South East Europe Review 2003-01-02 Detchev

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451/2//2003 South-East Europe Review S. 45 58

Teodor Detchev

Evolution of the model of industrial relations inBulgaria 1989 2002

The models of industrial relations on which this survey is grounded

There are different classifications of the models of industrial relations established in

different countries in which different criteria are used. Each of them bears conven-

tionality to some extent. For the needs of this survey, we use the classification pro-

posed in [1]. Three models are delimited by it a traditional, a

neo-conservative

and

a

neo-liberal one depending on who are the main actors and what are the rules and

procedures of establishing industrial relations in a particular country.

Traditional model of industrial relations

In accordance with [1], organisations of workers and employees on the one side, and

organisations of employers on the other, predominate in traditional industrial rela-

tions. The relations between them exist mainly at the sectoral or regional level, as

well as in enterprises. At a certain degree of association, they can also be realised at

the national level. In the traditional model, government authorities respect the auton-

omy of the actors in industrial relations and encourage regular bipartite interaction be-

tween the employers organisations and those of workers and employees. This

happens mainly by the establishment and development of legislative standards and

sub-normative regulations, and also by court and arbitration judgements. As a rule,the direct interference of the state in the relationships between employers and em-

ployees organisations is avoided. The state, on behalf of the government, acts an im-

portant role in the creation and normal working of the institutions of conciliation, as

well as of that of labour arbitration.

Neo-corporative model of industrial relations

In the case of the neo-corporative model, it is the organisations of workers and em-

ployees and the state, the government in particular, which are the main actors in in-

dustrial relations. Their interaction is concentrated predominantly at the national level

but it is also developed at the sectoral and the regional levels. The role of employers

associations here is certainly more slight, while the government is a direct participant

in the negotiations.

Neo-liberal model of industrial relations

In the case of the neo-liberal model, the government and the employers associations

are the main characters. In this case, the national level is also the fundamental one,

while relations are also developed at the sectoral and the regional levels. In the case of

the neo-liberal model, an under-appreciation of the organisations of workers and em-

ployees can be observed and is expressed by them being pushed out of discussionsover problems connected with the elaboration and realisation of economic and social


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South-East Europe Review 1/2//2003

policy. In fact, opportunities for trade unions to influence the making of decisions

concerning their members are restricted.

Establishment of the neo-corporative model of industrial relations in

Bulgaria, 19891994

It could be said that, in Bulgaria between 1989 and 1994, and even as far as the

present day in this country, a neo-corporative model of industrial relations has been

established. Associations of workers and employees (trade unions) on the one hand

and the state (represented by the Government) on the other are the leading actors in

industrial relations. That a transition from a centralised, planned economy of approxi-

mately 100% state-owned property to a mixed social market economy (at least, this is

what is stated in the Constitution of the country) is being carried out reflects, in an in-

disputable way, the development of industrial relations in Bulgaria as well as, respec-

tively, tripartite collaboration and the body of its realisation at the national level currently, the National Council for Tripartite Collaboration (NCTC).

Disproportionality in the development of trade unions and employers associations:the initial weakness of employers

An absolute disproportionality in the development of trade union and employer struc-

tures is the most important aspect originating from the totalitarian heritage.

On the one hand, between 1944 and 1989 trade unions were transformed into be-

ing a part of the state (they were the transmission belt of the Party) and, thus, they

were delegated with definite functions which, in a democratic society, would havebeen governmental ones (for example, labour safety or, in contemporary terms,

health and safety at work). Consequently, they had not only their own apparatus at

their disposal but also their own (furthermore, very well-grounded) nomenclature.

On the other hand, there were no employers associations. During the totalitarian

period, the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) was the only or-

ganisation in which industrial managerial cadres (who cannot be categorised precisely

as employers) have been able to participate. In 1980, the Bulgarian Industrial Associ-

ation (BIA) split away from it.

