Somaliland Democratisation and Its Discontents

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SOMALILAND:

DEMOCRATISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

28 July 2003

ICG Africa Report N66Nairobi/Brussels


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i

I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................... 1

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF SOMALILAND........................................................................ 2A. THE BRITISH SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE (18841960)...................................................2B. THE STATE OF SOMALILAND (1960).....................................................................................4C. INTERLUDE:DICTATORSHIP AND CIVIL WAR........................................................................5D. THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND...........................................................................................6

III. GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATISATION .......................................................... 8

A. FACTIONAL RULE (1991-1993).............................................................................................8B. CLAN REPRESENTATION AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (1993-1997) ..................................10C. TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY .........................................................................12

1. The May 2001 Constitutional Referendum .............................................................122. Constitutional Transition: The Death of Egal..........................................................13

IV. ELECTIONS: THE OLD WAYS DIE HARD....................................................... 14

V. LOCAL ELECTIONS: TOWARDS DECENTRALISATION................................ 15

A. POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS...................................................................................................16B. THE ISSUES .........................................................................................................................16C. THE POLL ...........................................................................................................................17D. THE RESULTS......................................................................................................................18

VI. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: THE COIN TOSS ................................................ 19

A. THE CHOICE........................................................................................................................191. UDUB......................................................................................................................192. Kulmiye ...................................................................................................................203. UCID........................................................................................................................21

B. THE CAMPAIGN...................................................................................................................21C. THE POLL ...........................................................................................................................23D. THE RESULTS......................................................................................................................24E. RECRIMINATIONS................................................................................................................25F. THE SUPREME COURT .........................................................................................................27

VII. SOOL AND EASTERN SANAAG REGIONS .......................................................... 28

A. SOMALILAND AND THE HARTI............................................................................................28B. WHERENEXT?....................................................................................................................30

VIII.COMPLETING THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION ........................................... 31

A. STRENGTHENING THE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM ....................................................................32B. THE CONSTITUTION ............................................................................................................32C. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRESS FREEDOM ...............................................................................33

IX. CONCLUSION: THE SOMALI PEACE PROCESS AND THE PROBLEM OFRECOGNITION........................................................................................................... 34


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APPENDICES

A. MAJOR CLANS AND SUB CLANS OF SOMALILAND ...............................................................36B.

LOCAL AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS ..................................................................37

C. MAP OF SOMALIA ...............................................................................................................38

D.

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................39E. ICGREPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS.................................................................................40F. ICGBOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................46


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SOMALILAND: DEMOCRATISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Recent developments have made the choice faced bythe international community considerably clearer:develop pragmatic responses to Somalilands demandfor self-determination or continue to insist upon theincreasingly abstract notion of the unity and territorialintegrity of the Somali Republic a course of actionalmost certain to open a new chapter in the Somalicivil war.

Somalilands presidential election of 14 April 2003

was a milestone in the self-declared, unrecognisedrepublics process of democratisation. Nearly half amillion voters cast ballots in one of the closest pollsever conducted in the region: when the last voteshad been counted and the results announced on 19April, the incumbent president, Dahir RayaleKahin, had won by only 80 votes.

A former British protectorate in the Horn of Africa,Somaliland declared its independence from the restof the Somali Republic in May 1991, following thecollapse of the military regime in Mogadishu.Although unrecognised by any country, Somalilandhas followed a very different trajectory from therest of the failed state of Somalia, embarking on a

process of internally driven political, economic andsocial reconstruction. Somalilands democratictransition began in May 2001 with a plebiscite on anew constitution that introduced a multipartyelectoral system, and continued in December 2002with local elections that were widely described asopen and transparent. The final stage of the process

legislative elections is scheduled to take place

by early 2005.

The electoral process has met with widespreadapproval from domestic and international observersalike, but has not been without problems. Theenlistment of government resources and personnel insupport of the ruling partys campaign, thedisqualification of numerous ballot boxes due to

procedural errors, reports of government harassmentand intimidation of opposition supporters in theaftermath of the election, and the oppositions initialrefusal to accept defeat all marred an otherwise

promising democratic exercise.

The next phase of the democratic transition will be themost critical: until opposition parties are able to contest

parliamentary seats, Somaliland will function as a defacto one party state. Somalilands international

partners can play a key role in assisting the NationalElectoral Commission to convene legislative electionswith the least possible delay, while ensuring a level

playing field. Constitutional and judicial reforms mayalso be required to ensure the integrity of thedemocratic process over the long-term.

Somalilands increasingly credible claims tostatehood present the international community with athorny diplomatic dilemma at a time when southernSomali leaders are meeting under the auspices of theInter-Governmental Authority on Development(IGAD) with the aim of establishing a new Somaligovernment. Recognition of Somaliland, althoughunder consideration by a growing number of Africanand Western governments, is still vigorously resisted

by many members of both the African Union (AU)

and the Arab League on the grounds that the unityand territorial integrity of member states is sacrosanct.Furthermore, the creation of a new Somali


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ICG Africa Report N66, 28 July 2003 Page ii

government emerging from the IGAD process thatclaims jurisdiction over Somaliland threatens to opena new phase in the Somali conflict.

Diplomatic hopes for a negotiated settlement between

Somaliland and a future Somali government,however, are unlikely to bear fruit. A hypotheticaldialogue on Somali unity would have to overcomemutually exclusive preconditions for talks, divergentvisions of what a reunited Somali state might looklike and incompatible institutional arrangements.Failing a negotiated settlement, any attempt to coerceSomaliland back to the Somali fold would entail a

bitter and probably futile conflict. The question nowconfronting the international community is no longerwhether Somaliland should be recognised as an

independent state, but whether there remain anyviable alternatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Somaliland Government

1. Demonstrate a genuine commitment topluralism by releasing remaining politicaldetainees and reinstating any governmentemployees dismissed from their jobs for

political reasons.2. Withdraw the proposed press law and invite

the independent media to assist in draftinglegislation more conducive to thedevelopment of independent yet responsiblemedia.

3.

Conclude the formal transition to amultiparty political system with the least

possible delay, by setting the date ofparliamentary elections within less than

twelve months.4. Introduce legislation providing for reasonable

subsidies to all official political parties on anequitable basis.

5.

Demonstrate a commitment to human rights byinvestigating past abuses, taking correctiveaction against those responsible andintroducing new measures to strengthen the

protection of human rights.

6. Initiate an independent review of the

constitution, with particular attention to thethree-party ceiling.

7. Undertake a comprehensive review of theelectoral law, based on lessons learned.

8. Introduce legislation to strengthen theelectoral process, including penalties forinfractions of the electoral law.

9. Commission an independent judicial review,with a view to introducing reformsstrengthening both the capacity of the

judiciary and its independence from politicalinfluence.

To Donor Governments

10. Provide party building training and financialassistance to all three official parties in orderto prepare them for legislative elections.

11.

Offer technical and financial assistance to theNational Electoral Commission in order toremedy problems encountered during localand presidential elections, and to assist in thedesign and implementation of an appropriatevoter registration system.

12.

Assist the government with other reformsintended to advance the process ofdemocratisation.

13.

Increase support for social and economic

development in order to enhance the peacedividend and preclude publicdisillusionment with the democratisation

process.

14. Explore options for providing Somalilandwith access to direct bilateral and multilateralfinancial assistance pending a resolution ofthe territorys legal status.

To the United Nations, African Union and IGAD

15.

Adopt a more open-minded approach to thequestion of Somalilands ultimate status, inparticular by:

a) dispatching fact-finding missions to assessthe current situation and to recommend

policy options, with leadership taken byeither the AUs Peace and Security Councilor the presidential troika (currently SouthAfrica, Mozambique and Zambia) in view ofthe serious divisions within IGAD;

b)

taking Somalilands demands under formalconsideration, including a legal review of theterritorys case vis--vis the current AUcharter; and


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ICG Africa Report N66, 28 July 2003 Page iii

c) granting Somaliland observer status pendinga final decision on its international status.

Nairobi/Brussels, 28 July 2003


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ICG Africa Report N66 28 July 2003

SOMALILAND: DEMOCRATISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

On 14 April 2003, the people of Somalilandenjoyed an experience all too rare in the Horn ofAfrica: an election without a predeterminedoutcome. The re-election of the incumbentPresident, Dahir Rayale Kahin, came as a surprisefor a number of reasons: First, because of the razorthin margin of his victory just 80 votes out ofnearly 500,000 ballots cast. Secondly, because he isnot a member of Somalilands majority clan.Thirdly, because the opposition was tipped to win.

