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Southern Reconstruction: A Radical ViewAuthor(s): Jack B. ScroggsSource: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Nov., 1958), pp. 407-429Published by: Southern Historical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2954670 .Accessed: 04/03/2011 13:59

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Southern Reconstruction:

A Radical View

By JACK B. SCROGGS

HE ADVENT OF RADICAL REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE

reconstruction of the recently rebellious states of the South in early 1867 resulted in sweeping changes in both the form and substance of government in this conquered area. Of revolutionary political significance, this shift brought to the fore a new group of leaders gathered from Negroes, the heretofore politically sub- merged class of native whites, and recently arrived Northerners. The fortunes of this unusual alliance, especially during the early phase of Reconstruction, depended largely upon the success of the Radical party in Congress, a circumstance which led to wide- spread efforts by state leaders to establish a close liaison with the national party. Correspondence from the Southern Republicans to congressional Radicals discloses many of the problems which they encountered and presents Reconstruction from a point of view frequently ignored by many historians. Here is found an intimate record of local political leaders striving to revamp South- ern political institutions despite the determined opposition of Southern spokesmen trained in the school of conservatism. This task, ambitious at best, was made increasingly difficult by intraparty factionalism on the state and local level and by the failure to maintain close co-operation between the national Republican leadership and the Radical party in the South. A cross section of regional Radicalism, based on the voluminous correspondence from the South Atlantic states-Virginia, North and South Car- olina, Georgia, and Florida-clearly reveals these difficulties in- herent in the organization of state parties dedicated to radical reform within the framework of a national party rapidly evolving as the agent of conservative interests.

408 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY

The return to power of traditional political leaders in 1865 and 1866 touched off an initial storm of protest from Southern Radi- cals. Union men vigorously charged that these former rebels continued to be hostile toward the government and could not be trusted with the job of reconstructing the economy, politics, and society of the South. From North Carolina and Virginia came complaints that rebels held the offices of "trust, honor, or emolu- ment" to the exclusion and proscription of men loyal to the Union.1 An observer in North Carolina asserted that "the feelings of by far the larger proportion of the people of this State are dis- loyal to the Govt-and enamored by the bitterest hatred towards the North." He expressed the view that the duplicity of Southern leaders led observers like General Grant to form hasty and er- roneous opinions of their loyalty.2 Thaddeus Stevens, Radical leader in the House, received a report from Georgia that the rebellious spirit in that state was greater than when the state seceded from the Union.3 Former rebels were accused of tamper- ing with the mails and practicing discrimination in the courts; one North Carolinian expressed fear of mob violence should the rebels discover that he had written to Charles Sumner.4

Initially this proscriptive attitude was displayed most promi- nently toward Southerners who had resisted the Confederacy," but Northerners and freedmen complained of similar treatment. The assistant superintendent of the Freedmen's Bureau at Harpers Ferry declared that "to be an Officer of the U S is to subject one to continual insult, without the power of redress."6 Protesting against the action of the Georgia convention of 1865 in requiring

1 John Robinson to Thaddeus Stevens, February 22, 1866; Augustus Watson to Stevens, May 3, 1866, in Thaddeus Stevens Papers (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).

2 G. F. Granger to Stevens, January 11, 1866, ibid. In November 1865 General Grant had made a hurried trip through some of the Southern states and had made a report highly favorable to the former rebellious citizens.

3 L. Black to Stevens, December 18, 1865, ibid. 4 Marion Roberts to Stevens, May 15, 1866, ibid.; W. T. Laflin to Charles

Sumner, February 25, 1867, in Charles Sumner Papers (Houghton Library, Harvard University). From a lower stratum of society came a more fervent plea: "I ask is thar no protection to union men my god how long shall I be prosecuted by Secessions." J. W. Ragland to Stevens, February 8, 1866, in Stevens Papers.

r See Roberts to Stevens, May 15, 1866, in Stevens Papers, for an account of Southern reaction to returning western North Carolina veterans of the Union army.

6 A. [F.] Higgs to Elihu B. Washburne, December 27, 1866, in Elihu B. Wash- burne Papers (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).

SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION 409

two years prior residence for voting, a recent immigrant to that state wrote to Thaddeus Stevens: "The loyal men thousands in number now residing in Georgia appeal to you to save them from this rebel act which has been passed to disfranchise them because they are loyal."7 The former rebels were accused not only of being unwilling to extend any considerable rights and privileges to the Negroes, but also of subjecting them to abuse and refusing to en- courage them to labor for themselves.8 A Georgia correspondent, refuting the claim that the Negro was indolent, maintained that "the Southern people as a whole, are not faithful or true exponents of the negroe's [sic] character or his ability."9 Negro testimony in a similar vein came from freedmen at Halifax, North Carolina, who requested aid from Elihu B. Washburne in collecting a fund to allow them to emigrate to Liberia. They complained that land- owners would not let land to black men and they were unable to collect their wages, in arrears for two years. Seeing no hope for freedom in the South, they lamented: "There is nothing in this country for a blackman that has comon sence but cruelty starva- tion & bloodshed."10J Also from North Carolina came the warning that the "protection afforded on account of property interest, and the social attachments of Master & Slave are destroyed, and now God have mercy on the blacks, if they are turned over to the government of their old masters, who seem determined to prove emancipation a curse."" Southern Radicals argued that Congress should remove the ex-Confederates from office and place Recon- struction in the hands of loyal Union men."2 Although not wholly responsible for the changing attitude of Congress, these pleas undoubtedly exerted considerable influence in crystallizing congressional action against the relatively lenient policies of President Johnson.

7 Frank S. Hesseltine to Stevens, April 26, 1866, in Stevens Papers. 8 Granger to Stevens, January 11, 1866, ibid. See also Dexter E. Clapp to

Benjamin F. Butler, November 9, 1865, in James A. Padgett (ed.), "Reconstruc- tion Letters from North Carolina," in North Carolina Historical Review (Raleigh, 1924- ), XIX (October 1942), 398-99.

