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DOI: 10.1177/03063127030333006

2003 33: 419Social Studies of ScienceArie Rip

Constructing Expertise : In a Third Wave of Science Studies?

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SYMPOSIUM

Constructing Expertise:

In a Third Wave of Science Studies?

Arie Rip

There is much with which to agree in the discussion paper of Collins &

Evans (2002) on a normative theory of expertise as the next step in

science studies, but also much with which to disagree. While I have a

problem with their various rhetorical strategies,1 I strongly agree with

Collins and Evans that a normative theory of expertise is an important

challenge for science studies at the present time (2002: 237, 239).2

However, I found their paper curiously disappointing in how they address

that challenge.

There are three items in their paper that qualify for a normative theory,or the beginnings of such a theory. First, Collins and Evans emphasize that

there is expertise, often experience-based, which is not recognized by

certification (2002: 238).3 They do not follow-up on how one can recog-

nize such expertise, and recognize it at an early stage, perhaps as a

competence. Although this may well be impossible, one might be able to

improve the processes of recognition. Second, they emphasize that more

extension, i.e. more participation by non-specialists, is not always better.

This point deserves to be reiterated, and further articulation is important.

Collins and Evans appear to suggest that the actual, optimal, extension isto be decided on a case-by-case basis. At least, that is the way they discuss

their cases (2002: 26165). Third, they emphasize that one can usefully

start with esoteric sciences as a model, and with the experience of the

sociologist studying such sciences as a heuristic. That this is indeed part of

a normative theory is visible in phrases such as:

It seems, then, important to retain a notion, even if it is an idealized one,of a core-set community in which expertise is used to adjudicate betweencompeting knowledge-claims and to determine the content of knowledge.(2002: 281)

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I can wholeheartedly agree with the first two items, but the third item

has definite limitations. Collins and Evans overall analytical strategy (or

heuristic) to start with esoteric sciences, which they assume should not be

interfered with, suggests that the burden of proof should be on the new

experts (experience-based or otherwise) who have to argue (with the helpof intermediaries including science studies scholars) that they have some-

thing to contribute. Rights that accrue from expertise (2002: 249, 251) is

a key phrase in Collins and Evans exposition, but they give no indication

of how such rights accrue and are to be recognized in practice.

Collins and Evans give a formal argument: if people can make a

reasonable claim to be members of the core-set relevant to [the] particular

technical decision they have contributory expertise (2002: 252). But who

is to decide what is relevant? Collins and Evans continue to say:

Their expertise would be continuous with the core-sets expertise, ratherthan discontinuous with it; astrology and theology are discontinuous withthose of radiation ecology, whereas the expertise of sheep farmers is not.

This is not such a simple distinction, however. For example, astrology and

theology overlap with anthroposophy, while anthroposophical expertise has

a recognized empirical component (for example, on water flows, plant

growth, healthy lifestyles), and links up with research questions in estab-

lished disciplines (up to radiation ecology). Should one rely on the estab-

lished core-set to adjudicate about the relevance of anthroposophy?

Their treatment of expertise is curiously decontextualized, as if the

nature of expertise and the rights that might accrue can be discussed

independent of the context in which they are shaped. Even for the esoteric

sciences, and for the core-sets that are seen as protected, somehow, against

epistemic interference, context is important if only in order to guarantee

such protection.

By choosing core-sets as their entrance point (2002: 24244) and

arguing that others than members have no say, their approach is socio-

logical, and because of their neglect of context, an internalist sociology of

science. I am not arguing against internalist sociology of science, but would

rather see it as an integral part of a broader sociology that includes

questions about how esoteric sciences emerge in the first place, and how

protected spaces for such sciences are maintained (and not just through

micro-boundary work).

Expertise is always about something that is relevant for an audience:

the courts, policy makers, decision makers more generally. Collins and

Evans discuss such issues in their Appendix, under the heading The

Nature of Expertise, but restrict their discussion to the issue of extension,

and to the recurrent point that participation is not necessarily good, andthat boundaries between inside and outside need not be dissolved. When

they say (a propos Sheila Jasanoff) that they need not go into the role of

expertise in particular institutional processes, but can concentrate on the

epistemological status of the outcome of [such] process[es] (2002: 276),

they sidestep the very issues that are relevant to the epistemological status

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of such outcomes. The Studies of Expertise and Experience that Collins

and Evans advocate would profit from consideration of the larger body of

work of political scientists, on rights that accrue (from expertise, or in

other ways) and on the role of scientific expertise in public decision

making.4In this paper, I want to problematize the role of core-sets and suggest a

broader approach in terms of productive arrangements and path-dependent

learning, where core-sets are just one possibility. Re-reading the cases

discussed by Collins and Evans, and introducing further experiences with

expertise in context will allow me to add some further aspects of expertise to

their analysis.

