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Memory, Expression, and Past-Tense Self-KnowledgeAuthor(s): William ChildSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jul., 2006), pp. 54-76Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040992 .

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Memory, xpression,ndPast-TenseSelf-Knowledge

WILLIAM CHILD

Universityollege,Oxford

PhilosophyndPhenomenologicalesearchVol. LXXIII,No. 1,July 006

How should we understandour capacity to rememberour past intentional tates? Andwhat can we learn fromWittgenstein's reatment f thistopic? Three questions are con-

sidered. First,what is the relationbetween ourpast attitudes nd ourpresentbeliefs about

them? Realism about past attitudes is defended. Second, how should we understand

Wittgenstein'sview thatself-ascriptions f past attitudes are a kind of "response" and

that the "language-game" of reporting past attitudes is "the primary thing"? The

epistemologyand metaphysicsof past-tense self-ascription re examined in the lightof

those comments,and our acquisition of theconcept of past attitudes s discussed. Third,

does Wittgenstein ive us reason to think hatthe identity f a past attitudemaybe con-

stituted, ot by anything hatwas trueof thesubject at thetime,butby herretrospective

tendency o self-ascribe t? It s arguedthat, ontrary o some interpretations,e does not.

How shouldwe understandurcapacity o rememberurpast intentions,wishes, eliefs,nd so forth? ndwhat,f nything,anwe learn romWitt-

genstein'sreatmentfthe opic?A central hemen Wittgenstein'saterphilosophys that houghtnd

language re based on natural,re-linguisticeactions.1o givetwoexam-

ples: theres the uggestionhat hefirst-personse of theword pain" s

acquired s a learned ddition opre-linguisticxpressionsfpain;and thereis the deathat urascriptionfsensationso otherss a developmentrom

our natural, re-linguisticendencyo respondwithsympathyo theirbehaviouralxpressionsfpain.2Wittgensteinpplies lementsf the ame

general pproach o theself-ascriptionfpropositionalttitudes.hus,he

suggests hatwe acquire the conceptof belief,for example,not via

introspectivecquaintancewith nternal tatesof beliefbut, n part,bylearningo udge"I believe hat " in circumstancesherewe alreadymakethe impleudgementp".3Andheholds hat,n an importantlass ofcases,

self-ascriptionsike"I believe t'sraining",I hopehe'llcome", r"I intend

1 Thecentralityf this deais wellbroughtutbyDavid Pears.See his 1987 & 1988, nd

1994,1995a and 1995b.For hesedeas, eePI §244 andZ 540-1See PIpp. 190-1.

54 WILLIAM CHILD







to leave",are immediatexpressionsfthe ubject's ttitudes;hey re not

reports adeon thebasis of self-observation.here recertainlylementsn

Wittgenstein'sreatmenthat re unappealing: orexample,his apparent

assumptionhatwhena self-ascriptiveudgementxpresses n attitude,tcannot imultaneouslyescribe he ubject s having hat ttitude. utthereis a growingensethatWittgenstein'sork,horn f someunattractivendinessential eatures,ontains he basis for a way of understandingelf-

knowledgehat oes betterhan hevarious lternatives.4MostWittgenstein-inspirediscussions fself-knowledgendself-ascrip-

tionhaveconcentratedxclusivelyn the ase ofself-ascribingne's currentattitudes.5utWittgensteinimselfpplies he ame deas to the elf-ascrip-tion fpast ttitudes.e says,for xample,hat reportf one'spast nten-

tion s standardlyresponse ndis notmade"ongroundsfself-observa-tion" PI §659). He urgesus to "look on thelanguage-gameof tellingsomeone hat time go I had such-and-suchwish] s theprimary hing"(PI §656). Andhe suggestshat hewaywe acquire he oncept f ourpastintentionss by earningoproduce etrospectivexpressionsf those nten-tions RPP i 163). ButWittgenstein'sreatmentf thepast-tensease aswell as the opic fpast-tenseelf-knowledgengeneral has beenrelativelyneglectedn the iterature.hispaper ims ocorrecthat eglect.

I pursue hreemain uestions. irst, hat sWittgenstein'sointntaking

the language-game"freportingast ttitudess "the rimaryhing":oes tyielda successfulreatmentf theepistemologyndmetaphysicsfpast-tense elf-ascription;nddoes tgive plausible ccount four cquisitionf

the oncept four wnpast ttitudes?econd, oesWittgenstein'siscussion

suggest,s some havethought,hat here re cases in which he dentityfsomeone's ttitudet a particularime sdetermined,otby nythinghatwastrue f her t the ime, utratheryherretrospectiveelf-ascriptionfthatattitude?hird,ndrunninghroughhewholediscussion, hatngeneralstherelation etween urpastattitudes,n the one hand, nd ourpresent

beliefs bout hem,n the ther? start ithhisast uestion.

1.Realism ndanti-realismboutpastattitudes

Thereare,broadly peaking,womodelsof the relation etween urpastintentionaltates nd ourpresent eliefs boutthem.We ordinarilyakea

fundamentallyealist iew.When remember hat believed r ntendedt

Recentdiscussions f self-knowledgehatdraw nspirationromWittgensteinithout

signing p to the ess attractiveeaturesf his views nclude: vans1982;Wright987,

1989,1991,2001b;vonSavigny 990;Gordon 995;Heal, 1994,2002; andMoran 001.Wrights a notable xception.He explicitlyonsiders,nd is inclined o accept,theextensionf hisgeneral ccount fself-ascriptionothepast-tensease. (See 1991: 314-15,and 1987: 140-2).Forother iscussionsf thepast-tensease,see Sullivan1994, ndHacker 000,chapters and7.

MEMORY, EXPRESSION,AND PAST-TENSE SELF-KNOWLEDGE 55







some previoustime, here s (we think) fact of thematter boutwhat did

believe or intend, ndependent f my subsequent udgementor report bout

it.6My judgement s true if it is) because the attitude t ascribesme is an

attitude had at thetime,

n advance ofanysubsequent

recollection.On this

view,understandinghereliability f ourmemory four attitudes s a matter

of understanding ow our past-tense elf-ascriptionsucceed in tracking he

facts bout thepastattitudes hemselves.