9 William Strother to Stevens, April 28, 1866, in Stevens Papers. 10 Charles Snyder et al. to Washburne, February 1, 1868, in Washburne Papers. 11 Clapp to Butler, November 9, 1865, in Padgett, "Reconstruction Letters from

North Carolina," in North Carolina Historical Review, XIX (October 1942), 398-99.

12 Watson to Stevens, May 3, 1866, in Stevens Papers. Watson wrote: "The true and simple policy is to declare every citizen (irrespective of color) a voter, and disfranchise every rebel both in the state and National Governments."


With the overthrow of the Johnson-supported state governments by the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, the three factions of Southern Republicans saw no further impediment in the path toward reform and personal aggrandizement.'3 The exuberant Radicals suggested that the incumbent state officers be immedi- ately dismissed-and replaced by loyal Republicans.'4 Although congressional Radicals refused to aid Southern Republicans to this extent, the influence of Radicals in the South began to show a remarkable growth. Negro meetings called by Southern Con- servatives tended to evolve into Radical rallies. The freedmen, safely under the control of carpetbag leadership, refused to respond to Conservative overtures, preferring to remain with the party which promised to preserve their political and civil rights.'5

Armed with the twin weapons of Negro enfranchisement and partial white disfranchisement, Southern Radicals faced the convention elections of the autumn of 1867 with unbounded confidence. From Augusta, Georgia, a local Republican wrote: "We are going to carry Ga for a Convention and frame a Radical Con- stitution with a Liberal disfranchising clause for rebels."'6 John T. Deweese, a leading carpetbagger in North Carolina, anticipated carrying the convention election by twenty or thirty thousand votes and declared that the Republicans could carry the state for either Grant or Salmon P. Chase in the 1868 presidential election.'7 From Florida carpetbaggers came optimistic predictions along with requests for campaign funds.'8 Only from Georgia were there complaints of bitter opposition by the Conservatives. One Radical in Augusta wrote that the Conservatives "talk con- fidently of the 'near approach of the day when all the Yanks & white niggers will have to leave the South'"; another reported

13 Joseph H. Williams to Sumner, March 15, 1867; J. B. Hall to Sumner, March 17, 1867, in Sumner Papers; S. A. Daniel, Jr., to John Sherman, March 13, 1867, in John Sherman Papers (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress); W. F. Henderson et al. to Stevens, March 4, 1867, in Stevens Papers.

14 Henderson et al. to Stevens, March 4, 1867, in Stevens Papers; J. Bowles to Saul Shellabarger, October 11, 1867, in Washburne Papers.

15 Thomas W. Conway to Salmon P. Chase, April 23, 1867, in Padgett (ed.), "Reconstruction Letters from North Carolina," in North Carolina Historical Re- view, XXI (July 1944), 233-35; Daniel Richards to Washburne, November 13, 1867, in Washburne Papers.

16 Bowles to Shellabarger, October 11, 1867, in Washburne Papers. 7 John T. Deweese to Washburne, October 30, 1867, ibid.

18 Richards to Washburne, November 11, 13, 1867, ibid.


from Savannah: "Our enemies here, are as Savage as rattle- snakes."'9

True to pre-election predictions, the people of the South voted for conventions and returned large Republican majorities in each of the South Atlantic states, but exultant reports of victory from Southern Radicals were intermingled with their charges of fraud by the Conservative opposition. A carpetbagger in Florida announced that "God is good and the 'radical team' has triumphed . . . in opposition to all the rings Cliques and Statemakers in the State." Declaring that the convention would be "extremely radical," he boasted: "We have secured the confidence of the masses so that we do not much fear opposition."20 From Georgia came complaints of Conservative fraud; one writer maintained that "Disloyalty was as rampant here during said election in spirit as I have seen it at any time during the Rebellion."21 Forecasting future difficulties for the Republicans, a Georgia carpetbagger wrote: "The white people of Georgia have thrown off their 'masterly inactivity', of which they boasted so much during the canvass and election for delegates . . . and are going to work in earnest to defeat the constitution, whatever it may be!"22 John C. Underwood, carpetbag leader in Virginia, complained that the state judiciary was "most unrelenting in the persecution of every white or colored voter who is favorable to the Republican party." He further alleged that "thousands have been discharged for the avowed reason that they voted the Republican ticket in Octo- ber."23

Faced with heightening Conservative opposition, Southern Radicals became more insistent upon assurances from Congress of continued support during this inchoate period of their new governments. In Virginia, Underwood wrote of threats "that if the colored and poor laboring people continued to vote against the

19 Bowles to Shellabarger, October 11, 1867, ibid.; C. H. Hopkins to William E. Chandler, November 16, 1867, in William E. Chandler Papers (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).

20 Richards to Washburne, November 19, 1867, in Washburne Papers. 21 Benjamin F. Bigelow to Sherman, November 18, 1867, in Sherman Papers. 22 A. L. Harris to Sherman, November 29, 1867, ibid. 23 John C. Underwood to Washburne, December 16, 1867, in Washburne

Papers. This charge was bolstered by similar complaints against officials of the Petersburg area. James H. Platt, Jr., to George F. Edmunds, December 28, 1867, in Sherman Papers.


land holders . . . they would find themselves between the upper & nether mill stones & would be ground to powder." A Conserva- tive member of the Virginia constitutional convention was charged with declaring that no such voter could live upon his land and that he "would sooner see it all grow up in broom sedge & scrub pine." Underwood declared: "These threats are made boldly & defiantly by those who hold all the offices with very rare excep- tions & who are at heart just as rebellious as when they were in arms against us." Faced with these threats to the rising power of the Radicals, Underwood asked, "Can Congress save us from annihilation?"24 From Georgia John Sherman received urgent pleas for firm action by Congress with the prophecy that if the South were to go Democratic "the poor negroes will have no rights and I may truthfully say will not be allowed even to exist except as the nominal slaves of the landed aristocracy of this section."25 A member of the Georgia convention told of being "grossly insulted . .. for being a member of a 'Yankee and negro Convention'," and warned that if Congress should take a back- ward step the cause would be lost.26 A Florida carpetbagger expressed fear that the Supreme Court might declare the Recon- struction Acts unconstitutional and precipitate another struggle in which "hopes for the 'lost Cause' would be revived and the hot breath of these infernal fiends would make this Southern country anything but comfortable."27