Core-sets, Tribal Norms and New Natural History

Let me start by undermining the self-evident and productive role Collins &

Evans (2002) assign to core-sets in esoteric sciences. Collins and Evans

(2002: 244) claim there is common agreement about that role. Is high-

energy physics doing a good job so that it actually deserves to be let alone?

Alvin Weinberg characterized high-energy physics as baroque, and Imre

Lakatos wondered in passing about degeneration of particle physics.5

Karin Knorr Cetina (1999: 1213, 47, 24849) wonders how truth effects

can be derived from a universe of signs and fictions, shams produced by

objects mimicking other objects. That there is, in fact, a protected space

for this esoteric science should not be an argument in a normative theory

of expertise.

Actually, there are structurally equivalent protected spaces that Collins

and Evans would not accept as relevant.6 In New Zealands Science Vote

there is a special budget for Maori Knowledge and Development, which is

translated into dedicated portfolios of the science funding agencies. Maori

Development research must be by Maori, for Maori and work from a

Maori worldview and approach to knowledge (kaupapa Maori). In addi-

tion, the conduct of research must adhere to tikanga Maori, that is,

customary practices and principles, including the judgment of what looks

right.7 High-level (non-Maori) science policy officials insist that Maori

worldviews have equal status alongside Western science. In the funding

agencies and research institutions, there is a tendency to go for projects

where Maori knowledge of a natural history kind provides input for

western-style research projects. From their side, the Maori insist on a

layered view of knowledge with differential access. This justifies limiting

participation to researchers who identify and belong, and general restric-

tions of access to community and personal knowledge (and the additional

issue of communal intellectual property rights). Clearly, epistemic as wellas cultural and political considerations are involved, and this is also the

case in the argument that any assessment of research proposals and

research results must be done by Maori, and that quality will be defined as

following a Maori approach. Political correctness dominates here, and this

increases the danger of a closed shop.

Symposium:Rip: Constructing Expertise 421



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John Ziman (1981/1973) once portrayed high-energy physicists as the

HEP tribe (joined precariously with the high-energy theorist, HET

tribe). Their kaupapa is more esoteric than that of the Maori, and they

have their tribal norms, and tikanga more generally (Traweek, 1988). In

other words, if one condemns Maori-development research as a closedshop, one must also condemn high-energy physics. These closed-shops are

protected spaces, which can be maintained as long as there are financial

and professional resources for ever more ambitious particle accelerators in

high-energy physics, and political and cultural resources (and over time,

human resources) for Maori Knowledge and Development research.

I would want the protection to be partial only, and have outsiders,

sympathetic or otherwise, involved in assessing the robustness of the

knowledge being produced. Support for indigenous knowledge is often

argued in terms of overcoming colonialism, while support for high-energyphysics is claimed because it extends the frontiers of knowledge. In both

cases, one must have a closer, and no-nonsense, look at the actual

knowledge production.

While my comparison of high-energy physics with Maori research can

be read as a rhetorical ploy, the point about tribal norms remains. Donald

Campbell (1979) has shown that scientific communities need what he calls

tribal norms to bind them together and make the epistemologically

important norms forceful. Competition for reputation would be one such

tribal norm. The next step, for a Third-Waver, is to translate these insights

about the nature and functioning of knowledge-productive arrangements,

into an understanding of what such arrangements of tribal norms and

epistemic work could be. Knowledge production is an intractable prob-

lem,8 and to make it tractable, practical arrangements are necessary. This

must be a key input into any normative theory of expertise, and it should

be taken up as a design challenge.9

The other key input must be about the actual processes and their

outcomes. I suggest that such processes can be viewed as path-dependent

learning,10 and the eventual contribution to path-dependent learning

would be the criterion for the right to be involved. This includes contribu-

tory expertise in the sense Collins and Evans use the term (contributory to

core-set expertise), but is not limited to it. It is important to have such a

broader approach, because the difficult issues are about learning in the

wider world, not about laboratory phenomena as such, which is learning

about the laboratory world (Hacking, 1992). This is clear already within

the experimental paradigm. Experiments that work do so under specific

circumstances. Experiments in a microcosm on the effects of release of

genetically modified organisms on the soil may say much about what

happens in the microcosm, but not necessarily about what happens in thewider world (Cambrosio et al., 1992). When society (and the world) is

taken as the laboratory, it is impossible to do fully controlled experiments

(Krohn & Weyer, 1994). Learning through trial and error occurs, but has

its risks (when the trials are dangerous) and is, epistemologically, limited

because such learning follows a particular learning trajectory.