During the period of totalitarianism (since 1967), the BCCI has, formally ofcourse, represented employers in Bulgarian delegations to international labour confer-

ences. Membership of it is mandatory and, according to some authors:

During this period, it could be considered as a sub-division of the Ministry of Commerce. [2]

Formal employer participation in the first steps of tripartism

In 1989, neither BCCI nor the BIA participated in the wakening of tripartite collabo-

ration. BCCI explained its passivity as:

A protest against the manipulations of the government. [2] [3]


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Evolution of the model of industrial relations in Bulgaria 1989 2002

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To be objective, neither the BCCI nor the BIA fulfilled the requirements and the

ideas of employers associations which were able to participate in tripartite collabora-

tion. When, on February 28 1990, negotiations began between the Confederation of

Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria CITUB (created as a result of the rapid re-

form process of the Bulgarian trade unions which had existed during totalitarianism),and Andrei Loukanovs government on the conclusion of a General Agreement, the

sharp necessity arose for an employers association in order that this might be trans-

formed from a bipartite social contract into a tripartite one.

As a result of the impossibility that BCCI could be deployed in this way, the

newly-established National Council of Industrial Managers in Bulgaria (NCIMB) was

called upon to help. Authors close to the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions

in Bulgaria state clearly that the NCIMB:

Has been established with the support of the trade unions in order that a tripartite structure at the

national level could be constructed. [3]

The assessment is also made that:

This is, to a large extent, a formal association of the directors of state-owned enterprises who are

not endowed with either economic or administrative power, or with motivation and responsibility,

to act as competent employers, i.e. to negotiate with trade unions and the government, standing

up for the interests of enterprises. [3]

It is not by chance that the Confederation of Labour

Podkrepa

did not miss the

opportunity to attack the General Agreement, rejecting its tripartite character by stat-ing that the NCIMB:

Does not represent managers who are independent of the state. [4]

Up to now, some leaders of the Confederation of Labour

Podkrepa

,

for example

its Vice-President Dimitar Manolov, have refuted in front of the most influential in-

ternational forums that the General Agreement has a tripartite character, commenting

that the chronology of tripartism in Bulgaria stems directly from 1993.

The indisputable weakness of employers associations was acknowledged by the

associations themselves on many occasions during the 1989-1994 period. In its posi-tion opposing the Agreement on the further conduct of industrial reform and keeping

the social peace (signed on June 13 1991), the Bulgarian Industrial Association de-

clared that:

At this stage of the economic and social development of society, the role of the employer is sub-

stantially deformed in a tripartite system. [5]

Looking for adequate social partners amongst the employers associations

It occurs that it is difficult even to point out employers associations which are repre-

sentative. After the NCIMB disappeared from the scene, at the time of Philip Dimitrovscabinet, different employers associations, or configurations of such organisations,


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Teodor Detchev

48


aspired towards being representative. The lack of a legally-established criteria of repre-

sentivity helps, to a great extent, the overall level of confusion over this problem.

For example, on May 20 1992, the Civic Union for Private Economic Enterprise

(CUPEE), the BIA, the Association of Free Entrepreneurs and the Movement for the

Economic Revival of Bulgaria

opposed, together with the trade unions, the social andeconomic policy of the government in a general declaration. Particularly on the part of

the employers, this move was also aimed at gaining the benevolent influence of CITUB

and CL

Podkrepa

within the tripartite association. Despite this, the situation turned out

to be a little different. On May 29 1992, the social partners and Vice-Premier Nikolai

Vassilev announced that CUPEE, the BIA, the Bulgarian Union of Private Entrepre-

neurs

Vazrajdane

and the Association of Free Entrepreneurs

Alternative 2000

would participate in the newly-established National Council of Social Partnership.

After the legislative arrangement of tripartite collaboration at the beginning of

Lyuben Berovs cabinet government, in January 1993, the BIA, BCCI, CUPEE and

BUPE

Vazrajdane

were approved as nationally-representative employers associa-

tions (NB the Civic Union for Private Economic Enterprise CUPEE is also men-

tioned in [8, p. 71] as the Union of Private Economic Enterprise). This situation is the

same today.

During conversations with Ian Grant (in connection with a project for the support

of social dialogue under the EU PHARE programme), conducted on July 8 1993, the

leaders of the social organisations fully accepted the assessment of the weakness of

their organisational structures. This became the occasion of establishing special funds

for them to the tune of ECU 450 000 [6].

Employers began to play a more important role in tripartite collaboration (mainlyvia the participation of the BIA and, to some extent, BCCI) only at the time of Ivan

Kostovs cabinet, i.e. during the 19972001 period.