Despite such warnings of tightening opposition, the constitutional conventions which met to reform the state governments were safely in the control of the Radicals, and reports received by congressional leaders were optimistic of the ultimate success of the Republican party in the South. Although the South Car- olina group contained a Negro majority, congressional Radicals were assured by a leading white member that "we have now a convention composed of better material than any other Southern state."28 Urged by Elihu B. Washburne to finish the Florida constitution in time to get it ratified before the Chicago Republi- can convention, a Radical leader from that state predicted early

24 Underwood to Washburne, December 9, 16, 1867, in Washburne Papers. 25 Blodgett to Sherman, December 30, 1867, in Sherman Papers. 26 Hopkins to Stevens, January 3, 1868, in Stevens Papers. 27 Richards to G. W. Atwood, January 13, 1868, in Washburne Papers. 28 J. P. M. Epping to Washburne, February 22, 1868, ibid.


agreement on the new frame of government.29 Virginia Radicals wrote for advice on the further disfranchisement of rebels; many Virginia Republicans favored disfranchisement but hoped to avoid anything that would injure the Republican party or "impede its glorious march toward human freedom."30 North Carolina leaders were optimistic, but Albion W. Tourgee, outstanding carpetbag leader in that state, advised congressional Radicals to defer action on Sherman's Alabama Bill until after all the state elections in order to lull the Conservatives into a continuation of their policy of inaction.31

Relative harmony attended the deliberations in all the constitutional conventions except that of Florida. In that state the Re- publican organization, much to the delight of the Conservatives, broke into three factions, each of which was led by carpetbaggers. The regular Republicans, under the leadership of Daniel Richards, Liberty Billings, and William U. Saunders, reflected the opinions of the Republican national committee, and their power rested upon the political potentialities of the Union Leagues, which they controlled. A more moderate group, led by Harrison Reed, from Wisconsin, and 0. B. Hart, a local Union man, possessed some capital and was supported by the businessmen in the party. The third faction, of lesser power and significance, was led by T. W. Osborn, formerly of Massachusetts.32 A vivid, partisan description of this dissension is to be found in the regular reports forwarded to Washburne by Daniel Richards.

In the struggle for control of the convention, scheduled to meet in Tallahassee on January 20, 1868, the Billings-Richards wing of the party made the initial move. A week before the assembling of the convention, Richards reported that the regular Republicans had rented a house and spent four or five hundred dollars con- verting it into a "mess" for fifteen or twenty delegates in order to keep them from being subjected to corrupting influences.33 This action was countered by similar activity on the part of the Reed forces, whereupon Richards claimed that the Johnson office-

29 Richards to Washburne, January 27, 1868, ibid. 30 J. W. D. Bland to Washburne, March 15, 1868, ibid. 31 A. W. Tourgee to Benjamin Wade, February 1, 1868, in Benjamin F. Wade

Papers (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress). 32 William W. Davis, The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida (New York,

1913), 470-73. 33 Richards to Washburne, January 13, 1868, in Washburne Papers.


holders were behind the move and accused them of "running a hotel free of expense and . . . pouring out money and whiskey most profusely to try and break up the organization of the Con- vention." He further asserted that Reed, who was the administration mail agent for Florida and Georgia, had authority to draw upon Postmaster General A. W. Randall for $13,500 for campaign expenses. The affluence of the Reed forces constituted a threat to the other factions in their struggle for delegates. Richards reported: "Probably 34 of them [delegates] had to borrow money to come with and of course all those of easy virtue soon fall a prey to these minions of the devil and A. Johnson who have plenty of money."34

On February 11 Richards reported that Johnson men had continued to ply members with money, whiskey, and offers of office until a test vote on eligibility revealed that the Radical wing of the party controlled a majority of one. With all hope of control- ling the convention gone, the m nority loft the city, adjourned to a meeting place twenty-five miles away, and set up a rival constitutional convention. The rump convention in Tallahassee, in perfect harmony, then adopted a constitution extremely Radical in character. In spite of the fact that the seceding delegates returned in mass, broke into the convention hall around midnight of February 10, organized, and requested recognition as the law- ful convention, Richards maintained: "We feel quite certain that our Constitution will be popular with our people and acceptable to Congress."35

Richards' optimism was premature. With the support of Gen- eral George G. Meade, military commander of the district, the seceders did gain recognition as the legal constitutional assembly and drafted a more restrictive document than that proposed by the ousted rump convention. Even with the solid support of the Negroes, the Radicals in Florida were defeated, and their constitution was never presented to the people for ratification.36

The campaign for ratification of the new state constitutions revealed a growing Conservative opposition which gave rise to another flurry of protests from Southern Republicans. A Savannah

34 Richards to Washburne, February 2, 11, 1868, ibid. 35 Richards to Washburne, February 11, 1868, ibid. 3 John Wallace, Carpetbag Rule in Florida . . . (Jacksonville, 1888), 63-65;

Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 509-15.


resident wrote that organized clubs of Conservatives were using all sorts of spurious promises to win Negro support and by the use of threats were making freedom of speech impossible. Mer- chants in Savannah were reportedly advertising that they did not want any further trade from Radicals.37 Another Georgia observer declared: "There are parties of rebels now going about through the state murdering loyal citizens in their houses at night and shooting them from bushes during the day.... These murdering parties are said to be chiefly composed of slave holders sons."38 Virginia Republicans complained of social ostracism of Yankees and animosity toward further settlement of Northerners; a Rich- mond Republican informed Stevens that "the Southern white man has become so demoralised in the late rebellion that very few can be trusted politically or in honorable business transactions."39 A North Carolinian reported that Conservatives in his state bitterly opposed the new constitution because it required the pay- ment of the interest on the state debt, thus increasing taxation.40 Thaddeus Stevens was urgently requested to curb further the power of President Johnson as a requisite to victory in South Carolina.4'

