWmunitions development since World War II,when the USSR had munitions suitable fordelivery by both ground weapons and aircraftflying at speeds up to about 250 knots. TheUSSR is probably developing spray tanks,bombs, and unfuzed containers for use byhigher speed aircraft. We believe the USSRis technically capable of modifying its presentbomb and warhead designs to permit thedelivery of CW agents by jet aircraft and bycertain guided missiles.

III. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS —AIRCRAFT

Soviet Long-Range Aviation

13. As of 1 October 1956, Soviet Long-RangeAviation is estimated to have been composedof 61 bomber regiments with an actualstrength of 1,405 bomber aircraft in operation-al units: i. e., 745 BULL piston medium bomb-ers, 585 BADGER jet medium bombers, 40BISON jet heavy bombers, and 35 BEAR turbo-prop heavy bombers.' We have no evidence

The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, De-partment of the Army, does not believe that theavailable evidence warrants the above estimateof the number of BULL bombers (745), thetotal number of bombers (1,405), or the num-ber of regiments ‘611. in Soviet Long-RangeAviation.

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of any tanker aircraft in operational units atpresent.'" All Long-Range Aviation units arebased in the European USSR except the ThirdLong-Range Air Army, which is in the SovietFar East and has an estimated actual strengthof 220 BULLS and 25 BADGERS.

14. We estimate that in mid-1960 Soviet Long-Range Aviation will probably comprise 56bomber regiments and a tanker force possiblyequivalent to 15 regiments." " The bomberforce will probably consist of some 1,500 air-craft, including 700 BADGERS, 500 BISONS,and 300 BEARS." Evidence in support ofthis estimate is found in: (a) the rapid in-crease in the number of Long-Range Aviationregiments from 48- in January 1956 to 61 inOctober 1956; (b) the trend toward replace-ment of BULLS by more modern aircraftsince 1954; (c) the appareat intent to buildup a heavy bomber force implicit in the devel-opment of BISON and BEAR aircraft andtheir introduction into operational units, nowin an early stage; and (d) current indicationsof the development of an inflight refuelingcapability.

15. The foregoing estimate of the size andcomposition of Soviet Long-Range Aviation

I*" Discussion of tanker strength will be found inparagraphs 18-21.

"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-partment of the Army, does not concur in thenumbers of regiments shown in this sentence.While some tanker regiments or their equivalentIn smaller units will probably be included inSoviet Long-Range Aviation by mid-1960, thereIs in his opinion no adequate evidence to In-dicate that the total of bomber and tankerregiments will be in excess of previously esti-mated bomber regiments. Some or all of thebomber regiments which may have been formedin addition to the 48 held as of 1 January 1956may be destined to become tanker regiments.In this case, many of the tanker regimentsestimated to be In existence in mid-1960 wouldbe included in a 56 regiment level. It would notseem justifiable to estimate an additional 15regiments, over and above recent increaseswhich may represent the initial phases of theformation of tanker regiments.

"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. De-partment of the Army, does not concur in thisestimate of the mid-1960 heavy bomber strength(500 BISON and 300 BEAR) presented in this

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is subject to all the uncertainties implicit inany estimate of a situation to be expectedthree years in the future. However, it is con-sistent, not only with the considerations enu-merated in the preceding paragraph, but alsowith estimated Soviet strategic requirementsfor high-performance, long-range bombers inthe event of general war, including require-ments for nuclear air attack on the continen-tal US. It is also within estimated Soviet air-craft production capabilities, although theproportion of aircraft production facilities as-signed to heavy bomber production wouldhave to be increased. We believe it unlikelythat the USSR will curtail its heavy bomberforce at least until it has achieved a substan-tial operational capability with an intercon-tinental ballistic missile. Such a capabilityalmost certainly will not be achieved duringthe period of this estimate.

16. Soviet Long-Range Aviation will probablycontinue with its present aircraft typesthroughout the period. An improved modelof the BISON is probably now becoming avail-able, and improved versions of both the BEAR

sentence. The presently estimated 1 October1956 force level of 40 BISON would have to beincreased at an average rate of more than 10per month to achieve this level while presentevidence indicates that production is continuingat about two to three per month, a rate whichhas remained roughly constant for some time.Achievement of the above force level wouldrequire that additional facilities presently pro-ducing other aircraft would have to be devotedto BISON production in the near future and thatall factories achieve optimum or near optimumproduction rates. An increase in the produc-tion rate of BEAR aircraft would also have tobe achieved since continuation of the presentproduction rate would not achieve this forcelevel. While it is possible that some increasein production may be planned and achieved,a more realistic estimate of the mid-1960 heavybomber force level should be somewhat lower.To properly reflect the uncertainties inherentin this estimate heavy bomber strength shouldbe stated as a bracket between the force whicha continuation of present production wouldachieve and the optimum force level shown inparagraph 14. Such a bracket would indicatethe following mid-1960 heavy bomber force level:

BISON: from 180 to 500BEAR : from 240 to 300

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and the BADGER will probably appear in1957) 4 At current rates of introduction intooperational units, Long-Range Aviation willhave achieved its full estimated complementof BADGERS by mid-1957; continued produc-tion at present rates could provide an appre-ciable reserve of BADGERS by the end of theperiod. BULLS will probably have been en-tirely phased out of long-range bomber unitsby mid-1959; serviceable BULLS surplus tothe needs of Long-Range Aviation will beavailable for some time for a variety of uses.

lnflight Refueling

17. We now have good evidence that the USSRis developing an inflight refueling system, andwe believe that during the period of this esti-mate it will achieve a substantial inflight re-fueling capability. Soviet planners have al-most certainly recognized the potentiality ofinflight refueling to overcome to. some extentthe geographic disadvantage they face in theapplication of their strategic air power againstthe continental US. On the basis of compara-tive speed and altitude capabilities of Sovietlong-range aircraft, and of their comparativecapabilities to reach US targets on refueledand unrefueled missions from Soviet bases,we believe Soviet planners will seek to providea refueling capability primarily for BISON air-craft. One refueling by a compatible tank-er 13 could approximately double the area ofthe continental US that could be reached byan improved BISON on a two-way missionfrom Chukotski. The BEAR's greater combatradius would make refueling less essential toits operations, although its capabilities toreach targets in continental US from interiorSoviet bases could be increased substantiallyby this means. Refueling would increaseBADGER capabilities to reach targets in the

"For estimated performance characteristic of So-viet long-range bombers, see Annex C.As used in this estimate, "compatible" meanshaving characteristics of speed and altitudesuitable to the bomber employed, and a transfercapability sufficient to add 35 percent to therange of the refueled bomber.For refueled and unrefueled coverage of con-tinental US, see Annex B, Maps and SummaryCharts.

continental US, but against most targetswould still not make two-way BADGER opera-tions possible."'

18. We therefore believe that during theperiod of this estimate the USSR's chief re-quirement for tanker aircraft would stemfrom the desirability of refueling a substan-tial number of its BISONS. To provide rea-sonably flexible support for a force of 500BISON bombers, some 350 compatible tank-ers would be required. To meet this require-ment, the USSR could employ one or a com-bination of the following alternatives: (a) pro-duce BISON tankers; (b) produce BEAR tank-ers; (c) develop and produce a new heavy air-craft designed specifically as a tanker. BI-SONS and BEARS could be used as converti-ble tanker-bombers by employing bomb-baytanks, but such tankers would not be fullycompatible insofar as range extension is con-cerned.

19. We know of no tanker production or tank-ers in operational units in the USSR at pres-ent. By mid-1960, the USSR could acquire350 heavy tankers as well as a bomber forceof the size estimated in paragraph 14. How-ever, in order to do so, it would in thenear future have either to increase productionrates at facilities which we estimate will bein the heavy bomber program, or to openadditional production facilities. We doubtthat the USSR will produce as many as 350heavy tankers during the period of this esti-mate, in view of the probability that thebomber program will have priority over thetanker program, and the fact that to producethe estimated number of heavy bombers willitself require an early increase in the facili-ties allocated to the heavy bomber productionprogram (see paragraph 15)."

" The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-partment of the Army, considers that aircraftproduction programs in the USSR are probably

.geared to the achievement of an Inflight refuel-ing capability compatible with Its bomber forceby 1960, and that the requirement for tankersis one of a number of factors which wouldmilitate against the production of a bomberforce of 500 BISONS and 300 BEARS as fore-cast in paragraph 14. The size of the tankerforce, therefore, is subject to the same element_sof uncertainty which attend bomber strength(see his footnote to paragraph 141.

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20. Therefore, we estimate that in mid-1960the USSR will be building toward, but willprobably not have achieved, a force of 350heavy tankers. We believe that, without in-terfering with currently estimated Sovietbomber production programs, the USSR could,by mid-1960, have a force of some 150 heavytankers. This could be accomplished by con-tinuing the production of BEAR type aircraftat existing facilities."(See footnote, page 7.)

21. The USSR could develop a BADGER tank-er force as an interim measure, for the pur-pose of increasing the range of some BISONbombers for which compatible tankers werenot available. Refueling by a BADGER tank-er could increase the radius of a BISON bysome 500 n.m., and the range by some 1,000n.m., although the net gain in radius/rangein any particular operation would be limitedby the route flown and refueling point em-ployed. In addition, BADGER tankers couldbe employed as compatible tankers for BADG-ER bombers.

Base Areas

22. We estimate that there are some 525 oper-ational airfields in the Sino-Soviet Bloc withpermanent surfaced runways of 5,000 feet orlonger. They are distributed as follows:

(Minimum Runway Length (feet)

9,000 8,000 '7,000 6,000 5,000 TotalUSSR 9 39 19 167 44 278European

Satellites 2 47 45 36 1 131Asiatic Commu-

nist Countries 7 23 54 32 11611 93 87 25'7 77 525

23. Given standard conditions," we estimatetake-off distances for Soviet long-range bomb-ers as follows:

"Normal take-off technique and take-off enginepower, no wind, sea level elevation, temperature69 degrees F., permanent surfaced runway. At0 degrees F., ground run requirements for take-off of Jet bombers would be about 25 percentless than under standard conditions. Groundrun requirements for propeller-driven bomberswould also be reduced, but the difference wouldnot be as great as for jet bombers.

