Socioeconomic Theory and Differential Fertility: The Case of the LDCs

Socioeconomic Theory and Differential Fertility: The Case of the LDCsAuthor(s): David GoldbergSource: Social Forces, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Sep., 1975), pp. 84-106Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2576079 .

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Socioeconomic Theory and Dijferential Fertility: The Case of the LDCs*

DAVID GOLDBE RG, University of Michigan

ABSTRACT

The paper attempts to show the relationship between sociological fertility "theory" and microeconomic fertility "theory." It is argued that both conceptualizations are derived from a role-competition model. Differences are more apparent than real, conflicts in the literature arising from differences in style of analysis. Economists emphasize the direct effects of independent variables with intervening variables treated essentially as a standardization measure. Sociologists emphasize the intervening variables, the objective being to account for the gross relationship between independent and dependent variable. The sociological style in fertility research would appear to fit in well with recent research on individual modernity. However, in the absence of a component analysis of modernity, the concept is undefined and unman- ageable in any attempt to develop a socioeconomic theory of fertility. A theory-data "confrontation" is displayed for Turkish and Mexican materials.

. . .whenever we deal with the 'population problem' the demographer becomes schizo- phrenic. That part of him which is essentially the scientist becomes completely confused with that part of him which cries out for social engineering. . . . I think there is a great danger that we can over-sell what the demographer can do. . . . I am becoming convinced that we can contribute best by becoming better academicians (Hauser, 1954:187-88).

The assignment: What do sociologists have to say about differential fertility in the context of the less developed world? How have the sociological propositions been modified or extended by the economists? How do the ideas relate to individual modernity? What does the "theory"-data confrontation look like? "And make the paper brief," said the Editor.

Given the ground rules, let me tell you what the paper cannot do:

1. It cannot pretend to review the literature. Several recent reviews are available (Hawthorn, 1970; McGreevey et al., 1974; Mason, et al., 1971; United Nations, 1973).

2. It cannot deal with an immense empirical and model building literature treating lactation, conception time, use-effectiveness, disease, nutrition, and infant mortality which may appear to a general sociological audience as tangential but which are highly important for differential fertility viewed within a socioeconomic perspective.

I can address the paper to the rather peculiar situation that we have reached in at- tempting to understand the relationship between individual, social, and economic characteristics and fertility. I use the term, peculiar, because the "theory" has not *The Population Council had enough "openness to new experience" to fund the research in Turkey and Mexico.

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followed an evolutionary process from what was a rich start. It has regressed, with the slack taken up by strangers called economists, most of whom couldn't have cared less about fertility or population in general until a few years ago.

A rapid historical summary runs something like this:

1. Before sociologists had their hands on much data, they developed a set of hypotheses designed to account for trends in country fertility, differences among countries, and individual fertility differences within countries.

2. When sociologists were able to explore their hypotheses with a surfeit of U.S. data in the late fifties and early sixties, they managed to arrive on the scene just in time to be greeted by data sets containing large correlation matrices with most of the entries near zero, during a period known in the literature as "incipient decline" but when American women were having large numbers of babies and had birth intervals approaching a noncontracepting biological model. Being human, the sociologists pulled back and retreated from several of the theoretical objectives that had been set during "poorer" days.

3. At about this time, the nondemographers became aware of or more sensitive to the population problems of LDCs. Money flowed freely for research in these areas. But with the bitter taste of zero correlations in their minds and some hesitance about their research abilities on foreign grounds, the sociologists designed studies for the LDCs that were bareboned descriptive efforts.

4. Noting the retrenchment from theory, the economists slipped into their natural role and substituted babies for consumer durables in their kit of models (Becker, 1960). Some sociologists (Blake, 1968) and even economists (Duesenberry, 1960; Leibenstein, 1974) have screamed "outrage" from the sidelines, but the fact remains that economists are pumping in the new theoretical excitement and elegance (note that I did not say insight) to the field-defined here as individual factors affect- ing fertility. Needless to say, when economists occasionally encounter data, the labels they dream up for the variables are about as firm, conceptually, as the labels one might choose to give to Factor V in a 400 variable exercise.

To the extent that the scenario is accurate-and I think it almost is-it should be obvious that no firm conclusions can be reached about theory-data confrontations. That is not only sad, it is disgraceful. I will plump out some of the details and let you reach your own conclusions.

Writing for the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, not in 1975, but in 1933, Ogbum and Tibbetts argue that social change has resulted in the loss of many of the economic functions of the family, producing a change in the role of women, bringing about a decline in the birth rate. Interestingly, a small group of demographers, some years later, used several variants of this idea in trying to understand the constraints imposed on fertility by elements of the social structure. They were concerned with demographic transition and were trying to pick out some crucial components that could account for the negative relationship between development and fertility. Less developed countries in the process of change were the objects of the speculation. There was a felt urgency about the matter. History and



86 I Social Forces

recent public health technology appeared to teach a rather frightening lesson: relatively small societal changes could be accompanied by substantial declines in mortality whereas fertility was rooted in the institutional patterns and associated cus- toms, beliefs or norms, making fertility much more resistant to change. The demographers had bits and scraps of anthropological, historical, and anecdotal evidence. But their main tools were about 40 censuses concentrated in the wrong parts of the world. The theory they developed had the following form: we have data on A (ur- banization, industrialization); we have data on C (fertility); we will now impute B for which we have no data. Variables of type B typically included comments about: role changes for women with a particular emphasis on their labor force participation; how educational change would raise the age at marriage and begin to break down the sex-segregated role structure resulting in a more "emancipated" woman; how differences between agrarian and urban organization result in different utilities for children; how modernization changes the kinship system and its control over individuals; how the changing structure of stratification would induce greater social mobility with resultant consequences for fertility; and how mortality reduction itself would eventually induce fertility reduction through its feedback implications for the social system.