The alternative, nti-realist,pproach reverses thatpicture:the presentbeliefs orreports ome first; hepast attitudes re a projection ntothepastof

those beliefs or reports.On such a view, to put it crudely, t is a subject's

present dispositionto judge that she believed thatp or intendedto O that

makes it true hat he did. So the reason our udgements bout ourpast inten-

tional statesare generallyrights that

theyare

actuallyconstitutive f the

truthshey eemtoreport.7Anti-realism f this sort faces obvious objections.In manycases, as well

as the laterself-ascriptionf intention,herewill also have been self-ascrip-

tions,or othermanifestations f intention,t the earliertime. And thoseear-

lier manifestationsestifyo thepresenceof something bout the subject at

the time in virtue of which it was alreadytrue thatshe intendedto O, in

advance ofthelater elf-ascription.ut the anti-realist iew is less obviously

implausibleforpropertiesnd attitudes hat hesubjectdid not self-ascribe r

manifestn otherways at thetime. And cases of this sort

figure rominentlyinWittgenstein's iscussions.For example:

Interrupt man in quite unpremeditatednd fluent alk. Then ask him what he was going to say;

and inmanycases he will be able to continuethe sentencehe had begun (Z 38).

In such cases, there s no contemporarymanifestation ithwhich the subse-

quentreport ould agree (or conflict).So it is notobviously hopeless to say

that, f the mandeclares,"I was goingto say that hereformsremisguided",what makes ittrue hat hat s whathe was goingto say is ust his subsequent

declaration.However,even in thesecases, we find thardto accept the anti-realist view. Something aid now maybe thebest way of tellingthatsome

earlierstate of affairs btained.But,we are stronglynclinedto insist, f t is

truethat someone was about to say that thereformswere misguided,there

Of course, the fact of the matterneed not be an all-or-nothing ffair.My past intentions

may have been mixed, or half-formed,r wavering. Ifso, the fact of the matter bout my

past intentionswill not be expressible in any such simple clause as "I intendedto O". But

thatdoes not show that there s no fact of the matter bout those intentions; n such a case

thefactof the matter s thatmy ntentionsweremixed,or half-formed,rwavering.Anti-realism f thissort has been promotedby Crispin Wright,who draws his inspirationfromWittgenstein nd suggests that his view is substantially Wittgensteinian. See the

references n notes 4 and 5 above.)

56 WILLIAMCHILD







must avebeensomethingbouthim t the ime nvirtuefwhich t s true;itcannot e made rue etrospectivelyy omethinge ater id or said.

However,hefact hatwe arestronglynclined o nsist nsomethingoesnot showthat t is true.

Maybeour ntuitiveealism bout

pastntentional

statess a mistake. rmaybet s anemptyattle ry a slogan hatwe findourselvesnclined o insist n whenwe reflect n ourordinary aysof

thinking,utwhich urns ut to have no genuine ontent.8o we cannotdismiss uestionsbout he ealistmodel utofhand.

2. The immediacyfpast-tense elf-ascriptionsWhatdoesWittgensteinhink boutpast-tenseelf-ascriptions?e is clearaboutwhat t wouldbe wrong osayabout heir henomenologyndepiste-

mology.9We can summarize is negative iews as follows.When thinkaboutmypast ntentions,ymemory ay ummonp experiences,houghts,words nd actions hat enjoyed, ntertained,ttered r performedt thetime.Butrememberingn intentions not a matter frememberingnyofthese hings; ornoneof thems, or sufficesor, he ntention. or is it amatterf nterpretinguchdata, r nferringrreading ffhe ntentionromthe data. For one thing, generallyudge what intendedmmediately,withoutonsideringememberedxperiences,r thoughts,r utterancestall.10 or anotherhing,he otalityf suchdatawould nany ase often ive

only veryweak grounds or suchan inference,ven if supplementedyinformationbout he ntecedentsnd urroundings.11nWittgenstein'siew,when judgewhat intendedo do or say, my udgements typicallyotbasedonanythingtall; I simplyememberhat wasgoing o do this rsaythat.12

Thesenegative laimsarepersuasive. utthey re neutral etween herealist nd anti-realist odels.Wittgenstein'sasic point s that ast-tenseself-ascriptionsre immediatendgroundless;hey re notbasedon intro-

spected henomenologyr on nferencerom ne's behaviour. ndthat oint

can be accommodatedyboth ealistnd nti-realist.The realistwillpoint ut that he pistemicmmediacyfourpast-tenseself-ascriptionss clearly ompatible ith ealism bout whatmakesthemtrue. cansaywhatmyname s,orreportheposition fmy rm,mmedi-

ately ndwithoutnference.ut that oes notshow thatmy sincerelynd

gSee Z §414 for the idea thatthe difference etween realists and idealists about material

objects is "only ... one of battlecry".See, for xample, PI §§633 ff.

'"See §637.

See §638.Of course there re cases in whichwe do reach our self-ascriptions y interpretingurpastbehaviour as we interprethe behaviour ofothers.But such cases are theexception,not the

rule. (I consider in section4.iii.b below whether uch self-interpretations necessarily the

exceptionrather hantherule.)








attentivelyudgingthatmynameis NN makes it thecase that t s, or thatmy

judgement bout thepositionofmyarmconstitutestspositionas beingwhat

it s.13The same is true, aystherealist, ormyreports fmypastattitudes.

Theanti-realist,

orhispart,

willsay

that t is nosurprise

hatourreportsof our past attitudes re groundless;forwhen we make such reports,he

thinks, here s nothing hatwe are detecting nd, therefore, othing or our

reports o be grounded n. Of course,the anti-realistcknowledges,we call

thecapacityto makeungrounded eports fourpast attitudes form fmem-

ory.After ll, likeothermemory-reports,hesereports re aboutthepast,and

they re standardly ccepted as true.But we mustnotassume that verycase

in which we talk about memory hould be construed n realistterms.Witt-

gensteincautions against assumingthateveryuse of the past-tense s the

same.14And in"getting bird's-eye

view ofthe

use of the word 'remem-

ber'"15perhaps we will have to acknowledge that,thoughmanycases of

rememberinghouldbe conceivedalongrealist ines,others houldnot.

Some readers of Wittgenstein ill protest hatmyquestion,"Should we

take a realist or an anti-realist iew of self-ascriptionsfpast attitudes?",s

fundamentally on-Wittgensteinian.he right attitude,they will say, is

something ike this:We have a practiceof reporting ur past attitudes. n

appropriate ases, we call suchreports memories" nd say that hey xpress

knowledge of the subject's past attitudes.But we can go no furtherhan

describingthese factsabout ourpractice.To pressthequestion,"Realism oranti-realism boutmemory f intentionaltates?", s in effect o ask whether

the phenomenonwe call "rememberingn intention" s really a form of

memory,whetherwe are right o call it remembering. nd such attemptso

justify, riticize, r explainourpractices re alwaysa mistake. f it s correct,

by the rules for the use of our concepts"memory" nd "intention", o call

something memory f an intention,hen t s a memory fan intention;here

is, and can be, no more tosaythan hat.

