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Sovereigntyandthe‘UnitedStatesofAfrica’•page� Paper�44•June2007

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Sovereignty and the ‘United States of Africa’Insights from the EUGeorge Mukundi Wachira

Introduction

The transformation of the Organisation of AfricanUnity(OAU)intotheAfricanUnion(AU)hasheraldednewhopeandaspirationsforunityandintegrationforthe continent. However, one of the greatest hurdlestosuchunityhasbeenAfricanstates’griponto theirsovereignpowers (Naldi in Evans&Murray2002:�).This is despite the fact that since the World War II,international law has increasingly transformed thetraditional concept of sovereignty. International andintergovernmentalbodiessuchastheAU,theUN,theWorld Trade Organisation (WTO) andsub-regionaleconomicbodieshavealsourged states to give up some of theirsovereignty if they are to realise theirfull economic and political potential.Indeed,thefutureofthenationstateintheglobalarenaintermsofpoliticalandeconomic influence is dependent onclosercooperationandintegration,asisaptlycapturedbyNyerere:

Africamustunite…TogetherwethepeoplesofAfricawillbeincomparablystronger internationally than we arenowwithourmultiplicityofunviablestates. The needs of our separatecountries can be and are being ignored bythe rich and powerful. The result is that Africais marginalized when international decisionsaffecting our vital interest are made. Unity willnotmakeusrich,butitcanmakeitdifficult forAfricaandtheAfricanpeoplestobedisregardedandhumiliated.Anditwill,thereforeincreasetheeffectivenessofthedecisionswemakeandtrytoimplement forourdevelopment.Mygenerationled Africa to political freedom. The currentgenerationofleadersandpeoplesofAfricamustpickup the flickering torchofAfrican freedom,refuelitwiththeirenthusiasmanddetermination,andcarryitforward(Nyerere2006:2�).

However, the journey towards Africa’s closerintegration is arduous. Furthermore, states will have

to cede some of their sovereignty to bring about aneffectiveunionandinstitutionsthathavethepowerstoexecute common competencies. Thus the realisationofacontinentalgovernmentorgoverningframeworkispremisedonthewillingnessbystatestogiveupsomeoftheirsovereignty–asexperiencesinotherpartsoftheworldportray.

Whiletheremaybeothermodels�fromwhichAfricacould seek inspiration in its pursuit for a UnitedStates of Africa, the European Union (EU) model isexamined for comparative purposes in this paper.

This is done in a bid to illustrate howstates have and are willing to cedesome of their sovereignty to effectivelyachievecommoncompetenciesthrougha supra-national entity. The choice ofthe EU2 as a model for this survey ispremised on the fact that there hasbeen close integration within the EUthat has warranted and occasioned itsconstituent states tocede someof theirsovereignty to the supra-governmentalbody.ThechoiceoftheEUisalsobasedontherecurringargumentthattheEUis‘emergingas thenew formof a federalunion’ almost akin to the United Statesof America (Backer 200�:�76). These

developments have resonated in the concept of theproposed ‘UnitedStates forAfrica’andcould informemerging debates on the proposed structure. Theexperiencesandlessonsfromthemodel,it ishoped,will inform the architects of the African continentaldream,andalsoinspirepolicy-anddecision-makersinAfricancountriestoforgeahead.

Thispaperhasfivemainparts.Inthefollowingpart,theconceptofstatesovereigntyanditsapplicationwithinthemodernstatediscourseistraced,albeitbriefly.Inthenextpart,theconceptofsovereigntyinthepursuitfor Africa’s integration is dealt with. The focus is ontheAUandtheextent towhichstates inAfricahavetransferredsomeoftheirsovereignpowerstotheAUisdiscussed.ThenextpartlooksattheEUmodelandhowitsmemberstateshavecededsomeoftheirstate

Theneedsofourseparate

countriescanbeandarebeing

ignoredbytherichandpowerful

Sovereigntyandthe‘UnitedStatesofAfrica’•page2 Paper�44•June2007

sovereigntytotheEUinstitutions.HowsomeEUstateshavesoughttoaddressthecedingofstatesovereigntytotheEUwithintheirdomesticlegalframeworkisalsoaddressed.Inthelasttwoparts,somepointsforfurtherthoughtandaconclusionisoffered.

State sovereignty in the modern state discourse

State sovereignty is a concept that attracts variedinterpretations and applications within domesticand international discourses (Crawford 2006:32).Sovereignty was traditionally understood to connote‘unlimited and absolute power within a jurisdiction’(Zick 2005:23�; see also Lee �997:243). Thereforesovereignty meant ‘the whole body of rights andattributeswhichastatepossessesinitsterritory,totheexclusion of all other states, and also in its relationswith other states’ (the Corfu Channel case, �949 ICJ39,43).Thiswastheexclusiverighttoexercisepoliticalauthority which inter alia encompasses executive,legislativeandjudicialcompetencieswithinthestate.Thetraditionalunderstanding,whichcanberegardedastheclassicalconceptofsovereignty,canbetracedbacktothe�648TreatyofWestphalia.Intermsofwhathassincebecomeknownas‘theWestphalianconceptofsovereignty’the nation state had absolute powerand authority over its internal affairswithout external interference, politicalandforeignpolicyautonomyandbordercontrol(Jackson2003:786).

Sovereignty and equality of statesare also closely linked and ‘representthe basic constitutional doctrine ofthe law of nations which governs acommunity primarily of states havinga uniform legal personality’ (Brownlie2003:287). According to Brownlie(citing the Declaration on Principlesof International Law Concerning Friendly RelationsandCooperationAmongStates�970),theprincipalcorollaries of the sovereignty and equality ofstatesare:

A jurisdiction,primafacieexclusive,over territoryandthepermanentpopulationlivingthereAdutyofnon-interventionintheareaofexclusivejurisdictionofotherstatesThe dependence of obligations arising fromcustomary law and treaties on the consent oftheobligor

Sovereignty therefore demands that states are equaland, irrespective of their size, have legal personalityintheirrelationshipwithotherstates.Thismeansthatstatesmust‘refrainfrominterventionintheinternalorexternal affairs of other states’ (Brownlie 2003:290;seealsoWachira&Ayinla2006:474).TheUNCharterprohibitsinterventiononmattersessentiallywithinthe

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domestic jurisdictionofanystate (art2,para7).TheOAU,theprecursortothecurrentAU,alsoprohibitedinterference in the domestic affairs of a state (OAUCharter,art3(2)).

However, the use of the term ‘sovereignty’ todayis commonly linked to the ‘totality of internationalrights and duties recognized by international lawas residing in an independent territorial unit - thestate’ (Brownlie citing the Reparations Case, ICJReport �949:�74, �80).3 Developments within theinternational community and the continued breachofinternationalnormsbystateswhilsthidingbehindtheveilofstatesovereignty,hascalledintoquestionthenon-interferenceprinciple(Oppenheim�992:25).While generally giving regard to the concept ofstate sovereignty, the international community hasacknowledged that intervention is required in thecase of certain acts, such as serious violation ofhuman rights and threats to international peaceand security (Brownlie 2003:293; see also Zick2005:235andart4(h)and(j)oftheConstitutiveActoftheAU,andart4(j)oftheProtocolRelatingtothe

PeaceandSecurityCounciloftheAU).Therefore,whiletheinteractionamongstates is largelydependentonconsent,lack of express consent on the part ofa state has not prevented internationalorganisationsandevenmembersoftheinternationalcommunityfromexecutingormakingdecisionsthatimpactonthatstate (Brownlie2003:290,UNCharter,chap3�). Itcanbearguedthoughthatonceastatecommitsitselftoatreatyortomembershipofanorganisation, thatact implies agreement tobeboundbydecisionsfromthoseinstitutionsthatareresponsibleforimplementingandgivingeffecttothetreaty.4

Increasedinternationalinteractions,inter-andsupra-governmental organisations, globalisation, humanrightsandhumanitarianlawamongotherdevelopmenthave indeedchallenged theWestphalianconceptofsovereignty(seeforexampleAnnan�999andGhali�992;�995).Themodernapplicationanduseoftheterm have limited the absolute sovereign power ofstatesininternationallawandrelations.5Stateshaveincreasinglyacknowledgedthatcertainproblemsaffectthem collectively and consequently their effectiveresolutioncanonlybeattainedthroughglobalefforts.These issues include nuclear proliferation, trade,pollution and other global environmental issues,refugees,andcriminallawissuessuchaswarcrimes,crimes against humanity, genocide and terrorism.It is on these and similar matters that internationallaw through treaties, international customary lawand related measures ‘seeks either to regulate theactivitiesortocoordinatenationalregulationefforts’(Tangney�996:400).