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In such situations, there may not even be core-sets available to fall

back upon, and claims made by established core-sets may rightfully be

contested. Core-set members must argue for their epistemic rights to

relevant expertise, just as other contestants must do. They may be privi-

leged because of their ability to work within a protected space, but,depending on the issue at hand, this can also disqualify them. Brian

Wynnes well-known study of the Cumbrian shepherds in the aftermath of

Chernobyl can be read this way (Wynne, 1991, 1996).

The definition and pursuit of learning trajectories are often predicated

on partial closure of broader questions. Core-sets become productive when

(and because) a paradigm or dominant problem definition (or dominant

design) closes off foundational debates.11 One challenge, then, is how to

evaluate such closure, including the possibility of breaking it open. If the

black-boxing becomes absolute, the overall processes lose flexibility, partic-ularly in their capacity to respond to the unexpected. The recently chang-

ing division of labour between certified scientists and experience-based

experts (and the professionalization of the latter, especially in the medical

and public health areas) may lead to attempts to open up foundational

issues, often linked to existing so-called deviant views within science. One

example is the debate between holistic and mechanistic views, in which

established science is accused of limiting itself to mechanistic views.12

Thus, the problem of extension is part of the dynamics of closure, of

inclusion and exclusion, of interactions and opening-up, of arrangements

that emerge and may be more or less productive. There may well be good

reasons for having core-sets: social closure can have epistemic advantages.

What such good reasons could be is a broader question than the problem

of extension, and requires what I call socio-epistemic history of science.

Here, I will limit myself to a key aspect: the increasing importance of (new)

natural history. That is where many rights to expertise are being claimed,

and can be found legitimate.

Natural history refers to our attempts to chart the world and its

development. From a major intellectual thrust (with Aristotle, and the

scholars of the 17th and 18th centuries) and practitioners all along, it

became a backwater, pushed aside by experiment-oriented high science.

Since the 19th century, the disciplinary hierarchy in the sciences has been

based on the claim that laboratory sciences (and work under controlled

conditions more generally) are better at producing valid knowledge than

work under non-controlled conditions.13 Over time, the importance of the

controlled-circumstances mode of knowledge production has grown, and

at the expense of relevance to concrete and complex situations. Epistemo-

logically, it is a matter of (always partial) reduction of variability and

heterogeneity; a reduction that is conducive to knowledge production, butcreates a distance to unrestricted practices and their complexity.14

Natural history has been revitalized through the increasing impor-

tance of the environmental sciences. Monitoring, mapping and modelling

the world has become a scientific challenge in its own right, and is pursued

with the help of new information and communication technologies.




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Thanks partly to the competencies acquired from its colonization by high

and restricted science, natural history is striking out in new ways, up to the

use of pattern recognition, in genomics.

The de-colonization movement is joined by a renewed interest in the

value of local knowledge, as of Cumbrian shepherds after Chernobyl(Wynne, 1991, 1996), and of indigenous knowledge (Van der Ploeg,

1993). Farmers knowledge can be seen as local, as well as indigenous, and

is increasingly recognized for its value.15

There is a fine line to be drawn between the recognition of the value

and potential robustness of local and indigenous knowledge, and embrac-

ing any such knowledge because it is an antidote to the colonialism of

western science (compare Turnbull [2000] and Verran [2002]). It is indeed

important to be able to relativize ones reliance on the western/modern

tradition and appreciate what happens elsewhere, but one should not gonative either. Wynne (1996), as well as Van der Ploeg (1993), wrestles with

this issue. To put it briefly, and in my terms: one must require knowledge

claims to have validity elsewhere and else when, even if only in the next

valley of the Andes. Some form of theory, or at least pattern recognition is

necessary to move findings from one location to another, or to apply them

to a future situation. It might well be that this always requires a measure of

restrictedness.

The necessary quality assessment, to counteract the political correct-

ness of local and indigenous knowledge claims, is also applicable to core-

sets with long standing. Their achievements in the past are no guarantee for

their being productive in the future. Closure is a historical achievement,

but not a sufficient basis for a normative theory of expertise.

