Some Points of Gontagt Between History and Natural Scienge. Edgar Wind (1936)

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OXFORD

,UNIVERSITY

PRESS

AMEN HOUSE, E.C. 4

London

Edinlmrgh

Glasgow New

York

Toronto tyfelbourne Capetown Bombay

Calcu tta Madras

HUMPHREY MILFORD

PUDLISIIER

1 0 T H E

UNIVERSI l Y

P ILOSOP Y

I STORY

Essays presented to

E R N S T

C A S S I R E R

Edited by

RAYMOND KLIBANSKY

and

H. ] PATON

OXFORD

AT THE GLARENDON PRESS

1936



viii

PREFACE

never-failing

support without

which

the

present publication

would have been impossible; to its Director, Dr. Saxl, to its staff,

and to those ofits collaborators, especially Dr. H. Buchthai and

Dr.

0

Kurz, who

have helped

to

proeure the

illustrations;

to

Dr. L. Labowsky

and

Miss M.

A.

Cox, who have so freely given

us ~ h i r time and

their help;

to Mrs. E. Gundolf for permission

to mclude a chapter from one

of

thc still unpublished works of

the late

Professor Friedrich Gundolf;

to the

scholars who

under

took the arduous task of translating

the

foreign contributions

into idiomatic English; and finally to

the

officers of the Glaren

don Press for their constant advice and assiduous care in an

undertaking

of

no little difficulty.

R.K.

H.J. P.

OXFORD,

February 1936

CONTENTS

A

DEFINITION OF

THE

CONCEPT OF HISTORY.

By

J·

HUIZINGA, Leiden

.

.

THE

HISTORICITY OF

THINGS. By

s. ALEXANDER, Manchester .

HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY. By L

BRUNSCHVICG, Paris

27

•

ON THE SO-CALLED IDENTITY OF HISTORY

AND

PHILO-

SOPHY. By

G. cALOGERO, Pisa

. 35

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY,

AND

HISTORY.

By

c. c. J W En n ,

Oxford

53

I(

CONCERNING

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. THE DISTINC

TIVENESS OF THE PHILOSOPHIC ORDER. By :E. GILSON,

Paris

TOWARDS AN

ANTHROPOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY.

By n.

GROETHUYSEN,

Paris

THE

TRANSGENDING OF

TIME IN

HISTORY.

By G.

GENTILE,

Rome

SOME

AMBIGUITIES IN

DISGUSSIONS

CONCERNING

TIME.

By L. s. STEBBING, London

THE UNIVERSAL

IN

THE STRUCTURE

OF

HISTORICAL

KNOWLEDGE.

By T. LITT, Leipzig

ON THE OBJECTIVITY OF HISTORICAL

KNOWLEDGE.

By

F. MEDICUS, Zürich

THE FORMATION OF OUR HISTORY OF

PHILOSOPHY.

By

:E. BREHIER, Paris

f PLATONISM

IN

AUGUSTINE S PHILOSOPHY

OF

HISTORY.

By

E. HOFFMANN, eidelberg

6r

77

gr

I25

1

37

159

173

<

THE CARTESIAN SPIRIT AND HISTORY. By L. LEVY-BRUIIL,

Paris

191

VERITAS

FILIA TEMPORIS.

By

F.

sAXL, London

197

ET

IN

ARCADIA EGO.

By E. PANOFSKY, Princeton 223

X

SOME

POINTS OF CONTACT

BETWEEN

HISTORY AND

NATURAL

SCIENCE. By E. WIND,

London

255



5

4

ET IN

ARCADIA EGO

taken over from the G · . . .

that

the De

h

uer?mo

pamtmg

m the Corsini Gallery and

vons Ire verswn was b b

1

'

between I625

and

628 Th

t. p ~ o

y executed as early as

was suggested to Po b

U ~ I

Israt errmprobable

that

the subject

hardly have

met e f ~ ; ~ ~ ~ 6

y t

~ p r e l a t e

Rospigliosi, whom he could

having h ld fl .32, w en the 1atter retu rned to Rom e after

0 e a

pro

essorship

at

the University

of

Pisa since r62

he

l i ~ e ~ f n ; a ~ e f hand

Bellori's Statements as to Poussin, with

Jhom

are quite

r e l i : ~ ~ l ~ : e : : ~ ~ ~ n a i ~ o n t a c ~ d u ~ i n g

the l atter' s 1ater years,

connexion with Poussin's

Ä r c a d ~ s

at e

te_Hs about

the prelate's

groundless either, though

l i g h t l y l ~ n ~ ~ ~ ~ u r ~ s

m.Ight notl'be altogether

~ : ; ; : : ~ h ~ , r ; ~ : " : ; : , o ~ ~ 7 a ~ o i a p h e ; : ' : . ~ ~ : : ' t a : : : , ; ~ : , ; ~ ; ; ~ : : ;