Stateshaveincreasingly

acknowledgedthatcertain

problemsaffectthemcollectively


Membership of international, intergovernmental andsupra-governmental institutions such as the EU hasalso transformed the traditional conceptualisation ofsovereignty.6Somestateshavebeenwillingtoacceptdecisions,directivesandregulationsadoptedbytheseinstitutions,inessencecedingsomeoftheirsovereignpowerstotheinstitutions(Tangney�996).AnexampleistherelationshipbetweendevelopingcountrieswithBretton Wood institutions (International MonetaryFundandWorldBank)inwhichthecountriesinvolvedonthewholeadoptandimplementthemonetaryandfiscalpoliciesprescribedby the institutions (Tangney�996:405).

However, these policies have not always been inthe best interests of the states concerned and haveoften neither been legislated upon by the states orsanctionedexpresslythroughthevariousmechanismsofstateprocesses.Toacertainextentonemayarguethat inadoptingthepolicies, thestatesareexercisingtheirsovereignpowersbutitcouldalsobearguedthatthepoliciesaredirectivesfromexternalauthoritiesastheydonotoriginateinthestate’sexecutive,legislativeor judicial powers. They are thereforetantamount to external interference. Inanefforttoattainandmeetdevelopmentstandards set by other global players,the states often embrace the directiveswithout question. Nor do they havethe capacity to determine whetherthe policies would be feasible in theirparticular circumstances. It should benoted that not all of these policies areunworkableandindeedvariousstatesinAfricaandotherpartsoftheworldhavederivedsomebenefitsintheirsearchtoattain western concepts of democracyand economic development and theoutcomesrelatedtothem.

In Africa, membership to the AU could be regardedas one way in which states have agreed to cedesome of their sovereign powers to achieve commonobjectives.7 In terms of the AU Constitutive Actvariousorganswithdiversecompetencieshavebeenestablished whose effective execution is dependenton states transferring someof their sovereignpowersto thoseorgans.The institutionsare theAssemblyoftheUnion (arts 6-9), the ExecutiveCouncil (arts �0-�3),thePan-AfricanParliament(art�7),8theEconomicandSocialandCulturalCouncil(art22),theCourtofJustice (art �8), the Commission (art 20), specialisedtechnical committees (arts �4–�6), the PermanentRepresentativesCommittee (art2�),and the financialinstitutions (art �9). The aim of these bodies is toachievethecommonobjectivesoftheAUsetoutintheConstitutiveActand includesamongotherspolitical,economic and social development; promotion ofpeace, security and stability on the continent; andpromotionandprotectionofhumanrights(art3).

Inthenextsectiontheextenttowhichmemberstatesof the AU have transferred some of their sovereignpowerstothebodyandorgansoftheAU,andwhichhas thepotentialofachieving thedreamofaUnitedStates of Africa, are examined. For purposes of thisdiscussion the relevant sovereign powers are thoserelated to a state’s exclusive authority to exerciseexecutive, legislative and judicial powers over itsterritoryandpeople.

The concept of sovereignty in the pursuit of closer integration for Africa

Variouseffortsand initiativesaimedatAfrica’scloserintegration include the �98� Lagos Plan (UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforAfrica/Organisationof African Unity �980) and the African EconomicCommunity (AEC)9 inwhichdevelopmentobjectivesand measures that Africa should undertake in orderto achieve socioeconomicprogress are setout.ThefocusofthispaperislimitedtotheAUastheinstitutionthat offers a realistic possibility of achieving closerintegrationamongitsmemberstates.Inthepreamble

to the Constitutive Act of the AU, theheads of states and government statedthat they are ‘determined to take allnecessary measures to strengthen theircommon institutions and provide themwithnecessarypowersandresourcestoenablethemtodischargetheirrespectivemandates effectively’(read the AUinstitutional framework).This seems toindicate that member states realise theneed to grant powers to the commoninstitutions, which in essence entailstransferring some of their sovereignpowerstotheAU,iftheyaretoachievethe objectives set out in article 3. Itincludescedingsomelegislativepowersto the Pan-African Parliament (PAP),

judicial powers to the African Court of Justice andHuman Rights, and powers over enforcement andimplementationofdecisionsdomestically.

One of the objectives listed in the Constitutive Actis defence of ‘the sovereignty, territorial integrityand independence of its member states’ (art 3(b)).While this may be reminiscent of its predecessor’spreoccupation with preserving state sovereignty,whichinessencecamedowntonon-interferenceintheinternalaffairsofmemberstates,theConstitutiveActallaysfearsofcomplacencybyexpresslystipulatingthatithasarighttointervenein‘gravecircumstances,namely war crimes, genocide and crimes againsthumanity’ (arts 4(h). It may also intervene uponrequestbyamemberstate‘inordertorestorepeaceandsecurity’(art4(j)).

On the faceof it, thismaynotseemtoamount toatransferof sovereignpowers to theAU,butmember

MembershiptotheAUcouldberegardedasone

wayinwhichstateshaveagreedto

cedesomeoftheirsovereignpowers


states did in effect transfer some of their sovereignpowers by ratifying the Constitutive Act whichempowerstheAUtointerveneinsuchcircumstances.However, apart from a few instances, the AU hasgenerally avoided intervening in the internal affairsofmemberstates�0Nevertheless,theAUhasrecentlydeployedpeacekeepingmissionsinSudanandSomalia,whichisevidenceofthefactthattheAUisdeterminedtokeeppeaceandsecurityon thecontinent.��Theseexamples not only point to the AU’s departure fromitspredecessor’sstanceofnon-interferenceininternalaffairs,butalso show that theAU isexercising somepowerscededtoitbymemberstates.

The Constitutive Act of the Union also envisagesthatmemberstateswillcedesomeoftheirsovereignpowers to the organs of the AU (art 5), in order toeffectively exercise their powers and competencies.The Assembly of the AU, its supreme organ, iscomposedofheadsofstatesandgovernmentofAUmembers.Amongothersit‘determinesthecommonpolicies of the union; monitors the implementationof policies and decisions of the Union as wellas ensures compliance by all memberstates; and gives directives to theExecutiveCouncil on themanagementof conflicts’ (art 9). In terms of thesepowersand functions, theAssembly isinchargeof issuesofcommoninterestand ensures their execution, includingimposingsanctionsfornon-compliance(art 23). These are competencies thataretraditionallyvestedintheexecutivebranchofastate.Thismeansthatstatesmustcooperateandindeedcedesomeof their executivepowers to theuniontoenabletheAUAssemblytocarryoutthefunctionsstatedaboveandmonitorandensurecompliance.

Decisions are ratified in theAssemblyby ‘consensusor failing which, by a two thirds majority of themember states of the Union, apart from proceduralmatters which require a simple majority’ (art 7).This means that even if not all members agree witha decision, they are bound by it regardless of theirindividual positions on that particular matter. Thesovereignpowersinquestionincludethoserelatedtoenforcement and implementation of decisions of theAssemblydomestically.Statesshouldthereforeacceptand implement thecommonpoliciesadoptedby theAssembly which may include economic policies;research; monetary and financial affairs; trade,customs and immigration; transport, communicationandtourismandsuchotherissuesofcommoninteresttothemembers.�2

However, apart from a few instances (Wachira &Ayinla2006:485),theAUAssemblyisstillreluctanttointerfere in the internalaffairsofmemberstates.This

isdespite the fact thatarticle4(g)of theConstitutiveAct provides for the principle of non-interferenceby any member state (and not necessarily the AU)in the internal affairs of another, which could beinterpreted tomean that theAUcan in fact interfereasan institution.With regard tohumanrights issues,forexample,somememberstateshaveprevaileduponthe Assembly to block publication of reports of AUorganswhichareunfavourabletotheminthenameofprotecting their sovereignty.�3Thecurrent situation inZimbabweforinstance,wherethereisoverwhelmingevidenceofmassiveviolationof fundamentalhumanrights and freedom of the citizens by the state butlittleifanyconcreteactionhasbeentakenbytheAUAssembly, illustrates the Assembly’s unwillingness tochallengethestatepresumablytoavoidinterferenceinitsinternalaffairs(MailandGuardianonline).