There are large issues here,whichI cannot now discuss in detail. I will

simply ndicate,briefly nd dogmatically,why do not think hattheques-tions I am pressingmustbe unWittgensteinian.Wittgenstein's wn work

gives us the basis for wo importantdeas: the dea that concepthas a pointas well as a set ofrules, hat hepoint s notexhaustively efinedbytherules,and thatgraspof thepointmaybe used togainsomereflective erspective n

therules;16 nd the idea thatwe can reflect n thesort of use a concepthas,and that such reflectionmay show thatconcepts that ook similar n some

ElizabethFlickeruses theexampleof first-personccessiblebodily tates o make asimilar

oint1998 155,n.

1).RichardMoran ites he aseof

bodily ositiono the ame

end 2001, 19-20).14SeeRPPi241.

lDRPPil60.See PI §§561-8.

58 WILLIAMHILD







waysare verydifferentn others. Askingwhether e shouldunderstand

past-tenseelf-ascriptionsn therealist r theanti-realist odel neednot

requireesourceseyondhese.

3. Disposition-basedealism

Supposesomeone ays, "Napoleonwas crowned n 1804". The questionarises, idhemean hemanwhowon heBattle fAusterlitz?hediscussion

proceeds:

"But after ll if someone sksyou didyoumean heverymanwhowon thebattle f Auster-

litz'youwill ay yes'. So youmeanthatmanwhen ouutteredhe entence" Yes,butonlyinthekind fway hat then new lsothat x 6 = 36.

The answer I meanthevictorf Austerlitz"s a new tep nour alculus.Thepasttense s

deceptive,ecause t ooks s if t wasgiving descriptionfwhatwent n"insideme"whilewasutteringhe entence.PG 103)

On thenaturalwayof reading uchpassages,Wittgenstein'sargets notrealism boutpast ntentionalropertiestself,utonly particularhiloso-phicalviewofwhat hat ealism nvolves. e doesnot hallengehe houghtthat,f t s true hat,when utteredhe entence,meanthemanwhowonthebattle fAusterlitz,hent s true n virtuefsomethingboutme atthetime.Whathe objects o is thephilosophicaliewthatwhatmakes ttruemust e somethinghat went n 'insideme'" atthe ime whethert be a

thoughtunninghrough ymind, mentalmage, n "act ofmeaning",ranythinglse. In place of that iew,Wittgensteinhinkshat hefact hatmeant hemanwho won thebattle fAusterlitzs linked ofacts bout he

dispositionsndabilities hadat thetime e.g.,thefact hat, ther hingsbeing qual,had been skedwhetherheman meantwasthe ne whowonthebattle fAusterlitz,wouldhavesaid yes'.We couldcall this iewdis-

position-basedealism bout ast ntentionalhenomena.A viewof ustthiskind anbe found nmany assages nWittgenstein.

Forexample:

Is it correctforsomeone to say: "When I gave you thisrule, I meant you to ... in thiscase"?

Even if he did not thinkof this case at all as he gave therule? Of course it is correct. For "to

mean it" did not mean: to thinkof it. But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether

someone meant such-and-such? The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular

techniquein arithmetic nd algebra,and thathe taught omeone else theexpansion of a series in

the usual way, is such a criterionPI §692).

Thatputsthepoint n epistemologicalerms:we udge whetheromeonemeant uch-and-suchy referenceo hismasteryf a techniqueand,we

couldadd,we udgewhetheromeonehasmastered techniquenpartbyseeingwhethere does in factgetcorrectesultsnsomesufficientlyarge

17See e.g.RPP i 366-7.










4. Theprimarinessndprimitivenessfreports fpast ntentions

One strandnWittgensteinhatmay uggest kind fanti-realismbout astintentionaltates omesout nhisremarks,hich noted t the utset,bout

the rimitivenessf ourverbal eportsf those tates. hus,for xample,nconsideringhe racticefreportingastwishes r ntentions,e advises:

Lookon the anguage-gameoftellingomeone hat time go I had such-and-suchwish] s

theprimary hing.And ookon thefeelings,tc., s you ookon a wayofregardinghe an-

guage-game,s interpretationPI §656).

One wayofputtingurordinary,ealist iew wouldbe to saythat hepastwishor ntentions theprimaryhing:he ubsequenterbal eports secon-

dary; t s made trueor false)bythepastexistenceor not)oftherelevant

wishorintention.t is easyto readWittgenstein'sdea as a reversal f thatview:theverbal eports theprimaryhing;o thepastwish r ntentionasno existence ndependentf the report ne subsequentlymakes (or is

disposed omake); t s simply projectionfthe resenteportack nto he

past.21But doesWittgenstein'stressn the rimarinessf the anguage-gamef

reportingastattitudes,nd onthe rimitivenessfsuchreportshemselves,

reallyndicate non-realistiewofthe ast ttitudes?verythingepends nthe ort fprioritye has in mind. f he is claiming metaphysicalriority

for person'spresent eportsf herpastattitudes,ispositionwill ndeedimply omekindof anti-realism.ut supposehis thoughts onlythat heverbal eportsreepistemicallyrimitive,nd that heyreprimaryntermsof concept-acquisition.n thatcase, thereneed be no tensionwithour

ordinary,ealist iew.How, hen,houldWittgenstein'semarkse taken?As I said at theoutset,he dea that houghtndlanguage rebasedon

natural,re-linguisticeactionss a centralhemenWittgenstein'sater hi-losophy. ut theapplicationf that deamayworkdifferentlyn differentcases.We can workup to the case ofpast-tenseelf-ascriptiony looking

firstt two therases:the ase of sensationsndthe aseofotherminds.

4. Sensations

In somecases,Wittgenstein'sppealto thenatural,re-linguisticasis of a

"language-game"asclearmetaphysicalmplications.hat eems rue f his

suggestionhat wordsfor ensationsare]tiedup with .. naturalxpres-sions of sensation"PI §256). Wittgensteinntroduceshissuggestionnconnection ith question boutconcept-acquisition:howdoes a human

being earn hemeaning f the namesof sensations?"PI §244). Andthe

immediateoint fthe uggestions to showhow wemight cquire he on-

This s the nterpretationhat eemstobe suggestedn P. M. S. Hacker's xegesis f PI

§656. See Hacker 000.

MEMORY, EXPRESSION,AND PAST-TENSE SELF-KNOWLEDGE 6 1







ceptofpain, giventhat t cannot be acquiredby inwardostensivedefinition.

But Wittgenstein'somments boutnatural xpressionsare clearlyalso con-

nected with he dea that ensations renot"private bjects",itemswith den-

tityconditions thatare

wholly independentf

anylinks withthe

subject'sbehaviour or external ircumstances.And that s a metaphysicaldea; being

disposed to exhibitcertain ortsof natural, xpressivebehaviour s a condi-

tion for creature'shavingsensations,not ust a conditionfor tsbeing able

to learn themeanings fsensationwords.