From quasi-tripartism to a neo-corporative model of industrial relations in Bulgaria

This review of the development of employers associations and their participation in

tripartite collaboration, including the authorities for its realisation at the national

level, shows clearly that, during these years, the fundamental axis along which the de-

bates were held within these authorities has been government-trade unions, with the

employers role being of more secondary importance. No doubt the position of CL

Podkrepa

, that the General Agreement of 1990 is not of a tripartite character, and

it is not the beginning of tripartite collaboration, is, to a great extent, an exaggerated

one. But it cannot be rejected that tripartite collaboration in Bulgaria has gone though

a unique quasi-tripartism

or two-and-a-half-partism

, in which the weak link has

been the employers associations [7]. This is a logical consequence also of the totali-

tarian heritage. For this reason, it can be stated quite firmly that, in the 1989-1994 pe-

riod, a neo-corporative model of industrial relations was gradually established in

Bulgaria. The trade unions and, of course, the government predominate in the Na-

tional Council of Tripartite Collaboration (NCTC). Depending on the situation, the

employers organisations stand either by the government or the trade unions but, inaddition, they are acutely lacking in both an expert and an administrative capacity.


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Moving further forward, after 1994, we can see that, nowadays, the importance of

CUPEE and, in particular, of BUPE

Vazrajdane

in tripartite collaboration is sur-

passed by their participation (against remuneration) in particular tripartite managerial

bodies, predominantly the National Social Insurance Institute and the National Em-

ployment Service.

Reciprocity between government strength and the model of industrialrelations during the period of transition

The problem of the correlation between the strength of a Government and the develop-

ment of social dialogue and tripartite collaboration is of great interest. (A criterion of

the strength of a Government can be the extent to which it enjoys sufficient parliamen-

tary support, i.e. whether it is a one-party government or one based on coalition).

It is no secret that, during the government of Jan Videnov, many trade union

members and authors connected with the labour movement shared the concept that,

the more imaginary the parliamentary support of a Government, the more construc-

tive its behaviour within a social dialogue framework, i.e. tripartite collaboration. [3]

The cabinets of Dimitar Popov and Lyuben Berov

The cabinet of Dimitar Popov is highlighted as a typical coalition Government in

which tripartite collaboration was attached major importance. Actually, during

Popovs cabinet, the decisions of the National Tripartite Commission of Interest Co-

ordination NTCCI (re-named towards the end of the mandate of the Government as

the Permanent Tripartite Commission of Interest Co-ordination PTCCI) attained ex-

clusive importance, as they:

Are to be immediately executed by all the ministries, institutions and territorial governmental

bodies, (quoted after [2], p. 93 and [7], p. 15)

In addition, the tripartite commission was referred to as the second centre of

power.

The government of Prof. Lyuben Berov is also used as a standard example during

its time, the legislative arrangements for tripartite collaboration were fulfilled. Actually,

in Parliament the Berov Government relied on the so-called dynamic majority (a jour-

nalistic expression which should be understood as the support of the parliamentary

group of the Movement of Rights and Freedoms; the major part of the parliamentary

group of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and its allies; some deputies of the parliamentary

group of the Union of Democratic Forces mainly the deputies of the Alternative

Social-Liberal Party; the circle around the former Vice-President and ex-Minister of

Defence, Dimiter Loudjev, initially known as the New Policy Centre; and the deputies

Ivan Poushkarov, Svilyana Zaharieva and Petko Ginev initially members of the Social

Democratic Party under the chair of Ivan Kourtev, and who later established themselves

as the Congregation of Democracy under the chair of Ivan Anev).

The Berov Government was a hostage of an intricate complex of intertwining in-terests but it really tried to guarantee the support of the social partners by delivering


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50


definite concessions in their favour. However, drawing parallels between the govern-

ments of Dimitar Popov and Lyuben Berov, we cannot fail to consider that giving a

decisive stimulus to the legal arrangements of tripartite collaboration, Lyuben

Berovs Government used almost effortlessly the concept on the regulation of tripar-

tite collaboration developed during the Popov Government.