It is submitted that there is a need to grant somesovereignpowers(readexecutivepowers)bymemberstatestotheAssembly,withoutundueinterferencebythestatesirrespectiveofadversementionoradoptionofmeasuresagainstit.Itisonlythroughsuchpowers

thattheAssemblywilleffectivelyensurecompliancewith policies anddecisionsof the AU that are a prerequisite forachievement of common objectives.Thesepoliciesanddecisionsaremainlyformulated by the Executive Counciland passed on to the Assembly foradoption, and therefore it is imperativethattheExecutiveCouncilhassufficientpowers,too.

The Executive Council comprises theministers of foreign affairs or suchothersdesignatedbythememberstates(ConstitutiveActoftheAU,art�0).Likethe Assembly, decision-making is byconsensusorwherethatfails,byatwo-

thirdsmajorityonmattersotherthanproceduralmatterswhichrequireasimplemajority.ThefunctionsoftheExecutive Council include ‘coordinating and takingdecisionsonpolicies in areasof common interest tothememberstates, suchas foreign trade,agriculture,transport and communications, environmentalprotection,humanitarianactionanddisasterresponses,nationality, residency and immigration matters‘(ConstitutiveActoftheAU,art�3).

Foreffectiveexecution, theCouncilmusthavesomepowers usually reserved for states. For example, inorder tocoordinateand takedecisionsonpolicies inareasofcommoninterestsuchasforeigntrade,stateswould have to grant the Executive Council powersrelated to determining trade tariffs, quotas, marketsandstandardsofcommoditiesandservicesforimportand export. The decisions of the Executive Councilwould be based on sound advice of the specialisedtechnicalcommittees.(ConstitutiveActoftheAU,art

Statesmustcooperateand

cedesomeoftheirexecutivepowerstotheuniontoenabletheAU

Assemblytocarryoutitsfunctions


�4and�5).�4Memberstateswill reap thebenefitsofeconomies of scale on common interests by doingso.Thisisparticularlyimportantifcloserintegrationisto be achieved as envisaged by the PAP, which wasestablished ‘to ensure the full participation of Africapeopleinthedevelopmentandeconomicintegrationofthecontinent’(art�7).

ThePAPcomprisesfivenomineeseachfrommemberstates, who should reflect the diversity of politicalopinion in the national parliaments (Protocol to theTreatyEstablishing theAfricanEconomicCommunityrelating to the Pan-African Parliament 200�, art 4).ThemembersarethereforenotelecteddirectlytothePAPbycitizensofthememberstates.InitsfirsttermofexistencethePAPshallonlyexerciseadvisoryandconsultative powers, but article �� of the protocolenvisagesthatthePAPshallbevestedwithlegislativepowerstobedefinedbytheAssembly.Untilsuchtimethe PAP is not empowered to legislate on issues ofcommoninterest,despitethefactthatitisaprerequisiteforaneffectiveunionwhichhopestoachievecommongoalsandobjectives(seeMagliveras&Naldi2003:225;Demeke2004:6�-66).

The power to legislate on issues ofcommon interest such as immigration,common tariffs and customs,communication, agriculture, trade,monetarypoliciesandregionalsecurity,will place the AU in a position toensure that constituent states benefitfrom collective bargaining powers andstrengths. States will be able to enjoyeconomies of scale, and a uniformexecutionandimplementationofpoliciesandlaws,whichwillimprovethewelfareofallAfricans. Inparticular, it ishopedthat states will open up their bordersand facilitate free movement of labour,goodsandservicesamongthemselvesthatisessentialfor social cohesion and economic development. Itis therefore envisaged that in the pursuit for closerintegrationandunity,memberstateswillagreethatitisnecessarytocedesomesovereignlegislativepowersto the PAP, once they are agreed on the commoncompetenciesthatthePAPshoulddealwith.

The PAP has thus far held six ordinary sessions andestablished ten permanent committees, all aimed atensuring ‘the full participation of African peoples,in the development and economic integration ofthe continent’ in accordance with article �7 of theConstitutive Act of the AU.�5 The committees havebroad mandates, including consideration of mattersrelating to development of sound policy for cross-border, regional andcontinental concernswithin theareas of trade, customs and immigration; assistingthe Parliament with oversight over the developmentand implementationofpoliciesof theAU relating to

transport, communication, science and technologyand industry; assisting theParliament in its effortsofconflict prevention and resolution; and assisting theParliamentinitsroleofharmonisingandcoordinatingthelawsofmemberstates(ConstitutiveActoftheAU,art�7;seealsotheProtocoltotheTreatyEstablishingtheAfricanEconomicCommunityrelatingtothePan-African Parliament, art ��(3)). Effective execution ofthecompetencieswouldentailandrequirethatstatescede and / or share some of their legislative powerswiththePAP.Thisisparticularlyrelevanttotheprocessof harmonising various laws of member states toensureuniformityoratleastacommonapproachandlegitimacyindealingwithcommunityissues.

The PAP must also ensure that the Assembly andother bodies of the AU are held accountable to theAfricanpeopleinmoreorlessthesamewaynationalparliaments must ensure that proper checks andbalancesaremaintained toavoidabuseofpowerbythe state institutions. The European Parliament offerssomecomparative experiences and lessons, andwillbediscussedinthenextsection.

ThejudicialframeworkoftheAUcentreson a proposed African Court of Justiceestablished through a protocol, whichhowever is yet to gain the requisiteratificationtocomeintoforce.Thecourthas been plagued by uncertainty sincetheAUhasdecidedtomergetheAfricanCourt on Human and Peoples’ Rights�6andtheAfricanCourtofJustice(ProtocolontheCourtofJusticeoftheAU2003)and has drafted a merger instrumentto this effect (Draft Protocol on theStatute of the African Court of Justiceand Human Rights, art �). The draftinstrument would replace the originalprotocols establishing the two (art �).

Thecourt,whichwillbeknownastheAfricanCourtof Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) (art 2), willcomprisetwosections,namelyageneralandahumanrightssection(arts5and�6).

Thecourtwillhanddownfinalandbindingdecisions(arts 47(�) & (2)) and the Executive Council will becharged with the responsibility for monitoring theexecutionofitsdecisionsonbehalfoftheAUAssembly(art44(6)).ThismeansthattheExecutiveCouncilwillbechargedwiththedutytodecideuponmeasurestogiveeffect todecisionsof thecourt,aswellas stepstobetakenintheeventofnon-compliance(art47(4)and(5)),whichwillpossiblytaketheformofsanctionsintermsofarticle23(2)oftheConstitutiveAct.Again,this will require that states not only share some oftheir judicialpowerswiththeAfricanCourt,butalsogrant someof the sovereignpowers to theotherAUorgans to ensure its decisions are executed withineachcountry.

ThePAPmustensurethattheAssemblyandotherbodiesoftheAUareheld

accountabletotheAfricanpeople


TheprotocolestablishingtheAfricanCourtonHumanand Peoples’ Rights is already in force with judgeselectedby theAssemblyand isexpected tobecomeoperational in the interim, pending the adoptionand final ratification of the merger instrument. Noimplementation date has been set and as such onemayonlyspeculateonhowthecourtwillinformandinfluence the manner in which the AU functions. Itis hoped that the court will ensure, among others,that all the organs of the AU function according totheConstitutiveActandrelatedprotocols,whichwillin turn ensure accountability and the rule of law. Itis also hoped that the court will be inspired by theEuropeanCourtof Justice,particularlywith regard tothebindingnessofitsdecisions(thisisdiscussedinthenextsection).