Take-off

Ground Ground Run

Weight

Run to Clear 50-ft.Type (lbs.)

(ft.) Obstacle (ft.) BULL 140,000

5,230 7,825BULL

(modified) 135,750

4,800 7,125BADGER 150,000

4,200 6,300BADGER

(improved) 170,000

4,800 7,100BISON 365,000

6,400 9,100BISON

(improved) 365,000

5,300 8,200BEAR 300,000

6,000 9,000BEAR no data

(improved)

available

24. There are approximately 27 airfields inthe USSR believed to be home bases for oper-ational Long-Range Aviation bomber units,three in the Far East, and the remainder inthe European USSR. In addition, a numberof airfields associated with command and/ortraining units, factory production and deliv-ery, and testing and development are in effectan integral part of the base structure of SovietLong-Range Aviation. As indicated by thetable in paragraph 22, many other airfieldsin the Sino-Soviet Bloc have runways suitablefor medium bomber operations and some haverunways suitable for heavy bombers. Theseairfields could be used as auxiliary airfields toinsure maximum aircraft dispersal away fromhome bases, but the actual designation ofsuch auxiliary fields within the Soviet Long-Range Aviation base structure cannot be veri-fied. Physical limitations on dispersal, andprobable requirements for limiting groundstay to a minimum, would make dispersal andrevetment at forward staging bases in theArctic unlikely.

25. We estimate that Soviet planners are nowdeveloping air facilities to meet their antici-pated requirements for the next 10 yearsor more. Progressive extension of runways atLong-Range Aviation home bases from cur-rent 8,200-foot lengths to 9,000 feet or moreis believed to be under way. In the case ofnew runway construction at bases, it is esti-mated that weight-bearing capacities are be-ing made adequate for heavy bombers of alltypes programmed, and that runway lengthswill generally exceed 11,000 feet.

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26. Because of the range limitations of avail-able Soviet bombers, the launching of strikesagainst the continental US at present wouldprobably involve staging through one or moreof five base areas within the USSR — the Chu-kotski Peninsula, the Kamchatka Peninsula,the Central Arctic area, the Kola Peninsula,and the Leningrad area.. (If overflight ofScandinavia were to be avoided in an initialstrike from Leningrad, a dog-leg route overthe Kola area would be necessary.) For pur-poses of this estimate, these five potentialstaging .areas are designated "forward" baseareas.° In each of these areas, airfields suit-able for long-range bombers exist, althoughthe Leningrad area is the only one of thefive now occupied by units of Long-RangeAviation. Bases in East Germany and Polandcould also be used, but because of the likeli-hood that surprise would be sacrificed by thenecessity of overflying West Europe, as wellas the lower security of preparations in theSatellites and vulnerability to NATO forces,this area would not be a likely choice for stag-ing initial strikes against the continental US.

27. Air base development over the past fewyears in the forward base areas has improvedthe capability of these areas for supportinglong-range bomber staging operations. Inthe Kamchatka, Kola, Chukotski, and CentralArctic areas, there are now 29 airfields withrunways long enough to accommodate Sovietlong-range bombers." Information is incom-plete concerning load-bearing capacity, air-craft servicing, maintenance, storage, and per-sonnel facilities at almost all of these airfields,but we estimate that 10 could stage eithermedium or heavy bombers, and that 19 otherscould stage medium bombers. In addition,there are at least 23 airfields in the Leningradarea capable of staging medium bombers, ofwhich three are present home bases of Long-Range Aviation, capable of staging heavybombers. In summary, we estimate that, for

" Annex A and D (the latter in limited distribu-tion under separate cover) cover air facilities,weather conditions, and airfield capacities Inthese base areas.In addition, there are eight airfields whose run-way characteristics indicate a marginal capa-bility for long-range bomber operations.

purposes of Long-Range Aviation operationsagainst the continental US, there are avail-able in the five forward base areas 52 airfieldscapable of staging medium bombers, of which13 are also capable of staging heavy bombers.

28. There are indications that airfield devel-opment in the forward base areas is contin-uing, and it is within Soviet capabilities tohave developed adequate facilities for sus-tained long-range bomber operations in anyof these areas by 1960. We believe that run-ways are being developed with length, sur-face, and weight-bearing standards similar tothose at Soviet Long-Range Aviation homebases. We estimate that by 1960, with theconstruction facilities and personnel now inthe area concerned, three new airfields suit-able for heavy bomber staging operationscould be developed in the Kola area, three inthe Leningrad area, and two each in the Chu-kotski, Central Arctic, and Kamchatka areas.Improvement of support facilities at existingpotential staging bases in these areas couldbe carried out concurrently without majorinterference with the construction effort.

29. In each of the forward areas there arebases, in addition to those considered suit-able for staging long-range bombers, whichcould be utilized for the fighter aircraft whichthe USSR would also require in any opera-tion conducted from these areas, In certainforward areas there are only a few such addi-tional bases at present. If necessary, by mid-1960 the USSR could provide additional facili-ties for fighter protection of its long-rangebomber staging bases, and for surface-to-airmissile defenses.

Other Factors Affecting SovietAir Operations

30. Reconnaissance. The USSR is not knownto have developed long-range reconnaissanceaircraft as such. It is possible that duringthe interval between now and mid-1960 theUSSR, employing existing long-range bombertypes, might build up a pattern of activityalong the early warning lines of the NorthAmerican continent, not only to determinetheir location, capabilities, and vulnerabili-ties, but also to increase the problem of recog-

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nizing the approach of an actual attack. Itis unlikely that the USSR would jeopardizesurprise by unusual reconnaissance activityimmediately preceding an actual attack.

31. Weather Forecasting. The USSR has foryears devoted considerable effort, with a highdegree of success, to both short-period andlong-period meteorological forecasting. Webelieve that it has the forecasting capabilityto support long-range air operations. Thiscapability plus extensive experience in me-teorological research in the extreme northernlatitudes, weather reporting facilities in Si-beria and on ice floes in the Central Arcticbasin, and constant access to regularly broad-cast North American weather reports andforecasts should enable the USSR to predictboth route and target weather with reasonableaccuracy.

32. Navigation Aids. The USSR has availablethrough open sources virtually complete tar-get and navigation data on North Americaand its approach routes. It is probable thatin the event of a surprise attack certain West-ern electronic navigational aids would beavailable during at least. part of the flight.For example, meteorological reports are regu-larly broadcast in the United States and Can-ada. It is also possible that clandestinely-placed navigational beacons might be usedfor aircraft homing. We estimate that Sovietnavigational radar equipment is capable ofbetter performance than the US World War IIequipment which the USSR acquired.

33. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)a. Soviet Offensive Capabilities. Soviet

ECM development is rapidly approaching, ifit has not already reached, the point, at whichECM will constitute a major threat to US airdefense capabilities. Within the past year orso the USSR has entered actively into devel-oping techniques for the tactical employmentof CHAFF. We have evidence that CHAFFhas been used in training exercises againstSoviet ground-based radars, and we estimatethat CHAFF would be widely used in a Sovietair attack. In addition; we estimate thatSoviet capabilities for , airborne jamming ofboth communications facilities and radar willmaterially increase during the period. The

USSR has conducted some jamming trainingexercises against its own airborne radars, andwe believe that active airborne jamming wouldbe used against US radar, communications,and navigation facilities in the event of Sovietattacks in mid-1960. However, even in 1960Soviet active airborne jammers for use againstradars at frequencies above the X-band willprobably be limited in quantity. We have noevidence of Soviet use of decoys, or of themodification of aircraft specifically for ECMuse, although we consider both to be withinSoviet capabilities.

b. Vulnerabilities. The concentration of allknown Soviet blind-bombing and Al radarsin the narrow frequency band 9,250-9,500Mc/s increases the vulnerability of this equip-ment to ECM. The circuits of the only Sovietmicrowave radar studied in detail, the ship-borne NEPTUNE, indicate that it is vulnerableto ECM and interference. Although such vul-nerability may not extend to all airborneradars, it probably applies to at least someearlier sets, especially the MUSHROOM. Pas-sive ECM receivers and radiation control areprobably in use as anti-ECM techniques atpresent, but we believe the vulnerabilities out-lined above will continue to exist for sometime. However,. Soviet airborne radar willeventually employ greater frequency spread-ing, and antijamming techniques employingthe switch-tuning of magnetrons and klys-trons to effect rapid changes in frequencymay be under development.

34. Evasion of US Radar. The USSR almostcertainly knows at least the general capabili-ties of US early warning radar equipment,coverage provided by the network, and weakand strong points of the system. With suchknowledge it might expect that properlyplanned attacks could reduce the chance ofdetection by US radar. However, the use ofsome evasion techniques, particularly lowaltitude penetration, would require acceptanceof reduced range or bomb load.

35. Crew Training and Proficiency. Flighttraining for Long-Range Aviation crews hasincreased in both intensity and scope duringthe past five years, especially since 1954, whenjet bombers began to be introduced into the

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long-range bomber force. At present, we esti-mate that long-range bomber crews averageat least 15-20 hours of flying time per month.The regular training program emphasizes theattainment of navigational and bombing pro-ficiency during the hours of darkness and inbad weather. A 1955 manual for Soviet navi-gator-bombardiers indicates that they are re-quired to achieve proficiency in the use ofmagnetic compass, pilotage, radio, celestial,and radar navigation techniques. They alsoprobably receive extensive training in the utili-zation of ground-based electronic navigationaids, such as Shoran, direction-finding anddistance-measuring equipment, and hyper-bolic navigation systems. We estimate thatthe capabilities of Long-Range Aviation crewsfor landing and take-off under instrumentflight conditions compare favorably with thoseachieved in the USAF.