Productive Arrangements: Hybrid Forums and Contributionsto Collective Learning

If core-sets are not, or not the only, entrance point, what could be an

alternative? There is a strong interest in participation exercises, in con-

sensus conferences and the like. As Collins & Evans (2002) note, these

may solve the problem of legitimacy, but not the problem of extension. To

address the question of extension, and when it is productive in terms of the

epistemic quality of the outcomes, one can re-position such exercises as

hybrid forums (Callon & Rip, 1992), and inquire into the nature and

productivity of such hybrid forums. Their hybridity should not just reflect

the variety of stakeholders, but also recognize the variety of expertise

(already within credentialled science). Using the notion of forum keeps

the epistemic and interactive aspects visible. On the other hand, to create

packaged and portable products for relevant audiences, some convergenceis necessary. As recent background studies have shown, there is a trade-off

between increasing variety and productive convergence.16 Without requi-

site variety, the product would not be sufficiently articulated, and thus not

robust (compare with Rip [1986]). But with too much variety, or just

general messiness, the temporary closure necessary to create a product




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would not be possible. The optimal balance will be specific to the situation,

and may well change over time.

Concrete incarnations of hybrid forums suffer from the problem that

they have to work with a micro-cosmos, collecting spokespersons of

various kinds in a setting, and for a limited time. The basic design principleof intra-mural exercises capture the variety out there, and especially, get

the main contenders together and interacting carries in itself the seeds of

failure. What has become tractable within the confines of the conference

centre or the computer-supported experiment need not solve intractability

in the wider and messier world. This so-called intra-murality trap (Rip,

1999/2001) will be exacerbated by strategic action of participants, includ-

ing their eventual refusal to participate.17

Still, the idea of a hybrid forum is important to get a handle on the

varieties of expertise. Empirically, one also sees learning occurring acrossoccasions, which implies some credentialling of participants, up to the

proto-professionalization of various stakeholders, in particular environ-

mental groups and patient associations.

Who will be allowed to participate and get a hearing in hybrid forums,

in the organized versions, but more importantly, in the diffuse forums

occurring in controversies and other agonistic interactions? In the former

case, institutional considerations will play an important role, so it is

preferable to take the latter, open version as a starting-point. I can then

define contributory expertise as a contribution to learning, or better, tolearning processes over time, rather than in terms of continuity with a

specific core-set (Collins & Evans, 2002: 252): the core-set may not offer

the best context for learning about the issues at hand.

Collins and Evans add interactional and referred expertise to their

typology. These involve mediating skills rather than epistemic contribu-

tions: they are about how contributory expertises, not limited to core-sets,

can be made to work. In fact, their theses 14 (Collin & Evans, 2002: 256,

258) are about such mediating and interactive skills. Still, it is important to

consider them, because they play a part in the overall process.Clearly, we need a better understanding of the dynamics of such

processes. These are processes of agonistic, collective learning, which

hopefully lead to robust outcomes. A productive arrangement then is one

that is conducive to agonistic learning and robust outcomes. Creating

conditions for such learning is not a simple matter. Since learning takes

effort and actors will often try to avoid agonistic interactions, learning will

not occur automatically. Something like a forceful focus is necessary to

set actors in motion (and in interaction) (Rip, 1986).

Apart from the general point that conflicts may then be welcomed asan incentive to learn, rather than that they should be mediated and

massaged away, a further implication is that involvement need not be

limited to those who can show relevant substantial expertise (certified or

not). Actors creating a forceful focus must also be welcomed, because their

presence will (in principle) improve the process and its outcomes.




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In the concrete cases discussed by Collins & Evans (2002), two further

kinds of expertise, having discrimination and being knowledgeable, are

visible, in addition to the ones they identified explicitly. Before I show this,

let me briefly indicate a problem with their evaluation of the first two cases.

They make a clear contrast between the Chernobyl fall-out case, where theCumbrian sheep-farmers had contributory knowledge (a body of knowl-

edge as esoteric as that of any group of qualified scientists [2002: 261])

and thus deserved a hearing, but lacked interactional expertise and so

failed to have impact, and the AIDS treatment case in San Francisco, in

which interactional expertise was present in addition to experience-based

contributory expertise. The gay community presumably possessed a degree

of both. The Cumbrian sheep-farmers are positioned as specialists, and

probably rightly so, because they were making a living on their land. The

gay community, however, was not specializing in AIDS treatment, andtheir spokespersons were translators rather than experience-based experts

(2002: 262). That some of them were receiving such treatment is an

argument for their involvement, but not a sufficient one.