AtthispointitisalsousefultomentiononeprogrammeoftheAU,namelyNEPAD,�7thathasdemonstratedthatmember states of the AU may be willing to changetheir thinking and cede some of their sovereignty toachieve economic integration.�8 NEPAD establishedanAfricanPeerReviewMechanism,asystemofpeerreviewtowhichastatemaysubmititselfandreceivefeedbackonitscompliancewith NEPAD governance standardsincluding comparison with their peers,conformitywith international standards,politicalgovernanceandhumanrights.�9Thereviewentailsself-assessmentbythecountry,followedbyavisittothecountryby a panel of eminent persons. Theimplicationisthatmemberstatesacceptscrutiny over their domestic affairs,relatingtoforexamplelegislative,judicialandeconomicpolicies.AnumberofAUmemberstatessuchasRwanda,Ghana,Kenya and South Africa have alreadysubmitted to thepeer review.Bydoingso and then undertaking to implementthe recommendations of the assessment panel,memberstatesillustratetheirwillingnesstocooperateandempower theAUinstitutiontoachievecommonobjectives. It is hoped that these developments willinspire more and closer cooperation between AUmemberstates.

Within the EU, member states have yielded someof their sovereign powers to a supra-governmentalinstitution, which increases the effectiveness ofthe EU’s institutions with regard to executing theircommon competencies. The next section contains abrief overviewof the EUmodel, to extract instancesthatmaybereplicatedinthepursuitofaUnitedStatesofAfrica.

The European Union model

The current EU framework is the product of varioustreatiesbymemberstateswhichgovernthemembership

andscopeofcommonmatters.20Thetreatiesestablishthe main EU institutions and bodies, including theEuropean Commission, the Council of the EuropeanUnion, the European Council, the European CentralBank,theEuropeanCourtofJusticeandtheEuropeanParliament.TheEUiscurrentlyfoundedonthreemainpillars.ThefirstistheEuropeanCommunity,whichisconcernedwith economic, social andenvironmentalpolicies;thesecondtheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy,whichisconcernedwith foreignpolicy issuessuch as immigration, security and the military; andthe third is the Police and Judicial Cooperation inCriminalMatters.2�Effectiveexecutionofthesepoliciescalls for increased cooperation by member statesnot only to benefit from economies of scale butalsoa commonmarket.Cooperativebargainingwithother countries and institutions is also a tremendousadvantage.Naturally,astheEUmembersforgecloserties, its institutionshavewieldedmorepowerswhichweretraditionallythepreserveofthedomesticstates.MemberstateshavethusincreasinglyyieldedsovereignpowerstotheEU.

The extent to and manner in whichmember states have ceded sovereignpowers to the EU institutions isdiscussed against the background offour key institutions of the EU, namelythe European Commission, the Councilof the European Union, the EuropeanParliament and the European Courtof Justice. These four are particularlyrelevantbecausetheAU–theframeworkwithin which a United States of Africagovernmentcouldbebased–hasthreesimilar institutions already. These aretheExecutiveCouncil,thePAP,andtheAfricanCourtofJustice.

The extent to which member states have yielded sovereignty to the EU institutions

The EU institutions are vested with variouscompetencies for the effective functioning of theunion. The functioning and exercise of some of thepowers of these institutions entail some dilution,albeit limited, of the sovereignty of member states.22However, the limits are setout in theunion treaties,which means that member states have consentedto those limits (Dashwood �998:20�-2�6, 209). Theeffectisthatmemberstatesretaintheirsovereigntyandyieldtherequiredamountnecessaryforeffectiveandefficientfunctioningoftheinstitutions,forthecommongood and interests of all EU members (MacCormick�999:�23-�36,�33).

The European Commission is the equivalent of anexecutive branch of a national government and iscurrentlycomposedofonemember fromeachstate.Although member states nominate members, they

ThecurrentEUframeworkisthe

productofvarioustreatiesbymemberstateswhichgovern

themembershipandscopeof

commonmatters


must be approved by the European Parliament andareexpectedtobeindependentofnationalinfluenceand have security of tenure (EC Treaty, arts 2�3-�4;McCormick �999:�02). It is important to note thedifference in the roles of the European Parliamentregarding a say in the composition of the EuropeanCommission, as against theAUwhere thePAPdoesnothaveanexpressmandatetoapprovemembersoftheAUbodies.Thepowers theEuropeanParliamentwields are crucial to its success, because it ensuresproperchecksandbalancesaswellasaccountability.It serves as a preventive measure against politicalinterferencebymemberstatesthroughtheirnominees,which could compromise the independence of thelatter. The European Commission is responsiblefor formulating and implementing EU laws andimplementingpolicies,aswellasmanagementoftheday today runningof theEU (McCormick�999:��-��2). The European Commission is headed by apresident nominated by the European Council andratifiedbytheEuropeanParliament.

Given that the European Commission is in chargeof formulating and implementinglegislation, it wields considerablepowersintermsofvarioustreaties.Thisis particularly important as nationallaws are subordinate to EU laws in thespecific areas of common interest andcompetence.23 It is important to notethat there is no blanket supremacy, forstatesretain‘anindispensablesourceoflegitimatizationforCommunityauthorityas well as sufficient competencies andresponsibilities on all other matters ofstate’ (Zalany 2005:624). A balance ismaintained between the supremacy oftheEUlawandlawsofmembersstatesby means of a principle of subsidiarity,which provides that the ‘Communityshalltakeactiononlyifandinsofarastheobjectivesoftheproposedactioncannotbesufficientlyachievedbythememberstatesandcantherefore,byreasonofthescaleoreffectsof theproposedaction,bebetterachievedbytheCommunity’(ECTreaty,art5).

Theeffectofthechecksandbalancesarethatmemberstates determine firstly what sovereign powers aregrantedtotheEU,thattheyundertaketobeboundbythemandthattheyarenecessarytogiveeffecttotheEU policies and laws. In this regard the commission‘ensures that EU legislation is applied correctly bythe member states through legally binding decisionsand the power to bring states that fail to fulfil theirobligations before the European Court of Justice’(Zalany2005:629).

A possible African equivalent to the EuropeanCommission(atleastbasedonnames)couldbetheAUCommission.However, theAUCommissionhaslittle

ifanypowersandisonlyanadministrativesecretariatoftheAU.Rather,thefunctionsandpowersoftheAUAssembly and Executive Council could be equatedtothoseof theEuropeanCommission.TheAssemblyhas thepower todeterminecommonpoliciesof theAU, as well as monitor their implementation. Butunlike the European Commission, the Assembly andthe Executive Council do not initiate AU laws. ThisresponsibilityissupposedlyvestedinthePAPbut,aswas discussed above, its legislative powers have notyet been defined. Furthermore, although failure toimplement decisions of the Assembly is tantamountto inviting sanctions in terms of article 23(2) of theConstitutiveActof theAU, theAssemblyhason thewholeavoidedsuchastepdespiteinstancesofblatantdisregardofsomeofitsdecisions.24ItishopedthatinthepursuitofcloserintegrationinAfrica,theAssemblyand theExecutiveCouncil could follow theexampleof the European Commission and ensure that theirdecisions are legally binding. Effective mechanismsand processes should also be instituted to guaranteethatthedecisionsareindeedenforcedinpractice,withattendantconsequencesintheeventofdefault.

A second highly important institutionof the EU is its Council, commonlyreferred to as the Council of Ministers,whichiscomposedofnationalministersresponsible for areas related to thespecific competences of the EU (ECTreaty, art �03). The council’s mandateistolegislateonspecificissuesunderitsauspices, suchaseconomy,agriculture,foreignaffairsandtransport(McCormick�999:��9). EU member states havetransferred some of their sovereignpowers to the council, enabling it tolegislateonthoseclearlydefinedissues.This impacts particularly on decision-making at council level: although it

initiallydependedonunanimousagreement,‘qualifiedmajority’ voting is now the basis for acceptance(McCormick �999:�30-�3�). This means that whilesomestatesmaybeopposedtoanissue,allareboundbyitifitiscarriedbyaqualifiedmajorityvote(Craig�997:��7).

TheAUExecutiveCouncilanditsspecialisedtechnicalcommitteesapproximatetheCounciloftheEuropeanUnion and although they do not have legislativepowers, theydohavepowers tocoordinateandtakedecisions on policies in areas of common interest.Therefore,stateswhoarepartytotheAUshouldconferonthesetwoinstitutionsthepowersthatwouldenablethem to actually achieve the common objectivesembodiedbysuchpolicies.Theywould forexamplehave to cede some sovereign powers to enableAU institutions to determine and adopt policies ontrade,agriculture,economic,customsandimmigrationmattersasenvisagedbysections�3and�4oftheAU

ApossibleAfricanequivalenttotheEuropeanCommissioncouldbethe

AUCommission


Constitutive Act. Furthermore, member states wouldberequiredtostreamlinetheirownpoliciesandlawstoensureeffectivecoordinationandimplementationofthecommonpoliciesoftheAU.