Louvre picture f r ~ m p . dospig

I?SI

mig. t have ordered the

tioned the fact

that

he

~ ~ s s m , an on

this occaswn might have men

of

the subject

wh

h '. e:.re1ate, cou1d boast the original invention

Poussin

but

to

G u ~ r c i ~ ~

\ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ,

h e l ; o u 1 ~

hhave suggested not to

between

I

6 d 6 · e cou easi Y ave

met

at

any

time

with the

J : s i u ~ ~ I h ~ f ' w en

the

youn?

nobleman studied

at

Rome

'Aurora Ludovi;i' w

~ t t ~

e young J?amter worked at his famous

known to be a t - fl e .more easi1y as the 'Aurora Luriovisi'

is

rans

ormatwn or

rather

a practical criticism

so

to

d : ~ ~ a ~ l ~ : ~ ~ ~ l o ~ i n ~ n ~ A w h i c h . ~ a s

the pri.de

of

the

later

Pope's

f

h. .

em

s uro ra m the Casmo Rospigliosi

IS

were true

t

wou1d be no 1

·u

.

Clement

IX

wh } d 1

ess

I

ustnous a person

than

Pope

. o la transp anted to the soil

of

Arcadia the medieval

~ ~ ~ p ~ ~ ~ d

a(i:xpr:ss:d

in the legend of the Three Living and the

Histriomastix

a ~ I m l a r way as he

had

transformed the content of

Vita

H ')

&c., mto the

~ c e n e

represented

in

Poussin's

Ballo

della

. .

umana

' and had

comed the phrase Et in

Arcadia e

h.

~ u ; ; ~ ~ o ~ f C f a c t ~

?ar:not be traced back beyond its

a p p e ~ a : c ~ c ~ ~

orsm1

p1cture.

I give this conjecture only for

what

it

is

worth

but it

would b .

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a y t i v \ ~ a r ~ o n y

with the Statement

of ~ l l o r i and

in

e n ~ i ~ ~

WI

t e somewhat moralizing t

h

hl h . .

spirit

of

Rospigliosi's

l t

d . ' ye

Ig

Y umamst1c,

Clemente

IX

I8 . I erar y poetreal works (cf. G. Beani,

' 93, G. Canevazzi,

Papa

Clemente IX

Poeta

M d

rgoo; Dff. Alaleona,

Bulletino della

Societd

F i l o l o g i c ~

o m ~ n a o g e ~ 4 a ,

PP· 71 . . • '

SOME POINTS OF GONTAGT BETWEEN

HISTORY AND NATURAL SGIENGE

y E D G A R W I N D

I

SHALL be

concerned here

with some, but by

no means

with

all, of

the points of contact between history

and

the

natural

sciences.

It is not my

intention,

for

instance,

to dwell

on well-known

facts

which have not

ceased tobe facts for

being

ignored or

forgotten

by professional philosophers.

In

spite of

Fichte-and some minor

autonomists

ofthe mind-history (taken

in

the customary

sense of

the term,

as

history

of human

fate

and achievement)

began

only at

a

certain

stage ofthe

develop

ment of nature. The earth had to separate

from

the sun and

acquire such motion, shape,

and tcmperature

that

living

bcings

could develop on it before History

was (to

adopt Kant s

phrase-

ology) made possible'.

When we, therefore,

speak

of

points

of contact between

nature

and

history, we may begin

by

recalling

the

trivial fact

that

between

the

two there

is a

contact

in

time

and

hence

a

transition. Once the

form

of

this

transition is

being

inquired

into, the most dreaded questions begin to make their appear

ance. What

is the relation between inorganic matter and

organic

life? How

did we

evolve

from

a

state of

nature

to one

of conscious

control? How did primitive man,

magically subjecting

him

self

to nature s

powers and

apparently living in an almost

a-historical

form, produce

his 'civilized'

descendant who,

in the

moulding of

his

surroundings,

creates

and experiences

historic

changes ? I shall

not

discuss

any ofthese

questions.

My

problern

is far

more modest. Instead ofinquiring into

cosmic

or cultural

events

which

mayillustrate the

temporalintersectionoftheworlds

of

nature and history, I

shall

confine

myself to indicating some

formal

points

of

correspondence between these two

worlds-or,

tobe

more

prccise,

between the

scientific

methods which render

each

of

them an object of human knowledge

and

experience.