In the early 1950s, thousands of hard-headed businessmen using a

battery additive, tests of which by a National Bureau of Standards scientist

showed it to be ineffective, still clamoured for his dismissal, because as

satisfied users they believed they could not be wrong. Collins & Evans

(2002: 271), when referring to this case, say: the public can be wrong. So

can AIDS activists. The lesson that should be drawn is then not about the

importance of interactional expertise, but about the range of specialist and

non-specialist forms of expertise, and the need to look into the content of

the experiences that might qualify non-credentialled persons as con-

tributors of expertise.18

The next two cases are about demonstrations and how they can sway

the public, rightly or wrongly. Collins & Evans (2002: 263) take them as

experimental demonstrations (the heart of the scientific process) in order

to use them as relevant cases. But they themselves recognize that the

inexpert witnesses could not be tasked with an expert role. On the other

hand, such witnesses do have discrimination (2002: 264). While these

cases cannot therefore show that less extension (decreasing interaction) is

justified, the main message is that these demonstrations were political

ploys, so their outcomes should be looked at critically. This is where

discrimination, as a separate type of expertise, will be important.19

In the AIDS activist case, a further kind of expertise is visible:

knowledgeability about the issue, without specific expertise. Knowledge-

ability provides an entrance ticket, and/or allows participants, accepted for

other reasons, to gain standing as members. The case study by Mercer

(2002), appearing in the same issue of Social Studies of Science as Collins &Evans (2002), offers a clear example because both parties refer to, and rely

upon, knowledgeable expertise, for example when the Oberon Powerline

Investigation Committee builds its case on materials assembled by a

power-line activist. Knowledgeability is also important for the challenge

offered by a Third Wave in Science Studies. Collins and Evans locate the




10/17

contribution of Third-Wave Science Studies as interactional expertise: how

to translate and how to mediate. From my own experience, I would say it is

not just a matter of mediating. Diagnosis also is involved: diagnosis of the

issues, of what is at stake, and thus, of how the science studies scholar can

make a difference. Making a difference requires more than a normativetheory of expertise. One has to involve oneself, become part of the messy

process, and make the compromises that are necessary. To get a hearing,

the science studies scholar must show that s/he is knowledgeable about the

topic. This is what Harry Collins did in his intervention into the Uri Geller

controversy. This is how I have been able to contribute to risk research,

adding a reflexive sociological perspective and getting a hearing because of

my standing as somebody able to discuss the content of risk research

issues. Brian Wynne, of course, has achieved such standing more widely.

Conclusion

While sharing Collins & Evans (2002) interest in a normative theory of

expertise, I have been critical of their focus on core-sets as being too

sociological (reducing the socio-epistemic to a question of membership)

and in a sense naive, because they take the existence of core-sets as given.

I have shown that the core-sets themselves should be evaluated as to their

contribution. The other main issue I have raised is how to recognize

experience-based (or other) expertise at an early stage. Within the limits of

this paper, I was able to suggest how to broaden their approach, but did

not resolve the issue any more than Collins and Evans could.

A key point in broadening Collins and Evans approach was the

identification of a new natural history as the new game in town. In new

natural history, the dominance of core-sets, traditionally linked to labo-

ratory or otherwise restricted approaches, is being undermined in a

variety of ways. This adds a further dimension to the attempt of Collins

and Evans (2002: 26769) to distinguish types of sciences.

The next step towards a normative theory of expertise is to look into

the (emerging and/or designed) arrangements that are conducive to ago-

nistic learning and robust outcomes. Embracing participation, of whatever

kind, is definitely not a solution. It may be that the public can be wrong

(2002: 271), but when (and how) do you know that the public is wrong?

This could be a prima facie argument for more extension (because the

core-set can overlook relevant experience), but also for less (because it is

not easy to identify the pockets of expertise within a public which might

well be wrong).

My discussion of learning in agonistic situations suggests to go with

such processes and grasp opportunities for improvement, rather thandesign a good process beforehand. In other words, quality assurance of

the process becomes more important than a better blueprint at the

beginning. But there will be meta-learning about the relative merits of

various arrangements. (Even if this will not be stable, because actors will

strategize on the basis of insight into the working of such arrangements.)




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I criticized (constructively) the typology of expertise that Collins and

Evans offered. In particular, interactional expertise must be more than

mediation between experts and (so-called) lay persons (compare with

Gorman [2002] for a similar point, using the notion of trading zones).

