Society & Its Transformations, Vol. 3 No. 1, April 2014

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SOCIETY & ITS TRANSFORMATIONS

An Annual Academic Journal on Social Issues

Volume 3 • April 2014

3 SOCIETY & ITS TRANSFORMATIONS

SOCIETY & ITS TRANSFORMATIONS

An Annual Academic Journal on Social Issues

Volume 3, April 2014

Editor-in-Chief

Denise Kara

Managing Editor Tiffany Huang

Graduate Consultants

Syed Muhammad Muneeb Ali Umberto Cappella

Editorial Board Israh Enaz Yusra Qazi Stevelle Steer Tony Ye

Contributors Omar AlBitar Olimpia Bidian Rashna Mohamed Diana Pegoraro Ameera Rasheed Santiago Vega

Cover Design and Layout

Denise Kara

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Table of Contents 5 Letter from the Editor-in-Chief 6 Self-Representation on Facebook: Opportunities for Change in Social Structure Santiago Vega

16 Family or Firm?: Why Having Children is Causing Many Women to Leave the Legal Profession Diana Pegoraro 23 Expert Testimony Empowers Women and Legitimizes Battered Woman Syndrome Ameera Rasheed

31 Welfare States, Governmentality, and Income Inequality: A Comparative Analysis of Canada & Sweden Omar AlBitar

40 Questions of Identity for Indo-Caribbean Muslims: A Case Study in the Social Construction of Ethnicity Rashna Mohamed 47 From Dictatorship to Democracy: Towards a Holistic Understanding of Fertility in Romania Olimpia Bidian


Letter from the Editor-in-Chief I assume that you are here, reading this publication because you want to know more about humanity, or society. My goal for this publication was to expand submissions from not only the Sociology department, but from others as well. I was somewhat successful in this endeavour, acquiring papers from the Human Biology, Immunology, Criminology, Political Science, and Caribbean Studies department. I wanted to show you, my reader, that sociology does not merely intersect these disciplines, but that it fundamentally transcends them. Sociology is a relatively new discipline in the history of academic study, and it is important that we, as a generation of infant sociologists, shape it, and mould it for successive generations to come by interacting with varying disciplines to determine sociology’s strengths, and most of all—weaknesses. We must understand our weaknesses before we come to know and understand our strengths. In this publication, you will find essays by Diana Pegoraro and Ameera Rasheed on the structural disadvantages women face. Omar AlBitar will challenge our intuitive notions of Sweden as a generous welfare state. Santiago Vega will discuss the implications of our newest development in societal interaction, Facebook. Olimpia Bidian will use demography to show us how fertility is affected by policies. While Rashna Mohamed will give us the reverse of a statistical understanding of the world, as she will show us the social construction of ethnicity through her qualitative work in the field. My hope is that you, my reader, will enter into a broader conversation not only with your own critical mind, but also with those around you. I would like to thank the undergraduate editors (Yusra Qazi, Israh Enaz, Stevelle Steer, and Tony Ye) for their hard work, enthusiasm, and thoughtful comments while editing. I would also like to thank the graduate editors, Umberto Cappella and Syed Muhammad Muneeb Ali for offering their seasoned insights. Thank you Diana Pegoraro for allowing me to succeed you as Editor-in-Chief. I hope I have carried on your vision with adequacy. Thank you to the Undergraduate Sociology Students’ Union (USSU), particularly Jesica Samuel and once again, Israh Enaz, for their sustained support of SIT’s activities. Thank you to all of the students who submitted their essays for ruthless scrutiny. It was very difficult for our editorial board to choose which ones would make it to publication. And thank you to you—the reader. I have one last thing to say to you, my diligent reader. Question the publication title’s premise, Society & Its Transformations, by asking has society (or does society) ever truly progress?

Denise Kara Editor-in-Chief

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Self-Representation on Facebook: Opportunities for Change in Social Structure

Santiago Vega

This paper is an exploration into the relationship between the social actor and the emerging social network "field," with a specific focus on Facebook. Of particular interest is the way in which self-representation takes place in relation to cognitive schema, and the “frames” this process creates that influences the production and consumption of culture. I conclude with a discussion regarding the possibility of change in social structure as a function of Facebook use.

I. INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW The eruption of social network platforms such as Facebook and Twitter onto the cultural landscape represents a significant stage of development in the relationship

between society and computer technology. As these sites become increasingly pervasive in daily experience, their effect takes on a supra-individual quality that endows reality with a new dimension, and consequently, may affect the totality of


society itself (Durkheim 1995). This great potential warrants further study so as to untangle the relationships between the new medium, individuals, and culture. This paper explores the relationship between the social actor and the emerging social network “field,” with a specific focus on Facebook. Of particular interest is the way in which self-representation takes place in relation to cognitive schema. I conclude with a brief discussion regarding the possibility of change in social structure as a function of Facebook use. For the sociologist, it is of great relevance to establish analytical models for determining exactly how the processes of socialization and social reproduction become influenced by online social networks (OSNs). The evaluation of these networks is multifaceted as these social platforms may operate differently on various levels and thus affect culture in varied, and sometimes incoherent ways. Friedland and Alford (1991) deem these levels a basic tenet of “the new institutionalism,” a theoretical stance in which

...adequate social theory must work at three levels of analysis – individuals competing and negotiating, organizations in conflict and coordination, and institutions in contradiction and interdependency…To restore meaning to social analysis in a way which is neither subjectivist, functionalist, nor teleological, the notion of institutional contradictions is vital (P. 241).

In this context, “institution” is both material and symbolic; the term does not necessarily imply scale in a material sense, but rather a salient “logic” that is dynamically related to other institutional logics in society. Thus, the institutional logic of “the family” is just as relevant for social analysis as that of “the state”, despite the fact that the family is a much smaller social unit than the state. Accordingly,

online social networks should be understood as a medium by which various institutional logics may come to interact and necessarily clash due to their mutual incompatibility. As institutions become manifested in OSNs, it is helpful to determine a point of reference from which to assess the effects of the new medium on culture. I advance that the online behaviour of individuals is of much relevance to this end. Furthermore, it is vital to understand the dynamics that motivate individuals to participate online (e.g. institutional logics), and these dynamics, I suggest, are essentially cognitive. Thus, cognition-based formulations of culture serve as optimal analytical tools to crystallize the relationship between individuals and OSNs, and among these, cognitive schemata constitute the starting point. Schemata encompass both the representation of knowledge and the mechanism by which environmental inputs are “decoded” (DiMaggio 1997). Along with cognition, a complimentary level of analysis involves the OSN medium itself. Given the brief historical presence of online social networks, we must evaluate how this new environment departs from more traditional forms of communication and cultural diffusion. This complicates the researcher’s task since different OSNs vary in the features they offer participants and the type of dialogue they promote. These incongruences between platforms suggest that research is more fruitful when engaging with one site at a time. For this reason, the content of this paper centers on Facebook and how it relates to culture and cognition. II. FACEBOOK Boyd and Ellison (2008) define social networking sites as:

…web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile

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within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system. The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to site (P. 211).

Featuring 900 million active users (and 500 million active users each day) as of March 2012 (cited in Giglietto, Rossi and Benato 2012:149), Facebook is arguably one of the most prominent environments of the “networked society.” Networked societies emerge through a process of technological and informational integration which continues to develop and transform society. This process includes grassroots movements, the distribution of resources, and the creation and dissemination of cultural products. The peculiarities of a networked society affects various social environments differently. Nevertheless, it exhibits particular characteristics that render it unique: it is informational, global, and networked (Castells 2000). These novel qualities yield a new layer of social life that is characterized by decentralization:

[Networks] On the one hand, they are the most flexible, and adaptable forms of organization, able to evolve with their environment and with the evolution of the nodes that compose the network. On the other hand, they have considerable difficulty in co-ordinating functions, in focusing resources on specific goals, [and] in managing the complexity of a given task beyond a certain size of network (P. 15).

Castells’ conceptualization of the new technological mode of cultural production is helpful in that it suggests a brand new

layer of social structure upon which the production of meaning is negotiated on the layer’s own terms. On Facebook, the way in which communication functions is important to consider since it differs from the direct communication that occurs in traditional mediums. Scholarship in the field of communication clarifies the distinction:

…the spatio-temporality of interpersonal communication is broken down online, and the hypertextuality of online communication also distances it from conversation. The alternative idea that “many” are communicating with “many” is also inadequate, since “many” in this case indicates a collective agency, which we do not believe exists. Online we appear as “ones,” individual actors (persons and organizations alike) that directly interact with a minority and indirectly interact with the majority (Gulbrandsen, Just 2011: 1100).

Guldbransten et. al. advance a “collaborative paradigm” of online communication. The “collaborative” aspect is intended to be connotation-free and suggests that the new medium favours de-individualized interaction based on the constant flow of information that is never static, and often incoherent. From this theoretical approach, we can only think in terms of “snapshots” of online activity, or “ongoing interaction” as the object of analysis. As individuals engage directly (with each other) and indirectly (with the majority) in an environment greatly devoid of spatial and temporal imperatives, the possibility of a new context in which a consciousness projects itself virtually through Facebook emerges.

Self-Representation on Facebook


Alteration of communication via Facebook may be interpreted as a form of “environmental triggering.” Environmental triggering assumes that cultural schemata are separated by “domains,” and that as individuals switch between domains, their “perspectives, attitudes, preferences, and dispositions may change radically” (DiMaggio 280). Significant changes in culture may be the result of “large-scale, more-or-less simultaneous frame switches by many interdependent actors” (Ibid). Facebook operates as the frame, a cognitive environment wherein persons are in a position to develop alternate, Facebook specific, schema, which in themselves (due to their scale) may suggest significant cultural changes. The development of Facebook decoding schemata varies in accordance to individuals’ attributes. This occurs both in the way in which others’ activities on Facebook are interpreted and in the way in which the interpretation influences how an individual self-represents virtually. The following section explores how the social structure intersects with the virtual via Facebook. III. SELF-REPRESENTATION Socialization generates a relationship to the self, both externally and internally. Mead’s (1934) “generalized other” is the conceptualization of the external relationship to the self, otherwise known as the “I.” The “I” responds to social context based on internalized assumptions of one’s place within the collective. The “me” constitutes more immediate reactions that are akin to choosing whether or not to follow one’s assumed role. The internal and external expressions of the self are, in turn, compounded by the prevalence of a frame. “Frames” are normative evaluations of specific situations in which particular schemata become salient and inform behaviour; for instance, whether one is part of an audience, and whether it is at a metal concert or at the ballet (Goffman 1974: 21).

Since the experiences that give rise to the self are materially constrained by social structure, it is expected that cultural schemata develop along these constraints. Bourdieu’s (1984) habitus sustains that cultural orientations are instilled early in life and embodied naturally (i.e. subconsciously). These embodiments become the hallmark of the dominant class thus reproducing distinctions between classes while legitimizing them simultaneously. As such, Facebook constitutes a new field (in Bourdieu’s sense) in which individual activity may be construed as a cultural performance that reproduces the social structure. Indeed, making a distinction was a foundational principle of the social network. Early in its development, Facebook established a sense of insularity as it was available only among certain elite academic institutions (Joinson, cited in Giglietto et. al: 149). Empirical data further suggests the extension of social structure onto Facebook. A study of U.S. undergraduates at a state university found that students coming from higher socioeconomic backgrounds, exhibit network qualities that suggest social advantages. Students whose parents are of a higher socioeconomic status had larger and denser networks. These network differences suggest that socioeconomic status enables the young to develop social capital to a greater extent as a function of their parents’ own cultural and economic capital. Furthermore, as perceived popularity on Facebook is public knowledge, and is observable based on an individual’s friend count, these individuals may become increasingly coveted as potential friends (Brooks, Welser, Hogan, and Tistsworth 2011). As Facebook contributes to the reproduction of the social structure, it also influences the formation of the schemata by which culture comes to be interpreted in a particular field. A popular person is in a position to establish or to follow patterns of cultural consumption (trends, fashion, movies, etc.) that, by virtue of the

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individual’s popularity, may come to be accepted as ideal or desirable by others. As the social structure becomes virtual by favouring privileged individuals’ expansion of their social and cultural capital, the effects on other Facebook users’ cognitive schemata begins to take shape. Silver and Lee (2012) distil the internal and external self through a network-based approach which delineates the relationship between the current self and the idealized self by sustaining that people are constantly motivated by a projected self, which features some improvement in relation to their current self. Culture is the avenue through which Facebook enables individuals to achieve and portray a self that is closer to their subjective ideal. Of course, the ideal is socially constructed and develops according to the schema by which the social actor conceives of his or herself, as well as others. Thus, as certain members become distinguished by virtue of their profile (their popularity, for instance), others may come to find them and their perceived qualities as more akin to their ideal self. The embodiment of the ideal self is cognitively internalized and becomes actualized through emulation in cultural consumption. For instance, a study across American universities found that Facebook social networks tend to cluster along political ideology (Gaines and Mondak 2009). That is, people tend to associate with those who they perceive to share their own cultural dispositions (in this example, political beliefs). The authors present the caveat that some self-declared liberals may be falsely representing their beliefs seeing that they belong to the minority, “which is itself significant because it suggests a possible discrepancy between the political views of the individual and those of whom he or she is willing to express” (P. 229). The point of authenticity in self-representation is an important one. Signaling theory “models the relationship between signals and qualities, showing

why certain signals are reliable and others are not” (Donath 2008: 233). The basic concern here is whether or not Facebook facilitates a way to verify how similar representation and reality are. A perceived disconnect between self-representation and actuality is influential in the way people assess the value of others’ character and cultural practices as factual and worthy of consideration. In this sense, Facebook provides a reasonable degree of reliability since it does not encourage indiscriminate collecting of “friends.” Instead, it relies mostly on offline vetting by trusted sources. Accordingly, Vasalou, Joinson, and Courvoisier (2010) show that, primordially, Facebook use across all ages is motivated by “social browsing” and not “social searching,” further suggesting that the maintenance of offline ties is the primary use of Facebook. Thus, OSNs like Facebook “can actually increase trustworthiness, by placing people within a context that can enforce social mores. Social networking sites (SNSs) make people aware that their friends and colleagues are looking at their self-representation” (Donath 236). The literature suggests that people connect on Facebook as long as a common point of reference is present. As mentioned above, this can be in the form of a common friend. Another university population study (Lampe, Ellison, and Steinfield 2007) found that profile information may also serve as a common referent by which individuals establish the viability of a potential Facebook friendship. These referents include profile information that is common between two people such as attended educational institutions, favourite music, and the “about me” section. In the study, the completion of these profile categories was associated with the greatest difference in network size. Consumption of culture on Facebook is a form of self-representation that becomes explicit as statements of taste. However, self-representation itself is motivated by



social actors’ self-interpretations, which themselves are informed by discrete cognitive schema. Given that schemata are socially constructed, it follows that individual interpretations of taste are possible to categorize within broader categories or subcultures. As a profile is completed, Facebook users employ culture to make statements about their membership in certain audiences, and simultaneously, to their own position within an audience. Hugo Liu’s (2008) study of MySpace profiles is applicable to Facebook in this regard. Framing profile information around syntagmatic rules of group identification and coherence distils a framework for categories of self-representation. Group identification involves the consumption and performance of culture “selected and combined so as to exhibit solidarity with the taste norms of some social group – such as a subculture (e.g., punk, hip-hop), or perhaps the “popular culture” of MySpace (P. 258). Coherence refers to expressions of culture that are consistent with successful identification within a group. The study found that four “typologies” of cultural consumption take shape from users’ expressed cultural preferences. The typologies are taste performances that serve to convey one of the following: prestige, differentiation or uniqueness (from friends), authenticity, or a playful persona. Note that the typologies are extracted from cultural consumption and constructed by the researcher as distinct categories that orient member behaviour. Schemata that inform self-representation are at work here. It is not that profile owners necessarily intend to appear as prestigious or unique, but that their socially-constructed cognitive schemata favour the creation of a self that consumes culture in particular ways. In line with Bourdieu, the supposition is that these schemata take shape and become embodied in accordance with the habitus, which is determined by social structure. As social actors vary in accordance to their

position in the social structure, we see that how people experience Facebook is likewise affected and manifested differently. Nevertheless, considering social structure as a defining determinant of Facebook use is misleading because it implies that individuals engage with Facebook as a function of a unitary thought style, as outlined by Fleck (1981), corresponding to a particular social class. I suggest, in agreement with Zerubavel’s notion of “thought communities,” (1997) that within classes, various forms of thinking, or schema, emerge in relation to Facebook. In fact, the variability of thought styles suggests a cumbersome dichotomy, portraying cultural consumption as either the result of “membership” in particular offline thought communities that informs Facebook use, or, as a function of a thought community that emerges exclusively as a way of cognizing and representing the self on Facebook. There appears to be some evidence for the latter proposition. A study of Facebook newcomers suggests that online friends’ content production (e.g. posting something) may alter the way in which the newcomers’ use of the site develops:

