Some Problems of the Revolutionary State 1789 1796 Albert Soboul

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Some Problems of the Revolutionary State 1789-1796Author(s): Albert SoboulSource: Past and Present, No. 65 (Nov., 1974), pp. 52-74Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society

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SOMEPROBLEMSOF THE REVOLUTIONARYSTATE 1789-1796

IN A WELL-KNOWN PHRASE FROM THE C'lVIL WAR IN FRANCE, MARX

epitomizes the political nature of the Commune: "the political form,at last discovered, under which to work out the economic emancipationof labour'';l Lenin, in The State astdthe Revolutio71,ook up andamplified the same phrase: "The Commune is the form, at lastdiscoveredy the proletarian revolution, the form which allows thepossibility of the economic liberation of labour. The Commune isthe first attempt by the proletarian revolution to break up themachinery of the bourgeois state: it is the political form, at lastdisco7)ered,hich can and must replace what has been broken up".2Through these texts, the Commune appears both as the end of a longline of historical experiments and the starting point of a line of criticalthought which was to find its conclusion in the Leninist theory andpractice of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"The political form, at last discoznered":enin, after Marx, refers

by implication to the French historicalexperience,and to the solutionsworked out or suggested, in the course of nearly a century of revolu-tionary struggle, from I789 tO I87I, to the problems of therevolutionary state, and more particularlyto the problem of revolu-tionary dictatorship. This influence, or filiation, from the FrenchRevolution to the Russian Revolution, has often been underlinedbyhistorians. By Georges Lefebvre, among others, as he wrote in LeDirectoire,n a passage about the plot led by Babeuf known as theConspiracy of Equals: "He [Babeuf] achieved a clear conception of

this popular dictatorship which had been mentioned, but not definednby Marat and the Hebertists; he bequeathed it, through Buonarotti,to Blanqui and subsequently to Lenin, who turned it into a reality".3

There would thus seem to be a continuous line of political practiceand critical reflection on the problems of the revolutioncarytate anddictatorship, a line going from Marat and the Hebertists to Babeufand Buonarotti, then to Blanqui and finally, through the Communeexperiment, to Lenin.

1 K. Marx, La guerrecivile en France Paris,I953 edn.), p. 45.2 V. I. Lenin, L'Etat et la Revolution Paris,I947 edn.), p. 54.3 G. Lefebvre, Le Directoire,2nd edn. (Paris, I950), p. 35. See too the

preface by Georges Lefebvre to P. Buonarroti,Conspiration our l'Egaliteditede Babeuf (Paris, I957 edn.), p. II: "One may wonder whether Buonarroti'sbook did not offer Lenin, as it did Blanqui,some food for thoukht".



THE REVOLUTIONARYTATE I 789- I 796 53

This is an attractive, and generally accepted hypothesis, but few

have bothered to bring to it either precision or supporting material.

An over-simplification, too, since by equating Marat and the

Hebertists, it obscuresthe basic oppositionbetweentwo revolutionary

approaches o the problemof the state and dictatorship,an opposition

which took concrete form in the antagonismbetween Sans-culottism

and Jacobinism. In fact, from the French Revolution on, one can

see the emergence of two basic lines of revolutionarytheory and

practice, running through the whole of the nineteenth century, and

meeting in the Communeof I87I a popularmovementand dictator-

ship of the masses, and the organizingof a revolutionaryparty, con-

centratingpower in the hands of a group of leaders.It seems not inappropriate o take a closer look at these problems,

as they appear during the French Revolution. This may help to

clarify some aspects of the problem of the state at the time of the

Commune: what share is to be credited, in I87In to each of the

revolutionary raditions? Was the Communereally"the form at last

discovered"of the revolutionarystate, or was it only a stage on the

way?

If we are then to confine ourselves to the French Revolution, it

does appearthat ideas about the revolutionarystate and the notion of

dictatorshipbecome increasinglyclear and precisewhen we look from

Marat to Babeuf: from the dictatorship of one man to that of a

revolutionaryparty,from the dictatorshipof a tribune of the people to

that, if not yet of a class, at least of the "plebeians"and the "poor".4

But the individualthinkingof a Marat or a Babeufon dictatorshipand

the revolutionarystate cannot be isolatedfrom history itself. On the

one hand, each distinct ideology, every individualidea, is dependenton its relatioIlship o the existingideologicalfieldand on the socialand

political structures which support it. On the other hand, actual

history is necessarily reflected in this individual development,

accordingto the complex connectionsbetweenthe individualandthat

moment of history. It was through the revolutionarystruggles that

the notions of dictatorshipand the revolutionary tatebecameprogres-

sively clearer. Action often precededand justifiedthe theory, which

in its turn reinforcedthe struggle. Neither the thought of Marat nor

4 "N3Vhats a politicalrevolution n general? Whatis the French Revolutionin particular? Open war between patriciansand plebeians, between the richand the poor": Babeuf, in Le Tribundu peuple,no. 34 (I5 BrumaireYearIV[5 Nov. I795])



54 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 65

that of Babeuf can be isolated from the two great ideological currents,the two types of revolutionarypractice of the time: Sans-culottismand

Jacobinism. Even though Marat died before his conception ofdictatorship and of the revolutionary state could be clarified, in thelight of solutions suggested or worked out by the popularsans-culottemovement or by the Jacobin-led revolutionary government, Babeufwas able to derive from both these lines of experiment an enrichmentof his criticalthinking: he finally bequeathedto the nineteenth centurya revolutionary theory and practice which, in spite of their obviousderivative character, were none the less a significant step forward.

As far back as I789, the demands of the Revolution were provokingreflection on the nature of revolutionary power and the necessity ofdictatorship. From the beginning it took two directions: concentra-tion of power was indeed necessary, but it led, for one man, Sieyes, tothe collective dictatorshipof an assembly, and for the other, Marat, tothe demand for a dictator or tribune of the people.

Sieyes, a truly political thinker if ever there was one, laid in I789,

in his famous pamphletQu'est-ce ue e TiersEtat.>,he foundation-stone on which the men of I789, and those of I793 after them, builtthe whole of their revolutionarystruggle: the theory of the constituentpower,he foundation and the justification or the concentrationof allpowers in the hands of the Constituent Assembly, and subsequently ofthe Convention, and for the successive dictatorshipsof these.5

The constituent power is the result of a particular and directdelegation from the Nation, which alone is sovereign; its object is todraw up the Constitution. When a nation wishes for a new con-

stitution, it elects "representatives extraordinary [who] shall havesuch new powers as it will please the nation to give them". Theserepresentatives extraordinary, who embody the constituent power,act for the nation itself and are not bound by previous legislation."It is enough that they should exercise their will as men in the state ofnature do".

Extraordinary epresentation(that s, constituent power) is unlike ordinarylegislation; they are separatepowers. The latter can move only within theforms and conditions imposed upon it the former is subject to no form inparticular; it meets and deliberates as the nation itself would, if it were

composedonly of a small numberof individualswishing to give a constitutionto their government.