Philip Dimitrovs Government and his time-expired experiment on transforming theneo-corporative model of industrial relations into a traditional one

Philip Dimitrovs Government (the one-party government of the Union of Demo-

cratic Forces, relying in Parliament on its parliamentary group and on the parliamen-

tary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms) is regarded as a typical

example of a one-party government. During its time, a crisis of tripartite collaboration

occurred because of the wish of the cabinet to limit its framework and to decrease the

burden of the social partners mainly, of the trade unions. Actually, Philip Dimi-

trovs government tried to make two once-for-all changes in industrial relations.

On the one hand, it tried to transform the model of industrial relations in the con-

text of the traditional model described above. This turned out to be groundless at the

moment when the state was the owner of the majority of enterprises all over the coun-

try and when managerial employees were very far from the position and mentality of

real employers. The attempt the state to alienate from social collaboration and to leave

it mainly in the hands of the rest of the social partners, has been reasonably taken by

the trade unions as an escape of responsibility at the eve of very difficult political and

structural reforms.

On the other hand, Philip Dimitrovs Government had tried, through making alter-ations in the Labour Code, to initiate in enterprises the institution of works councils,

and it also took up the issue of the conclusion of employment contracts. The latter was

a quite untimely initiative and was considered by the trade unions as no more than an

attempt at their exclusion from social partnership. At that time, in fact, there were no

foreign investments in Bulgaria; and neither had the large trans-national companies

entered the country. If, nowadays, the trade unions (and, especially, the CITUB) re-

port at a much higher degree the benefits of participating in works councils, then,

back in 1992, regarding the conclusion of collective employment contracts at the level

of incorporation in trans-national companies, this was for them quite simply a viola-

tion of their interests. The result was the strong opposition to the Government of hith-

erto irreconcilable opponents CITUB and CL

Podkrepa

.

The confrontation between Philip Dimitrovs Government and CL

Podkrepa

is

one of the main reasons behind the emergence from it of two new trade union centres

the National Trade Union (NTU) and the Association of Democratic Syndicates

(ADS). CL

Podkrepa

has been successful in reaching a definite degree of agreement

and unity of action with its initially resolute opponent CITUB but its relations

with NTU and ADS thus far remain antagonistic and characterised by deep hostility.

It is a particular paradox that Lyuben Berovs Government stepped up the changes

in the Labour Code which had been prepared during the Government of Philip Dim-itrov. To some extent, the comparatively smooth procedure of tripartite collaboration


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during the first year of the coalition Government of Lyuben Berov can be attributed to

the social partners having managed to spend a large amount of pent-up negative

energy during the time in power of the one-party Government of Philip Dimitrov.

Jan Videnovs Government and the attempts at erasing the trade union parameterof tripartite collaboration

The activities of Jan Videnovs Government (which was a pseudo-coalition, dominated

by the Bulgarian Socialist Party and relying on an absolute majority in Parliament) are

also pointed to as constituting a further downwards trend in the development of tripar-

tite collaboration while, furthermore, such trends were exacerbated by the trade unions

themselves. [8] Videnovs cabinet did not make any alterations in the regulation of tri-

partite collaboration, but the socialist Government did try to subvert the National Coun-

cil of Tripartite Collaboration (BCTC) by allowing membership of it to a new trade

union creation the Community of Free Trade Union Organisations in Bulgaria

(CFTUOB). This was the cause of the initial incitement of confrontation, thereafter es-

calated step-by-step and fed by the different activities of the Government until the

events of January 1997 were reached, during which period the Bulgarian Socialist Party

was forced to transfer power to a Cabinet led by Stefan Sofianski.

Like the Government of Philip Dimitrov, the Government of Jan Videnov tried to

control how trade unions would react in a situation in which the level of the state rep-

resentative, who presided over the national body of tripartite collaboration, had de-

creased. Both Governments tried at the beginning to change the vice-president and to

preside over the national body of tripartite collaboration with a Government Minister.

In both cases, this provoked an immediate reaction by the trade unions and, aftersome disputes and much wasted energy, the previous condition was re-attained.

A deterministic correlation between the strength of the Government andthe model of industrial relations does not exist

The axiom

coalition Governmentsuccessful tripartite collaboration; one-party

Governmentcrisis in tripartite collaboration

is simplistic and determinable only on

a superficial basis. A more detailed analysis of the facts shows that things are not so

deterministic.