A relatively inactive newcomer who sees stories about her friends’ photo uploads during her first two weeks on the site is more likely to increase her photo sharing over the next three months. Similarly, if a relatively inactive newcomer is tagged in a photo she will be more likely to increase her photo contributions (Burke, Marlow, and Lento 2009: 953)

Users who initially contribute content become even more active as a function of feedback from their friends (P. 950). Of course, the cognitive relationship that an individual develops with Facebook does not necessarily determine cultural content; instead, it simply illustrates how that

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culture is embodied online. The expressive quality of cultural consumption is the way in which class distinction functions in a world where material signals of status (Prada shoes) can be easily fabricated (by wearing a Prada knock-off). A model that considers Facebook use as a development purely contingent on the experience of Facebook itself is problematic in that it eradicates the a priori social aspect involved in its creation and eventual magnitude. Although the features of the site (status, sharing, tagging, etc.) may promote certain cognitive proclivities, the offline world necessarily influences the formation of online thought communities that result in certain forms of self-representation. A compelling example of offline cultural influence on OSN behaviour is the comparison between Asian and Western users. Members of Renren, considered the Chinese parallel to Facebook, were shown to exhibit a much more collectivistic type of online sharing in comparison to their much more individualistic Western counterparts. The differences in national culture emerge online through behavioural differences:

For the first type [Facebook], users post status updates, pictures, videos, or comments about themselves for self-disclosure or self-promotion purposes. For example, users may post their own status “having dinner in school” with their friends…For the second type [Renren], users share information to benefit others. For example, users may share a website that contains travel tips with their friends (Qiu, Lin, and Leung 2013: 108).

More interestingly, the study found that people with both Facebook and Renren accounts actually switch their behaviour online in accordance to the OSN they are using. The tendency to perform differently depending on the network being used by a

person is incongruous with the notion that behaviour is shaped offline as a function of cultural region. Do these results imply that individuals who have both types of accounts have lived both in the U.S. and China, and are therefore able to follow cultural scripts according to each regions’ values? If not, does it mean that they exclusively learned online that certain types of sharing are more appropriate in Facebook and others in Renren? Perhaps the answer hinges on the difference between culture that is internalized (part of the habitus) and culture that is performed. In the former, behaviour is informed by one’s native culture, and in the latter, by the culture that is developed through online experience and strategically applied in its appropriate context, much like Swidler’s “cultural toolkit” consisting of the “symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems” (Swidler 1986: 273). The growing body of research elucidates the cognitive resources social actors develop as they employ culture as a means to make sense of others and themselves in OSNs. At times, this process involves the unconscious performance of cultural repertoires established through the process of socialization offline. These repertoires are embedded as cognitive schema that orient the relationship between the user and the medium and that result in a type of self-representation. Concurrently, individuals manage the demands of a novel form of communication by developing new ways of relating to OSNs. In the case of Facebook, these demands are imposed by the activities of friends online and result in the formation of thought communities that become manifested as cultural performances in the pursuit of an ideal projection of the self, which in turn is associated, by means of friendship, to other ideal selves. Nevertheless, as Facebook is predominantly utilized as a way to maintain offline ties, the signals of self-representation are subject to evaluation by



its connection to the non-virtual social world. It is also this connection to the non-virtual world that implicates the presence of social structure in the process of self-representation on Facebook. Empirical evidence for this is present in the effect of socioeconomic status in Facebook network size (Brooks et. al.). The influence is limited, the same study finds that socioeconomic status is not related to network diversity, thus reducing the potential of high socioeconomic status actors to serve as structural bridges as conceived by Burt (2004) and demonstrating a diminished effect of social structure in the conversion of economic capital into social capital. IV. SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION In the first section of this paper I proposed that how Facebook influences social life should be understood through the convergence of three dimensions of social experience: individuals, organizations, and institutions. At each level, strategically applied schemata decode the symbolic patterns implicated in a particular situation. These institutional logics are in constant tension and are often contradictory. For example, an organization like the University of Toronto functions based on various competing logics, for instance, it necessarily aligns with the idea of education as something valuable in its own right. This works at the organizational level and is evident by the university’s offering of courses and programs exploring abstract matters with varying degrees of inherent value that are perceived by some to have minimal direct practical application whatsoever. However, given that the university exists in an economic environment where market imperatives are dominant and all-pervasive, the organization must adjust to the institutional logic of a capitalist economy and charge money for its services, thus playing a role in the commoditization of education. We see here a contradiction that emerges through competing institutional logics. Education as

something inherently valuable and commercially non-transferable compared to education as something that is sold, and as such, assumed to ideally represent some type of economic gain to compensate for its cost in dollars. Similarly, Facebook must manage the demands of contradictory institutional logics within it. Examples of these include creative self-expression as an institution (or freedom of speech), the internet itself, as well as the plethora of logics that the site’s users bring along with them and that inform the ways in which they represent themselves. An imperative of OSNs like Facebook involves motivating user contribution as well: “Social Networking Sites (SNS) are only as good as the content their users share. Therefore, designers of SNS seek to improve the overall user experience by encouraging members to contribute more content” (Burke et. al. 2009: 945). And just like a university, Facebook fails to avoid the institutional logic suggested by capitalism. This is evidenced by the fact that Facebook is a publicly traded company. Facebook also features advertisements, which are intended to generate capital for one or more parties. To the extent that Facebook’s institutional logic is bound to the structurally determining symbolic production of capitalism (i.e. the culture of capitalism), along with its institutional logic and the cognitive schema it promotes, the supra-individual effect of Facebook in society appears to be far from transcendental. Still, we may consider the emergence of the “Occupy Movement” and revolutions in the Middle East as indicators of the potential for fundamental social change through OSNs (Christian Science). Perhaps a significant social shift latent in the cultural prevalence of Facebook involves an increase in the recognition of an illegitimate social structure - the development of class consciousness - on the basis of its unfairness. Castells (2012)

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points out: “legitimacy is dependent on the belief that a given pattern of domination is right or correct, justified or valid” (P. 183). Castells identifies this transition as a shift from a culture of networked individualism to cultures of network belonging, in which the assumptions of how the market (i.e. the dominant institutional logic) relates to the individual and to the collective become manifest in alternative cultural practices, thus representing the advent of a new institutional logic as it concerns economic production. This supposed change is necessarily a cognitive one and requires the development of new schema, probably en masse - the thought communities that serve as the seeds of a new social order. On Facebook, this may take the shape of self-representations that are crafted in pursuit of a self that is conscious of the collective and that seeks to exist in an equitable society. However, as illustrated by the comparison between Renren and Facebook (see above p.11-12), prototypical use of Facebook in the West has an individualistic bent. Yet, the individual as an institution is of infinite appetite in a world of finite resources. Is it possible to re-imagine a relationship between the individual and the collective before the forces that cater to revelling in the narcissistic self destroy the planet? Maybe in China. The study of Facebook is of paramount importance to the understanding of future generations: “In a very short span of time, Facebook has emerged as a remarkably salient cultural force, and arguably as the single most important platform for social communication among the young” (Gaines and Mondak 229). The idea that fundamental change in the social structure is latent in the cultural practices implicitly recommended by Facebook appears to be a dubious one. However, all you need to do is look at a group of teenagers “socializing” in the same physical space to realize that something important is happening. Barely any talking takes place and everyone compulsively checks their tablet or phone. It is on these luminescent frames that

culture spreads now; and within we find more frames: the cognitive support-beams upon which the personal world of the lone-self amongst the many unravels, all under people’s thumbs. WORKS CITED Blandford, Nicholas. 2011. “On Facebook

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Family or Firm?: Why Having Children is Causing Many Women to Leave the Legal Profession Diana Pegoraro This paper explores the challenges associated with being a "lawyer-mom", particularly the adverse effects having children can have on a female lawyer's career. It focuses on recent reports from Vancouver, which indicate that female lawyers are leaving private legal practices in droves. Some of the challenges for "lawyer-moms" include problems associated with maternity leave, workplace stigmas, as well as issues with work-life balance. This paper will explore these challenges in depth, and suggest directions for future research and improvement.

Recent statistics suggest that Canada has one of the highest labour force participation rates of mothers with children under the age of six among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Adkin & Laban2008:49).Paired with a lack of affordable child-care, this means that many Canadian working mothers are obliged to balance their roles in both the home and workplace. Role conflict often results, and this can lead to an “imbalance”

for women when the cumulative demands of work and non-work roles are incompatible in some respect (Brady 2008:105). This imbalance in women’s lives can lead to many issues arising at work and in the home, one example of these issues is absenteeism in the workplace, or a woman making the decision to leave her career altogether. Reports from Vancouver indicate a startling statistic regarding women lawyers


in particular. Women are entering the legal profession in numbers equal or greater to those of men, but make up only 29% of lawyers in full-time private practice. This is likely due to the fact that after five years of practicing law, only 66% of women retain practicing status, compared to 80% of men (Law Society of BC 2009:4). One is then able to pose the question of why women are leaving the legal profession in droves? This paper will attempt to answer this question by focusing on one part of the issue – motherhood. In particular, this paper will examine the challenges presented by maternity leave, the workplace stigmas associated with being a “lawyer-mom”, and the difficult time constraints that result from balancing children and the law. There is a great deal of research material that exists in the area of “lawyer-moms”, and whether or not work-family “balance” is possible, but most of these materials focus on the impact of a law career on a woman’s familial relationships. This paper differs in the sense that it will also examine the direct impact of this balancing act on a woman’s law career, and her ability to advance in a law firm while maintaining the role of a “lawyer-mom”. All of the research that will be used comes from Canada and the United States, as many of these issues are common to both countries. It is also important to note that some of these issues for lawyers with children may be relevant to fathers as well, but this will not be the focus of this paper. CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH MATERNITY LEAVE Many challenges are presented when a female lawyer chooses to have a child, one of the main issues being maternity leave. The initial choice to become pregnant may be influenced by a female lawyer’s workplace policies about pregnancy. The National Law Journal reports that many lawyers believe they are penalized for taking leave or reducing their schedule

to part-time work (Couric1989:10). In a recent survey conducted by the American Bar Association, 11-18% of respondents felt that taking parental leave had negative impacts on their careers. Some of these negative impacts included a loss of opportunity for quality assignments, losing client or colleague respect, or being taken off the partnership track (Winter 1983:1384). Also, a large percentage of the respondents had limited or no knowledge about their firms’ policies regarding maternity leave, whether paid or unpaid (Winter:1385). This lack of knowledge suggests that this information is not made openly available to female lawyers, perhaps hinting at a subtle effort by firms to discourage maternity leave. It has also been suggested that, due to dissatisfaction and stress at work, many female lawyers are postponing motherhood. This could be related not only to ambiguous maternity leave policies, but also to a growing emphasis on “billable hours”, which limits autonomy and causes an increased amount of stress in the workplace, giving women little time to even think about having children (Schenker 1997:556). This decision to delay childbearing may ultimately affect the ability to have a successful pregnancy, which is influenced not only by the amount of stress a woman experiences at work during her first trimester, but also by a woman’s age. After the age of 35, a woman is more likely to take twice as long to conceive a child, and the health risks for the mother and child increase significantly (Gosden & Rutherford 1995:1585). As a result of being pregnant after the age of 35, a woman has an increased risk of having a baby with a type of disability. It is then possible that this woman may have to leave her legal career altogether to devote the majority of her time to caring for her child. Due to potential career disruptions, demanding work schedules, and a lack of information about maternity leave, many

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female lawyers are choosing to postpone having children, or abandoning the idea of having children altogether because of the impact it may have on their careers (Kay 2004:109). If women do decide to delay childbearing, health complications may result, which could potentially lead to a woman having to leave her legal career permanently. It is in this way that maternity leave policies greatly impact a lawyer-mom’s career, and steps need to be taken to clarify these policies across all law firms. The Ontario Ministry of Labour outlines universal policies regarding parental leave (Ontario Ministry of Labour 2000:60), but the application of these policies varies greatly within the legal profession. In 2006, The Law Society of Upper Canada published a report entitled “Pregnancy and Parental Leaves and Benefits for Professional Legal Staff and Law Firm Equity Partners” in order to help ensure that parental leave decisions are not made on an arbitrary, ad hoc basis. This report does not address specific parental leave conditions, but rather “encourages law firms to provide pregnancy and parental leaves and benefits to their professional legal staff and equity partners, and to adopt written policies that clearly define the extent of the leaves and benefits and outline processes for requesting and granting such leaves and benefits” (Law Society of Upper Canada:2). Clearly defined, written policies are the first step in helping to ensure that maternity leave does not adversely affect a female lawyer’s career. STIGMAS ASSOCIATED WITH BEING A “LAWYER-MOM” A female lawyer who chooses to have children may already be dealing with the effects of the “glass ceiling” in the workplace; in addition to this she may also be faced with an entirely different set of stigmas associated with being a “lawyer-mom”. These biases may eventually prove to be damaging enough to make a woman want to leave her legal career. An article recently published in the North American

