Director ofCentralIntelligence

Soviet Forces and Capabilities forStrategic Nuclear ConflictThrough the Mid-1990s

National Intelligence EstimateKey Judgments and Executive Summary

-Seepet-NIE 11-318-86April 1986

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DERIVATIVE CI BY I L.REVIEW ON OADRDERIVED FROM MuItipIo

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,

EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations.participated in the preparation of theEstimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National SecurityAgency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Energy.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

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NIE 11-3/8-86

SOVIET FORCES AND CAPABILITIES FORSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT

, THROUGH THE MID-1990s

KEY JUDGMENTSAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Information available as of 24 April 1986 was used inthe preparation of this Estimate, which was approved bythe National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.

KEY JUDGMENTS

By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployedintercontinental nuclear attack forces—land- and sea-based ballisticmissiles and heavy bombers—will be replaced by new and improvedsystems. Most of these are already in production or in flight-testing.Improved Soviet heavy ICBMs will increase the already formidableSoviet counterforce capabilities; mobile ICBMs and quieter SSBNs withlong-range missiles will enhance force survivability and endurance; newbombers and cruise missiles 'will add diversity to the aerodynamicthreat. An increasing proportion of Soviet intercontinental attackwarheads will be deployed on SSBNs and mobile ICBMs, with a lowerproportion in fixed silos. The number of deployed intercontinentalnuclear warheads will increase by a couple of thousand by 1990, withthe potential for greater expansion in the 1990s. We are especiallyconcerned about the Soviets' longstanding commitment to strategicdefense, including their extensive program to protect the leadership,their potential to deploy widespread defenses against ballistic missiles,and their extensive efforts in directed-energy weapons technologies,particularly high-energy lasers. The vigorous Soviet effort in strategicforce research, development, and deployment is not new, but is theresult of an unswerving commitment for the past two decades to buildup and improve strategic capabilities.

The Soviets do not endorse mutual vulnerability—nor, for thatmatter, mutual survivability—as a desirable basis for establishing orpreserving strategic stability. The USSR, no less than the United States,appreciates the tremendous destruction a strategic nuclear war wouldentail and thus strongly seeks to avoid such a conflict. The Soviets wantto deter their adversaries from attacking the USSR, and from interferingwith Soviet political and military initiatives. They are convinced thatthe best means to do this, and to provide for the contingency thatstrategic nuclear conflict could nevertheless occur, is to build forces thatoffer the greatest prospect of limiting damage to their societ y andprevailing over their adversaries in a nuclear war. The Soviets havepersistently tried to alter the strategic balance in their favor.

The Soviets' appreciation of the persistent risk of all-out nuclearwar sustains a commitment to meet requirements for effectivelyfighting it. They take a sober view of their prospective adversaries'capabilities and programs, but do not simply try to tailor their programsclosely to specific future threats that may be variable and uncertain.They seek to deploy, as technology and resources permit, a wide array

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of systems to meet broad, standing requirements that they deemmilitarily prudent for the complex task of waging nuclear war. Thus, inthe past decade they have expended much effort to improve thecountermilitary capabilities of their offensive forces, especially ballisticmissiles, and the survivability and endurance of their forces, leadership,and command and control.

We believe the Soviets are determined to increase their strengthrelative to the United States or, at a minimum, to prevent anysignificant erosion of the military gains the USSR has made over thepast decade. They recognize that new US strategic systems beingdeployed or under development will increase the vulnerability of theirsilo-based ICBM force, complicate their antisubmarine warfare (ASW)efforts, and present their air defense forces with increasingly complexproblems. By their actions and propaganda, the Soviets have demon-strated that they are very concerned about the US Strategic DefenseInitiative (SDI). Soviet leaders view arms control policy as an importantfactor in preserving past strategic gains and achieving further strategicadvantages. They will try to use the arms control arena as a means ofdelaying or undercutting the US SDI program and slowing other USprograms.

We have considered the question of whether their economic andtechnological difficulties may force the Soviets to slacken their strategicforce efforts and reduce their long-term competitiveness in this field.Despite serious economic problems since the mid-1970s, the Sovietshave continued to procure large quantities of new strategic weapons.Strategic forces, more than any other single element of power, are thefoundation of Soviet superpower status. While the Soviets are attempt-ing a major restructuring of their industrial production capability, wedo not believe that economic considerations alone would lead them toabandon major strategic weapon programs, to forsake force moderniza-tion goals, or to make substantial concessions in arms control.

The evidence shows clearly that Soviet leaders are preparing theirmilitary forces for the possibility that they will actually have to fight anuclear war. We judge that the Soviets would plan to conduct a militarycampaign that would seek to end a nuclear war on their terms—byneutralizing the ability of US intercontinental and theater nuclearforces to interfere with Soviet capabilities to defeat adversary forces inEurasia and dominate that area, while preserving the ability of theSoviet state to survive and recover.

The Soviets place demanding requirements on the capabilities oftheir strategic forces to wage war effectively. They are likely to ratetheir capabilities as lower in some areas than we would assess them to

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be, and they are probably pessimistic about the implications of ongoingUS strategic modernization programs. For example, significant im-provements in US strategic offensive forces and in command, control,and communications capabilities will occur over the next 10 years, andsizable US, as well as Soviet, forces would survive large-scale nuclearstrikes. Although we do not have specific evidence on how the Sovietsassess their prospects in a global nuclear conflict, we judge that theywould not have high confidence in the capability of their strategicoffensive and defensive forces to accomplish their wartime missions,particularly limiting the extent of damage to the Soviet homeland.