The examples of the governments of Dimitar Popov and Lyuben Berov are per-

haps not well sustained. In the first place, during Dimitar Popovs Government and, to

an even greater degree, during Lyuben Berovs Government, it has been noted that, at

the first symptoms of the cabinet quivering, cataclysms took place in the functions of

tripartite collaboration at the national level. In the case of the cabinet of Lyuben

Berov cited as an example of a successful tripartite collaboration cabinet after a

course of conflicts within it, the NCTC ceased its operations on April 26 1994. This

state of affairs continued up to November 11 1994, when Reneta Injovas

cabinet

doffice

(and, to be more precise, vice-premier Nikola Vassilev) restored tripartite col-

laboration.

Tripartite collaboration during the strong cabinet of Ivan Kostov, on the otherhand, depicts a triumph of the neo-corporatist model.


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At the same time, Ivan Kostovs Government, which relied on an absolute parlia-

mentary majority (not only among the representatives elected on the list of the Allied

Democratic Forces ADF, but also in the parliamentary group of the Union of the

Democratic Forces, which was the backbone of the ADF), does not register in the

scheme described above. During Kostovs cabinet, by mutual concessions betweenthe social partners, tripartite partnership worked rather successfully. On October 2

1997, the Government, CITUB, CL

Podkrepa

and BIA signed a Charter for social

collaboration

and aMemorandum of priority activities

. During the next few years, the

Memorandum was updated several times. Even when CL

Podkrepa

withdrew its

signature from the Charter (on grounds which were perhaps rather conjectural), it did

not leave the NCTC or any other body realising tripartite collaboration. During Ivan

Kostovs cabinet (in which, it is rather important to note, that Ivan Neikov the long-

time Deputy Chair of the largest trade union confederation, the CITUB was the

Minister of Labour and Social Policy), tripartite collaboration clearly even reached an

optimal level the NCTC was less burdened but, on the other hand, the intense partic-

ipation of the social partners at all levels in working groups aiming to realise solutions

should be noted.

During Ivan Kostovs cabinet, an overhaul of legislation in the spheres of health

and safety at work and in social insurance was accomplished, while important

changes in the Labour Code were also made and the Act on the Economic and Social

Council passed. Considering that all this was done in close collaboration with the so-

cial partners, and with the very important participation of the trade unions, it could be

said that, during this period, we witnessed a triumph of the neo-corporative model of

industrial relations in Bulgaria.In this sense, the thesis that strong governments always aim to restrict, or simply

to neglect, tripartite collaboration is not always valid and it should certainly be con-

sidered in the context of the historical situation. Above all, we are unable to agree

with Lajos Hthy that the successful action of tripartite collaboration in countries in

transition depends to an enormous degree on the philosophy, i.e. the readiness, of the

relevant governments to partner in it. [9] All over central and eastern Europe, there

are many examples of governments which do not mind sharing the responsibility of

conducting unpopular reforms connected with the economy and the reconstruction of

the labour market together with their social partners and, in particular, with the trade

unions. But neither is the opposite an exception; typical examples here are the Go-

vernments of Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic [10] [11] and that of Victor Orban

in Hungary. [9]

The strategy of the social partners in Bulgaria regarding the developmentof industrial relations

Considering the neo-corporative model of industrial relations which has characterised

Bulgaria and the co-relationship between the strength of the Government and the

course of social dialogue predominantly at the national level (i.e. in the National

Commission for the Co-ordination of Interests NCCI; the National Tripartite Com-mission for the Co-ordination of Interests NTCCI; the Permanent Tripartite Com-


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mission for the Co-ordination of Interests PTCCI; the National Council for Social

Partnership NCSP; and the National Council for Tripartite Collaboration NCTC),

the conclusion could surely be drawn that trade unions will defend the retention of the

status quo

by all means available. Even right after November 10 1989, the trade union

elite in the Bulgarian trade union movement had a far clearer vision of its future rolethan, say, the elite of the Bulgarian Communist Party in power. The reformist CITUB

(the successor of the former Bulgarian trade union movement) found its place in the

democratic process in a clever way. CL

Podkrepa

also appreciated very quickly the

forward prospects of being a national representative trade union formation and gave

up the rather attractive position of being a founder-member of the Union of Demo-

cratic Forces just when the latter came to power.