36. The current trend in Long-Range Aviationtraining is believed to be toward larger-scaleoperations and longer-range flights out ofhome base areas, including bomber operationsInto and over the Arctic areas as well as simu-lated attacks on major Soviet cities. Lastsummer a large-scale temporary deploymentof medium and heavy bombers was apparent-ly conducted into the Satellites, probably totest the capabilities of the units involved tostage into and operate from forward areas.Considerable over-water flying has been un-dertaken during the past five years.

37. The current state of training in SovietLong-Range Aviation leads us to estimatethat at present the mounting of an initialattack against the continental US utilizingthe bulk of the long-range bomber force wouldrequire several months of intensive prepara-tory training. However, a reduced scale ofattack, still sufficient to deliver a devastatingblow upon the US, could currently be mountedwith a minimum of pre-strike preparatoryactivity. The current training program pointsto continuing improvement in air crew pro-ficiency. Moreover, past Soviet personnelpractices, which insure relatively little turn-over in personnel over the years, indicate thatimprovements in proficiency will be cumu-lative during the period of this estimate.

Therefore, the over-all proficiency of Long-Range Aviation crews will almost certainly bemuch higher by mid-1960.

38. Bombing Accuracy. By mid-1960, mostSoviet long-range bomber crews will probablyhave achieved the following levels of bombingproficiency:

VisualBombing

CEP Radar Bombing(ft.) CEP (ft.)

Well-definedtargets

Poorly-definedtargets

50,000 2,900 2,400 3,100

40,000 2,100 2,000 2,700

30,000 1,400 1,700 2,300

20,000 900 1,400 2,100

10,000 400 900 1,600

5,000 800 1,400

IV. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS —GUIDED MISSILES 21

39. We have no firm evidence that the USSRnow has any offensive guided missiles avail-able for operational employment against thecontinental US, although we believe that em-ployment of missiles launched from aircraftor submarines is within present Soviet capa-bilities. We estimate that for some time aftera particular missile system becomes opera-tional, its system reliability 22 will probablybe about 40-60 percent. By 1960 the reliabili-ties of earlier Soviet missile systems will al-most certainly have been improved. In mid-1960 the USSR will probably have operationalstockpiles of several types of missiles withnuclear warheads suitable for launching fromsubmarines or aircraft in an attack on thecontinental US.

" For a detailed study see the forthcoming NIE11-5-57, "Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities andProbable Programs."

= System reliability refers to the percentage ofmissiles which will function according to speci-fications from the launching area to detonationin the target area.

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Submarine-Launched Missiles40. We estimate that any of the present Sovietlong-range submarine types could be equippedto carry one to two guided missiles in topsidestowage. The USSR could construct nuclear-powered submarines or conventional-poweredsubmarines, about the size of the present Zclass, to accommodate internally four missileseach of the size and weight of the Regulus I.

41. We estimate that Soviet turbojet missilesof the Regulus I type could have been avail-able for launching from submarines since1955. These missiles could have a maximumrange of 500 n.m., with a high subsonic speedcapability. A supersonic version could beavailable in 1957. Low-yield nuclear warheadscould be employed at present and high-yieldwarheads beginning in 1957-1958. At pres-ent, with radar track-radio command guid-ance, a CEP of 0.5 n.m. could be achieved byemploying a guidance submarine within 100n.m. of the target, and a CEP of 1.0 n.m. couldbe achieved with a guidance submarine up to200 n.m. from the target, assuming accuratepositioning of the submarine. We estimatethat by 1960 a CEP of 1-2 n.m. could beachieved at maximum missile range by em-ploying an inertial guidance system supple-mented by radar map-matching. By mid-1960, the USSR could have sufficient super-sonic 500 n.m. turbojet missiles to equip thenumber of missile-launching submarines esti-mated in paragraph 45. We do not believethat the USSR is capable of developing sig-nificantly advanced submarine-launched mis-sile systems, such as a submarine-launchedERBM, during the period of this estimate.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)42. We estimate that at some time in theperiod 1960-1961 the USSR could achieve aninitial operational capability with an ICBMwith a 5,500 n.m. maximum range, a high:yield nuclear warhead, and a CEP of 5 n.m.We believe that the high priority the USSRwould almost certainly assign to this missilesystem would dictate equipping the first oper-ational unit with prototype weapons simul-taneously with the decision to initiate seriesproduction. If the USSR succeeded in achiev-

ing an initial operational capability at theearliest time estimated (i. e., the beginning ofthe 1960-1961 time period), and simultaneous-ly initiated series production, we believe thatin mid-1960 it could have a stockpile of up to25 ICBMs.

Air-Launched Missiles43. The USSR is now technically capable ofattacking targets with rocket-propelled glidebombs of 20 n.m. maximum range, launchedfrom long-range aircraft and fitted with low-yield nuclear warheads. We estimate thatair-to-surface missiles capable of carryingnuclear warheads to a maximum range of 55n.m. could be placed in operation as follows:a subsonic interim version in 1956-1957 anda supersonic version in 1958. This missilewould probably be equipped with semiactivehoming guidance, and achieve a CEP of about150 feet against ships or other well-definedradar targets. Beginning in 1957-1958, high-yield nuclear warheads could be employed.By mid-1960 the USSR could have a sufficientnumber of supersonic air-to-surface missilesof 55 n.m. range to meet the requirements ofthe attack described in paragraph 62.

V. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS —OTHER FORCES

Airborne and Amphibious Forces44. The USSR has considerable airborne andamphibious forces which could be used toattack certain US overseas bases and Alaska.Its capabilities for both these types of opera-tion are insufficient to make them a threatagainst continental US.

Naval Forces45. The USSR's large surface naval force,lacking aircraft carriers, is unsuited fortransoceanic naval operations on any sig-nificant scale. On the other hand, the largeand increasing Soviet submarine force is capa-ble of carrying out large-scale operations offthe US coasts. However, only those subma-rines capable of launching guided missilescould attack targets within the continentalUS. Although the evidence pointing to the

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existence of Soviet guided missile submarinesis not conclusive, we believe that the USSRintends to produce submarines of this typeduring the period. However, we have no evi-dence to indicate how many it plans to con-struct or convert by mid-1960. We estimatethat the USSR could now have about 10guided missile submarines, all of which wouldprobably be converted boats with topside stow-age. We believe that by mid-1960, the USSRmay have an additional 20 guided missilesubmarines with internal stowage, of whichabout eight could be nuclear-powered.

46. Although we have no firm evidence thatthe USSR has a nuclear-powered submarine,there is reason to believe that a program fordevelopment of such a submarine has reachedan advanced stage. The state of power reactordevelopments in the USSR is such that anatomic submarine could be in operation wellbefore 1960. We estimate that by mid-1960the USSR could have up to 10 atomic reactorsinstalled in submarines if it is willing to adopta relatively simple, standardized design. If

emphasis were placed on improving designs,It is probable that no more than five atomicreactors for submarines would be built dur-ing the period. Nuclear-powered submarineswould probably be capable of surfaced andsubmerged speeds of about 18 and 24 knotsrespectively, submerged endurance of 30 daysor more, and cruising ranges at full speed inexcess of 25,000 nautical miles.

47. The capability of the Soviet submarineforce will probably be improved by a limitedmodernization of older types, including theinstallation of snorkel. Intelligence is lack-ing on a number of other factors essential tothe development of an effective submarineforce, such as mobile and permanent logisticalsupport and the operating efficiency of theforce, which is probably still inferior to thatof US and German forces in World War II.There is, however, evidence of increased long-range patrolling activity, and intensifiedtraining of this and other types will probablyraise performance standards during the periodof this estimate.

PROBABLE SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES AGAINST

THE CONTINENTAL US

Methods of Attack

48. We believe that in mid-1960 the USSRwould place chief reliance in attacks on thecontinental US upon aircraft carrying nuclearweapons. ICBMs, if available in mid-1960,would almost certainly be used to augmentattacks by manned aircraft, but not to replaceany mission aircraft. Missiles launched fromsubmarines probably would be used in coordi-nation with nuclear strikes by aircraft. Clan-destine delivery of nuclear and other weaponsof mass destruction might also be attempted,but we estimate that this form of attackwould probably be employed only against afew selected targets. Sabotage of certain keyinstallations might occur concurrently withor immediately following the initial attacks.

VI. ATTACKS BY AIRCRAFT

49. Present Soviet capabilities for air attackon the continental US are restricted by therelatively small numbers of operational heavybombers, the limited availability of megaton-yield nuclear weapons, the status of supportfacilities at Arctic bases, and the probablelack of a substantial inflight refueling capa-bility. Improved aircrew proficiency, furtherimprovement of Arctic bases, development ofa substantial operational inflight refuelingcapability, and production of larger numbersof megaton-yield weapons and heavy bombers,all of which we believe will be realized, wouldresult in a considerable increase in Sovietcapabilities for attack on the continental USby mid-1960.

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50. During the early part of the period ofthis estimate, the BULL and the BADGERwould be the principal aircraft available forattack on the continental US. In the latterpart of the period, the USSR would almostcertainly place chief reliance on the BISONand the BEAR for such attacks, with theBADGER playing a secondary role.

51. Without inflight refueling the BULL(maps 1-4) 13 would be unable to reach tar-gets in the US on two-way missions evenfrom forward bases unless it were modified, 24in which case it could reach the Seattle area.The modified BULL could, without inflight re-fueling, reach all of the US on a one-way mis-sion from Chukotski. The current BADGERwould require inflight refueling in order tocover most of the important target areas inthe US, even on one-way missions from for-ward bases, but an improved BADGER (seemaps 5-8), which we estimate will be avail-able in 1957, could carry out these one-waymissions without inflight refueling. Two-wayBADGER operations would be limited tonorthwestern US targets, even with refuel-ing. In order to reach all targets in the USwith the BISON (see maps 9-12, 17, 18), theUSSR would have to employ one-way mis-sions. However, on two-way refueled mis-sions from forward bases, the improved BISONcould reach targets in much of the westernand northern portions of the US. The BEAR(see maps 13-16, 19, 20), if launched fromthe Chukotski Peninsula, could reach almostall of the US on two-way unrefueled mis-sions, but from interior bases could reachonly a small portion of the US. On two-wayrefueled missions, the BEAR could cover theentire US from forward bases and most ofthe US from interior bases.