The mere

assertion

that there are such correspondenccs

may

appear

heretical to

many. German

scholars

have taught

for

decades that,

apart

from adherence to the most general

rulcs of

1

The following refers

in

particular to the schools of Dilthey, Windel

band,

and

Rickert.



256 SOME POINTS OF GONTAGT BETWEEN

logic, the studyofhistoryand thenaturalsciences are to each other

as pole and

anti

pole,

and that it

is the first duty of any historian

to forswear all

sympathy with the

ideals ofmen who w ould like

to reduce the whole world to a mathematical formula. This

:evol.t was

no

doubt

an

act

of

Iiberation in its time.

To-day

it

Is _rmntless. The very concept

of

nature in opposition to which

D1lthey proclaimed his Geisteswissenschaft has long been aban

~ o n e d by the s c i e ~ t i s t s

t h ~ m s : h : e s

and the notion

of

a descrip

twn

o f nature which mdiscnmmately subjects

men

and their

fates h ke rocks

and

stones to its

'unalterable

laws' survives only

as a

mghtmare

of certain historians.

Thus

it need not be symptomatic of a sinful relapse into the

method

of thought so generously abused as 'positivistic', if in

what o l l o w s s o m ~ exa.mples.

are

chosen to illustrate

how the

very

questwns that histonans hke to look upon as

their own

are

also raised in natural science. The all too sedentary inhabitants

of

the 'Globus intellectualis' may, it is true, think

it

incredible

that their antipodes do not stand

on their

heads.

I. Document and Instrument

In defiance of

the

rules of

traditional

logic,

circular

argu

m ~ n t s

are the normal method

of

producing documentary

ev1dence.

An historian who consults his documents in order to interpret

some political event

can

judge the value

of

these documents

only

if he

knows their place within tbe very same course of

events about wbicb be consults tbem.

In tbe same way, an art-bistorian wbo from a given work

draws _an inference concerning

tbe

development of its author

turns mto an art-connoisseur wbo examines tbe reasons for

attributing

this work to tbis

particular master: and

for tbis

purpose be must presuppose tbe knowledge

of tbat

master's

development

wbich

was

just wbat be wanted

to infer.

Tbis cbange

focu_s

fron:

tbe

obje;t

to

tbe

means

of

inquiry,

and

tbe ~ o n c ~ m i t a n t mverswn of object

and

means, is peculiar

to.most 1 ~ t o n c a l

~ t u d i : s and tbe

instances given may

be

multi

phed. lzb. An. mqmry concerning

tbe

Baroque, wbicb uses

Bermm

s.

beoretical utt:rances as a source for explaining the

style _of bis works, turns mto a

study

of

tbe

role

of

tbeory in tbe

creative process of Bernini.

An

inquiry concerning Gaesar's

monarchy and tbe principate

of Pompey, rnaking use

of

I

HISTORY AND NATURAL SCIENCE

257

Cicero's writings as its main source, becomes a study

of tbe

part

played by Cicero

in

the conftict between the Senate and the

usurpers. . . .

Generally speaking tbis

migbt

be

termed tbe

d1alectiC

of

the

historical

document:

that

the

information which one tries to

gain

with the help of the document ought

to

be

presupposed

for its adequate

understanding.

Tbe scientist is subject to the very same paradox. The

pbysicist seeks to infer general laws

of n a t u r ~

by instrumen_ts

tbemselves subject to tbese laws.

For

measurmg heat,

a ftmd

like quicksilver is chosen as a

standard,

and

it

is claimed

that

it

expands evenly

with

increasing

warmth.

Y

et

how

can

such

an

assertion be made without knowledge of the laws of thermo

dynamics? And again, how c a ~ tbese la;vs k n ~ w n except

by measurements in wbicb a ftmd, e.g. qmcksilver, S used as a

~ t a n d a r d

Classical mechanics employs

measuring

rods

and

clocks that

are transferred from one place

to

another; the assumption being

tbat this alteration of place leaves

untouched

their constancy as

measuring instruments. This assumption, however, e x p r e s s e ~ a

mechanical

law

(viz. tbat

the

results of measurement are m

dependent of

the

state of motion)

the

validity o f w l ~ i c b

must

b_e

tested by instruments wbicb, in

their

turn,

are rehable

only

1f

tbe

law

assumed is valid.

The circle thus proves in science as inescapable as in history.