This meets few formal-theory criteria, but it hangs together and furthermore has clear implications for the translation of individual differences in fertility. The fact that higher status couples had lower fertility and lower-status couples higher fertility in the minds of many researchers could be described by the intervening variables: family organization, geographic mobility, social mobility, etc. The frequent attribu- tion of social class differences in fertility to differential use of family limitation methods, was of course true, but an evasion of the conceptual issue. Not infrequent- ly, data on children ever born had an inverse relationship to social class up to the group just below the top of the class structure, with the class above them exhibiting higher fertility. The interpretation of this "J" relationship was usually in terms of status strivings, anticipatory socialization, reference group behavior-producing pressure on these families. Families had to be slim for capillary action to take place (Dumont, 1890). At a structural level, the compression of income differences leading to a combination of decline in relative income and a desire to maintain a given standard of living results in lower fertility for classes caught in the middle (Banks, 1954). This kind of observation is completely consistent with everything we are given to understand in sociology and with the economic theory of fertility.2

In my opinion the most general theoretical statements pulling together the elements of a theory of individual differences in fertility are to be found in three unpublished documents (R. Freedman, 1954; Mishler, 1954; Westoff and Bensman, 1954) and in the Hill, Stycos, and Back (1959) effort in Puerto Rico. Although the forms of expression in the first three may vary from psychological to sociological, the documents resemble one another in their emphasis upon actual or desired activity patterns of the family as the primary intervening variable. Each argues that "psychological role densities" or "life plan" or "family activity ratio" help us in- terpret differences in fertility. An important feature common to all is the concept of



Theory and Fertility / 87

strain involved in fitting the demands of actual roles, desired roles, and family size into a compatible system. The first three were written to provide guidelines for new research efforts in the U.S. and were followed by the FGMA Study (Westoff et al., 1961). The Hill, Stycos, and Back materials report on a study and experiment conducted in Puerto Rico in the 1950s. This research was oriented to the nuclear family as an "interactive system," focusing on dimensions such as dominance, prohibi- tions, communication, marital happiness, etc. The object was to identify "deficiencies" in the family organization that handicapped families in reaching their fertility goals. An appealing and simple typology is contained in Tables 104-105 (pp. 204-5). At one extreme of eight types based on a three-variable dichotomy we encounter "wife at home-high husband dominance-high prohibi- tions." At the other extreme, "wife working-low husband dominance-low prohibi- tions." The authors were trying to capture "eight familistic types reflecting freedom of the wife." Commenting on the relationship of this typology to fertility, they state, "The consequences in fertility behavior are striking. The more restrictive the family organization, the less birth control methods are used, the less regularly employed if used, and the higher the failure rate among users. The correlations are high and statistically significant. . ." (p. 217). To that list can be added-and the higher the fertility rate and the number of living children. These findings for lower-class Puerto Ricans fit into the heartland of a large part of the previous speculation.

One would assume take-off from that point in the volume. Unfortunately the authors fell into some fairly standard traps associated with sociological style: they worked with an unnecessarily complex "schema" that had rational actors walking through the sequence of knowledge, attitudes, practice, and fertility. The factor analysis that followed resulted in the elimination of two of the three variables that had just been combined successfully to measure restrictiveness of family organization. The "factor analytic model of fertility dynamics" could only salvage the importance of husband-wife communication in relation to fertility control. The empirical potential of the study was destroyed. And, probably more important, some of the better hypotheses were pushed to the sidelines.

Microeconomists bring a totally different style of operation as input to the theory of differential fertility. Whereas sociologists operate freely in an apparently un- bounded discipline, the economists have clear boundaries. Whereas sociologists have no need for rational actors in their systems, the microeconomists assume rational, calculating actors. One economist reported that in observing the product of the microeconomists in the fertility area, a colleague "has conjured up the image of every couple having a miniature Wang calculator under their bed on which they work out the balance of the streams of expected benefits and costs" (Liebenstein, 1974:469). I would hate to define sociological theory. It floats freely in a space that includes propositions subject to empirical verification and a host of undefined terms deemed important to the system-fertility "norms" in this area and terms like the "culture of poverty" in others. These concepts are undefined in the sense that one cannot trace their system effects. Economists attempt to use an abstract, formal, rigorous theory, which does not imply that it will be good.



88 / Social Forces

The microeconomic beginning in fertility research was a paper that tried to spell out the demand for children as consumer durables (Becker, 1960). The paper says that under conditions of perfect contraception ("desired" number achieved) and for a given level of "taste" (a term we will confront momentarily), increases in income should result in increases in the quantity and "quality" (economically defined) of children. The income elasticity of quality was presumed to be greater than the one for quantity. Couples may trade quantity for quality. The real world prediction was that, as undesired fertility was eliminated, there would be a direct relationship between income and fertility. If "taste," which has been described as the "preference map" for children in relation to other goods (Easterlin, 1969), is taken as fixed, then I believe most sociologists would argue that the predicted positive relationship was trivial. The quantity-quality trade-off should make sense to sociologists provided quality of the child is defined in terms broader than dollars. The idea expands the concept of strain in the ability of families to accommodate different numbers of children and/or implicitly raises fundamental questions about the appropriate scaling of the dependent variable-number of children.

This was followed up by the idea that since children make it more difficult for a mother to work (hardly a breakthrough), mothers forego potential wages which are called the opportunity cost of her time. Since the substitution effect is negative we should expect an inverse relationship between opportunity cost and number of children (Mincer, 1963). Economists usually use wife's education as a proxy for opportunity costs. So, when economists confront data and find a negative relationship between education and number of children they feel they are getting some confirmation of part of their theory.

The sociological reaction to calling mother's education a proxy for opportunity costs is shock. An economist has tried to bridge the gap (Easterlin, 1969). He points out that the wife would not assess costs in terms of her potential wage but in terms of the services required for child care. He notes that the price of service could be close to zero if there were an elderly relative in the household, for example. The thinking is clearly the same as that involved in some of the initial sociological hypotheses about kinship and fertility and resembles the ideas of Hill, Stycos, and Back in seek- ing to find variations in family organization that encounter differing strains in their potential accommodation of children.