5 See A. Mathiez, "La RevolutionFransaiseet la theorie de la dictature. LaConstituante",Revue Historique,no. 32 (July-Aug. I929), p. 304. See alsoP. Bastid, Sieyeset sa pensde, nd edn. (Paris, 970), p. 39I, "PouvoirConstituantet pouvoir constitue".



THE REVOLUTIONARY TATE I 789-I 796 55

The will of the nation is sovereignand independent of all civil forces,

and so is that of the assembly in which the constituentpower is vested:

"all forms are good and its will is always the supremelaw".6By virtue of this theory, the Constituent Assembly, and the

Convention after it, took upon themselves all powers withoutexception: older constituted powers vanished before the constituentpower, wholly representative of popular sovereignty. The theory ofconstituent powerconferreduponthe Constituent Assembly, and laterupon the Convention, dictatorship unlimited in any respect: theytook on both administration and government, through theircommittees, and the separationof powers disappeared. Of course,

the dictatorship of the corlstitllent power could come into practiceonly through the use of force: it took the storming of the Bastille tobring the king to acknowledge the union of the three orders and theNational Constituent Assembly. As it moved from theory topractice, the dictatorship of the constituent power also became thedictatorshipof violence: "might had to be used to bring forth right". 7

Sieyes was to write, in the YearVIII (I799-I800), that his pamphlethad proved to be "the theoreticalhandbookfrom which grew the greatachievementsof our Revolution".8 The theory of constituent power

was indeed to exert a decisirrenfluenceover the whole course of eventsfrom I789 to I793, and to prove singularlyefficaciousas a revolutionaryforce. It eventually took its placeamong the theoreticaljustificationsof the Jacobin dictatorship.

Meanwhile, Marat's political thought was following quite anotherpath.

The notion of dictatorship appearsclearly in Marat's work, as early

as his The Chainsof Slavery I774), and is linked with his obviousdistrust of the revolutionaryspontaneityof the masses.

What can be expectedfrom these unfortunates . . . The measures hey takeare ill-conceived, and above all they are incapableof secrecy. In the heat ofresentment or the transports of despair, the people threaten, reveal theirplans, and thus give their enemies timeto counter hem.

sEm. Sieyes, Qu'est-ceque le TiersEtat? (n.p., I789; Geneva, I970 edn.),ch. v.

7 Mathiez, op. cit. He rightly countershere the ideas of A. Aulard who inhis speech of 6 April I923, La thdoriede la violenceet la Rdvolutionfiranfaise

(Paris, I923), had tried to discredit "the legend which shows the men of theFrench Revolutionas theoristsof violence,and the Revolutionas an example ofviolence, fruitful because of this very violence".

8 Cited by Roberto Zapperi in his Introduction to Sieyes, Op. Cit. (Geneva,I970 edn.).



NUMBER 65AST AND PRESENT

Even then Marat had a pessimistic view of history: "Thus the fate ofliberty is that of all other human things; it is the victim of time, whichdestroys everything, of ignorance, which confuses everythirlg,of vice,which corrupts everything, and of force, which crushes everything".Consequently a leader is necessary to the movement, "some daringman to put himself at the head of the malcontents and raise themagainst the oppressor, some great person who can tame rebelliousminds, some wise man to direct the decisions of a waveringand unrulymultitude". Fifteen years before the storming of the Bastille, Maratwas thus taking the first step in a process of reflection on revolutionarypower which became increasingly precise as the necessities of theRevolution itself made themselves felt.9

It was during the crisis of September I789 that Marat firstconceived the idea of the need for a concentration of revolutionarypower, which was not realizeduntil the summer of I793) in the form ofthe Committee of Public Safety.l? If it is dispersed between toomany hands, revolutionary action loses its impetus. "France",Jaures commented in his Histoire ocialiste e la Revolutionrangaise,"must not be abandoned either to the anarchy of over-excited, blindcrowds, or to the anarchy of overcrowded assemblies". Marat

proposed the constitution of a revolutionarytribune, enforcing in thename of the people, but with more accuracy than the people couldhave, the necessary repression (foreshadowing already the "coactiveforce" of I793); the purging of the Constituent Assembly, reduced toa quarter of its membership; the substitution of a committee consist-ing only of a few resolute mesnbers for the incoherent, impotentAssembly of the Hotel de Ville. "The political machine cannot berestarted except through violent upheavals". We shall not follow upJaures'scritical commentary; we shall rather, like J.Massin, underline

the clear-sightedness, he foresight even, of Marat.11 At a time when

9 J. P. Marat, TheChainsof Slavery(London, I774). This work was publishedin Frenchas Les Chatnes e l'esclavage Paris, I793). Cf. J. Massin, Marat (ParisI960), p. 3I

10On the campaignwaged by Marat'sjournalL'Ami du Peuple n SeptemberI789, see particularlyno. 5 (I5 Sept.), "Observationsmportantessur les droitsdes Constituantset les devoirsdes Constitues", no. 6 (I6 Sept.), which includesthe first attackon the Committeeof Subsistenceof the Hotel de Ville- no. 7 (I7

Sept.), denouncing the slowness and the mistaken direction followed by theNational Assembly. See J. Jaures,Histoiresocialistede la Revolution ranfaise

(Paris, I9OI), i, ed. A. Soboul (Paris, I968), i, p. Sr8. The following quotationfrom Jaures s to be found ibid.11"In Septemberand October 789, Marat'spolitics would probablyhave led

to the dictatorship of a moderate committee, nominated by the NationalAssembly": ibid. See Massin, Op. Cit., p. 98.



THE REVOLUTIONARYTATE I789-I796 57

it is as yet inconceivable, Marat'snewspaperL'AmiuPeupleensesthe Revolution's only road to salvation.

No doubt Marat's notion of dictatorship was still, in these earlydays of the Revolution, rudimentary and devoid of precise socialcontent. It is going too far to assert, with J. Massin, that "revolu-tionary dictatorshipis for him linked with the class struggle'',12 incethe latter was usually for Marat reduced to the struggle of the pooragainst the rich, of the plebeians against the patricians. As fordictatorship, if it demands the concentrationof power in the hands ofa small group or of a single man, does it not demand revolutionaryviolence as well? "It is utter folly to expect that men who for tencenturies have been in a position to reprove us, loot us, oppress uswith impunity, will accept with good grace to be no more than ourequals''.13 Hence the resort to violence, and the famous sentence inthe poster of 26 July I790, entitled Weare inisked:Five or sixhundred beheadings would have ensured your peace of mind, yourfreedom and your happiness; a mistaken sense if humanityhas stayedyour hand and suspended your blows: it is going to cost the lives ofmillions of your brethren". Extreme violence, and a brief dictator-ship. "If I werea tribune of the people, and had the support of a few

thousand resolute men", Marat writes on this same date of 26 JulyI790, in L'Amidu Peuple, "I swearthat within six weeksthe Constitu-tion would be completed, and the political machine, by then in goodorder, would be working perfectly". A tribune of the people ora dictator is what is needed, according to L'Ami du Peuple of 30thJuly, for six weeks or for three days. To dam up the surging tides ofcounter-revolution,it would be necessary "first of all to erect a trueState Tribunal . . . and then to institute a dictator, elected by thepeople in times of crisis, and whose period of authority would not

exceed three days".The political thinking of Marat finds it hard to disentangle itself

from its memories of Roman antiquity, idealized through schoolmemories of Rollin'stextbooks. A tribune of the people or a dictator,no matter. But "elected by the people", or "the support of a fewthousand resolute men" ? Is this mere reminiscingon the practice ofAncient Rome, or is Marat hesitating, faced with the choice betweenthe two roads history was to follow: a dictatorship by plebiscite, orthe dictatorship of a revolutionaryminority? It must also be under-

lined here (andthis is the measureof the distance between Marat and

2Ibid.,pp.38ff:13 L'Amidu Peuple)30 July I790.