The Soviets' lack of high confidence and their appreciation of thedestructiveness inherent in nuclear conflict would probably inhibitthem in peacetime from deliberately risking a direct clash with theUnited States or its NATO Allies. Avoiding further escalation, however,would not be their sole concern, should they get involved in a majorconventional war with the United States and its Allies. In thesecircumstances—where they would expect the risks of nuclear war to behigh—the Soviets would also consider that, by failing to seize theinitiative should all-out nuclear war appear imminent and unavoidable,the USSR could suffer both greater damage and a reduction in itschances for eventual combat success. The likelihood of the Soviets'initiation of nuclear strikes would increase if they suffered a majorstrategic reversal on the battlefield. If they possessed convincingevidence that NATO or the United States was about to launch a large-scale nuclear strike, they would attempt to preempt. For reasons such aslack of convincing evidence, they might not mount a preemptive attack.They are improving their capabilities for riding out an attack andretaliating, and they have the capability to launch forces quickly, uponreceipt of warning that an ICBM attack is under way.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strategic Offensive Forces

1. All elements of Soviet strategic offensive forceswill be extensively modernized by the mid-1990s.While the Soviets will continue to rely on fixed, silo-based ICBMs, mobile ICBMs will be deployed in largenumbers (see figure 1), and major improvements willbe made to the sea-based and bomber forces. Themajor changes in the force will include:

— An improved capability against hardened targetsthrough further improvements to the heavyICBM force.

Significantly better survivability from improve-ments in the submarine-launched ballistic missile(SLBM) force—through quieter submarines andlonger range missiles—and deployment of mo-bile ICBMs. Mobile ICBMs will also improve theSoviets' capabilities to use reserve missiles forreload and refire.'

— An increase in the number of deliverable war-heads for the bomber force and in its diversity, asa result of the deployment of new bombers withlong-range, land-attack cruise missiles.

— Deployment of a variety of new long-range,land-attack cruise missiles. I I

ICBMs

2. The ICBM force, as shown in figure 2, will havebeen almost entirely replaced with new systems by themid-1990s:

— The Soviets are preparing to deploy the SS-X-24in a rail-mobile mode in 1987. Evidence indi-cates a follow-on, similar in size and payload butprobably with greater range, is likely to begintesting in about 1987. We expect SS-X-24-classICBMs equipped with 10 multiple independentlytargetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to replacethe MIRVed SS-17 and SS-19 silo-based ICBMs,which carry fewer warheads. An alternative viewholds that the future of the SS-X-24 program is

unclear, and that an SS-X-24 follow-on will beginflight-testing in about 1989.2

— Within the last year, the Soviets deployed 72launchers at eight bases for the road-mobileSS-25. We have detected several other basesunder construction, and we expect some 400 to500 launchers by the early 1990s. A follow-on,which we judge will have single- and three-RVpayload options, will probably be flight-tested in1987. Soviet commitment to mobile ICBMs rep-resents a major resource decision; such systemsrequire substantially more support infrastructurethan do silo-based systems, and thus are muchmore costly to operate and maintain.

— .The Soviets have retired older silo-based single-RV SS-11s as they have deployed the single-RVroad-mobile SS-25.

— A new silo-based heavy ICBM, to replace theSS-18, with improved ca pabilities against hard-ened targets, is beginning its flight test program.

SLBMs

3. An extensive modernization program will resultin replacement of the entire MIRVed Soviet SLBMforce and deployment of much better nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Themajor changes, as shown in figure 3, include:

— Deployment of additional SSBNs. We have evi-dence that five to seven new SSBNs of theTyphoon and Delta types are under construction.

— Ongoing deployment of the new SS-N-23 SLBMon Delta-IVs and probably future deployments onDelta-Ills. The increased range of the SS-N-23,relative to that of the SS-N-18 missile currently onDelta-Ills, will make SS-N-23-equipped SSBNsmore survivable.

— A replacement for the SS-N-20 on TyphoonSSBNs will probably be deployed between 1988

' For an alternative view of the Director, Bureau of Intelligence 1 The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligenceand Research, Department of State, see paragraph 29. pi and Research, Department of State.[]

7■frierepILLT.

Figure 1Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces,Warhead Mix

1986 Mid-,1990s

•fisaakij,3C8310 4-86

ICBMs

and 1990; and a new missile in the SS-N-23 classwill probably be tested later in the 1980s.

— With long-range missiles, Typhoon and DeltaSSBNs can operate under the Arctic ice or closeto Soviet shores, where the Soviet Navy canbetter protect them. Soviet capabilities for moreextensive operations in the Arctic are increasing.

Heavy Bombers

4. The Soviet heavy bomber force is undergoing itsfirst major modernization since the 1960s; by the mid-1990s, as shown in figure 4, most of the older bomberswill have been replaced. The heavy bomber force willhave a somewhat greater role in intercontinentalattack and greater diversity will have been added:

— Production continues for Bear H aircraft andAS-15 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).

— We project the Blackjack will be operational in1988, carrying both ALCMs and bombs. Thisaircraft will soon enter serial production.

