SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALIA IN THE 1980s

ALAN RENOUF

Firstly, the current scene in ASEAN and in the countries which make it up and the likely future. Secondly, the state of play in relations between Australia and the region. Thirdly, what Australia should do about it.

As to the first, there are reassuring circumstances and those not so reassuring. Reassuring circumstances include:

(a) ASEAN has been more successful than anyone envisaged when it was formed some ten years ago. Conceived as an economic organisation, paradoxically its success lies in the political area rather than the economic (it has not worked so well in the economic area because the respective economies are more com- petitive than complementary) : although ASEAN has not become a security grouping as one or two of its membes would like, it has become useful politically in fostering a process of consultation and co-ordination of attitudes to international political problems. It has therefore brought into the region a new factor of political strength. This is good as not so long ago one of the fears in the region was of Indonesian expan- sionism towards Singapore and Malaysia. Such fear has now sunk from sight.

(b) Reassurance to a point also lies in the political situation in the various ASEAN countries: over recent years there has emerged a pattern of political stability in each of these countries. The future in this respect may be uncertain (more later) but so far there has been a rather unexpected degree of political stability.

(c) Economically, the respective members of ASEAN have d e veloped quite a deal more satisfactorily than might have been expected some time ago. Singapore, in particular, is something of an economic miracle. While progress elsewhere has not been so substantial, it has been impressive.

Not so reassuring circumstances include: (a) One is entitled to wonder whether the recent pattern of political

stability will last. It should last in Singapore but in the other ASEAN countries the outlook is more uncertain. Malaysia’s population is nearly 40 per cent ethnic Chinese yet Malaysian

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politics are dominated by the Malays and the Communist guerillas have not been eliminated. While Malaysia’s Chinese are deeply antiCommunist and dedicated to free enterprise, communal relations unless carefully handled could give rise to instability in the future. Thailand has periodically seen periods of political unrest in the past and no one can be sure this will not recur, particularly now that Viet-Nam is on the border. The Marcos r6gime in the Philippines cannot last for ever and the insurrection in the South continues. One of the disquietening aspects of the insurrection is that it has led to the creation of a large standing army and there must be elements within that which have political ambitions. The end of the Suharto r6gime in Indonesia is approaching and the succession problem is looming up. Who will replace Suhartwanother Suharto who has been quite responsible, or another Sukarno? Indonesia has the greatest number of active volcanoes in the world and the country has always seemed to be a volcano, dormant now but likely to blow its top at any time to the general surprise of the world.

(b) Each of the ASEAN countries has elements in common which cast a shadow over the political future. Apart from Malaysia. they are all run by dictatorships, military in Thailand and Indonesia, civilian elsewhere. While there is not much faith to be placed in democracy in developing countries, the alternative dictatorship is more given to violent challenge. In each country, except perhaps Singapore, there is a lot of corruption, especially in Indonesia and the Philippines. While this may be inevitable, it means that the spoils for the political victors are great and this increases the temptation to action. Finally, prosperity in developing countries invariably means a growing educated class with expectations of satisfactory employment: if economic progress cannot meet these expectations in adequate degree. the disaffected tend to turn to politics and this portends trouble.

(c) In recent times, South-East Asia has become more an area of great power rivalry. Whereas the protection once afforded by the United States has diminished, Russia has become more involved and China has responded. While talk of Viet-Nam being a creature of Russia is to be deprecated, it is true that Russia has gained a foothold there and it will be difficult to dislodge her. Viet-Nam will have the will to do so when the time is ripe but that time may be distant and even when it comes, will Viet-Nam’s will be able to prevail? So there is a new scene now in South-East Asia of Russia and China con- testing for influence and this is unsettling.

(d) Also causing unsettlement in the region are the activities of Viet-Nam. These are not without advantage in the sense that they are encouraging cohesion among the members of ASEAN but otherwise Viet-Nam’s conduct is causing concern in the

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region: personally I am not that worried about Viet-Nam’s conduct in itself because once Viet-Nam dominates the whole of the old Indo-China, her territorial ambitions should be satisfied, her internal problems will be its pre-occupation and Ch,ina will be watching.

Australia’s Policies The Government’s policies towards South-East Asia leave a lot to

be desired. Generally speaking, Australia’s relations with the region are at a lower ebb than they have been for a long time. There are various reasons for this. Firstly, the ASEAN countries are annoyed that they cannot secure the degree of access to the Australian market for their products which they regard as adequate. They have a fairly strong case-as far as I can see. For internal political considerations, the Government feels unable to give the ASEAN countries their due. It has tried to meet the bill by setting up some consultative machinery but this is more in the nature of an early warning system than any- thing else. This has not deceived the ASEAN countries: to make matters worse, the Government preaches free trade abroad while denying it to Australia’s nearest neighbours and hence gives an impression of hypocrisy. The Government further damaged relations with these countries a year or so ago by trying with Britain to take from some of the ASEAN airlines their share of the Australia/West Europe traffic. The attempt was made in a ham-fisted way and this caused an unnecessary degree of resentment.

A second and more general ground for the ASEAN countries’ current dissatisfaction with Australia is the feeling they must have that Australia no longer attached the same degree of importance to relations with them. These relations have traditionally been a priority affair for Australian Governments and they were carried to a new height by the Whitlam Government. They do not carry the same degree of priority with the present Government. Australia’s conduct of the market-access and civil-aviation questions gives this impression. It is also given by the new importance which the Government gives to the British Commonwealth and Southern Africa: an importance which any objective reading of national interests does not sustain. In short, Australia appears to have lost some degree of interest in the ASEAN countries and has turned her attention more elsewhere.