Unlike the PAP, the members of the EuropeanParliament have since�979been electeddirectly byall the citizens of the member states for a five-yearterm (Bermanetal2002:5�).Theeffecthasbeen toaccordtheEuropeanParliamentgreatlegitimacyintheeyesofthecitizensofthememberstates,withregardto both community legislation and its supervisorymandate (Zalany2005:636). InAfrica, however, it isdebatablewhetherdirectelectionsformembersofthePAPwouldbefeasibleatthispoint,despitethepositiveoutcomesitcouldyield,giventhehugedifferencesinthepoliticalandeconomicterrain.

Onepointofsimilaritywith theEuropeanParliamentis that the PAP also began as a consultative andadvisory assembly. However, through activism andwide interpretation of its mandate, the EuropeanParliamentoftodayhasachievedco-legislativepowerswiththeCounciloftheEuropeanUnion.IthasbeentransformedintoalegislativeandsupervisorybodyandfunctionsinatriangularrelationshipwiththecounciloftheEUandthecommissionwithregardtolegislativematters(Demeke2004:64,56). The European Parliament wieldsconsiderable powers over legislativematters, including ‘veto powers overseveral policy areas’. Apart from thesepowers,theEuropeanParliamentandtheCouncilof theEUalsosharebudgetarypowers (Neuhold 2000:4 cited inDemeke 2004:57). The implicationof these powers is that it enables theParliamenttoexercisesomecontroloverthe priorities of the EU institutions andexecutionofcommoncompetencies.

The European Parliament also has a supervisorymandate over all other EU institutions, in essenceensuringproperchecksandbalancesaremaintained.25ThisisafunctionthataneffectiveAUshouldstrivetoemulate, so that thePAPcouldensureaccountabilityofotherAUorgans.CitizensofEUmemberstatesmayalsopetitiontheEuropeanParliamentdirectlyonissuesof alleged violation of human rights. While it is nota judicial body, the Parliament has pressed memberstateswhoselawsmayviolatehumanrightstoinstituteamendments (Demeke 2004:6�). Similarly, in Africa,article ��(�) of the PAP stipulates that one of its keyconcernswillbetoupholdfundamentalhumanrightsand consolidate democracyon the continent. In thisregard it will hopefully be inspired by the EuropeanParliament and ensure that laws and governmentpoliciesprotectandrespectthefundamentallibertiesofAfricans.ThepowersthattheEuropeanParliament

exercises have resulted in EU institutions functioningmore effectively, while being accountable to EUcitizens. Again, this would not have been possible ifmemberstateshadnotbeenwillingtogiveupsomeoftheirsovereignpowersregardinglegislationonareasofcommoninterest.

TheEuropeanCourtofJusticeisthejudicialinstitutionchargedwiththetaskofinterpretingandadjudicatingon issues setout in the treatiesof theEU.Thecourtcomprises judgesnominatedbymember states,withthe president elected from among those nominees(EC Treaty, art 22�). The European Court of Justiceis theultimate ‘judicialauthority tocheck thepowerof theEUpolicymaking institutionsbyensuring thatmember states’ ultimate sovereignty is respected’(Zalany2005:639).

Ofparticularimportance,andnoteworthywithregardto Africa, is that decisions of the European Court ofJusticearebindingonnationalcourtsofmemberstates(Cohen �996:42�, 425-26). Although the envisagedAfricanCourtofJusticestipulatesthatitsdecisionswill

bebindingonmemberstates,thecurrentframeworkforenforcementofdecisionsleaves a lot to be desired (Wachira &Ayinla 2006:487-492). The EuropeanCourtofJusticehasbeeninstrumentalingrantingEUlawsupremacyovernationallaws where the two are inconsistent.It can declare any national law or rulenull and void if it conflicts with a lawof the European Community or thetreatyitself.Thecourthasalsoheldthatsomecommunitylawhas‘directeffect’in member states. In the process, thecourt has changed the perception thatsovereigntyisthepreserveofthenationstate (Henkel 200�:�53-�79; Weiler�99�:24�3,24�4).Whilethecourthasso

fargone largelyunchallenged in itsexpansionof theEU competencies and the supremacy of communitylaw, not all states are comfortable with this state ofaffairs(Swaine2000:5).Theseconcernsarediscussedbrieflyinthenextsection.

The foregoing makes it clear that EU member stateshave of their own volition yielded some of theirsovereignpowers,bymeansoftheUnion’sinstitutionalframework, to achieve common objectives. Thetransformation of the EU has been heralded as atriumph,andisfetedashavingredefinedthetraditionalnotionofsovereignty(Cohen2007:�).Althoughsomememberstatesarereluctanttoforgeclosertiespossiblyintheformofafederation,thereareeffortsunderwayto bring about such a goal (Treaty Establishing aConstitutionforEurope2004).

Admittedly issues of increased cession of sovereignpowers to EU institutions continue to raise concerns

ThepowersthattheEuropean

ParliamentexerciseshaveresultedinEU

institutionsfunctioningmoreeffectivelywhile

beingaccountabletoEUcitizens


among some leaders and the general public, theprogress made so far by the EU is inspirational.26The EU has undoubtedly become a force to reckonwith both in political and economic terms. TheintroductionoftheEuro,forexample,hasprovidedaglobalalternativetothedominanceofthedollarasthemediumofexchangeininternationalcommerce.TheEU has also been able to remove trade barriers andtariffs,facilitatefreemovementofEUcitizens,improvefreecommercialandcompetitiveeconomicexchange,limitwars andhostility betweenmember states, andplay a greater role internationally in peace, securityanddevelopmentalissues(Cohen2007:�03,��).

ThepositiveresultsoftheEUhavepromptedcallsforevengreaterintegrationofmemberstates.Whilesomeleaderssupportcloser integration,othersarewaryoftheprospectoflosingfurthersovereignpowers.

The transfer of state sovereignty to the European Union within the domestic legal framework of member states

In most jurisdictions domesticconstitutionsarethesupremelawswhichset out the organs of each state, howthey function and what competenciesthey exercise. (It is noteworthy thatsome states, such as the UK, do nothave a written constitution.) Further,the national judiciary then has thetask of interpreting a country’s legalframework. Therefore, an overview ofthe interpretations of constitutions bycourtsofEUmemberstatestocedingofsovereignpowerstotheEUwill informthedebateonAfrica’spursuit formoreintegration. Comparable situations inEurope and Africa are bound to yieldcomparable solutions, despite differentexperiencesandbackgrounds,since theaimofbothis effective functioning with regard to commoncompetencies,throughasupra-nationalbody.

Although the constitution is generally the supremelaw in EU member states, membership of the EUdemandsconcomitantrecognitionoftheEUlegalandinstitutional framework. But, as was stated above, incases of conflict, EU laws take precedence over thedomesticlawsonsuchcommonissuesthatmembershavecededto theEU.27 Ifanational lawis thereforeinconsistentwithEUlaw,itisdeclarednullandvoidtotheextentthatitisinconsistent.Nationalconstitutionsand statutes are therefore expected to conform tothe provisions of the treaties entered into under theauspicesoftheEU.

National constitutions of member states provideguidance on the scope of the relationship betweenthestateandthesupranationalbody(Albi&Elsuwege

2004).Oneofthekeyissuesthatneedstobeclarifiedis the extent to which the state may cede sovereignpowers to suchabody. In thecaseof theEU, somememberstateshaveamendedtheirconstitutionssothattheymaylegitimatelycedepowerstoEUinstitutions.28The provisions generally yield sovereignty to theEUwith regard tomatters of commonconcern. It isimportanttonote,however,thatmemberstatesretainthe‘ultimateauthorityandonlytheexerciseofdelimitedpowerscanbetransferred’(DeWitte200�:78citedinAlbi & Elsuwege 2004). If African states are seriousaboutachievingcloserintegration,memberstatesmaybe compelled to harmonise their laws with those oftheAU.Thiscouldentailconstitutionalandlegislativerevisions and amendments to bring about legitimacyandauthoritytothecommoninstitutions.

