WHAT AMSTERDAM HAS MEANT

Some Reflections on the Ecumenical Movement

Jacques Ellul

I should like to start with three preliminary reflections. The first is that the context for the ecumenical movement has changed since 1948. Then the great problem was the division or fragmentation of the churches and it was constantly being said that their separation was both a scandal in the eyes of the world, and a betrayal of the command that “they may all be one”. Hence these churches must at the very least recognize each other and agree to enter into dialogue and to present a common approach in the societies to which they belonged, both out of obedience and to make the Christian faith more credible to “the world”. This raised a two-sided question: first, that of the old, traditional theological conflicts which it was essential to try and look at again. There was, it seemed, a need to take up again the questions on which Christians had parted company and discover whether these theological, liturgical and spiritual divisions still existed in 1948 (as relevant a question now in 1988 as then) other than as tradition; and whether it could be said that because of changes in society and in scientific and philosophical standpoints many of the old problems should be restated in new terms. It was necessary also to think in terms of an increasingly close dialogue that might lead to reconciliations. To me it did not seem a good approach to pass too quickly over the past and simply rubber-stamp it. Then there was the question of the extent to which the divisions had become first and foremost institutional: how far were they a product of the will to survive - which is, sociologically, intrinsic to all human institutions, even when they can no longer justify their existence? Seemingly the resolve was rather to look to the future in the conviction that if it became possible to work together the very fact of travelling side by side and getting to know each other would lexd to a reduction in conflicts and to mutual understanding and the present display of a Christian “common front” towards the world at large.

The second point is that the world has changed considerably over the last forty years, not only as regards the economic, political and socidl situations where the change is self-evident, but also intellectually, spiritLaily and in terms of values. We had seen Christianity relentlessly challenged by science (and even more by scientism), but Western societies (including those of the communist world) were still structured on the basis of values - held often unconsciously - which had their origin in Christianity. For instance individual human beings (even in collectivist societies) retained an unique, irreplaceable value, and the hoqor evoked by Nazism had its source in that attitude. But we have to realize thai there has been a change in the system of values. Around us today the values orisinating in Christianity are in ruins and social systems are disintegrating. Everythi~ig that reminds us either closely or

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distantly of Christianity is not merely called in question but entirely devoid of significance. Decisive factors in this are, clearly, the destruction of language and the devaluation of the question of meaning; also the universal diffusion of “artificial intelligence”. The human factor is no longer meaningful; it is simply something which can be assimilated into systems of networks and vectors. Hence I would say that ecumenism has become something much more than the simple coming together of churches of different confessions. It represents the need to rediscover a basic common substratum which will make it possible to reassert certain values without which humanity will disappear. Twenty years ago it was being proclaimed that after the death of God would come the death of humanity. It has happened! Since therefore that which is specifically human no longer has its place, ecumenism ought to be the force to restore meaning to it. In other words, I consider that ecumenism is no longer something relating to church order and institutions or to theological conflicts but has to do with human survival. Here too we must not of course make any mistakes about what has to be done in the world of today. To this point I shall return.

Lastly, a third preliminary reflection: simply to recall some well-known facts and observations. There is on the one hand an ecumenism of the “grassroots” which does not match that of the “summits” - of councils and assemblies. I have the feeling that the “grassroots” membership of the various churches has been more aware of the fearful problem just mentioned than the central bodies and directors (but most often without being explicit about it). And so alongside the recognized institutional churches charismatic movements are also coming into being (in which this ecumenism of the base is frequently practised) and it is very difficult to get them into the “ecumenical movement”. And in these charismatic groups there is something of everything: there is an effort at greater Christian credibility and also a “simple return to religion” which is no cause for rejoicing on our part as it encourages one of the worst of confusions - that of Christianity with Religion. We are confronted by a society without values, and all sorts of groups set up their own values for living since it is not possible for human beings to live in a meaningless universe. Thus far my preliminary comments.