Easterlin believes that a synthesis of the microeconomic approach and the sociological approach can take place if economists explicitly incorporate measures of "taste" into their analysis. Taste is a function of the sociological variables place of birth, education, religion, etc. Since taste is a preference map of children and other "goods," it is critical that we understand what economists mean by other goods. At one point in Easterlin's presentation one can infer that a good is anything that has utility (Easterlin, 1969:134); at another, the preference map contains family size preferences and "material goods that compete with children for the household's scarce resources" (p. 143-4). The former interpretation would provide a scheme with a time-cost orientation, one that was essentially identical to the competition of roles and attitudes we have already seen in "family activity ratio" and "psychological role density." The latter leads to a consumerism hypothesis, one that has been



Theory and Fertilityi / 89

incorporated in research on fertility and "modern objects" in Taiwan (D. Freed- man, 1975).

Occasionally, the income-fertility relationship seems fairly straightforward. In- come affects tastes, (a life style, in our language) that may have a negative impact on fertility. It also has a direct effect on the consumption of children (Simon, 1974). This is a three-variable problem in which the predicted direct path from income to fertility is positive and the indirect effects through correlations of income with other taste shaping variables are negative (Namboodiri, 1970). The gross relationship between income and fertility would depend on the relative size of the coefficients. Economists do not appear to commit themselves to the relative sizes of the coefficients in LDCs and MDCs. Most sociologists would argue that the negative coefficient is stronger than the positive. Just as Easterlin has tried to break down some of the communications barriers between the disciplines by incorporating tastes, Namboodiri (1972) has tried to bridge the gap to economists by incorporating the variables economists use and by adding (we always add) some variables that cdncern sociologists-husband-wife power, time commitment to nonchild-centered activities.

More recently economists have been giving greater attention to the costs of time. (Becker, 1965; Schultz, 1973). If all activities of husbands and wives are placed in a time frame and treated as being in competition with childrearing demands, then economists could be doing what sociologists have been saying and implying con- tinuously: the time costs of children are greater in a nuclear family system than in an extended family system; the time costs of children are greater if the locus of roles is outside the home. When the economists' horizon extends to time and if they follow an empirical path that says identify it, price it, and put it in an equation, their activities could make enormous inroads to the understanding of differential fertility, but depending almost entirely on their treatment of time. Up to now, their treatment has been constrained. They note that the consumption of durables requires time. If this is priced, then they would move in the direction of a double distilled consumerism hypothesis. Some sociological awareness will have to be brought to the problem, however. For example, ignoring the message-reception aspect, is TV time consumption competitive with childrearing? Is not participation in activities outside the home (a component of individual modernity) less compatible with childrearing demands than home centered activities? Even household tasks involve differing levels of competition. For example, a recent study of housekeeping activities shows that in the highest income families (> $15,000) the wife spends nearly eight hours more per week in "managerial household tasks" than is the case in the lowest income families (< $4,000) (Vanek, 1973). Managerial tasks are planning time, travel time, and shopping time associated with household maintenance. This type of activity is more competitive with child care than other kinds of housekeeping activities, like cooking.

Some economists are not only aware of the sociological orientations, they are doing the empirical work for which sociologists claim competence. This work deals with the evaluation and impact of one's own circumstances in relation to relevant



90 I Social Forces

others. Easterlin has tried to account for the post war up-down pattern of American fertility by relating the economic experiences of young couples to the expected living levels acquired during the socialization experience. The economic expectations of couples married during the early fifties were shaped by parental patterns during the depression period. The young couple cohorts were small, the demand for their labor high, the economic experience good, and they proceeded to have relatively large families. Today, the young couples face the opposite situation. Their parents enjoyed good economic times in the fifties, produced many children, the demand for the labor of the children when they became couples was lower, their economic experiences were more difficult, and they are having fewer children (Easterlin, 1968, 1975). Using data for individuals, D. Freeman (1963) finds that the relationship between the ratio of actual to expected income and fertility is positive. Expected income is based on the income received by other persons in the same occupational class, education group, etc.-clearly a reference group hypothesis. Given a negative relationship between actual income and fertility, the finding is consistent with economic and sociological orientations to the problem.

Economists are likely to incorporate an increasing number of variables in their fertility research because it will increase the probability of finding a positive coefficient for income and that will please them. But it will also reflect their narrow commitment to the direct effects of income-the rest of the system be damned. This orientation is clearly reflected in the way they display their empirical results-a regression equation, usually with no comments about the system of interrelationships underlying that equation. If one is to have a socioeconomic theory of fertility or even an economic theory, a regression equation, no matter how many variables are included, simply does not provide enough information about the empirical confrontation from the perspective of the sociologist.

There is an enormous gulf between the two disciplines with respect to what they believe should come out of the system. The economists have a select list of variables of primary interest-say, potential income, child quality, and opportunity cost. Everything else in the system is essentially includedfor purposes of standardization. The motivation of the sociologist is just the opposite. Let us say he is interested in education and fertility. His objective will be to drive the direct path for education doWn to zero by incorporating a series of other variables. This will make him smile. Finding a relationship between education or income and fertility doesn't tell us too much in relation to the "theory" sociologists wish to generate. There is too much undefined space between independent and dependent variables. Hawthorn's (1970:84) comment about "the relatively plentiful data on differential fertility by social class or socioeconomic status can at best specify the questions we need to ask; they can never answer explanatory questions" -is on target.