Base Areas

52. We estimate that there are now 52 air-fields in the forward base areas capable ofstaging long-range bombers, and that theUSSR will continue to improve its forwardbase structure during the period of this esti-mate. By mid-1960, the capacity of the for-ward base areas could have been increasedsufficiently to stage simultaneously the entire

long-range bomber and tanker force estimatedfor that date.

53. Staging. About a 10-hour flight wouldbe required to move BULL aircraft from FarEast home bases to Chukotski area bases, andabout three to five hours from Western USSRbases to the Kola Peninsula. Flying timesfor BADGER, BISON, and BEAR aircraftwould be about half as long. The USSR isfully capable of developing servicing and fuelstorage and transfer facilities at its forwardbases, if these facilities are not already avail-able. For example, we believe the USSR hasa fuel truck with a capacity of 6,000 gallonsand a pumping rate of 240 gallons per minute.We estimate that, when BISON and BEARbombers appear in service in large numbers,the USSR will have ground refueling equip-ment more compatible with the requirementsof these aircraft. In order to service largenumbers of long-range bomber aircraft atstaging bases in forward areas, it would prob-ably be necessary to increase present stocksof POL and servicing equipment and to estab-lish or increase weapons stockpiles at thesebases.

54. Weather. Weather and climatic condi-tions in the far northern staging areas wouldhave a considerable impact on the timing andmagnitude of attacks on the US. 25 Duringcold weather, requirements for high-speedrefueling and heated shelter space for mainte-nance are among the critical problems whichwould be magnified as the numbers and sizeof aircraft increased. Moreover, the coordi-nated launching of a large-scale strike forcecomprising elements from widely separatedbase areas would probably be further compli-cated by varying weather conditions at thedifferent bases. Cold weather problems would,however, be less critical with jet than withpiston aircraft.

The maps and summary charts in Annex Bshow ranges of which the various Soviet air-craft operating from various bases would becapable in attacks against continental US.

" S. g., stripped and altered for longer range ina manner similar to the US B 293.See Annex A for an account of weather condi-tions in the various base areas.

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55. The USSR has demonstrated that it caneffectively.operate aircraft under extreme coldweather conditions. In addition, aircraft per-formance is improved by low ground temper-atures in Arctic areas, since the higher den-sity of cold air increases engine thrust andairfoil lift so that take-off distance may bereduced or maximum gross take-off weightsincreased. For example, at 0 degrees F. theground run requirement for take-off of jetbombers would be about 25 percent less thanunder standard conditions (see paragraph23). Ground run requirements for the BULLand the BEAR would also be reduced, but thedifference would not be as great as for jetbombers.

56. The low temperatures of the Arctic regionpose some special problems in the handlingof nuclear weapons. However, virtually all ofthe components of nuclear weapons are betterable to resist the effects of cold weather thanare the delivery aircraft, and provision of ade-quate shelters and equipment to overcome theundesirable effects of cold weather on thebombs is a much simpler problem. We esti-mate that the USSR can successfully storeand assemble nuclear weapons for use atArctic bases under any weather conditionswhich will permit the operation of bombers.

57. Scale of pre-strike preparations. At pres-ent the preparations necessary for launchinga maximum-scale attack from likely stagingareas would probably require several months.We estimate that the USSR will continue toimprove its base facilities and the training,logistics, and equipment of its Long-RangeAviation throughout this period, so that thetime required for preparations for attackwould be considerably reduced.

Assumptions Underlying EstimatedIntercontinental Striking Forces

58. Although the variety in methods of em-ployment and attack patterns open to theUSSR makes it difficult to estimate which air-fields the USSR might employ in an initialattack, sufficient intelligence is available tomake a logical selection as to which of theforward airfields will be most suitable forstaging bomber operations. Therefore, we be-

lieve that the most likely Soviet choices of baseareas for an initial air attack against the con-tinental US would be the Chukotski, Kam-.chatka, Central Arctic, Kola, and Leningradareas. In addition, some BEAR aircraft couldbe launched from interior bases.

59. In order to determine the general orderof magnitude of Soviet capabilities for aninitial attack against the US in mid-1960,.we have considered the available intelligenceon runway lengths, POL, maintenance, otherbase facilities, and accessibility for supplypurposes, and have arrived at an estimate ofa probable maximum capacity of each of theforward bases for staging bomber aircraft.All bases that we have selected for the stagingof heavy bombers have runway lengths of atleast 7,900 feet and are considered to havean average maximum staging capacity of 30heavy or 60 medium bombers. Those selectedfor staging medium bombers only have gener-ally fewer base facilities, but have runwaysestimated to be at least 6,000 feet in length.Their maximum staging capacities are consid-ered as varying from 30 to 60 medium bomb-ers, depending on the facilities at each base."Although usable on the basis of estimatedaircraft performance figures, existing runwaysat many of these airfields are considerablybelow the standards normally associated withSoviet long-range bomber bases.

60. The following planning factors, based onUS experience and estimated Soviet capabil-ities, have been assumed:

a. 90 percent of aircraft at home base incommission after stand-down;

b. 85 percent of those aircraft departinghome bases can be launched from stagingbases (includes attrition enroute to and whileat staging bases) ;

c. 80 percent of those bomber aircraftlaunched on unfueled missions will arrive intarget area (excluding combat attrition);

d. 75 percent of those bomber aircraftlaunched on missions utilizing inffight refuel-ing will arrive in target areas (excluding com-bat attrition) ; and

For estimated staging capacities of individualbases in each of the forward areas, see AnnexD (limited distribution under separate cover).

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e. An allowance of one tanker aircraft pro-vided for each bomber refueled in flight (com-patible tanker assumed).

Maximum Strike Forces for Air Attackin Mid-1960

61. For the purposes of this estimate, the onlyfactors used in determining the maximumbomber force the USSR could launch againstthe continental US in mid-1960 are the esti-mated strength of Soviet Long-Range Avia-tion, the estimated capacity of the forwardstaging areas, and the operational planningfactors given in paragraph 60. Among thefactors specifically excluded from the calcula-tions are Soviet requirements for attack onareas outside the continental US, and for re-attack after the initial strikes. These factorswould reduce the number of bombers actuallycommitted to an initial attack on the con-tinental US.

62. =I We estimate that in mid-1960, SovietLong-Range Aviation will include an increasednumber of bomber aircraft, a greater pro-portion of heavy bombers, and a tanker fleetadequate to support a portion of its heavybomber force. By that date, the capacity ofthe forward staging areas could have been in-creased to permit the launching of the entirebomber force on a combination of refueledand unrefueled missions. Under these cir-cumstances, and assuming that all aircraftwere launched from staging bases rather thanhome bases, the maximum mid-1960 Sovietstrike capability would be as follows:

AvailableAfter

Stand-down

Launchedfrom

StagingBases

Arrivingin

TargetAreas •

BADGER 830 535 428

BISON 450 382 300

BEAR 270 230 184

TANKER 135' 115'

Total 1,485 1,282 912

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'Not considering combat losses.'These figures assume that all tankers employedwill be heavy tankers compatible with the BISON.This does not take into account the fact thatBADGER tankers could be employed as an in-terim measure to refuel BISONS or Other BADG-ERS. (See paragraph 21.)

16

We have assumed the following method ofemployment:

Two- One-Way Two- Way TotalUn- Way Un- Bombers

refueled Refueled refueled LaunchedBADGER 535 535BISON 287 115 382BEAR 230 230

Total 497 115. 535 1,147

63. If the USSR attempted to achieve sur-prise, it could employ several alternativemethods of attack against the continental USin mid-1960, at the cost of reducing the weightof attack:

a. The USSR could elect to employ onlyheavy bombers in an initial attack, launchingthem from the forward staging bases. In thiscase, as indicated in the table above, 612 couldbe launched in a combination of refueled andunrefueled two-way missions, and 484 couldarrive in targets areas, not considering com-bat losses.

b. It could elect to employ only heavy bomb-ers, launching them from home bases. In thiscase 720 could be launched and 569 could ar-rive in target areas, not considering combatlosses. This alternative would require thatall the BISONS be employed on one-way mis-sions and that almost all the BEARS be re-fueled if they were to be employed on two-waymissions.

c. It could elect to employ medium as wellas heavy bombers in various combinationsdesigned to achieve the maximum weight ofattack possible without jeopardizing surprise.

64. Allocation to ECM and Diversicmary Tasks.All attacking bombers would probably pos-sess some ECM capability in mid-1960. It isalso possible that some portion of the aircraftin the attacking force would be assigned ex-clusively as specialized ECM aircraft for pur-poses which might include diversion and de-coy use. Such aircraft would probably beemployed to assist bombers in carrying out

"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-partment of the Army, does not concur in themaximum mid-1960 Soviet strike capabilities asestimated in paragraphs 62 and 63. (See hisfootnote to paragraph 14.)

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C 0 0 2 6 7 6 4 9

attacks against extremely important targets,particularly those which would be involved inUS retaliatory action.