The church and the disorder of society The trends in the Amsterdam report were undoubtedly very much conditioned both

by the renewal of theology which followed Karl Barth and by political circumstances. The world had just emerged from a frightful war which had revealed the horrors of Nazism - and there was the consequent condemnation of what totalitarianism could be; but at that time of course it was a fascist-style totalitarianism of the right, associated with capitalism. So there was then a tendency to see in the values of the left not indeed an expression of Christianity but the chance of a more humane society. But to gain acceptance for this it was necessary to start with a struggle at a deeper level. Were Christians to become interested and perhaps involved in politics - given that till around 1940 Christianity had continued to be very avowedly church-centred in some churches and very individualistic in others? I have in mind the French Reformed Christians for whom the essentials of the faith related to “my salvation”, “my responsibility before God”, “my duty” etc., and among whom the church as the body of Christ and the eschatological presence were left out of consideration; likewise, though of course this was not actually said, Christianity belonged to the spiritual realm and it was not for Christians to meddle in the affairs of a world which was sinful and

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incapable of reform to achieve justice - which only God could achieve. It is indeed true that since 1880 there had been a small Christian socialist movement but it was wholly marginal, like that of conscientious objectors. And, unintentionally, Karl Barth’s theology reinforced that “spiritual” tendency. “The God who was Wholly Other” did not imply our meddling in the affairs of the world. The God who had a plan for human history was managing matters without using these human beings who were wholly incapable of good actions and of “saving themselves”. Christianity was becoming a total faith in grace but this did not imply responsibilities in the world. Of course the war period and Hitlerism had called in question these attitudes which were almost unanim- ously held in (say) 1936. But Christians as a whole remained far removed from having any sense of responsibility in the political field. And everywhere there was a need for an initial step to be taken to convince them of the most elementary things.

It was thus one of the merits of the Amsterdam Assembly to affirm that Christians cannot be outsiders in the society to which they belong but must take part in political life and because of the gospel’s demands must make a choice and opt for the most coherent approach in the attention they pay to all society’s problems. But this was the period when it seemed that first and foremost it was the Russians who had conquered Nazism, and consequently the politics which seemed most admissible for Christians was socialism. While Karl Barth was providing theological justification for socialism certain theologians who were to play an important part in the World Council - Hromadka, Bereczki - had accepted and supported the communist regime in their country, and F. Lieb was at pains to demonstrate that the Soviet regime had chznged considerably, that there no longer was a Red Terror in the USSR and that there was a trend towards liberalization. The essential task was to rebuild a world that had both been spiritually destroyed by Nazism and devastated by the most distressing of wars. And at the same time fundamental values were being rediscovered which had to be recovered and reasserted - among others freedom and the possibility of rebuilding a more humane world. But there was no way of dismissing the horror caused by the Hiroshima explosion, so that everything pointed in the same direction: the German capitalists had supported Hitler and the American capitalists had produced the most frightful means of destruction. Here again socialism seemed to be the best road to take, the more so since the other great tragic scenario had been racism and it was discovered that there was a racist USA. A world of values, such as would make liberty and equality possible, had to be rebuilt against racism and capitalism on the one hand and for socialism with a human face on the other. This is precisely what is reflected, as I see it, in the report on the church and the disorder of society.

At all events, these Amsterdam reflections embraced two elements which I find wholly correct and prophetic. First, in the attention given to the third world (realiza- tion that a Eurocentric approach must be abandoned, that an answer had to be given as quickly as possible to the disorder in which the third world was going to be engulfed, after the Japanese occupation in Asia and the expansion of communism in Europe, and after the quite involuntary involvement of so many people from Africa in that barbarous war in which they had learned the value of national liberation). Then there was the denunciation of all totalitarianisms andsome realization that totalitarianism could be left wing as well as right wing. But it was not yet clearly seen that totalitarianism could also emerge (though in a different way) in democratic societies. There was no need to change a constitution or a political regime for totalitarianism to

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develop. It was enough if a wholly effective administrative system and a system of police supervision were established (without any terrorism) for a totalitarianism to exist, no longer politically - as in fascism, with the absolute obedience of everyone to the state - but socially, with the total absorption of the individual in a rigid, unified social organism.’ One then had a totalitarianism which initially was difficult to identify because it was not expressed in a doctrine but established itself gradually without any violence. And we cannot hold it against the Amsterdam Assembly that they did not divine this possibility when they condemned “all forms of totalitarian- ism”. It was actually only after the much later work of sociologists like Castoriadis and Touraine that this form of totalitarianism began to be known. But subsequently the World Council did not pay much attention to it.

Limitations Now I shall have to offer some criticisms regarding these Amsterdam conclusions.