Discrimination and knowledgeability are important further types of expert-ise: these relate to a general understandings of the issues and the ability to

make critical contributions. Such expertise is what critical participants in a

controversy acquire during the controversy: they become knowledgeable.

Thus, one cannot define and decide access in terms of present com-

petencies. Competencies evolve, if the right contexts are provided. The

definition of a right to be involved as expert must take this into account.

The Third Wave of Science Studies has been present all along, even if it

was not always visible in the pages of Social Studies of Science. Thus, Collins

and Evans threw a small stone in a big pond. It could still make big waves.But two cautionary comments are in order.

One is that our kind of Third-Wavers are not alone anymore. Political

scientists study expertise, and more often than not they have important

things to say (compare with Hisschemoller et al. [2001] and Guston

[2001b]). Economists of various persuasion, but in particular the new

economics of science (Dasgupta & David, 1994; Mirowski & Sent, 2002),

are rediscovering the phenomena analysed by sociology of scientific knowl-

edge, and might carry the day because of their status and assertiveness,

and their willingness to model and create normative theories.

The other is about the importance of interaction with more or less

reflective actors out there, in the wider world. A normative theory of

expertise, even when perfect, is to no avail if it has no impact on actors and

their interactions. To achieve such an impact requires compromises, like

following the norms of another tribe. Such processes could be studied as

well, and become part of an integral theory of expertise.

Notes

1. There is the tactic of positioning themselves as offering just one approach to the ThirdWave: we will indicate one way to start to build a normative theory of expertise . . .

There are, no doubt, many other ways to go about such an exercise, but . . . providing

an example . . . is at least a start (2002: 238). And later: No doubt other approaches

are possible . . . but we have chosen a different analytical strategy (2002: 242). In

presenting themselves in such an uncharacteristically modest manner, they immunize

themselves against substantial criticism, arguing that there are other and better

alternatives. If commentators come up with such alternatives (and I will do so later),

Collins and Evans can say: thank you, youre enriching the discussion we wanted to

start up. But they also make claims about the deficiencies of other approaches, as part

of their argument about the need for a Third Wave of Science Studies (2002: 236, 238,

27681). This is in some ways a polemical paper, they say (2002: 237), and so allowthemselves to position others as they see fit. They apologize to all . . . whose work we

caricature (2002: 237), as if this makes the caricature more palatable. This second

rhetorical strategy creates problems for commentators like me who thought of

themselves as doing Third Wave Science Studies before Collins and Evans coined the

term. What to do when you read about yourself (as author of the Constructive

Technology Assessment [CTA] approach): The CTA approach is explicitly




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sociological, and is closely related to the Second Wave of Science Studies (2002: 279)?

Protest that CTA emphatically includes analysis of the contents of technological

developments, opens up complexities that actors may not always see and offers reflexive

tools to handle such complexity? Whatever you do has now been positioned as a

struggle for admission into the charmed circle of Third Wave Science Studies drawn by

Collins and Evans. There is more rhetoric in the paper, for example the use of we as

referring to the authors, but shifting to we, science studies scholars, or even we,

members of the public (and back again). For example, on page 236, at the bottom:

We [the authors] think we [science studies scholars] need to start pursuing Studies of

Expertise and Experience . . . [contribution of Sociology of Scientific Knowledge].

Our question is: . . . by then it is unclear whose question it is. With the little experiment

of replacing the second we by you, the patronizing element becomes explicit. In

other places, the usage of we is made explicit, for example on page 253: We (that is,

sociologists of scientific knowledge) claim the right to disagree about this last

judgement [of radiation scientists saying that Cumbrian sheep farmers are not

experts].

2. Normative theory is used here (by Collins and Evans, and by me) in the same way as

economists distinguish normative economics, which allows identification of an

optimum, and descriptive economics. The link with discussions about (lack of)

normativity and politics of science studies, featured also in the pages of this journal,

will not be discussed explicitly.

3. Interestingly, there are all sorts of attempts at informal and formal certification of

experience-based expertise. Spokespersons of patient groups become recognized, and

have to legitimize their representation. Practitioners of various kinds are invited to

participate in extended peer review, but are informally selected on the basis of whether

they will actually contribute, or at least not disrupt the proceedings. Traditional healers

in South Africa (and elsewhere, I presume) create associations and have entrance

requirements; as well as try to distantiate themselves from disreputable practices of

witchcraft.