VII. ATTACKS BY GUIDED MISSILES

Submarine-Launched Missiles"65. We believe that in mid-1960, submarine-launched missiles probably would be used incoordination with nuclear strikes by aircraftin any Soviet plan of attack against the con-tinental US. In mid-1960, the USSR mayhave available about 30 submarine equippedto launch guided missiles. If the USSR at-tempted to achieve surprise in an initial at-tack in mid-1960, we believe that it wouldconsider that the deployment of a relativelysmall number of guided missile submarinescould be accomplished without jeopardizingsurprise. This risk would be minimal in thecase of nuclear-powered guided missile sub-marines, but no more than eight of these arelikely to be operational in mid-1960.66. Since the submarine must necessarily sur-face and remain surfaced for about five to 10minutes to launch a missile, it would be vul-nerable to radar detection during that time.If the submarine were operating at periscopedepth while actively guiding a missile it wouldbe vulnerable to both active radar and pas-sive electronic intercept detection. Nuclear-powered submarines are likely to be large andwould be just as vulnerable to active sonardetection as conventional submarines of com-parable size. Any antisonar coatings avail-able to the USSR would be difficult and costlyto apply, would have a relatively short effec-tive life, and would be ineffective at deep sub-mergence because of distortion of the materialunder hydrostatic pressure. Based on US ex-perience, a submerged nuclear-powered boatcan be expected to be less noisy than a snor-keling diesel submarine at speeds below 17knots, and thus less susceptible to detectionby passive underwater intercept. However, atspeeds above 17 knots the nuclear-poweredboat would be at least as detectable. At sub-merged speeds below nine knots, the nuclear-powered boat would be virtually undetectable

n For estimated range coverage of continental US,see map 21, Annex B.

17

by LOFAR, and might even go undetected atsubmerged speed as high as 15 knots.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)67. As indicated in paragraph 42, we be-lieve that in mid-1960 the USSR could em-ploy only a few, if any, ICBMs against thecontinental US. Because the system relia-bility, accuracy, and nuclear warhead yieldof the ICBM are estimated to be considerablylower than those of manned bombers in mid-1960, we believe that any ICBMs available tothe USSR at that date would be used to aug-ment bomber attacks, rather than to replaceany mission aircraft.

Air-Launched Missiles68. A supersonic air-to-surface missile of 55n.m. range could to some extent improve thecapabilities of Soviet medium and heavybombers to attack heavily-defended US tar-gets. However, their warheads would havelower yields than available nuclear bombsand their guidance radar would restrict theireffectiveness to well-defined targets.

VIII. CLANDESTINE ATTACKClandestine Delivery of Nuclear

Weapons69. We have no evidence as to any Sovietplans or preparations for clandestine deliveryof nuclear weapons against the. US. How-ever, during the period of this estimate theUSSR will be capable of producing nuclearweapons which could be smuggled into theUS either as complete assemblies or as com-ponent parts of subassemblies. These couldrange from small-yield weapons

3 up to the highest-yield device the USSR was capable of produc-ing. All of these weapons or devices could bedesigned to break down into transportablecomponents. Those designed to give a rel-atively low yield would not require muchlabor or technical training for assembly. Con-siderably more labor and training would berequired to assemble weapons designed to givehigh yields, and, once assembled, they would

C00267649be more difficult to transport. The size andweight of any multimegaton device would tendto limit its use other than as a fixed instal-lation in the hold of a merchant vessel, in atruck-trailer, or in premises with diplomaticimmunity.

70. Considering the known limitations of themeans of physical detection, the USSR couldprobably introduce into the US and detonateIn place a considerable number of nuclearweapons by clandestine means. A variety ofmethods of clandestine delivery suggest them-selves. Assembled weapons could be droppedby apparently friendly aircraft, detonated inthe hold of a merchant ship, or sown as under-water mines by submarines and possibly bymerchant ships. Either components or as-sembled weapons could be brought in underdiplomatic immunity, smuggled across land orsea frontiers, introduced through normal im-port channels, or brought in as bonded mer-chandise awaiting transshipment.71. In introducing nuclear weapons clandes-tinely into the US, the USSR would have totake into account not only the estimatedchances of detection but also the conse-quences of detection, including the loss ofsurprise in any intended overt attack and thepossible provocation of US military action.As the number of weapons clandestinely in-troduced was increased, the risk of compro-mise would grow. This increased risk wouldbe less a function of the physical means ofdetection (the effectiveness of which is ex-tremely limited) than of the possibilities ofUS penetration of the Communist apparatus,of the defection of a trusted agent, or of sheeraccident. The USSR could not be confidentthat none of these mischances would occur.We conclude that, although clandestine at-tack with nuclear weapons might be madeagainst specially selected targets, as a sup-plement to overt attacks, the use of largenumbers of such weapons would probably beprecluded by security considerations.

Clandestine Use of BW andCW Weapons

72. We estimate that the USSR has a capa-bility for the clandestine delivery of BW

18

agents against targets in the continental US.Most BW agents are peculiarly adaptable toclandestine utilization, since detection of theirintended use would be difficult. Even small-scale employment of BW agents against live-stock could be highly effective. BW attacksagainst personnel concentrated in selectedbuildings could also be effective. AnticropBW operations could be carried out clandes-tinely, with possible damaging effects underproper environmental conditions.

73. CW agents are not as suitable to clandes-tine operations as BW agents. The effects aremore readily identifiable and a much greatereffort would be necessary to deliver quantitiesrequired for lethal concentrations over largeareas. Although it probably would not befeasible to accumulate CW agents or dissem-ination devices for more than limited attacksagainst population centers in the US, CW at-tacks against personnel in buildings couldbe effective. In this connection, psycho-chemical agents could be employed againstkey personnel in buildings or select groupsin small areas.

Conventional Sabotage

74. The USSR is capable of subversion, espi-onage, and widespread sabotage in the USthrough the use of existing subversive ele-ments and the placement of foreign agents.Sabotage could not be undertaken on a largescale prior to air attack without forfeitingsurprise. Attempts to sabotage US trans-portation, industrial, and communicationsfacilities, as well as military installations,could be expected concurrent with and im-mediately following surprise attack by theUSSR. Communist Party members and ad-herents are capable of organizing saboteurunits, of varying sizes and equipped withsmall arms and other suitable material, whichcould strike at specially selected and widelyseparated targets simultaneously and with-out warning. Whether these attacks wouldbe timed with a surprise military attack orcarried out after the initial attack would bedependent upon the Soviet appraisal of therelative advantages of such action.

TOP 013CIIET

a .7

C00267649

ANNEX A

BASE AREAS SUITABLE FOR LONG-RANGE BOMBER OPERATIONS

1. Chukotski Peninsula. As the result of run-way construction believed to have been car-ried out at several airfields within the pastthree years, we believe that at least six air-fields probably now have runways long enoughfor staging medium bombers and that at leastfive of these are suitable for heavy bomberoperations. Three other airfields have run-ways whose characteristics indicate a mar-ginal capability for medium bomber opera-tions. Military air units are based on someairfields in the Chukotski area, but none aresubordinate to Long-Range Aviation.

2. Air operations in this area are made diffi-cult by several factors. Recent constructionof long, surfaced runways indicates that cli-matic and logistical difficulties of this areaare being overcome. However, ice and com-pacted snow runways are also still in use.There are some indications that the USSR issteadily improving its operational potentialthrough installation of modern radio naviga-tion facilities. In addition, the USSR hasan ever-increasing fund of Arctic experiencewhich can be applied to staging operations inthis area.

3. Cold, wind, snow, and fog, which are preva-lent throughout the area, tend to make opera-tions difficult and hazardous. The most un-favorable weather conditions occur duringNovember through March. , The most favor-able conditions occur at all stations duringthe spring and early summer. Weather in

1 in order to estimate the seasonal suitability ofaverage weather conditions in potential stagingareas, the percentage frequency of occurrence ofthose conditions which would handicap the massmovement of aircraft into or out of staging areaswas computed. Two conditions were selected asa basis for analysis: (1) ceiling/visibility lessthan 300 feet/one mile; (2) temperature below—20 F., although with adequate preparationsstaging operations could be carried out success-fully In temperatures below —20' F.

the interior is highly favorable during thesummer months. Only those areas adjacentto the Chuckchee Sea or which lie along theBering Sea coast have a relatively high inci-dence of unfavorable conditions during themidsummer months.

4. The status of base logistical support facili-ties required to stage long-range strike oper-ations from the Chukotski area is unknown.The area is accessible only by air and by seaduring the ice-free season, and supply prob-lems would be difficult. However, the USSRis considered capable of stockpiling the nec-essary supplies. Moreover, the area's stag-ing potential could be markedly increased by1960. By using construction elements alreadyavailable in the area the USSR could buildtwo additional concrete surfaced runwayssuitable for staging heavy bombers by 1960.

5. Kola Peninsula. The Kola Peninsula hasat least 14 bases with runways long enoughfor staging medium bombers. At least oneof these airfields would be suitable for heavybombers. Permanent-surfaced , runways canbe constructed throughout the area withoutdifficulty as it is relatively free of permafrost.

6. Prevailing climatic conditions, while a re-strictive factor on air operations, are rela-tively more favorable than in other regionsof the Soviet Far North. In general, the mostfavorable conditions occur in the late springand early summer. In late summer and earlyautumn, conditions are favorable except atbases adjacent to the cold waters of the WhiteSea. However, during May through Octoberconditions are favorable at all locations over90 percent of the time. In winter, conditionsare less favorable due to the more frequentoccurrence of low ceilings and poor visibili-ties. Extremely cold temperatures are rela-tively infrequent, and occur less than 10 per-cent of the time at any base.

1960 by employing airfield construction unitsnow in the area. Improvement of existingairfields would require only a minimum ofadditional construction, as there are already20 other airfields in the Leningrad area withconcrete runways long enough for mediumbomber operations. None of these additionalbases, however, are known to be associatedcurrently with Long-Range Aviation opera-tions. Operations from this area by long-range aircraft would offer the advantage of atemperate climate and good logistical support.

11. The bases in this area have the most favor-able weather during the late spring and sum-mer, when about 97 to 99 percent of the timeis favorable for operations. Even duringautumn and winter 88 to 90 percent of theweather is favorable at all bases. There ap-pears to be little difference between night-time and daytime weather except during Sep-tember, October, and November. During thesemonths, reduced visibility sometimes occursduring the early morning hours. Tempera-tures below —20° F. occur less than five per-cent of the time at all bases.