The first is that the Assembly was very much obsessed by political problems. It is very easy to see why this was so, given the world situation at the time - the concerns of the various nations and the political upheavals - but while some clear-sightedness, not to say prophetic vision, might have been expected, it was scarcely in evidence. Of course, the world’s disorder - not as it then was but as it could be foreseen - was already conditioned by phenomena which, though not so far dominant, were already identifiable, and the importance they might come to have should have been evaluated. First among them was the astounding development of technology. It is astonishing that when the first atomic bomb exploded no study in depth was undertaken as to the implications. It is a fact that apart from humanist and sentimentalist protests (if we except that of Karl Jaspers) no one thought to look at the phenomenon of the atomic bomb theologically and as to the warning it gave of the change, the mutation, from which the world would suffer. Theologically, this kind of disintegration of matter was an assault on the very substance of which creation is constituted. That being so, was it legitimate to disintegrate matter? But the theologians, still benumbed by “the Galileo affair”, did not dare to pass any judgments on scientific research and, all things considered, tended to favour it. To ask the question I am asking was to place a question mark against all scientific research. Only Einstein himself repented of his discovery and questioned the omnipotence of science. But with the failure ever to ask that question it could be foreseen politically that this use of atomic energy would engender a diabolical disorder in the world as a whole, given the multiplication of atom bombs and subsequent “peaceful” application of the splitting of the atom, with the production of nuclear energy. In its train this was going to bring a whole host of inequalities and in particular would increase the disparity between the third world and the energy-consuming world. In its turn this last factor was to involve huge advances in all kinds of technology. This growth would take us out of an industrial into what D. Bell has called a “post-industrial” society (a meaningless term; I was the first to call it a “technological society”). This should have been foreseen. My contention is that all the present disorders of the world arise out of this unlimited technicization. So do the disbalances between the power blocs, the wrong direction taken in the “development” of the third-world countries, the great difficulty in applying the simple rules of

’ See De Tocqueville’s book La dkmocratie en Amkrique (Democracy in America).

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democracy, the possibility of frighteningly destructive localized wars, international indebtedness etc. Now in 1948 it was perfectly possible to achieve this foresight and have that clearsightedness.

But Christian vision ought to have been at its most perceptive on what has since come to be called ecology. Account should have been taken of the fact that industrial growth or the increasingly intensified use of raw materials would place a question mark over the natural world and its capacity for resistance, reproduction and recovery. At the time this was not at all unpredictable - for there were those who did foresee it - but a theology of nature should have been worked out and it should have been understood that when all is said this disorder was much more serious for the human race as a whole than social inequalities or even exploitation of others. But here the difficulty was that to have any kind of new thinking it was necessary to move away from the realm of traditional values - justice, equality, fraternity and so on - which had always been defended in Christian circles. It should have been understood that if humanity as a whole were annihilated by a nuclear war or by excessive pollution, the traditional problems would simply have vanished. There was of course a possible biblical basis for this kind of prophetic vision: to mention only the New Testament, it is to be found in the virtue of enkrateia - for which moderation is a flavourless translation, since the term is a very strong one and means rather self-mastery, the imposition of limits on oneself - the exact opposite of hubris, which is characteristic of technology. And this seemed all the more indispensable when already in 1948 it was seen that science and technology were heading for unlimited growth and power. And here we rediscovered something that was very common in the Old Testament: the unbounded acquisitiveness and lust for absolute power in the human will - which the prophets categorically condemned. But their experience of this was very mal l alongside what we were in process of creating. The insanity of planning for unlimited production in a delimited world should also have been grasped. Today the real disorder of the world is to be found much more in this than - let us say - in apartheid! And the World Council would have played a really prophetic part if it had oriented its activities along these lines instead of allowing itself to be dominated by political problems - quite apart from the fact that a consensus would probably have been easier to achieve on these subjects than on thorny political questions. Then the Council would have been fulfilling its proper function as a source of wisdom in a world emerging from the madness of war by recalling humanity to another Wisdom.

The second element of criticism the importance of which 1 shall be bold enough to stress is that in almost all the 1948 Assembly documents there is an absence of discipline in the use of the terms used - a lack of precision and proper definition. Thus for example we frequently hear of the need to establish or have respect for “justice”. But what are we talking about? What is “justice”? For three thousand years Western civilizations have debated what this term might refer to. For of course legal justice - conformity with the law - is not social justice: the justitia of the nominalists is not that of the realists, the cardinal virtue is not Ulpian’s ars aequi et boni, etc. etc. And Pauline “justice” (cf. also “righteousness”) as the outcome of justification2 is something wholly different again! The least that should have been done

ZTranslator’s note: Cf. Greek dikaiosune and associated terms. Unfortunately French has only the word “justice” for both “justice” and “righteousness”.

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was to say clearly what the word “justice” - used so often in ecumenical documents - was understood to mean. For lack of this we most frequently get the impression that justice is being invoked to provide moral or metaphysical support for choices dictated either by political preferences and highly general options (e.g. in favour of all the “oppressed”; I shall come back to this) or by support for this or that doctrine - things which have little to do with “justice” unless it is to be identified with some cause or other (which was always so with all the totalitarian parties). But this attitude is very dangerous because then it can be used to justify every action and every means to ensure the mumph of that cause, as has been our experience during this century. If then there is no clear, strict definition of the word “justice” the references we make to it are invalid.