58 NUMBER 65AST AND PRESENT

Babeuf) that L'Ami du Peuple, so anxious to provide the victoriousrevolutionary movement with a leader, appears to rely for ultimate

victory, in spite of a certain initial mistrust, on the spontaneity of themasses. He calls them to action without caring much about buildingthe future: he has no precise political programme. A tribune of thepeople or a dictator: and everything would be swept away within sixweeks, within three days even, and "the nation would be free andhappy .... In order to achieve this I shall not even need to act; myknown devotion to the country, my respect for justice, my love ofliberty, would suffice''.14

These are the limits of Marat'spolitical thought. No doubt further

analysis would be appropriate. Yet Marat does not appear ever tohave gone any further than his assertions of I789-90 ("I came to theRevolution with my mind made up" he said in I793):15 the necessity ofrevolutionaryviolence and of the concentrationof powers in the handsof a dictator for a short while, long enough to break down resistanceand institute definitive prosperityand happiness.

It has been said that Marat was a prophet; he was indeed moreprophet than theorist. It must be acknowledged that his calls todictatorship woke few echoes: the masses were instinctively hostile to

it, whereas for politicians it conjured up unpleasant historicalmemories. More in agreement with the temperament and therevolutionary behaviour of the masses was Marat's justification ofviolence.

Indeed, rather than individual positions, it is collective conceptionsand practice that require close examination: Sans-culottism andJacobinism contributed much more to the progress of the Revolution.Yet the struggle between their antagonistic points of view on theproblem ofthe revolutionary tate contributed ts shareto the downfall

of the system of Year II (22 September I793-2I September I794).

IIBetween I792 and I795, even though they were unable to put

together an original and satisfactory social programme, the Parisianpopular militants nevertheless put into action in the field of politicsa coherent system of ideas and practices. Having deduced from thetotal conception of popular sovereignty that the autonomy andpermanence of the Sections gave to them alone the right to approve

the laws and to control and invalidate elected members, they tendedtowards the Ezractice f direct government and the institution of a

4 Ibid., 26 July I790

5 See Massin, op. cit., p. 78-



THE REVOLUTIONARYTATE I 789-I 796 s9

popular democracy.l6 Thus in the YearII (I793-4)) a conception of

governmentand the revolutionarystate took hold which ran counter

to Marat's conception of dictatorship as much as to the Jacobinpractice of the concentration of powers and centralization. We see

here, in the YearII, the start of one of the characteristicines taken byrevolutionarytemperamentand practice in France in the nineteenthand the twentieth century: the libertarian,"spontaneist"line.

Sovereigntyis vested in the people: the action of popularmilitantsis based entirely on this principle; for them it was not an abstract

notion, but the concrete reality of the people in their Sectionassembliesexercisingtheir rights in full: the revolutionaryconcentra-tion of powers must be at the bottom, it cannot be delegatedwithout

a. enatlon.Hence, in the popular mind, the mistrustand hatred of all dictator-

ship, be it personal or collegiate: it could only be usurpation.Since popular sovereignty is, even in revolutionary times,

'<imprescriptible)nalienable,and cannot be delegated", the Section

of the Cite concluded, on 3 November I 792) that "any man who claims

that it is vested in him will be regardedas a tyrant, a usurperof publicliberty, deserving death''.17 On I3 March I793) when a citizen

declared, in the general assembly of the Pantheon-Fransais:'(we are

threatenedwith a dictator",the whole assemblyrose and sworeto put

a dagger into "any dictator, protector, tribune, triumvir, moderator,

or other, whatsoever his name may be, who would attempt to destroy

the sovereignty of the peopIe''.18 This politically-mindedtrait, this

16The phrase"popularrepublic" s to be foundin a text of July I7g3. Onall thesepointssee A. Soboul,Les sans-culottesarisiensen l'an II. Mouvementpopulaireet gouvernemente'volutionnaire. juin I793-9 Thermidor n II(Paris, I 958), ch. v, "Les tendancespolitiquesde la sans-culotterieparisienne"p. 505. The "SectionsX', umbering48 for Paris,constituted he politicalandadministrativedivisions of the urban communes. They had a deliberativebody, the "GeneralAssembly",and executivebodies, the "Civil Committee"and the "RevolutionaryCommittee". By virtue of these bodies, the Sectionsentoyed, at the heart of the commune,real autonomy. When, fromthe begin-ningof the autumnof I 793, the governmentcommitteesundertookhe reductionof the autonomyof the organsof the Sections, the sans-culotte militantscreated"SectionSocieties",specificallypopularorganizations,which very quicklycameup against he hostilityof theJacobinClub.

17 Quoted by F. Braesch, La Communedu dix aout I792 (Paris, I9II)p. I,092, without reference.

l8Archivesnationales hereafterA.N.), AD XVI, p. 37*Ph. J. B. Buchez andP. C. Roux-Lavergne,Histoireparlementaire e la Revoiution ranfaise (Paris,I834-8), XXV, p- 104



60 PASTND PRESENT NUMBER5

desire o keep revolutionary power in the hands of the people,

probably xplains the lack of success met by Marat's repeated

proposalsor the nominationof a tribune of the people or a dictator,

aswell as the chargelevelled at Hebert and the Cordeliergroup (just

the ne to ruin them in the minds of the people) of havingconsidered

instituting Grand dge.

Since the exercise of popular sovereignty cannot suffer any

restrictions,he sans-culottes intended to enjoy it to the full, even in

revolutionaryircumstances. First, as faras legislationis concerned:

thelaw is valid only if made by the people or sanctioned by the

people. In exceptional circumstances, the sans-culottes egain

effectiveexercise of the legislative power; as at the time of the

acceptance f the ConstitutionalAct, on 6 July I793; as, of course, iIl

tlmes of lnsurrectlon.