The ratification contest also brought a renewal of party strife in Florida, and both factions of Republicans sought congressional support. An adherent of the "Johnson" Republicans wrote: "The rebel element is powerless in Florida before a united Republican party, but in the event of disaffection among ourselves and a con- sequent division of our strength, a Conservative (rebel) ticket will inevitably be put in the field and the hazard of our success would be very great."42 Washburne's faithful reporter, the carpetbagger Richards, warned that "a perfect reign of terror is most imminent." He pointed out that Klan outrages were applauded in Florida, and that "threats of violence against all those who dare oppose the adoption of the Rebel Constitution come from high

37 J. S. Powell to "The Reconstruction Committee," February 18, 1868, in Stevens Papers.

38 Joseph McKee to Stevenson [Stevens], April 16, 1868, ibid. 39 J. G. Landes to Stevens, March 28, 1868; Thomas J. Gale to Stevens, March

19, 1868, ibid. 40 J. M. Clement to Edward McPherson, April 21, 1868, in Edward McPherson

Papers (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress). 41 Samuel Linsley to Stevens, March 15, 1868, in Stevens Papers. 42 F. A. Dockray to Stevens, March 18, 1868, ibid.


quarters so that we are not permitted to question their purposes."43 Richards later reported that "the rebels are organizing rapidly and will all support the Constitution," and that their leaders were sponsoring Reed meetings. The Conservatives not only used threats and intimidation, but the Reed Republican faction boasted of their employment of force and their control of the election boards. And yet, even though the Negro leader Saunders deserted them, the Radicals remained optimistic of a shift in the tide.44

Despite internal party divisions and growing Conservative opposition, the ratification elections resulted in Republican victories in each of the states except Virginia, where the election was post- poned. A combination of factors contributed to this victory, but Republican reports particularly stressed the value of the Union League organizations in achieving ultimate victory.45

Meanwhile disaffection continued among the Republicans of strife-torn Florida. Lamenting Reed's victory in that state, Daniel Richards charged that the Reed party had controlled the news- papers, telegraph, mail, and railroads, had used the school fund for campaign purposes, and had perpetrated "enormous and start- ling frauds" to secure the adoption of their illegal constitution. He reported that General Milton S. Littlefield, notorious lobbyist from Pennsylvania, had been active in buying up votes for the Reed group; and Richards lamented: "If hell has not turned out all its imps against us then it must be a big and roomy place."46 Liberty Billings also complained of fraud by the Reed faction; he asked: "Is not Congress bound to see that the people of these States are likely to have a loyal government of equal rights in the future secured by decisive and trustworthy majorities? . . . Give us another opportunity, & we will see that the State is recon-

43 Richards to Washburne, April 14, 1868, in Washburne Papers. 44 Richards to Washburne, April 14, 20, 21, 1868, ibid. 45 H. P. Farrow of Georgia proclaimed that the "Union League has again saved

us." J. M. Edmunds, head of the National Union League, announced in a report to Chandler that testimony from every Southern state witnessed the fact that the Union League was responsible for the Republican sweep in the delegate and constitutional elections. In contrast to most estimates, Farrow announced that the Conservatives of Georgia had secured the support of about twenty thousand Negroes. Farrow to Chandler, April 28, 1868; Edmunds to Chandler, June 13, 1868, in Chandler Papers.

46 Richards to Washburne, May 6, 1868, in Washburne Papers; Richards to Stevens, May 25, 1868, in Stevens Papers.


structed upon a basis that will secure permanent peace, progress and prosperity."47

Assuring congressional Radicals that Reed was preparing to sell out Radical Republicanism to the Democrats, the Florida extremists pleaded for the rejection of the Florida constitution by Congress. Richards warned: "They have swindled and cheated the people and now they mean to try it on with Congress, and defy their wishes and choice in the matter."48 Liberty Billings referred to the "Rebel Herods and Johnson office-holding Copper- head-Pilates combining to crucify Radical Republicanism," and predicted that the acceptance of the constitution by Congress would ruin the Republican party in Florida.49 Charges that the constitution was the result of a compact between Reed and the rebels were mingled with requests for a new provisional government and summary rejection by Congress of the Reed constitution.50

To all pleas from the Florida extremists for congressional action national Radicals turned a deaf ear. On June 8, 1868, Governor Reed was sworn into office, and seventeen days later a bill passed over Johnson's veto admitted Florida's representatives to Con- gress.51 Apparent party harmony settled over the political scene in Florida, although one prominent Tallahassee Radical described this harmony as "the concord of a gang of slaves lashed by the whip of the enormous appointing power of the Govemor."52 Con- gressional Republicans, however, apparently chose to accept the Reed constitution in preference to risking the loss of the state electoral vote in the forthcoming presidential election.

With an apparent victory won in the battle for state reorganiza- tion, congressional and local Radicals began to show increasing

47 Liberty Billings to Washburne, June 7, 1868, in Washburne Papers. Another Radical claimed that the ballot box stuffing and mail-robbing propensities of the Reed forces "incapacitated them for lawmakers," and a Tallahassee Republican protested vigorously to Washburne against the apparent adoption of the constitution by "mail robbing, stealing votes honestly cast against it, ballot box stuffing, etc., etc." Atwood to Washburne, June 11, 1868; Samuel Walker to Washburne, June 12, 1868, ibid.

48 Richards to Washburne, June 2, 1868, ibid. 49 Billings to Washburne, June 7, 1868, ibid. 50 C. L. Robinson to Stevens, May 29, 1868, in Stevens Papers; Atwood to

Washburne, June 8, 1868; Richards to Washburne, May 18, June 2, 1868, in Washburne Papers.