4. i Otherminds

In other ases, theappeal toprimitive, re-linguisticeactionsdoes not mplythat he reactionshave anyconstitutive ole. Consider,for xample,Wittgen-

stein's comments bout our relation o others'pains:

it is a primitivereaction to tend,to treat, hepartthat hurtswhen someone else is in pain; and

not merelywhen oneself is and so to pay attention o otherpeople's pain-behaviour,as one

does notpay attention o one's own pain behaviour.

But what is the word "primitive"meant to say here?Presumablythat this sort of behaviour

ispre-linguistic:that language-game is based on it,that t is theprototype f a way of thinkingand not theresultof thought. Z §§540-1)

Here,the dea that ur reactions o others'pains are primitives used tomake

twopoints.The first oint s epistemic.An instinctiveeactionbyone pre-conceptual

creature o another'spain involves no inference r reasoning.As the creature

develops conceptual capacities, ts reactionsdevelop; they ome to include a

tendency o applytheconceptpain and to form he belief that he other rea-

ture s in pain. But though he natureof the reactionschanges,their piste-

mological immediacydoes not. When I believe that omeone is inpain, I do

notstandardly each thatbeliefby observinghis behaviourand inferringhat

he is inpain: I form hebelief mmediately, ithout nference.22

Wittgenstein's econd point is about concept-acquisition:grasp of the

conceptof others'pain is a development rextension f a pre-linguisticeac-

tion towardsothers' pain. When I acquire the concept pain, as applied to

others,mytask is made relatively asy by the factthat, hroughmy pre-lin-

guisticreactions, alreadydistinguish ases whereothers are manifestlyn

pain from ases wherethey re not. Ourbehaviouralreactions oothers'painsare primarybecause theypre-date, nd are thebasis for, rticulate houghtabout thosepains.

See Z§§537,

542 for thisepistemicpoint.

Tosay

thatthird-personscriptions

ofpain

are

immediate and non-inferentials not to say thattheyare groundless. When I judge that

someone is in pain, I don't inferhis pain fromhis behaviour and its similarity o thewaythat behave when I am in pain. But I do have grounds formy udgement; I tellthathe is

inpain by observinghis situation nd behaviour.

62 WILLIAM CHILD







This is, in the first nstance, claim about how we do infact come to

acquiretheconceptofothers'pains.As such it seemsentirely lausible: chil-

dren do exhibitways ofbehaving appropriatelyowardsothers'pains before

they ould be said tograsptheconceptofpain; and it is plausible thatpartoftheprocessofcomingto graspthat oncept s learning osay "Her toe hurts"

or "He's got a stomach ache" in circumstances hatthechild alreadydistin-

guishes in her sympatheticbehaviour. Wittgensteindoes not make the

strongerlaimthatwe couldn tgrasptheconceptof others'pain ifwe did not

have thiskindofnatural eaction oothers.Butdoes anything e says suggestthis tronger iew?

Wittgenstein oes argue that could not acquire the concept of others'

pain by starting rom purely ntrospectiveonceptionofmyown pain and

working utwardsfrom here o construct conceptofpains that re notmypains.23But thatdoes not establish thatone can acquire theconceptonly by

building on a primitive, re-conceptualtendencyto react sympatheticallytowardsothers'pains. For all thathas been said so far, ne could acquire the

idea thatothers an be ascribedpain on the basis of theirbehaviour, nd the

capacity to make such ascriptions,without ny prior tendencyto behave

towards otherswithsympathyr concern.One could thengo on to learn to

behave with concerntowards omeonewho is in pain. So one's sympatheticbehaviourwould be "the result of thought"rather han "the prototype f

thought". hat is not how it s withus. But it s hardto see whythere ouldn'tbe cases inwhich the standard rderofacquisitionwas reversed. ndeed,that

maywell be how thingsworkfor omepeople with utism.Even ifan autistic

child has little r no natural endency o treat therpeople as sentient eingswith intentional tates,or to think of themas such, she can acquire the

concepts of sensoryand intentional tatesand learn how to apply them to

others n thebasis oftheir ituation nd behaviour.24 nd she can go on from

thereto learn how to interact uccessfullywith others including earninghow torespond ppropriatelyo others'pain.

So, in stressing heprimitivenessf our reactionsto others'pain, Witt-gensteinmakes twopoints:one aboutepistemology,he other boutconcept-

acquisition.But he does not suggestthat our reactionsto others' pains are

partof themetaphysics f the statestheyare reactionsto. Our reactionsdo

notplay a constitutive ole: either nthe weakersense, in which oneperson's

pains would onlycount as pains if othershad some tendency o treat hem

sympathetically;r in thestrongerense, in which absurdly)the existenceof

23See PI §§302 and350-1.For n interestingeview f work nteaching eoplewith utism owtoascribe ttitudestoothers,ee Swettenham000.

MEMORY, EXPRESSION,AND PAST-TENSESELF-KNOWLEDGE 63







one person's pains would actuallybe constituted y otherpeople's reactions

to them.25

4.Hi Past-tenseelf-ascriptions f

ntentional tates

In some cases, then,Wittgenstein'salkofprimitive xpressionsor reactions

carries a metaphysicalmessage. In others, t does not. What points is he

makingwhenhe calls a report f one's past intention response (PI §659),and says that the language-gameof tellingsomeone about a past wish or

intention hould be regarded s theprimary hing? will considerthatques-tion n three tages:epistemology,metaphysics,nd concept-acquisition.

4. Hi. Thepast-tense ase: epistemology

The epistemic pointof calling a report f one's past intention response istheone we have alreadyseen: in ordinary ases, myknowledgeof mypastintentionss immediate ndungrounded;t s nota report fdataprovidedby

introspectionr observation;nor is it an inference rom, r interpretationf,such data. As I have said,this eemsto me tobe correct.

4.iii.b Thepast-tense ase: metaphysics

Does the factthat we can make immediate,groundlessreportsof our pastintentionsnd wisheshave anymetaphysicalmport? said that, or hecase

of pain, Wittgenstein'stresson the idea ofprimitive, re-linguisticxpres-sions ofpain is partof a view aboutthemetaphysics fexperience.He seems

to suggestsomething imilarfornatural, re-linguisticxpressionsof a crea-

ture'scurrentntentions:

What s thenaturalxpressionf an intention?Look at a catwhen tstalks bird; ra beast

when twants oescape PI §647).

Exhibitingnaturalexpressionsof intention f thissortseems a preconditionfor creature ohave intentionsor

proto-intentions)t all. Andwhenwe turn

from the pre-linguistic o the linguisticcase, it is very plausible thatthe

ability ogive linguistic xpression o one's currentntentions to stateone's

intentionswithout elf-observationr self-interpretationis essential to the

possession of full-blownntentions y a conscious, language-using ubject.