The establishmentof the revolutionarygovernmentseems to have

leftthese pretensions unabated,at least until the spring of the Year

II (I794), when the Jacobincentralizationgatheredstrength. In the

Sectionof the Marches,"when a decreewas a nuisanceto irltriguers"

(thisis a moderatespeaking)"they would say, we are the sovereign,

we alone have the right to make laws, and consequentlynot to obey

thosewhich we do not like". s In the Section of the Contrat-Social,Guiraut, a revolutionary "commissaire", was not afraid of saying

publicly,duringthe summerof I793: "The momenthas come for the

Sections to rise and go in a mass to the Convention, to tell them to

makelaws for the people, and above all laws that suit the people; to

set them a time limit of three months and warnthem that if by that

time they were not done, all of them would be put to the sword".20

From the principle of popular sovereignty, confusedly put into

practiceas directgovernment,the popularmilitantsalso deduced the

ratificationof the laws by the people, the exercise of justice by thepeople, and the freedom of all citizens to beararms. In this way, at

crucial times during the Revolution, in the summer of I792, in the

spring of I793, a genuine populardictatorshipasserteditself, contri-

buting successfully to the establishment of the revolutionary

government. We shall not irlsiston these aspects, which have been

studiedelsewhere;we shallinsteadpoint out the bearingof this on the

problemof dictatorshipand the concentrationof revolutionarypower

in the YearII (I793-4).

19 A. N., F 7477445, enunciation,no date [YearIII].

20 Biblothequenationale(hereafterB.N.), Lb4?I78I; M. Tourneux,Biblio-

graphiede l'histoirede Parispendantla Revolutionrangaise Paris, I890-I9I3),

no. 875S-



THE REVOLUTIONARYTATE I 789- I 7966I

From the summer of I793 onwards, the antagonism between thebehaviour and demands of the people, and those of the Montagnard

or Jacobin bourgeoisie became manifest: was revolutionarypower toremain in the hands of the people, or was it to be concentrated in thehands of a collegiate dictatorship? The problem was essentially oneof political direction; but can politics be abstractedfromthe interplayof the rival social forces? The problem is also that of the duality ofpowers. Who can fail to recognize here the problems which were toconfront the revolutionarymovements of the nineteenth century, nottO mention those of the twentieth?

As the Jacobin-led revolutionary government was consolidated,

then stabilized, between the summer and the autumn of I793

thanks to the institution of popularpower in the ParisianSectionsthe sovereignty and therefore the powers became increasingly con-centrated in the Convention, and later in the hands of its governingcommittees, essentially in those of the Committee of Public Safety.The very phrase "popularsovereignty", which had been so widelyused in I792 and I793, disappearedin the Year II (I793-4) fromgovernment vocabulary. One would look for it in vain in Saint-Just's speech of IO October I793, on the necessity for declaring a

revolutionarygovernment which should stand until the advent ofpeace; or in the decree of I4 Frimaire Year II (4 December I793)

which constituted that government; or in Robespierre's speech of5 Nivose Year II (25 I)ecember I793) on the principles of therevolutionarygovernment. Representative democracy, the basis ofthe Jacobin dictatorship, was substituted for direct democracy, thefoundation of popular dictatorship. Nomination succeeded election.

In this respect, the evolution of the revolutionarycommittees issignificant. These, which had been the essential organs of popular

dictatorship in the spring of I793, were originally elected by theSection general assemblies, according to the terms of the law of2ISt March which gave them lawful existence (a number had beenspontaneously formed by the militants). They were re-elected as aconsequence of the Law of Suspects of I7 September x793, butpurged by the Paris Commune, and fell, during the winter, under thecontrol of the Committee of Public Safety; finally, in the spring of theYear II (I794), their members were nominated by the Committee ofPublic Safety, in which all powers tended to be concentrated. The

same happened to the General Council of the Commune, purgedafter Germinal and its numbers made up by the Committee of PublicSafety, on its own authority, without consultation with the Sections.On I6 Floreal Year II (5 May I794) the national agent of the Paris



62PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 65

Commune,Payan,a sound Robespierrist,remindedthe Sections that"under the revolutionary government, there are no primaryassemblies,only generalassembliesarerecognized". 1 This signifiedto the san3-culottes that their sovereignrights were transferred o therevolutionarygovernment. This wasthe finalstageof an unavoidableevolution: the end of popularrevolutionarypower,andthe concentra-tion of all powersin the hands of the Jacobindictatorship.

Yet this evolution must be placedin its generalsocialand historicalcontext if it is to be understoodproperly. The bourgeoisie,or at leastthat fraction of it which saw an alliancewith the people as the onlysalvationfor the Revolution, kept the upper hand. Even if popularpowerreignedin the Sections, it wasthe bourgeoisie hat hadpreparedand organizedthe great Days of 3I May-2 June I793. These greatpopular Dayswere in this respectbourgeois-revolutionary nes; theybroughtthe Jacobindictatorshipa step nearer. How could it havebeen otherwise? The attempts at insurrectionof the isolated sans-culorttes, in Ventose Year II (February-MarchI794), as well as thoseinGerminaland PrairialYearIII (March-Apriland May-June I794),ended n tragic failure: as though popularviolence, left to itself, wasdoomed to impotence. But had not the Jacobin revolutionarygovernment,deprived of popular support, fallen in the night of9-IO Thermidor Year II (27-8 July I794)?

There was an irreducible contradiction between the popularconceptionsof the revolutionary state and those of the Jacobinbourgeoisie:wasit to remainconstantlyunderthe controlof the basicorganizationsf the sovereignpeople? Or was it, in the name of theprinciplesof representative democracy) to be concentrated in thehandsof an assembly, and ultimately of a steering committee?Inevitably,n the circumstances, he Jacobinconceptionwon the day;

buthis kilIedthe surge of popularmovementwhich had broughttherevolutionaryovernment to power and which alone supported it.Jacobinismas unableto surviveits own victoryover Sans-culottism.

IIIJacobinism, historically speaking,must be more preciselydeEned,sincehe Club underwent an evolution during its four years ofexistence.Michelet, clear-sighted in spite of his prejudice againsttheacobins,mentions the arrival nto the society, towardthe end of

I792,

of a third generation. This "is the beginningofthe Jacobinismof93, that of Couthon, Saint-Just,Dumas, etc.... which is to undo

21 .N.,MS. Nouv. acq. fr. 2663, fo. I78.