4. Of many examples, I mention David Gustons analysis of serviceable truths here,

because his approach is very close to Collins and Evans idea of a Third Wave: A

realistic study of science in politics must be constructivist. But can a constructivist

approach provide more precise guidance for best practice in constructing serviceable

truths? (Guston, 2001a: 104).

5. Weinberg (1967: 74). He borrowed the term baroque and the idea that there must be

links to other fields to counteract baroqueness from John von Neumann discussing

mathematics. Lakatoss suggestion is a footnote to his claim that sometimes

philosophers statute law (a normative theory) is necessary to correct scientificpractices (Lakatos, 1978: 137). For the issue of expertise and a Third Wave of Science

Studies, which joins Collins and Evans and me, his further remarks in Volume 2

(Lakatos, 1980: 109110), are interesting, as he emphasizes a critical respect for the

articulated as well as a democratic respect for the layman. In a footnote he adds:

Educated laymen, not uneducated sociologists of science. Lakatos is not an easy ally!

6. Collins and Evans confess that their paper stands or falls on an agreement to play the

Western science language game (note 27, p. 286). I think stepping outside that

language game is important to understand experience, knowledge, and expertise

(compare also Watson-Verran & Turnbull [1995]).

7. Here (and elsewhere in these comments), I draw on Rip (2002), an essay written on

the occasion of the 250th anniversary of a Dutch scientific society, HollandscheMaatschappij der Wetenschappen. References for the New Zealand situation (and for later

points I make) can be found there.

8. As I phrased it (for an audience of bureaucrats and policy advisers) in Rip

(1999/2001): The intellectual achievements of science are built on . . . a compromise.

Consider the intractable problem of formulating knowledge claims with universal

validity, and proving them, when one cannot do more than experiments of limited




13/17

scope, in certain places and at certain times. Still, an edifice of scientific knowledge has

been built on these precarious foundations.

9. I use design here both as an intentional activity with a product to be implemented,

and as a process of de facto design in which new practices, procedures, norms and

institutions emerge. Such dual use of the concept is analogous to the way Henry

Mintzberg et al. (1998) discuss strategy: intentional strategy, developed as such and to

be implemented with some effort (if at all), but also what they call pattern strategy,

the goals and approaches implicit in the actions and interactions as they occur, and

which can be, but need not be, made explicit and reflected upon. The methodologies of

science can be seen as socio-epistemic strategies, and they have evolved as pattern

strategies: part of productive practices and interactions, and then reflected upon, by

practitioners and by philosophers. A question for the Third Wave of Science Studies is

then about the quality of the reflections of practitioners. Will these be just folk theories

to be critically assessed? But, as noted, we want to accept experience-based expertise.

The problem of extension occurs also within the Third Wave of Science Studies!

10. The idea of a learning trajectory is clear in how Peter Lipton (1991) discusses inference

to the best explanation. Closure of the quest is a practical matter. Iterations between

preliminary understanding and first attempts at control often converge to a stable

alignment between working experiments and scientific understanding based upon them

(Collins, 1985; Rip, 1982).

11. Following Yehuda Elkana (1978), in a discussion of realism and relativism, such two-

tier thinking (by analysts and reflective practitioners), and the two-tier phenomena and

processes that occur, indicate a vertical closure: an overarching or foundational tier is

black-boxed so as to make ongoing work, action and interaction possible in the other

tier. This reasoning applies to routines and rule-sets, and to cultural frames in general.

12. For example, David Mercer (2002: 218) shows that opponents of exposure to electric

and magnetic fields call upon ecological rather than mechanistic approaches and link

this with an argument about electric and magnetic fields being unnatural. The

electricity companies, in contrast, emphasized that such exposures were a natural part

of everyday life (2002: 210). Change agents have a choice between emphasizing basic

epistemic differences or accommodating to established approaches. The latter choice is

visible, even in the case of movements for complementary and alternative medicine,

which arguably suppose a different foundation of medical and health care than that of

regular medicine (Hess, 2003). Collins and Evans discuss Steven Epsteins (1996)

analysis of AIDS activists in San Francisco as showing how these non-certified experts

gained an entree to the scientific core (1996: 262). They wonder if the necessity of

mimicry is not too severe a constraint (1996: 264), but this question relates to the

campaigning, rather than to epistemic issues.13. There is a status aspect as well. The epistemic advantage of reducing variability was

combined with the social and political advantage of excluding deviants; that is,

excluding actors and approaches not acceptable to establishments. The second half of

the 17th century was a turning point, when earlier variety (including reformist and

revolutionary approaches) was reduced in order to have privileged institutions: a Royal