Journal of Psychology states that, “Although there is evidence that the gender gap has lessened, there is still a significant bias against women in both upper management positions and compensation” , and that women face obstacles in fighting against their “perceived gender role” (2012, 213). Part of this perceived stigma of the female gender role is the idea of women having children, and making their families a priority, as opposed to their careers (North American Journal of Psychology:213). In a personal account by Whittney Graham-Beard, the former lawyer recalls a job interview she once had in which she asked the interviewer about the lack of young female lawyers at the firm. The interviewer responded by saying, “It takes a lot of time and energy to train an associate. After working for a few years, you may want to start a family; and the lifestyle of a lawyer is probably not going to suit you anymore” (Slotkin & Goodman 2007: 24). This is just one personal example to illustrate the stigma associated with, not only being a woman in law, but being a woman who may want to have children. This example illustrates ,the stigma that may prevent a woman from obtaining a job at a law firm , which as a result significantly impacts her career before it even begins. Many more of these stigmas are outlined in The Law Society of British Columbia’s 2009 report on the retention of women lawyers in private firms. Some of these challenges (identified in the report as the “maternal wall”) include negative commitment assumptions, negative competence assumptions inside of the law firm itself, benevolent side-tracking, and the fact that rules may be applied more rigidly to mothers (15). Negative commitment assumptions stem from the idea that, to be a “good” mother,

Family or Firm?


a woman must be available to her children 24/7, but to be a good lawyer, a person must be available to clients 24/7. Since there is no way to do both of these things simultaneously, a lawyer who places limits on her work availability is seen as lacking in commitment to her clients, regardless of whatever familial factors might have caused it. Negative competence assumptions occur after a woman has children and consequently her work tends to become more highly scrutinized, and rules are more rigidly applied to her. One example of this is the rule, “no leaving for personal reasons”; this rule may prevent a woman from leaving work early to see her child’s school event, but in contrast might not necessarily prevent a man from leaving work early to play golf (Law Society of British Columbia: 15). Negative assumptions can also occur on the basis of a woman having a standard or part-time schedule. For example, when a woman on a standard schedule is out of the office, it is more likely to be assumed that she is at a client meeting, whereas a woman on a flexible schedule may be assumed to be at home, looking after children. Lastly, these negative biases can especially impact a woman’s career advancement when she misses out on assignments that require overtime or travel, as it is assumed that because she is a mother, she would be unable to meet their requirements. After a lawyer-mom has had children and has dealt with the implications of maternity leave, while still balancing the challenges associated with having children, she should not be stereotyped in the workplace. This could be the “last straw” that pushes many women to leave their legal careers. As a result of much of this bias being hidden, there are few statistics to investigate, and much of the research in this area revolves around personal accounts from female lawyers who have experienced said stigma. One particular recount from Vancouver tells the story of a judge who was practicing mediation, and told the two parties, “we can settle our

differences today, or head down to the courthouse and let one of those soccer moms they’re now appointing to the bench decide things” (McLennan 2010:1). Steps need to be taken to ensure that law firms become aware of these biased comments, and that zero tolerance policies are put into place to ensure that their usage is discontinued. One way to do this may be the publishing of reports on the retention of female lawyers, like those recently published by the law societies of British Columbia and Ontario (Law Society of Upper Canada, 2008). These reports help to create awareness about the biases associated with being a lawyer-mom, and may empower women to take action in situations where they are faced with these biases. WORK-LIFE BALANCE CHALLENGES Balancing motherhood and a legal career creates time constraints that may ultimately impact a woman’s work and opportunity for advancement in the workplace. These challenges of balancing motherhood and a legal career at the same time could result in a woman “burning out”, and choosing not to continue with her legal career (Peeters, Montgomery & Bakker 2005:43). Some of these challenges include a lack of available billing hours, lack of leisure time, and the stresses associated with routine daily child-rearing tasks. For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that lawyer moms do not have round the clock child-care, and that they participate in a significant portion of the child-rearing themselves. Due to child-related responsibilities, mothers often have fewer billable hours available than women without children their childless counterparts. As most lawyers charge by the hour, this lack of available time for work often results in less money earned, and less opportunity for advancement for lawyer-moms. This can also prevent lawyer-moms from becoming partners in law firms, a common career

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goal for lawyers (Durrani & Singh 2011:300). Numerous suggestions have been made regarding a change to the “time=money” system currently in place for lawyers. It has been suggested that lawyers adopt the “fixed fee”, or “unit fee” system for fairly routinized and standardized legal service, which would put women with children on a level playing field with their childless counterparts, and with men (Balbi 2010: 99). If a different system were put into place, success (both monetary and advancement) in a legal career would not depend on the amount of time available to work, but rather how much work a lawyer actually did. One lawyer explains, “the profession’s obsession with billable hours is like drinking water from a fire hose, and the result is that many lawyers are starting to drown” (Balbi: 99); lawyer-moms, whose time is already spread thin, may experience this phenomenon more quickly than others. In a recent study funded by the Law School Admission Council (LSAC), it was found that the relationships between work, family and leisure domains differ for women and men. The study particularly examined lawyers working in different legal settings, and found that men report spending more time in paid work and leisure whereas women devote more time to housework and childcare (Wallace & Young 2010: 27). During the leisure time that women do have, literature suggests that women (mothers in particular) often feel guilty, or are more likely to multi-task. This suggests that, not only do women experience less leisure time than men, but the leisure time they do experience is less beneficial to their overall health (Bianchi et al. 2006). Leisure is considered important as a means of coping with work-related stress (Trenberth & Dewe 2002: 59); if lawyer-moms are not experiencing the same amount and quality of leisure time they had before having children, they may have more difficulty coping with the stresses in their legal careers, which have remained unchanged.

There are many stresses and challenges associated with daily child-rearing routines, and these “invisible” stresses could ultimately be considered a detriment to a woman’s legal career. Examples of these include simply getting children up and ready for school in the morning, or rushing to piano lessons in the evening. A great deal of research has been done in the area of working mothers and the concept of “balance”, with no clear right answer to the difficulties these tight schedules present. It has been suggested that parental stress is at its worse when parents are not only experiencing child-related stress, but stress from other sources outside of the home as well, and for a mother, a law career might serve as a definite source of stress outside of the home (Deater-Deckard & Scarr 1996:58). The answer to this issue may be making more affordable child-care available to lawyer-moms, as research demonstrates that childcare can reduce the stress levels for working mothers with children, lawyers in particular. Despite the fact that many lawyers are of a high socioeconomic standing in life than the average person and thus may be able to easily afford childcare, many lawyer-moms may not wish to leave most of their child-rearing in the hands of hired help; rather, many of these women want to mother their children themselves, and to be home for their children’s different milestones in life (Slotkin & Gooman: 63). This is a delicate balancing act, in which even the slightest imbalance could lead to a woman cutting something out of her life. In order to prevent burn-out, and to assist female lawyers with work-life balance challenges, programs should be put into place that provide training and support for non-work related demands. Companies are usually quite ready to provide work-related training and support to employees, but organizations should also provide training and support for non-work related demands (for example, parental training, role re-orientation for couples, possibilities for working at home, or child care

Family or Firm?


facilities) (Peeters, Montgomery & Bakker 2005:58).With this added support, lawyer-moms might feel more confident in managing their child-related responsibilities, as well as those related to legal work, and this may encourage them to continue their work in the legal field. CONCLUSION Overall, it is clear that there are many challenges associated with having children and attempting to maintain a legal career. Some of these challenges include those associated with maternity leave, stigmas associated with being a “lawyer-mom” in the workplace, and dealing with the difficult time constraints that result from balancing raising children and pursuing a career in law. Any or a combination of these challenges would be valid explanations for a woman wanting to leave her legal career, either in favour of staying home to look after children, or to seek a different career outside of the legal field. The lack of retention of female lawyers in the legal field ultimately serves as a detriment to the legal system as a whole. Many of the most successful lawyers in Canada and the United States are women, and by allowing women to leave legal careers early, the judicial system is missing out on valuable perspectives. One theory has also suggested that, at times, the gender of a lawyer can actually influence the outcome of a case (Kaheny, Szmer, & Sarver 2011: 83). Without enough practicing female lawyers, it will be difficult to continue researching this theory, which, if proven true even to a degree, could drastically impact the legal field as a whole. As this issue begins to receive more attention, and policy changes are made, it will be important to keep in mind that there are also male lawyers who act as primary caregivers to their children, and who would benefit from many of these policy changes. Policies will need to be

worded to include all lawyer-parents, as many of them will face similar challenges. WORKS CITED Adkin, L., & Laban, Y.A. (2008). “The Challenge of Care: Early Childhood Education and Care in Canada and Quebec”. Studies in Political Economy, 81, :49-76.Balbi, L. (2010). “Death to the billable hour: alternative billing methods in family law practice”. American Journal of Family Law, 24(2):.99. Bianchi, S.M., Robinson, J.P., & Milkie, A. (2006). Changing Rhythms of American Life. New York: Russell Sage. Brady, M. (2008). “Absences and Silences in the Production of Work-Life Balance Policies in Canada”. Studies in Political Economy, 81:99-127. Couric, E. (1989). “Women in the large firms: a high price of admission”. National Law Journal, S2-S3:10-12. Deater-Deckard, K. & Scarr, S. “Parenting Stress Among Dual-Earning Mothers and Fathers: Are there gender differences?”. Journal of Family Psychology, 10(1):45-59. Durrani, S., & Singh, P. (2011). “Women, Private Practice and Billable Hours: Time for a Total Rewards Strategy?”. Compensation and Benefits Review, 43(5):300-305. Gosden, R., & Rutherford, A. (1995). “Delayed Childbearing: Fertility declines at 30 and is almost gone by 40”. BMJ (Clinical Research ed.), 311:1585-1586. Kaheny, E., Szmer, J., & Sarver, T. (2011). “Women Lawyers before the Supreme Court of Canada”. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 44(1):83-109.

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Kay, F. (2004). Turning Points and Transitions: Women’s Career in the Legal Profession – A Longitudinal Survey of Ontario Lawyers 1990-2002 (A Report to the Law Society of Upper Canada). Retrieved from (http://rc.lsuc.on.ca/pdf/equity/womenTurningPoints.pdf) McLennan, N. (2010). “Women Lawyers and the Boys’ Club”. BCBusiness. Retrieved (http://www.bcbusinessonline.ca/print/bcb/top-stories/2010/06/09/women-lawyers-amp boys039-club) Nadler, J. & Stockdale, M. (2012). “Workplace gender bias: not just between strangers”. North American Journal of Psychology, 14.2:213. Ontario Ministry of Labour. (2000). “Benefit Plans”. Your Guide to the Employment Standards Act, 2000. Retrieved from (http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/pdf/es_guide.pdf) Peeters, Montgomery & Bakker (2005). “Balancing Work and Home: How Job and Home Demands Are Related to Burnout”. International Journal of Stress Management, 12(1):43-61. Retention of Women in Law Task Force. (2009). The Business Case for Retaining and Advancing Women Lawyers in Private Practice. Vancouver: The Law Society of British Columbia.

Schenker, M., et al. (1997). “Self-Reported Stress and Reproductive Health of Female Lawyers”. Journal of Occupational & Environmental Medicine, 39 (6):556-568 . Slotkin, J., & Goodman, S. (2007). It’s Harder in Heels: Essays by Women Lawyers Achieving Work-Life Balance. United States of America: Vandeplas Publishing. The Law Society of Upper Canada. (2006). Pregnancy and Parental Leaves and Benefits for Professional Legal Staff and Law Firm Equity Partners: A Model Policy for Law Firms and Legal Organizations. Retrieved from(http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/pregnancy_leaves_policy.pdf) The Law Society of Upper Canada. (2008). Retention of Women in Private Practice Working Group. Retrieved from(http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convmay08_retention_of_women.pdf) Trenberth, L. & Dewe, P. (2002). “The Importance of leisure as a means of coping with work related stress: an exploratory study”. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 15(1):59-72. Wallace, J., & Young, M. (2010). “Work hard, play hard?: A Comparison of male and femal lawyers’ time in paid and unpaid work and participation in leisure activities”. Canadian Review of Sociology, 47(1):27. Winter, B. (1983). “Survey: Women Lawyers work harder, are paid less, but they’re happy”. American Bar Association Journal, 69:1384-1393.


Expert Testimony Empowers Women and Legitimizes Battered Woman Syndrome Ameera Rasheed Amongst criminologists and some feminists, there is a belief that expert testimony disempowers battered women. Primarily, this belief is due to the fact that battered women syndrome is either not seen as a legitimate defense by some or that if valid the woman should solely explain her actions. However, this essay contends that expert testimony is crucial to battered women trials because it both empowers women and legitimizes their experience in their abusive relationships. By providing counter arguments with studies or statistics and research on battered women, expert testimony has been shown to aid battered women explain their actions within the justice system. Studies have shown that an expert testimony supports women by speaking on their behalf, explaining the psychological, mental and emotional effects of abuse. This allows juries and judges who are not exposed or well informed of the extent of the impact abuse has on its victims, to truly understand and explain why a persistent abused female can resort to killing her spouse as a form of an escape. The use of an expert allows the jury to perceive the female with a sympathetic lens by dispelling stereotypes surrounding battered women, allowing the experience of the battered woman to by further legitimized and understood. These findings reveal that there is a heavy focus upon the victim and that more research needs to be done on male abusers in order to better understand battered women and provide them with support within society and in the justice system. The use of psychological experts in criminal trials featuring battered woman syndrome has increased the public’s knowledge of the victimization that battered women endure by their abusive husbands. In 1990, R v. Lavallee was the first case in Canada that allowed and demonstrated the importance of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome

(Tang, 2003, p.620). In this case, Madame Justice Wilson stated that the average member of the public is guilty of victim-blaming in female-on-male domestic violence cases. To remedy the public’s inclination towards victim-blaming, she suggested that the public be educated through expert testimony (Tang, 2003, p.620). However, the role and use of

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psychiatric experts has been criticised by some. The main argument by feminists is that experts portray battered women as weak and incapable of explaining their own actions (Tang, 2003, p.622). By pathologizing battered women, expert testimonials fail to take into account other factors, such as financial insecurity, as explanations for her actions (Tang, 2003, p.622). However, the justice system simply is not equipped to allow defendants to put forward theories to explain their own actions, nor to consider remote causes of a person’s actions like systemic disadvantages or broad social problems. With a recent phenomenon, like battered woman syndrome, studies illustrate that jurors distrust female victims’ personal explanation as an exaggeration of the abuse that they personally encountered (Schopp, 1994, p.9). The solution to ensure that female victims are not stigmatized by jurors is to have expert testimony explain the rationale for killing her abuser as a justifiable and not irrational act. This paper argues that psychologists do not intend to disempower women by explaining their actions on their behalf; rather they empower women by legitimizing their actions. As a result, expert testimony should be encouraged and given due weight in all battered woman syndrome trials to ensure a fair verdict is reached. HISTORICAL CONTEXT The issue surrounding battered women emerged from a long history where legal doctrine allowed wife beating. The common law of England stated that a “man and his woman were legally one person”, concluding that a woman was the property of her husband (Leary, 1985, p.387). Unless the act resulted in death, husbands were allowed to commit acts of physical violence upon their wives without charge of legal penalty (Leary, 1985, p.387). In contrast, if a woman murdered her husband “she was charged with treason as if she had killed the King” and would be burned alive as punishment (Leary, 1985, p. 387). At the time, divorce was not commonly accepted

so a woman had no choice but to accept the abuse she received. However, there were limitations associated to wife beating as outlined in the English Rule of Thumb; a man could not “hit his wife with a rod no larger in circumference than the width of his thumb” (Leary, 1985, p.388.) It was not until 1981 that the law abolished a man’s right to hit his wife (Leary, 1985, p.388). Despite this amendment, there were no provisions in place that would provide abused women assistance, nor did the laws enforce severe sanctions if abuse were to still occur. At the same time the incorporation of psychology in law was coming into effect. Michel Foucault (1978) stated that crime is an event that “signals the existence of a dangerous element” in the body (p.2). In the early 18th century, this social body became a field for biological and medical intervention. The doctor became viewed as the sole technician who could aid this social body (Foucault, 1978, p.7). As a result, psychiatry emerged as a discipline that could explain dangerous elements in the body. Moreover, the law required more than an admission of guilt, but for the defendant to explain themselves in order for their punishment to be reasonable (Foucault, 1978, p.2). Again, psychiatry was deemed fit to explain the intentions of a criminal because after coining the term “homicidal monomania” to explain crime without reason, they were credited as “specialists in motivation” (Foucault, 1978, p. 4, p.10). Foucault criticizes psychiatry for coining such an ambivalent term in order to portray itself as a legitimate field in the legal system. However, psychology was the only field to claim a desire to control the dangers hidden in human behaviour, such that the law recognized psychology as being able to cure social ills (Foucault, 1978, p.7). Similarly, the law had some reluctance to accept psychiatry, but it did recognize that psychiatrists can provide explanations for things that the law alone cannot make clear.