Somalilands presidential election was remarkable

for other reasons as well: it was the second electionsince December 2002, after a democratic hiatus of32 years, and the third time in as many years thatSomalilanders had been given the opportunity toexpress their preferences at the ballot box. Thesefirst bold steps towards democratisation setSomaliland apart from the rest of the SomaliRepublic, which has become virtually synonymouswith the term failed state since the collapse ofMajor-General Mohamed Siyaad Barresdictatorship in 1991. At a time when the Horn of

Africa has been described as home to some of theworlds worst regimes,1the achievements of thisunrecognised republic stand out in even greatercontrast.

But elections alone do not make a democracy.Corrupt and authoritarian habits of governance, alegacy of Somalias dictatorial and war-torn past,have encumbered Somalilands democratic

1 Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan among world's worst regimes,report says, IRIN, 15 April 2003. The citation refers to areport to the UN Human Rights Commission by the U.S.-based advocacy group, Freedom House.

transition. The interlude between presidential andparliamentary elections (expected to take placebefore June 2005) will be a critical period in whichthe government faces a clear choice: to lay theground for free and fair elections and a truly

pluralistic political system or to exploit itsincumbency to stifle real political competition.International engagement during this period couldhelp to tip the balance one way or the other.

Somalilands democratisation renders the prospectsfor reunification with the rest of Somaliaincreasingly improbable, not only because theaspiring states political institutions have little incommon with the kinds of interim, factional

arrangements likely to emerge in the south, but alsobecause its leadership is becoming moreaccountable to its electorate the majority ofwhom no longer desire any form of associationwith Somalia. It is becoming apparent that if theinternational community continues to insist upon aunity and territorial integrity of the SomaliRepublic that may no longer be realistic and doesnot develop pragmatic responses to the demand forSomalilands self-determination, the result couldwell be the reopening of the Somali civil war.2

2For thoughtful reflections on the nature of statehood andits relevance to Somaliland, see for example, Jeffrey

Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessonsin Authority and Control (Princeton, 2000), pp. 267-268and Maria Brons, Somalia: From Statelessness toStatelessness?(Utrecht, 2001),passim.


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ICG Africa Report N66, 28 July 2003 Page 3

was a schism that would prefigure Somalilandpolitics for much of the next century.

Between the end of the Dervish revolt and theadvent of World War II, the British embarked on a

modest expansion of their administration of theProtectorate, necessitating a shift of theadministrative capital from the coast to the interior,first to the town of Sheikh and then to Hargeysa.

Nevertheless, in comparison with Italian rule to thesouth, British administration of the Protectorateresembled a form of benign neglect. Unlike morefavoured colonial possessions, such as Kenya and

Nigeria, the British showed little interest inSomalilands economic development beyondclearing rough roads between major towns. The

British system of indirect rule left traditionalsystems of authority largely intact, employing clanchiefs (aqiilo) as mediators between thegovernment and the people. District courts,

presided over by judges known as qadis, dispenseda familiar blend of customary and religious law.

In August 1940, British Somaliland fell into Italianhands and was briefly incorporated into the ItalianEast African Empire. Just seven months later theProtectorate was back under British control, whereit remained until the end of the war, when, like

other Somali territories (with the exception of theFrench Somali Coast), it was consigned to BritishMilitary Administration. In 1946, the BritishForeign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, proposed that thede facto union of Somali territories under Britishrule be extended. His plan met with strenuousobjections from other wartime Allies, as well asEthiopia, who suspected the British of trying toextend their colonial possession in the Horn, andhad to be abandoned. In 1948, the British decidedto return Somaliland to its pre-war status as a

Protectorate in preparation for eventualindependence.

The failure of the Bevin Plan was by no means thelast word on the unification of the Somali people.Since 1943, the Somali Youth League, a nationalist

political association with branches in all of theSomali territories except Djibouti, had beenworking towards the unity of the Somali peoplesthroughout the Horn.7 In the British SomalilandProtectorate, the Somaliland National League, the

7Originally named the Somali Youth Club, it changed itsname to Somali Youth League in 1947.

result of a merger between two pre-war politicalassociations, also began agitating for unification.

Economic and social development of theProtectorate failed to keep pace with the rapidly

changing political scene. Unlike Somalia, whichthe United Nations General Assembly determinedshould become independent in 1960 after a ten-year

period of Italian Trusteeship, no date had been setfor Somalilands independence. Events during themid-1950s served to focus British and Somaliattention alike on the process of Somalilandsdecolonisation.

In late 1954, the British decided, without warning,to cede the Haud and Reserved Area to Ethiopiancontrol. These traditional grazing lands ofSomalilands nomads had been arbitrarily awardedto Ethiopia by the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian protocol,

but had remained under British administration inorder to ensure Somali grazing rights. Publicoutrage in the Protectorate found expression in

political agitation and increasingly urgent demandsfor greater autonomy from British rule. A newnational convention of associations, unions and

political parties, known as the National UnitedFront (NUF) was established specifically todemand the retrieval of the Haud and obtain

independence for Somaliland as a member of theBritish Commonwealth.8The surrender of the Haudand Reserved Area gave added impetus toSomalilands unification agenda since the mergerwith the other Somali territories (includingEthiopias Ogaden region) would restore thegrazing lands to Somali control.

In response to Somali pressure, the Britishgovernment agreed in 1956 to an acceleratedschedule for self-government, and Somalilands

timetable for independence became graduallysynchronised with that of the Italian Trust Territoryof Somalia, scheduled for 1960. In 1957 the firstSomali Legislative Council was appointed by theBritish governor and in 1958, the process ofreplacing expatriate government officials withSomalis got underway. In early 1959, the Councilwas reconstituted to include twelve elected

8 The Fronts pluralistic composition was short lived.

Having failed to prevent the surrender of the Haud, theNUF went on to become a political party in its own right,drawing its support mainly from the Habar Jeelo sub clanof the Isaaq.


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representatives, and the introduction of a newconstitution in early 1960 permitted the formationof an executive branch. The 33 seats of thelegislature were filled by elections and, with barelythree months remaining until independence, a

young politician named Mohamed Haji IbrahimEgal, leader of the pro-unity SNL, emerged asLeader of Government Business.

In April 1960, a delegation of the Protectoratesnew leaders travelled to Mogadishu, where theyaccepted without modification the constitutionalarrangements that had already been prepared for theindependence of the Italian Trust Territory. At ameeting in London less than a month later, theBritish formally agreed to grant independence to

the Protectorate, on condition that the traditionalclan leaders express their support for the decision.On 19 May 1960, the Somaliland Council of Eldersgave its assent and the path was clear forSomalilands independence.

B. THE STATE OF SOMALILAND (1960)

Somalilands second incarnation, as an independentand sovereign state, was short lived. A RoyalProclamation of Queen Elizabeth II granted

independence to the Protectorate at midnight on 25June 1960, and the State of Somaliland came into

being on 26 June. The territory was, however,woefully unprepared for the challenge of statehood:the entire country could boast of only a handful ofuniversity graduates and two secondary schools.

Not a single sealed road linked the major towns,and there was no industry to speak of.

Despite its plans for imminent unification withSomalia, Somalilands independence was received

internationally as a welcome step in the process ofAfrican decolonisation, and consequentlyrecognised by a number of foreign governments.9Five days later, on 1 July 1960, the Italian TrustTerritory of Somalia also received itsindependence. The legislatures of the two territoriesmet in joint session in Mogadishu and announcedtheir unification as the Somali Republic. The State

9According to a former U.S. ambassador, David Shinn, 35

governments recognised Somaliland including the U.S. SeeDavid Shinn, The Horn Of Africa: Where DoesSomaliland Fit?, paper presented at a discussion seminaron Somaliland in Umea, Sweden, 8 March 2003.

of Somaliland was no more. But the process ofunification was anything but smooth:

Although officially unified as a single nationat independence, the former Italian colony

and trust territory in the south and the formerBritish protectorate in the north were, froman institutional standpoint, two separatecountries. Italy and Britain had left them withseparate administrative, legal and educationsystems where affairs were conductedaccording to different procedures and indifferent languages. Police, taxes, and theexchange rates of their separate currencieswere also different. The orientations of theireducated elites were divergent, and economic

contacts between the two regions werevirtually non-existent.10

These problems were exacerbated by perceivedsouthern domination of the new government.Mogadishu became the national capital, whileHargeysa declined to a mere provincialheadquarters remote from the centre of things.11Representatives from the former BritishSomaliland, now known as the Northern Regions,received just 33 seats in the new 123-membernational assembly. The posts of President and

Prime Minister were both held by southerners, aswere the principal ministerial portfolios such asDefence, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Interior. Thecommand of the new national army wasoverwhelmingly drawn from former carabinieriofficers from the south a source of acutefrustration for British-trained military officers fromthe north.