Suppose one had no such immediate ccess to one's own currentntentions.

25This s not osaythatwe couldnotform he oncept f a kind fstate uchthat condi-tionfor neperson's eing n a state fthat ind s that ther eoplehave ome endencyto react owardshemwithympathynd concern.Wittgenstein'smaginedaseofa tribewith wo

onceptsakin o our

pain'" (RPPii

638) mightedeveloped

n thatway.)

Butthat s nothowour oncept fpainfunctions.

Wittgensteinxplicitlyinks his emarko hisearlier ommentsbout ensationsndtheirnaturalxpression;t s immediatelyollowedwith henote: ((Connexionwith roposi-tions bout ensations.))"

64 WILLIAM HILD







So one could tell whatone intendedonly by observingone's situation nd

behaviourand ascribing ntentionso onself n thesame kind ofwaythat ne

ascribes themto others. f thatwerereallyone's only way ofknowingone's

currentntentions,t could not be the case thatone's intentionswere formedbyone's decisions aboutwhat to do, in the ight f one's reasoning bout the

options.But intentionust is a state that s formed nd controlled n thatway;states that the subject could not standardlyknow about by recalling his

decisions orrecapitulatingisreasoningwould not be intentions.27

What about the past-tense ase? As things re, we have the capacityto

make immediate,groundless reportsof our past intentions; oth intentions

thatwe acted on and intentions hatwe formed ut nevertried o implement.But is thecapacityto make such immediatereports ssentialforsomeone's

having ntentions t all? To putthequestion n a differentorm, an we con-sistently escribe people who have intentions ut who have no immediate

access totheir wnpast intentions?28

Wittgensteinonsiders xactly hisquestion nthefollowing assage:

Suppose omeone ever aid"I wasgoing o do this hen" nd couldnotbe taughtouse such

an expressionither? It s surelylear hat person anthink lot withouthinkinghat.He

can master great reaof language,withoutmasteringhisone. I mean: he remembers is

expressions,ncludingerhapshat esaidsuch-and-sucho himself.o he will ay, .g., I said

tomyselfI want ogothere'"ndperhapslso"I imaginedhehouse ndwent n the ath hat

led there".What s characteristicere s thathe has his intentionsn theform fthoughts

r

picturesnd hence hat heywould lwaysbe replaceable ythe peaking f a sentencer the

seeingof a picture. he "lightningpeed"of thoughts missingn him. Butnow, s that

supposed omean thathe oftenmoves ike an automaton; alks n thestreet,erhaps,nd

makespurchases; utwhen nemeets im nd asks "Where reyougoing?" he stares tone

as ifhewere leep-walking?He won't nswer I don'tknow" ither. rwillhisproceedingsstrike im, rus, s planless? don't eewhy

When go tothebaker, ay,perhaps saytomyselfI needbread" nd gotheusualway.If someone sks him"Where re you going?" wantto assumethathe answerswith he

expressionf ntentionustas we do. But willhe also say:"As I left hehouse, wasmeaningtogo tothebaker, utnow .."? No; butoughtwe tosaythat n this ccount esetouton his

way s itwere leep-walking?But sn't tthen emarkablehat,n all thegreat arietyf mankind e do notmeet uch

peopleas this?Or are there uchpeopleamongthemental efectives;nd it is merely ot

sufficientlybserved hichanguage-gameshese recapableof and which ot?RPP i 178-9)

For xtensiveevelopmentf the ineofthoughtuggestedere,ee Moran 001Some will think hat hequestion,whetherhecapacity o make mmediateeportsfone'spast ntentionssessential or ossessingntentions,s unWittgensteinian.ut Witt-

gensteins actually uitehappy odistinguishetweenheessential nd the nessentialfeaturesfmental henomenancasesofexactlyhis ort. ee e.g. PI p. 175 andRPP i

163,177,282-3,666,871.29Wittgensteins talkingbout hephenomenonfrememberingn intentionnehad formomentutthen bandoned. hat s clearfromhe ontext,nd also from heZettel er-sion,which tarts:Suppose human eingnever earnt he xpressionI was on thepointof or I was ust going o ' andcouldnot earn heir se?" Z 43)








The case Wittgensteinmaginesseems to be this. The personbehaves pur-

posivelyand intelligibly; e does not behave like a mereautomaton;he has,and acts on, intentions. urthermore,t seems that he can set out withone

intention,hen

changehismindand act on a differentntention. e can

givereports f his current ntentionsjust as we do"; so he satisfies hecondition

thatpossessingintentionsequires heability o makeimmediate, ngrounded

judgements boutone's currentntentions.What he lacks is just theability o

give an immediate,non-inferentialeport f a past intention eitherone on

which he acted or one that he never tried to implement; he can never

remember n intentionxceptbyrememberingheexpressionof an intention"

(RPP i 225). If Wittgenstein'sdea is, as it appears to be, that all this is

coherentlymaginable,then it looks as thoughhe does not thinkthat the

abilityomake immediate

eportsf one's

pastintentions

laysa constitutive

role: either n the weaker sense thatdirect ccess to one's past intentionss an

essential condition forpossessing intentions; r in the stronger ense that

facts bout one's past intentionsre directly onstitutedy thereports ne is

disposedto make.30

Should we conclude that, houghwe do in fact have theabilityto make

immediatereportsof our past attitudes, hatability s not essentialforthe

possession of intentional tates either n Wittgenstein'sview or in fact?

That would be too quick,for number freasons.

First,the quoted discussionfromWittgensteins evidently entative ndexperimental.And,rather hanoffering view,he asks a seriesof rhetorical

questions which he leaves unanswered. The man he describes would

evidentlybe verydifferentromus. Wittgenstein eed not have had a view

aboutwhether hedifferences ould be so greatthat heconceptof intention

could notproperly e appliedto him.

Second, Wittgenstein's hought-experimentocuses on memory f inten-

tions with which we acted and memoryof unimplementedntentions.He

imaginesthose forms fmemory ltogetheracking.But, as he describesthe

case, the subjectwho has no memory fhis formerntentions oes not lackall memoryof intentionalfacts about himself.Faced with the question,"Where was I intendingo go?", thesubjectcannotsimplyremember hathe

was intending o go to the house. But he can "rememberhis expressions

[Aufierungen]"'.o, forexample,he can remember hathe said to himself I

wantto go there";and ("perhaps") he can remember hat he imaginedthe

house and went on thepaththat ed there.Here Wittgensteineemsto take it

It s,again,worthmentioninghe ase ofpeoplewith utism s a possible eal-lifexam-

pleof the

phenomenonhat

Wittgensteinsimagining. xperimental

videnceuggeststhat omepeoplewith utism reextremelyadatrecallingheir ast ntentions.Phillips,

Baron-Cohennd Rutter 998.) Such evidencemighthow that hese ubjectshavenot

properly rasped he oncept ftheirwnpast ntentions.ut tdoes not howthat heydonot eally ave ntentionst all.