Running parallel to this I have the feeling that the ASEAN countries, perhaps provoked by Australia, are beginning to sense that Australia is not so important to them as they once felt. In this connection, they have found a new identity and a new strength in ASEAN and their economies have prospered despite Australia. The ASEAN countries are commencing, in other words, to feel that Australia is not so relevant to them and that they need more to look among themselves and in directions other than southwards.

A third reason for the ASEAN countries’ present attitude towards Australia may be the tendency the Government has shown since

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Russia’s aggression in Afghanistan, to swing back towards the United States, especially in the field of security. While one or two of these countries may privately be content with the Government’s offer of naval and air facilities to the United States, I wonder whether the region as a whole welcomes such a move. Foreign conventional military bases do not find favour with most Third World countries now and Australia’s offers are contrary to the spirit of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) at least.

Some other explanations, not as important as the foregoing, may be adduced for the ASEAN countries’ present coolness towards Australia. One is that Australia’s relations with Indonesia are not at all good, as the recent closure of Radio Australia’s office in Djakarta has shown. Of course, these relations have rarely been as good as Australia has wanted them to be, and has striven to make them, because of the three successive crises of West New Guinea, confrontation of Malaysia and East Timor and the legacy of bitterness which each of these crises has left. Clearly, the continuing rancour over Australia’s atti- tude to East Timor has contributed to the closure of Radio Australia’s office. As Indonesia is the most powerful member of ASEAN, her feelings towards Australia must exercise some influence upon the feelings of other ASEAN members.

Another possible explanation is that the ASEAN countries may look with some puzzlement on the impression the present Government gives of aspiring to play a world role. In showing pretensions towards a world vocation, the ASEAN countries may think that Australia is getting too big for her boots. The main context is, of course, Afghanistan with regard to which Australia has been one of the three countries in the world most critical of Russia and most active against her. Yet Australia is as far removed from Afghanistan as any country and has only a slight degree of dependence upon the oil flowing through the Persian Gulf. In any foreign-policy issue, a role com- mensurate with the importance of the issue to the country concerned and commensurate with power is respected: an incommensurate role damages the national reputation.

Finally, at least three of the ASEAN countries do not share the present Government’s attitude to China, at least unreservedly: that is, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. In its abhorrence of Russia, the Government has leant over backwards towards China rather grace- lessly in my view. For example, Australia was the only country in the world publicly to speak with approval of China’s recent testing of an ICBM in the Pacific, overlooking that such missiles, once perfected, can be targeted elsewhere than Russia.

Australia’s relations with another pivotal country in South-East Asia, Viet-Nam, are bad, since they can only be described as nominal. The responsibility rests mainly with Australia. Prime Minister Fraser cannot forgive Viet-Nam for having won the Viet-Nam War (neither can he forgive the United States for losing it nor that Viet-Nam

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provoked in some degree by the United States, concluded an alliance with Russia). Hence, when Vie$-Nam, after suffering a lot of taunting by Kampuchea, invaded Kampuchea, Australia condemned her most severely and abruptly ended Australia’s small aid programme with Viet-Nam. This aid should have been valued as a means of lessening Viet-Nam’s dependence upon Russia. No such displeasure however was displayed by the Government when China later launched her punitive raid into Viet-Nam although this too was a case of aggression. By such actions, Australia relinquished any influence upon Viet-Nam and helped to drive her more towards Russia, a consequence which the Government inconsistently said it wanted to avoid. Most recently, the Government has baulked. despite the plea of its Foreign Minister, to withdraw recognition in the near future from the Pol Pot rkgime in Kampuchea which is horrendous and has no future; this is the essen- tial first step for trying to get on better terms with VietiNam. If the Government’s obduracy equals its short-sightedness, Australia will only take this step after those more directly concerned have done so and accordingly will win little credit with Viet-Nam for doing so. Resentment about the Viet-Nam War and an erroneous belief that Viet-Nam is a stooge of Russia are not a sound basis for foreign policy. Mr Peacock appreciates t h i s but Mr Fraser and the many in the Government he dominates do not. (In the run-up to the Federal election it was announced that the Government would withdraw recog- nition from the Pol Pot kgime-Note by the editor.)

For all these reasons, I maintain that the Government should direct more intelligent attention towards South-East Asia and make a con- soious effort to improve Australia’s relations with the region. I say so not only for political and security reasons but also for those economic because whatever happens in one part of a relationship afEects what happens in the other parts of it and the whole (a fact of which the Government is oblivious). Various measures are neces- s a r y of which the principal ones are as follows:

The Government should give up the strenuous efforts it has made to be a leader in the West’s struggle against Russia. Clearly, Australia has to join in that struggle but it should not try to lead it. The Government should, in consultation with ASEAN. study what needs to be done in terms of access for such countries to the Australian market and make a meaningful effort to meet the needs which are identified. There wi l l be domestic political ramifications but the Government is strong enough, as is the economy, to handle them. Generally, the Government should give relations with the ASEAN countries the priority they merit. The Government should seek to improve relations with Viet- Nam so as to countervail, even in the small way that Australia can, the influace of Russia upon that country.

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If such measures are taken, the drift of Australia towards irrelevance in the South-East Asian Region can be arrested. If not, it can only accelerate. The present foreign policy of the Government lacks balance and one of the victims is South-East Asia, a kegion of priority impor- tance to Australia.

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