Size of Intercontinental Attack Forces

5. The projected growth in the number of deployedwarheads on Soviet intercontinental attack forces isshown in figure 5, page 12:

— The force currently consists of about 10,000warheads on some 2,500 deployed ballistic mis-sile launchers and heavy bombers. Most war-heads are in the ICBM force.

— Warheads are increasing. Systems now beingdeployed—new Typhoon and Delta-IV subma-rines, Bear H bombers, and, soon, SS-X-24ICBMs—carry many more warheads than thesystems they are replacing.

— Force diversity is increasing. A growing propor-tion of Soviet intercontinental attack warheadswill be deployed on SSBNs and mobile ICBMs,with a lower proportion in fixed silos.

— If the Soviets continue to have about 2,500 ballis-tic missile launchers and heavy bombers andremain within the quantitative sublimits of SALTII, by 1990 the deployed warheads will grow toabout 12,000; by 1995 probably over 14,000.

— While in the absence of an arms control process,the Soviets would not necessarily expand theirintercontinental attack forces beyond theseSALT II figures, they clearly have the capabilityfor significant further expansion, to between16,000 and 19,000 deployed warheads by 1995.The projection is lower by a few thousand war-heads than last year's, and reflects further analy-

Figure 2Modernization of Soviet ICBMs

Launchers

1986 Mid-1990s

SS-II, SS-13 New heavyICBM

SS-25 SS-X-24 class

Warheads

1986

SS-11. SS 13SS-25

Mid-1990s

SS-I8 New heavyICBM

22 Uncertainty in extent of SS-X-24-class deployments.Some SS-19s might still be deployed.

464111M14

308311 4-86

9

SS-25class

SS-17,SS-I9

46GREZ...

Figure 3Modernization of Soviet SLBMs

Launchers

1986 Mid-I990s

YankeeYankee

Typhoon

Delta-IV

Delta-Ill

Delta- I,Delta-II

Typhoon

NewDelta type

Delta-IV

Delta I,Delta-II

Mid-199%

YankeeDelta I,

Typhoon Delta-II Typhoon

Delta-IVNewDelta type

Delta- IV

Note: Color change for Delta-III and Typhoon in the mid-1990sindicates new missiles deployed in existing submarine classes.

30E012 486

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Warheads

1986

Yankee

Delta I,Delta-II

Delta-III

•61r6Firp

FFigure 4Modernization of Soviet Heavy Bombers

' Weapons

Mid-1990s1986

Bison

OlderBears

Bear H

Blackjack

rbesse617:1313313 4116

114.6441.14.

Heavy Bombers

1986 Mid-1990s

Bison

OlderBears

Bear H

Blackjack

1 I 1 1 1 1

0 1985 87 89 91 93 95

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6. Estimates of the number of warheads on variousSoviet ballistic missiles are becoming more uncertain

While there are (littering views, we assess that theSoviets have deployed, and will continue to deploy,some missiles with more reentry vehicles (RVs) thanthe maximum number released in flight tests, andeven more than the total of RVs actually released plusthose simulated.

Figure 5Projected Total Number of Deployed SovietWarheads-ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy Bombers

Thousands of weapons

20

16

12

00Expanded

8AccountableUS START

"AccountableSoviet START

SALT

1 e am or uture s and SLBMs,

The number of war-heads actually deployed could be significantly greaterthan the accountable number in an arms controlagreement.'

sis of Soviet requirements, programs, productioncapabilities, and nuclear materials constraints.

ome increasein t o weapons beyond that figure ispossible, primarily as a result of some reductionsin projected tactical nuclear weapons or su pple-mental production of nuclear materials fromother than existing military production facilities.

— Both the US and Soviet proposals at the strategicarms reduction talks (START) would result in asignificant reduction from the current force sizeand have a major effect on the current andplanned programs. These proposals, however,differ in major ways. We judge that the Sovietswould be slow to drastically reduce the numberof their heavy ICBMs, given the importance theyattach to them and the unique counterforcecapabilities of these weapons. Any willingness tomake such reductions would depend on major USconcessions, including concessions on the Strate-gic Defense Initiative (SDI), and a large reduc-tion in US silo-based ICBMs.

8. The Soviets will face important decisions in thenext few years as they proceed with flight-testing forballistic missiles scheduled for deployment beginningin the late 1980s and early 1990s. Specifically, theywill have to decide whether to test new ICBMs andSLBMs in such a way as to conform, or appear close toconforming, with limitations on characteristics andimprovements from the unratified SALT H Treaty.They appear to have technical options for some oftheir new systems that will allow them to go eitherway.

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Cruise Missiles

9. Over the next 10 years, we expect the Soviets todeploy large numbers of nuclear-armed ALCMs, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs); some of these willbe supersonic. The deployment of cruise missilesprovides the Soviets with new multidirectional, low-and high-altitude capabilities against US and Alliedtargets. Estimated numbers are highly uncertain, butwe project an aggregate total of about 2,000 to 3,000.

SS-20s

10. In the absence of negotiated reductions, weexpect the number of deployed SS-20–class missiles tochange only slightly, if at all, from the current level.During 1985 the Soviets completed 11 new SS-20bases, but they also deactivated others, mostly toconvert to SS-25 ICBM bases. We have not identifiedany new bases under construction. An SS-20–classmissile, with improved accuracy, is in flight-testingand is expected to begin replacing SS-20s in late 1986or early 1987.