66 WILLIAM CHILD







forgranted hat hesubjectremembers,ay,walking or thathe walked).And

remembering walking is remembering somethingunder an intentional

description; hesubjectdoes notmerelyremember isbody moving n such-

and-sucha way and have to figure ut whether r notthat series of) bodilymovement(s) was an action. So even if the thought-experiments fully

coherent,t does not showthatwe can makesenseof the dea ofa personwho

entirelyacks thecapacityto remembernyof hispast intentional roperties.Itsfocus s more imited han hat.

Third, independently f Wittgenstein's wn treatment f the thought-

experiment,tmightbe arguedthatthere re limits o how far t is possiblefor omeonewho genuinely ossesses intentional tates o lack thecapacityto

remember heir ntentions, eliefs,wishesand so on. It is easy to make sense

ofthe dea of someonewho is much worse thanwe are at remembering hatthey ntended r wished a year,or a month, r a week ago; someone whose

onlyway ofknowingwhatthey ntended r wanted then s to interpretheir

past actionsas they nterprethe actions ofothers.Buthow well can we make

sense of the dea of someonewho simplyhas no capacityto remembernyof

theirpast intentionaltates?We might rgue thatwe cannot make sense of

that dea at all. The argumentmightgo like this."An intention s a state that

rationally ontrols ction and practicalreasoning.And it can only play that

role if one can keep trackof it over time. f one forgot ne's intentions s

soon as one had formed hem, ne could notplan one's actions n the ight fone's intentions,ne could notmonitor ne's intentionsnd revise them n

the ightofsubsequentdevelopments, nd crucially one could notact at a

later tageon an intentionhat ne had formed arlier.But ifone could not do

anyofthat, ne could notengage inpracticalreasoning nd rational ctionat

all. A simpleexample illustrates hepoint.Suppose I go to the kitchenwith

the intention f collectingmy razor but that,by the time I arrive, have

forgotten hyI came. Because I have forgottenmyintentiono collect my

razor,the ntentionan playno rational ole incontrollingmyaction; do not

knowwhat to do in thekitchenbecause I cannotrememberwhy came. Inthis case, the action-stultifyingailureof memory s limited to a singleintention.But if I could never remember ny of my intentions, ll action

wouldbe impossible."31The arguments correct s far s itgoes. But it tradeson an ambiguityn

the idea ofrememberingn intention.32n one sense,rememberingn inten-

tion is simplya matter f retaining n intention have formed arlier. In

another ense, rememberingn intention s a matter f rememberinghat

had that ntentiont some earliertime,whether rnotI stillhave it. And the

For interesting eflectionson the extent to which verysevere amnesia preventsrational

thought nd action,see Sacks 1985.

I am indebtedhere to Ralph Wedgwood.








considerationsust advancedonlygiveus a reasonto think hat easoning nd

action requireone to remember ne's earlier intentionsn the first ense.

Suppose that form he ntentionnFebruary o takemybrother ut fordin-

ner nOctober.Aslong

as Igo

onintending

o take himto dinner nOctober

I will be able to reasonand plan as I need to: keeping mydiaryfree forthe

day,making hebookingand,whenthe timescomes,goingfor he meal. But

thatdoes notrequirethat, t each stage, shouldnotonlyretain he ntention

to takemybrother o dinnerbut also knowthat have had that ntention t

each previous stage. Of course I can in fact remembermyintentionsn this

strongerense too: as thedayofthe dinner rawsnear, t s not ust that still

intend to take mybrother o dinner; also rememberhaving formed hat

intentionnFebruary nd havinghad it since then.But is thisfurtherevel of

memory ctuallynecessaryfor ction and

practicalreasoning?Thingswould certainly e verydifferentfwe lacked thefurtherevel of

memory. or example, f wereengagedin some extended ction, would at

each stageknow the ntention ithwhich was acting t that tage;so I could

planwhat needed to do nextto fulfilmy ntention. ut at each stage would

not rememberwhat I had intended to do before. So, though I would

frequentlyindmyself n situationswheremypast actions had preparedthe

way forwhat I now intended o do, I would notknow thatthereasonwhythoseactionscoordinated o conveniently ithmypresent ntentions as that

I had performedhem s earlier tages nthe mplementationfthe

planIwasstillpursuing.Or again, if could notrememberwhat had intended odo at

an earliertime, would have no directway of tellingwhether r not I had

succeeded in doingwhat intended.Would thismatter?We are familiarwith

cases in which I do something ntentionallywithoutknowingthatI have

succeeded in implementingmy intention.But the standardcases are ones

where knowwhat intended odo, butdo notknowwhat have achieved.33

What we are contemplatings the reversephenomenon: know whatmyaction has achieved; but I do not know whetherthat counts as success

because I do notknow whatI intended o do when I performed he action.That can happen in particular ases; it is perfectly ossible to know what

have achieved even when have forgotten hat was tryingo do. Perhaps t

could be shown thatsuch cases must be exceptions so thatthe general

ability o rememberwhat one intended o do in the recentpast (at least) is a

necessaryconditionfor rational action. But nothingwe have seen so far

suggestshow suchan argumentwouldgo.To sumup. As things re,we have twocapacities:thecapacityto retain n

intentionormed tone time nd to reason and act on it at later imes;and the

Fortwo lassicexamples writingwillwith he ntentionfmaking rovisionor ne'schildren,ndpressing ard n thepagewith he ntentionfproducingen egible arbon

copies- seeDavidson1980 90-1.

68 WILLIAMHILD







capacityto knowimmediatelyboutthe ntentions, ishes and so on thatwe

had at particularpast times.The first apacity is certainly ssential for the

possession of intentions. ut what of the second capacity?We can certainly

conceive ofpeople who have intentions ut whose ability o rememberwhattheypreviously ntended s much more restricted han ours. And we have

foundno reasonofprinciplefor hinkinghat heability oengage inpractical

reasoning nd rational ction could not survive nthecomplete bsence of the

secondcapacity.34

4.iii.c Thepast-tense ase: concept-acquisition

We have a practiceof makingpast-tense elf-ascriptionsf intentions. ut

how do we gettheconceptof a past intention? ow do we gettheconceptof

a past intentionhatthe agentneverattempted o implement?And on whatbasis do we come toapplytheseconceptsto ourselves and others?