The sociological position is defensible on theoretical grounds and with respect to potential social engineering-not that we know how to do it. But filling in the space between independent and dependent variables in a meaningful way could suggest policy that was initially unanticipated or could supply policy for combinations of variables that may be of greater concern to the consumer than fertility. My concern,




knowing sociologists, is that they are likely to make their systems too complex. Sociologists frequently reward one another for complexity to the point of incom- prehensibility. My fear of this sociological trait extends to some of the efforts now directed at "individual modernity." By all rights, there should be a payoff for those interested in differential fertility because modernization is viewed as a process mov- ing from changing institutions and industrial order to a set of individual characteristics that usually include measures of changing role density, openness, personal efficacy, achievement orientation, a host of other characteristics (depending, on the individual researcher involved), and frequently fertility or family planning attitudes.3 In some respects, components of individual modernity, seen as a process, are the dynamic equivalents of "family activity ratio." Demographers would be wiser and better informed if they confined their interest in individual modernity to those parts that correspond with the general fertility scheme they have been developing.

If sociologists "account" for a decline in fertility among LDCs by suggesting a model that goes from structural change to individual modernity to fertility and if individual modernity is defined in such broad terms that it includes the incredibly vast expanse of values, attitudes, and behaviors frequently attributed to modern men (Miller and Inkeles, 1975), then theoretically we will have come back to zero. We will have filled in the space with what is essentially an undefined term. Individual modernity can serve as a beginning for the task of selecting some intervening variables that have a direct bearing on fertility. In most respects, the task has already been performed for me.

I would like to narrow down the problem of translating the modernization process at the individual level to an overly simple model that can be confronted by some data, involving three types of variables-background characteristics, a limited set of identified intervening variables, and fertility. If the direct effect of the background variables is large, I feel we have failed to complete the sociological task. Economists certainly would not be upset with a strong direct effect to the extent that "background" was dominated by income.

Residence, education, and income typically serve as the starting point in describ- ing the fertility process. Call these background variables. We would be puzzled if we encountered data that failed to reveal differences in fertility associated with such variables. These variables serve as the starting point or preconditions for the process of modernism. According to the sociologists the intervening variables should de- lineate a set of alternatives to the mother role that could compete for her time and energy or a set of activities and preferences that could sustain or reinforce the mother role. In combination they can be viewed as direct and indirect measures of the extent, the width, of woman's horizon. If we ask: Education for what? Educa- tion, by design, makes people aware of alternatives (Holsinger and Kasarda, 1975). Income? It allows us to participate in a range of activities that compete with the demands associated with childrearing and it puts us in a better position to handle children as consumer durables-the former generally outweighing the latter. Commun- ity background? It starts the process and is a prime determinant of education and in-



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come (though I will specifically ignore the sequencing problem among the background variables for simplicity).

We can capture the main thrust of the intervening variable, without an elaborate time budget study, by concentrating our efforts on a very limited number of dimensions. The first, and most central for sociological hypotheses about fertility, is a fairly direct measure of the extensiveness of women's activities, attitudes, and per- ceptions. I focus on variables that give us a fix on the breadth of the woman's horizon-power, segregation, and containment. Specifically, I choose to emphasize six sub-indexes:

1. Husband's Power Index 2. Sex Segregation Attitudes Index 3. Containment: Forbids Index 4. Containment: Restaurant, Movies, Parties Index 5. Containment: Non-Home Centered Leisure Index 6. Size of World Index

This serves as a convenient reference point in dealing with a much longer list of values and behavior subsumed under the expression individual modernity. I don't wish to argue that efficacy or planning are irrelevant in considerations of modernism, but that those themes of modernism most relevant for fertility are located in family organization. Many significant alternatives (or the freedom to have alternatives) are contained in the six sub-indexes given above. We may call their combination the Truncated Modernism Index (TMI).

Other indexes included in the intervening variable set are:

Modern Objects Index (MO) Media Exposure Index (ME) Kinship-Marriage Index (KMI)

The inclusion of these indexes is dictated by the emphasis in sociology or economics on their potential impact on behavior in general or fertility in particular. I consider these to be only indirect indicators because of the implied hypotheses involving the relationships between them and TMI: kinship attachment is a constraining force on TMI; media is an expanding force on TMI, etc. Again, I will ignore the sequence of components within the set.

Two surveys, one conducted in Ankara in 1966, the other from Mexico City in 1971, contain the necessary ingredients. The designs and interview schedules were virtually identical within the constraints imposed by different cultures. The first five sub-indexes of TMI were constructed by dichotomizing three to eight questions and summing the 0-1 collapsed coding. There are few surprises in the individual items that were combined to form the indexes. For example, in the Sex Segregation At- titudes Index, a couple of questions included were:

Most of the important decisions in the life of the family should be made by the man of the house. (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.)




There is some work that is men's and some that is women's and they shouldn't be doing each other's. (Strongly agree, agree disagree, strongly disagree.)

The Husband Power Index items consisted of a relatively standard set of "Who de- cides . . . ." questions. The Husband Forbid Index is made from a series of questions such as these in Ankara:

Does your husbandforbid you to talk to men Does your husbandforbid you to wear short sleeve dresses Does your husbandforbid you to go to a matinee alone, etc.

while in Mexico City, the questions read:

Does your husband strongly object to having you go to the movies alone Does your husband strongly object to having you talk to men he doesn't know, etc.

Restaurants, Movies, Parties Index was a simple reporting of frequency of atten- dance at these places and the Non-Home Centered Leisure Index was an open-ended question that asked the wife ". . . what kinds of things do you do in the day or even- ing when you have some free time," with the answers coded for location of activity and potential source of interruption with children present. The only sub-index that may appear unusual is the one corresponding to the last index name-Size of World. The question was:

What country in the world do you think is the farthest place in the world from Turkey (Mex- ico)?

A small world for Turkish wives was a response that fell in the Near East or Europe, except England or Spain. For Mexican wives, a small world response extended as far north as Canada and as far south as the northern tier of Latin American countries. Each sub-index was trichotomized, scored 0, 1, 2 on the basis of marginal distribu- tions, and the six sub-index scores summed to create the arbitrary, unmaximized, understandable but perhaps poorly named, Truncated Modernism Index (scored 0-12). This combination gives me what I want concetually. Why factor analyze it?