THE REVOLUTIONARY TATE I789-I796 63

Robespierre, and itself with him".22 This, then, is the Jacobinism

of '93, if we are to take up Michelet's expression; the very same which,in association with Rousseauism, has focused upon itself the hatred oftraditionalists and counter-revolutionaries, just as much as that ofsans-culottesknown as Hebertists) and their sympathizers. There isProudhon, enfolding in the same detestation "the Geneva mounte-bank" and Jacobinismdefined as "a variety of doctrinairism". Thereis Tridon, with his attempted rehabilitationof the Hebertists, and hisimprecations against Robespierre.23 But there is also Taine, whowrote in Les origines e la Francecontemporaine,ollowing a wide-

ranging analysis of the Contrat ocial:"There practice follows theory,and the dogma of the sovereignty of the people, as interpreted by thecrowd, will produce perfect anarchy" so much for Sans-culottism andpopular power), "until the moment when, interpreted by the leaders,it will produce perfect despotism" (so much for Jacobinism and thedictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety). 4

As well as a political temperament, Jacobinism can be defined asa revolutionary technique. Adherence to principle, certainty andpride in being right; the rigidity of the attitude has often masked the

vagueness of the doctrine. Although frequently intolerants some-times sectarian,Jacobinismapplied itself however, even at the price ofoccasional self-contradiction, to a passionate search for unity; but isthis not also one of the characteristic features of Sans-culottism?We must add, too, that being more of a committee-man than a manforthe masses (as was the Section militant), the Jacobin easily lost hisbearings when in contact with the crowds. 5

The mechanism of the revolutionary technique of Jacobinism haslong since been laid bare, even if not always without hostile precon-

ception.26 The Jacobins perfected the use of limited committees thatfixed the doctrine, clarifiedthe political line, made it accessible in theform of simple and effective slogans. The practice of election is

22 J. Michelet, Histoire de la RevolutionFran,caise Paris, I847-53; Paris,I939 edn.), book IX, ch. iv, p. 2IO.

23 G. Tridon, Les Hebertistes. Plainte contreune calomnie e l'histoire Paris,I864). This pamphlet is of little interest except from the point of view ofnineteenth-century ntellectualhistory; it was reprintedduring the Commune.

24 H. A. Taine, Les originesde la France contemporaine.L'Ancien Regime(Paris,I876), book III, "L'espritet la doctrine",ch. iv, p. 3.

25 C'Itwas an entirely exclusive, inward-turned society. They knew oneanother, and knew nobody else; they remained suspicious of all that was notJacobin".htichelet, op. cit., book IX, ch. iii, p. I96.

26 See A. Cochin, Les societesde pensee et la Revolutionen Bretagne(Paris,I925); L. de Cardenal, La provincependant la Revolution . . (Paris, I929),

especiallybookIV, "Les moyens d'action". Less complete, but more objectiveis Gaston-Martin,Les 3'acobinsParis, I945), p. 89, "La Methode".




tempered by that of the purge, and its corollary, infiltration; oncecompetition has been limited by an eliminatory vote, which allowsthe alreadyaffiliatedmembers to judge the suitability of the candidatesto their post, the electors are left free to choose. In extreme cases,election can be replaced by co-optation or nomination. The citizenis encircled by a network of interconnecting organizations whichreceive their impulses from the parent society, "the only centre ofpublic opinion", as the Committee of Public Safety is the centre ofgovernment action; in it originate, according to a circular of thepopular society of Belleville in the Year II (I793-4), "the rays of lightand life which will illuminate, animate, and fire patriotism".27

Such political practice and revolutionary technique, allied topopular violence, proved extremely effective: they ensured, in '93, theconquest of power, the institution of the revolutionary governmentand of the dictatorshipof the Committee of Public Safety, and finally,in the spring of the Year II (I794), the victory of the armies of theRepublic. But they went radicallyagainstthe political practice and therevolutionary style of Sans-culottism. Jacobinism was unable to

* * *

survlve ltS vlctory.

The problem of the revolutionary state and its orientation wasalready emerging at the beginning of August I793: a dictatorship ofthe mass of the people, or a centralizeddictatorship? Since it held itsmandate from the Convention, sole repository of national sovereignty,according to the principles of representative democracy, the Com-mittee of Public Safety fully intended to be obeyed, whereas theSection militants demanded to be followed. Though the lattermanaged to push through, during the summer of I793, a whole series

of revolutionary measures, the Committee was intent on turningthem to the profit of the state, so reinforcing the dictatorship of theCommittee. "Popular movements are justified only when tyrannymakes them necessary", the government-inspired gournal de laMontagne rote on I9 September I793; "fortunately, the people ofParis have always felt this necessity . . .". In fact, the Committee ofPublic Safety wished to put an end to the pressure of the masses andto the popular forms of dictatorship, in order to complete the con-centration of powers in its own hands.

A first stage was completed when, on IO October I793, on therecommendation of Saint-Just, the provisional government was

27 Archives departmentalesde la Seine, 4 AZ, 590.




declareda revolutionary overnment,o stand until the advent ofpeace:the Committee f Public Safetyreceived ull controloverthe

executivepower,not only overministers,but over localadministra-tion, not to mention he armies.28

The second stage came with the stroke aimed at stopping de-christianizationn the decreeof I4 FrimaireYear II (4 DecemberI793) whichrewardedhe effortsof the Committee f Public Safetyby ratifying its dictatorship.9 All constituted bodies and civilservantswereplacedunder he directauthority f the Committee fPublic Safety; they were forbiddento take decisionsextending,limitingor interpretinghe literalmeaningof the law: a blow aimed

straightat the naturalpredisposition f popularauthorities owardsdirectgovernment. The procuratorf the communewas to becomea national gent,a mererepresentativef the revolutionarytate,andresponsibleo thegovernmentommittees. The right o sendagentsor "commissaires"ay exclusivelywith centralpower:there was nolongera place or the "commissaires"f the ParisCommunewho hadat times playedso important part n the revolutionarymovement.The constituted uthoritieswereforbidden o communicatehrough"commissaires" r delegates and to form central assemblies: a

commonprocedureused by Paris Sections,one whichwas indeedtheir mainstrength. The sameheldfor popular ocieties: hey werehenceforthorbidden o federateogetheras a committee r a centralclub, consideredubversive f the unityof government ction. Thislaw thus constitutedhe iast stage n the evolution owardsdictatorialconcentration f powers.3"

's Moniteur, viii, p. I IO. "YourCommittee of Public Safety, in whom theconsequencesof all actions ultimatelyconverge, has investigatedthe causes ofthe troubles of the people, and has foundthem to reside in the weaknesswhichmarksthe executionof your decrees, . . in the fluctuatingopinions of the state

and in the vicissitudesof the passionsthat influencethe government".@9Ibid., pp. 590, 6IO.

30 Robespierreput forwardthe theory of the revolutionarygovernment, butafter the event, in his Rapport ur lesprincipesdu Gouvernementez)olutionnaire(5 Nivose Year II/2s December I793), and in his Rapportsur les principesdemoralepolitiquequidoSzpentuider a ConventionI8 Pluviose YearII/6 FebruaryI794). This theory s basedessentiallyonthe distinctionbetweenconstitutionalgovernment, whose object is "to preserve the Republic", and revolutionarygovernment, whose object is "to institute it". "If the mainspringof populargovernment in peace-time is virtue, the mainspring of popularrevolutionarygovernment s virtuemixed with terror". These are well-knownthemes. Infact, neitherRobespierrenor any Jacobinhad a true theory of the revolutionarystate. Because of his anti-materialisticupbringing, his belief in the overallpower of ideas and of calls to virtue,Robespierrewas incapableof accurate ocialanalysis. The Jacobins anyway did not constitute a social class, still less aclass-basedparty. The Jacobinrevolutionary tate rested, in the final analysis,on an anti-materialistic conception of social relationships: a notion whichultimatelybroughtabout its downfall.