The precipitate nature of the union had also left anumber of important legal questions pending. The

two Acts of Union approved by the respectivelegislatures differed somewhat, and no single legaldocument actually bound the two territories.12Thenew national assembly recognised the error and

passed a new Act of Union in January 1961,retroactive to the moment of independence, but

10 Harold D. Nelson (ed.), Somalia: A Country Study(United States Government: Department of the Army),p.35.11 I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, op.cit.,

p. 172.12Anthony J. Carroll and B. Rajagopal, The Case for anIndependent Somaliland, American University Journal of

Law and Politics, vol. 8, no. 653 (1993), p. 661.


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some observers have argued that, since the twoterritories were not legally united, the new Actremained without force in the north.13

Public support for the merger was put to the test in

June 1961 in the form of a referendum on the newunitary constitution. Whatever enthusiasm for unityhad initially existed in the north seemed already to

be fading. The SNL leadership campaigned for aboycott of the referendum and only 100,000Northerners actually turned out to vote from anestimated population of 650,000. More than half ofthe Northerners who did vote rejected theconstitution, reflecting widespread discontent inthe Northern Region over the economic declinethere, and over the growing political influence

Mogadishu.

14

In December the same year,Northern military officers in Hargeysa launched anunsuccessful coup on the platform of a separation

between north and south.

Such expressions of discontent, however, did notamount to a serious challenge to Somali unity.

Northern politicians continued to represent northerninterests in both the executive and legislative

branches of government, and in 1967 BritishSomalilands independence leader, Mohamed HajiIbrahim Egal, became the first northern Prime

Minister of Somalia.

C. INTERLUDE:DICTATORSHIP AND

CIVIL WAR

Somali President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke wasassassinated by a disgruntled policeman on 15October 1969, and less than a week later themilitary staged a coup dtat under the leadership ofGeneral Mohamed Siyaad Barre. Many Somalis

were hopeful that the military takeover wouldrepresent an improvement over the decrepit civilianadministration, which had become spoiled bycorruption and nepotism. The military alsoembraced a Greater Somalia policy of politicaland military irredentism, which had lapsed in thelate 1960s, reviving some of the popularenthusiasm that had underpinned the original union

between north and south.

13Ibid., p. 661.14Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge, 1963),p.121.

The honeymoon was short lived. The regimesdisastrous defeat in the 1977-78 Ogaden War withEthiopia, its dependence on select branches of theDarod clan for political support, and itsincreasingly brutal character all contributed to

public disillusionment. An attempted coup byMajerteen officers from the northeast of the countrytriggered brutal government reprisals around thetown of Gaalkayo and led to the formation of thefirst Somali opposition group, the Somali SalvationDemocratic Front (SSDF). But disaffection with themilitary regime was felt most keenly in the formerBritish Somaliland: public expenditure in thenorthwest compared unfavourably with otherregions (less than 7 per cent of developmentassistance was allocated to the north), and the

governments economic policies seemed to beaimed at curbing the influence of the wealthy Isaaqtrading community.

In the aftermath of the Ogaden War, approximatelya quarter of a million refugees had been settled inthe northwest by the Somali government, with theassistance of UNHCR.15Most were ethnic Somalisfrom the Ogaden branch of the Darod clan,although some were members of the Oromo andother Ethiopian ethnic groups. For several years,traditional competition between the Isaaq and theOgaden for pasture and water in the southern Haudhad been aggravated by the Somali governments

provision of arms, ammunition and training to theOgaden fighters of the Western Somali LiberationFront. Although intended for use against theEthiopian government, this military assistance wasoften directed instead against Isaaq civilians in theHaud.16 Government favouritism towards theOgaden refugees, who enjoyed preferential accessto social services (provided by UNHCR and itsSomali government counterpart, the National

Refugee Commission), business licenses andgovernment posts, further fuelled Isaaq grievances.

15The total number of refugees settled throughout Somaliaas a consequence of the Ogaden War has never beenaccurately determined. The Somali governments estimateof 1.5 million was contested by the UNHCR, which hadarrived at a figure closer to 600,000 through its ownsurveys. A planning figure of 900,000 was finally agreedupon. For a discussion of the Somali governments refugee

policies in the northwest, see Maria Brons, op.cit., pp. 187-189.16Africa Watch, Somalia: A Government at War with itsOwn People, Washington/New York, 1990, p. 31.


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In 1981, a group of mainly Isaaq exiles meeting inLondon declared the formation of the Somali

National Movement (SNM), an armed movementdedicated to the overthrow of the Barre regime. TheSNM initially tried to cast itself as an alliance of

opposition figures from different clans, but its coremembership and constituency was principallyIsaaq. The SNM established its first bases inEthiopia in 1982, and by 1983 it had establisheditself as an effective guerrilla force in thenorthwest. In response, government pressure on theIsaaq population, whom it deemed sympathetic tothe SNM, took the form of extreme and systematicrepression.17 Summary arrests, extrajudicialexecutions, rape, confiscation of private propertyand disappearances all became commonplace as

the government sought to deprive the SNM of thesupport of the Isaaq public. The government alsoenlisted the support of the non-Isaaq clans of thenorthwest, attempting with only partial success to exploit traditional kinship affiliations.

In 1988, following a meeting in Djibouti betweenSiyaad Barre and his Ethiopian counterpart,Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopiangovernment instructed the SNM to cease operationsin Somalia and withdraw its forces from the borderareas. The SNM, fearing the collapse of its longinsurgency, instead attacked the major northerntowns of Hargeysa and Burco, triggering the onsetof full-scale civil war in the northwest. Thegovernment response was fierce: artillery andaircraft bombed the major towns into rubble andforced the displacement of roughly half a millionrefugees across the border into Ethiopia. Isaaqdwellings were systematically destroyed, whiletheir settlements and water points were extensivelymined.

The formation in 1989 (with SNM support) of thesouthern Somali factions, the Somali PatrioticMovement (SPM) and the United Somali Congress(USC), provided the SNM with allies and helped torelieve some of the pressure on its fighters. InJanuary 1991, as USC advances in and aroundMogadishu forced Barre to abandon the capital, theSNM staged its final offensive in the northwest.The remaining government forces disintegrated andfled, and the vestiges of civil administrationcollapsed.

17Africa Watch, Somalia,op. cit., p.7.

D. THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND

Within months of the SNM victory, Somalilandappeared in its third incarnation. On 18 May 1991,a self-proclaimed independent Republic of

Somaliland was announced. Since then, it hasfollowed a very different trajectory from southernSomalia. While the collapse of the Siyaad Barreregime plunged the south into civil war and thekind of institutional vacuum that has since come toepitomise the notion of state failure, Somalilandembarked on a period of increasing politicalstabilisation and economic growth. Since 1991,roughly half a million people have returned to theirhomes, and tens of thousands of dwellings and

businesses have been rebuilt from rubble. The

majority of militia have been demobilised orincorporated into national armed forces and tens ofthousands of mines and unexploded munitions have

been removed from the ground.

Somalilands social services are in less admirableshape, being heavily dependent on external support.With the help of Western donors, the United

Nations and international NGOs, the governmenthas been able to restore rudimentary education andhealth care services throughout much of

Somaliland. All such funding, however, ischannelled through international aid agencies sincedonors are unable to provide assistance directly to agovernment they do not recognise. Arab andIslamic donors have also played a part inSomalilands reconstruction, though their funds are

by-and-large directed towards the development of aparallel social service system, outside of thegovernment. Most people, however, still depend on

private service providers, such as medical clinics,pharmacies and private schools, which havemushroomed without standardisation or regulation.