Modern Objects and Media Exposure4 follow the standard survey pattern. "Does this house have a: radio, refrigerator, phonograph, . . ." There were five items for Ankara and eight for Mexico City. The media questions dealth with newspapers, radio, movies, books, and magazines. Television was added for Mexico City. An index (KMI) designed to tap kinship influences on early marital circumstances was based on questions dealing with whether husband and wife were relatives, whether their marriage was arranged (Ankara) or heavily influenced by parental decisions (Mexico), whether the couple lived with kin immediately following marriage, and how long they had been living with kin. A full listing of the questions is available elsewhere (Goldberg, 1974).

Now let us turn to the data. Ankara and Mexico City had experienced substantial growth in the years preceding the study. Both cities have large rural migrant populations, but both are capital cities so that each one contains a substantial number of white-collar moderns. The combination produces a more than "normal'



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heterogeneity of data, which I presume is working for me. In each case, a probability sample of the metropolitan area equivalent was taken. Eligible households were those containing a married couple. Interviews were taken with about 800 wives dis- tributed across more than 200 blocks. Response rates were well over 90 percent in both places.

The analysis is restricted to fecund wives under forty-five years old-593 in Ank- ara and 537 in Mexico City. These women had given birth to an average of 3.28 and 3.94 children at the time they were interviewed. They expected to have a total of 4.63 and 6.25 children before their families were completed. In Ankara 38 percent had used some form of family limitation other than abortion, while in Mexico City the figure was 31 percent. I have used the latter two measures of fertility behavior in the analysis. The reader may not be familiar with the use of total expected births. After obtaining a fairly standard pregnancy-live birth-child mortality history, and following with a sequence of questions dealing with current pregnancy and fecundity, we asked the following question:

(In addition to your current pregnancy) How many more children do you actually expect to have by the time your family is completed?

This question had appropriate follow-up procedures built into the schedule to handle women who were evasive or had difficulty with the reality orientation of the question (there were very few). In addition to the expectations question, respondents were asked about number of children wanted and ideal number of children. They were prepared for the different concepts by the statement (preceding the expectations question):

To get an accurate picture of the future growth of families in (Turkey, Mexico), we need to get information about the number of children couples want, how many they actually expect to have, and so on.

Women made a sharp distinction between number of children wanted and expected. This was true for means (3.04, 4.63 in Ankara and 4.22, 6.25 in Mexico City) and relationships.

Expectation data are used for several reasons:

1. This places the independent and dependent variables in proper time perspective. 2. In aggregate terms, the expectation data appear highly "reasonable" in relation to wife's age, birth history, fecundity and the fertility behavior of cohorts that had already completed their families. None of this implies that these women will, in fact, have the number of children they expect to have. 3. Expectation data have a greater real world base than questions dealing with family size ideals or desires that contain substantial elements of fantasy, probably differing in form from one respondent to the next.

Since our independent variables presumably come from the real world, it should be conceptually cleaner to deal with variables that we believe come out of the same set. The family planning variable employed is "ever used" family limitation, including methods not involving specific devices (rhythm, withdrawal). Abortion has been




excluded because its pattern of relationship to several types of independent variables is completely different from "ever used" as defined here.

A correlation matrix for the independent variables is provided in Table 1. The variables have been scored in full detail-education in single years, the scale of the extensiveness of wife's roles and attitudes (TMI) scored 0-12, etc. The only exception to this is wife's place of birth, scored 1 for city and 0 for noncity. The more modern end of the modernism items have the highest scores and those occupying more ad- vantaged positions on the stratification or background variables have higher scores. The combination yields an expected pattern of positive correlations with the exception of the Kinship-Marriage Index which is scaled so that those with greater kin involvement have the highest scores.

When the matrix is examined, one immediately recognizes the centrality of wife's education to the particular set of variables included. This should be no surprise. However, if you read across the truncated modernism row you will note that this variable is an extremely strong competitor for the central position in the set. Its correlations with other variables are exceptionally high. For example, the reader and I both know that there has to be a very high correlation between wife' s education and Media Exposure-it is, after all, partly circular. But if you examine the wife's education column (WE), you will note that this combination of power, segregation, and containment has even higher correlations with wife's education than media. In Ank- ara, TMI correlates more strongly with the presence of modern objects in the home than any other variable. The contained, powerless woman with relatively few op- tions or alternatives to a life organized around home and family emerges from pre- dictable parts of the stratification system and appears to be cut off from contemporary or current sources of exposure to the "other" world. A variable that has received considerable attention from the sociologist-demographer, kinship, is least central to this system of variables. All of the variables, with the exception of the Kin-Marriage Index have rather substantial zero-order correlations with expectations and use.

Given the high levels of crystallization in these settings, one cannot expect an immense buildup to large multiple correlations. But the several combinations of variables shown in Table 2 are important theoretically. I have displayed standardized beta coefficients, not to argue that a given variable is "most important"-a frequently used and unfortunate misinterpretation-but to suggest the kinds of direct and indirect routings that occur in the relationship between the background variables and fertility-in hope of providing a fuller understanding of the modernization process as it relates to fertility. Much of the discussion of this process centers around the total effects of variables, their direct and indirect effects. In this sense the combination of Tables 1 and 2 provide a large amount of information.