It only remained to put it into practice through the curtailment ofall autonomous powers: the elimination of factions provided this, asdid, even more, the destruction of the main organ of popular dictator-ship, the Section societies.

Being securely encamped in the general assemblies and therevolutionary committees, popular power, after the permanence ofthe Sections was abolished and the power of the committees had beenbroken, had gathered, in the autumn of I793, inside the Sectionsocieties; they soon became the sole directing and controlling agencyof popular political activity. They stood as a challenge to establishedpower; more accurately,their influence balanced that of the Jacobins.

This is the reason for the cold war waged against them from thestart by the revolutionary government, signs of this were alreadyapparent in a significant intervention from Robespierre on I g

Brumaire Year II (9 November I793). A plan for a decree, foundamong the papers of the Committee of Public Safety and prob3blydating back to the winter of I794, clearly reveals the government'sintentions:

I. That in orderto maintain he unity of the Republic,there should be no newsocieties except those affiliated o the Society of the Fl^iends f Liberty andEquality [the Jacobins];II. That in orderto preserveunity in each large city,there should not be formed any new societies except in connectionwith thefirst society affiliated o that of Paris, and forming as it were a section of it.tl

This plan gave the Jacobins control of all societies: a hierarchical,centralized network of popula1^ocieties, in the grip of the revolu-tionary government.

The Committee of Public Safety achieved its ends after the downfallof the factions. The raction societies were denounced by Saint-Just,on 23 Ventose Year II (I3 March I794) in his report on factionsabroad; then again on 2I Germinal Year II (IO April I794) by Collotd'Herbois, in the name of unity and efficiency; four days earlier theyhad been accused of "federalizing"public opinion.32

The debate took an even more pressing turn in Florcal (April-May),at the Jacobin Club. On the 26th (Isth May) Couthon stigmatizedthose societies which in Paris showed "the hideous spectacle offederalism". Unity of pnblic opinionhad to be regained, all patriots

sl A.N., AF II 66, pl. 488, p. II. There is no mention of this paper in theRecueildes Actes du Comite' e Salut Public.32 Saint-Just, Moniteur, xix, p. 686. Collot d'Herbois, 707tRnAl de la

Montagne,24 GerminalYear II (I 3 Apr. I 794); Moniteur,xx, p. 203; 3facobins,Vi, p. 6I.



THE REVOLUTIONARY TATE I 789- I 796 67

must be concentratedn the JacobinClubs. According o Collotd'Herbois,on the same day, the Section societies "tendedvisiblytowards he establishment f a new federalism . . they wished tomakeeachSectiona little republic".33 Collotd'Herbois ttacked hepopularpracticeof revolutionary ower, pointing out that it wasincompatiblewith Jacobin entralism. The unity of public opinionmust be regainedunderthe aegis of the parentsociety,the JacobinClub, tself both the expression nd the supportof the dictatorshipof the Committeeof Public Safety; in this way, the last obstaclesto the concentration f powers in the hands of the Jacobinstatewoulddisappear.

Finally,betweenGerminal nd PrairialYearII (2I March-I8JuneI794), thirty-nine societies were disbanded, thirty-one of thembetween2sth Florealand sth Prairial I4th and24th May),after heJacobinattacksof 23rd and 26th FIoreal I2th and I5th May)-which servesto point up the authoritarianspect of the operation.The societiesdisbandedunder pressure rom the Jacobinsand thegovernment, n the initiativeof the revolutionaryommittees,nowassimilatedo a civil service,ot^ f some official. So the backof thepopularmovementwas broken. Since t had destroyed he factions,andkeptdownpopularmilitantsby meansof the threatof repression,the revolutionaryovernment nifiedall forcesand concentrated llpowers nto itself: a singlecentreof opinion,as well as a singlecentrefor action,the revolutionarytate, supportedby the networkof theJacobins ndtheir ailiated clubs.

This logical but rigid structuretook no account of the socialvariations nside the revolutionaryorces. By forcibly ntegratinginto the Jacobin ramework popularmovement,autonomous ntilthen,andwhichhad ts ownaspirations, rganizationsnd democratic

practice, he revolutionaryovernment lienated he goodwillof thesans-culotte militants. The irreducible ntagonism f Sans-culottismand Jacobinism sserted tself, and prepared,hrough he divisionofrevolutionaryorces, the way to Thermidor.

IVThe JacobinDictatorship or Public Safety had failed because t

had cut itself off from its socialbasis, the popularmovement:"the

333fournal e la Montagne,28 and 29 Floreal Year II (I6 and I7 May I794)-

Moniteur,x, p. 48g;3?acobins, i, I25. Couthon: "Division is harmful, andunity of opinion cannot be broken without great danger. If you are to pre-serve all these societies . . . public opinion will be prodigiously divided . . .and the operationof governmentwill be impeded".




Revolutions frozen",Saint-Justhad observedn Messidor June-July). The crisisof the Revolution fterThermidorJuly-August),and the terribleexperienceof the YearIII (22 September 794-22 September795) induced he revolutionarymilitants o makeacriticalexaminationf whatthey hadlivedthrough. Although hefall of the revolutionaryovernment averise,between he summerand the autumnof I794, to an anti-Jacobin eaction,a "neo-Hebertism"it wouldbe morepreciseto call it a revivalof Sans-culottism),he defeatof the sans-culottes during he PrairialDaysofof the Year III (May-JuneI795) broughtabout a measureofrehabilitation f Jacobinrevolutionary ractice. From this dualexperience newrevolutionaryracticeanda newconception f therevolutionarytateemerged:nota synthesis econcilinghe two,butarealmutation. Thisessential tagewasBabeuvism. TranscendingSans-culottismndJacobinism, abeuf,alikepre-eminentn thoughtasin action,achieveda full conception f the revolutionaryracticeandideologyadequate o the new society,bornof the Revolutionitself. His critical hinkingon the problems f dictatorshipndtherevolutionarytatewasparticularlyruitful.

The organizationf the Conspiracyf Equalsduring he winterof

theYearIV (I795-I796) brokeaway romthe variousmethodsusedhithertoytherevolutionary ovement,be it Jacobin rsans-culotte.Until I 794, Babeuf,like other popularmilitants,had been anadvocatefdirectdemocracy. Asfarbackas I 789hewasmistrustfulof he representativeystemandelectedassemblies"itis imperativethathe peopleshouldhavea veto");in I790, he championedheautonomyftheParisdistricts. Babeuf'sdeasonthispointwerenotparticularlyriginal:his debtto Rousseau,whoseContral Socialheoftenparaphrased,s evident,as is his kinshipwith the political

tendenciesf the Paris sans-culotte militants.34This makestheprinciples,he organizationnd the methodswhichhe causedhisconspiratorso adopt n I796 allthe moreremarkable.Theaimsof the Conspiracy3wereestablished uring hemeetingsof secretcommitteeheldin Amar'shouse,during he winterof theYearV (I796): 36 irstcame hedestructionftheConstitutionfthe34 SeeV. M. Daline, GtacchusBabeufavantetpe7zdanta Revolution ranfaise:,785-I 794 (Moscow, I 963, in Russian; see account by A. Soboul, Revue'Histoireodernetcontemporaine,966, p. I66).35 See M. Dommanget, "La

structureet les methodesde la Conjurationdesgaux",nnalesrevolutionnaires,922, p. I77 and p. 28I; also in Sur Babeufta ConjurationesEgaux(Paris,I970), p. I45.36 See essentiallyP. Buonarroti,Conspiration our l'egalitedite de BabeufBrussels,828). I amusinghereandsubsequently he editioncited in note 3.