Expert Testimony Empowers Women


VICTIM BLAMING Psychologist Ana Pauna (2012) explains that jurors are biased due to their “dispositionist worldview” (p.1). This theory claims that people believe what happens to individuals is their own fault, which neglects that a persons actions typically correspond to the situation they are in (Pauna, 2012, p.1). This results in jurors blaming the victim for provoking the alleged abuse she endures. In this regard, there is an act of reverse onus where the victims is perceived as already being guilty. Subsequently, victims are subjected to judgements which cannot be simply countered by personal accounts. Instead, an expert is needed to provide an objective view to educate jurors to validate the victim’s experience and the need to defend herself. The main misconception surrounding battered women is that victims are masochists. Social scientist William Ryan discovered that jurors have preconceived notions blaming the victim because jurors cannot understand why she would remain within a relationship if the abuse was persistent unless she enjoyed the pain (Mihajlovich, 1987, p.1264). These judgements suggest that “help is readily available to all worthy victims” and that the woman can simply file for a divorce or leave the abuser (Jones, 2000, p. 132). Psychiatrist Lenore Walker is a renowned figure in battered woman syndrome trials because of her “cycle of violence” and “learned helplessness” theories. These theories explain how the victim is subjected to tension followed by a violent assault and then an apology by the abuser (Kirkwood, 1993, p.10). As a result of the continuous violence, the woman learns self-helplessness as a coping mechanism in hopes that more violence will not persist. Prior to experts sharing these theories, jurors were less knowledgeable about the characteristics of abusive relationships. These theories have been influential in legitimizing women’s actions because they

provide evidence of and an explanation for why abused women do not leave. Feminists criticize Walker for pathologizing women as being helpless. They say these theories suggest that women possess individual personality problems, such as passivity, which allows the abuse to occur (Kirkwood, 1993, p.10). These theories blame the victim as being in some way responsible for the abuse. Yet Walker’s explanation of what victims experience does not pathologize women because she argues that these characteristics are a result of battering, and not innate characteristics women possess that predisposes them to abuse (Kirkwood, 1993, p.10). In addition, feminist critics fail to acknowledge that current testimony does not solely focus on women’s pathology, but it includes the social and practical experiences (Gelles and Loseke and Cavanaugh, 2005, p.231-2). As a result, experts no longer testify about “battered woman syndrome” but testify on “battery and its effects” which provides a more broad explanation for the woman’s behaviour (Gelles et al., 2005, p.232). In this regard, Walker is not demeaning women’s personality, but she attempts to illustrate that battered women are not only victims of physical abuse, but also that abuse has an impact on the victim’s mental and emotional psyche which leads to her becoming submissive. Without expert testimony, jurors can fail to understand how battered woman syndrome can be used as a defence. Battered women retaliate against their husbands when there is no immediate threat – for example when he is asleep – which would be perceived as a premeditated act rather than defensive act (Schopp, 1994, p.46). Expert testimony can explain to jurors the extent to which long-term abuse can cause a person to act out of desperation. For instance, Lenore Walker states that a battered woman undergoes “psychological paralysis” as a result of persistent abuse, which can only be ended

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by violence on her part (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p. 66). Even when the abuser is asleep, victims feel as though “he still had power over her and would kill her” (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.70). Moreover, it is the psychological reaction a woman experiences when she is “triggered by an event similar to or symbolic of a previous traumatic experience” that her underlying fear for survival emerges (United States Department of Justice, 1996, p.32). Some critics may find that psychiatrists subject battered women by solely focusing on their mental capacity as if it were impaired or irrational. But, battered women have heightened sensitivity to signs of impeding danger that expert testimony can explain to justify her actions (Raitt & Zeedyk, p.73). By providing this explanation, the jurors are given the context in which an abused woman felt it was reasonable to use deadly force as a means for survival (Donileen, Cavanaugh and Gelles, 2005, 237). Thus, a victim’s rationale for her actions is heavily dependant on her perception, which expert testimony validates by explaining to the jurors how her fear for her own safety justified her use of excessive force. Members of the public may assume that the victims could have left the relationship at any time but Lenore Walker argues that “the loving contrition stage” in the cycle of violence prevents women from leaving (Leary, 1985, p.399). Abusers convince their victims the abuse will stop which causes the victim to have faith and hope for a loving relationship with their partner (Leary, 1985, p.399). Another reason is fear – it “immobilizes them, ruling their actions, their decisions, their very lives” (Martin, 1976, p.76). If a woman were to leave, her husband would stalk her like a hunted animal. and she can never truly be safe unless she has her own financial stability and housing at her disposal (Martin, 1976, p.76). By using expert testimony, the jurors can understand that the abuser impacts a woman beyond just physical violence.

EDUCATION The inclusion of expert testimony has educated agents of law enforcement on how to view battered woman syndrome. Prior to expert testimony, judges were lenient towards the punishment of abusers. In particular, some judges ignored the seriousness of abuse by stating that these couples needed marriage counselling, not law involvement (Martin, 1976, p.116). In other circumstances, judges ignored the impact of abuse upon the victim by not imposing any punishment upon the abuser (Martin, 1976, p.116). When neither jury nor expert testimony are allowed in court and the sole decision is made by a judge, these unsympathetic and ignorant attitudes victimize battered woman . Judges were more likely to be unsympathetic because they felt that circumstances and occurrences in the private sphere do not require involvement of the law (Martin, 1976, p.116). The inclusion and acknowledgement of the importance of expert testimony since R.v.Lavallee not only dispels stereotypes jurors may have, but judges too. Both Frye.v.United States and the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 indicate there must be general acceptance in the scientific community in order for expert testimony to be allowed (Taylor, Rush & Munro, 1999, p.525). As a result, having experts within the trial not only validates a woman’s experience, but also promotes judges to view battered woman syndrome as a serious issue. Another issue in law enforcement is that lawyers have difficulty relying on co-operation from victims. Although the introduction of “no drop” policies have encouraged more prosecutors to take on domestic cases, victims either refuse to testify or recant their earlier statements detailing the abuse they suffered (Rogers, 1998, p.68). This serves as a deterrent for prosecutors to defend battered women because they will be unable to prove to the jury that their defendant acted in the interest of self-defence. Instead, expert testimony can educate jurors and



prosecutors that victims may recant their testimony not because it was false but due to fear or being sanctioned (Schnieder, 2000, p.81). This explanation by an expert can instil sympathy within the jurors because without it, the jurors may be more susceptible in thinking the defendant is lying about the abuse. Moreover, this can also educate prosecutors in how they can better understand their client, allowing them to defend more effectively. Thus, experts can work in conjunction with the prosecutor to discuss the implications and repercussions of abuse on a battered woman. SUPPORT FOR WOMEN Expert testimony can reduce the sentence the accused receives. When making a decision, jurors follow two decision models to comprehend the evidence; the mathematical model and the explanation model (Pauna, 2012, p.2). The former model is when juries calculate how important or strong each piece of evidence is that is presented at trial (Pauna, 2012, p.2). For instance, if no explanation is given then jurors will perceive a woman killing her husband in his sleep as support for a guilty verdict (Pauna, 2012, p.2). However, when experts testify and explain how the victim could not leave due to fear, then jurors are more likely to acquit (Pauna, 2012, p.2). The latter model entails jurors compiling all the different versions to explain the circumstances of the crime (Pauna, 2012, p.2). In this case, expert testimony helps the jurors by explaining the victim’s side of the story which makes jurors more understanding and sympathetic to the victim (Pauna, 2012, p.2). Results in a study conducted by Schuller reinforces this concept by indicating when experts are presented, jurors tend to be more lenient on the victim by reducing a conviction from murder to a lesser crime, such as manslaughter (Pauna, 2012, p.3). Thus, allowing experts to testify within a trial can greatly benefit women from being sentenced with harsh convictions.

Some have criticized the results in Schuller’s study by arguing that psychiatric testimony portrays women as psychologically unstable resulting in the jury not sympathizing, but pitying them (Pauna, 2012, p.3). Feminists argue that expert testimony portrays battered women as weak, submissive and mentally unstable. However, results in a study conducted by Schuller and Hastin (1996), with mock jurors exposed to expert testimony where women were described as either aggressive (physically retaliating against her abuser) or as passive, illustrates that neither description influenced jurors to perceive battered women in a different manner (Schuller and Rzepa, 2002, p.658). The study illustrated that it was not the manner in how the victim was described, but that the explanation provided by the expert on what battered woman syndrome is and what a woman experiences heavily impacted their decision (Schuller and Rzepa, 2002, p.658). Thus, jurors focus more on understanding the situation to see if the act was justified than to provide a lesser conviction because they merely felt pity towards the victim. Some critics claim that expert testimony is not successful because acquittals are very rare in battered woman syndrome trials. Although true that acquittals are rare this cannot solely be blamed upon expert testimony. Statistics illustrate that battered women are unlikely “to fight for a total acquittal and risk conviction” (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.71). Instead, the battered woman is likely to want a manslaughter plea because it is acceptable to the Crown. (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.71). If a woman were to advance a plea bargain to avoid a trial, she would not be able to defend her actions as self defence. Rather, her decision not to fight for acquittal will have facilitate misinterpretation of her actions as a consequence of her disordered mental state (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.75). Moreover, in most cases where expert testimony is allowed there are other pieces of evidence admitted to strengthen the victim’s case.

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For example, calls to the police, records of injuries during confrontations, photographs of the scene which also impact how a jury would perceive both the crime and the battered woman (Donileen, et al., 2005, 237). It is important to recognize that solely blaming expert testimony for women being perceived as mentally disturbed is a spurious argument for there are other causes that can result in this portrayal. The inclusion of battered woman syndrome within the DSM in 1984 serves to legitimize battered women’s experience. Even though feminists heavily criticize this inclusion it was deemed acceptable by Lenore Walker and fellow psychiatrists to have women viewed as pathological if the inclusion would allow experts to testify in trials (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.83). That is to say, the judicial process prevented women’s life conditions to be discussed unless it was medically recognized as a syndrome or a mental impairment (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.83). Both Frye.v.United States and The Federal Rule of Evidence 702 state that for experts to testify in a trial it must be accepted within the medical community. Only when it was entered in the DSM was there more attention brought to battered women in the medical, legal and community organizations (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.83). Although it was never the original intention, the inclusion does imply that persistent abuse can result in a woman suffering from a mental disorder – a view that mirrors the manner in which law has historically viewed women (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.83). Because the actions of a battered woman legally must be compared to that of an objective man, her actions must be decontextualized and evaluated rather than being easily accepted (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.85). Thus, though it was a controversial move with some negative side-effects, the inclusion of battered woman syndrome in the DSM was meant to bring attention to the seriousness of abuse.

The role and use of expert testimony is one of the few social agents that publicly support battered victims. In courts there are “paradigmatic standards of criminal defences” that demand the actions of the accused to be judged upon “what the theoretical reasonable man would have done” (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.76). Already women are disadvantaged based on this objective test because a battered woman could never equate her actions or thinking similar to a man because females are predominately the victims in abuse cases (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.76). Moreover, battered wives’ explanations do not meet the law’s criteria of what would constitute a “signal of danger,” such as an immediate sign of threat, and as a consequence their actions are preconceived to be unacceptable (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.76). This is evident in provocation where a “woman’s personal knowledge regarding her husband’s behaviour is subordinate” to how the law evaluates reasonable provocation (Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000, p.77). Experts explain what forms of violence and methods of survival victims will experience in order to illustrate that victims are in very dangerous situations with little chance of escape. Experts can provide statistical evidence as well as support the victim’s she experienced constitutes battery. Thus, this gap between a woman’s experience and the law’s behavioural explanation can be bridged by expert testimony. Again, there are critics who argue that an expert undermines women’s rights to defend themselves, which causes more victimization. However, when an expert testifies, their role is not to accuse anyone nor speak directly on the victim’s behalf. Instead, experts provide the jury with an opinion on battery, in the general sense, by explaining what victims experience and how abuse could impact an individual (Pauna, 2012, p.2). In addition, studies conclude that if a victim were to testify on her own, jurors would perceive her to be exaggerating the abuse which “generally



discounts the defendant’s testimony” (Schopp, 1994, p.9). This is not a question of psychology demeaning women. but rather women are naturally perceived with doubt as jurors and the law are distrustful of women’s accounts of abuse. Having experts testify to the abuse and conditions that a battered woman will legitimize her experience. This essay has explored some of the many controversies surrounding the use of expert testimony of battered woman syndrome in the defence of women accused of murdering their abusive partners. Critics of battered woman syndrome blame expert testimony for pathologizing women as weak, or having a mentally disturbed mind, leading to a failure in addressing the larger issues at hand. Although some aspects of the defence, such as the inclusion of battered woman syndrome in the DSM, can be interpreted as pathologizing women, in a legal system and society that heavily favours men and has historically not supported women, the use of expert testimony is necessary to empower abused women. The legal system and the public often do not perceive battery to be a serious event, and do not fully understand that women are heavily victimized by their abusers. The legal system and jurors rarely trust testimony from the victim herself unless it is has been verified and supported by an expert. The act of a woman feeling the need to defend herself by killing her abuser or to retaliate in order to protect herself is often seen as an unjustifiable act, since the battered woman is always at the centre of scrutiny and never her abuser. Society rarely questions why the abuser never left the relationship if he was unhappy, or why he inflicted the abuse, or ask what mental disturbance he suffered that would lead him to rationalize abusing another person continuously. In conclusion, the onus should not be on expert testimony to correct society’s patriarchal views towards women. Rather critics should appreciate the extent to

which experts are trying to provide battered women with support to dispel these patriarchal views by legitimizing the effects of the abuse endured by the individual woman. Critics should instead ask why the abuser's actions and explanations are rarely researched or discussed in society to provide better protection and understanding of battered women. WORKS CITED Foucault, M. (1978). About the Concept of the "Dangerous Individual" in 19th-Century Legal Psychiatry. Law and Psychiatry: Proceedings of an International Symposium Held at the Clark Institute, 1, 1-29. Gelles, R., Loseke, D., & Cavanaugh, M. (2005). Controversies: Battered Woman Syndrome. Current Controversies on Family Violence (pp. 221-257). London: Sage Publications, Inc Jones, A. (2000). Next Time She'll Be Dead (Battering and How To Stop It ed.). Boston: Beacon Press. Kirkwood, C. (1993). Leaving Abusive Partners. London: Sage Publications. Leary, J. (1985). A woman, a horse, and a hickory tree: the development of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in homicide cases. UMKC Law Review, 53(3), 386-410. Martin, D. (1976). Battered Wives. Volcano: Volcano Press. Mihajlovich, M. (1987). Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self Defence. Indiana Law Journal, 62(4), 1253-1280. Retrieved October 25, 2012

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Pauna, A. (2012). Expert Witness Testimony in the Battered Woman Syndrome . World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology , 66, 278-284. Retrieved October 24, 2012 Raitt, F., & Zeedyk, S. (2000). The Implicit Relation of Psychology and Law. London: Routledge. Rogers, A. (1998). Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases: From Recantation to Refusal to Testify Special Focus on Domestic Violence. Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, 8, 67-93. Retrieved October 31, 2012. Schneider, E. (2000). Theoretical Dimensions of Feminist Lawmaking on Battering. Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking (pp. 57-99). Virginia: R & R Donnelley & Sons. Schopp, R., Sturgis, B., & Sullivan, M. (1994). Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse. College of Law, Faculty Publications, 1(1), 45-113. Retrieved October 17, 2012.