Society in the UK and an Academie des Sciences in France. Social distancing strategies

and exclusions created high sciences, linked to establishments (royal or otherwise),

and availed themselves of what Thomas Kuhn was to call paradigms, useful in policing

others. Low sciences, on the other hand, were open to whatever appeared to be

interesting and useful to practitioners in relation to a variety of audiences, from the

fairs and markets to the newly emerging industries.14. Pickstones (2000: 209) overall diagnosis is similar to mine: natural history is often left

out of science and relegated as mere information. I have argued for a wide view of

natural history, and for placing this descriptive, classificatory way of knowing at the

heart of the scientific enterprise, as a cultural achievement on which analytical and

experimental modes are built, and one which remains a major way of dealing with our

world.




14/17

15. Workable combinations evolve, for example in the acceptance of farmers contributions

in new agricultural practices we study in an ongoing project: the experiential

knowledge of the farmers [in Friesland] works, even though it had not yet been

scientifically understood how it works. This [was] an effective storyline. As a

consequence, scientific knowledge was depicted as lagging behind and incapable of

understanding farming in practice. This also allowed a compromise solution in thedebate about levels of fertilization: prevailing scientific models were valid when higher

quantities of artificial fertilizer were applied, but not when lower quantities were used.

A new storyline emerged: different sources of knowledge are valid in different

circumstances. This storyline made it possible for actors belonging to the different

groups to work together because it implied that each group had valid and useful

knowledge, albeit for different situations (Eshuis & Stuiver, 2002).

16. Callon et al. (2001), Rip et al. (2000), Bal et al. (2002) and ongoing yet unpublished

work on evaluations of new medical technologies by Kirejczyk et al. (University of

Twente).

17. In Rip (1986), I describe two meetings in the 1970s on risks of a herbicide in these

terms. The experience of the participatory technology assessment exercise on the

introduction of genetically modified plants in the environment, organized by the

Wissenschaftszentrum in Berlin, reinforces the point about strategic action. While the

structured discussions were productive, the environmental groups abruptly decided to

step out so as to avoid having the eventual conclusions being attributed also to them,

which would hamper their freedom of action in the wider world. In pursuing their own

interests in this way, they also (inadvertently or intentionally) undermined the legitimity

of the exercise, which was based on getting the contending parties together (Van den

Daele et al., 1997). As Gorman (2002: 934) mentions in passing, exit strategies also

occur in agonistic interactions among credentialed experts.

18. This point is also important for their discussion of Benvenistes claim about the power

of zero-solutions, under the heading understanding interaction. The main message

appears to be that core-sets are not always reluctant to include outsiders (2002: 264).

For cold fusion: suddenly there were experts everywhere (2002: 264). For

Benvenistes case, the argument is not about his knowledge claim, but about possible

deception. There, professional magicians can indeed be accepted as experts. Collins

and Evans thus fall into a (self-created) trap. They want to distance themselves from

the position that scientists should not ask stage-magicians to help out, as this would

abandon their responsibility to guard quality (truth?). But their argument that stage-

magicians have [relevant] experience-based expertise is flawed, because the magicians

expertise is about how to deceive an audience, not about testing for effects of very

diluted solutions, which was the question at issue. So they do not belong to the coreset, even if they have long experience (2002: 265). This is a contrast with Collins and

Evans earlier emphasis on continuity with the core-sets expertise (2002: 252).

19. The notion of discrimination is first brought up for the sheep farmers who had (local)

discrimination. Then, a distinction is made between local and ubiquitous discrimination

(2002: 259), which reads as saving the scientific enterprise by allowing it to have

ubiquitous discrimination (compare also with page 278).

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Arie Rip was educated as a chemist and a philosopher, and was a key figurein setting up science, technology and society (STS) courses and research inthe Netherlands in the 1970s. His research (at the University of Leiden and




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the University of Amsterdam) was focused on science dynamics, bridgingsociology of science and science policy studies. His STS interests led tostudies of controversies and to developing the approach of constructivetechnology assessment. Since 1987, he has been full professor of Philosophy

of Science and Technology at the University of Twente. He contributes toscience and technology policy studies internationally and is interested inissues of expertise and indigenous knowledge.

Address: Universiteit Twente BBT, Postbus 217, 7500 AE Enschede, TheNetherlands; email: [email protected]


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