South Africa, the East African Community, and the U.S.-Africa Policy Conundrum

7/30/2019 South Africa, the East African Community, and the U.S.-Africa Policy Conundrum

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South Africa, the East African Community and the

U.S.-Africa Policy ConundrumFrancis a.

K ornegay

senior Fellow

institute

For global

Dialogue

Fbu 2012

The following analysis was prepared several weeks prior to the just concluded Afri-

can Union summit in Addis Ababa. The outcome of the contest to head the AU

Commission (yet to be determined at the time of writing) is not considered to af-

fect the main thrust of the options put forth in terms of US policy, especially with

respect to the East African Community. Of course, if the desired outcome material-

ized, this will only reinforce what is advocated.

The percepTion ThaT africa

Takes a backseat to Asia in President Barack

Obama’s foreign policy view obscures a compel-

ling strategic landscape the administration could

construct were it ever to elevate the attention it

apportions to Africa. With the global geo-eco-

nomic center of gravity shifting from west to

east and north to south, Africa in general and

eastern and southern Africa in particular con-

stitute the missing piece in what could consti-

tute the shaping of a coherent U.S.-global South

strategy; one based on a convergence of Asia

and Africa policies. But for this to happen, Presi-

dent Obama must afford comparable status to

Africa Program Policy Brief No. 4



africa program policy brief no. 4

Kenya and the East African Community (EAC) to

what he coners on Indonesia and the Association

o Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

o be sure, the Obama administration has been

preoccupied with Kenya’s stability and, more

broadly, with regional security in northeast Arica.

Yet, it has not been moved to develop a broader

regional initiative revolving around Nairobi com-parable to what it is weaving around Indonesia

and the ASEAN. Moreover, South Arica - and

its bid to have Home Aairs Minister Nkosazana

Dlamini-Zuma become the new head o the A-

rican Union (AU) – gures importantly in this

calculus. But the rst order o business should be

creating convergence between Kenya and the EAC

with Indonesia and the ASEAN as centerpieces

in ashioning the U.S./Aro-Asian component

o a global strategy. Here, Obama’s rans-Pacic

Partnership would be the oundational element

or a broader coalition with East Arica. Beyond

that, Kenya and East Arica should be perceived in

much broader geostrategic terms.

By ignoring the Kenya-EAC connection, it is as

though President Obama has omitted a critica

element in his biographical journey in sculpting

a new oreign policy identity or America and his

presidency; one grounded in his uniquely Aro-

Asian cosmopolitan background as an Arican-

American (which, in itsel, provides ample poten

tial or recasting America’s oreign policy narrative)

In other words, America’s rst “Pacic President”

is also America’s rst president, not only o Arican

descent, but o a lineage rooted in the very soil o

the Rit Valley cradle o humankind.

Tis cradle happens to serve as a ulcrum around

which revolves much o Arica’s peril and promise

Te peril reers to instabilities along the escarp-

ment, rom the threat o the Lord’s Resistance

Army which Uganda is combating with U.S. as-

sistance, to war and mayhem in the eastern Dem-

ocratic Republic o Congo, to the south Somal

cauldron stretching into the Indian Ocean and

aecting Kenya’s cohesion, to the challenges in

stabilizing the Sudanese contradictions o Jubaand Khartoum. Indeed, this latter dimension has

been likened to a “great game” pitting Beijing and

Khartoum against Washington and Juba in search

o alternate outlets or South Sudan’s oil exports as

a means o breaking Juba’s dependency on Khar-

toum.

In act, there are a number o North-South cor-

ridor inrastructure projects underway actoring

South Sudan within the larger scheme o consoli-dating an eastern and southern Arican integrat-

ed market bordering the western Indian Ocean

Te tripartite Kenyan Lamu Port-South Sudan-

Ethiopia ransport (Lapsset) corridor scheduled

to break ground in February 2012 is one such

By ignoring the Kenya-

EAC connection, it is asthough President Obama

has omitted a critical

element in his biographical

journey in sculpting a

new foreign policy

identity for America

and his presidency



South Africa, the East African Community and

the U.S.-Africa Policy Conundrum

initiative. Moreover, it may be in both the U.S.

and China’s interest to see Sudan and South Su-

dan “reintegrated” into an expanding EAC look-

ing eventually to mutate into a political ederation

or “regional integration community.”

Tis is all the more reason why Washington

should consider ways o consolidating its regional

priorities – security, diplomatic and economic – in

East Arica by ocusing on strengthening the East

Arican Community, not just or itsel, but as a

“gateway” to the rest o central and southern A-

rica. For much o Arica’s promise resides in the

600-700 million Grand Free rade Area initiative

amalgamating the EAC with the Southern Ari-

can Development Community (SADC) and the

Common Market or Eastern and Southern A-

rica (COMESA); a “Cape to Cairo” vision linking

South Arica to the southern tip o the continent

with a “new” Egypt and the northern crossroads o

the eastern Mediterranean encompassing the Red

Sea and the western Indian Ocean littoral. Such

a U.S.-East Arican relationship would contributeto building the relationship between the EAC and

its tripartite partners, COMESA and SADC and

the ASEAN.