Strategic Defensive Forces11. The Soviets will significantly improve the capa-

bilities of their active and passive strategic defensesover the next 10 years, as a number of new types ofweapons are introduced and many of the older systemsretired. Significant developments in active strategicdefenses include the following:

— The new Moscow antiballistic missile (ABM) de-fenses, which will be fully operational in 1988,will have 100 silo-based interceptors, providingan improved intercept capability against small-scale attacks on key targets around Moscow.

— The new large phased-array radar network,when fully operational at the end of the decade,will provide a much improved capability forballistic missile early warning, attack assessment,and accurate target tracking. These radars will betechnically capable of providing battle manage-ment support to a widespread ABM system, butthere are uncertainties and differences of viewabout their suitability for battle management andwhether the Soviets would rely on these radars tosupport a widespread ABM deployment.

— Deployment of new low-altitude-capable strate-gic air defense systems will increase. The Sovietsare continuing to deploy the SA-10 all-altitudesurface-to-air missile (SAM), have begun fielding

a new mobile version, are deploying new aircraftwith much better capabilities against low-flyingtargets, and will begin deploying the Mainstayairborne warning and control system (AWACS)aircraft during 1986.

— The mobile SA-X-12 s ystem, to be deployed in thenext few years, can engage conventional aircraft,cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. Weare uncertain about its potential capabilitiesagainst strategic ballistic missiles. On the basis of anumber of assumptions I

we conclude that it could havecapabilities to intercept some types of US strategicballistic missile RVs. Its technical capabilitiesbring to the forefront the problem that improvingtechnology is blurring the distinction between airdefense and ABM systems. This problem will befurther complicated as newer, more complex airdefense missile systems are developed. An alterna-tive view holds that the SA-X-12 system hasvirtually no capability against modern strategicreentry vehicles.5

Ballistic Missile Defense12. The Soviets are developing all the major compo-

nents for an ABM system that could be used forwidespread ABM defenses well in excess of ABMTreaty limits. The system consists of radars, an above-ground launcher, and the Gazelle missile that will bedeployed at Moscow. The potential exists for theproduction lines associated with the upgrade of theMoscow ABM system to be used to support a wide-spread deployment. We judge the Soviets are capableof undertaking rapidly paced ABM deployments tostrengthen the defenses at Moscow and cover keytargets in the western USSR, and to extend protectionto key targets east of the Urals by the late 1980s orearly 1990s, assuming they have already begun mak-ing some of the necessary preparations.

13. We have reexamined our estimates of the likeli-hood that the Soviets would conduct such a wide-spread ABM deployment beginning in the 1980s, andwe now conclude that it is unlikely that they will.(Roughly a 10-percent chance, as compared with a

'The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff,Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.7

13;EGRE1

$1 billion per year if carried out in the UnitedStates.

— Two facilities at the Saryshagan test range areassessed to have high-energy lasers with thepotential to function as antisatellite (ASAT)

• weapons.

previousl y estimated 10- to 30-percent chance.) TheSoviets probably perceive the near-term military bene-fits as outweighed by the long-term implications of USand Allied responses, particularly the prospects of aunified commitment to SDI. If the Soviets choose todeploy a widespread ABM system, we judge it is morelikely that they will deploy, beginning in the early-to-middle 1990s, defenses based on a new generation ofABM equipment, than that they will soon begin todeploy defenses based on their current equipment. Analternative view holds that the probability of Sovietabrogation may be understated. According to thisview, Soviet doctrinal requirements for damage-limit-ing capability have always . provided a motivation todeploy ABMs both at Moscow and elsewhere. Thisview also holds that the likelihood of deployment isnot contingent on the development of a new ABMsystem.•

Antisubmarine Warfare

14. The Soviets still lack effective means to locateUS SSBNs at sea. We expect them to continue topursue vigorously all ASW technologies as potentialsolutions to the problems of countering US SSBNs anddefending their own SSBNs against US attack subma-rines. They have an energetic effort to develop acapability to remotely sense submarine-generated ef-fects. Although we have improved our understandingof the nature of the Soviets' overall effort

Ithere remainimportant uncertainties about the full extent anddirection of their program.

— There is a large Soviet program to developground-based laser weapons for terminal defenseagainst reentry vehicles. There are major uncer-tainties, however, concerning the feasibility andpracticality of using ground-based lasers for bal-listic missile defense and about when the Sovietsmight have such systems operational. We expectthem to test the feasibility of such a systemduring the 1980s, probably using one of the high-energy laser facilities at Saryshagan. An opera-tional system could not be deployed until manyyears later, probably not until after the year2000, although a few such systems could conceiv-ably be operational in the 1990s.

— The Soviets appear to be developing two high-energy laser weapons with potential strategic airdefense app!ications—ground-based and navalpoint defense.

— The Soviets are continuing to develop an air-borne laser.