51 Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 528-31. 52 Samuel Walker to Washburne, June 20, 1868, in Washburne Papers.


concern over the approaching presidential election. For a time there was some doubt among Southern Radicals as to whether they should support Grant or Chase for the nomination.53 Grant's nomination by the Chicago Republican convention resolved this doubt, but left the Radicals to face the twin difficulties of Con- servative opposition in the South and dissension within their own state organizations. A moderate Republican of Florida reported to national party secretary William E. Chandler: "The Rebels are thoroughly organized and are using every means to intimidate and prevent the loyal people black and white from a free ex- pression & exercise of their political rights.... It is evident that ... the Rebels intend to take forcible possession of these State Governments."54 North Carolina Republicans, blessed with relative party harmony, caused no worry to the national leaders, although a correspondent from Smithfield informed Washburne that "The rebels are more industrious than the bee & the vote on the constitution is not significant of the presidential vote."5" Vir- ginia Radicals, although unable to participate in the election, expressed an anxiety over the outcome, predicting that "if [Horatio] Seymour & [Francis P.] Blair should be elected, we are satisfied all loyal men would have to leave the State."56

Political conditions in South Carolina during the presidential campaign became so chaotic as to justify the dispatch of a special Radical agent and observer to that state. This observer, John M. Morris, reported that the Democrats were very active and well- supplied with money-the "rich rebels coax with one breath and threaten with the next." As to intimidation by the Democrats, Morris declared: "All that is said in the North is true. It is not safe for me to go alone unarmed into the up country here. Negroes are daily shot dead or wounded. Nobody is convicted

53 Washburne, the central power behind the early Grant boom, was informed of the Chase campaign in the South; a Florida carpetbagger warned that Thomas Conway, Union League agent, on his tour through the South was threatening the curtailment of funds to the local leagues unless they lent their support to Chase. By January 1868, however, the incipient Chase boom was losing ground. A native of Jacksonville, Florida, just completing a tour of the South, wrote Washburne that the entire region could be swung for Grant if he took a stand "unequivocally with the Republican Party & opposed to Johnson's plans of Reconstruction." Deweese to Washburne, October 30, 1867; Richards to Washburne, November 11, 13, 1867; J. B. Stockton to Washburne, January 14, 1868, ibid.

54 S. B. Conover to Chandler, September 3, 1868, in Chandler Papers. 55 H. G. Gallion to Washburne, April 27, 1868, in Washburne Papers. 56 Lewis W. Webb to Chandler, September 16, 1868, in Chandler Papers.


because no adequate testimony is found or the magistrates don't prosecute.... I fear that thousands of voters will be kept away or driven away from the polls."57 The carpetbag leadership in the state reported that the malignancy of the Democrats was growing and that they were openly proclaiming that no Negro would be allowed to approach the polls.58 Governor Robert K. Scott warned: "The rebels did not misrepresent the fact when they said they were not whipped but only overpowered."59 Nor was evidence lacking to corroborate these charges. In Abbeville County, B. F. Randolph, colored state senator and chairman of the Republican state central committee, while on a speaking tour was murdered by a group of undisguised whites.60 A congressional representative from the state reported: "Three members of the General Assembly and one member of the late Constitu- tional Convention have been murdered secretly." He added that the "whole upper portion of the State is said to be in such a condition that it is regarded as unsafe for Republicans to go there to speak." It was impossible, he said, to punish the murderers because of the sympathy of their white neighbors.6'

Faced with this determined Democratic opposition, Morris was concerned over the prospects of a divided state machine. He reported: "There is yet small party discipline and self control. ... Every man nominated by the State Convention was heartily cursed and shamelessly abused by those he defeated." The colored element, the majority in South Carolina, Morris described as "shrewd-but not educated politically. They have not experience and sagacity." Such lack of party harmony in a Northern state would lead to inevitable defeat. "But here," Morris observed, "I think all can be quieted ... and a victory won."62

The position of the party in Georgia caused further anxiety to the national Radicals. The Negroes of that state were of doubtful value to the Republicans, and the white members of the party were hopelessly at odds. The Democrats, on the other hand, were

57 John M. Morris to Williqm Claflin, September 14, 1868, ibid. 58 B. F. Wittemore to Chandler, September 16, 1868; N. G. Parker, D. H.

Chamberlain, C. C. Bowen to Chandler, September 12, 1868, ibid. 59 R. K. Scott to T. L. Tullock, October 20, 1868, ibid. 60 A. J. Ransier to Tullock, October 19, 1868; Scott to Tullock, October 20, 1868,

ibid.; Francis B. Simkins and Robert H. Woody, South Carolina During Recon- struction (Chapel Hill, 1932), 446.

61 F. A. Sawyer to Chandler, October 22, 1868, in Chandler Papers. 62 Morris to Claffin, September 14, 1868, ibid.


well organized. Ex-governor Joseph E. Brown predicted a difficult campaign to swing the state to Grant, and, in a plea for funds, declared that all the money in Georgia was concentrated in the hands of the Democrats.63 John H. Caldwell, national Republican committee member from Georgia, reported that the Democrats were spending vast sums on barbecues to lure the colored vote to the Seymour ticket. He believed that the position of the party would improve when Governor Rufus B. Bullock assumed charge of the patronage;64 but another prominent Republican informed Chandler that the "sadly demoralized" condition of the party was caused by the action of the constitutional convention in nominat- ing Bullock instead of calling a state Republican convention. He wrote: "In order to secure his nomination and to allay opposition to such action by the Cons'l Conv'n Gov. B. had recourse to bar- gain and sale of all the prominent offices in the State mainly amongst the members of the Convention, which bargains are now being carried into effect in his appointments to the great mortifica- tion and disgust of the prominent Republicans of the State."665

The success of the Democrats in the newly elected Georgia legislature served to heighten the anxiety of the Radicals. Close division not only made it impossible for the Republican administration to carry out an effective program, but ultimately led to the expulsion of the Negro members of both houses by the Democrats, and thus to an absolute Democratic majority.66 The Radicals hoped that this move would "arouse the colored race to sense of their danger, and . . . stimulate them in the cause of their own defense, and that of the Republican party."67 Actually, Demo- cratic assumption of control in the legislature caused talk of calling a "white man's" constitutional convention. A Republican observer declared: "It is manifestly the intention of the Rebel leaders, to defy the power of the U. S. Govt. and to set at naught the laws of Congress."68

Democratic success in Georgia brought an increased volume of Republican protests against frauds, violence, and intimidation.

63 Joseph E. Brown to Tullock, June 29, 1868, ibid. 64 John H. Caldwell to Claflin, July 4, 1868, ibid. 65 Volney Spalding to Chandler, August 14, 1868, ibid. 66 Caldwell to Claflin, September 1, 3, 1868; J. E. Bryant to [Chandler],

October 5, 1868; Spalding to Chandler, September 5, 1868, ibid. 67 Spalding to Chandler, September 1, 1868, ibid. 68 Spalding to Chandler, September 5, 1868, ibid.