12. Kamchatka-Sea of Okhotsk Area. Onlytwo airfields in this area are considered ade-quate for medium bombers, and only one ofthese is considered suitable for heavy bomb-ers. Three other airfields have runways withmarginal capabilities for medium bomber op-erations. Long-range staging capabilitiesfrom this area are therefore estimated to beextremely limited, but two additional run-ways could be constructed to accommodateheavy bombers by 1960.

13. The weather in this area is relativelyfavorable for air operations. Throughout theyear the weather on the east coast of Kam-chatka Peninsula is the most favorable in theentire area. In the Magadan area the bestweather occurs during the early spring andautumn.

14. Baltic-East Germany. Poland and the So-viet Zone of Germany have a total of at least70 airfields from which medium and heavybomber operations could be mounted againstthe US and US bases in Western Europe.However, a disadvantage of this area as abase for air attacks on North America is that

C002676497. The status of base logistical support facili-ties required to conduct long-range bomberstrikes from airfields in this area is unknown,but it is considered that logistics would notbe an important limiting factor. Supplyroutes by rail and road are open to the KolaPeninsula on a year-round basis, althoughlogistical support of large-scale air operationswould still pose difficulties under extremeweather conditions. Moreover, the stagingpotential of the area could be readily in-creased. With construction elements alreadyin the area, three additional concrete-surfacedrunways suitable for heavy bombers could beconstructed by 1960.

8. Central Arctic. An airfield constructionand development program in this area hasbeen in progress since early 1949. The devel-opment program was carried out for Polar Av4-ation of the Northern Sea Route Administra-tion, but at least seven airfields now in exist-ence probably have runways of sufficientlength to handle the staging of medium bomb-ers. Of these, three are probably suitable forthe staging of heavy bombers. Two other air-fields in this area have runways with marginalcapabilities for medium bomber operations.However, logistical support would be difficult,probably requiring heavy stockpiling. Con-struction elements in the area could buildtwo additional runways suitable for heavybombers by mid-1960.

9. The major handicap to air operations inthis area arises from the frequency and per-sistence of extremely low temperatures. Forexample, at Tiksi over 50 percent of all obser-vations during January record temperatureslower than —20° F. Jet engines, however, areless adversely affected by low temperaturesthan piston engines and jet take-off require-ments are considerably reduced. The summermonths are not very favorable due to the highfrequency of fog in the coastal belt.

10. Leningrad. This area contains at leastthree home bases of Long-Range Aviationunits equipped with BULL and BADGER air-craft. These bases probably have runwaysof sufficient length for heavy bomber opera-tions. Three additional runways suitable forheavy bombers could be constructed by mid-

%E 21C00267649

Great Circle routes pass over nations friend-ly to the .US. In addition, it would be moredifficult than in other forward base areas tomaintain security of preparations, and thearea is more vulnerable to NATO attack.However, climatic conditions are most favor-able and there would be relatively few logisti-cal problems. This base complex is servedadequately by all types of transportation.

15. The bases located in the Baltic coastalarea are most suitable for air operations dur-

ing April through August, when favorableconditions occur about 97 percent of the time,both day and night. The least favorableperiod is December through March, when fre-quency of favorable conditions drops to about75 percent. However, the unfavorable condi-tions occur most often during the night andearly morning hours. The mid-day hours arefavorable for operations about 85 percent ofthe time. Very low temperatures are rare inthis area.

C00267649

ANNEX B

MAPS AND SUMMARY CHARTS

I. GENERAL

The following maps show estimated Sovietlong-range aircraft and submarine-launchedguided missile radius/range capabilities underselected conditions against the continentalUS through mid-1960. The maps depictingthe capabilities of the BISON (nos. 9-12) andBADGER (nos. 5-8) are based on estimatedperformance characteristics of improved ver-sions of these aircraft estimated to be avail-able in mid-1956 and in 1957, respectively.The estimated capabilities of the standardversions of these two aircraft types are shownin boxes included on the appropriate maps.The estimated capabilities of the modifiedBULL and improved BEAR are shown in boxeson the maps dealing with the standard ver-sions of these aircraft.

Estimated range coverage under refueledconditions is particularly difficult to depictsince many different routes and refuel pointscould be used by Soviet strike forces. There-fore, it should be noted that this coverageassumes certain routes and refuel points, andunder different assumptions the indicatedcoverage would be somewhat altered.

II. RANGE COMPUTATION

In all cases the estimated coverage is basedon ranges calculated in accordance with

standard US military mission profiles. Forestimating ranges under unrefueled conditionsit has been assumed that Great Circle routeswould be flown, although such flights wouldhave to transit major Western warning anddefense positions. For refueled flights, how-ever, routes indicated show possible approach-es intended to avoid overflight of major West-ern defense and warning systems. Totalranges indicated assume a Soviet refuelingcapability permitting a range extension ofapproximately 35 percent.

III. BASE MAP

The base used for all maps is a simplifiedversion of a US target system which Sovietplanners might seek to attack. It is intendedonly to indicate the general geographical dis-tribution of possible US targets, and shouldnot be considered as a definitive picture ofthe US target complex. Moreover, it does notreflect programmed changes or other changeslikely to occur between now and mid-1960.

IV. SUMMARY CHARTS

These charts are included for conveniencein comparing the radius/range capabilities ofall Soviet long-range bombers, if launchedfrom the Chukotski, Kola, or Moscow areas.They are based on the same calculations andassumptions used in preparing the maps.

T

ANNEX C

TABLE I

ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT(Calculated In accordance with US Mil-C-5011A (Spec))

Modified ' Improved • Improved • ImprovedCONDITIONS BULL BULL BADGER BADGER BISON BISON BEAR BEAR

(1957) (1956) (1957)Combat Radius/Range (nm.)

_ _ _ _ 2200/4300 2500/4700 3500/8800 3400/8300a. 25,000-lb. bomb loadone refuel • 3000/5800 3400/8400 4750 4600

b. 10,000-1b. bomb load 1700/3100 2000/3600 1500/2900 1900/3700 2450/4800 2750/5300 3900/7800 3800/7300one refuel • 2300/4200 2700/4900 2050/3900 2550/5000 3300/6500 3700/7200 5300 5100

c. 3,500-1b. bomb load 1950/3500 2300/4100 1700/3400 2100/4200 2550/5000 2800/5800 4100/8200 4000/7800one refuel • 2850/4700 3100/5500 2300/4800 2850/5700 3450/8800 3800/7600 5800 5400

Speed/Altitude (kn./ft.)

350/30,000

310/30,000

360/30,000

340/35,000

545/12,500

475/41,000

550/12,500

470/43,000

535/18,800

475/41,500

540/19,000

475/44,500

495/21,400

435/40,000

510/21,400

440/42,900

a. Max. speed atoptimum alt.

b. Target speed/Target alt.

Combat Ceiling (ft.) 38,500 37,500 45,000 48,000 43,800 48,500 40,700 45,400

•Refueling estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which will provide approximately 35 percent increase in radius/range.`Stripped and altered for longer range in a manner similar to the US B29B.•Improvements include the replacement of the 18,000-1b. thrust engines with those having a thrust of 20,500 lbs.'Based on Installation of engines with improved altitude rating.

23

CONDITIONS

Combat Radius/Range (nm.)

a. 25,000-lb. bomb loadone refuel •

b. 10,000-lb. bomb loadone refuel •

c. 3,500-1b. bomb loadone refuel •

Speed/Altitude (km/ft.)

a. Max. speed atoptimum alt.

b. Target speed/Target alt.

Combat Ceiling (ft.)

Terminal Target Altitude (M)

a. 25,000-1b. bomb load

b. 10,000-lb. bomb load

c. 3,500-lb. bomb load

Na, A-1 1-•

t.9TA13LE II

ESTIMATED SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE UNDER AN OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE

(Calculated in accordance with US Mil-C-5011A Spec except that fuel reservesare reduced to permit a maximum of 30 minutes loiter at sea level, and

aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range)

Modified • Improved' Improved' Improved •BULL BULL BADGER BADGER BISON BISON BEAR BEAR

(1957) (1958) (1957)

- - - - 2500/4800 2800/5300 3800/7200 3800/71003400/8500 3800/7200 5100 5100

1800/3300 2150/4000 1800/3100 2050/4000 2800/5400 3100/6100 4250/8300 4300/83002400/4500 2900/5400 2200/4200 2750/5400 3800/7300 4200/8200 5750 5800

2050/3700 2450/4600 1850/3700 2300/4500 2900/5700 3200/8400 4500/8900 4500/89002750/5000 3350/8200 2500/5000 3100/8100 3900/7700 4300/8800 6100 6050

350/30,000 380/30,000 545/12,500 550/12,500 535/18,800 540/19,000 495/21,600 505/21,000

310/30,000 340/35,000 475/41,500 470/43,500 475/42,400 475/45,500 410/42,100 430/44,900

36,500 37,500 45,500 46,500 44,600 47,500 41,300 48,000

- - - 52,600 55,200 48,200 50,100

41,500 42,500 49,500 51,800 53,200 58,000 50,200 52,100

42,000 43,000 51,000 53,000 54,600 57,000 51,200 53,100

•Refuelin g estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which will provide approximately 35 percent increase In radius/range.' Service ceiling at maximum power with one hour fuel reserves plus bomb load aboard. No range figure is associated with this altitude.•Stripped and altered for longer range in a manner similar to the US B29B.'Improvements include the replacement of the 18,000-1b. thrust engines with those having a thrust of 20,500 lbs.*Based on installation of engines with improved altitude rating.

24

BEST COPY

AVAILARLE

*WelterCHART 1

UNREFUELEDBULL (Std.)

BULL (Mod.)

BADGER (Std.)

BADGER (Imp.)

BISON (Std.)

BISON (Imp.)

BEAR

SOVIET AIRCRAFT RADIUS/RANGE CAPABILITIES SUMMARYFrom the Chukotski Area

APPROXIMATE AREA OF U.S. COVERED(In percent of total: see maps 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, //, /3, /5)

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Nor ro Sa.ile

REFUELED

BULL (Std.)