The struggle between the trade union confederations for national representivity

CITUB and CL

Podkrepa

eagerly defend the basis of the neo-corporative model, as

well as their roles as main participants and actors. They reject the opportunity for an-

other nationally-representative trade union to appear and, in the vocabulary of the

leaders of CL

Podkrepa

, terms such as authentic trade unions (no doubt these are

CITUB and CL

Podkrepa

) and syndicalists (other registered trade union organisa-

tions) do crop up.

During Dimitar Popovs Government, CITUB and CL

Podkrepa

successfully re-

jected the pretensions of the Peoples Trade Union

Edinstvo

(later renamed the In-

dependent Trade Union

Edinstvo

) towards participation in the NTCCI/PTCCI. In all

justice, it ought to be acknowledged that a large number of self-employed and unem-

ployed people are listed as members of

Edinstvo

. The notion of a trade union of theunemployed (having several tens of thousands of members) and of a trade union for

members of producers co-operatives (having several hundred thousands of members)

provokes justified hesitations as to what extent

Edinstvo

is a trade union organisa-

tion at all.

During Lyuben Berovs Government, CITUB and CL

Podkrepa

also repelled

the pretensions of the Community of Free Trade Union Organisations in Bulgaria

(CFTUOB) towards participation in the NCTC. Their reasons are connected with the

disputed evidence of the national representivity of the CFTUOB. It should not be for-

gotten that, at that time, the procedure of proving that the criteria for national repre-

sentivity had been fulfilled was rather conditional. Proof is grounded on documents,

presented by the social partners themselves, which are not certified by anyone. Con-

trol is executed, in fact, by the General Labour Inspectorate but a complete, meticu-

lous check is not possible at all.

However, Jan Videnovs Government managed to introduce the CFTUOB to the

NCTC, in spite of the protests of CITUB and CL

Podkrepa

, in the attempt to wash

away the trade union component in tripartite partnership. This is one of the numerous

grounds why CITUB and CL

Podkrepa

participated with particular eagerness in the

little revolution during January-February 1997 which led to the falling from power

of the Democratic Left coalition, dominated as it was by the Bulgarian SocialistParty (BSP). At the last meeting of Jan Videnovs cabinet (at that time, the cabinet


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Teodor Detchev

54


had been resigned for almost two months), it took its revenge of CITUB and CL

Pod-

krepa

by accepting the National Trade Union (NTU), the General Centre of Branch

Trade Unions in Bulgaria (GCBTB) and the Independent Trade Union

Edinstvo

as

nationally representative. It must be emphasised that NTU is a trade union centre, de-

spite being at that time in an exclusively close relationship with the Union of Demo-cratic Forces. (

Edinstvo

has for a long time been close to the BSP, while the

GCBTB is a split from CFTUOB). Evidently, the hostility of the resignation cabinet

to both the two general trade union confederations was so significant that it passed as

a nationally representative organisation one that has been amongst the most hostile to

BSP trade union structures, in order only to hurt them.

The cabinet doffice

of Stefan Sofianski recognised as nationally representative the

Association of Democratic Syndicates (ADS) and so the trade unions in the NCTC

amounted to seven. Both authentic trade unions answered the hit immediately in

countersigning the Charter for social collaboration and theMemorandum of priority

activities

, they gained the consent of Ivan Kostovs Government to a unique trade

union count to be undertaken in order to determine the presence of representivity crite-

ria concerning the trade union formations. The procedure began at the end of 1998 and,

by 1999, the nationally representative trade unions numbered again only two.

CITUB and CL Podkrepa strongholds of the neo-corporative model of industrialrelations

From everything written thus far, it is evident that CITUB and CL Podkrepa are

ready to oppose all who try to deflect the model of industrial relations into a more

neo-liberal or, even, traditional course. Accepting this axiom, we can explain the un-expected attack of CL Podkrepa against Philip Dimitrovs Government in 1992 at

a moment when it had been granted with exclusive privileges. Its officials literally

lorded the Ministry of Industry (of which Ivan Poushkarov was the Minister), while

the property of the general competitor CITUB was confiscated by law. Excluding

conspiracy theories of overthrowing the cabinet of Philip Dimitrov, which are not a

subject of the present survey, the only explanation remaining is that CL Podkrepa

preferred to start a war against the Government in the name of the defence of the neo-

corporative model to the prospect of sustaining a strong attack on CITUB and to con-

sent to the narrowing of the scope of tripartite collaboration.