There is another term, not unrelated to the above, which can lack content and precision: “human rights”. The World Council has resolutely worked for the recogni- tion of a declaration on human rights and one can very well understand the spirit in which this was done. The world was emerging from a period of contempt for human beings, not just for personal rights obtained through democracy and established by the law, but for physical integrity, respect shown to beliefs and for the “soul”; and a hundred times it had been noticed that in a variety of regimes there was a compulsion to degrade and dehumanize. Very well, then. But here too there was (and still is) a lack of precision; and I would like to make quite a number of points. First, when we talk about “right”3 we are using a legal term whether we like it or not. But when we say “legal” we are also speaking of an authority that ordains what is legally right, what sanctions are to be imposed and who is to judge (or at least arbitrate) when it comes to assessing where there has been a violation of what is (legally) right. But there is nothing of that here. (I have mentioned the World Council though it alone is not to blame because its influence was not inconsiderable in the drafting of the Declaration of Human Rights). In these circumstances, can we still talk about “right”? It is a downright abuse of words. Which brings me to my second criticism. The World Council was not able to see that we were in fact entering a period in which human “rights” were to be affirmed by a mad verbal inflation. Long ago the US Constitution had provided an example of such an abuse of words by talking about the “right to happiness” - which means nothing. And since then we have had the right to holidays, the right to go and ski (sic!!), the right of a child to be born and so on. I could quote a hundred such nonsenses. The primary work of the World Council should in reality have been theological - so that on the basis of a theology of the human person it could produce a formula indicating which commandments were non-negotiable for human life in a world rapidly developing, technologically transformed, politicized and given over to mass culture; without taking into account the political options, the various regimes, the value of science and so on ad injinitum. But had it done this theological work (instead of resting content with general ideas) the next problem, which was not touched on, would have raised its head: is there such an entity as “humanity” (when it comes to its “rights”)? To put it differently: is our charter appropriate for every culture (the Islamic declaration of human rights is quite different)? The Council should not have avoided the burning issue of the continuity and identity of humanity irrespective of particular cultures and societies. Such a study, in fact, would inevitably have meant

Translator’s note: “droit” covers a range of connotations from “right” through “law”, including both these possibilities.

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compiling a charter of humanity’s duties and obligations as a counterpart to one on human rights (instead of making do with just a brief reference). The World Council would have done something really original here. And at the same time it would have discovered the sole possible foundation for “rights” - i.e. that rights are based on the existence of duties.

The last point I want to make as to the absence of precision in this work relates to the weakness of the texts on law and on the UNO. To begin with, there is wholesale ambiguity as to what is meant here: several times it is the law of God (and what an illusion it would be to suppose that all nations must acknowledge the authority of the law!); sometimes the reference is to international law and sometimes to an abstract idea which would issue in what European democracy has called the “constitutional state” (1’Etat de droit). Here too vagueness prevails because of the lack of theological analysis. Thus while I do not agree very much with Karl Barth’s Rechtfertigung und Recht (justification and justice) I do at least see what he is talking about! I think these pages bear the mark of what in France is called the &tat de droit, but it should have been gone into in detail, showing all the progress that had to be made.

Finally we cannot fail to be disappointed at the confidence placed in UNO. After the resounding failures of the League of Nations between 1930 and 1940 how could anyone again put their trust in a similar body exhibiting the same weaknesses and one more besides? As to these weaknesses, they lie in the lack of the means to enforce decisions, and of a supra-state authority: each state retains its full sovereignty. The UN could issue only recommendations which would be no more than “pious wishes”, and pronounce judgments that lead to nothing. The additional weakness lies in the fact that as organized in 1948 UNO had a majority which was automatically favourable to any resolutions from the USA. The USA reigned supreme and the majority was always established in advance! In other words, the Amsterdam Assembly did not tackle the basic problem (again contenting itself here with a somewhat vague comment) - i.e. national sovereignty. It was for the World Council to take up arms against the idea that each nation, and each state representing it, was sovereign and that there is nothing in principle or in practice to limit or restrain that sovereignty. Here again timidity and vagueness were exhibited where there should have been a high degree of vigour, especially at a time when the state of the world after the war was prompting doubts as to the legitimacy of national sovereignty. With the loss of that opportunity the consequences were what one would expect: all the new nations at whose birth the World Council was present, were also going to claim the right to “national sovereignty” - with the support of the Council - and this has led to the frightening international disorder we know today.