— Soviet research includes a project to develophigh-energy laser weapons for use in space. Weestimate there is an even chance that a prototypehigh-energy, space-based laser ASAT weaponwill be tested in low orbit in the early 1990s.Even if testing were successful, such a systemprobably could not be operational before themid-1990s. An alternative view holds there isonly a low probability of such tests by the early1990s.7

15. We do not believe there is a realistic possibilitythat the Soviets will be able to deploy in the 1990s asystem that could reliably monitor US SSBNs operat-ing in the open ocean. There is a low-to-moderateprobability that the Soviets could deploy in the mid-1990s an ASW remote detection system that wouldoperate with some effectiveness if enem y nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) approached ASWbarriers near Soviet SSBN bastions.

Directed-Energy Weapons

16. There is strong evidence of Soviet efforts todevelop high-energy laser weapons, although there arelarge uncertainties about the size and scope of theSoviets' research efforts in key technologies, as well asabout the status and goals of their weapon develop-ment programs:

17. The Soviets are also conducting research undermilitary sponsorship for the purpose of acquiring theability to develop particle beam weapons (PBWs), butthe size and scope of this effort are unknown. Webelieve the Soviets will eventually attempt to build aspace-based PBW, but we estimate there is only a lowprobability they will test a prototype before the year2000.

— We estimate the high-energy laser efforts wehave been able to observe would cost roughly

18. We have no recent information on any Sovietprogram to develop radiofrequency (RF) weapons todestroy the electronics of a target. The Soviets arestrong in the appropriate technologies, however, and

6 The holder of this view is the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency.111

The holders of this view are the Assistant Chief of Staff forIntelligence, Department of the Army; Director, Bureau of Intelli-gence and Research, Department of State; and the Deputy Assis-tant Secretary for Intelligence, Department of Energy. El

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adirected-energy weapon unction—either a laser orpossibly a radiofrequency ASAT weapon—seems mostconsistent with the available evidence. A somewhatless likely, but still plausible, function is deep spacesurveillance and/or space object identification. I

we judge they are capable of developing a prototypeRP weapon system.

19. Since 1981 the Soviets have been constructing alarge facility on top of a mountain near Dushanbe inthe southernmost area of the USSR.1

Resources and Arms Control

20. While the Soviets are attempting a major re-structuring of their industrial production capability,we do not believe that economic considerations alonewould lead them to abandon major strategic weaponprograms, to forsake force modernization goals, or tomake substantial concessions in arms control. In recentyears they made major resource commitments toemerging new systems, particularly costly mobile mis-sile systems. Soviet force decisions and arms controldecisions are likely to continue to be driven primarilyby calculations of political-strategic benefits and thedynamism of weapons technology. We believe, how-ever, that, as a result of the stark economic realities,decisions involving the rate of strategic force modern-ization probably will be influenced by economic fac-tors more now than in the past and some deploymentprograms could be stretched out. Major new initiativeswould involve difficult trade-offs; in particular, if theSoviets decided to expand their ABM defenses farbeyond the 100-launcher treaty limit, they might becompelled to alter some of their other nonstrategicmilitary modernization efforts, or to stretch out theABM deployments somewhat. We judge, however,that strategic forces will continue to command thehighest resource priorities and therefore would be

affected less by economic problems than any otherelement of the Soviet military, although there areindications of an increased Soviet emphasis on conven-tional forces, using more advanced technology.

21. Soviet leaders view arms control policy as animportant factor in preserving past strategic gains andachieving further strategic advantages. Moscow haslong believed that arms control must first and foremostprotect the capabilities of Soviet military forces rela-tive to their opponents. The Soviets seek to limit USforce modernization through both the arms controlprocess and any resulting agreements. They will try touse the arms control arena as a means of slowingvarious US strategic programs and delaying or under-cutting the US SDI program. In their view, SDI couldforce them to redirect their offensive ballistic missiledevelopment programs to reduce vulnerabilities andcould stimulate a costly, open-ended high-technologycompetition in which, they apparently believe, theUnited States could outpace their own ongoing efforts.

Soviet Scenarios for Nuclear War

22. Soviet military planning is guided by funda-mental wartime objectives: to decisively defeat enemyconventional and nuclear forces, occupy enemy terri-tory in the theater, and defend the homeland againstenemy attack. To meet these objectives, the Sovietstrain their forces for a global nuclear conflict. Thistraining has diversified in scope and become increas-ingly complex in the operational factors with which itdeals.

23. The Soviets apparently believe that a majornuclear conflict, if it occurred, would be likely to ariseout of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflictpreceded by a political crisis period that could lastseveral weeks or longer. They perceive a conventionalphase as lasting from a few days to as long as severalweeks. The Soviets see little likelihood that the UnitedStates would initiate a surprise nuclear attack from anormal peacetime posture; we judge it is unlikely thatthey would mount such an attack themselves. Theirkey objectives in the conventional phase would be toweaken the enemy's theater-based and sea-based nu-clear forces with attacks by conventional weapons,while protecting their own nuclear forces. We esti-mate there is a high likelihood that the Soviets wouldattempt to interfere with selected US space systemsthat provide important wartime support, using bothdestructive and nondestructive means. (However, theSoviets' growing reliance on space assets for the con-duct of military operations is likely to pose a dilemmaif better US antisatellite capabilities emerge.) Theybelieve elements of their strategic forces would sufferlosses during conventional conflict.