If we start with the background variables and expected fertility, it is immediately obvious that the bulk of the negative effect of income on fertility is joint with education. The direct effects of income are either trivial negative (Ankara in all equations, Mexico City in equations I, II, V, VI) or trivial positive (Mexico City equations III, IV, VI). Wife's education maintains a significant strong negative effect on expecta-



96 / Social Forces

TABLE I. Correlation Matrix for Fertility, Background and Modernism Variables, Fecund Women

Expected No. Ever Used of children Family Plan. WPB WB

Independent Variables A MC A MC A MC A MC

Wife's Place of Birth -.33 -.27 .20 .21 X Wife's Education -.46 -.46 .27 .36 .52 .40 X Husband's Income -.31 -.25 .29 .41 .37 .22 .51 .54

Truncated Mod. Index -.50 -.41 .40 .42 .54 .26 .72 .67 Modem Objects -.33 -.33 .33 .40 .42 .29 .57 .58

Media Exposure -.50 -.31 .36 .37 .59 .28 .70 .63

Kin-Marriage Index .27 .11 -.13 -.13 -.22 (.06) -.37 -.11

*Not significant at the .05 level; () In "wrong" direction.

TABLE 2. Standardized Betas for the Regression of Expected Number of Children and Use of Ankara, 1966 and Mexico City, 1971

Independent Equa. I Equa. II Equa. III

Variables A MC A MC A MC

Expected Number of Children

Wife's Place of Birth - -.12 -.10 -.05 - .10 Wife's Education -.41 -.45 -.36 -.41 -.19 -.31 Husband's Income -.09 - .01* -.08 - .01* - .01* (.03) Truncated Mod. Index -.33 -.19 Modem Objects Media Exposure - ---

Kin-Marriage Index R .47 .46 .48 .47 .53 .49

Ever Used Family Planning

Wife's Place of Birth .06 .07 (-.02) .07 Wife's Education .17 .20 .15 .17 (-.05) .03* Husband's Income .20 .30 .19 .30 .12 .25 Truncated Mod. Index - - .39 .26 Modem Objects Media Exposure - - -

Kin-Marriage Index R .32 .44 .32 .45 .41 .49

*Not significant at the .05 level, one-tailed; ()direction reversal from original zero-order correlation.




Under 45: Ankara, 1966 and Mexico City, 1971

HI TMI MO ME

A MC A MC A MC A MC

x .53 .51 X .56 .53 .62 .53 X .48 .46 .77 .63 .58 .58 X

-.20 -.14 -.30 -.12 -.18 -.06* -.313 -.05*

Family Planning on Selected Combinations of Independent Variablesfor Fecund Women Under 45:

Equa. IV Equa. V Equa. VI Equa. VII

A MC A MC A MC A MC

Expected Number of Children

-.11 -.10 -.02* -10 -.11 -.11 -.01* -.10 -.34 -.38 -.20 -.40 -.32 -.41 -.11 -.30 r .06* (.02) -.04* -.00* -.08 -.00* -.02* (.06)

-.23 -.19

-.06* -.09 (.04) -.08* -.33 -.03* -.22 (.05)

.11 .07 .09 .06

.48 .47 .53 .47 .49 .47 .55 .49

Ever Used Family Planning

.03* .06* (-.03) .07* .06* .08 (-.06) .07

.08* .10 (-.01) .08* .14 .17 (-.1 1) (-.04)

.12 .24 .15 .27 .19 .30 .08 .19 .27 .21

.21 .21 .11 .15 .32 .18 .16 .07*

- .02* -.06* -.01* -.06* .36 .48 .39 .47 .33 .45 .43 .51



98 I Social Forces

tions in all combinations of independent variables for Mexico City and in those combinations from Ankara that do not include TMI or ME. When all of the intervening variables are included in the equation (VII), the residual direct effect for wife's education is only - .1] (from a total effect of -.46) in Ankara but remains at a relatively high -.30 in Mexico City, having declined from a gross level of -.46. In both cities, the drop in the coefficient for wife's education is produced primarily by the presence of the intervening variables and not by the other background variables. This implies that we have been successful in arguing that the effect of wife's education on fertility is transmitted through the intervening variables in Ankara, only par- tially successful for Mexico City. Being born in a city has a negative, though mini- mal effect (-.12, -.10) on expectations when the three background variables are used alone. When TMI or ME are used in Ankara the direct effect is lost. In Mexico City, wife's place of birth continues to have a small negative direct path to expectations with any combination of variables. Place of birth is a good example of a variable that seems to have only moderate direct effects on other variables in a mul- tivariate equation. But it is by definition an incredibly important variable in the modernization process. Villages lack schools and cities have them. The equations say that if former villagers had comparable levels of education they would behave almost like indigenous city people-but, of course, they don't have comparable educational experiences.

Among the intervening variables, only TMI fits the kind of consistent pattern one looks for: strong correlations with the background variables and strong direct effects on expectations for both cities. Media exposure fits the model for Ankara but fails badly in Mexico City. Perhaps the Mexican media present a female image that is in no sense a full participant in alternative roles but one who is angelic, homemaker, motherly. The censorship of movies follows this pattern. You have to be eighteen or twenty-one to see anything other than Disney films. It is an intriguing difference in outcomes, but one I had not anticipated, with the result that I can bring no intelli- gence to the matter.

If the relationships to expected number of children can be summarized as being dominated by wife's education and TMI, then the bottom panel of Table 2 indicates that a different pattern emerges for use. Here the large and consistent net effects come from TMI and modern objects followed by income and media exposure. Net of other variables, women with greater involvement and participation in the world outside their home are much more likely to have used contraception. The net differences in use (adjusting for the three background variables) are 52 percent com- paring upper and lower quintiles for TMI in Ankara and 29 percent for a like comparison in Mexico City. Similar net comparisons for income (adjusting for WPB, WE and TMI) involve differences of 26 percent in Ankara and 36 percent in Mexico City.5 It should be emphasized that contraceptive costs relative to income were high in both of these cities. Neither had a public program at the time of the study. Another important difference between the data on use and expectations related to educational effects. In equation VII you will notice that the direct educational effects on use are turned around completely in the presence of the intervening vari-




ables (primarily TMI)-the direct effects are modest negative. I have never seen that before. Perhaps we would see it more often if social scientists didn't rush to the "next study" before they cleaned up the cards from the first one. A zero or negative effect suggests we have been successful in translating education into its indirect income and life-style effects, which leaves little for pure reading, pure writing, and pure arithmetic.