On the domestic judicial level, the establishment oftheEUand increased integrationhas forcednationalcourts to determine the extent to which ‘a statemay delegate its powers without losing sovereignty’(Albi & Elsuwege 2004). In what are regarded aslandmarkdecisions,theGermanConstitutionalCourt

(German Maastricht decision �993:57-�08) and the Danish Supreme Court(Danish Maastricht decision �993:855-862) established a number of criteriato ‘assess the permissible level ofintegration, so that sovereignty wouldnotbelost’(Albi&Elsuwege2004:745).The courts held that the only powersthat may be delegated are those thatdo not compromise a state’s autonomyand independence (German Maastrichtdecision �993:9�, in Albi & Elsuwege2004:862).

The courts listed amongst others thefollowing reasons why the TreatyEstablishing the EU (Maastricht Treaty)

didnotcompromisetheindependentsovereignstatesofGermanyandDenmark.

First, the negotiation and ratification or accession oftreaties is thepreserveof the state, and as such anydelegationofpowerstoEUinstitutionswasconsensualandinaccordancewiththelawsandproceduresofthemember state (GermanMaastrichtdecision�993:84,9�&97,inAlbi&Elsuwege2004).Thestateremainsincontrolof theextent towhich it iswilling tocedesovereignpowerstoasupranationalentity.

Second, the powers conferred on the supranationalentityby the statewere specific (GermanMaastrichtdecision �993:84, 89 & �05, and Danish Maastrichtdecision�993:858inAlbi&Elsuwege2004:858).ThismeantthattheEUcouldnotatitsdiscretionextenditspowerstomattersbeyondthescopeagreeduponandenvisaged by the states. Therefore the free will andconsentofstatesinpermittingtheEUtoexercisethese

ThepositiveresultsoftheEUhavepromptedcallsforevengreaterintegrationof

memberstates.Whilesomeleaderssupportthat,others

arewary

Sovereigntyandthe‘UnitedStatesofAfrica’•page�0 Paper�44•June2007

powersremainsafundamentalfactorintherelationshipbetweeneachstateandthesupranationalbody.

Finally, the three state bodies, namely the executive,legislativeandjudicial,remaintheprincipleinstitutionsthatupholdstatesovereignty.Evenifthestatedelegatessomeofitspowerstothesupranationalbody,thestateretains substantial control over its own affairs. Thethree institutions therefore ensure the state remainsaccountable to its people and that the nationaljudicial processes ultimately determine ‘whether EUinstitutions act within the powers conferred uponthembymemberstates’(GermanMaastrichtdecision�993:89andDanishMaastrichtdecision�993:86�,inAlbi&Elsuwege2004:86�).

AlthoughtheFrenchConstitutionalCouncilreiteratedthattheEUtreaties‘shouldnotunderminetheessentialconditions for the exercise of national sovereignty’,theFrenchhaveoptedforconstitutionalamendmentsto reflect the developments within the EU (Albi& Elsuwege 2004:747).29 The essential conditions‘includethestates’institutionalstructure,independenceof the nation, territorial integrity andfundamental rights and liberties ofthe nationals’ (Albi & Elsuwege 2004,footnote36).

It is noteworthy that the EU still has todeal with uncertainties regarding thesovereignpowersofmemberstatesandof EU institutions. This was highlightedduring the bid to harmonise the extentof powers ceded by individual statesby means of an EU constitution.30 Theproposal entailed merging the threepillars intoa single structure to simplifyand unify the operations of the EU.Severalcountrieshaveheldreferendumsonthematter,inwhataccordingtosomecommentators parallels the Philadelphia Conventionin�787,wheretheAmericanconstitutionwascreated(Albi & Elsuwege 2004:748; see also Rosenfeld2003:375-376).

The premise was that the EU needed a commonconstitutiontoentrenchdemocracy,transparencyandefficiency in the operations of EU institutions (Albi& Elsuwege 2004:742). While some EU states haveendorsedtheproposedconstitution,keynationssuchas the French and the Dutch, who are among thefounders of the EU, rejected a common constitutionfor Europe through referendums held in 2005.3� Thereasons for rejecting the proposed constitution arelinked to concernsover the increasedmove towardscloserintegrationandbyextensionthelimitationsonnational sovereignty. Some voters thus rejected theproposedconstitutionbecausetheyfearedthepowerthe EU institutions and the implications for nationalpolicies and liberties (http://news.bbc.co.uk/�/hi/

world/europe/460�439.stm). From this it is obviousthat some states and their citizens are not yet readytoyieldall their sovereignpowers toa supranationalentity,butprefertoretaintheirnationalidentitiesandindependence. Nevertheless, most member statesacknowledge that some functions are best executedcollectivelyandthattheinstitutionschargedwiththeseresponsibilities should be empowered to dischargetheirmandateeffectively.

From the foregoing it should be clear that states arepreparedtoconsensuallydelegateonlysomeof theirsovereignpowers to theEU.MostEUmemberstatesstill prefer to retain sovereignty and autonomy withregard to anumberof aspects, andonly cede thosepowerswhichareaprerequisiteforcommonfunctionstothesupra-nationalbody.

Food for thought

Although the EU model does contain lessons forthe proponents of closer integration in Africa,one must bear in mind that the two continents

have very different backgrounds, atleast with regard to economic andpolitical aspirations. Unlike Europe,whohasadvancednationalinstitutions,particularly with regard to legislativeand judicial bodies, their Africancounterparts are generally still in theprocess of achieving legitimacy. Insome African countries instances ofjudicial interference, lackof separationof parliamentary and executivepowers and even unconstitutional andundemocratic changes in government(notwithstandingelections takingplaceregularly) are still common. Theseand other constraints, such as lack ofthe necessary economic capacity to

support even the most common institutions, will ofnecessityhindertheachievementofcloserintegrationinAfrica.

Itwould seem that integration is a longand tediousprocess that demands sacrifice and commitmentbeyondindividualstateinterests.Itisalsoaprocessthatshould be approached with caution, with measuredsteps that incorporate and ensure proper and wideconsultationwithallstakeholders,andparticularlythecitizensofmemberstates.32Italsorequiresathoroughunderstanding of the meaning and consequences ofintegration.ThecitizensofallAfricanstatesshouldbeconsultedandallowedtoparticipateactivelyinissuesthataffectthem.Inviewofthepoliticalandeconomicdisparities and differing levels of development inAfrica,itisimportantthatintegrationeffortsarewellthought out and carried out in sequential, logicalsteps.Itshouldstartwiththeidentificationofmatterswhich states agree are of common interest and on

Lackofthenecessary

economiccapacitytosupporteven

themostcommoninstitutions,

willhindertheachievementof

closerintegrationinAfrica

Sovereigntyandthe‘UnitedStatesofAfrica’•page�� Paper�44•June2007

which they would be willing to delegate powers tofacilitatecollectiveachievement.

Suchcommon issueswould forma foundation fromwhichstateswouldactcollectively.Fromthisshouldfollow other steps to expand areas of commoncompetencies. These common issues include thoseidentifiedintheConstitutiveActoftheAU.33However,a prerequisite for achievement of those objectivesis that the necessary powers to execute them areconferredupon theAUand its institutions.Memberstates will thus have to transfer sovereign powers toAU institutions to further common objectives. Forexample to ensure peace, security and stability onthecontinent,particularly in timesof civil strife andunrestwithinastate,theAUmusthavethenecessarypower to enable it to send a peacekeeping forceto the relevant territory. This in turn implies that acommon defence policy and laws to manage andcoordinatesuchAUpeacekeepingefforts.Thefurtherimplication is that domestic policies and laws willnotonlyhavetoreflectthecommonpolicy,butthatstateswillhave tobewilling toensure that theyareconsistent with such common policies.The next implication is that states willhavetoconfersufficientpowersonthePAP to enforce harmonisation of AUand domestic laws. Furthermore, theAssembly and the Executive Councilwillrequireamandate,andconcomitantpowers, to ensure and monitor theirimplementation.Fromthis it isobviousthatonestepleadsinevitablytothenextifeffectiveintegrationistobeachieved.