Reconstruction of the employers parameter of tripartite collaboration the marchof neo-liberal conceptsIt should be noted that at the beginning of 1993, when the newly-formed NCTC began

its operations, no action had been undertaken in connection with establishing the degree

to which the employers associations announced as nationally representative answered

the criteria of representivity as set out by the Labour Code. In addition, in 2003 the term

of trade union representivity expires, after which it should be re-established which un-

ion organisations answer the criteria of representivity and which do not.

Even so, at the end of the government of Ivan Kostovs cabinet, a certain hyper-activity appeared with respect to some newly-formed, nationally non-representative


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employers organisations which brought into question all the achievements in the

sphere of social partnership during the previous twelve years. The established neo-

corporative model of tripartite collaboration (with the substantial participation of the

state, workers associations and the gradually increasing importance of the structuring

into a movement of employers associations) did have opportunities to develop suc-cessfully into a scheme of social partnership so typical of EU countries. However, this

was not appreciated by representatives of large-scale capital, who had already gained

some inertia.

The present Government of Simeon SaxeCoburgGotha happens to be under the

permanent pressure of the newly-established Employers Association of Bulgaria

(EAB) (www.eabg.org), of the Association of Foreign Investors in Bulgaria officially

called the Bulgarian Industrial Business Association BIBA (www.biba.bg) and, to

some extent, of the Bulgarian Business Club Vazrajdane (which should not be con-

fused with the Bulgarian Union of Private Entrepreneurs Vazrajdane. The former

unites some major business people in Bulgaria bankers, media magnates, gambling

bosses and industrialists; actually, it is the only one which has the character of a busi-

ness club and is not nationally representative. In contrast, the Bulgarian Union of Pri-

vate Entrepreneurs (BUPE) Vazrajdane is a formal, nationally representative, asso-

ciation of small investors but has functions that are fast fading away.) The Cabinet

needs to manoeuvre between the radical, neo-liberal claims of the EAB and the under-

standable desire of employers not to give up positions achieved as a result of long ne-

gotiations between the social partners and the exhausting demands of consensus.

Claims for a new Labour Code, providing employers with almost limitless opportuni-

ties to get rid of their workers whenever they like and without compensation, and fora drastic restriction of trade union rights, are not only an interruption of the polite tone

of the social partnership but are also a gauntlet thrown down before workers, officials

and their representative associations.

Under these circumstances of growing social confrontation, and under a serious

lack of space for social manoeuvre, the Government has turned out to be in a very

complicated situation. And, again, it has undertaken a rather dubious step, from a tac-

tical point of view, by founding an institution in which only the pressure groups of

large-scale business can be especially associated. It is undisputable that the Govern-

ment needs to be in constant dialogue with large-scale entrepreneurs, in order to be

aware of their claims and the reasons for them, but the institution it has created the

Economic Growth Council (EGC) associates some nationally-representative em-

ployers associations together with nationally non-representative employers associa-

tions. The EGC actually doubles to a great extent the work of the National Council of

Tripartite Collaboration. (In the EGC take part the Employers Association of Bul-

garia (EAB), the Bulgarian Business Club Vazrajdane, the BIA, BCCI, and the As-

sociation of Foreign Investors in Bulgaria BIBA.) It is clear that, owing to the ag-

gressive behaviour of the newly-founded EAB, the representative employers

associations are unable not to radicalise as they do not want to experience an exodus

of their members. Willing or not, they should keep on the outside edge of such a pecu-liar institution as the Economic Growth Council.