Schuller, R., & Rzepa, S. (2002). Expert Testimony Pertaining to Battered Woman Syndrome: Its Impact on Jurors Decisions. Law and Human Behaviour, 26(6), 655-673. Retrieved October 16, 2012, from Vol. 26, No. 6, December 2002 Tang, K. (2003). Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony in Canada: Its Development and Lingering Issues. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47(6), 618-629. Retrieved October 23, 2012. Taylor, B., Rush, S., & Munro, R. (1999). Feminism and Evidence. Feminist Jurisprudence, Women and the Law: Critical Essays, Research Agenda and Bibliography (pp. 507-539). New York: William S. Hein & Co. United States Department of Justice (1996). The Validity and Use of Evidence Concerning Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Trials: Report Responding to Section 40507 of the Violence Against Women Act. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1, 1-156. Retrieved October 23, 2012.


Welfare States, Governmentality, and Income Inequality: A Comparative Analysis of Canada & Sweden Omar AlBitar

When we think of the modern welfare state (at least in the developed world), we often think of certain, established social policies that governments have structured and implemented. The fundamental aim of this welfare state can be seen as an attempt to mitigate various forms of social inequality, promote greater well-being, and sustain a defined living standard. Or, as Olsen (2002) has put it, modern forms of welfare can be seen as “an institutionalization of the state’s responsibility for the well-being of its citizens” (p. 27). However, seen through a political frame, the very structuring and character of the welfare state across various

countries in the developed world has taken a multitude of forms. This disparity can be dramatically discerned when Western nations like the U.S. or Canada are contrasted with Nordic ones, such as Sweden or Denmark (Olsen, 2011). Prior to addressing a possible explanation behind such a variation in the underlying structure of welfare states, it is important establish the dialectical framework that will characterize the discussions and arguments throughout this paper. There is an inseparable link between power, the welfare state, and their explicit (or even

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implicit) reflections on the concerned subjects. This power, negotiated and manifested through a state’s form of governance and by the fundamental policies that structure its welfare system, serves to construct a public perception of predominant ideologies; a pervading ethos or spirit towards many rising social trends like unemployment or income inequality. Given this multifaceted interplay, it is essential to compare, contrast, and analyze how varying forms of government have dealt with issues ranging from the income gap to the provisioning of welfare. In addition, it is also important to ask what are the predominant ideologies present in each political milieu and, more crucially, who are the groups or individuals benefitting from their very perpetuation. I have chosen to provide a comparative analysis of the Canadian, Anglo-Saxon model and the Swedish, Nordic model. In different ways, both models exhibit a peculiar relationship. Despite their categorization into different political characterizations (i.e., Canada as a Neoliberal model and Sweden as a Social Democratic one), both nations seem to share several features in economical and governmental contexts. For instance, both have established capitalist economies and welfare systems; both governments are constitutional monarchies, and both employ a tax-benefit system. Interestingly, according to relatively recent studies, both nations have been witnessing a continual – yet differential – rise in income inequality (OECD, 2011; OECD, 2011). However, it is the very differences in the structures and dynamics of these welfare states that constitutes the essence of my comparative analysis; namely, how do the differences between the Canadian and Swedish welfare states mediate the rise (or decline) of certain social trends on one hand, and construct the aforementioned ethos towards their respective governments on the other?

To provide a generalized, historical context, let me highlight a few main points that characterize the Canadian and Swedish welfare structures. This will facilitate and further introduce the subject matter of my comparative paper. To begin with, Sweden is frequently ranked as one of the most egalitarian nations. Its welfare state is often regarded as an epitome of the global development of social policy (Olsen, 2002). Additionally, Sweden’s Nordic counterparts enjoy the highest rates of social mobility in the world (The Economist, 2013). When it comes to welfare systems, Sweden has been known for having a quasi-ideal model with its encompassing, universal programs, such as public education, healthcare, pensions, and extensive periods of parental leave (Olsen, 2011). The global publicity Sweden’s welfare system has received can largely be attributed to the fact that as an advanced capitalist economy, it has managed to establish and merge such an aspiring welfare system (Freeman et al., 2010). Hence, we can begin to understand why its mode of governance has often been referred to as a “third way” (The Economist, 2013), denoting a compelling compromise between socialist and capitalist ideologies (Heclo & Madsen, 1987). The Canadian welfare structure, on the other hand, is often associated with that of the United States. Regardless of this association, Canada is still considered more developed in the scope of the social policies it offers. If we were to imagine the U.S. and Sweden as two extremities on a scale of welfare comprehensiveness, with the former being the least comprehensive and the latter being the most, Canada poses as a quite interesting model to scrutinize as it resembles the U.S.’s selective welfare character in some of its programs, and Sweden’s all-encompassing universalism in others (Olsen, 2002).

Welfare States, Governmentality, and Income Inequality


Looking at trends in income inequality, I had previously mentioned that both nations have been witnessing a continual rise. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Olsen (2002) reports that both Canada and Sweden had witnessed an increase in income inequality. In addition, more recent 2008 Gini index scores further demonstrate a shift towards more income inequality (OECD, 2011). However, it is important to note that Sweden, through allocating various forms of public entitlements, has significantly reduced instances of poverty (Olsen, 2002). Countless questions could be asked on the interpretation of such statistics. How can we make use of these trends? In more concrete terms, how can we explain this apparent reproduction of the status quo? What are the social policies that might account for these trends, and what are the pervading, hegemonic ideologies that each of the two sociopolitical spheres seem to express? In this paper, through the framework that I had established earlier on, I will provide a detailed analysis of how governance can take on a paradoxical character, a dichotomy between the explicit and the implicit. Employing a Foucauldian framework, I will provide an interesting relationship between the character of a welfare state, and the values and ideologies that reflect onto its subjects. In addition, I present recent trends in income inequality and provide a cross-national, comparative analysis of how they come to reflect the very policies of the welfare state. I interpret the trends and pinpoint the welfare policies that should be revised and targeted for reform. Finally, I conclude with raising a compelling question that integrates the Deleuzian notion of “Strategy of Subjectification” with Bonoli’s new social risks, raising questions and calling for future research. THE GOVERNING PARADOX: IDEOLOGICAL DISTORTIONS OF CITIZEN-STATE POWER RELATIONS

Modern political ideologies exude a particular ethos that informs and molds a country’s form of governance. A country’s style of governance in turn establishes different “state-citizen” interfaces, which delineate the short and long term interactions between the individual and the state as institution. It is at this very juncture that power is continuously negotiated and exchanged (Mik-Meyer & Villadsen, 2013). It is well known that the Neoliberal ideology adopted by Canada, highly praises values of individual volition, impartiality, and autonomy from the state through its minimal intervention. Foucault’s notion of Governmentality, or active form of self-governance (Stanbridge & Ramos, 2012), becomes crucial here in that it elegantly describes the manifest (or explicit) goal value of modern Neoliberal politics, namely, individualism (Mik-Meyer & Villadsen, 2013). But what happens when a contradiction arises between the manifest and the latent? How does this dichotomy between manifest and latent affect welfare provisioning? The governing paradox lies therein. The manifest dimension of this hegemonic ideology is individualizing the subject, or as Abraham Maslow (1943) would have put it, guiding the individual to self-actualization (the point of which is the peak of his hierarchy of needs). On the other hand, the latent dimension is that this very guidance can itself be an illusory or veiled form of coercion that is reproduced to benefit certain groups or individuals with the goal of sustaining the status quo. Let us put this in the context of welfare provisioning. According to Esping-Andersen’s “welfare regime” categorization, Canada falls under the liberal category (Bambra, 2004). What then constitutes the ideal citizen for liberal welfare structures? In advanced liberal states, citizens who are largely dependent on welfare packages are perceived to have brought about their own misfortune. By expressing their free will, they are thought to also be their own saviours. There is a

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sort of implicit, ideological form of disgrace associated with welfare dependency, the purpose of which is to motivate and drive the individual citizen’s actions to restore his or her own financial betterment. For instance, the selective and temporary nature of Canada’s employment insurance policies may cause underemployed individuals to either seek self-employed means of sustenance, or engage in part-time, minimum-wage labour. As Mik-Meyer & Villadsen (2013) elegantly put it, this modern (or post-modern) paradigm shift in the meaning of welfare provisioning has implicated a dramatic shift in power structure from state to market. The shift in power structure from state to market inculcates the idea in the common imagination that income inequality is a natural outcome – a byproduct of one’s own volitional misconduct rather than a mere reflection of social policies and bureaucratic structures. A coinciding trend with this noted paradigm shift is that recent OECD reports show that the documented rise in low-paid, part-time labor in Canada has severed the income gap (Willcocks, 2011). Also, other reports have shown a rise in self-employed individuals (OECD, 2011). This is where the welfare state stands as an interface of grave capacity, interacting and informing predominant ideological values on one hand (e.g., “the ideal citizen”), and shaping the rise and decline of various equalities and inequalities (e.g., income inequality). This almost inevitably raises the question of why certain welfare programs in Canada are selective (as in the case of employment insurance), targeting certain groups at certain times or conditions, while others are not. Granberg (1987) states that “political issues in Sweden cohere with a well-known left-right dimension” (p. 39). However, given the almost uncontested power of the Social Democratic Party (Sweden’s oldest and largest party) it is worthy to discuss how

latent dynamics of power might be influencing certain citizen-state relations. With deeply entrenched historical roots dating back to the latter part of the twentieth century, the Swedish Democratic Party, as Heclo & Madsen (1987) had argued, had been unmatched in its power in collective mobilization. In addition, they emphasize what they refer to as “collective affiliation” (p. 24), the most prominent mechanism employed by the party in order to weave its own ideologies into the fabric of Swedish society; “the Social Democratic project had become the nation’s project” (p.29). With other contesting parties (like Center or Liberal parties for instance), a question political sociologists should ask is: how did the Social Democrats establish such a legitimized public perception? And, as I had asked with regards to the Neoliberal Canadian model, what constitutes the “ideal citizen” in this context, and how is he or she being constructed? In stark contrast to Canada, the predominant cultural ethos in Sweden places prime importance on the collective rather than the individual. In Sweden, a common ideological motto would be “you are no better than anyone else”, denoting the importance of communitarian values in Swedish culture (Heclo & Madsen, 1987). Interestingly, as these ideologies pass down from one generation to the next, they come to reflect a distinct disposition that is quite differentiable from that of Canada’s or other Neoliberal nations. In addition, Swedish citizens have displayed high rates of government trustworthiness, and hence conceptualize the notion of freedom from a different angle (Olsen, 2002). To elucidate the distinction of this ideological split, I will use Erich Fromm’s sociopsychological description. Fromm (1941) presents a thought-provoking distinction of “freedom from” and “freedom to”. In the case of Sweden, citizens’ perceptions of freedom are often portrayed as “freedom to,” referring to freedom through the state’s welfare policies and universal programs



(Olsen, 2002). On the other hand, it seems that the Canadian conceptualization of freedom tends towards a “freedom from” state intervention. Of course, to ask why these conceptualizations have manifested in each nation would demand an intricate inquiry of the historical-philosophical origins of each respective ideology. As I had mentioned, the Swedish Democratic Party has become almost synonymous with Swedish nationalism. To a certain extent, this could account for the unmatched legitimacy that the party has built in the hearts of its supporters. Nationalism can be a productive feature for the collective mobilization of the party’s members and supporters, which is further reinforced by the constructed form of Governmentality; a self-governance characterized by collective subjectivity, community, and statism. Conversely, over-legitimate bodies of power may forge a sort of Machiavellian loophole that may plunge the Swedes into less transparency in citizen-state relations, fewer reforms in social policies, and fettered public affairs. Parallel to the manifest-latent typology I had discussed in the Canadian case, we can understand the manifest ideal citizen construction by what Heclo & Madsen (1987) referred to as “Old Sven”. Old Sven, an abstract embodiment of Social Democratic ideology, has high trust for his superiors. He is adapted to the unceasing routine of the industrial lifestyle. He believes in the “collective purpose of the labor movement” (p. 39), and most importantly, he is “almost instinctive” in the way he recognizes the Social Democratic Party. Borrowing from Pierre Bourdieu’s notion, there is a unifying habitus, or embodied history (Mik-Meyer & Villadsen, 2013, p. 54), in the subjective experience of the Swedish population. The ensuing latent dimension of the governing paradox takes on the form of cultural-political hegemony. A good example to demonstrate the intermixing of