Overall, foreign aid has played a minor part inSomalilands reconstruction. The figures of theSomalia Aid Co-ordinating Body (the Nairobi-

based body that co-ordinates assistance to Somaliain the absence of a recognised government) areimprecise, but suggest that less than 20 per cent ofthat donor aid is directed towards Somaliland, orroughly U.S.$30 million in 2002.18Moreover, thisfigure does not show the high proportion of donor

18 Based on Somalia Aid Coordination Body, DonorReport,Nairobi, 2002.


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funding that is spent on overhead, Nairobi officesor international personnel. Probably less than halfthe total volume of aid is actually spent on theground.

The real engine of Somalilands recovery has beenneither the government, nor internationalassistance, but rather the private sector. Livestock,much of it raised in southern Somalia and easternEthiopia, is the backbone of the Somalilandeconomy, accounting for roughly 90 per cent ofexport earnings or U.S.$175 million per year. Since1998, however, a Saudi ban on Somali livestockhas severely depressed the livestock trade.19 The

proceeds of the livestock trade are generally used topurchase foodstuffs and luxury items for import, an

unknown proportion of which is destined forEthiopia as both legitimate trade and contraband.

The Somaliland economy is also fuelled by theestimated U.S.$200 million that arrives each yearfrom Somalilanders abroad via hawaala moneytransfer agents.20 These remittances are almostentirely destined for private households and have

played a vital role in the physical reconstruction offamily homes and businesses a critical functiongiven the scale of devastation visited upon majortowns like Hargeysa and Burco during the civil

war. Since no international banks are present inSomaliland, the hawaala have come to offer agrowing range of financial services, includinginterest-free accounts, cheque-cashing facilities and

business loans.

The governments own accomplishments (basiccivil administration across roughly 80 per cent ofthe territory, reasonably disciplined army and

police forces and a relatively stable currency),although impressive achievements on a budget of

roughly U.S.$20 million per year are, in absolute

19 The ban was initially imposed on the grounds thatSomali were potential carriers of Rift Valley Fever (RVF),a haemorrhagic disease, following an outbreak in NortheastKenya/Southwest Somalia, and subsequently amonganimals in Saudi Arabia. Since a UN report declaredSomaliland free of the disease, however, manySomalilanders suspect that the ban remains in force forpolitical rather than veterinary reasons: Saudi Arabia isstrongly opposed to Somalilands claim to separate

statehood.20 Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development, A SelfPortrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins

(Hargeysa, 1999), p. 69.

terms, quite modest. Since 2001, Somaliland hasintroduced a new and potentially decisivedimension to its quest for statehood:democratisation. In May 2001, a new constitutionestablishing a multi-party electoral system was

approved by plebiscite. Local (municipal) electionsfollowed in December 2002 and a fiercelycontested presidential election was held in April2003. With only parliamentary elections remaininguntil Somalilands transition to multipartydemocracy is formally complete, internationalinterest in this would-be state has grown

perceptibly.


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III.GOVERNANCE AND

DEMOCRATISATION

After more than a century of colonial administration,

civilian misrule and military dictatorship, the peopleof Somaliland are yearning for freedom, justice andrepresentative government. The problem is thatSomaliland like the rest of Somalia has littleexperience of democratic rule. Political leaders haveinstead seemed intent on resuscitating centralised,

patrimonial systems of political authority. Thebehaviour of the political elite often smacks ofarrogance and paternalism; the rule of law is weak,corruption is endemic and nepotism still pervades

political and administrative appointments. Civil

society remains underdeveloped, and the Somalilandpublic remains by-and-large a passive taker ofgovernment policy not its maker.21

Such constraints have conspired to makeSomalilands pursuit of democracy a long, uphillstruggle a struggle all the more remarkable for itsdomestic, as opposed to donor driven, origins.Donors have been reluctant to provide even tokensupport for Somalilands democratic project on thegrounds that it might be construed as support forthe territorys independence.

Ironically, Somalilands international isolation pastand present - has made a positive contribution to its

political evolution. Benign neglect under British rule,and the decidedly less benign neglect of the Barreregime, left the territorys traditions of pastoraldemocracy22 intact, conferring a vital degree oflegitimacy and accountability upon the SNM andsubsequent Somaliland administrations. The SNMsfailure to obtain significant international sponsorshipduring the 1980s obliged the movement to develop a

popular support base. Present day Somalilandsadministrative arrangements are consciouslymodelled on the small, cost-efficient exemplar of theBritish colonial administration, reflecting thegovernments minute revenue stream and itsextremely limited opportunities to incur debt.

21 Carolyn Logan, Overcoming the State-SocietyDisconnect in the Former Somalia, USAID/REDSO,

Nairobi, September 2000.22The term is borrowed from I.M. Lewiss seminal workon pre-independence Somaliland, A Pastoral Democracy(London, 1961).

It is unclear whether Somalilands unique politicalsystem has evolved towards democracy because ofthe territorys poverty, historical neglect andinternational isolation, or in spite of them. Yet thereis no denying that over the past decade, Somaliland

has made significant progress towards a pluralisticpolitical system, a free and critical press, rule oflaw, and an environment conducive to the respectand promotion of human rights.

Historically, Somalilands democratisation processhas unfolded in three phases: the first, which beganwith the cessation of hostilities, witnessed theestablishment of an administration led by a clan-

based military faction (the SNM); the second phaseinvolved the transfer of power from the factional

government to a more inclusive civiladministration; and the third began with aconstitutional referendum, which paved the way formultiparty elections.

A. FACTIONAL RULE (1991-1993)

In late January 1991, the SNM was engaged in thefinal stages of its mopping up operations againstgovernment forces in the northwest while GeneralMohamed Farah Aidids forces entered the Somali

capital, Mogadishu, over one thousand kilometresaway to the south.. By the end of the month, Isaaq-

populated areas, including the towns of Hargeysa,Berbera and Burco were in SNM hands. Severalhundred Somali government soldiers captured bythe SNM were subjected to summary trials: thosefound guilty of war crimes were executed on thespot. The majority, however, were released andgiven safe passage home. A garrison of severalhundred southern soldiers and their families inBurco even chose to remain temporarily rather than

face the anarchy and bloodshed that had consumedMogadishu.

The key dilemma remaining was how to deal withthe non-Isaaq clans who had aligned themselves, tolesser or greater degrees, with the Barre regime. Tothe west, SNM forces destroyed the largelyGadabursi village of Dila and entered theGadabursi town of Boorama, but were withdrawnin less than 24 hours on the orders of the SNMcommand, which sought a speedy rapprochementwith the Gadabursi leadership. In the east, the SNMleadership decided against entering Dhulbahanteterritory and opted for dialogue instead.


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Within weeks of its victory, in mid-February 1991,the SNM leadership met in Berbera for preliminarytalks with representatives of the Isse, Gadabursi,Dhulbahante, and Warsengeli clans. All sidesconfirmed their common desire for peace and agreed

to meet again during the month of April at a largerregional peace conference in order to conclude aformal peace. The conference was to be followed by acongress of the SNMs supreme decision-making

body, the 99-member Central Committee.

In the meantime, the SNM attempted to consolidateits grip on the Isaaq regions of the northwest. Thescale of destruction in Hargeysa, and the danger

posed by tens of thousands of mines andunexploded munitions within the city limits obliged

the SNM to declare Berbera the temporary capital.An administration, central bank and other basicinstitutions existed only on paper. Command andcontrol had largely broken down and many of theSNMs militia were out of control, looting andsettling old scores.

In April 1991, elders from the various northwesternclans convened as agreed at Burco.23 The original

purpose of the meeting had been to cement the peacein Northwest Somalia, but as the assembled leadersdebated how best to proceed, angry crowds gathered

around the conference hall, demanding independencefrom Mogadishu, the Somali capital. SNM fighters

joined the crowds in their tanks and Land Cruisersmounted with heavy machine-guns, taking upthreatening positions around the conference venue.Independence was hastily declared and a Provisional

National Charter followed about a week later. ArticleI of the Charter stated:

The State formerly known as Somaliland,which secured its Independence from the

United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland on the 25th Day of June1960, is hereby reconstituted as a fullIndependent and Sovereign State.24

The Charter also stipulated that for a transitionalperiod of two years the government of the newRepublic of Somaliland would be the

23 For a concise, first hand account of the Burco

conference, see John Drysdale, Whatever Happened toSomalia?(London, 1994), pp. 139-142.24National Charter of the Somaliland Republic (unofficialtranslation), 1991.

responsibility of the Somali National Movement,whose Chairman and Vice Chairman would

become, respectively, the President and VicePresident. Provision was made for members ofother clans to join the new cabinet and Parliament

(an enlarged version of the SNM centralcommittee), but power remained firmly in thehands of the Isaaq. Upon conclusion of thetransitional period, the Provisional National Charterwould be replaced by a Constitution approved bythe people of Somaliland in a NationalReferendum.