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24. The Soviets are unlikely to initiate nuclear usein a theater conflict unless they perceived that NATOwas about to use nuclear weapons, because they wouldprobably see it as being to their advantage instead tokeep the conflict at the conventional level. The Sovietswould probably see an initial localized use of nuclearweapons as still leaving an opportunity to avoid large-scale nuclear war. However, once large-scale use ofnuclear weapons in the theater occurred, imminentSoviet escalation to intercontinental nuclear warwould be likely.

28. As force modernization proceeds, the Sovietswill continue to rely primarily on silo-based ICBMs foruse in initial strikes, while withholding many of theirSLBMs and presumably most of their dispersed mobileICBMs for subsequent strikes during later phases ofnuclear conflict. They also would attempt to reloadand refire some ICBMs, many SS-20s, and probablysome SLBMs, using reserve missiles and equipment.Taking into account the problems the Soviets are likelyto face in a postattack environment and the apparentlylimited extent of preparations they have undertaken tocope with these difficulties, we estimate they probablywould be able to reload and refire from silos over aperiod of weeks or months only a small portion of thereserve ICBMs they maintain in peacetime. The de-ployment of mobile ICBMs will lead to improvedcapabilities for ICBM reload.

25. As the likelihood of large-scale nuclear conflictincreased, Soviet leaders would face the difficultdecision of whether to seize the initiative and strike, aswould be consistent with their general military doc-trine, or to be more cautious in the hope of avertinglarge-scale nuclear strikes on the Soviet homeland.There are no easy prescriptions for what the Sovietswould actually do under a particular set of circum-stances, despite the apparent doctrinal imperative tomount large-scale preemptive nuclear attacks.

29. There is an alternative view that the main textoverstates the difficulties the Soviets would have inreconstituting their current silo-based ICBM force innuclear conflict, given the extensive preparations thisview holds they have made, and that consequentlythey would be able to refire a large portion of theirreserve ICBMs.'° According to another alternativeview, the Soviets do not include ICBM, SLBM, andSS-20 reload and refire in their war plans. However,the Soviets probably would, in this view, attempt toreload a few launchers on a contingency basis, if anyreserve missiles not required to maintain the onlineforce were available. According to this view, a Sovietrequirement for additional warheads would be bettermet by deployment of additional missiles on launch-ers. Furthermore, in this view, it is by no means clearthat reload and refire operations during nuclear warwould be less problematic for mobile launchers thanfor silos."

26. In intercontinental strikes the Soviets wouldseek to neutralize US and Allied military operationsand capabilities—to destroy US-based nuclear forces,to disrupt and destroy the supporting infrastructureand control systems for these forces as well as theNational Command Authority, and to attempt toisolate the United States from the theater campaign byattacking its power projection capabilities. They prob-ably would also attempt to reduce US military powerin the long term by attacking other nonnuclear forces,US military-industrial capacity, and governmentalcontrol facilities, although the extent of the attack onthese targets in the initial strikes could vary, depend-ing on the circumstances. It is highly unlikely that theSoviets would limit initial intercontinental strikes onlyto a -decapitation" attack against command, control,and communications targets, or only to a portion of USstrategic forces, such as ICBM silos.

Capabilities of Strategic Forces

30. The Soviets have enough hard-target-capableICBM RVs today to attack all US missile silos andlaunch control centers with at least two warheadseach. Our estimate of the expected damage to a USMinuteman silo from two Soviet SS-18 warheads isabout 65 to 75 percent. (There is some additionaluncertainty because we cannot precisely estimate theaccuracy and yield of Soviet warheads.) The projectedaccuracy improvements for the new heavy ICBM weexpect the Soviets to deploy in the late 1980s would

27. The Soviets, following the initial large-scalenuclear strikes, plan to reconstitute some survivinggeneral purpose and strategic forces and to occupysubstantial areas of Western Europe, while neutraliz-ing the ability of US and Allied nuclear forces tointerfere with these objectives. The Soviets wouldclearly prefer to accomplish their objectives quickly,but recognize that the later phases could be protracted,given the size and power of the contending coalitions,as well as the difficulty and complexity of conductingoperations following large-scale nuclear strikes. Theyprepare for combat operations that could extendweeks beyond an initial nuclear phase.

"The holder of this view is the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency.

" The der of this view is the Director. Bureau of Intelligenceand Research, Department of State.n

16

'These deep underground facilities presenta difficult targeting problem for US planners.

35. The Soviets' commitment to their deep under-ground program is greater than we previously estimat-ed. We now have a better understanding of the factthat, over the last 35 years, they have constructed anenormous system of deep underground facilities, per-haps several hundred meters beneath the Moscowurban area, interconnected both by the public metrosystem and dedicated VIP metro lines leading to theVnukovo Airfield VIP terminal, the Chekhov andSharapovo deep underground complexes, and proba-bly the Chernoye air defense complex. Access to theMoscow underground complex is available from eachof the major state and party institutional headquarters,including the Kremlin, KGB Headquarters, and thefacilities of the Central Committee. Similar subway-related deep underground facilities have been con-firmed in Leningrad, Kiev, and Baku, I

With the

result in a substantial increase in damage capability,with a best estimate around 85 to 90 percent. Ouranalysis suggests that the Soviets, although they haveviews different from those of the United States aboutthe pertinent nuclear effects and best attack modesagainst silos, probably have a similar perception oftheir effectiveness in attacking a Minuteman silo.