And this brings me to my third criticism. The Amsterdam text on war has been the subject of many discussions during which some very proper opinions have been expressed, especially that there can no longer be any just wars. But the problem I have often encountered over the last fifty years is that while the churches lay down right principles, when these are applied one finds oneself confronted by attitudes which are in every respect questionable. And I have noted that most frequently these attitudes spring from a failure to recognize the reality of the situations and from inadequate information (especially historical and sociological). Thus on the basis of ideas which are correct, such as the need for the commitment of Christians in politics or the notion of a “church for the others” certain immediate choices were made: viz. that the World

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Council must champion all the oppressed, the poor nations etc. Which is all very fine; but must we then distinguish two kinds of wars - those of the powerful nations which are always to be condemned, and those of the oppressed which are legitimate, i.e. revolutionary wars? We have had many examples of these. When the fourth section was being discussed someone wisely remarked “there has been no mention of Palestine.. .” (the pro-Palestinian trend was thus already indicating its presence) but it was objected that this would have led to calling in question the situation of the Baltic States (though good care was taken not to add Bessarabia, Karelia, etc.). And why was that not done? For either one queries all occupations of territories by war or none. This the World Council did not do. For instance it took the part of the Palestinians but said nothing about other peoples who had been invaded and subjugated (e.g. Tibet). Very persistently it took a stance against apartheid (and of course I agree with the condemnation of racial discrimination) but why did it not denounce social discrimina- tion as unacceptable (some sections of the population being totally deprived of rights because of their social origins, e.g. in the communist countries?). And this stance on behalf of the “oppressed” (not all of them!) necessarily led to legitimizing the so-called wars of liberation.

Now this is where the most serious omission comes to light: the World Council does not weigh up the foreseeable consequences in many of these wars of “liberation”. It has not been realized that no war of liberation ever led any people to liberty but that when liberation has been won by war it inevirably gives rise to a new dictatorship. The Cuban adventure is a case in point and it can be multiplied for all the “liberated” peoples. The African peoples (apart from those who have obtained their liberty by negotiation and peaceful means) are all subjected to dictatorships far worse than “colonialist exploitation”. Likewise a vigorous stand has been taken on behalf of the young and valiant people of Vietnam, and then in support of the Khmer Rouge war of liberation. This led on the one hand to an extremely violent dictatorship and on the other to the biggest massacre of civil populations since the time of Stalin. Now, my contention is that it was perfectly possible to foresee all this. It should have been realized that every revolutionary movement in the world, whatever its basis, was immediately taken in hand covertly by international communism and led to such extremes. It should have been firmly maintained that only peaceful means can lead to liberation - a slow, gradual liberation. Gandhi was not the only one - Martin Luther King did a thousand times more to gain equality for black persons than did the violent revolutionary movements which followed him (Black Panthers, Black Muslims); and currently Lech Walesa, using admirable peaceful tactics, is getting the Polish govern- ment gradually to give way. The Berlin, Budapest or Prague revolts were not able to achieve such results. Christians ought to display greater clearsightedness than other people and a body as large as the World Council, before taking sides, should have at its disposal all the information, not just that of one side, and should calculate the probable consequences.

Let me close by repeating two essential truths. Taking sides politically should be based not on “sentimental idealism” (all the weak, all the oppressed) but on having certain knowledge of the whole situation in its entirety. And the second is that every effort must be made to foresee as well as possible the results likely to be brought about by the movements involved (the oppressed are only rarely liberated by violence). With the sources of information available today we can in any event have better knowledge

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(provided we do not have any a priori positions, or “filters” which ensure that we take note only of the information which says we are right); and the methods of analysis used in political science also make a certain number of forecasts possible4 from which we have to establish a pattern of commitment on behalf of one element or another in a conflict.

* * *

I should not like these pages to be regarded as a negative criticism of the World Council. From 1945 to 1948 I took part in the preparations for the 1948 Assembly and I know the wide range of obstacles and contradictions that had to be overcome. I should simply like all this to be regarded as positive criticism, that is, as something intended to help the World Council to re-think some of its attitudes and aim at the maximum discipline in its reflections, with a maximum of information coming from different sources. This likewise means theological research and “scientific” analysis (in so far as sociology, economics and politics may be regarded as sciences.. .).

4E.g. the now well-established rule that when a liberation, independence or revolutionary movement takes shape among a people, it is afways the most extremist faction that gains power when victory comes. The moderates are inevitably got rid of.

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