Every instrument and every document participates in tbe struc-

ture whicb

it is meant to reveal.

1

Il. The Intrusion

ri

the

Observer

It is curious tbat Diltbey sbould bave considered this participa-

tion as one

of the

traits which distinguish the study

of

bistory

from the natural sciences. In bis Einleitung in die Geisteswissen-

schaften be

admits that

tbe study of

'social bodies'

is

less precise

tban

that of'natural

bodies'.

'And

yet',

be

adds,

'all

this

is

more

tban counterbalanced

by

tbe fact

that

I who experience

and

know myself

inwardly, am

part of this s o i ~ l body.

he

individual is, on tbe one hand, an element m the mteractwns

'

For

a more detai ed analysis of this fact and

an exposition

of some of its wider

implications,

cp.

as Experiment und die J;letaphysik Tübingen,

1934, and 'Can

the

Antinomies

be

restated?' Psyche vol. xtv, I934·

4114

Ll



258 SOME POINTS

OF

CONTACT BETWEEN

of

society, reacting to its effects in conscious will-direction

and

action,

and is at

the same time the intelligence contemplat

ing and investigating all this' (p. 46 sq.).

That

human agents, who form the substance of

what

Dilthey

calls the socio-historical reality', experience and know them

selves

inwardly is

a bold assertion.

It

transforms one of

the

most troublesome moral precepts

( Know

thysclf ') into a plain

and

ordinary

matter of fact, which is contradicted by both

ancient and

modern

experience. Whatever objections may be

made

to

the current

psychology

of

the

unconscious,

it

is

un

deniable

that

men do

not

know themselves

by

immediate intui

tion

and that

they live and express themselves on severallevels.

Hence,

the

interpretation of historical documents requires a far

more complex psychology than Dilthey's doctrine ofimmediate

experience with its direct appeal to a state of feeling. Peirce

wrotc in a draft of a psychology

of

the development of ideas:

it

is the beliefmen

betray and not that

which they parade which

has to be studied.'

1

Once the direct appeal to inner experience

is

abandoned,

Dilthey's

remark

ceases to contain

anything

that a physicist

might

not

apply to himself: I myself, who am handling appa

ratuses

and

instruments,

am

a

part of

this physical

world; the

individual (i.e.

the

physical technician and observer) is,

on

the

one

hand,

an element in the interactions of nature, and he

is

at

the same time the intelligence calculating ;md investigat

ing all this.'

Let

it not

be objected

that

by this 'physical travesty' the

meaning

of

Dilthey's statement

is

completely destroyed. True,

the

profundity has disappeared, and what remains seems to be

rather trivial. But what the statement now conveys is not only

simple, but also true: The investigator intrudes into the

process

that

he is investigating. This is what the supreme rule

of

methodology

demands.

In

order to study physics, one must be physically

affected;

pure

mind does

not

study physics. A body is needed

-however

much

the

mind

may

interpret -which transmits

the

signals that aretobe

interpreted.

Otherwise,

there

would be

no contact with the surrounding world

that

is

tobe

investigated.

Nor does

pure

mind study history.

Forthat

purpose, one must

'Issues of Pragmaticism', in

The Monist

xv, 1903, p. 485.

Reprinted

in

Collected Papers

of

Charles Sanders Peirce

v, p. 297, Harvard University Press, 1934

(ed.

by

Charles

Bartshorne

and

Paul

Weiss).

I

;

HISTORY AND NATURAL SCIENCE 259

be historically affected; caught

by

the mass of past experience

that

intrudes into the present in the shape of

tradition :

de

manding, compelling, often only narrating, reporting, pointing

to

other past

experience which has not as

yet been

unfolclecl.

Again,

the

investigator is in the first instancc a receiver of

signals to which he attends and which he pursues, but on whose

transmission he has only a very limited influence. The register

ing ancl digesting of these signs, the functioning

of

this whole

'receiving apparatus ,

cannot

be reducecl to

the

vague formula

of

traditional

antitheses ('bocly

and

soul',

inward

ancl

outward ).

The only antithesis that does

apply

is that between

part

ancl

'whole'. By his intrusion into the process

that

is to be studied,

the stuclent himself, like every one of his tools, becomes part

object of investigation; part-object to be

taken

in a twofold

sense: he is, like any

other organ

of investigation, but p rt of

the whole object

that

is

being investigated.

But

equally it is

only apart of hirnself

that,

thus externalizecl into an instrument,

enters

into

the object-world of his stuclies.