An Atlanta Radical informed Chandler that the colored vote could not be trusted:

The Negroes are too dependent upon their employers to be counted upon with certainty. They are without property, and cannot sustain themselves, but a few days at most, without being fed by their Masters; they are without education or sufficient intelligence to appreciate the power the Ballot gives them, add to which a system of intimidation persistently practiced by the Rebels, appealing to their fears through their superstitions, and you have a mass of poverty, ignorance, stu- pidity, and superstition under the influence of fears both real and imaginary, to organize and control, upon whom but little reliance can be placed.69

Joseph E. Brown feared that the Negroes would be driven from the polls either by intimidation or by force. In the event of a free election the state would go Republican by a ten thousand majority, but, Brown declared: "There is . . . a reign of terror and violence in some parts of the state, and Republicans cannot hold meetings and discuss the questions involved in the canvass without actual violence or such threats of it as drive off the timid from the meetings."70 Foster Blodgett, notorious Georgia scala- wag, echoed the former governor's observations. "The rebellious spirit is more intense and bitter now than in 1860 and 1861," he said. "Negroes are killed almost every day while white Republi- cans are threatened [with] abuse and maltreated to an extent that is alarming.' John H. Caldwell, Republican candidate for Con- gress, reported that Democratic methods in Georgia included "bribery, threats, and when they can do so unmolested, actual violence, as well as fraud in the election."72

When it became increasingly obvious that the Republican organization lacked the strength to carry Georgia for Grant, Radicals begged Congress to intercede. From Dalton came the assertion: "The present Rebellious spirit is greater here now than it was before the late War. Congress have been too lenient toward the Rebels. Give them an inch and they will take a mile. Active

69 Spalding to Chandler, September 1, 1868, ibid. 70 Brown to Chandler, October 8, 1868, ibid. 71 Blodgett to Chandler, September 13, 1868, ibid. 72 Caldwell to Claflin, July 4, 1868, ibid. Caldwell reported that there was a

Democratic plot to murder him which failed when rains delayed his campaign trip. Caldwell to Chandler, October 10, 1868, ibid.


measures must be enacted or we are Butchered up and Law & Constitution trampled under foot."73 Chandler was warned that further congressional inaction would lead to civil war in the state.74 Blodgett suggested that Georgia be given another provisional government with Bullock as governor and with six regi- ments of infantry and one of cavalry to support him. When the election returns confirmed the fears of the Republicans, additional charges of corruption were accompanied by pleas for the overthrow of the "rebel" government and the disallowance of the Georgia electoral vote.75

The election resulted in a Grant victory in three of the five states. Through intimidation of the Negroes and a tightly-knit white organization the Democrats secured the ascendancy in Georgia; Virginia, not yet readmitted to the Union, was not en- titled to a vote.

With the Republicans in control in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida, and the status of Virginia and Georgia not fully decided, correspondence between the Radicals of the South and congressional Republicans began to dwindle. No longer were Southern Republicans entirely dependent upon Northern arms for their support. And, with Grant safely elected, congressional Radicals were largely content to allow their Southern colleagues free sway in the former rebellious states-their electoral votes would not be required again until 1872.

Only in Virginia and Georgia did Southern Radicals still urgently petition congressional aid. In a bid for further help, a prominent Georgia Republican, early in 1869, reported that "There is no split in the Republican Party of Georgia.... There has never been a question as to whether Georgia is reconstructed." His solution of the problem called for the convening of the old constitutional convention to complete the work of reconstruction.76 The strife in Georgia led Congress, after a year of vacilla- tion, again to impose military rule in that state. Even so, the state Radicals were still unable to co-operate, and a combination

73 L. P. Gudger to Chandler, September 7, 1868, ibid. 74 Spalding to Chandler, September 5, 1868, ibid. 75 Blodgett to Chandler, September 13, 1868; Caldwell to Chandler, November

23, 1868, ibid.; Francis H. Smith to Washburne, November 8, 1868, in Washburne Papers.

76 Farrow to Washburne, February 26, 1869, in Washburne Papers.


of anti-Bullock Republicans and Democrats brought about the overthrow of the Radical administration in the state election of December 1870.77 In Virginia, the disputed sections on disfranchisement in the 1868 constitution delayed the ratification vote until 1869, when a combination of conservative Republicans and Democrats secured the defeat of these provisions and elected a compromise governor and a Democratic legislature.78

The presidential election of 1872 brought another attempt to affect a liaison between national Radical leaders and Southern Republicans to assure the re-election of Grant. Southern Re- publicans again poured forth tales of Democratic violence and intimidation and bemoaned the dissension within the Radical group of the South. From North Carolina came an early request for protection from the outrages of the Ku Klux Klan. A New Bern Republican wrote Benjamin F. Butler: "I can Say to you With Safity that a Union man Chance is slender hear in North Carolina."79 A prominent carpetbagger of Greensboro wrote:

The old aristocracy and slave owners of the South are soreheaded; thus far they have refused to be comforted by any sanctifying grace flowing from republican sources. Their hostility to the republican party and their hatred of the U.S. government drove them into the Ku Klux organization. They hoped that by means of that wicked order they would get undisputed control of the South, and with the assistance of Tammany they would walk into the White House in 1873.80

On the other hand, Joseph C. Abbott, former carpetbag senator from North Carolina, telegraphed from Raleigh that "Prospects looks [sic] bright if fraud can be Prevented we think success certain."'8' The Radicals of South Carolina bitterly complained of their lot. A prominent Republican editor of Columbia, protesting continued Klan activity, declared: "There has never, during my

77 C. Mildred Thompson, Reconstruction in Georgia (New York, 1915), 255-75; M. M. Hale to Chandler, March 25, 1872, in Chandler Papers.

78 L. E. Dudley to Chandler, August 1, 1868, in Chandler Papers; James B. Hope to Washburne, December 21, 1868; J. K. Gilmer to Washburne, January 16, 1869, in Washburne Papers; Hamilton J. Eckenrode, The Political History of Vir- ginia During the Reconstruction (Baltimore, 1904), 87-128.