BULL (Mod.)

BADGER (Std.)

BADGER (Imp.)

BISON (Std.)

BISON (Imp.)

BEAR

10 000 lbTWO-WAY Bomb Load

3 500 lbBomb Load 0

25755

1.5

CDCD

gtr.ot co, C5l"1"dip

•

CHART 2 l.0

APPROXIMATE AREA OF U.S. COVERED( In percent of total: see maps 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, /4, /6)

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Not to Scale

10,000 lb 3,500 lo

TWO-WAY Bomb Load Bomb Load

ONE-WAY0•■■••■■:)

10,000 lb 3,500 lb.Bomb Load Bomb Load SEERET

SOVIET AIRCRAFT RADIUS/RANGE CAPABILITIES SUMMARYFrom the Kola Area

UNREFUELED

BULL (Std.)

BULL (Mod.)

BADGER (Std.)

BADGER (Imp.)

BISON (Std.)

BISON (Imp.)

BEAR

REFUELED

BULL (Std.)

BULL (Mod.)

BADGER (Std.)

BADGER (Imp.)

BISON (Std.)

BISON (Imp.)

BEAR

25756 1.57

APPROXIMATE AREA OF U.S. COVERED(In percent of total: see maps /7 to 20)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

80 90 100 Not co Scale

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ONE-WAY 0

l0 300 lh COO th cr.eirsricr'

BEST COPY•-]

AVAILABLE=

Sfettrir CHART 3

SOVIET AIRCRAFT RADIUS/RANGE CAPABILITIES SUMMARYFrom the Moscow Area

UNREFUELED

BULL (Std.)

BULL (Mod.)

BADGER (Std.)

BADGER (Imp.)

BISON (Std.)

BISON (Imp.)

BEAR

REFUELED

BULL (Std.)

BULL (Mod.)

BADGER (Std.)

BADGER (Imp.)

BISON (Std.)

BISON (Imp.)

BEAR

25757 1,57

2

0 Uerkar

Nz/

Note MODIFIED PULLrn. o 1106, 10.000 1b bol,th load, 2,000 NM

IWO , WAY, ISO° lb Bomb LonG, 2,300 NM

ONE WAY, 10 OW lb 0000 Load, 3,600 NM

' 010 NAY 3,500 10 Bornb Load, 4,100 NM

Map 1 —

P', Two-wAy, :0 oeo lb Bomb Load, 1,700 NM

1WO-W.AY, 3.500 lb. Bomb Load, 1,950 NM

L -] ONE WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 3,100 NM

ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb, Bomb Load. 3,500 NM2,3,ro; 6.1, 3i • Md101 Iaq'et

41'

•

252'39■•■■••`.1•10 ■•••■••■111,

55 ,A3 1•5

C00267649 BEST COPY

CAPABILITY OF STANDARD BULL, UNREFUELED AVM ARVFrom the Chukotski Area 4arkGRET

C00267649 riCAPABILITY OF STANDARD BULL, UNREFUELED BEST n"

From the Kola Area, 4:EeREr

Al urtti

Not MODIFIED BULL1300 WAY, 10 000 16 Ran% Load, 2,000 NM

1150 WAY, 3,500 lb Bomb Load, 2.300 NM

ONE WAY, 10,000 lb Bomb Load. 350C NV, ONE WAY, 3,500 II Bomb Load, 4.100 NAY

Ii

/ --

Map 2TWO WAY, 10,000 IL Bomb Load, 1)00 NM

TWO WAY, 3,500 lb Bomb Load, 1,950 NM

ONE WAY, 10,000 lb Bomb Load, 3,100 NM

ONE .WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 3,500 NM

CMIVII SAC Base • Y.) , large' Clty

25240 I 56 (Bevis,' I 521

Not'. MODIFIED BULLTWO WAY, 10000 10 Bomb Load, 2,700 NMTWO WAY, 1.500 IS Bomb load, 3,100 NONE WAY, 10.000 15. Bomb load, 4,900 NMONE WAY, 3.500 lb Bomb load, 5,500 NI4

Isas,mag ilinslrates coverage attainlewith ccrtethi=ble flight paterns a ngthe many op open lo Sa y re P l a n erS.f or delailed inloirwatron t on radius angecapabilibes under vandus.condrtio , seeAuer. C.

Map 3

1SYD-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,300 NM

1WO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,650 NM

L,_ I ONE . WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 4,200 NM

ONLWAY, 3,500 lb, Bomb Load, 4,700 NMA Curren: SAC Base • Maio, largel City

25:4 I 1 !,6 (Revised 1 57)

C00267649 BEST C'n DvCAPABILITY OF STANDARD BULL, REFUELED AvAup

From the Chukotski Area Hem"

C00267649CAPABILITY OF STANDARD BULL, REFUELE

From the Kola Area

EST CO PYYA0 An'

4ECRET

Noe, MODIFIED BULLIY40-WAY, 10.000 M. Bomb load, 2,700 NMTWO -0635, 3,500 15 Bomb load, 3,100 NONE-WAY, 10,000 lb Boors 0.1,4,900 NM...,,,,....„,...,,,,,.ONE WAY, 3,500 15, Bomb load, 5,500 N

.4

Ms map illustrates coverage aBamatheh gya nOykigoQs,s,Mol 4 i,:n g, I spoavtiteer ,nsg

for detailed intovosoinn on radius/ nge.capablImes under vimms_condrlion , oneAnnex C

Map 4TWO-WAY, 10,000 lo 1i3C111 Load, 2,305 NM

TWO WAY, 3,500 lb, Bomb Load, 2,650 NM

ONLWAY, 10,000 lb Bomb Load, 4,200 NM

ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 4,700 NM

Currenl SAC Base • Major large! City

25 2 0 2 I 56 (Revmed IS?)

Note: STANDARD BADGERIWO WAY. 10,000 IS Eiumb Load, 1,S00 NM /IWO WAY, 3,510 lb Bomb Load, 1.700 NM,ONE WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2.900 Nisi035 WAY, 3,500 lb Bomb Load, 3A00

Map 5[ TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb Bomb Load, 1.900 NM

L_iiii TWC WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,100 NM

[ .1 ONE WAY, 10.000 lb Bomb Load, 3,700 NM

[ ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb Bomb Load, 4,200 NMt.orr,,li • ,11,yo Iarget C.ty

C00267649 BEST COPYCAPABILITY OF IMPROVED BADGER, UNREFUELED maw

From the Chukotski Area morn

C00267649BEST COPYCAPABILITY OF IMPROVED BADGER, UNREFUELED A VAILABL rFrom the Kola AreaSWAM

Not, STANDARD BADGERIWO . WAY, 10,000 lb Bomb load, 1,500 NM /IWO WAY.1 500 lb Bomb load, 1.700 NM /ONE WAY, 10,000 lb Bomb load, 2,900 N

N,093 WAY, 3,5000 Bomb load 3,490 N

•••.,

.410 44111L,%1111111*r

14i NWr le.

AA Ar •

\*

Map 61010 WAY. 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 1,900 NM

Li TWO WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,100 NM1 ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 3,700 NM

1 — 1 ONE WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 4,200 NM

Caroni SAC Hose • Major large! Crty

•—.5eetrEr•1 55 (iteatsed ),5/1

C00267649 CAPABILITY OF IMPROVED BADGER, REFUELED AvAILAR I -From the Chukotski Area SECRET

STANDARD BADGERTWO WAY, !Odd° lb Bomb Load. 7,050 NM

IWO WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb load. 2.300 NM

ONE-WAY, 10.000 lb Bornb Load, 3,900 LIM/

0145 WAY, 3.500 lb Bomb load. 4,600 NM

INS Map illustrates coverage attoea46lecCiLam possible NIA pallerns 00$50

the m an y o0Nods open lo Soviet plan ersOar deladed in loimallon on radlus/ angecapabdmes alder vaNdos 0OrdllO3t, SceAnnex C

Map 7[ _ TWO WAY, 10.000 lb Bomb Load, 2.550 NM

1WO-WAY, 3,500 b Oomb Load, 2,850 NM

ONE-WAY, 10.000 lb Bomb Load, 5,000 NM

L. ONE WAY. 3.500 lb. Bomb Load, 5,700 NM

Current Sale • Motor Tal gel City

20005 5 56 (Revised I 55,

C00267649 BEST COPYCAPABILITY OF IMPROVED BADGER, REFUELED AVAILABLEFrom the Kola Area sEeRrr

STANDARD BADGERIWO WAY. 10.000 lb Bomb Load, 2,050 NM11.113-WAY, 3,500 lb Bomb load, 2,300 NMCAIC WAY, 10.000 lb. Bomb load. 3,900 NM0140 WAY, 3 500 lb Bomb load, 4,00 MAI

w ith ''axip%';oLiss'irbl'eVIITIeeriVs174the many oetiOm open lo SOV,ei planersFor detailed inloirealor on radius/ angecapabilities under 'conmlmtmoryt, seeAnnex C

Map 8TWO WAY, 10,000 ft). Bomb Load, 2,550 NM

11---J TWO-WAY, 3,500 Bomb Load, 2,850 NM

1 ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb Booth Load, 5,000 NMri ONE WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 5,700 NMto Cur,ent SAC Hare • Maior a[gel Cily

2 5 246 1 56 (Revised 1.57/

CO 0267649CAPABILITY OF IMPROVED BISON, UNREFUELED

From the Chukotski Area

,OEST COPY

AVARABLF

AGM'

Uerk—a,

Not.. STANDARD BISONTWO-WAY. 0500 lb Bomb Load, 2,450 NM

TWO WAY, 2,500 lb Bomb Load, 2,550 NM

ONE WAY. :0.000 lb Bomb Load, 4,830 NW

ONE WAY, 3,500 lb Bomb Load. 5.000 h17/

4.