A

limitin Y

case might certainly be imagined where this part

of his p e r s o ~ becomes equal to the whole: w.here the

~ l i s t o ~ i n

ceases to be anything

but

a

product

of the h1story he 1magmes

hirnself

writing;

where

the student

of

documents

is

hirnself

at

best only another document

of the

historical contagion to which

he is a prey. Nor will it be clenied

that

this limiting case is occa

sionally almost reached;

just

as there are said to be physicists

whose working process comes alarmingly near to

that

of

thc

machirres with which they are conversant. But

if any

one were

to look upon this as

the normal

conclition, and to

proclaim

the 'inescapability of such material ties'-without a sense of thc

steps and grades that hold. g o o ~ here-he w o u l ~

commit.

the

mistake opposite

tothat

wh1ch d1ssolves all mate.nal con.nexwns

into mere associations of ideas. However true t remams that

pure

mind

cannot pursue. either ~ i s t o r y r physics, because

these things

clo

not affect lt

matenally,

lt s also t r ~ e that

material contact

does

not

suffice

to

supply these sCiences w1th

a conscious agent.

f he

physicist were nothing

but

a physical

apparatus, there

woulcl be no physics;

nor

would history exist,

if the historian were merely an historical clocument. (The very

formulation of these sentences contains a contradiction, for

the

worcls apparatus ancl

document

cannot be clefined at all

without

relation to some one who uses them for some purposc.)



6o

SOME POINTS

OF

CONTACT

BETWEEN

It follows that we must

admit

a major

or minor

feat

of

in

telligence in

every

act

of

measurement or textual criticism but

that we

ought

to define this feat

of

intelligence as a

mode

of

behaviour,

that is, as a

type

of event. The critical interpretation

of

a

document by an

historian, considered as

an act in time

is

in

the first i n s t ~ n c e an event, no less than, say, the anger ; r joy

caus.ed by thrs ~ o c u m e n t as a biased contemporary may have

feit rt.

In the

hrstorian, too,

if he is

cnthusiastic

about

his sub

ject, somcthing

of

this anger or joy will reverberate. However

by the application of the

critical

method the raw excitement

r:fined

to

a more

thoughtful

mode of

behaviour.

He does not

s1mply follow hisspontaneaus

emotion, instead

he

appeals (more

or less ~ ~ c u r a t e l y

and

successfully) to a system

of grammatical

a n ~

cn.tical ~ · u l e s on

which

he bases his interpretation and

whrch, m therr

turn,

are tested

by

being applied.

Corresponding to

these grammatical and critical axioms the

experimental

physicist

has

his axioms ofmeasurement. He,pre

s ~ p p o s e s them and

appeals

to their rules, in order to

show

that

hrs method is correct. But what is the basis ofhis confidence

that

these rules will be a safe guide

in

the investigation ofhis subject?

A

pre-established

harmony , in the sense

of

Leibniz,

is unaccept

able

to-d ay. So is

Spinoza s doctrine of

a necessary

identity in

the order

and

connexion

of

things

and

'ideas'.

1

Kant had

tried

to eliminate

the

problern

by the

Copernican emotion

in

his

Critique

ri Pure

Reason,

which

made

the order

of

hings dependent

upon the order of ideas, i.e. the forms

of

judgement. Yet in

th.e Critique

ri

]udgement, the

problern

of the harmony of na{ure

With our understanding

die

Zusammenstimmung der Natur zu

unserem

Erkenntnisvermögen) is again

raised; only to

be

solved

o n ~ e m.ore by h ~ t a priori and

generalizing

method ofreasoning

whrch IS

called

transeendental deduction . Here

we

have the

~ r u x

of

all

such

t?eories : the

problern

is neither

capable,

nor

m

need,

of a

u ~ z v e r s a l

solution. What

is

actually an experi

m e ~ t a l

h ~ p o . t h e s i s h ~ s been a ~ e n for a

metaphysical

or epistemo

logical pnnc1ple; whrch explams

why

all these doctrines without

exception,

provide

a theory of truth, bu t not of error:

2

Error

E t l ~ i c a pars ii, prop. vii:

Ordo

et connexio iclearum idem est ac ordo et

connex o

rerum.

•

2

Cf.

Spinoza s

'?':ivat/v<:' . e ~ p ~ a n ~ t i o n .

?f

error Ethica, pars ii, prop. xxxv)

based on proposJUon: NJ ul m Jde1s posJtJvum est, propter quod falsae dicuntur

(prop. xxxm).

HISTORY AND NATURAL SCIENCE

6r

can only be accounted for if the methodical rulcs of invcstiga

tion are considered as part o the

experimental

hypothesis.