THE REVOLUTIONARY TATE I 789- I 796 69

Year III, as being "illegitimaten origin, oppressive n spirit, andtyrannicaln intention"; ollowedby the revival f the I793 Constitu-

tion, "a rallyingpoint ndispensableor the bringingdownof existingauthorities"; nd finally,"the preparationor the ultimateadventoftrue equality".37 In the light of this analysis,the revolutionarydemands ppear o include he destruction f the former tate,as wellas the necessity or an intermediate tage before the social systemaimedat is definitively eached:demaIldswhichhad neitherof themappearedn Jacobinpractice.

Two basicprobIemsemain:"themodusoperandi"the destructionof the Constitution f the YearIII) and "the public ormto succeed

immediatelyhe governmenthat wasto be broughtdown".

In the organizationf the Conspiracy,he swing rom he methodswhich had until then characterized evolutionary ction, whethersans-culotter Jacobin, ppearsess clear hanhas oftenbeensaid. Itwas the organizing onspiracy ar excellence,ccordingo some. Itwas indeed,but leading o popular nsurrectionnsteadof to a coupd'etator an armedattack. Buthadnot the insurrection f IOAugust

I792 beenprepared y an insurgent ommune, ecretly ormed,as thepopularDaysof3I May-2JuneI793 hadbeenby thesecret ommitteewhichmet n the Eveche,he former piscopal alace The differencehereseems o be one of degree, ather hanof kind. Neverthelesshenecessity or secrecywas clearlyasserted,and the rulesnecessary orclandestine ctionpromulgated y the "First nstruction f the secretDirectory o its mainrevolutionarygents".38

37 Buonarroti, p. cit., i, p. 84, "Points de ralliementoffertsaux republicains".38 Ibid., ii, p. 84, sixth document, "Premiere nstructiondu directoiresecret

adressee a chacun des agents revolutionnairesprincipaux". "While we havetaken every precaution o ensure our safety, and the secrecy of the measureswetake, we have wanted you to be protected from all surprises ... The secretDirectory have taken prudence so far that they have isolated the twelve mainagents from one another.... The intermediate agents are similarlyisolated ... In general,since the secret Directoryhave adopted as a generalsystem the isolationof everyone, the cutting of all conamunications,heir wholeorganizationwill be subject to this order, so that each individualperson em-ployed by them, whether directly or indirectly, will be unable to betrayanybody, and his disappearancewould be the only loss to the revolutionaries".

Not that the strictlyclandestinecharacter f the Conspiracy or Equalitymustbe unduly emphasized. The denunciationof Grisel led directly to the arrestofthe leaders; they had not foreseen this eventuality, and had not provided for

anybodyto take their place. The same lack of precaution s evident in the listsof names and addressesof revolutionary gents seized by the police in the roomoccupied by Babeufat the time of his arrest, ogetherwith numerousdocumentswhich were to be the prosecution's chief weapon against the accused at theVendome trial. On this point see Dommanget, Sur Babeuf et la Conjurationdes Egaux, p. I66.



NUMBER 65o PAST AND PRESENT

We see then at the centre of the undergroundorganization he smallgroup of collegiate directors: they "bind into one single strand the

scattered threads of democracy,so as to direct them uniformlytowardsthe restoration of the sovereignty of the people'. This asserts thenecessity of centralism, which was already the corner-stone of theJacobin system. Outside the nucleus of directors, there is a smallnumber of tried underground militants: the revolutionary agents ofthe twelve Paris districts, as well as middlemen who ensure continuedcontact with the Directory. 9 Further out are the fringe sympathizers,patriots and democrats (in the Year II sense of the word), who are notin the secret and who do not seem to have shared the new revolu-

tionary ideal; the task of the revolutionaryagents is "to organize, eachin his district, one or several meetings of patriots, and there to feed anddirect the minds of the public by the reading of popular journals, andby discussions on the rights of the people and their present situation'.Further out still are the mass of the people who are directed.

An organizing conspiracy, indeed; but one which seems to havebeen uncertain how to solve the problem of communication with themasses. Although the "Instructions to agents on the organizationofthe movement"40 laid down rules for the leaders of the insurgent

people, no plans seem to have been made for the previous stage: notext explains how communication between the "meetings of patriots"and the masses was to be effected at the level of the district. AsM. Dommanget has remarked, "Babeuf's conspiracy had above all apowerful leadership''.41 We are still far from the concept of astrongly structured party. The revolutionaryavant-gardeppearsdetached from the mass of the people which it wants to lead: acharacteristicwhich it would be possible to find later in the revolu-tionary organizationof Blanqui.

Once insurrection is triumphant and the former state has beedestroyed, the problem arises of what revolutionary power is to besubstituted for it. At this point, if we are to follow Buonarroti illhis history of the Conjrationpour l'Egalite, he idea of an inter-mediate stage appears, necessary to the success of the enterprise,"between the downfall of aristocratic power and the definitive

39 Buonarroti,Op. Cit., ii, p. 82, fifth document, "Organisationdes agentsprincipaux au nombre de douze et des agents intermediaires. Premieres

fonctions de chacun deux". To the district (arrondissement)gents must beadded the military agents, fuIfilling the same functions with the battalionsquartered n and around Paris.

40 Ibid., . I92, twenty-fifthdocument, "Le Directoire aux agents".41 Dommanget, Op. Cit., p. I66.



THE REVOLUTIONARYTATE I 789- I 796 7I

establishment of the popularconstitution" 4 2 This intermediate tageof revolutionarydictatorship is definedby Buonarroti n these words:

An extraordinary nd necessaryauthority,by means of which a nation can begiven full possession of its freedom, in spite of the corruptionwhich is thesequel of its formerslavery, and despitethe traps and the enmity of internaland external foes in league against her.43

Three solutions were possible for the conspirators: the very samewhich they had seen at work during the Revolution since I789.

Some were proposing to recall what was left of the National Conventionwhich they regardedas still existing de jare; others wished to entrust theprovisionalgovernment of the republic to a body of men nominated by theinsurgentpeople of Paris- others, finally,wanted to put, for a specified ength

of time, into the handsof one man, calledadiclatoror amoderator,theupremepower and the task of instituting the Republic.44

The recall of the purged Convention,as was proposed by Amar, wasthe Jacobin solution; dictatorship,propounded by Debon, was in theMaratist traditiorl; he nomination of a provisionalgovernment by theinsurgent people was in the sans-culotte (Hebertist) tradition.