An U.S.-EAC orum initiative could represent the

type o multidimensional structuring Washing-

ton’s relations in greater East Arica, including the

Horn (and the Inter-Governmental Authority orDevelopment as a “security community” adjunct

to the EAC), that could clearly underline America’s

support or an integrationist Arica policy agenda.

Tis is where the model o the relationship being

orged with Indonesia and the ASEAN comes in

play. Tis would eed into the New Asia-Arica

Strategic Partnership launched by South Arica, as

well as Indonesia in 2005 at the 50th anniversary

o the Bandung conerence.

Purely in Arica policy terms, an U.S.-EAC orum

could be conceived as a sort o “pilot project” or

replication in other AU regions o the continent:

an U.S.-ECOWAS orum to consolidate America’s

relations in West Arica and a revived U.S.-SADC

This is all the more

reason why Washington

should consider ways

of consolidating its

regional priorities –

security, diplomatic

and economic – in

East Africa

The US Agency for Inter-

national Development’sregional hubs for

promoting intra-

African trade might

well serve as the vehicle

for negotiating such

forums into being in

a regionalizing of

the U.S.-Africa policy

template.




orum in southern Arica encompassing relations

with Angola, as well as South Arica. In the case o

an U.S.-ECOWAS orum, such a structure could

relate to the collaborative ashioning o a southern

transatlantic cooperation with Brazil and Nigeria.

Te US Agency or International Development’s

regional hubs or promoting intra-Arican trade

might well serve as the vehicle or negotiating such

orums into being in a regionalizing o the U.S.-

Arica policy template.

On the domestic end, a clearly resolved integra-

tionist strategy on the continent could have the

potential to restructure constituencies o Arica

interest in America. Tis could involve a greater

role or Americans o Arican immigrant descent

as well as Arican-Americans o historical lineage

in a real pan-Arican partnership spanning the At-

lantic. Such a recasting o America’s constituency

or Arica alongside a comparable realignment o

constituencies in support o the administration’s

trans-Pacic strategy should help propel an overall

adaptive reconguration o the U.S.’ global pos-ture toward a changing strategic landscape that is

shiting south as well as east.

Te orgoing is suggestive o an emerging “big pic-

ture” against which Washington’s Arica calculus

may need rethinking. Among other things, this

would need to include a more strategically prag-

matic bilateral relationship with South Arica

Tis is where the Dlamini-Zuma AU candidacy

gures as a critical actor in U.S.-South Arica and

broader Arica policy considerations. Her candida-

cy is centered on the institutional strengthening

ecient unctioning and geopolitical credibility-

building o the AU in the service o continental

and regional integration. Te goal: continenta

sovereignty.

Tere have been various allegations and denials

o external lobbying on behal o both Dlamini-

Zuma and the incumbent seeking a second term

Gabon’s Jean Ping. Yet, it can be assumed that

Paris has invested heavily in Ping’s retention as

chairman o the continental governing body (AU

Commission) that has come up short in severa

Arican crisis situations, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya

among the most prominent cases in point during

2011. Hence, the not-without-oundation notion

that with rancophone Arica remaining a Frenchbailiwick, Paris’ interests are best served by a weak

AU, a predicament that might serve the interest o

other actors as well, particularly China.

Owing to the weight o France’s sway in its ormer

colonies and South Arica’s own diplomatic mis-

steps on Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, Dlamini-Zuma’s

is considered an uphill candidacy. Given France’s

infuence, this speaks volumes o Arica’s overal

lack o continental sovereignty in a period whereina widely perceived “new scramble” or Arica is

underway. Although there have been denials sur-

rounding alleged EU support or Dlamini-Zuma

South Arican President Jacob Zuma’s visit to

his counterpart in Abuja, Nigerian President

The forgoing is sugges-

tive of an emerging “bigpicture” against which

Washington’s Africa

calculus may need

rethinking.





Goodluck Jonathan no doubt had much to do

with ence-mending in advancing Dlamini-

Zuma’s candidacy.

2011 was not a banner year in the bilateral South

Arica-Nigeria relationship. Neither was it an es-

pecially stellar year in relations between the U.S.

and South Arica. But this may be as much a com-

mentary on the state o U.S.-Arica policy as it is

on South Arica’s diplomacy. For the latter’s part,

Côte d’Ivoire’s crisis introduced an element o di-

visive regionalism between ECOWAS and SADC

with Angola being implicated.

Luanda reportedly infuenced South Arica’s rever-

sal rom its original support or the Arican and

international consensus on Ouattara having won

the disputed presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire.

As a result, South Arica’s moral and political high

ground coming out o the Abidjan crisis was di-

minished. Te Libyan imbroglio was equally i not

more convoluted.

What is critical is that irrespective o Washing-ton and shwane-Pretoria divergence on these

and other issues, it is in both countries’ interests

to support the strengthening o continental gov-

ernance. Tis will benet American and Arican

interests in an increasingly competitive strategic

economic environment on the continent. Arica’s

interests most o all must be divested rom colo-

nially-rooted spheres o infuence and those that

might arise rom new claimants among emerging

powers. America as well as Arica has a stake in

Arican continental sovereignty. Tis may be what

is at stake in the current contest over the next head

o the AU Commission.