Wittgenstein's nswer to these questionsstartswith the thought hatwe

acquire the conceptof our past intentions y learning o produce the utter-

ances thatwe come to understand s reports f those intentions. o the lan-

guage-gameof producingthose utterances s (or starts ffas) a "proto-phe-nomenon" PI §654)- it s "theproto-typefa wayofthinking,ot the result

of thought"Z 541). That is the lesson forconcept-acquisition f his claim

thatthe language-gameof reporting r confessing ntentions s theprimary

thing:

How does anyone learn to ... understandthe order "Throw "; and how, the expression of

intention Now I am going to throw"? Well thegrown-upsmayperform eforethechild,may

pronounce the word and straightway hrow, but now the child must mitate that. "But that s

theexpressionof intention nlyifthe child reallyhas the ntentionn itsmind" But then when

does one say that hat s thecase?)

And how does it learn to use theexpression"I was just about to throw"?And how does one

know that t was thenreallyin the state of mindthat call "being about to throw"?After uch-

and-such language games have been taught it, then on such-and-such occasions it uses the

words that the grown-ups spoke in such cases, or it uses a moreprimitiveformof expression,

which contains the essential relations to what it has previously learnt,and the grown-upssubstitute heregularform f expressionfor he moreprimitive ne (RPP i 163).

This model, like Wittgenstein'smodel foracquiringthe concept of pain

(in bothfirst-personnd third-personpplications), s anti-intellectualist.nd

as in the case of otherminds,we can ask two questions:How much can be

claimed forthis model of concept-acquisition;nd how muchdoes Wittgen-steinclaim? He clearlysuggeststhat, s things ctuallyare,we do come to

grasp theconcept of our past intentionsn partby being trained o produce

34 Even if we could show that hecapacity to remember ne's intentionsn thestronger ense

was essential for rational action, the argumentwould presumably apply directlyonly tothose past intentionson which we had acted; nothingwould follow about the ability toremember n intention hatone had had for momentbutdid not even try o implement.

MEMORY, EXPRESSION,ANDPAST-TENSESELF-KNOWLEDGE 69









it splausible hat rasp ftheverydea of thepastdoesrequire ne to haveimmediatenowledge,iamemory,fat least omepaststates f affairs:fsomeonehad no memoryt all, and their xperiencewas confined o

awareness f howthings resentlyre,how couldtheyo much

sform

heconcept fthe ast?But t s onethingo make very eneral laim bout he

dependencefthe oncept fthe ast npossession f ome mmediate odeofaccess to somepaststates f affairs.t is anotherhingo claim hat, oreachconcept f a kind fpast-tensetate f affairshat negrasps, ne musthave mmediateccessto somepast tates faffairsfthat ype.fsomeone

already grasps the generaldistinctionetweenpast and present, ndunderstandshat t s for omeone o intend odo something,t s not lear

why he shouldnoton that asis be able tograspwhat t s for omeone o

have ntendedodosomethingn the ast.Second, ven fwe accept heWittgensteinianrgument,e cannot on-clude that rasp f theconcept fa past ntentionequires irect ccess toone'spast ntentions.heargumentims o show hat avinghe oncept f

past ntentionequires grasp fthe ircumstancesnderwhich tcan be saidthat omeone ntended o O whichgoes beyondmasteryf the simpleprinciple,'I intendedoO' tells f ustthe ame hingn the ast s 'I intendto O' in thepresent". ut, on the face of it, someonecan satisfy hatcondition ithout aving nydirect ccess to herownpast ntentions.he

might egard erownpastbehaviour s sheregardshepastbehaviourfothers,earn bout hecomplexways nwhich ast ntentionselate opastbehaviourincluding astexpressionsf ntention),nd earn o ascribe astintentionso herself sing hesameinterpretativeethods he employsn

ascribingast ntentionsoothers.n thatway, he could cquire he onceptofherownpast ntentionsithoutelyingnany bilityomakegroundlessself-ascriptionsf past intentionsjust as, we speculated,omeonewithautismould cquire he oncept f others' ainwithoutelyingnanynatu-raltendencyorespondo others ithympathyndconcern.

I conclude hatwehave beengivenno reason othinkhat heonlywayfor subject oacquire he oncept fherpast ntentionsnvolvesearningomake mmediate,ngroundedeportsfthose ntentions.

5. Common ense ndretrospectiveonstitution

What onnects pastthoughtr attitudeo tsobject?The realist boutpastintentionalhenomenahinkshat,whatevertis, it must e somethinghatwas true f the ubject tthe ime hehadthathoughtr attitude. series fcommentsn Wittgenstein ay suggest less realistview.There s, for

example, he dea that subject's udgementboutan earlier emarkmaymake connectionetween hat emarknd tsobjectratherhanoras well

MEMORY, EXPRESSION,AND PAST-TENSE SELF-KNOWLEDGE 7 1







as) describing he connection.39 nd there s thesuggestion hat if have two

friendswith the same name and am writing ne of thema letter .. the fact

that am notwritingtto the other"mayconsist n"v/hziollowsthewriting"

(Z§7).It is sometimes suggested that there is really nothingcounterintuitive

about the idea that ntentional onnectionsmaybe setup after heevent. On

thisview,whatthe realistpresents s an affront o common sense is actuallyan ordinary act of everyday xperience.Consider whatWittgenstein ays in

passages such as thefollowing:

It's likesearchingor wordwhenyouarewritingnd then aying: That s it, hat xpresseswhat intended " Your cceptanceertifiesheword s having eenfound nd hence s beingthe neyouwere ooking or.Inthis nstance e couldreally ay:wedon'tknowwhatwe are

looking or ntilwe havefoundt whichs likewhatRussell ays boutwishing.)CV 68)

On the basis of such examples,it maybe claimed that there are cases that

meetthefollowing airofconditions:

Condition a) I was at the earliertime ookingfor hisparticularword or

thing;

Condition b) There was nothing boutme at the time thatmade it true

that was lookingforust thisword orthing.

In such cases, itmaybe suggested,what makes ittrue hat was lookingfor

just this word or thingreally s mysubsequent, etrospectiveudgementthat

that s what was lookingfor.

Wittgenstein's emarks uggestvarious different inds of case. But I shall

argue against drawing any such anti-realist onclusion; there s no case in

whichtherewas at thepast time a determinatehingmeant,or intended, r

wantedetc.,but where the identity f thatthing s constitutivelyetermined

bythesubject's retrospectiveudgement.

In a first ind ofcase, there s a particular hing hat intend r want.But Icannotdescribe,or otherwise pecify t; I simplyhave the capacityto rec-

ognize it when see it. n sucha case, when say "That's what was lookingfor", t is truethat was lookingforthatparticular hing t thepast time;so

thecase meets condition a). But in such a case, therewas something bout

me at the time n virtue f which twas thentruethat was lookingforthis

thing;namely,that had thecapacityto recognizeit as the one I meant;so

thiscase fails condition b). It is an importantWittgensteiniannsight hat

39See PI

§§682-4.Wrightuoteshese ections s confirmationhatt s "on the

rightxe-

geticaltracks" o suggest hat a subject'savowals have "a constitutiveather han

descriptiveole" 1987 139).For furtheriscussion f this ort fcase,see PI pp. 218-19.Fora related xample,eeRPP 60.