The new President, Abdirahman Ahmed AliTuur, was a shrewd but uncharismatic formerdiplomat, who had favoured federation over

independence and assumed the Presidency ofSomaliland through circumstance rather thanconviction. He governed mainly from behindclosed doors, and his impoverished administrationexerted little real control, even of the capital cityHargeysa. Within a matter of months, the SNM

began to suffer from the kind of factionalism moreoften associated with southern Somali politicalmovements. As tensions within the SNM came to ahead, even the illusion of control evaporated and inJanuary 1992 the Movement went to war withitself.

The fighting pitted the loosely named nationalarmy (in reality an alliance of clan-based militiasaligned with the Tuur government) againstopposition forces led by members of an SNMfaction known as the Alan As (Red Flag). The

belligerents were all members of the Isaaq; non-Isaaq clans chose to remain uninvolved. During thecourse of the conflict the towns of Burco andBerbera were heavily damaged and tens ofthousands of recent returnees from Ethiopian

refugee camps were again put to flight.

In October 1992, after nine months of sporadic,highly mobile warfare, a delegation of clan eldersmanaged to bring the two sides to peace talks at thetown of Sheikh. The conference, known as Towfiiq,concluded with a ceasefire and an agreement toreconvene for a more inclusive, nationalconference at Boorama in January 1993.


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B. CLAN REPRESENTATION AND CIVIL

ADMINISTRATION (1993-1997)

The 1993 Boorama Conference (properly known asGuul Allah, or Gods Triumph), which lasted nearly

five months and involved hundreds of representativesfrom all of Somalilands clans, is considered to have

been a milestone in Somalilands evolution as a defacto state. Before they dispersed, the conferencedelegates managed to conclude a peace and securityaccord, formulate a new national charter, andestablish a new government under the leadership ofMohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, the former PrimeMinister of Somalia.

The choice of Egal to lead the new government was

significant, yet controversial. As one of the authors ofSomalilands independence in 1960, and arguably themost accomplished Isaaq statesman, there was nodoubt about his ability to lead. But he had come upfirmly against the 1991 declaration of independence,opting instead to take part in talks hosted by theDjibouti government aimed at setting up a nationalgovernment in Mogadishu. Presumably on account ofhis objections to Somalilands ambitions forstatehood, between 1991 and 1993 he had chosenself-imposed exile in the United Arab Emirates. Upon

his nomination to the Somaliland presidency at theBoorama conference, few Somalilanders believed thathe had entirely abandoned his preference for a unitedSomalia.

The primary achievement of the BooramaConference was the replacement of the factionalrule of the SNM with a civilian administration. Thisnew system of government, known as the beelsystem, was a hybrid of Western politicalinstitutions and the traditional Somali system ofclan representation. Although only intended tofunction as a three-year stopgap measure, the beelsystem has underpinned Somalilands peace andstability ever since.25

At the heart of the beel system is a two-chamberParliament, comprising 82 members each, with

25 For an in-depth examination of state structures inSomaliland and the beel system, see CabdirahmaanJimcaale, Consolidation and Decentralisation of

Government Institutions, Hargeysa, WSP-International/Academy for Peace and Development, 2002,pp. 29-43.

seats distributed by clan. While the lower houseserves as a legislature, the upper house (known asthe Guurti) is charged with maintaining peace andsecurity in the territory. Over time the Guurti,which was composed of traditional leaders or their

representatives, has also emerged as Somalilandssupreme moral authority.

By designating the Parliament as the primary forumfor clan representation, the beel system relievedsome of the pressure on the executive branch andcivil service to fulfil clan demands forrepresentation one of the causes of war under theTuur administration. Although the new Presidentremained mindful of the need for a broadly basedcabinet, he enjoyed a certain degree of flexibility in

ministerial appointments and was eventually able toembark, albeit in a very tentative way, on a courseof civil service reform.

Likewise, the leadership role assumed by clanelders at the Boorama conference, as well as by theestablishment of the Guurti, implied their directresponsibility for the success of the accord and thushelped the new government to secure their co-operation. For example, the authority of traditionalleaders was to prove vital in the governmentsefforts to disarm and demobilise clan militia. Those

who handed in their weapons were absorbed into anew National Army or promised demobilisationassistance. Those who declined the governmentsoffer forfeited the protection of their clans if theydisturbed the peace.

As uniformed police replaced the militia on thestreets of the major towns, public confidence and

pride in the new government grew. The improvedsecurity situation encouraged a surge in physicalreconstruction: newly built homes began to rise

above the rubble and new companies opened forbusiness. Even the United Nations, whichdisapproved of Somalilands claims to statehoodand had therefore remained absent from theBoorama Conference, was forced to acknowledgethat the peaceful reconciliation process has movedforward impressively and noted the formation ofa functioning administration under the leadership ofMr. Egal.26

26 Letter to Mr Egal from Jonathan T. Howe, SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary General, 1 October 1993.


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The fruits of the peace process were not restrictedto Isaaq areas of Somaliland. On the contrary, theBoorama Conference signalled the first modest steptowards securing more equitable arrangements forthe Dir and Darod groups in Somaliland and in

broadening the new governments constituencybeyond the Isaaq clan. The choice of Boorama, theprincipal town of the Gadabursi clan, as theconference venue was itself highly symbolic.Having long sided with the Barre government in itswar against the SNM, the Gadabursi had made their

peace with the Isaaq in 1991, then taken the lead inobtaining the October 1992 Sheikh ceasefireagreement, and finally hosted the peace conferenceintended to restore peace among their oldadversaries. For their pains, the Gadabursi were

rewarded with the post of Vice President.Furthermore, unlike the 1991 Burco conference,where the Isaaq-dominated SNM CentralCommittee had held the real power, the BooramaConference established a genuinely multi-clanParliament. Taking the colonial period as theirhistorical point of reference, the non-Isaaq clansdemanded at Boorama and received a greatershare of the seats than they had been assigned inthe legislature under British rule.

The beel system, however, was no panacea: itsucceeded in resolving some, but not all, clangrievances, and in some respects it gave rise to new

problems. For example, under British rule, theHarti clans (Dhulbahante and Warsengeli) had beenconsidered second only to the Isaaq in terms ofimportance. With the appointment of a GadabursiVice President, many Harti felt that they had beenunfairly relegated to third place a sleight forwhich the post of Speaker of the Lower House wasconsidered to be inadequate compensation.

Although the Harti representatives at the Booramaconference endorsed the new arrangements, theperception that they had been somehowmarginalised at Boorama contributed to a broaderHarti sense of alienation from Somaliland.

At the same time, the advent of the beel systemcomplicated the delicate issue of power sharingwithin the Isaaq. The distribution of Isaaq seats inthe new Parliament was a legacy of the SNMcentral committee, which since 1989 had employed

an arcane formula based on the progeny of theircelebrated ancestor, Sheikh Isaaq. Under thisarrangement, the large and influential Garhajis clanreceived a disproportionately small share of seats,

but a Garhajis politician also held the post of SNMchairman. Although Egal, a member of the HabarAwal, assumed the Presidency in May 1993, thedistribution of Isaaq seats in Parliament remainedthe same. The Garhajis political leadership felt

cheated and refused to recognise the legitimacy ofthe new government.

Tensions came to a head in November 1994 whenthe Egal government tried to wrest control ofHargeysa airport from a group of clan militia fromthe Iidagale, a sub-clan of the Garhajis. Heavyfighting broke out first in Hargeysa, then in Burco,where government authority was challenged bymilitia from another Garhajis sub clan, the HabarYunis. With the political legitimacy conferred by

the Boorama process, the revenues of Berbera portat his disposal and a unified army under hiscommand, Egal was in a far better position toenforce the writ of his government than Tuur had

been in 1992. Nevertheless, by early 1996 fightinghad ground to a halt with neither side able toimpose its will decisively on the other. Nocomprehensive peace agreement was ever signedand hostilities were instead brought to a close by aseries of local agreements between clans.