Swedish nationalism, celebrated culture, and Social Democratic values is the Swedes’ perception of their present condition as a byproduct of the successful Social Democratic agenda (Heclo & Madsen, 1987). As long as these values are passed on, how could there ever be an imagined alternative in Swedish politics? It is widely held that the Swedish Democratic Party has been largely known to be behind the development of the globally acknowledged “Swedish way” (referring to the government’s wide array of universal public social services). Nevertheless, Heclo & Madsen (1987) and Olsen (2002) have noted progressing erosion in Sweden’s uncontested, egalitarian, political structure. By and large, there is an ongoing interplay between propagated cultural ideologies and the organizational character of the welfare state. As discussed prior, by understanding the ambivalent nature of the governing paradox (i.e., the manifest and latent ideological goals), we can begin to appreciate Foucault’s description of modern forms of power as both “individualizing and totalizing at one and the same time” (Mik-Meyer & Villadsen, 2013, p.11). In more concrete terms, Foucault discerned a productive element in the dynamics and relations of power-- namely, a subjectification of the agents involved in these very dynamics; a guided construction of values, dispositions, and worldviews. In contrast, he also acknowledged a disciplinary, somewhat authoritative dimension inherent within power relations. In Canada and Sweden, this ideological subjectification produces an individualized Neoliberal, and a collectivist Social Democrat respectively. IN SEARCH FOR POWER: REFLECTIONS ON MARX & FOUCAULT I had placed my comparative analysis of cross-national ideology and its relation to the welfare state in a Foucauldian, post-structural framework, as I have found it to significantly recognize coexisting

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modalities of power. Moreover, the framework’s conception of the notion of power as being inherent in social relations (e.g., citizen-state interactions) provides a more elaborate framework when compared to the Marxian perspective. The materialist perspective perceives power as manifesting through an inevitable class conflict-- a conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In this context, materialists understand income inequality as a byproduct of class stratification, where the higher strata hold asymmetric amounts of power through their possession of what Marx referred to as the means of production (Marx & Engels, 1998). As both Sweden and Canada are advanced capitalist economies with established welfare systems, the materialist critique is almost exclusively centered on the capitalist mode of production. The conundrum here is that, while capitalism certainly exerts profound effects on many socioeconomic trends (including income inequality), it is severely restricting to confine one’s analysis to it given the complexity of causality. Many critics, like Max Weber (Standbridge & Ramos, 2012) have recognized this shortcoming. Weber’s conceptualization of social class incorporated factors like prestige and power alongside the forces of production. The post-structural perspective, on the other hand, does not perceive the notion of power as one emanating from a monolithic, capitalist leviathan as Hobbes (2008) would say, but rather a more complex object of negotiation that is strategically being exchanged in social interactions. Where Marx observed power as unidirectional, Foucault saw it as regulatory, networked, and paradoxical (Downing, 2008). In the following section, I will discuss how relatively recent trends in income inequality can be largely understood as a reflection of organizational welfare in Canada and Sweden, and I will suggest how each government could adapt, adjust, and reform.

THE POLITICS OF DESPAIR: THOUGHTS ON WELFARE REFORM When asked if it is the government’s responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed, 90.3% of Swedes and 65.5% of Canadians had agreed (Olsen, 2002). Of course, the differing percentages observed in both nations are deeply intertwined to the varying, ideological constructs that were molded by Governmentality. Recent studies from the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives state that today, the most affluent 1% of individuals in Canada earn approximately $180,000 more than they did in 1982 (CCPA, 2013). A parallel finding that supports the latter is that there has been a resurgence in income inequality among working-age citizens (OECD, 2011). Integrating both findings, we are looking at an apparent maldistribution in income taxation, a distorted tax-benefit system, and a widening of the income gap. So where are the state-collected taxes being redistributed? Is it not the function of redistribution policies to impose higher taxes on the affluent and redistribute funds collected to the needy? Returning to Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology, we find that liberal welfare regimes, like Canada’s, design their policy structure on an after the fact basis, that is, as a reaction or response to certain conditions or ailments. They are categorized as a “compensator of last resort” (Olsen, 2002, p. 72). Looking at income security programs in Canada, we find that the basis for income security allocation is whether an individual or family is deemed to be in need or not (Olsen, 2002). However, the notion of neediness seems quite abstract to me. So I ask, where is the line between the deserving and non-deserving being drawn? Philosophically, it is essential to ask such policymakers: what do you mean when you selectively define a needy individual or family? As a consequence, the policies of liberal welfare regimes have kept the needy in their position, sustaining



the status quo produced by the market (Olsen, 2002). For that to change, tax distribution policies will require a restructuring in their selectivity and more efficient means to categorize and define the needy. In addition, assisting the unemployed (or even self-employed) will be crucial. This could be done through enhancing Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) across all provinces, and by providing a citizen-state interface in which citizens could positively interact with state-hired professionals. In the 1990s, the Swedish welfare system witnessed a great deal of restructuring and decentralization as a result of an international economic recession, a budget deficit, and a plummeting GDP (Olsen, 2002). Consequently, many of its programs underwent various changes. Examples are reductions in unemployment insurance, and the development of a more selective, two-tier pension system. In addition, Olsen (2002) reported that the Social Democratic Party “appears somewhat less committed to equality, full employment, and the principle of universal citizenship benefits than it was previously” (p. 172). This becomes highly problematic as it gradually subverts the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the government. Fortunately, according to a recent report by The Economist, Sweden has been undergoing a “quiet revolution” to recover from the aforementioned economic downturns that had plagued its welfare provisioning back in the 1980s and 1990s. By implementing more liberal, free-market reforms, it has recovered at a quite impressive rate. Moreover, its private sector has shown high rates of growth and progress (National Review, 2010). Consequently, Sweden’s public debt fell from 70% of GDP in 1993 to 37% in 2010, indicating a great jolt in economic recovery (The Economist, 2013). However, this free-market expansion had been achieved at a cost, as it can explain the documented rise in income inequality in market-income

sources (OECD, 2011). As comprehensive as it may be, certain policies in the Swedish welfare structure seem to require revision in response to the recent market transformation. To be more precise, Sweden’s famous Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) may need to be adjusted to account for the recent trend in income inequality. In addition, distributive policies such as those related to income taxation and cash transfers have always been a hallmark of Swedish welfare back in the 20th century (Heclo & Madsen, 1987). Hence, revising and restructuring them to more recent socioeconomic trends can definitely reduce income inequality. CONCLUSION: THE DELEUZIAN SUBJECT & THE NEW SOCIAL RISKS In his article, What is a Dispositif?, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (Mik-Meyer & Villadsen, 2013) outlined a framework for analyzing Foucault’s theories on co-existing forms of power. I would like to conclude by underlining how one of these frameworks, namely “the Strategy of Subjectification,” becomes highly relevant in light of today’s emerging, social transformations. Deleuze asserts that the subject (or citizen) is not predetermined, but that he or she is in a continual process of becoming (p. 17). This very becoming, he claims, is a product of Foucault’s co-existing, imbalanced modalities of power. So what happens to this subject in the light of a “new order”? Giuliano Bonoli (2005) employs the notion of new social risks (NSRs) to highlight some of the risks associated with major, socioeconomic transformations that have resulted in post-industrial labour markets and new manifestations of the Family (Bonoli, 2005). For instance, if we look at Canada, Sweden, and many other countries, we find that there is a rising trend in single-parent families (OECD, 2011; OECD, 2011). In addition, the unceasing globalization of the world’s economies is melting the geopolitical boundaries in unprecedented ways,

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rendering nation-states almost obsolete. So what does this mean for the future of welfare structures? What is it that is going to shape the conscious becoming of a subject’s Governmentality with the ever-bombarding, external forces of globalization? These matters should be the focus of future research, as they will provide governments with an understanding of post-modern citizen-state relations and new forms of power dynamics. In conclusion, I have outlined a dialectical framework, placing the welfare state as an interface that constructs certain ideological perceptions and values on the one hand, and reflects the rise and decline of trends like income inequality on the other. I have applied my framework to a comparative case between Canada and Sweden, two disparate, yet interestingly similar paradigms. Through the governing paradox, I have demonstrated that in both cases, manifest (explicit) and latent (implicit) ideological goals can be analyzed in the state’s construction of the ideal citizen, an embodiment of the predominating ethos. In the context of analytical frameworks, I have chosen the post-structuralist theories of Michel Foucault to assist me in my analyses, and have elaborated on why I had chosen that perspective over a materialist one. Moreover, I have presented relatively recent statistics that demonstrate the rising income inequality in both Canadian and Swedish contexts, and raised appropriate questions and social policy reforms for each respective one in an attempt to challenge the status quo. WORKS CITED Bambra, C. (2004). The worlds of welfare:

Illusory and gender blind?, Social Policy and Society, 3(3):201-211. doi: 10.1017/S147474640400171X

Bonoli, G. (2005). The politics of the new social policies: providing coverage against new social risks in mature welfare states. Policy & Politics, 33(3):431-449.

Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. (2013). Income inequality on the rise, especially in large cities. Retrieved from http://www.policyalternatives.ca/newsroom/updates/income-inequality-rise-especially-large-cities

Currie, C. (2010, September 30). Sweden’s Quiet Revolution. National Review Online. Retrieved from http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/248263/sweden’s-quiet-revolution-duncan-currie

Downing, L. (2008). The cambridge introduction to michel foucault. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Granberg, D. (1987), A Contextual Effect in Political Perception and Self-Placement on an Ideology Scale: Comparative Analyses of Sweden and the U.S.. Scandinavian Political Studies, 10: 39–60. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9477.1987.tb00059.x

Heclo, H. (1987). In Madsen H. (Ed.), Policy and politics in sweden: Principled pragmatism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Hobbes, T. (2008). In Missner M. (Ed.), Thomas hobbes: Leviathan. New York: Pearson Longman.

Marx, K., Engels, F. (1998). The communist manifesto. Merlin Press

Maslow, A.H. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological Review, 50(4): 370-96.



Mik-Meyer, N. (2013). In Villadsen K. (Ed.), Power and welfare: Understanding citizens' encounters with state welfare, New York, NY: Routledge.

OECD (2011). Divided We Stand:Why Inequality Keeps Rising. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/49177689.pdf

OECD (2011). Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/49564868.pdf

Olsen, G. M. (2011). Power & inequality: A comparative introduction. Toronto: OUP Canada.

Olsen, G. M. (2002). The politics of the welfare state: Canada, sweden and the united states. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press.

Special report. (2013, February 2). Northern lights. The Economist, 406, 3-16.

Stanbridge, K., Ramos, H. (2012). Seeing politics differently: A brief introduction to political sociology. Canada: Oxford University Press.

Swedenborg B., Topel R. H., and Freeman R. B. (Eds.) (2010). Reforming the welfare state: Recovery and beyond in sweden, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Willcocks, P. (2011). Fixing Canada’s Growing Income Inequality. Retrieved from:http://www.princegeorgecitizen.com/article/20111210/FORTSTJOHN0306/312109996/FORTSTJOHN/wheat-board-legislation-ruled-illegal

April 2014 40

Questions of Indo-Caribbean Muslims: A Case Study in the Social Construction of Ethnicity Rashna Mohamed This study seeks to explore the complications surrounding Indo-Caribbean Muslims’ search for identity by observing the relationships between them and other Muslims of the South Asian diaspora. Diasporic and transnational studies have paid little to no attention to these relationships. This ethnographic study will unearth this little known topic. Results were gathered by interviewing members of a Mississauga, Ontario mosque and by generally observing them day-to-day. Findings indicate that the interaction between Muslims of the South Asian diaspora (the South-South encounter) resulted in Indo-Caribbean Muslims learning more about their lost heritage, as well as South Asian Muslims incorporating Indo-Caribbean cultural practices into their lives. This study also found that there is some tension between the groups as each views itself as superior to the other. These findings are consistent with those in similar studies among the South Asian Hindu diaspora. Contact between these groups allows Indo-Caribbean people to differentiate themselves from other South Asian diasporic people, while strengthening their connections to each other. This, I will argue, fosters a stronger sense of identity and heritage.


Doreen Massey writes that each space is unique due to the presence of different ethnic groups, nationalities, languages, and cultures. A place does not have to be one homogenous group of people. This is especially the case for Toronto, one of the world’s most multicultural cities. The connections between people in this mosque have enriched the cultural understanding of the Indo-Caribbean members, as well as opened the eyes of the South Asian members to different cultures. Singh (1997), in explaining his findings about the mandir he studied, argues that "the construction of ethnic identity and culture is the result of both convention and innovation... characterized by a syncretistic fusion of Indo-Caribbean and South Asian cultural traditions, and this has resulted in the emergence of a new and second diasporic Indo-Caribbean ethnic identity: an identity that takes the form of an imaginary South Asian Indian identity" (p. ii).

Having seen mass migrations from Africa and India throughout history (as well as having experienced colonialism under British rule) modern-day Caribbeans continually find themselves struggling with issues of identity. Beside a majority black population, the Caribbean is also home to a minority Indo-Caribbean denomination. Having descended from and acquired Indian heritage through ancestry, it is a widely-held misconception that all Indo-Caribbeans follow the Hindu religion. Within the Indo-Caribbean population, there exists a minority group that practices Islam: the Indo-Caribbean Muslims. It is this intersectionality of Indian culture and heritage with the religious traditions of Islam that results in an identity crisis for many Indo-Caribbean Muslims. Even more confusion ensues when Indo-Caribbeans migrate to other nations such as Canada and are met with other forms of cultural exchange.

A review of the current academic literature pertaining to Indo-Caribbean Muslims and

the social construction of their identities is scarce. There is constant reference to houses of worship such as churches, temples and synagogues in Singh’s (1997) study, however, he fails to mention mosques, thus neglecting an entire community of Indo-Caribbean Muslims. This may be due to their small numbers in the Caribbean, and therefore may lead to their exclusion from the broader Indo-Caribbean identity. It may also be due to the fact that Indo-Caribbean Muslims participate little in what many would consider hallmark Caribbean cultural traditions (such as Carnival). And unlike their Hindu counterparts, they do not take part in classical Indian singing or dancing, acts that are affiliated with Hinduism. Further, many Muslims do not consume alcohol. Stuart Hall points out that "questions of identity... are always exercises in selective memory, and they almost always involve the silencing of something in order to allow something else to speak" (Hall, 1995, p. 26). The need for Indo-Caribbean Muslims to distinguish their identities from Indo-Caribbean Hindus is what has caused Indo-Caribbean Muslims to forsake Indian cultural practices. Lack of identification with the cultural and religious identities of what constitutes inclusion as a "mainstream" Caribbean is the primary reason why Indo-Caribbean Muslims are almost always left out of discussions of Caribbean identity.

Attitudes about practices that are considered "Hindu" are beginning to change due to what is known as the South Asian/Indo-Caribbean encounter. The term 'South Asian' in this context refers to individuals born in either India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. For this case study, I observed encounters between South Asians and Indo-Caribbeans that occurred in a Mississauga, Ontario mosque. Along with accommodating many South Asian and Indo-Mauritian individuals, this mosque is home to a large Indo-Caribbean population. It should be noted that although the mosque is also frequented by

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congregants from the Middle East, Africa, and South East Asia, the scope of this paper deals exclusively with congregants of Indian descent. Many congregants, regardless of origin, are faced with issues of identity, having all come from immigrant backgrounds. It leads me to wonder if this mosque is considered a Caribbean mosque because of the large number of Caribbean congregants. Or is it a mosque without any regional ties because it is so multicultural? Doreen Massey (1994) suggests that it does not have to be one or the other: "spaces do not have single, unique 'identities'; they are full of internal conflicts" (p. 155). Just as Massey suggests that a space does not have to adhere to a single identity, I suggest that people do not have to adhere to just one identity; one does not have to be only Caribbean, only Indian, only Muslim, or only Canadian.