Map 9 LE_1'7-11

TV/0 WAY, 10.000 lb Bomb Load, 2,750 NM

IWO WAY, 3,500 lb, Bomb Load, ma NM

ON•WAY. 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 5,300 NM

ONE WAY, 3,500 lb Bomb Load, 5,600 NM

• Ma,o, 2argel Lay2. CI111,11( SA

AN

A\

TWO WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,000 NM

ONE-WAY, 10,030 lb. Bomb Load, 5,300 NM

EJ ONE-WAY, :1,500 lb Bomb Load, 5,600 NM

A isoI SAC [law • Map 1,0 City

25248 56 1805,5100 1171

C00267649 BEST COPY

CAPABILITY OF IMPROVED BISON, UNREFUELED AVAILABLE

TAGRET-0From the Kola Area

<NN

Map 10I \0 WAY, 10.0 lb Bumb Load, 2,750 NM

No STANDARD BISONTWO WAY, 10,000 lb 8umb lo3d, 7.450 NM

TWO WAY. 3,500 lb. Bomb Lo g , 2,1,50 NM

051 wAY 10.000 lb bomb Load, 4800 NM

ONE L.,,LL, 500 lb Bomb Load 5.000

\egeeirrIlL \

C00267649 LAFAIIILI I Y UF IMPliUVED BISON, REFUELEDFrom the Chukotski Area

-BEST COPYru m AYil0. API r

• v:

Note:- STANDARD BISON7110)-WAY, 10.000 lb. Bomb Load, 3.300 NM/11SO WAY, 3.500 lb Bomb Load, 3,150 NM

ONE WAY 10.000 lb Elornb load, 6,500 NM

ONE-WAY 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 6.800 N

Illustrams coverage altame ew.th certaiY-plasmble llight pa:terns am nglbc many opbofts,ypen to Soloiel plan usFol detailed informammy on ,adlus/ an•cal:Id:Abet undef vartoui - coOtIon , see

C

Map 1113,0 WOO, 10,000 lb Bomb Load, 3,700 NM

TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. 003115 Load, 3,800 NM

ONE WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 7,200 NM

A C,Nrcrc SAC Rase • Malor Target Oily

171I_ .1

20249 1 55, (Revised 571

C00267649CAPABILITY OF IMPROVED BISON, REFUELED

From the Kola Area

BEST COPYAVM.

*SECRET"

Not, STANDARD BISON1W0 . WAY 10000 lb Bomb load, 3,300 NMTWO WAY, 3.500 lb Bomb Load, 3,450 NMONE WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 6.500 NMONE WAY. 3 530 lb Bomb Load, 6.1300 NM

Id'Olsa , llus lares cos vsge.91 necw, possple bighl pdBerns arno,II! 11303 earns Inn la 53,■el planne sPo, detailed infarreal■alt —tag radiusgra ,aerepabl:nes unier sari 333 c3n404200. oneAso. C

--/

Map 12

TWO WAY, 10,003 lb Bomb Load, 3.100 NM

TWO WAY, 3.500 lb. Bomb Load, 3,800 NM

ON[ WAY, 10.000 lb. Bomb Load, 7,200 NM

• Map/ Target Lily

25250 I 50 (Revised I 5•//

C00267649BEST COPYAVAILABLE

CAPABILITY OF BEAR, UNREFUELEDFrom the Chukotski Area

—

Note IMPROVED BEAR1010 WAY , 10,000 tb Bomb Load. 300 NM /IWO WAY. :.500 lb 90mb toad, 4.000 NM /051 wAY, 10 0000,3 Bono 1.6.01. /.300 NM /

)

/

Map 13_ 1 TWO WAY, 10.000 lb Bomb Load, 3,900 NM

1 590 . 0109, 3,500 5 Bomb Load, 4,100 NM

[J 065 WAY, 10,000 lb Bomb Load, 7,600 NM

• Mao,

-4reerrr2 5751 1•56 ;Revi,,,1 I 51,

CO 0267649CAPABILITY OF BEAR, UNREFUELED

From the Kola Area

BEST COPY

AVAILABLE

IlteltET

1

/

Noie IMPROVED BEAR010. 10.000 'I, Rom) toad. 3.800 NM /

V1/0 7070 . 3.50010 Haut load. 4 000 NM01/1 '001 IC.000 II Bumb Loa 7.300 NM/

Map 14

IWO WAY 10,000 lb Bomb load, 3,900 NM

LWO WAY, 3.500 lb Bomb Load, 4,100 NM

ONE WAY, 10,000 lb Bomb Load, 7.600 NM

I i 7Sc • Map, lilt C./y

25250 I 56 (Revlsed I 57) WAIT

••r .

•4

-1

•

•A )

4 . •Not,. imPROVED BEARTWO We, 10 000 10 Bomb load 5100 NMIWO WOO . 3 500 1 b BOrntr Load. 0.400 NM

C00267649CAPABILITY OF BEAR, REFUELED

From the Chukotski Area

BEST COPY.ffeRE4WARABLE

illuslrolcs coverage altarna lewith ceitoVc„possrole IIrZhl patterns a , ngthe many opTicros, npen 10 Sorrel plan ern.For OcIalled rolor?rra4n on rode/ sodacaocbr011es , seeAnne. C

Map 15TwO WOO 10,000 IS Bomb Load, 5,300 NM

1__] IWO WOO, 3,500 lb Bomb Load, 5,600 NM

ONE WOO, 10,000 lb Bomb Load, 10,600 NM

et.ell; SAC Base • Major largel Cds

•25253 I 55 . rHevIsed 1-575

C00267649 BEST COPY

AVAILABLECAPABILITY OF BEAR, REFUELEDFrom the Kola Area mazer

Nor. IMPROVED REARTWO WAY. 10,400 lb. Bomb Load, 5.100 NIIWO WAY 1,500 lb Bomb Load. 5,400 IN

ibis reap illusliates ceaerage attainablewitS..earlain passible bight pi/Marna ambhgIhe nt anit.potio n s open to SOVIei plantyis.For detailed- tialorrnatton on .00s/bingeca pabdtlies undat avaatous conelibonY, seeAnnea C

1 TWO WAY. 10.000 lb. Bomb Load, 5,300 NM

L _I TWO . WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 5,600 NM

ONE-WAY, 10.000 lb. Bomb Load, 10,600 NM

A arreni SAC Bare • Maio: Target CO

25751 I 56 tReviBod I 571

C00267649CAPABILITY OF IMPROVED BISON, UNREFUELED

From Selected Interior Bases

BEST COPYAVA11A13LE

SPEeRET

't4?,

5,300 NA/ from Novo'sdi

5,600 from

Not, STANDARD BISONwoo ‘vAY, 10,000 lb Sutra, Load, 0.450 NM

NN,,,0T:01NAY, 1,500 lb Bomb Load, 2.550 NM(WAY, 10,000 lb Bond) lead, 4,800 NM

071i1 18k,(.7,500 lb Bobb toad 5,000 NM

/

Map 17

1 TWO WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,750 NM

TWO WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,800 NM

I

ONT WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 5,300 NM

ONE WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 5,600 NMA Cure,1 S4C Base • Major latget Cdy

25755 1 . 56 ;Revised IS?'

C00267649BEST COPY

VARABLECAPABILITY OF IMPROVED BISON, REFUELED

From Selected Interior Bases

sibirsk

Nor, STANDARD BISONIMOD 0020. 10.000 IS Bomb toad, 3.360 NM

0000 000, 3.500 lb Bomb load, 3.450 NM

0005 1001 15 , 000 M Bomb load, 0500 NM/

056 WAY 3.600 o Soot toad. 6.800 NM/

nro O, 0,I I jes rove,age allmoa etattdt li r,r, r t r e Melt iiiiilerns am g

0011e1 p!sno -ts,10 01 , 2100154 (00

CJI'jil]lIltt II 010 l, 00,.iS corublioo , seeA5,2, C

Map 18,1 'T. 10,000 10. Bomb load. 3,700 NM

r

r TWOWr•LY, 3.500 lb. Bomb Load, 3,800 NM

ONE 6500, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 7,200 NM

A Cm rent SAC Base • Maim Target City

25250 1-50 Jam/ p i:oil 1-57

C002 67649; BEST COPY

TACRET AVAILABLE

FromK abarovsk

CAPABILITY OF BEAR, UNREFUELEDFrom Selected Interior Bases

F omoscow

FromN vosibirsk

Noe. IMPROVED BEARTWO WAY, 10,000 lb Bomb load, 3,800 NMTWO WAY, 3.500 lb Bomb toad. 4,000 MMONC WAY, /0,000 lb BoN/l/ to4A. /.300 NM

LII(=_7.

I II

Map 19

tWO WAY. 10,000 lb Bomb Load. 3,900 NM

TWO WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 4,100 NM

ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb Bomb Load, 7,600 NM

i 56 iewsed / 52: 'SECRET.

C00267649 CAPABILITY OF BEAR, REFUELEDFrom Selected Interior Bases

1M COPY.SEEREVAILABLE

Note . IMPROVED BEAR10003010, 10,000 lb Booth Load 5,100 NMTWO WAY 3,500 lb Bomb Load, 5,400 NM

Ms map iltu3liates covriage altainab?ella6 possible 111131 palleins arm

the rn woo, open to Soviet plannFor deladeiLiii.olorroalion on radiastiacapabilities or an,iadito3s condbion, 000

Annet C

TWO WAY. 10,000 lb Bomb Load, 5,300 NM

TWO WAY, 3,500 lb Bomb load, 5,600 NM

ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 10,600 NM

257543 1 56 Woolard 1 til)

-i BEST COPY

- - MAILABLE--SECRET'

Maximum submarine penetrationfor optimum operating depth

Maximum submarine penetrationfor optimum' operating depth

Maximum Range forCEP of 2.0 NM

Maximum range tot CEPof 1.0 NM

Map 21

A Current SAC Base

Major Target City

-mar

\14

25753 I 57

C00267649