In December 1996 a National Conference was

convened in Hargeysa to resolve Somalilandsdivisions and to appoint a new government. Althoughgenerally considered to have been a follow-up to the1993 Boorama Conference, the 1996-1997 HargeysaConference differed in important ways, shedding lighton both the strengths and weaknesses of Somalilandsbeelsystem.

When the Hargeysa Conference opened, Egal hadalready been in office far longer than the two-yearterm he had originally been appointed to serve. In

May 1995, his mandate set to expire, Egal had usedthe ongoing civil war in Somaliland to justify a six-month state of emergency; in September 1995, withthe war still unfinished, Parliament granted him aneighteen-month extension of his term, ending inMarch 1997.

In the lead up to the Hargeysa conference, Egalmoved the goalposts once again. The conferencewould not be a clan conference (shir beleed) butrather a national conference (shir qarameed)

because of the existence of a legitimategovernment. On these grounds, he lobbied for and obtained a concession that the members ofParliament should constitute half of the delegates to


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the conference, while clan representatives wouldmake up the other half. These new ground rules,combined with Egals innate political genius andhis deft use of a large political slush fund, won hima landslide victory and secured him a further five-

year term at Somalilands helm. But the credibilityof the shir (assembly of elders) as a nationalpolitical forum had been fundamentally damaged.

Egals first term had been, in many respects, a failure.He had presided over a civil war; his government hadmade little or no progress towards a new constitution,a referendum or elections; and the self-declaredrepublic was no closer to international recognition.Fortunately for Somaliland, Egals second termwould prove more fruitful. In the aftermath of the

Hargeysa Conference, Somaliland experienced itsmost prolonged and dramatic period of reconstructionand growth. The sphere of activity of theadministration was broadened to almost all parts ofthe territory; and the process of democratisation,which had essentially remained frozen since the 1991Burco conference, finally went forward.

C. TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL

DEMOCRACY

One of the pressing tasks of Egals second term ofoffice was the development of a new, permanentconstitution for Somaliland. Since 1994, Egal andthe Parliament had been at odds over the questionof who should draft it, with each side producing itsown version. Not surprisingly, the Parliamentsdraft favoured a strong legislative branch, Egalsgreater powers for the executive. The HargeysaConference attempted to break the stalemate bycombining the two into a single document thatwould provide an interim basis for government

pending endorsement by general referendum.

Egal was deeply dissatisfied with the compromise,and the constitution remained a bone of contentionuntil 2000 when a 45-member committee, jointlynominated by the executive and the legislature,managed to come up with a mutually acceptabledraft. The presidency retained most of the executive

powers sought by Egal, while Parliament receivedadditional powers of financial oversight and a rolein the approval of administrative appointments.

With the last remaining obstacles resolved, thereferendum originally envisioned by the 1991

Burco conference for 1993 was finally held on 31May2001.

1. The May 2001 Constitutional

Referendum

To the general public, the substance of theconstitution mattered little beyond Article 1, whichreaffirmed Somalilands existence as a sovereignand independent state. Egal himself encouraged this

perception by linking the transition to a multi-party democracy with Somalilands desire to gaininternational recognition, arguing that theinternational community would not recogniseSomalilands independent status unless it adoptedsuch a system.27 A report on the referendum by

one team of international observers found thelinkage to be unmistakeable: A yes vote to theconstitution was widely perceived as anendorsement of Somalilands independence and arejection of rule from Mogadishu and Somalia.28

In that context, the overwhelming endorsement ofthe new constitution (over 1.183 million yesvotes out of nearly 1.19 million ballots cast, or 97

per cent) sent an unmistakeable message. Egalhimself was unprepared for the landslide, whichreportedly dispelled any lingering misgivings he

might have felt about Somalilands independence:Whatever he may have believed previously, oneof his Ministers later confided, from 31 May[2001] onwards he was a Somalilander.29

In some respects the referendum results weremisleading. The much lower turnout for subsequentelections casts doubt upon the turnout for thereferendum. And the 97 per cent yes is not anaccurate representation of support for independenceamong Somalilanders. In the Harti-inhabited parts

27 Mark Bradbury and Adan Yusuf Abokor, ChoosingPolitics Over Violence: state formation in Somaliland,unpublished draft, forthcoming in The Review of AfricanPolitical Economy, p. 9.28Initiative and Referendum Institute (IRI), Final Reportof the Initiative and Referendum Institutes (IRI) ElectionMonitoring Team, Somaliland National Referendum May31 2001, Washington, D.C., Citizen Lawmaker Press, 27July 2001.29From an interview cited by Matt Bryden in The Banana

Test: Is Somaliland Ready for International Recognition?,forthcoming in Les Annales de lEthiopie, vol. 19, AddisAbaba: Centre Franais des tudes Ethiopiennes (July2003).


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of eastern Somaliland, the turnout was especiallylow suggesting to one team of internationalobservers (probably correctly) a local boycott of thereferendum. But even so, the team noted that evenif one assumes that the 34 per cent of the

Somaliland eligible voters that did not vote in thereferendum were opposed to the Constitution,independence, or the current administration,nonetheless, there was nearly 66 per cent of theeligible voters who clearly supported theconstitution and independence a respectableresult in any representative democracy.30

Approval of the new constitution paved the way formultiparty elections, about which the Somaliland

public remained deeply ambivalent. Although few

contested the transitional nature of the beelsystem,many were apprehensive that the introduction ofmultiparty politics was being rushed and that Egalcould not be trusted to establish a level playingfield for electoral competition.

In August 2001, simmering discontent boiled overinto open revolt when Parliament tabled a vote ofno-confidence in Egal. The motion was defeated by

just one vote. The same month, a group oftraditional elders challenged Egal, calling for a shirbeleed (clan conference) to be held to decide on the

future of the country.31The challenge of the eldersand the governments heavy-handed responsethreatened to bring Somaliland to the brink of civilconflict, but mediation by civic and religiousleaders managed to defuse the crisis.

Time for completion of the political transition wasnow running short. Municipal elections were slatedto take place in late December 2001, to be followed

by presidential elections before the expiry of Egalsmandate in March 2002. But the legislative and

administrative preconditions for elections did notyet exist. An Electoral Law was passed only inNovember 2001, and the National ElectoralCommission (NEC) was formed a month later, justtwo days before the scheduled date of the elections.Confronted with a potential crisis if Egals term ofoffice came to an end without the election of asuccessor, Parliament granted the president one lastextension of his mandate until March 2003.

30IRI, op cit., p. 58.31Bradbury and Abokor, op. cit., p. 10.

2. Constitutional Transition:

The Death of Egal

Egal did not live out his term of office: he died on 3May 2002 while undergoing surgery in South

Africa. Many observers, Somali and foreign alike,doubted that Somaliland could survive his death,and watched the transition for signs ofdisintegration. The greatest fear was that violencewould undo the progress that had been made sincethe start of the democratisation process. Instead, hissudden departure from the scene served as a tonicto the political process, generating an outpouringof nationalist sentiment.32

When the news of Egals death reached Hargeysa,the leaders of Somalilands three councils (the

two chambers of Parliament and the Council ofMinisters) met to decide upon a course of action.Article 130 of the Constitution stipulated that in theevent of the presidents death prior to the adoptionof a multiparty electoral system, the Parliamentshould elect a new president within 45 days. In themeantime, the speaker of the House of Eldersshould serve as interim chief executive. It was anarrangement some believed was intended to

preclude the accession of the Vice President, DahirRayale Kahin, a Gadabursi, to the Presidency:

Egal wanted to replace Dahir and to establish anew team for the next government, a politicianclose to Egal explained to ICG. He didnt want toleave the system as it was [] After thereferendum he even called some Samaroon33eldersand asked them who else they might suggest as aVice President.34

The leaders managing the transition were lessconcerned with palace intrigues than with avoidinga political vacuum. Whether by accident or by

design, they set aside Article 139 of the constitutionand opted instead to apply Article 89 (intended tocome into effect only after the first elections),which states that the Vice President shall assumethe office of the Presidency for the remainder of theterm. By sunset on 3 May, Kahin had been swornin as interim president until March 2003, andSomaliland had successfully navigated its firstconstitutional transition.

32Ibid., p.10.33Samaroon is another name for Gadabursi.34ICG interview, Hargeysa, April 2003.