The

investigator

who

constructs and manipulates his

instrumcnts

believing

that

his method conforms with the gen?ral laws ?f

nature,

may

be

compared with the

driver

of

a v e h ~ c l e who, m

a country whose language

and

habits he knows but rm_rerfectly,

assumes that

he

is conforming with traffic regulatwns.

An

epoch-making event

in

a

laboratory

is often ~ o t . so

very_

different

from

an ordinary road

accident. However,

t

1s

pecuhar

to

the

physicist

that-within

controllable

limits-he

does

not

s l ~ u n

but

seeks these collisions, because

by them he

learns somethmg

of the structure

of the

occurrences

he

wants to investigate, and

of the rules

of

the game which he hypothetically presupposes.

The

physicist

about

to

abandon

one

ofhis

hypotheses ?ught

rejoice, for

he

finds an unexpected

opportumty

for a chscovery

(Poincare, Science

et

Hypothese, iv, p. g). It is für the sake ofthese

cliscoveries that

he

insertshirnself

into the

process,

and the

rules

according to which

he

cloes so are proved by the outcome

of

the experimenttobe either true or false, or doubtful. . .

This intrusion,

of

which every investigator must

be

gmlty rf

he wishes to make

any

sort

of

contact with bis material

and

to

test

the

rules

of

his procedure,

is

a t h o r o u g ~ l y real event.

_

s:t

of instruments

is

being

insertecl, ancl

the

grven

constellatwn rs

thereby disturbecl. The physicist clisturbs the

atoms

whose

.composition he

wants

to

study.

The

historian

clisturbs_the s l ~ e p

of the document that he

drags forth from a clusty arcluve. 1lus

worcl 'clisturbance' is

not

to be taken as a metaphor,

but

is

meant

literally.

Even the

astronomical physicist acts clisturb

ingly on nature when he ~ l i t s up a

b ~ a m

_of light that

has c o ~ e

from the stars, in order to mfer

the

clrrectwn

and

speed

of the1r

motion.

True he cloes

not

clisturb the

star,

but the nexus

of

nature in w h i ~ h the star is

only

a member. To the

historian

it

might,

incleed, souncl like a metaphor if he is

told

th.at the

clocument

is

clisturbed

by

him.

For involuntanly he

prctures

it

as a

material piece of paper, which

cloes

not

mincl

.whether

it

is

lying

in

a cupboarcl

or on

a table. How:ver, .rf we look

upon it as an historical o b ~ e c t ancl consrcler rts present

status-viz. how it has been

drscarded

and forgotten-as part

of

the historic process itself, then this process is indeed 'clis

turbed

by

him who

brings

the forgotten worcls back

to e ~ o r y ;

often a very unpleasant clisturbance-as when a traclrtwnal



262

SOME POINTS

OF

CONTACT

BETWEEN

hero-worship is endaugered b d.

ness.

f

the t

~ d ·

b y a. Sclosure of the hero's weak-

erm

lstur ance IS take

.

ffi

sense so that

1

·

1

b n m a su c1ently wide

' em races every

r i

·

or intensification that . t amp 1 catwn, confirmation,

, lS o say ever I' ·

evcry factual alteraf f b y qua ltatlve as weil as

wn

°our

ehef no

histor· 1 · · ·

unclertaken without

the

intenf f . lCa mqmry lS ever

I t 'll b . wn o creatmg such a disturbance

.

WI

e notlced that I am no k . .

that concern ourselves b

spea

mg

of disturbances

rather

than

the

ob. , , .our own e Ief and

our

own behaviour,

thc subject

of

our

s ~ ~ ~ t : v e

order of historical events,

which

is

historicai events

and ~ ~ ; : : ~ ~ e t t ~ e n

the.

j ~ c t i v e

order

of

detcrmined by it no h . e le that IS dlrectecl to ancl

speak

of a traclitional ~ : ~ ~ w ~ ~ ~ ~ c l a r y ca_n

be.

clrawn.