CULTURAL EXCHANGE

Although Indo-Caribbeans do not constitute the majority at the Mississauga mosque under study, they are the largest group that visits to worship, therefore the essence of Caribbean-ness can easily be observed. Being a member of the mosque myself, I have full access to the building and the people in it. I was able to make observations simply by walking around and taking notes. The food served at the mosque is Guyanese, Trinidadian or Indian-Pakistani. As they greet, Indo-Caribbean men and women hug and kiss each other on the cheek. Already, identities become contested, as this form of greeting is generally frowned upon by many Muslim communities. The songs at events are sung in Arabic, the language of Islam, or Urdu, the language that most South Asian Muslims speak. Indo-Caribbeans claim Urdu as their language, instead of Hindi, which is the language of Hindus. It is interesting to note that while most of the qaseedas (devotional songs) derive from India, Indo-Caribbean Muslims are able to recognize them while many South Asians

lack familiarity with qaseedas. Hall (1995) refers to these people (in this case, Indo-Caribbeans) as "nostalgic and sentimental" (p. 34) and explains that "Africa had moved on" (p. 34). Or in this case, India—which now includes Pakistan and Bangladesh—has moved on. Another reason why South Asians may not recognize the songs is because Indo-Caribbean people pronounce the Urdu words differently—leading to the assumption by many South Asians that Indo-Caribbeans are "watered down Indians" and "cultural bastards" (Mootoo, 1993, p. 45). One Pakistani member of the mosque's youth group jokingly comments on this upon hearing a discussion amongst the Indo-Caribbean members about old Hindi film songs. He says that "nobody even listens to or knows those songs anymore." However, Indo-Caribbeans, both Muslims and Hindus, have held onto these cultural productions because they allow for the retention of their heritage. The same member is also amused when he hears Indo-Caribbean members singing a Hindi song as their pronunciation was deemed incorrect. At another mosque in Rexdale, from which many members left in order to join this Mississauga mosque (and whose old imam is the Mississauga mosque's current imam) recently went so far as to have an evening of "light Bollywood entertainment" where members sing classical Hindi songs. Such an event would be absolutely unheard of in a mosque predominantly composed of South Asians. "It may be that the music from Hindi films which most Indo-Caribbeans do not understand may ... have had a strong influence in sustaining their Indian identity in Caribbean societies" (Singh, 1997, p. 10). Indo-Caribbeans do not have an Islamic musical genre in the same way that South Asians do (ghazals and qawalis), or Hindus do (bhajans). So while Hindus and South Asian Muslims have no need to latch onto Bollywood, Indo-Caribbeans Muslims do.

Conversely, I discovered that encounters with South Asian people in the mosque has

Questions of Indo-Caribbean Muslims


re-introduced Indo-Caribbean Muslims to traditions that they had previously lost or rejected because they felt that these traditions were "too Hindu." For example, on the night before the Islamic holiday of Eid, a Pakistani woman is seen applying henna or mehndi designs to the hands of women, most of whom are Indo-Caribbean. This is something that was traditionally uncommon to Guyanese and Trinidadian Muslims. One Guyanese congregant in his seventies comments by saying that henna used to be applied a “long time ago”. I have also witnessed Indo-Caribbean Muslims beginning to wear saris and red clothes on their wedding days, acts previously believed to be Hindu customs. Upon interacting with South Asians Muslims in Toronto and the Greater Toronto Area, many Indo-Caribbean Muslims have either realized that these practices are cultural and not religious, or that they are influenced by these customs because they are vastly outnumbered by South Asian people.

This encounter with South Asian people is good for Indo-Caribbean Muslims because the latter can recall and re-learn customs that were previously lost from the former, diversifying and enlarging cultural knowledge. However, this could also result in the loss of a specific Indo-Caribbean culture for Muslims as South Asian culture takes hold. In Preeia Surajbali's thesis on the encounter between various South Asian diasporic groups in a Hindu temple, we find the statement of a respondent who points out that at weddings, Indo-Caribbean people serve regular Indian food instead of serving seven curry, which was once the traditional vegetarian menu served at Indo-Caribbean Hindu weddings: "Everywhere you look there is 'Bollywood' and 'Indian inspired' and more and more West Indians [Indo-Caribbeans] are into it" (Surajbali, p. 54). In the Muslim community, however, the same cannot be said because Muslims have few ritualistic religious practices which are related to ethnic or cultural practices. Thus, almost

no custom that is introduced by South Asian Muslims to Indo-Caribbean Muslims would involve the rejection of another custom. For instance, at weddings, Indo-Caribbean Muslim brides generally wear a white, European style gowns instead of the red lehnga commonly worn by Indian brides. Indo-Caribbean Muslim brides felt that wearing the white gown of the Christians was closer to Islam, as both share the Abrahamic tradition. Perhaps this sentiment is a result of colonization. If it is the former, it could be the case that this is yet another means by which Indo-Caribbean Muslims seek to differentiate themselves from Hindus. If it is the latter, then it is a sentiment shared by most, if not all, colonized peoples. In any case, with the Caribbean-Indian encounter occurring in the past few decades, we find more Muslims donning Indian attire at weddings and other major events, and it is not done at the expense of another inherently Indo-Caribbean tradition: white gowns are a product of European Christian tradition.

Indo-Caribbean members of the Mississauga mosque under study have also introduced their culture to their South Asian counterparts. This can be seen most clearly through the experiences of the mosque’s youth group. The overwhelming majority of its members are Guyanese and Trinidadian. The minority consists of four Indo-Mauritians, two Pakistanis and one Indian. The three South Asian members understand Creole or Patois, and attempt to speak it themselves, while none of the Indo-Caribbean members try to speak Urdu. Interestingly, the same South Asian youth who makes fun of the Indo-Caribbean youth for singing old Hindi songs incorrectly is the one who most often tries to speak Creole. This may be a result of a phenomenon that is explained by Mark Campbell in his article "Gwannings." He argues that non-Caribbean youth have adopted the Jamaican language "as a way to empower themselves within the context of disempowerment cultivated by various

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local institutions" (Campbell, 2012, p. 128). In this case, because the South Asian members of the youth group have more access to Indo-Guyanese and Trinidadian individuals than Jamaicans, they have chosen to adopt Guyanese Creole (somewhat similar to Jamaican patois) as a means of empowerment. This would most likely not have been the case had these youth been attending a mosque or school where the vast majority of members were also South Asian since there would be no people from which they could learn this language.

I have not discussed the interactions between Indo-Caribbean Muslims and Indo-Mauritians because there is not much exchange between the two by way of sharing customs. Many aspects of Mauritian culture is similar to Caribbean culture, as many of their ancestors hailed from the same parts of India. Both also had experienced being taken to Mauritius and the Caribbean under British forces in the 1800s to early 1900s. Other than the fact that Mauritians speak French Creole and Caribbeans speak English Creole, their cultures are very much the same. They dress in Indian clothing for special occasions, they cook similar foods, address family members by Indian names, and engage in the same amount of affectionate physical contact such as hugging and kissing on the cheek with the opposite gender. Since there are so many similarities, there is not much room for exchange. However, it is heartening for Indo-Caribbeans and Mauritians to know that there are other members of the Indian diaspora who share a similar culture that both identify with. Many Indo-Caribbeans report feeling isolated in their cultural practices, and thus encountering people from another part of the world who share the same ethnic background and cultural practices creates solidarity between the two groups.

A UNIQUELY TORONTO MOSQUE "When Indo-Caribbeans first arrived in Canada, they quickly learned something: they were a very different "brand" of Indians" (Singh, 1997, p. 103). Living in the Caribbean, Indo-Caribbean people ethnically identified as simply “Indian,” but upon reaching Canada and interacting with other Indians, they discovered they were a different “brand.” In the Caribbean, there is almost no direct contact with Indians from India. To be Indian means to be Indo-Caribbean. However, upon migrating to other countries like Canada or the United States, they come into contact with South Asians and realize that their flavour of "Indian" is quite different. In this way, the Indian experience in Canada is much different than the Indian experience in the Caribbean. Mootoo (1993) states that she only considered herself a real Indian when she came "up here and s[aw] real flesh and blood Indian from India" (p. 47). In addition, Brampton and Mississauga have massive Indian and Pakistani populations. Our Mississauga mosque is located on the border between these two cities. Because of its geographic location, there is an even larger South Asian influence. It is common knowledge amongst Indo-Caribbeans who live in places where they interact with South Asians that the latter feel superior in their Indian-ness to Indo-Caribbeans. Singh writes in his dissertation that "from the perspective of India-born Indians/South Asians, Indo-Caribbeans represent a ‘bastardized’ version of ‘Indianess’ and Indian culture. This type of situation ... has caused a degree of friction between the two groups" (Singh, 1997, p. 13). Conversely, many Indo-Caribbeans hold a negative view of South Asians. Several family members of the mosque's congregants regularly express their opinion that it is a good thing that the British took their forbearers out of India and into the Caribbean. If not, they would still be left in India "wearing a leaf and holding a stick," (according to one congregant in his fifties) implying that had it not been for the

Questions of Indo-Caribbean Muslims


British, they would have been uncivilized barbarians. This attitude is most likely a result of colonialism and colonial-style education both during the official colonial period and post-independence, and it continues to prevail.

One would assume that because of these attitudes of superiority and inferiority from within both groups, there conflicts between South Asians and Indo-Caribbeans would remain in institutions where they share spaces. In her research at a Hindu temple, Surajbali (2008) found that some of the Caribbean respondents wanted Indian members of the congregation to start their own temple instead of imposing their food and customs on the former. This is also the case for some Indo-Canadian mosques in Canada that are frequented by individuals of Indian/South Asian descent. A nearby mosque in Brampton (from which many members left and joined this new mosque in Mississauga) has had to deal with problems between Pakistani members and Guyanese members. The administration of the mosque is Guyanese, while most of its members are Pakistani. The Pakistanis did not cooperate with two Guyanese imams. Conversely, the Guyanese were unaccepting of a Pakistani imam. A compromise was made by hiring a Barbadian imam whose parents were from India. Similar conflicts take place all over the Greater Toronto Area. So why is this not the case in the Mississauga mosque? It can be attributed to several factors. While Caribbean-ness is being produced in this mosque by way of language, food, song, and culture in general, it does not overwhelm the others. There is no tyranny of the majority, so the minority groups do not feel threatened. Secondly, the imam is Moroccan, and therefore, there can be no complaints from either side that the leader of the mosque favours one group over another. The congregation is a mix of people from all over the world; it just so happens that a large number of the people in authority are Indo-Caribbean, hence their visibility. At this mosque, instead of

people sitting with "their own kind," you see people sitting together, regardless of where they come from. The young people in the youth group are all friends and regularly interact with one another outside of the mosque. Having all grown up in the Toronto area, they do not have issues with individuals of different backgrounds, and by extension, this acceptance and tolerance has reached their parents. The mothers of these youth regularly sit together and will discuss the similarities and differences in snacks and sweets. The Indo-Caribbeans will say a word in Creole, and the South Asians will tell them the word's Hindi origin. This cultural exchange has fostered friendships and has even led to marriage. Two of the youth group members, a Guyanese and an Indian, have recently gotten engaged. Two other mosque members, a Mauritian and a Trinidadian, have recently gotten married. Interestingly, it was Trinidadian elders who encouraged this match. Generally when elders try to match a couple, they match people from the same country. Another reason this is possible is because Toronto and the GTA do not have concentrated ethnic enclaves in the same way that cities like London, England do. While there are areas that have residents who are predominantly of one ethnicity or nationality, they are not concentrated enough in any neighbourhood to be considered an “enclave”.

Indo-Caribbean Muslims have held onto their conventions (such as singing in Urdu), but have also adopted new customs from their South Asian counterparts, which in reality were long-forgotten customs of their own. The same can be said for the South Asian members; they have adopted cultural practices from their Indo-Caribbean counterparts. All this has been made possible by the unique way in which the multiculturalism of Toronto allows for cross-cultural exchange, learning, and cooperation.

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WORKS CITED

Campbell, Mark V (2012). Jamaica in the Canadian Experience: A Multiculturalizing Presence. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.

Massey, Doreen (1994). Space, Place

and Gender. Minn: University of Minnesota Press.

Mootoo, Shani (1993). Out on Main

Street. Vancouver: Press Gang Publishers.

Singh, Simboonath (1997). The Social Construction of a Collective "Indian" Ethno-Religious Identity in a Context of Ethnic Diversity: A Case Study of an Indo-Caribbean Hindu Temple in Toronto. (Doctoral dissertation). University of Toronto.

Surajbali, Preeia (2008). South-South

Encounters: Temple Affiliation, Identity Formation and Authenticity among South-Asian, Indo-Caribbean and Indo-African Hindu Women. (Master’s Thesis). University of Toronto.


From Dictatorship to Democracy: Towards a Holistic Understanding of Fertility in Romania Olimpia Bidian Most of the Eastern European countries, formerly members of the Communist Bloc, are currently faced with below replacement fertility rate and the demographic implications are far-reaching. Yet, demographers have yet to identify a comprehensive account for it. In Romania, for example, some demographers have attempted to explain the fertility decline through various social, economic, demographic, and evolutionary conditions. Others have argued that it is the product of a unique socio-historical experience created by the communist government’s pro-natalist policy, which failed to accomplish its purpose and ultimately resulted in a decreased fertility rate. Drawing on both demographic theories and population policies, this paper analyzes Romanian fertility rate patterns between 1930 and 1989, in an attempt to provide a more holistic explanation for the steep decline in fertility. The main argument is that no theory or population policy alone is sufficient to explain the complex decline in fertility in Romania, either during or post-communist era.

April 2014 48

Following the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’ in 1989 and the overthrow of the communist dictatorship, Romania experienced a remarkable decline in fertility. The driving force behind this decline has been the topic of study and debate ever since (e.g. Keil and Andreescu 1999; Bardatan 2004; Bardatan and Firebaugh 2007; Aceleanu 2007; Soare 2012). In an attempt to explain the consistently declining fertility rate in Romania, some researchers have turned to demographic theories and argued, for example, that the declining fertility rate in communist and post-communist Romania can be explained through the second demographic transition perspective, as there has been a decline in marriage rates, coupled with an increased divorce rate and number of couples who remain childless. The innovation-diffusion thesis (Trovato 2009) has been used to forward the argument that the idea of small family diffused from the urban areas to the countryside, from the wealthy to the less wealthy, and from the educated to the uneducated and, therefore, family limitation became a wide-spread practice. Other researchers have gone back to the communist era and argued that the government’s pro-natalist policy failed in the long-term to accomplish its purpose and created today’s steep decline. This paper argues that no theory alone is sufficient to explain the complex fertility decline in either communist or post-communist Romania. Similarly, the viewpoint that the Romanian regime’s pro-natalist policy alone is the root cause of fertility decline does not provide a holistic view of the contemporary declining fertility rate. Drawing on demographic theories, social policies and their connection to population policies, and societal interrelationships, this paper analyzes the period between 1930 and 1989, in an attempt to find a holistic explanation for today’s steep decline in fertility. Based on the approaches taken by Romanian state planners in addressing fertility problems, this period of study is

divided into two sub-periods. The first sub-period, from 1930 to 1965, encompassed a series of measures meant to fast track the country’s industrialization and urbanization through technological modernization of agriculture, rapid expansion of the education system, and improved healthcare and housing. The second sub-period is from 1966 to the overthrow of the communist regime in 1989 and is marked by the introduction of the pro-natalist policy and subsequent amendments.