The relatively strong net effects of income and modern objects for use and their lack of direct impact on expectations suggests the possibility that a component of use may be a form of consumerism-not bright and shiny like a refrigerator but a modern object as well. If there is any truth in this speculation, it suggests that the promotion of use may be more easily manipulated, like other goods, than the manipulation of family size.

The Kinship-Marriage index, the variable least related to the others in the set, does not produce much by way of direct effects on expectations or use, though it is statistically significant for expectations. It is possible that my data come from the wrong settings or that I have bad measures. However, readers should be informed that in addition to the index reported here, I constructed another based on "social security" type questions and attachment to kin as opposed to friends. It did abso- lutely nothing. This is conceptually troubling in view of the consistent positive results coming out of Taiwan (Freedman et al., 1974; Mueller, 1972). I am forced to conclude that we require much greater specification of the relationship between kinship and fertility before it can yield a comprehensible payoff (Burch and Gendell, 1971). But I strongly suspect that it pales by comparison to other components of the modernization process.

Of the four intervening variables, TMI emerges as the most central component and the most powerful predictor of fertility behavior under a wide range of specifications not reported here. Although some of the components of TMI (forbids, size of world) may appear strange to readers at first sight, it should be fairly obvious that I have tried to deal with the kinds of variables that have been suggested for fertility studies over an exceptionally long period. TMI is an attempt to operationally capture, in capsule form, the main interpretive thrust of the "socioeconomic theory" of fertility, whether expressed as role densities, time costs, or an expanded version of opportunity costs. TMI contributes significantly and substantially to the variance explained by the three background variables. The increment in explained variance is always greater when adding TMI to the background variables than when adding the other three individual modernity indexes to the four variables (WPB, WE, HI, TMI) already in the equation. This condition holds for each empirical "confrontation'"'-expectations and use in Ankara and Mexico City.

Those who have followed through the analysis may have some questions to raise:

1. How can one talk about the extensiveness of women's roles and attitudes as a time cost competitor with childrearing without including data on wife's work experience? Isn't women's work axiomatically included in all fertility studies? Answer: What is the sociological axiom? Is it not that the time required by work



100 / Social Forces

makes it more difficult to care for children? If that is the case, work is but one ele- ment in a much larger set of activities and orientations that compete with childrearing or expose women to alternative values. It is one of many indicators. Economists like data on wife's work experience because it is a nice parochial measure that is easily converted into dollars. Why should sociologists be constrained by their hang-ups? Incidentally, I added an index of wife's work experience to equation VII for expectations. The beta coefficient was precisely .001-but I don't remember the direction. 2. Who ever heard of analyzing data on use of family limitation without controls for age or duration of marriage and some measure of demographic pressure (difference between desired or expected number of children and the number of live births or survivors)? Answer: You're right, I should have those "controls" even though I don't get too excited about some of those high correlations between duration of marriage and number of live births reported in the professional journals. Incidentally, I added duration of marriage and demographic pressure to equation VII for use. TMI still has the strongest net effect and the coefficient on wife's education remains negative. The demographic pressure variable is strong, operates in the correct direction, and adds significantly to the explained variance. Duration does nothing-in a direct path, that is. 3. How can anyone in his right mind substitute a few crazy questions about restaurants, forbids, spare time activities, size of world-call it TMI and substitute it for individual modernity? Answer: Individual modernity is like a Bedouin tent containing so many parts that only a Bedouin or a student in Anthro 347 could construct it. I don't want the whole tent because I don't know what it is. Science tells us to be slim for several reasons, so I have truncated to the fertility core. Incidentally, one of those studies of individual modernity reports a median correlation of .14-.15 between six questions dealing with family size desires or family planning attitudes and the overall modernity scale for six LDCs (Inkeles and Smith, 1974). Even ignoring the whole-tent issue, what do you think that would look like in an equation containing wife's education?

The analysis presented captures only a small part of the explanation of fertility in two cities. I don't know whether similar results would be obtained in Sri Lanka or Sierra Leone or in France6 but we clearly won't have answers to any questions re- garding the modernization-fertility process until similar exercises are carried out. 7

My impression of new inroads that can be achieved in attacking the problem are located in:

MEASUREMENT

It is not obvious what the dependent variable should be in fertility research-a measure of desired number of children, the number of children expected, a measure




of difference between goals and behavior, or selected components of the cumulative end product. This is not the kind of comment that most sociologists incorrectly catalogue as "there go the demographers again-pursuing the third decimal place." It is crucial for the formulation of theory and exceptionally important in relation to policy goals. Relatively few in the field give this matter other than casual consideration.8

NEW SUBSTANTIVE LEADS

Ecological Variables. Up to now there has been only a limited effort to incorporate ecological, contextual, structural, reference group variables into the analysis of individual fertility behavior (Duncan, 1964; Goldberg, 1975; Srikantan, 1967). Sociologist-demographers should be chastized. I thought that was the definition of the field. Since sociologists are the first to argue that manipulation of these variables can bring about desired societal objectives, one would think that these variables would be incorporated into their research. I strongly suspect that territorial effects will be most pronounced in the LDCs because of their greater levels of segregation and crystallization and because the friction of space is greater (Moots and Goldberg, 1973).