31. Over the next 10 years, Soviet offensive forceswill not be able to reliably target and destroy patrolingUS SSBNs, alert aircraft, aircraft in flight, or dispersedland-mobile missiles, particularly those beyond therange of tactical reconnaissance systems. We believethat, in a crisis or conflict, the Soviets would creditundegraded US warning and control systems with theability to launch ICBMs on tactical warning.

32. Dispersed Soviet mobile missiles, many SSBNspatrolling in waters near the USSR, and a large part ofthe silo-based ICBM force would survive an attack bycurrent US forces. The Soviets, however, probablyperceive their ICBM silos to be somewhat morevulnerable to a US attack than we would assess, giventheir differing views of nuclear effects and likelyattack modes,'

increasing vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silos duringthe period of this Estimate if more accurate USmissiles are deployed, the Soviets will be faced withmore difficult problems in assuring adequate retalia-tory capabilities in their critical planning scenario inwhich they are struck first. The Soviets will continueto rely on silo-based ICBMs for the bulk of theirpreemptive attack capabilities. We have seen no evi-dence of a program to significantly increase thehardness of their missile silos; our analysis suggests theSoviets are unlikely to see much advantage in super-hardening. They will increasingly depend on theirmobile ICBM and SLBM forces for their retaliatorycapabilities. We also judge that the Soviets can launchICBMs on tactical warning, assuming their warningand command and control systems were undegraded.

33. Current Soviet ASAT capabilities could notdeny enemy use of space in time of war, but SovietASAT systems could attack a number of key USsatellites. In addition to the dedicated nonnuclearorbital interceptor, other systems—the nuclear GaloshABM interceptor and two ground-based high-energylasers—have the potential to destroy or interfere withsome satellites in near-Earth orbit; these capabilities,however, would not survive a nuclear attack. Electron-ic warfare currently represents the only potential

threat to unprotected satellites in higher orbits.

34. Because of recent analysis, we have a somewhatdifferent picture of Soviet leadership protection thanwas shown in last year's Estimate. We now estimatethe total number of exurban facilities supporting theSoviet wartime leadership to be over 1,000, somewhatlower than last year's figure. Of this number, we assessabout 300 as being vital to supporting Soviet war-fighting operations; I

36. Sufficient warning to implement relocationplans would allow survival of a large percentage of theSoviet leadership, mostly at lower territorial levels.However, the Soviet wartime management systemwould be seriously disrupted, with major degradationor denial of many national-level leadership functionsassociated with the Moscow area. Damage would alsobe pronounced at the intermediate level, affectingmilitary districts (and regional military high com-mands) as well as the leadership of the Soviet repub-lics.

37. Any judgment about the overall effectiveness ofthe future Soviet air defenses against an attack bybombers and cruise missiles is subject to considerableuncertainty. Penetration of improved Soviet air de-fenses by currently deployed bombers would be moredifficult. These defenses, however, would be consider-

17

ably less effective against US cruise missiles and futurebombers. Our judgment is that, against a combinedattack of penetrating.bombers, short-range attack mis-siles (SRAMs), and cruise missiles, Soviet air defensesduring the next 10 years probably would not becapable of inflicting sufficient losses to prevent consid-erable penetration of Soviet air defenses. These judg-ments, however, are highly dependent on the effec-tiveness of US electronic countermeasures and thepenetration altitudes of US bombers and cruise mis-siles.

38. There is an alternative view that this Estimatesubstantially understates the capability of the Sovietair defense system to defend key target areas againstlow-altitude penetrators. The holder of this view be-lieves that the effectiveness in such areas would besignificantly higher against a combined attack ofpenetrating bombers, SRAMs, and cruise missiles thanthe Estimate suggests."

39. While significant improvements in the capabili-ties of both Soviet and US strategic offensive forceswill occur throughout the next 10 years, sizable forceson both sides would survive large-scale nuclear strikes.It seems highly likely that the Soviets could maintainoverall continuity of command and control, althoughit would probably be degraded. The Soviets couldexperience difficulty in maintaining endurance andeffectiveness for weeks of continuing operations, par-ticularly if subjected to US strikes. Soviet long-rangereconnaissance capabilities could be particularly af-fected. We believe the Soviets would launch continu-ing attacks on US and Allied strategic command,control, and communications to prevent or impair thecoordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby easing theburden on Soviet strategic defenses, and impairing USand Allied abilities to marshal military and civilianresources to reconstitute forces.

Concluding Observations

40. The evidence shows clearly that Soviet leadersare preparing their military forces for the possibilitythat they will actually have to fight a nuclear war.They have seriously addressed many of the problemsof conducting military operations in a nuclear war,and are training for increasingly complex conflictsituations, thereby improving their ability to deal withthe many contingencies of such a conflict. We judgethat the Soviets would plan to conduct a militarycampaign that would seek to end a nuclear war on

The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff forIntelligence, Department of the ArmlAn

their terms—by neutralizing the ability of US inter-continental and theater nuclear forces to interferewith Soviet capabilities to defeat adversary forces inEurasia and dominate that area, while preserving theability of the Soviet state to survive and recover. Wedo not have specific evidence on how the Sovietswould assess their prospects for prevailing in a globalnuclear conflict, but, because their perspective isdifferent from ours, their conclusions as to compara-tive advantages may also be very different from ourown:

— Their persistence in enhancing their strategicoffensive and defensive capabilities is pursuednot with the expectation that they would avertwidespread disaster in all circumstances, butrather in a belief that, if nuclear strikes tookplace, sizable forces would be likely to survive onboth sides, the war might well continue, and theyshould be prepared to pursue an outcome asfavorable as possible.