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IV. ELECTIONS: THE OLD WAYS DIE

HARD

Somalilands democratisation process is incomplete,

but it can already boast of some impressiveachievements. Between December 2002 and April2003, the people voted twice for their leaders: once inlocal elections and once in a presidential poll. Allcitizens over the age of 16, male and female, wereeligible to cast their ballots, and nearly half a millionof them did so each time. During the first round, theyelected 332 district councillors representing six

political associations; during the second, they voted intheir first democratically elected head of governmentsince 1969.

On the other hand, the process has revealed seriousflaws in the constitution and electoral law, as wellas grave inadequacies on the part of the ElectoralCommission. It has also served to highlightregional differences, reinforced the urban bias inSomaliland politics and maintained the near-totalexclusion of women from elected political office.

More importantly, however, elections have obligedSomalilands political elites to confront their own

profound ambivalence about the democraticprocess, and will yet demand tough choices of themthat will test the depth of their commitment togenuine democratisation. The old ways die hard,one of Somalilands leading political figures toldICG, but Somaliland has already crossed that

bridge, and there is no turning back.35

The electoral system is a work in progress, anincomplete tangle of constitutional articles, legislation,and administrative procedures. Luckily for Somaliland,the whole has proven more coherent than the sum of its

parts, which are often unclear, contradictory or simplymissing.

The legal foundation of democracy is the 2001constitution, which states that Somalilands

political system shall be based on peace, co-operation, democracy and plurality of political

parties. The constitution guarantees the right ofevery citizen, male and female, to participate in

political life, to be elected to political office and tovote. These are no trifling matters in a conservative

35ICG interview, Addis Ababa, May 2003.

society where women have traditionally beenexcluded from formal political participation.

These foundational rights are subject to a variety ofrestrictions. Article 9 of the constitution, following

the Nigerian precedent, limits the number ofpolitical parties to three; it also forbids any politicalparty to be based on regionalism or clanism. Inaddition, The Electoral Law requires politicalorganisations to obtain 20 per cent of the popularvote in each of Somalilands six regions. The

purpose of these criteria is to ensure that all partiesattract a national constituency, rather than a clanor regional base.

Together, these measures amount to a kind ofpolitical steeplechase that political associationsmust complete in order to be eligible to take part inelections. Prior to elections, critics argued that thehurdles had been deliberately arranged in such away that only one party Egals would everqualify. But the electoral law has since proven to bea relatively flexible document, and the systemultimately did produce three official political

parties. Whether or not they fulfil the desire ofSomalilanders for political representation, however,remains to be seen.

The body charged with navigating Somalilandspreviously uncharted electoral waters is theNational Electoral Commission (NEC), which wasformed on 18 December 2001, just two days beforethe scheduled date of the first local elections. Giventhe impossibility of organising elections within 48hours, the NECs first act when it convened on 19December was to declare a postponement. TheParliament, and particularly the House of Elders,took umbrage at the commissions decision, since itimplied an extension of the Presidents mandate.

Since only the Guurtihas the power to grant suchextensions, the NECs decision was initiallyattacked as being ultra vires, but Parliament couldhardly object to the commissions argument that itrequired several months to prepare a successfulelection and eventually agreed to extend the

presidents term of office by one year.

The NECs decision to postpone the electionspleased no one. The ruling Ururka DimograadigaUmmadda Bahoobey (the Democratic UnitedPeoples Movement, or UDUB) party, stood to

benefit from early elections, while the oppositionwas still relatively weak and disorganised.Opposition parties stood to gain from a delay of


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several months, which would give them time forsome fund raising and campaigning, but they wereunsure whether they could find the resources tohold themselves together for a full year.

In such a polarised political environment, it wasunderstandable that the neutrality and integrity of theelectoral commission should be called into question.Although constitutionally an independent body, the

NECs composition had initially been perceived asfavouring the incumbent government: three membershad been selected by Egal, two by the Guurtiand two

by opposition political organisations. Since theGuurti, a conservative institution, typically aligneditself with the President, this arrangement was felt togive Egal an edge.

With Egals death, the political allegiances of thecommissions members seemed likely to canceleach other out and the NEC was largely liberatedfrom charges of bias. The commissioners evidentdedication to their task and the presence amongthem of foreign experts, seconded by the EuropeanCommission, further bolstered public confidence inthe NEC.

The NECs work was not without difficulty orinterference. None of the commissioners had prior

experience in administering elections. The scaleand complexity of the task alone might haveoverwhelmed them had they not received foreigntechnical assistance. Moreover the governmentstardiness in releasing funds for the commissionswork not only threatened to wreck the electoralschedule, but also gave the impression that thegovernment sought to exert political influence overthe commissions work.

V. LOCAL ELECTIONS: TOWARDS

DECENTRALISATION

The local elections of December 2002 may have

generated less excitement than the presidentialelection of April 2003, but they were arguably farmore important in entrenching democracy. Whilethe presidential contest offered voters little morethan a choice of personalities, Somalilands localelections represented the first real decentralisationof government authority since independence in1960.

The political and traditional elders gathered atBoorama in early 1993 were no doubt mindful of

the centralised, patrimonial political systems thathad served Somalis so poorly since independencewhen they enshrined the principle ofdecentralisation in the new National Charter.Accordingly, regions and districts were assignedresponsibility for the nomination of their owncouncils. But the intent of the Boorama elders wasnegated almost immediately by a decree from theMinistry of Interior, which waived this right ifdistricts or regions failed to establish councilswithin 45 days. As a result, between 1993 and2001, all regional and district administrations inSomaliland were nominated by (and accountableto) the central government, employing the samestructure as the Barre regime.

During the course of the 1990s, with a handful ofnotable exceptions, local governments acquired areputation for incompetence, indolence andcorruption. Local officials were appointed for their

pliability or clan connections rather than theircapabilities. Land disputes, typically created by venalmunicipal authorities simultaneously issuing title to

several different owners in exchange for bribes,became an endemic source of rancour and violence.Instead of opening a new chapter in governance,Somalilands rulers seemed intent to repeat the errorsof the past. The formation of locally elected councilsoffered the first real opportunity for Somalilanders toestablish a form of government that is moreresponsive to local needs and will prevent a return toauthoritarian rule.36

36Bradbury and Abokor, op. cit., p. 21.


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A. POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS

The 2001 constitution had legalised the formationof political associations, which would be eligible tocompete for seats on local councils. But more was

at stake than control of municipal governments: thethree associations to obtain the highest percentageof the vote could then be registered as political

parties and go forward to contest parliamentary andpresidential elections.

Characteristically, Egal set the pace, forming UDUBin August 2001. Its symbol the centre pole of thenomadic hut37 was ironically appropriate: UDUBwas identified from its inception as the party ofgovernment, counting many cabinet ministers and

parliamentarians among its members. Egal was boththe chairman of the party and its presidentialcandidate. UDUBs identification with theSomaliland state was carefully calculated to suggestcontinuity and stability, but its relationship withgovernment also enraged the opposition. In directcontravention of the political party law, UDUBactivities were largely financed from state funds, andgovernment officials at all levels were enlisted intoworking for the party. Although UDUB becamewidely referred to as the ruling party, it had yet to

earn that privilege.UDUB was soon joined in the field by eight more

political organisations. Three were subsequentlydisqualified for failing to meet the criteriaestablished by law, leaving six to contest the localelections. For the most part these organisationsrepresented sections of Somalilands urban politicalelite, and there was little to distinguish them fromone another besides the personalities of theirleaders and the degree to which they appealed todifferent clan constituencies. Kulmiye, the main

challenger, was the brainchild of its chairman,Ahmed Mohamed Mohamud Silanyo, a veteran

politician who had served two consecutive terms asSNM chairman.

Hormood had initially been formed by civicactivists, and had acquired a reputation as a party ofintellectuals, but its profile was drastically altered

by the nomination of Omar Arteh Qalib as itschairman. Qalib, who had become closelyidentified with the Barre regime as Foreign

37In Somali, the forked stick that holds up the roof of thehut is known as the udub.

Minister and had a reputation as an opponent ofSomalilands independence, appealed to very fewvoters beyond his own Saad Muse sub-clan.

Sahan, which began by calling itself the Somaliland

Islamic Party38

attracted support mainly fromwithin the clan of its chairman, the Habar Yunis.Although its use of the Quran in its logo probablyappealed to parts of the electorate, others perceivedSahans religious pretensions as a cynical politicaldevice.