Despite dierences between Washington and sh-

wane-Pretoria, a shared pan-Arican integrationist

commitment revolving around Dlamini-Zuma’s

candidacy and President Obama’s Kenyan-based

East Arican lineage, could provide broadly bene-

cial common ground between the two countries.

In terms o strategic convergence, emerging rom

such synergies could, initially, revolve around the

Indian Ocean. Tis would involve the Indian

Ocean’s link into the ‘Indo-Pacic’ trajectory o Obama’s trans-Pacic geo-strategy and the grow-

ing Indian and South Arican southern sea lane

maritime commitments.

At the end o 2011, India took over as the chair

o the Indian Ocean Rim-Association or Re-

gional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). Tis has, as

important members, Indonesia and Australia

as well as South Arica and India. South Arica,

meanwhile, is set to assume the chair o the In-dian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). IONS

complements the American-led Western Pacic

Naval Symposium.

Much, however, depends on what South Arica

Africa’s interests

most of all must be

divested from colonially-

rooted spheres of

influence and thosethat might arise from

new claimants among

emerging powers...




and India make o their respective chairmanships

over the next two years in conjunction with their

collaboration with Brazil in the India-Brazil-South

Arica Maritime Exercise (IBSAMAR) compact.

Involved here is the strategically critical need or

constructing a ramework o maritime security

and unctional cooperation in the Indian Ocean

and South Atlantic. Tis could make or synergies

with American maritime and naval strategy in the

western Pacic while ostering interregional Aro-

Asian economic and commercial relations in what

Wilson Center senior ellow Martin Walker has

dubbed CHIMEA: the China-India-Middle East- Arica nexus.

Such a convergence o strategies between South

Arica, India and the U.S. should also help in con-

structing an alternative narrative o Indian Ocean

dynamics to that associated with Robert Kaplan’s

“monsoon” scenario o Sino-Indian rivalry with

Uncle Sam serving as reeree. I linked to South

Arica and India’s IBSAMAR partner, Brazil, this

could or the rst time refect a homegrown Amer-ican brand o global South tri-continentalism in

oreign policy and global posture. Te upshot

would be the tying together o America and trans

Pacic Asia with Arica at the center and South A-

rica serving as the southern sea lanes central pivot

Tus is a “rising Arica” the unavoidable strategic

centerpiece o a much needed U.S. southern hemi-

spheric geo-strategy in adapting to and shaping a

post-hegemonic global order retaining Ameri-

can leadership at the core. But such a prospect

will only happen i the Obama administration

elevates Arica alongside Asia as a priority in itsoreign policy.

Such a convergence

of strategies betweenSouth Africa, India and

the U.S. should also help

in constructing an

alternative narrative of

Indian Ocean dynamics...





Francis A. Kornegay Institute for Global Dialogue Johannesburg, South Africa

Francis Kornegay is a Senior Research Associate at the

Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD). He is a political analyst on a range

of foreign affairs and international relations, and widely published in

the following areas: South Africa’s foreign policy and its African agenda;

African continental and regional integration; U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-

African/South African relations; South-South cooperation and emerging

power alliances (IBSA, BRIC, BASIC) and global geopolitical dynamics.

Kornegay, a graduate of the University of Michigan, holds Master‘s

degrees in African Studies from Howard University and in Internation-

al Public Policy from the School of Advanced International Studies at

Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, DC.



AFRICA PROGRAM SAFF

Steve McDonald

Consulting Director

Mame Khady Diou

Program Associate

Derek J. Langord

Program Assistant

CONAC INFORMAION

Te Arica Program

Woodrow Wilson International

Center or Scholars

1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW

Washington, DC 20004-3027

Th af Pm was established at the Woodrow Wilson InternationalCenter or Scholars in 1999 with the generous support o the Ford Foundation. Serving as a bridge or academics, diplomatic practitioners, policymakers, and the private sector,rom Arica and the United States, the Arica Program is a nexus or developing inormedand eective policy decisions on Arica and conducting confict transormation and peacebuilding programs in selected Arican countries.Te Arica Program is predicated on the belie that Arica and Arica related issues are

important to the United States and provide important experiences and models or therest o the world. With the support o the World Bank’s Post-Confict Fund, the Arica Program launched a major capacity building initiative in Burundi, designed to increasethe ability o the country’s leadership to advance the post-war transition and economic re-construction. Te strategies and techniques developed in Burundi are now being adaptedto confict and post-confict situations in the Democratic Republic o Congo, Liberia, andother countries world-wide.Te Arica Program also oversees several ellowship and scholarship programs, supporting residential scholars, and works closely with the Wilson Center’s other projects and programson cross-regional issues such as governance, the development o state capacity, crime andcorruption, and pressing health and social problems such as the AIDS pandemic. Otenresulting rom these programs and conerences, the Arica Program publishes a series o papers, reports, and bries, designed to highlight timely issues in Arica policy and provideexpert analyses.

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South Africa, the East African Community, and the U.S.-Africa Policy Conundrum