72 WILLIAM HILD







recognitional apacity for a particular hingor propertymay be basic and

ungrounded41: can recognize somethingmmediately,without omparing t

witha mentaltemplateand withoutknowinghow I recognize it.42But we

shouldnotconfusethatfactwith he dea that omething an be theobject ofmyattitude t a time even though here s nothing t all about me at the time

tolinktheattitude o that bject.In a second sort of case, theattitude had at thepast timewas directed,

not at a particular thing, but at whatever thing fitted some general

specification. or example, wanttofind hebestwayofarrangingomenew

plants in a flower-bed. tryvarious possibilities,see that this is the best

arrangement,nd say: "That's thearrangementwas lookingfor " There is a

sense inwhichthe claim is true: ince I was lookingfor hearrangementhat

would look best,and this s thearrangementhat ooks best,we can say thatthis is the arrangement was lookingfor. But theparticular rrangement

subsequentlydentifys fittinghegeneral specification id notfigure n the

content f the attitude had at thetime.There is, again,no questionhere of

an intentional onnectionbeing retrospectivelyonstituted: he case meets

conditionb) but failsconditiona).In a third ortofcase, thepast episode does not have a content hat peci-

fies even ingeneraltermswhat t s directed owards.For example, wakeupone day feeling nxious,but without nysense of what am anxious about. n

theevening, think boutwhy had thefeeling. realize that t vanishedafterI had completedsome unpleasant ask that knew had toperform hatday.The judgement, That's what was anxiousabout ", expressesmyrealization

about the cause of the earlier sense of anxiety. In this case, the later

judgementreveals somethinghatwas trueofmysense ofanxiety t the time

I felt t namely,whatwas causing it.But it does nottellus anythingbout

its intentional irectedness:for thefeeling tselfdid not have a content hat

specifieda particular bject; I felt nxious,but I did not feel anxious about

theunpleasanttask.43

Finally,and relatedly, here re cases wherethe udgement That's who Iwantedtomeet", ay, s theresult freflectingnmybehaviour nd ascribing

myself n attitude hat had not realized I had. For example, go to a partywouldnormally void tellingmyself hat willbe able to do some business

withJones. When I get to the party, see Smith,an attractivenewcomer

Ungrounded,hats,at the evelofconscious houghtndphenomenologywhichs,for

Wittgenstein,he evel at whichphilosophyas opposedto empirical sychology)mustoperate.42See e.g.BB 85-9,PI §604.

See BB 21-2.Wittgensteinllows hat,fmy enseofanxietys causedbytheknowledgethat heres anunpleasantask obedone, hen heres a sense n which couldbe saidtobe worried bouttheunpleasant ask. But he consistentlyaintainshat his enseofaboutness whichhas to do with hecausalorigin f a feeling r emotion is entirelydifferentromhe boutness fgenuinententionalonnectedness.

MEMORY, EXPRESSION,ANDPAST-TENSE SELF-KNOWLEDGE 73







whom want togettoknow.My reaction fpleasuremakes me acknowledgean ulteriormotive;"That's whom wantedtomeet ". In thiscase, Smithdoes

figure n the contentof the earlierdesire I self-ascribe; o the case meets

conditiona).

Since the earlier desire wasrepressed

orunacknowledged,would not earlier have identified mith as the person I wanted to meet.

Nonetheless, herewas somethingbout me at the time thatmade ittrue hat

itwas Smith whomI wantedto meet:after ll, thedesireto meetSmith ed

me to come to a party wouldnormally void; so thecase fails conditionb).When I make the later udgement, am learning omething hatwas alreadytrue boutmyearlier ttitudes; am notconstitutinghat ruth.

I conclude thatnone of these cases supports he idea thatpast intentional

connectionscan be constituted y something he subject latersays or does.

Ournatural,

ealistviewremains ntact.44

44An earlier version of this paper was presentedat the APA Eastern Division Meeting in

Washington DC in December 2003; I am grateful o Ed Minar, who responded on that

occasion. Versions of some of thematerial werepresented t the International olloquiumon Wittgenstein nd 20th Century Analytic Philosophy, Peking University, n October

2002, at ECAP 4 in Lund, in June2002, and at the Universitiesof Oxford, York, Bristol,

Nottingham, Prague, Southampton, Birmingham, and Vercelli. I am grateful to the

audiences on those occasions formany helpfulcomments and objections, and particularlyto Anita

Avramides,Tom

Baldwin,Paul

Boghossian,Jessica

Brown,DarraghByrne,John

Campbell, David Charles, Philippa Foot, Paul Horwich, Michael Forster,Robert Kirk,Marie McGinn, Penelope Mackie, Adrian Moore, Harold Noonan, Paul Noordhof,David

Owen, David Pears, Aaron Ridley,Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra,Genia Schoenbaumsfeld,

Ralph Wedgwood, MeredithWilliams,and Tim Williamson.

74 WILLIAM CHILD







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Wittgenstein,. RPP i: Remarks n thePhilosophyofPsychology,Volume ,editedbyG. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. vonWright, ranslated yG. E.

M. Anscombe.Oxford:Blackwell, 1980.

Wittgenstein,. RPP ii: Remarks on thePhilosophyof Psychology,Volume

2, editedbyG. H. von Wright ndH. Nyman, ranslated yC. G. Luck-

hardt ndM. A. E. Aue. Oxford:Blackwell, 1980.

Wittgenstein,. Z: Zettel,2nd Edition,editedbyG. E. M. Anscombeand G.

H. von Wright, ranslated y G.E.

M. Anscombe. Oxford:Blackwell,1981.

Wright, . 1987: "On MakingUp One's Mind:Wittgensteinn Intention",n

Wright 001a.

Wright,C. 1989: "Wittgenstein'sRule-FollowingConsiderationsand the

CentralProjectof TheoreticalLinguistics",nWright 001a.

Wright,C. 1991: "Wittgenstein's aterPhilosophyof Mind: Sensation,Pri-

vacyand Intention",nWright 001a.

Wright,C. 2001a: Rails to Infinity: ssays on Themes rom Wittgenstein's

Philosophical Investigations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress.

Wright, . 2001b: "The ProblemofSelf-Knowledge",nWright 001a.

Wright,C, Smith,B., and Macdonald, C. 1998: KnowingOur Own Minds.

Oxford: OxfordUniversity ress.

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