THE FERTILITY RATE BETWEEN 1930 AND 1965 By the 1930s, the fertility in Central, Eastern, and Southern European countries fell into three broad categories (Wolchik 1985). Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia had a Crude Birth Rate (CBR) below 20, similar to Northern and Western Europe. Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia averaged between 22.8 and 29.6, while Albania stood alone in the third category with a rate of over 34 (Keil and Andreescu 1999). While the CBR is impractical for comparative analysis, as it overlooks the effect of age on fertility and it includes not just women of childbearing age, but also children, the elderly, and men – segments of the population that have no direct relationship to childbearing (Trovato 2009), these numbers show that the fertility rate in Eastern Europe was almost double compared with Western Europe. Furthermore, the CBR in Romania was approximately three times higher than what it is today (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). The low fertility rate in Western Europe has been explained by the innovation-diffusion thesis (Trovato 2009), which posits that family limitation emerged as a novel idea in the mid-19th century as part of the social-psychological transformation that accompanied socio-economic modernization, urbanization, and secularization. Innovation-diffusion

From Dictatorship to Democracy


theorists believe that once the idea of the small family diffused from the urban areas to the countryside, from the wealthy to the less wealthy, from the educated to the uneducated, family limitation became wide-spread. The Western Europe of the 1930 displayed higher levels of industrial development and urbanization, higher levels of education – especially for women, and more active involvement of women in the workforce, compared to countries in Eastern Europe. Thus, it may be deduced that the fertility rate in Romania was in fact the result of the country not being industrialized. While the level of literacy in Romania registered a staggering 56 percent, over 66 percent of its population was working in the agriculture (Keil and Andreescu 1999). However, after the 1930s and until the end of the Second World War, while the economy continued to be primarily agricultural, the fertility rate in Romania registered a significant decline (Keil and Andreescu 1999). It continued to decline even though Romania had a policy strictly forbidding abortion, until 1937 when the policy was relaxed and abortion was allowed, albeit on very limited basis (Soare 2012). After World War II, the Romanian communist regime embarked on an aggressive campaign of socio-economic modernization. The Romanian leaders in power began to dismantle the mostly agricultural social and economic structures. Following the model of development established by the Soviet Union, they instituted a model that emphasized rapid industrialization and urbanization, rural collectivization and technological modernization of agriculture, rapid expansion of the education system, and improved healthcare and housing. Furthermore, the regime focused on job creation – especially for women in the wage sector of the economy – and the overall improvement of population well-being (Keil and Andreescu 1999). Comparatively, East and Central Europe, at the time, showed that women’s level of

participation in the income-producing jobs was about 90 percent of that of men, whereas Western Europe and North America had considerably lower rates, at approximately 60-70 percent (Sivard 1995). Cole and Nydon (1990) argue that Romania’s fertility crisis at the time is a socialist variant of the demographic transition perspective, since the transition from an almost exclusively agrarian to an industrial economy, from unemployment and underemployment to overemployment, and the active participation of women in the labour force, determined a fertility transition (Trovato 2009). Furthermore, Butz and Ward’s countercyclical theory (Trovato 2009) may also explain the low fertility rate in Romania, as women aggressively entered the work force and their higher earnings may have had a depressing effect on reproduction. An increase in women’s average income raised the household income, yet simultaneously raised the cost of having children by the amount of earnings lost while the unemployed women would take time off work to have and raise their children (Trovato 2009). Furthermore, as argued by Butz and Ward, women may have considered bearing children as directly affecting their opportunity costs in three ways: 1) there was an immediate effect on the women’s employment; 2) there were long-term effects on the family’s earning power; and 3) significant losses of future pension coverage were anticipated (Trovato 2009). While these theories offer an explanation for Romania’s low fertility rate, they are mainly considering socio-economic factors, such as the industrialization and urbanization, the integration of women in the workforce, and the significant improvements in healthcare, and educational factors, such as raising the level of higher education. In complementing these theories, I argue that the transition period in Romania was also the result of demographic factors such as lower marriage and higher divorce rates,

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higher abortion rates, cultural factors such as lower religious influence on family values, and legislative factors such as liberal divorce and abortion policies (Soare 2012).

THE FERTILITY RATE IN THE 1960s AND THE PRO-NATALIST POLICY During the early to mid-1960s, Romania’s political leaders began to perceive the declining fertility rate as detrimental to the country’s development plans, a train of thought arguably similar to the 18th century Physiocracy theory (Keil and Andreescu 1999), which puts emphasis on productive work as the source of state wealth. The communist leaders saw the low fertility rate and the characteristics of the population as obstructing the modernization efforts and the nation’s wealth. The regime’s perspective on the dynamics of the population simplistically resumed to asserting that the low fertility rate is the result of psychological influences of a ‘good life’ – too liberalist views on life, perpetuation of ego-centrism, and the need for material attainment (Soare 2012). This correlation between the rising levels of income and the falling fertility rate is similar to Becker’s theory (Trovato 2009) of demand – the number of children desired by parents is a rational evaluation of household income and the ability to raise their children in a quality fashion. In other words, parents do not necessarily translate a higher income into having more children; they rather focus on the quality of their children’s upbringing. Based on these premises and the fact that the economic action plan did not improve the fertility rate, Romanian state planners considered that a modification of the population’s reproductive behaviour could only be achieved through a pro-natalist policy that accelerated the demographic transformation through the alteration of demographic processes. As defined by Trovato (2009), a population policy is a plan formulated by the government with the aim of reducing, increasing, or

stabilizing population growth over a period of time. Usually, such policies effect quantitative change through one or more of the three major demographic variables: fertility, mortality, and migration. The Romanian communist regime made use of all three variables, alas more in a restrictive rather than stimulating way. In 1966, Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, in his speech before the National Conference of Romanian Women, cautioned against the threat of a declining birthrate and its impact on the nation’s wealth. He made a personal appeal to women all over the country to focus their “tireless energy” and exercise their right of rebuilding the family and educating the youth (Kligman 1998:113). Ceausescu stated that “backward attitudes and expressions of levity toward the family must be combated with determination [because they] result in the disintegration of the family, and the neglect of children’s education and training for life” (Keil and Andreescu 1999:481). The Romanian President blamed the declining birthrate on the existing legislative deficiencies, which the state planners were mandated to address immediately. Consequently, the first legislative act designed to address the declining fertility rates was the infamous Presidential Decree 770/1966, which made abortion illegal in Romania, barring exceptional situations, such as an imminent threat to the pregnant mother’s health, risk of deformity of the fetus, and pregnancy as a result of rape. The pro-natalist policy was regarded by state planners, following an essentially Physiocratic philosophy vis-à-vis factors that increase the nation’s wealth, as the appropriate way to increase fertility, avoid labour shortages, expand national production and markets, and offset the aging population. While the initial introduction of the pro-natalist policy produced a dramatic change in fertility, couple of years later the fertility increase dissipated, and by 1973 fertility was again



regarded as a problem that had to be addressed (see Appendix I). The law remained in effect for nearly one quarter of century, being revoked only after the regime was overthrown in 1989. During this period, the law prohibiting abortion was vigorously enforced, not only by the state’s policing authorities, but also by doctors and medical practitioners, who were mandated to closely monitor and report on the status of pregnant women in their care, to ensure that women did not voluntarily terminate their pregnancies (Keil and Andreescu 1999). Furthermore, any method of contraception was strictly forbidden and such products were removed from pharmacies and their import/manufacturing was ceased. Consequently, women were forced to obtain abortions illegally, which involved extremely dangerous and high-risk procedures that often resulted in infections, injury, and even death (Keil and Andreescu 1999). The state also offered a number of incentives meant to increase fertility. Parents of large families were entitled to subsidies for their children and families with two or more children were given preference in housing allocations and had better access to rationed goods, compared to childless adults. Furthermore, the number of childcare facilities was increased throughout the country, their operating hours extended to accommodate parents working late, and maternal leave policies were implemented in all organizations (Keil and Andreescu 1999). In addition, the state officially recognized mothers with ten or more children, by awarding them the Civil Order of Mother Heroine, an honorary title adapted from the 1944 Soviet Union Decree of the Presidium (Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 1944). Furthermore, the communist regime introduced special measures for maternal and child healthcare, with the aim of

reducing infant and obstetric mortality, as well as birth defects (Jinga 2013). The nationwide, free of charge, easily accessible healthcare system was greatly improved – the network of hospitals and clinics was rapidly expanded throughout the country, multidisciplinary medical teams were introduced into general practice, and new medical schools were opened to allow the rapid increase in the numbers of highly needed medical staff. The main focus of the healthcare policy was on eradicating infectious and viral diseases and on reducing child mortality (Jinga 2013). Another demographic variable, used by the Romanian state planners to effect quantitative changes in fertility over this period of time, was migration. Authorities exercised a strict control over population migration, both internally and internationally. Restrictive exit policies severely limited the population’s ability to travel outside the country. Passports were seized by the local police and prior approval from state authorities was needed to obtain the travel document (German Federal Agency for Civic Education 2007). Individuals who attempted to apply for emigrant or political refugee status at various embassies in Romania had their social and economic rights revoked and were stigmatised and harassed by the authorities. Consequently, the number of emigrants was drastically reduced (see Appendix II) and the population movements kept under strict control. Internal migration, particularly labour related, was also state-managed, with some exceptions allowed for marriage and education (German Federal Agency for Civic Education 2007), albeit the latter had a mandated temporary status. Yet the fertility rate continued to follow a slow declining trend. One possible explanation for the apparent failure of the pro-natalist policy to increase the fertility rate is provided by Birg (1995), who asserts that a policy should not be “implemented without first having some idea of the socioeconomic and

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environmental implications of current and projected population trends” (Trovato 2009:534). To some extent, this appears to have been the case in Romania. The Communist Party’s official program stipulated that, “to build a multi-developed socialist society, increased attention should be devoted to the family’s strengthening, because the family is the nucleus of the society” (Keil and Andreescu 1999:482). Therefore, an adequate age structure of the population had to be maintained, children and young adults were to be educated and, upon graduation, provided with job opportunities, women were protected and encouraged to have children, and the state provided social protection for the family. However, the Romanian communist regime failed to take into consideration the importance of socio-economic measures meant to support and maintain the increase in fertility over the long-tem. Aside the overall lack of long-term planning, there are three other important factors that contributed to this fertility decline. First, state planners focused exclusively on a quantitative increase and applied restrictive, rather than stimulating, measures. For instance, alongside the above mentioned measures, another piece of legislation was introduced to apply a surtax on all adults, 25 years of age and older, who were childless, regardless of their marital status, which the population sarcastically referred to as the National Celibacy Tax (Keil and Andreescu 1999). Secondly, while vigorously promoting fertility and closely-spaced pregnancies, the state was also encouraging women to aggressively enter the labour market. This approach contributed to an actual decline in fertility, as previously explained through the demographic transition and countercyclical perspectives. I further argue that the pro-natalist policy also had a significant social effect on women, because promoting women as mothers and family caretakers reinforced the already strong patriarchal values of the society and confirmed the women’s status as

subordinate to men. In addition, by allowing state planners to take reproductive decisions, the policy favoured social antagonisms, not only between the state authorities and the population, but also between men and disadvantaged women. Thirdly, the push for women to enter the labour market was not supported by any measures to increase the presence of women in management positions and the upper echelons of leadership. In addition, the deepening economic crisis in Romania in the early 1980s brought about a series of measures under the umbrella of a national austerity program and the already existing wage discrepancies between men and women were further deepened (Keil and Andreescu 1999).

IN CLOSING: UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEMPORARY STEEP DECLINE IN FERTILITY This paper has argued that no one theory is sufficient to explain the complex fertility decline in communist and post-communist Romania. Similarly, the viewpoint that the Romanian regime’s pro-natalist policy alone is the root cause of fertility decline does not provide a holistic view of the contemporary declining fertility rate. The above analysis of fertility rate patterns during the communist era revealed several additional aspects and theories that provide a more holistic explanation for today’s steep decline in fertility. Demographic and family policies have been implemented throughout the history of Romania, at one time or another, with the aim of stabilizing and even increasing the population (Keil and Andreescu 1999). Taking the 1950s as the base for analysis (see Appendix I), the fertility rate in Romania has continued to decline, and by 1965 it reached the below replacement level. The pro-natalist policy implemented by the state planners caused a significant spike in fertility rate, reaching a level comparable to the baby boom period in the United States (Trovato 2009). However, this high level was maintained only for



couple of years, and subsequent amendments to the policy, such as the surtax on childless adults (Keil and Andreescu 1999) and the introduction of family planning programs, have ultimately failed and the slow decline of the fertility rate continued, until 1989 when the communist regime was overthrown. Furthermore, the contemporary fertility decline may also be the result of the revoking of the pro-natalist policy and of all the population migration restrictions. In other words, the increased internal and international migration, increased availability of contraceptive and birth control measures, and the legalization of abortion (Keil and Andreescu 1999) may also be factors in understanding why the fertility rate in Romania has declined and reached below replacement level. The demographic transition and countercyclical perspectives offer a potential explanation for the low fertility rate in the sub-period 1930 to 1966. A particular impact was created by women who aggressively entered the workforce and consequently raised the household income, which simultaneously raised the cost of having children by the amount of earnings lost while mothers would take time off work to have and raise their children. The current situation in Romania displays a similar état d’affaires, since over 70 percent of women aged 15 to 64 are

actively participating in the workforce (Keil and Andreescu 1999). Furthermore, as Soare (2012) asserts, other demographic factors, such as lower marriage and higher divorce rates, and cultural factors, such as low religious influence on family values, may further explain the contemporary low fertility, as they did for the communist era. A further understanding may be provided by Easterlin’s argument that today’s low fertility stems from adults struggling to satisfy their material aspirations because of economic insecurity (Trovato 2009). Ever since the 1989 overthrow of the communist regime, Romania continues to struggle through very difficult economic times. This economic instability cannot inspire families with the confidence that they can support their children, let alone provide them with a quality of life in the near or even long term (Keil and Andreescu 1999).

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Appendix I

Annual fertility rates of Romanian women aged 15 to 49, between 1956 and 1989. Note: Nicolae Ceausescu period = 1965 to 1989. Source: Keil and Andreescu (1999).

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Appendix II Romanian emigration between 1957 and 1989. Note: Nicolae Ceausescu period = 1965 to 1989. Source: German Federal Agency for Civic Education (2007) based on the 2006 Romanian National Statistics Agency emigration report.

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Sivard, Ruth Leger. 1995. Women… A World Survey, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities.

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Documents

Society & Its Transformations, Vol. 3 No. 1, April 2014