UCID, the Party for Justice and Democracy(Ururka Cadaaladda iyo Dimoqraadiga) presentedthe most ambitious if implausible political

program. Led by a civic engineer from Finlandnamed Faysal Ali Waraabe, UCID dedicated itselfto the establishment of a means-tested welfaresystem of the Scandinavian variety. The platformappeared to be most persuasive among members ofWaraabes own Iidagale clan and other groups inthe Hargeysa area.

Asad, led by Suleyman Mohamud Aden Gaal,stood apart for its radically anti-Egal rhetoric andits initial refusal to register as a political party onthe grounds that the entire electoral exercise wascorrupt. Gaal, who had unsuccessfully challenged

Egal for the Presidency at the 1997 HargeysaConference, had initially argued that no electioncould be free and fair as long as Egal held office,calling instead for another national conference in

place of elections (apparently forgetting howeffortlessly Egal had engineered his own re-appointment to the presidency at a conference just afew years earlier). Following Egals death,however, Asad registered itself as a political partyand became closely identified with the Alan Asfaction of the SNM that had contributed to the 1992

ouster of then-president Abdirahman Tuur.

B. THE ISSUES

As Election Day approached, the contenders wereless preoccupied with promoting party platformsthan with the conduct of the poll itself. This was in

part a reflection of the failure of the politicalassociations to articulate meaningful party

38The association was obliged to change its name since theexploitation of religion by a political party arguablycontravened the Somaliland constitution.


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platforms, but it was also a symptom of universaluncertainty and unfamiliarity with an unprovenelectoral system.

The question of voter registration, in particular,

emerged as one of the prime areas of contentionbetween UDUB and the opposition. UDUB arguedthat registration, although desirable, was neithernecessary nor feasible, given the time and resourcesavailable. Opposition parties feared that the lack ofregistration would facilitate vote rigging and ballotstuffing by government supporters. In their view,the point of registration was not so much to preventnon-Somalilanders from voting, but rather to

prevent multiple voting. When it became clear thatregistration was beyond the NECs means, the

parties agreed that the inking of voters would haveto suffice. The hope was that the quality of the inkused to mark them would be of sufficient quality to

prevent people from washing it off and castingmultiple ballots.

Registration aside, the most persistent problem wasthe allegation by opposition parties that UDUB wasmaking use of state funds for its campaign and thatlocal government officials were being pressed intoservice for the party. Despite UDUBs flat denials,there was plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that

this was indeed the case. However, the oppositionparties failed to come forward with specific, verifiablegrievances. Following Egals death in May 2002,rumours circulated that the interim President, DahirRayale Kahin, might remove himself from the raceand declare his government a neutral, caretakeradministration capable of ensuring a level playingfield. But he soon dashed such hopes by assuming thechairmanship of UDUB and declaring his intent toseek election. To the chagrin of the opposition,UDUBs pre-election behaviour remained unchanged.

At times, such problems threatened to derail theprocess. The Academy for Peace and Development,a local research organisation and think tank, tookthe initiative in bringing the political partiestogether to share their concerns and to seekcommon solutions. The inter-party dialogue, which

began on a monthly basis but became an almostdaily occurrence as Election Day neared, initiallymet with resistance, especially from UDUB. Theytold us: Youre not the government, youre not a

party Who gave you the authority to hold thesemeetings? the Academys Director, Dr. HusseinBulhan, told ICG. So we told them: Youre right,you dont have to come. This is an entirely

voluntary civic initiative. But since all the otherparties were there, the Electoral Commission wasthere, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court wasaware of the process, they had no choice. Theycouldnt afford not to come.39

The Academys efforts helped to produce twoagreements between the political parties: a twelve-

point Declaration of Principles and a Code ofConduct intended to optimise the prospects forfree and fair elections, while minimising potentialthreats to Somalilands peace and securitythroughout the process.

C. THE POLL

On 15 December 2002, Election Day dawned: inaccordance with the law, campaigning had ceased48 hours before the poll. During the course of theday, a total of 453,902 ballots were cast at 726

polling stations.40

International observers present found the process tohave been orderly and transparent. Statements byinternational observers were generallycongratulatory. One team, which witnessed votingat 81 polling stations, expressed the general

consensus in its statement:

In our view the electoral process and the dayof polling were undertaken in line withinternationally-recognised electoral norms.During the polling day we did not observeanything that would invalidate the electoral

process.41

Irregularities were reported in a number of areas,including incidents of multiple voting, but nothingcame to light that would have substantially alteredthe outcome of the vote. The same observer teamexpressed the opinion that most such problemswere due to lack of experience and capacity

39ICG interview, Hargeysa, April 2003.40A total of 800 polling stations had been planned by theNEC. Of these, 74 remained closed because of security

conditions in Sool and eastern Sanaag.41 Independent Observers Statement, Somaliland LocalElections: 15 December 2002, ICD/CIIR and Royal DanishEmbassy, Nairobi, p. 1.


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among electoral officials and knowledge amongvoters.42

D. THE RESULTS43

UDUBs triumph in the local elections came as nosurprise: the party machinery built by Egal was stillrobust enough to deliver the votes. But UDUBsmargin of victory was far from comfortable: with

just 41 per cent of the overall vote, the party founditself in the minority on many district councils. Norhad there been any real doubt that Kulmiye wouldtake second place, although the party faithful wereclearly disappointed at having obtained less than 20

per cent of the vote. But UCIDs third place finishwas unexpected, earning the association the official

political party status that many had anticipatedwould go to Sahan.

Since only three political parties are permitted bythe Somaliland constitution, those associations thatfailed to become approved political parties butgained council seats were obliged under Article 34of the Electoral Law to join one of the threeapproved parties. In reality, the Hormood, Sahanand Asad immediately ceased to function ascorporate entities, and their members joined the

parties of their choice.

Despite the approval of domestic and internationalobservers, voting patterns in the local electionsrevealed serious challenges to Somalilandsdemocratisation process. For example, althoughwomen reportedly turned out to vote in greaternumbers than men, their representation on districtcouncils remained close to zero. Only six womenwere actually presented as candidates (neitherUDUB nor Asad fielded any women candidates at

all), none of whom ranked higher than seventhplace on party lists.44 Only two women wereultimately elected to council seats.

Likewise, voting patterns indicated an importanturban and regional bias. Western Somaliland (theregions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed and Saaxil)accounted for 71 per cent of the total vote, withHargeysa alone returning 43 per cent of the total.45

42Ibid., p. 1.43See also the chart in Appendix B below.44Bradbury and Abokor, op.cit., p. 20.45Ibid., p. 18.

The three eastern regions together accounted foronly 29 per cent. Although such disparities can beexplained partly by demographics, they also bearwitness to Somalilands east-west divide and thedramatic post-war acceleration of urban drift.

What remained uncertain in the aftermath of theelections was exactly how much authority the newcouncils would possess. Articles 109-112 of the2001 constitution describe the formation ofregional and districts councils and award themspecific administrative powers. But the constitutionis ambiguous in its commitment to decentralisation,leaving much to the discretion of the legislature.For example, while district councils theoreticallyenjoy the power to plan their economic and social

affairs, the demarcation of the administrative andtax levying powers between the central governmentand the regions/districts remains undefined. In

practice, the central governments continuingcontrol of the public purse leaves little real powerin the hands of local governments, and the Ministryof Interior has already begun to insist onnominating key local officials, although theconstitution limits the executives role to thenomination of regional chairmen and assistinglocal councils in their work.

Recent legislation on decentralisation is at besthalf-hearted, and in the short term the new districtcouncils, being inexperienced and unfamiliar withtheir powers and responsibilities, are likely to findtheir authority trespassed upon by pushy centralgovernment politicians and bureaucrats. Over thelong term, however, there seems little doubt thatthe pressures of electoral politics will graduallyhelp shift the balance in favour of localgovernments, bringing about the type ofdecentralisation envisioned in the constitution.


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VI. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: THE

COIN TOSS

On 15 April 2003, the United Nations information

service carried a press item describing a recentpublication of the Washington-based think tankFreedom House that concluded three of the worldsworst regimes were to be found in the Horn ofAfrica.46 That story provided a suitable coda toSomalilands first presidential election, which hadtaken place the previous day. In a part of the worldknown for conflict, instability and authoritarianregimes, Somalilands inelegant democraticexperiment stands as a remarkable achievement.

The real challenge of presidential elections was theshift from the consensus-based beel system, inwhich every clan had its say, to a majori

Documents

Somaliland Democratisation and Its Discontents