Sex Differences in Fertility Decisions. If I lean back and half close my eyes, I get the distinct impression that economic fertility theory is "male chauvinist" and sociological fertility theory is "womens lib." Quite clearly, economists emphasize variables such as income or potential income that may be more important for the person who can most easily react to children as consumer durables. For all practical purposes that is the male. The economist's usual interpretation of opportunity costs, defined for women, is in male-oriented terms. The image sociologists carry in their heads is typically defined in relation to the tension in wife's role structure existing between childrearing roles and others. The husband and his income barely exist in the model. Isn't it interesting that our research models are built to ignore husband-wife interaction or differential husband-wife input to the fertility decision? (Goldberg, 1960). Each discipline seems to treat this as a one-zero phenomenon in spite of the known low correlations between husband's and wife's fertility preferences. In my own data the husband-wife correlation for number of children wanted is .35 for Ankara and .44 for Mexico City. How do differences get resolved? Is it not possible that wife's characteristics are a better predictor of fertility behavior than husband's because the decision about number has a greater impact on her and that she frequently has greater control over the final outcome? When several variables including education of husband and wife are entered in a regression equation, don't we usually find that the size of the negative coefficient is greater for wife than husband or that the coefficient for husband may be positive, as in Sierra Leone? (Snyder, 1974). We may be cap- turing some differences in the forces that operate on husbands and wives. It is my impression that education has totally different consequences for men and women



102 / Social Forces

with respect to the fertility process and the roles they play in relation to that process (Cain and Weininger, 1973). Education creates competitive roles for women and places men in a better position to "accommodate" more children to the extent that they are not responsible for the direct time costs involved in the raising of children. When economists rather casually call husband's education "permanent income" and label wife's education an "opportunity cost," it is not as bizarre as it appears. We may be able to explain much more with the variables we already have if we can find some intelligent way to code couples with respect to relative "persuasiveness" of husband and wife in the household fertility decision (Namboodiri, 1972). I would hypothesize that with few exceptions, in LDCs the "wife variables" (kinship, TMI, other measures of 'the locus of her roles) will be more important but that as sex role segregation declines with modernization the "husband variables" (his education, savings, income) will begin to play a more prominent part in the equation. The latter are never likely to dominate because biology will remain with us. The line from Kiss Me Kate handles the explanation- "for it is ye who'll have the baby."

Age at Marriage of Husband and Wife. This variable is included in every fertility study so we can't hope to account for more variance. But our treatment of it is overly simple. We handle age at marriage as if it were strictly an exposure variable. In many LDCs, females essentially move directly from the role of child to the role of mother without having assumed the role of woman. This situation is probably most pronounced under circumstances where age differences between husband and wife are large. Our research should decom- pose the so-called exposure variable into the indirect effects routed through things like TMI and an undefined residual that we can call exposure until we can better define it.9

Many of the kinds of variables described in this paper "fit" into discussions that are called "beyond family planning" (Berelson, 1969a). I do not wish to enter into the "debate" about the relative importance of basic changes in social structure "vs." the probable success of family planning programs in the absence of those changes. There is more than enough historical and contemporary evidence to de- monstrate that fertility is deeply rooted in social structure and there is substantial evidence demonstrating that family planning programs can reach "traditionals" and can provide an alternative that was undoubtedly more difficult to achieve prior to the existence of public programs. As Berelson puts it, "an improved contraceptive technology can reach further down on the motivational curve" (Berelson, 1969b). We cannot afford enervating and divisive confrontation. There is so little solid material that sociologists and economists have to offer. The exchange also has a god- like quality that implies that we know which buttons to push and have the right to push them. The Mexicans, the Turks, and the Nigerians will do the button pushing-not us.

We have the responsibility to provide intelligent inputs and in many respects we have failed to do so. Our failures on this count derive from some ridiculous faddism




within disciplines and irresponsibilities in data collection and analysis. We offer a very narrow range of research results. The base of that research should be broadened immensely so that consumers may be able to push the correct buttons for the kinds of social action programs they select.

Certainly, if the sociologist-demographers don't wake up they will find their "baby" kidnapped by the economists who may be smarter but who, fortunately or unfortunately, live in a small world.

FOOTNOTES

'The interests of micro theorists in differential fertility is very recent. Before that the few economists in the field directed most of their attention to formal demography and the influence of population in economic development. Their contribution within the group of pioneers was greater than their number.

2The social mobility hypothesis has always had immense appeal for sociologists. Its conceptualization is a special case of the role competition model and it incorporates elements of reference group theory. Except for populations of elites, the mobility-fertility relationship fails to differ from an additive model in MDCs (Blau and Duncan, 1967) and LDCs (Boyd, 1973). It appears to fall into that large class of sociology taken as gospel but which is mostly fantasy.

3One should be wary of the seductive qualities and theoretical significance of this umbrella concept. Schnaiberg (1970) and Armer and Schnaiberg (1972) argue for a limited component treatment, whereas Inkeles and Smith (1974) allign themselves with the broad sweep of "overal modernity" that is difficult to pin down.

4The treatment of consumer durables and media could be refined considerably in relation to the competitive roles hypothesis. Bicycles and sewing machines have differing implications with respect to exposure to new roles. Movies not only convey a message, they take the wife out of the household and in this sense differ from other media.

5The net differences were obtained using multiple classification analysis with 4-5-6 categories of each variable.

6J believe the scheme is applicable to LDCs and MDCs. Operationally, this simply means an intelligent substitution of different questions tapping the same dimensions for differing settings. A recent effort with U.S. data is reported by Stokes (1973).

7This paper has grossly short-changed the empirical efforts with LDC data. I have done that purposely to create more manageable and direct data confrontation with the Turkish and Mexican materials. It is difficult and time consuming to adequately review other's research that may deal only tangentially with the issues raised in this paper. Excellent summaries of the research and its relationship to economic and sociological considerations can be found in (Hermalin, 1974; MacDonald and Mueller, 1975; Mauldin, 1969, 1965).

8Coombs (1974), Coombs et al. (1975), McLaughlin (1974) and Namboodiri (1972) have recently written about some of the measurement problems. The concept of unwanted children is one of the most frequently used terms in discussions of policy. Its use implies that we have measured the distance between actual and desired number of children. I wonder.

9Bumpass (1969) is one of the few researchers who argues that marriage age has attitudinal or be- havioral consequences that affect fertility indirectly.

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Documents

Socioeconomic Theory and Differential Fertility: The Case of the LDCs