— The Soviet view of nuclear strategy holds thatchallenges to Soviet interests become less likely asthe Soviet Union is better prepared to fight invarious contingencies. This approach is designedto realize Soviet geopolitical objectives throughcoercion, if possible, and to emerge as the domi-nant power should war nevertheless occur.

— While the Soviets emphasize the military valueof preemption as a means of reducing damage,they also evaluate the capabilities of strategicforces to accomplish missions under unfavorableconditions, such as having to launch from underattack or after absorbing an attack. Soviet plan-ning also has emphasized the adequacy of strate-gic forces to fulfill missions after a phase ofnonnuclear theater war during which strategicassets might have iuffered losses.1

41. A Soviet planner's judgments are likely to bestrongly shaped both by his appreciation of the persis-tent possibility of nuclear war and by his sensitivity tothe stringent requirements for waging it effectively—by limiting damage to the homeland and pursuingwide-ranging combat objectives against the UnitedStates and in continental theaters on the periphery ofthe USSR. Thus he operates in a planning environmentwhich typically has placed a high priority on suchcapabilities as:

— Passive defenses, as well as active defenses andmassive initial strikes on enemy ICBMs, to limitdamage.

18,E€1461...

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— Highly redundant command, control, communi-cations, and intelligence capabilities and exten-sive leadership protection measures to assurecontinuity of control of the war effort.

— Various command, control, communications, andintelligence capabilities and other measures toassure the integration and coordination of thedisparate strategic and other force elements thatwould prosecute the war both at the interconti-nental level and in Eurasian theaters.

— In general, preparations for more extended oper-ations beyond the initial nuclear strikes.

I I

42. As a result of such different and, in some ways,more demanding requirements, as compared withtraditional US requirements, the Soviets are likely torate their capabilities as lower in some areas than wewould assess them to be. They clearly are concernedabout:

— The vulnerability of their submarines to USASW, particularly in view of the reserve missionthey assign to a part of their SSBN force.

— The impact of ongoing and potential US strategicprograms.

— The increased probability that US improvementsin command, control, communications, and intel-ligence will enable the United States to retaliatemore effectively and to manage forces moreefficiently in at least the initial stage of a nuclearwar.

— Their own ability to maintain effective com-mand, control, communications, and intelligenceconnectivity throughout key phases of crisis orwar.

— Their inability to prevent the United States fromlaunching a counterstrike. We judge that theSoviets would anticipate that a large force of USand Allied weapons—alert bombers, patrollingSSBNs, and at least a small number of ICBMs—could survive a major massed strike. Moreover,the Soviets could not be confident that theUnited States would not be capable of launchingthe ICBM force on tactical warning or underattack. The Soviets are also well aware of theirinability to prevent massive damage to the USSRwith their strategic defenses even with the im-provements taking place in these forces. Theyalso recognize that US strategic defenses cannotprevent massive damage.

43. We conclude that the Soviets' calculations oftheir chances for success in any nuclear conflict wouldoccur against a backdrop of fundamental uncertainty.They recognize the uncertainties inherent in many ofthe factors upon which their success in nuclear warwould depend. They do not know some factors withprecision and others are unknowable in advance ofwar itself. We judge, therefore, that the Soviets wouldnot have high confidence in the capability of theirstrategic offensive and defensive forces to accomplishtheir wartime missions, particularly limiting the extentof damage to the Soviet homeland. The Soviets' lack ofhigh confidence and their appreciation of the destruc-tiveness inherent in nuclear conflict would probablyinhibit them in peacetime from deliberately risking adirect clash with the United States or its NATO Allies.Avoiding further escalation, however, would not betheir sole concern should they get involved in a majorconventional war with the United States and its Allies.In these circumstances—where they would expect therisks of nuclear war to be high—they would alsoconsider that, by failing to seize the initiative shouldall-out nuclear war appear imminent and unavoidable,the Soviets could suffer both greater damage and areduction in their chances for eventual combat success.The likelihood of their initiation of nuclear strikeswould increase if they suffered a major strategicreversal on the battlefield. If the Soviets possessedconvincing evidence that NATO or the United Stateswas about to launch a large-scale nuclear strike, theywould attempt to preempt.

44. We cannot fully determine the operational con-siderations that would sway the Soviets' judgments onwhether to risk nuclear war in the various circum-stances where they might face such a decision over thenext decade. We note, in general, that, despite exten-sive deployments of mobile ICBMs and other project-ed measures to enhance the survivability of theirforces, we expect them to deploy new silo-based heavyICBMs that probably will be both more capableagainst US hard targets and more vulnerable them-selves to a US countersilo attack in the 1990s. TheSoviets' strategic programs suggest that, while improv-ing their prospects for riding out an attack, they stillwill have incentives to rely on the employment optionsof preemption and launching on tactical warning—options that are cons , stent with their longstandingstrategic outlook. Their willingness to rely on theseoptions, in short, attests to their continued concern tomaximize their combat advantages—or at least mini-mize those of the United States—in the event ofnuclear war.I

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