If

I

documentary discover this p as bemg d:sturbecl by a

the one

having the o{-'ective can be expressed m

two

forms,

own belief

fo

t

b order of events, the other our

, r 1 s su

~ e c t

r Tl.he

effect

Nachwirkung) of

this

man

is moclified

by

th

C lSCOVery. lS

2·

Our present opinion of th . .

cliffers

from

that p r e v i o u s { ~

~ ~ ~ : owmg

to this cliscovery,

B ; ~ ~ e s ~ e n t c n c e s

are

peifectly

equivalent,

ancl I woulcl strongly

were any one to say th t h fi

phoricai ancl onl th d a t e rst sentence is meta-

' y e secon can

be

taken Iit

v·

as an historical event, the 'effect' f

h

h

era

y. Iewecl

speaks

is

no less real h o w I the first sentence

from a star tak t

_Jet

us say, the transmission

of light

toricai s p a ~ e a n ~ n t ~ s a p. yslcal process. It can be tracecl in his

oflight in the

p a c ~ ~ ~ t

With

t ~ e same

precision as the migration

the

formcr

case th m ~ c o n t m u u m ofphysics. It is true that in

that

expancl in fl e ":'ay

Isn

ot pavecl with Gaussian co-orclinates

our

mterc angeable clim . b .

by

symbols of histori c I . . enswns, ut IS markecl

least as insistent ancl s i ~ ~ I g m ; yet they speak a language

at

In

fact in a . . m cant as any mathematical equation

t . , competltwn between science and history th h .

onans

woulcl

be

sure to s . . ' e

IS-

symbois the h 1

c ~ r e

one pomt: m

dealing with

their

the p o l i ~ h e / a p ~ : : r ~ : ~ : ~ a / ~ z ~ ~ what physicists, clazzled by

noticed. namely that d:Ir equatwns, have only recently

their i n ~ u i r y r e ~ c t s

o:vtehry I s c o v e ~

regarding

the objects of

· e

constructwn

of their · I

JUSt

as every

alteration

of th . I

Imp

ements;

discovery The H . e Imp ements makes possible new

.

ermeneutics of Schleiermacher and

Boeckh

'

HISTORY AND NATURAL. SCIENCE 263

who in the field of philology gave this rule its dassie expression,

might have carried as a motto

the

words that Edelington put

at the end of his book on the modern theory of gravitation:

'We

have

found a

strange foot-print

on the shores of the un

known.

Wehave

devised profound theories,

one

after another,

to account for its origin. At last, we have succeeded in

reconstructing

the creature that made the foot-print. And lo it

is our own.

1

III.

The

Selj-

Transformation o Man

I may be pardoned for returning

to

the natural scienccs

with

this anthropomorphic

phrase.

For it would

almost

seem as

if

we hacl

not

yet carried anthropomorphism far enough

in

this

field. With

the

historical approach it has proved impossible to

separate man from

his historical antecedents.

Every

change

of

our ideas about

our

ancestors entails a change of

our

icleas

about ourselves and will indirectly affect our behaviour. In

precisely the same way, it ought to

be

recognized that those

successful

disturbances by which we

intrude

into the

natural

world which surrounds us amount in the last resort to clis

turbances,

that is modifications,

of

our

personal

equipment.

The

dividing

line

between

man

and

his

surroundings

can

no

more be

fixed

in

this case

than

the

line

of

clivision

between

man

and his antecedents could

be

fixed in the other.

It is an old puzzle where to draw the

line

between man and

the

objects of his

environment.

His head,

we

clarc say, quite

certainly belongs to him; without it,

he

would lose his identity .

But how

about

his

hair?

And ifwe let

him

have

that,

how

about

his

hat? Ifhis

hat is taken

away,

or its

shape

is altercd, is not

the entire

form of

the man altered as weil? A man

accustomed

to

walking

with a stick becomes another man

if

this stick is tak:cn

from

him. His

gait changes, his gestures, possibly his

whole

constitution.

There

is much in the

magic

doctrines of sympathy

which, after rational sifting and re-interpreting, might help to

illuminate

this

problem.

Butthereis

no

neecl

to

dcscend

to such

gloomy

depths

to bring this wisclom to light. Did not

Plato

dread

even

art and banish it

from

the

state,

because it trans

mutes ( charms

is

his word) the man who exposes hi rnself to

1

Space, Time and Gravitation Cambridge, 1929 ,

p. 201

2

These observations do not refer

to the

problern of external

and

internal

rela

tions.

The

question I

am

discussing is

that of

bio-physical,

not

of logical, trans-

formation.



26<t HISTORY AND NATURAL SCIENCE

it?.

Right up

to. the most recent times the poets, often without

bemg aware

of

1t, have agreed with him,

and

gloried in their

power to

transform.

1

Schalars have as a rule been more cautious. Their claim

is

based

on

even

juster

foundations, but its exercise would entail

a far greater :isk, as the

~ v i d e n c e

in their case is more striking.

Students

of

h1story are still surprised, though this fact has Iong

been known, that any alteration

of

our

knowledge

of

past events

:nay

also a l t ~ r

our

present behaviour.