79 E. A. Smith to Butler, March 20, 1871, in Padgett (ed.), "Reconstruction Letters from North Carolina," in North Carolina Historical Review, XX (October 1943), 348.

80 Thomas B. Keogh to Butler, November 25, 1871, ibid., 358-59. 81 J. C. Abbott to Chandler, July 29, 1872, in Chandler Papers.


four years residence here, been a more intolerant and vindictive spirit manifest than is exhibited now. The threat is openly made, that if Mr. Greeley is elected President the northern men will all be driven out of the state, the negroes degraded from office, and all the old Southern rebel element put into power again."82 De- spite the seriousness of a growing party schism in South Carolina, however, national Radicals refused to intercede in aid of either group. William E. Chandler informed Franklin J. Moses that local politics were of no concern to the party leadership so long as the state was won for Grant.83

Radical reports from Georgia expressed a more optimistic view of the chances of the party in that doubtful state. In spite of the activity of the Ku Klux Klan and the poll tax requirements for voting-a newly inaugurated Democratic device-informed Re- publicans were increasingly hopeful of a Democratic party split in the state.84 The carpetbag president of the local Union League Council reported to Chandler: "Hostility to the Federal Govern- ment and dread of 'negro supremacy,' constitute the cement that holds together the discordant elements of the Democratic Party. The refractory are tamed and whipped in by the fear of 'nigger equality'; but for this kind of pressure the Democratic Party would fall in pieces, and the whites would be about equally divided."85 The development of the "straight-out" Democratic movement in Georgia in opposition to Horace Greeley was a con- crete illustration of internal Democratic strife. Georgia Republi- cans anticipated aid from the "straight-outs" in preventing the intimidation of Negroes at the polls, and an Atlanta Radical reported that "where they make no nomination, the agreement is, that they will support our man or else remain neutral."86

Republican hopes for the capture of Georgia were dissipated by the results of the state election in August. Democrats again asserted their power. One Radical, reporting to Chandler, declared: "To say that the election was a farce, fails to express the truth; it was a mob, controlled by the Democratic bullies, and

82 L. Cass Carpenter to Chandler, August 6, September 21, 1872, ibid. 83 F. J. Moses to Chandler, September 1872, ibid. 84 A. B. Ragan to [Chandler?], September 28, 1872, ibid. 85 Isaac Seeley to Chandler, March 26, 1872, ibid. 86William L. Scruggs to Chandler, September 26, 1872, ibid.; Edward Stan-

wood, A History of the Presidency from 1788 to 1897 (Boston, 1928), 349-55.


ended in crime." The "straights," he complained, either stayed at home or were bullied into the Democratic ranks.87 A South Carolinian observing the Georgia election reported:

Never since the formation of this government was there a more shame- ful outrage upon free suffrage than the one just perpetrated in Georgia in the name of democracy. The colored men were intimidated and driven away from the polls by the hundred and one devices of the democrats, and where words would not do, bloody deeds soon taught the negroes that to vote against the wishes of their white employers and neighbors was to risk death.88

Despite internal Republican dissension, the political picture in Florida was cause for Radical optimism. A Tallahassee carpetbagger wrote of the improving political sagacity of the Negro: "The opposition may talk of the everlasting 'nigger' but it is beginning to learn that it has in the black man a foe whose opinions are born of honesty and whose native instincts assisted by six years' education in the exercise of the suffrage, and his naturally Christian heart, make him at this time their most formidable enemy, and the finest and most progressive friend of the Re- publican party."89 By mid-summer of 1872 the party had begun to recover from the effects of attempts to impeach Governor Reed, and the relative harmony displayed at the August state convention gave further hope of continued Radical success.90 Although Reed continued to press for the support of the national Radicals, his influence steadily declined.9' Republicans in Florida became more concerned over President Grant's removal from federal office of District Attorney H. Bisbee and Marshal Sherman Conant, two leading carpetbaggers, than with the contentions of Reed. Radicals protested that these removals "cast a damper upon the honest Republicans here and the Democrats are in great glee"; and the chairman of the state executive committee informed

87 Scruggs to Chandler, October 5, 1872, in Chandler Papers. 88 Carpenter to Chairman, National Executive Committee, October 6, 1872, ibid. 89 Sid L. Bates to Chandler, April 15, 1872, ibid. 90 Osborn to [Chandler?], July 11, 1872; W. J. Purman to Chandler, April 25,

1872; Bates to Chandler, April 15, 1872, ibid. 91 In October Reed informed Chandler: "I have not suffered for four years, to

now be willing to see my glorious work overthrown & freedom cheated of her triumphs, nor shall I under any circumstances consent to see this great revolution turned back, either for the benefit of rebels, or sneaking traitors." Reed to Chandler, October 24, 1872, ibid.


Chandler that this action would probably throw the state to the Democrats. So insistent were the state leaders that Grant was persuaded to reinstate the two carpetbaggers, a move hailed by the state Radical leadership as responsible for the revival of party harmony.92

Notwithstanding the favorable turn of events in Florida, and continued strong Radical influence in North and South Carolina, Republican prospects generally were not thought to be as bright as in 1868. Indeed, a Savannah correspondent declared that the Republican victory of 1868 had brought about the ultimate de- cline of the party by the elevation of unworthy and corrupt in- dividuals to positions of trust.93 A South Carolina Radical wrote that the main hope of a Grant victory must rest on the Northern states, for "Southern States like Southern chivalry are mighty uncertain."94 A North Carolina carpetbagger suggested an astute political move by which national Radicals could improve the party position in the South. He proposed that a bill be drawn up for the assumption of the Southern state debts and sent through the House with a great deal of fanfare. Then it could be held in the Senate until after the election, at which time it could be killed or passed as desired. Thus could favorable sentiment be created for the Republicans by subterfuge.95 More optimistically, the secretary of the National Union Council informed Chandler that with "the Union League in full blast all over the South and South West ... we can rally all our forces, and control the black vote for Grant" even though there were persistent reports of organized attempts to mislead the Negro.96

Doubtless these local Radical apprehensions had a salutary effect upon the activities and contributions of national Republi- cans, for the efforts of the Democrats and "straight-outs" to re- capture these Southern states were in vain except in Georgia. In that state, although it was a center of insurgent Democratic

92 John F. Rollins to Chandler, October 4, 1872; A. A. Knight to Chandler, October 6, 1872; E. M. Cheney to Chandler, October 7, 11, 1872; J. 0. Townsend to Chandler, October 7, 1872; Charles Cowlan to Chandler, October 8, 1872, ibid.