ThesameprogressionwouldhavetobefollowedwithregardtotheAU’sobjectiveofpromotingandprotectinghumanandpeoples’ rights. All 53 member statesof the AU are party to the AfricanCharter on Human and Peoples Rights. This meansthat they are agreed, at least on paper, that humanrights are fundamental to the realisation of greaterunityandsolidarityof theAfricanpeoples.Basedonthis overwhelming acceptance of the importance offundamental human rights, member states would beduty bound to accept the jurisdiction and decisionsemanatingfromtheenvisagedAUjudicialframework,andeventhequasi-judicialorgansthatareinplaceatthis time.34Again, togiveeffect toandenforce thesedecisions at a national level, member states wouldhave to be willing to grant the institutions some ofthose sovereign powers that are usually reservedfor the domestic judicial framework and executivebranches. Only then would it be possible to ensurethat the decisions are actually implemented. Further,stateswouldhave tobewilling to accept asbindingthedecisionsoftheproposedAfricanCourtofJusticeand Human Rights and also be prepared to reviewand amend national legislation and policies that are

inconsistent with the AU laws (Constitutive Act andotherprotocols).

The steps necessary to achieve a closer continentalunion,withthefinalgoalofaUnitedStatesofAfrica,include the need to define the legislative powers ofthePAP–thusthecommonareasonwhichthePAPshouldlegislate.Thesecouldincludetradeandmarketrelated matters such as common tariffs, monetaryissues, immigration, and peace and security. In themeantime, the PAP should interpret its powers, asdefined by the Protocol establishing it, widely andprogressively and exercise them in cooperation andconsultationwithother institutionsof theAU.Futurepowers would include oversight and supervisorypowers over budgetary matters and oversight overotherinstitutionsoftheAU.ThiswouldrequireasayintheappointmentofmembersoftheAUCommissionandotherAUbodies.

In view of the present inability of many Africanstates to ensure that members of the PAP receive adirectmandate fromall theircitizens, it is imperative

that theprocess for electionof the fiverepresentativesofeachstate to thePAPbe rationalised. This will enhance itslegitimacy as a voice of the people,whichwillinturnimproveitscapacitytochallengepoliciesandlegislationatoddswiththewillofthepeople.

Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion itshould be apparent that the traditionalconcept of sovereignty has diminishedand continues to be restated. Theincreased need for state cooperationandinteractionstomeetthenewglobalchallenges demand that states review

and rethink the concept of sovereignty. Today itis acknowledged that international law, institutionsand processes have compelled states to forge closer‘to assert and enforce broadly agreed internationalcommunity policies, interests and values, such asthose concerning human rights, international peaceandsecurity,armscontrol,environmentaldegradation,poverty, health andmanagement of the internationalcommons, even when this may impinge upon astate’straditionallyexclusiveinternalauthority’(Bilder�994:�6).Theimplicationisthatwhetherstatesenterintocloserintegrationtreatiesornot,therearecertainmatters in which their sovereign powers will belimitedinanyevent.Onthewhole,thebenefitstobederivedfromfreelyenteringintotreatiesforacommoneconomic, social andpoliticalpurpose, faroutweighthedisadvantages.

Therefore it is imperative that, in the pursuit of a‘United States of Africa’, existing institutions such as

Onthewhole,thebenefitsto

bederivedfromfreelyentering

intotreatiesforacommonpurpose,

faroutweighthedisadvantages


the AU are able to exercise the required powers todischarge their functions effectively. As in the caseof the EU, the legitimacy of such powers shouldoriginate from treaties entered into by the memberstates.Onlymemberstatesareinapositiontoensurethat the common institutions are able to functionand execute their mandates effectively. A collectivestancewillenablememberstatestoreapthebenefitsofeconomiesofscaleandgreaterbargainingpowers,vis-à-visotherglobalplayers.Theobverseisofcoursethatstatescedesomeoftheirsovereignpowerstothecommoninstitution.

ThereisnodoubtthattheAUremainsthemostviablevehicle forachievingaUnitedStatesofAfrica, toberealisedthroughcloserintegrationofitsmemberstates.It is hoped that member states of the AU will seizethe moment and consolidate their powers so as toachievethecommonobjectivestheyhavealreadysetoutintheConstitutiveAct.InthiswaytheywillattaingreaterunityandsolidarityamongcountriesinAfricaandthepeoplesofAfrica.Inthelightoftheenvisagedcollective benefits, the transfer of some sovereignpowers to the AU by members, which will ensuregreater coordination and effectiveness in executingcommoncompetencies,isjustifiable.

Notes

� Other models could be for example the USA, whichisbrieflymentioned later in thepaperbutonly to theextent that itsconstituentstateshaveconferredcertainsovereignpowersonthefederalgovernmentbutwhichanumberofstatesintheEUandcertainlyAfricawouldfindproblematictocedetoasupranationalbody.

2 For a historical background to the EU generally, seethe call by Winston Churchill in �946 for a UnitedStates of Europe; the Robert Schuman Declaration of9May�950whichledtotheEuropeanCoalandSteelCommunity;DeWitte(200�:65);andAlbiandElsuwege(2004:743).

3 SeealsothefollowingreferencetosovereigntybyMaxHuber,thearbitratorintheIslandofPalmascase(USAv Netherland) [�928] 2 R Int’l Arb Awards 82�, 838:Sovereignty in the relations between states signifiesindependence.Independenceinregardtoaportionoftheglobeistherighttoexercisethere,totheexclusionofanyotherstates,thefunctionofastate.

4 Seearticle�4oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreatieswhichprovidesthat‘[t]heconsentofastatetobeboundbyatreatyisexpressedbyratificationwhen,inter alia, the treaty provides for such consent to beexpressedbymeansofratification,ortheconsentofastatetobeboundbyatreatyisexpressedbyacceptanceor approval under conditions similar to those whichapplytoratification’.SeealsoBrownlie(2003),Wachiraand Ayinla (2006:47�-473), Dugard (�992:266) andHarris(�99�:747).

5 In Heller versus US [�985] 776 F 2d 92, 96-7 (3rdCircuit�985)theUnitedStatesCourtobservedthatthe

definitionof sovereigntyas the supreme,absoluteanduncontrollablepowerbywhichanindependentstateisgovernedwasunacceptable.

6 Such institutions include the UN, the Bretton WoodsInstitutions, the World Trade Organisation, theInternationalCriminalCourt,andtheAU.

7 For example, article 4(h)(p) of the Constitutive Act oftheAfricanUnionprovidesfortherightoftheuniontointerveneinamemberstate.

8 See also the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing theAfrican Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament, which was adopted in 200� andcameintoforcein2003.

9 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community,adoptedon3June�99�,cameintoforcein�994.WiththetransformationoftheOAUtotheAUtheAECformsanintegralpartoftheAU.ItsprovisionsarevalidinsofarastheydonotcontradicttheConstitutiveActoftheAU (art33(2)). SeeCompendiumofkeyhuman rightsdocuments of the African Union, PULP 2005:3. ForanexposeoftheAECTreaty,seeNaldiandMagliveras(�999:60�).

�0 Wachira and Ayinla (2006:485) cite the example ofMadagascar,whichwasbarredfromtheAUinaugurationsummitin2002becauseofdoubtsoverthelegitimacyof itspresident, in accordancewitharticle4(p)of theConstitutive Act of the AU. The AU also suspendedTogo and urged its members to impose economicand travel sanctions on the Togolese governmentduring an unconstitutional change of leadership inFebruary2005.

�� TheAUwebsitecontainsdetailsandsetsout someofthe problems faced by these missions, at http://www.africa-union.org/root /au/News/Press/2007/April /press_release_on_Darfu.doc.

�2 Seearticle9oftheConstitutiveActoftheUnion,readtogether with functions of other organs such as theSpecialisedTechnicalCommitteesinarticle�4.

�3 Notably, some states have recently even taken topressurising the AU Assembly, through the ExecutiveCouncil, to suspend the publication of the AfricanCommission’sAnnualActivityReport for incorporatingunfavourable resolutions and recommendations(Assembly/AU/Dec 49 (III)). The AU AssemblysuspendedthepublicationoftheAfricanCommission’sSeventeenthAnnualActivityReport, at its4thSummitin Addis Ababa, Ethiopia at the behest of Zimbabwe,sinceit incorporatedareportonafact-findingmissiontothatcountry(Assembly/AU/Dec�0�(VI)para�).TheAUAssemblyalsowanted todeletecertainaspectsoftheNineteenthActivityReportbeforepublication,attheAssembly’s6thSummitinKhartoum,Sudan.Thereportamong others contained resolutions on the humanrights situations in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, UgandaandZimbabwe.