The

corresponding claim

m

n ~ t u r a l s C i e n c ~

1s more generally

recognized.

Any

discovery

w1thm the domam

of

what is

usually called

the

external

world

of physics may Iead to

technical innovations

which

change

our

p e r s o n a ~

b:hav10ur. These technical innovations

may at first

have hmited s c ~ p e . Pcrhaps

it is

only a new way

of

handling

~ o m _ e

mstrument m the laboratory. Soon, however, the effect

mfrmges on the pragmatism

of

daily life, where it evokes wonder

or ?orror. There is no great

invention, from

fire to flying,

wh1ch has .not been hailed as an insult to some god. But if

e ~ e r y

p h y ~ I c a l a_nd ~ h e m i c a l invention is a

blasphemy,

every

bwlog1cal

mventwn S

a perversion.

2

. Until recently, the study

of

Nature

and

History was con

sJdered a

contemplative occupation ,

confined

to men

who

locked themselves up in their libraries and l a b o r a t o r i e ~ where

they ~ s c p e d fr?m the turmoil

of

the world into the quiet and

secluswn

of

the1r thoughts. To-day, intentionally or not, they

threaten the

world

by their discoveries .

In an

.age w ~ e n not only reformers but despots as well often

base the1r p r e ~ t i g e less on ?od than on a limited knowledge of

nature and

h1story, expenmental and documentary evidence

mould

the

destiny which controls

our

lives for

better

or for

worse.

But

even those scholars who desire now as before to

safeguard their work from

the

tumults

of

the

moment

c ~ n o t

ignore

the

fact that

apparently independent

lines study

converge to-day

in

one point: this point

is

the self-transformation

of man

who has b e ~ o m e lord

and

victim

of

his own cognitions.

In the study

of h1s

self-transformation, scientific

and

historical

research have worked too long independently. It is timethat they

should

be combined.

Translated from the German.

See the synopsis in

6kios

<P6ßos Untersuchungen

über die

Platonische

Kunslphilosophie , Zeitschrift

ür

Aesthetik u. allgem. Kunstwissenschaft

vol. xxvi,

1932, PP· 34·9-73·

2

J B. S. Haldane,

Daedalus

London, 1924, p. 24.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

SIGNIFICANCE OF

COMPARATIVE

SEMANTICS

ß HENDRIK J

POS

E

VEN

to

the

inexperienced

immature mind

speech is an

object of

wonder.

In so

far

as this attitude

produces

an

intellectual content, it leads to a conception of

the

relation of

speechtothat

which

is

expressed

by

it,

namely

objects.

Word

and meaning, which in

the

unreflective activity

of

speech

are

always

bound

together,

are by

intellectual analysis

brought

face

to face, and thus there arises a relation which

is

at

the

sametime

a comparison. Wonder,

in

breaking

up the

identity, brings to

light a distinction in virtue of which the process

of

speech is

analysed into

sound

and thing.

The

suppressed identity tries

to

re-establish itsel f

by

means

of the

question:

How can thc word

represent

the

object, how

can

it stand for

the

object? The

answer to this question does notleadback to

the

original identity,

but does lead in

the

direction

ofit. From

this arises the

attempt

to trace the sound

back in

some way to

the

object, to show

the

sound as proceeding

from

the

object

already in existence. Here

we

have the copy theory of

specch as

an

answer to the question.

This theory

attempts

to

understand the

relation between

word

and

object on

the

basis

of

similarity. t takes its stand on those

instances

which seem to

be

examples

of

such

similarity, where

sound signifies sound.

t

secks to grasp

the

original elements

of

speech in

the imitation of

sound shown in

actual

speech.

The

relatively few instances in which a sound signifies a sound

seem

to place

the

origin

of the

rise

of

speech clearly before us.

Sound,

before

it

became

the

symbol

ofthe

object, was identical with the

object:

it

was

the

object before it

came

to

mean

it.

The

conception

of an

original similarity

of

sound

and meaning

holds only

within narrow

limits, for most words arenot like

their

objects.

The

copy theory must take

a

new form

here,

if

it

is

to

maintain itself. Where there

can be

no similarity between word

and object, such a correspondence must nevertheless have been

present originally. This way out, however, is only a partial

help.

A similarity of sound and object is only possible with objects

which,

if

not themselves sounds, are at

least

like sounds. Now

most

of the

objects signified

by

words

do not

conform

to

this

4144

ill

Documents

Some Points of Gontagt Between History and Natural Scienge. Edgar Wind (1936)