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Teodor Detchev

56 South-East Europe Review 1/2//2003

However, the Cabinet was not obliged to institutionalise the natural will of large-

scale capital to have a point for lobbying the executive directly. Even so, it undertook

an action which can be assessed in terms of its potential for re-orientation, increasing

to some extent the development of industrial relations in the direction of a neo-liberal

model. Of course, no-one believed that the foundation of the Economic Growth Coun-cil would make the relationship between the Government and large-scale capital more

transparent. Furthermore, the anti-corruption association of non-governmental organ-

isations Coalition-2000 provided a negative assessment of the foundation of the

Council. Many of the problems discussed at the EGC are either within the compe-

tence of the Ministry of the Economy (given that tripartite collaboration at sectoral

and branch level has never been particularly advanced in Bulgaria), or that of the

NCTC, or else could be set in front of the Prime Minister by the representative em-

ployers associations without it being necessary to have a separate institution founded

for that purpose. At the same time, almost all the members of the newly-founded em-

ployers structures (for example the EAB) also participate in the BIA, as well as in the

BCCI, and it is unlikely that this would refuse to represent them.

In making such concessions to one of the parties in the system of industrial rela-

tions, the Government is generating problems for itself: conditions of stress accumu-

lation rise, and their settling will, later, be one of its subsequent problems. Another is-

sue is that it will scarcely be able to rely on the eternal gratitude of employers

participating in the EGC. They will never save the Government from any situation in

which their interests are threatened or where their opinion does not coincide with the

position of the executive.

References

[1] Shopov, D: Industrial Relations, Trakiya - M Publishers: Sofia, 1999, p. 60-61

(in Bulgarian).

[2] Shopov, D:Industrial Relations in Bulgaria, Sofia, 1994 (in Bulgarian).

[3] Petkov, K., D. Koumanov, V. Mratchkov, Y. Bliznakov, Y. Aroyo, I. Neikov,

N. Koleva: Tripartite Partnership (A Cause for Specialisation in the Field of In-

dustrial Relations), Sofia, 1996, published by the Institute for Industrial Rela-

tions and Management and the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences Plov-

div University Paisiy of Hilendar (in Bulgarian).

[4] Standpoint of CL Podkrepa on the General Agreement, signed by the Govern-

ment of Bulgaria, the National Council of Industrial Managers in Bulgaria and

CITUB. Sofia, Podkrepa weekly, March 2 1990, p. 4 (in Bulgarian).

[5] Standpoint of the BIA on the second stage of economic reform in Bulgaria and

on the agreement on social peace, Sofia, Podkrepa daily, June 25 1991, p. 5 (in

Bulgarian).

[6] Indicative Programme for Reinforcing the Social Dialogue in the Republic of

Bulgaria first draft, proposal for financing within the framework of the PHAREprogramme, prepared by Ian Grant; quoted from the Bulgarian text and as re-


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ported at the session of the NCTC on 27 August 1993, archive of the Secretariat

of the NCTC non-classified.

[7] Milcheva, E: The National Council for Tripartite Collaboration and the Institu-

tionalisation of Tripartism in Bulgaria, Sofia University St. Kliment of Ohrid,

Faculty of Philosophy, Theory of Politics Chair, January 2001 (in Bulgarian).[8] Dimitrova, D: Tripartism and Industrial Relations in Bulgaria, in: Casale,

Giuseppe (ed.): Social Dialogue in Central and Eastern Europe, International

Labour Office, CEET: Budapest, 1999, p. 77.

[9] Hthy, L: Social Dialogue and the Expanding World. The Decade of Tripartism

in Hungary and in Central and Eastern Europe 198899 (pre-print of an unre-

vised translation from the Hungarian text), European Trade Union Institute/Frie-

drich-Ebert-Stiftung, Brussels: February 2001; Budapest: 2000, p. 149.

[10] Kubinkova, M: Tripartism and Industrial Relations in the Czech Republic, in:

Casale, Giuseppe (ed.): Social Dialogue in Central and Eastern Europe, Interna-

tional Labour Office, CEET: Budapest, 1999, p. 118 and p. 128.

[11] Pollert, A: The Czech Republic Industrial Relations Background,European

Industrial Relations Review, London, No. 296, Sept. 1998, p. 20-21.

[12] ILO CEET: The Bulgarian Challenge: Reforming Labour Market and Social

Policy, International Labour Office: Budapest, 1994.


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Documents

South East Europe Review 2003-01-02 Detchev