93 Hale to Chandler, March 25, 1872, ibid. 94 Carpenter to Chandler, October 15, 1872, ibid. 95 Keogh to Butler, November 25, 1871, in Padgett (ed.), "Reconstruction

Letters from North Carolina," in North Carolina Historical Review, XX (October 1943), 358-59.

96 Thomas G. Baker to Chandler, May 17, 23, 1872, in Chandler Papers.


activity, the regular Democrats produced a sizable majority for Greeley.

After the re-election of Grant in 1872, the tie between the congressional Radicals and Southern Republicans rapidly deterio- rated. Southern Radicals, gradually losing power throughout the South Atlantic states, discovered that Congress was reluctant to act except during periods of national party crisis, and their complaints and pleas gradually lessened. Indeed, when in 1874 the Democrats captured the lower house of Congress, Radical congressional action was no longer possible.

As the election of 1876 approached, Democratic leaders displayed a determination to oust the Republicans regardless of methods. A Florida Radical, despairing of victory with two Re- publican electoral tickets in the field, informed Chandler that the strong opposition was composed of young men who had grown up in postwar conditions and who blamed all the ills of the South on Yankees and Negroes, and a Virginia observer told John Sher- man that there was great danger of open revolt in the South if the Democrats failed to win the election.97 In South Carolina, Governor Daniel H. Chamberlain, candidate for re-election, faced Wade Hampton's formidable "red-shirts," undergoing personal abuse and even threats on his life. Chandler received a report that at one Republican rally in Barnwell County six hundred mounted Democrats had taken over the meeting and heaped abuse upon the carpetbaggers and scalawags. The governor was denounced as "a Carrion Crow, a Buzzard who has come down here to prey upon our people and steal from them their substance," and amidst frequent rebel yells it was suggested that the crowd hang him and his entourage on the spot. An observer of the affray declared that the Republicans of the state were no longer willing to undergo such punishment unless the North came to their aid.98 An Atlanta Republican suggested that North- ern speakers be sent South: "The ignorant masses here (mostly Republicans) require instruction in their political rights and duties as free citizens, and encouragement to stand up like men for their rights."99

97 Alex River to Sherman, July 25, 1875, in Sherman Papers; Rollins to Chandler, August 9, 1876, in Chandler Papers.

98 Carpenter to Chandler, August 26, 1876, in Chandler Papers. 99 Spalding to Chandler, June 26, 1876, ibid.


The determination of Southern Democrats plus the dissension within the Southern Republican party ultimately led to the defeat of the Radicals in each of the South Atlantic states by 1876. Con- tested election returns from both South Carolina and Florida for a time beclouded the political scene, but the repudiation of the Radical state leaders by the Hayes administration brought a quick collapse of the remaining Radical organizations.

Although Southern Radical Republican correspondence neces- sarily presents a distorted picture of the full process of Southern Reconstruction, it is nevertheless an invaluable source for a study of that much-disputed period of American history. From no other source is the historian able to secure so complete a picture of the motives, emotions, and reactions of the members of the three factions who composed the Southern wing of the postwar Re- publican party. This correspondence, along with other contemporary sources, reveals a much more complex social, economic, and political evolution than is found in partisan accounts by historians who neglect material prejudicial to their sectional sym- pathies.

Several factors of primary importance are disclosed by these Radical letters from the South. In the first place they reveal a problem of adjustment of interests which plagued the party until its overthrow in 1876-a problem which undoubtedly contributed much to that downfall. A contemporary North Carolinian phrased the difficulty thus: "The problem of adjusting the balance between the three constituent elements of the Republican party South is certainly one pregnant with danger, therefore claiming imminent solution from the hands of the national leaders of our party."'100 That the national leaders were either unable or unwilling to undertake this task is evidenced by the inability of the state organizations to follow consistently a policy of co-operation.

These communications further reveal a lack of close co-operation between the leading Radicals of the South and the congressional Radicals. Most frequently the correspondence was from less influential Republicans often in opposition to dominant groups. The urgency of pleas and complaints from these Southern Radicals obviously was important in helping to shape the opinions

100 E. M. Rosafy to Butler, March 28, 1874, in Padgett (ed.), "Reconstruction Letters from North Carolina," in North Carolina Historical Review, XX (October 1943), 365-70.


of congressional leaders, but, after 1868, the pleas received a favorable response only when the strength of the national party was threatened. Intrastate party difficulties were, in the main, left to the solution of local leaders; national leaders refused to become involved in party splits such as occurred in Florida and South Carolina. Central direction was difficult to achieve, particularly as the Southern Radicals became increasingly a burden and an embarrassment to the national party.10' Personal ambition and differences in ideology worked to produce antagonistic groups within the party in each of the Southern states, and astute Con- servative politicians proved to be adept at widening the gaps. This intraparty division ultimately proved disastrous to the Re- publicans in all of the South Atlantic states, especially in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, where conflicting groups struggled for power throughout the Reconstruction years.

Southern Radical correspondence further reveals the effective- ness of the campaign developed by the Redeemers in their struggle to capture control of the state governments. Radical accounts of intimidation, fraud, and violence, while undoubtedly exag- gerated, demonstrate an early reinvigoration of local political leadership. The evidence indicates that state Radicals, especially the carpetbag leaders, grossly underestimated the abilities and strength of this Conservative leadership in all of the South At- lantic states. The immigrants from the North seized upon the Reconstruction Acts as an opportunity to revamp Southern political and social standards, but their methods were revolutionary in character and took little account of past development and of national trends in political economy. Ultimately cultural forces of the past, and long-standing mores, in league with newly evolving economic combinations, led to repudiation of Southern Radi- calism by the national party leaders and the emergence of conservative whites of the South as the stronger force.

101 C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (Boston, 1951), deals extensively with this party problem.

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