�4 ThespecialisedtechnicalcommitteesoftheAUperformvariousfunctionsaswellassomedelegatedtoitbytheExecutive Council. Their efficiency and effectivenesswould depend on cooperation from member stateswhichgoesfurtherthanpoliticalrhetoric.Theseinclude


thecommitteesonmonetaryandfinancialaffairs,trade,customsandimmigrationmatters.

�5 Seehttp://www.pan-african-parliament.org/committees.htmforadescriptionofthecommittees(PAPcommittees)andtheirfunctions.

�6 Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State andGovernment of the OAU in Ougoadougou, BurkinaFaso,on9June�998andcameintoforceon25January2004(OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT(��)).However,the 3rd ordinary session of the Assembly of the AUdecidedtointegrateitwithitsCourtofJustice(Protocolof the Court of Justice adopted by the 2nd ordinarysessionof theAssemblyof theAU inMaputo,�� July2003)Assembly/AU/Dec45(��).

�7 TheNewPartnershipforAfrica’sDevelopment(NEPAD)is ‘a pledge by African leaders based on a commonvisionandafirmandsharedconviction,thattheyhaveapressingdutytoeradicatepovertyandtoplacetheircountries,bothindividuallyandcollectively,onapathofsustainablegrowthintheworldeconomyandbodypolitic’ (NEPAD Declaration (200�) adopted in Abuja,NigeriainOctober200�).

�8 ForotherviewsonNEPAD,seeGumedze(2006:�44).�9 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Base

Document (2003) adopted at the 6th summit of theNEPADHeadsofStateandGovernmentImplementationCommittee,March2003,Abuja,Nigeria.

20 SeetheTreatyEstablishingtheEuropeanAtomicEnergyCommunity of 25 March �957, 298 UNTS �67, 5 EurYB 454; Treaty Establishing the European EconomicCommunityof25March�957,298UNTS��,4EurYB4�2(TreatyofRome);TreatyontheEuropeanUnionof7February�992,�992OJ(C224)�(theMaastrichtTreatyorTEU);TreatyofAmsterdamof2October�997,�997OJ(C340)�.

2� See the Maastricht Treaty as amended and also theofficialwebsiteoftheEUathttp:/europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm(accessedon24March2007).

22 SeeNVAlgemeneTransport-enExpeditieOndernemingvan Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie derBelastingen[�963]ECR�,�2(case26/62)andFlaminioCostavENEL[�964]ECR585,593(case6/64),citedinEvans2003:23.

23 SeeInternationaleHandelgesellschaftGmbHvEinfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, �970E.C.R. ��25 (case ��/70) and NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos vNederlandseAdministratiederBelastingen [�963]ECR�(case26/62),citedinZalany2005:623.

24 SeeWachiraandAyinla(2006:482-485)forananalysisof thecategorisationofdecisionsof theAssemblyandinstances where the recommendations of the AfricanCommissiononHumanandPeoples’Rightshavebeendisregarded, but where the authors argue that, onadoptionbytheAssembly,theybecomedecisionsoftheAssembly.

25 For example in �998, the European Parliament setup an independent ad hoc committee of experts toinvestigate irregularities in a report over allegationsof mismanagement of expenditures by the European

Commission,whichledtotheresignationof theentirecommission,includingitspresident(Demeke2004:59).

26 See Cohen’s (2007:6) expressing the view that somecountriesintheEU,forexamplePoland,CzechandtheUK,looktotheEUas‘moreofamarketthanapoliticalforceandasaloosealignmentthatstrategicUnion’.

27 Van Gend en Los [�963] ECR �, �2 (case 26/62);in Costa v ENEL [�964] ECR �25� (case 6/64) thecourt amongothers stated that ‘the executive forceofCommunitylawcannotvaryfromonestatetoanother…withoutjeopardizingtheattainmentoftheobjectivesoftheTreaty’.

28 AlbiandElsuwege(2004)citeforexamplearticle88(�)of theFrenchconstitution,article23(�)of theGermanConstitution,article7(6)ofthePortugueseconstitution,chapter �0, article 5 of the Swedish Government Act,article29(4)oftheIrishconstitutionandarticle28oftheGreekconstitution.

29 Decision No 92-308 DC, 09.04.�992 www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/�992/92308dc.htm, cited inAlbiandElsuwege(2004:747).

30 See the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe,signedinRomeon29October2004.Availableathttp://www.europa.eu/constitution/index_en.htm (accessed23March2007).

3� Atpresent�7outofthepossible27memberstateshaveratified the Constitution either through parliamentaryaction or referenda. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4592243.stm(accessed 20 March2007).

32 In Europe for example, there is a wider participationofpeople fromEUcountries inmatters thatwillaffectthem,suchastheuseoftheeuro.TheFinnishpeople,for instance,afterconsultationagreed touse theeuro,whereas Denmark, Sweden and the UK refused. Thepeople’s views were respected without compromisingEU integration. In East Africa a process has beeninitiatedtoconsultthecitizensoftheconstituentstates,Kenya,UgandaTanzania,RwandaandBurundi,ontheconsequences and effects of joining an East AfricanFederation. So far a number of citizens from thesecountrieshavevoicedconcernoverapossibledilutionoftheircountries’sovereignty(YoumustbenationalistsbeforebeingEastAfricans,availableatwww.eastandard.net(accessedon5April2007)).

33 ConstitutiveActoftheAU,article3(thatis,toachievepeaceandsecurity,promoteandprotecthumanrights,promote sustainable development, promote researchin science and technology, eradication of preventablediseases,internationalcooperation).

34 TheseincludetheAfricanCommissiononHumanandPeoples’Rights and theAfricanCourt onHumanandPeoples’rights(Wachira&Ayinla2006:48�-487).

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The ISS missionThevisionoftheInstituteforSecurityStudiesisoneofastableandpeacefulAfricacharacterisedbyarespectforhumanrights,theruleoflaw,democracyandcollaborativesecurity.Asanappliedpolicyresearchinstitutewithamissiontoconceptualise,informandenhancethesecuritydebateinAfrica,theInstitutesupportsthisvisionstatementbyundertakingindependentappliedresearchandanalysis;facilitatingandsupportingpolicyformulation;raisingtheawarenessofdecisionmakersandthepublic;monitoringtrendsandpolicyimplementation;collecting,interpretinganddisseminatinginformation;networkingonnational,regionalandinternationallevels;andcapacitybuilding.

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About this paper MemberstatesoftheAfricanUnionhaveproposedanambitiousintegrationeffortdesignedtocreateacontinentalgovernment.Thesuccessofsuchabidwillbedependentontheresolutionofvariouslegal,politicalandeconomicissuesthatarecrucialtoagovernmentofthisnature.Oneofthefundamentalquestionsthatstateshavetodealwithistheextenttowhichtheyarewillingtocedesovereignpowerstheycurrentlyenjoytoacontinentalbodyorgovernmentto enable it to achieve their commonobjectives.Comparable experiences from the EuropeanUnion institutionalframeworkillustratethatenhancedeconomicandpoliticalunitydemandsclosercooperationandself-sacrificethatsometimesconflictwithtraditionalnotionsofstatesovereignty.Inthispapertheconceptofsovereigntyisdiscussedaswellastheextenttowhichstateshavebeenwillingtoandwillbereadytotransfersomeoftheirsovereigntytoanoverarchinginstitutioninabidtoformasolidandeffectivesupranationalgovernmentalbody.

About the author GeorgeMukundiWachiraisaresearchfellow,SouthAfricanInstituteforAdvancedConstitutional,Public,HumanRightsand InternationalLawandadvocateof theHighCourtofKenya.Theauthor thanks JakkieCilliers,TshepoMadlingozi,SabeloGumedze,SaneleSibanda,GodfreyMusilaandSolomonDersso for insightfulcommentsandsuggestionsondraftsofthispaper.Anyerrorsandomissionsremainthoseoftheauthor.

FunderThispaperandtheresearchuponwhichitisbasedwasmadepossiblethroughthegenerousfundingoftheSwitzerlandEmbassyinEthiopia,theDanishEmbassyinEthiopiaandtheDeutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit(GTZ).