During the first days of Germinal Year IV (March I796), thesecret Directory for Public Safety was instituted. It reopened thedebate on "what form of authority was to replace at one stroke the

one whose destruction was being planned". It is important at thispoint, in order to throw some light on the distant originsof the notionof dictatorship of the proletariat, to follow Buonarroti closely in hishistory of the Corlspiracy or Equality.45

The first obvious point is the necessity for "an interval . . . betweenthe insurrection and the installation of the new constitutionalauthority", allowing of course for the fact that "it would have beenmost imprudent to leave the nation even for a moment without aleader and without a guide". The arguments mentioned byBuonarroti are the same which were suggested to the conspiratorsbythe history and the working of the French Revolution: "a people so

49 Buonarroti, p. cit., i, p, 84, "Autoritea substitueraugouvernementde l'anIII", and p. IO9, "Autoritea substituera l'autoriteexistante"

43 See also Buonarroti'snote: "The experience of the French Revolutionand more particularly he troubles and disordersof the National Conventionhave, I think, amply demonstrated hat a people whose opinions have takenshape under a regime of despotism and inequality are hardly capable, at thestart of a regenerating evolution, of electing by their vote the men who are tolead it .... Perhaps t is necessary,at the birth of a political revolution, evenin the interests of the real sovereigntyof the people, to be less concernedwith

consulting the suffrageof the nation than with putting the supreme authorityin the least arbitraryway possible, between the hands of wise and strongrevolutionaries". Buonarroti,Op. Cit., i, p. I I I, n. I .

44 Ibid., p. 85, "Autoritea substituerau gouvernementde l'an III".45 Ibid., p. IO9, "Autoritea substituera l'autoriteexistante".



NUMBER 652 PAST AND PRESENT

strangely emoved rom naturalorderwas hardlycapableof makinga useful choice, and needed extraordinary eansto restore t to a

condition where it could wield its sovereignty o the full in aneffectiverather han a fictitiousway'. Hence the necessity or "aprovisional evolutionary uthority onstituted o as to protectthepeople or everfromthe influence f the natural nemiesof equality,and nspire t anewwith he unityof willnecessaryo adopt epublicaninstitutions"

What s this authority o be? The threeproposalsmade n Amar'shouseduly reappeared.

The recallof the Convention-the only legitimate uthority-a

proposal n the revolutionaryradition f the Jacobins,was rejected:the necessary urge nvolved reated oo complexa problem, s manyMontagnards nd Jacobinshad taken part in the "crimesof gthThermidor". The exigenciesof revolutionary fficiencyovercamethe wish for legitimacy.

Dictatorshipwas defined by Debon and Douthe as an extra-ordinary uthority, ntrusted o one man,who has a double unctionto fulfil: "to set before he peoplea legislation oth simpleand likelyto ensure hem equalityand the real exerciseof sovereignty . . and

to dictateprovisionalmeasureswith a view to preparinghe natiotl oreceive this sovereignty". So importanta task requiredunity ofthought,unity of action,and consequently ne man. The collegiatesystemcouldonlyhavedisastrous onsequences,s wasprovedby thedissensionsnsidethe Committee f Public Safetyon the eve of gthThermidor. Of course, he exerciseof such an officecould lead todangerous buse; this would be avoided hrough he virtue of thecitizenappointed,hrough he clear ormulation f the aimsenvisaged,and through he limits set in advanceon the durationof the oice.

These argumentswererejected y the secretDirectory, n accountofthe difficultyof choice and, still more, of "the generalprejudicewhichseemed mpossible o overcome":hat is, populardislikeof allformsof personalpower,even of revolutionaryrigin.

There remained only the third solution, derived from Sans-culottism: hatthe insurgent eopleof Parisnominatehe provisionalauthority o whom he government f the nationmust necessarily eentrusted. This solution agreed with the principlesof popularsovereignty o which the mass of the people were deeply attached.

Did it guarantee he necessary evolutionaryEciency? Even thesecretDirectorydoubted his, since it decided o institutea rigorousscrutiny f the democratswho mightbe proposed s candidates; andthe revolution ver,not to desist rom ts work,but to watchover he




behaviour f the new assembly".46We are back, in a way, to thepractices f Jacobin entralism.

If we go no furtherhan hese exts,we cannotwithout xaggerationderive Blanquistpractice from Babeuvist theory. To be moreaccurate, et us say that when in I848 he pronouncedn favourofadjourning lectionsand havinga provisionalevolutionary ictator-ship, Blanquiwas clarifyingBabeuvist heory,supporting t withcareful nalysis f thesocialandpolitical onditions f histime. It istrue that Babeufandhis fellowconspiratorssserted he necessity ordictatorshipn the aftermath f the revolutionaryonquestof power;but they do not appear o have reacheda cleardefinitionof the

structures f this dictatorship. A mutant orm bornof the previousrevolutionarydeologies, Babeuvismwas yet not always easy todistinguish romsans-culotter Jacobinpractices.

* * * *

Such hen, is thenatureof thedouble egacyof the FrenchRevolu-tion to the nineteenthcentury; t left its markon the revolutionarymovementand on the Commune tself, together with the tragic

contradictionswhich arose from it. The sans-culotteradition,socharacteristicf popularaction, ivedon to assert tselffinallyas the"Neo-Hebertism"or more accurately"Neo-Sans-culottism")fTridon and his friends:a libertarianine which runsright throughthe nineteenthcentury. Beside it, a centralist ine visible in theneo-Jacobinismof a Delescluze. But through the legacy ofBabeuvism, oes not Blanquism,withits authoritarianractices, tsconception f a centralized ictatorship,ts "elitist" onception f theRevolution,belong to the samerevolutionaryamily?

The FrenchRevolutionbequeathedo the nineteenth entury heproblemof the revolutionarytate. NVast to be a populardictator-ship of the massesorthe concentrationf powers n the handsof anavant-gardeminority? Torn betweenopposingendencies, ome ofwhich tragically e-enactedhistory, he Communedoesnot seem tohave solved this problem with any certainty. The revolutionaryCommune eldcommand; ut it had,according oEdouardVaillant,neither the unity of thought and action, nor the energy of truepower. It was a deliberative ssembly,acking ufficient oherence.

And could not the same be said of the centralcommittee of

46 Ibid., p. II5, "Corpscompose d'un democratepar departement,a proposeraupeuple de Parisen insurrection".




the twenty-fourdistricts of Paris, a debatingclub ratherthan aninstrument of action? It would be necessaryat this point to

measure xactly he part o be allotted, n the historyof the Communeof I87I, to the revolutionaryraditions f '93 andthe YearIV (I795-

6); this wouldbe the measure f theirdegeneration,s wellas showingone of the causes or the final ailureof the Commune.

The politicalform of the revolutioncould only be "at last dis-covered" when the heavy handicapof this double revolutionaryheritagehadbeen overcome. But does not this doubleheritageie inthe natureof things, and in the natureof man?

Sorbonne AlbertSoboul

Documents

Some Problems of the Revolutionary State 1789 1796 Albert Soboul